CTC Sentinel Vol 2 Issue 9

8/8/2019 CTC Sentinel Vol 2 Issue 9

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In a video aired on ABC Newsin June 2007, Aghan Talibancommander Mansour Dadullahis shown speaking to a group o

around 300 masked men. The men arepresented as suicide bombers about togo on missions in Western countries, inparticular to the United States, Canada,the United Kingdom and Germany. 1The video created considerable mediaattention, but was soon dismissedas jihadist bravado rather thanrepresenting a genuine threat. Two yearsater it was aired, the Aghan Taliban haveyet to put Dadullahs words into action.

The Aghan Taliban movement haschanged considerably since it was irstormed in southern Aghanistan in 1994,and it has been described by some scholarsas an integrated part o the global jihadistmovement.2 Aghan Taliban leaders

1 Inside the Taliban Graduation, ABC News, June 28,

2007.

2 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The

requently use al-Qaìda-style antWestern rhetoric, and insurgents havendorsed suicide bombing as a tacticphenomenon previously unknown iAghanistan. Moreover, the AghaTalibans most immediate enemies arthe United States and its allies, whthey claim have occupied their countrsince 2001. They do not shun attackinand killing oreignerscivilian as weas militaryinside Aghanistan. Is only a matter o time beore the AghaTaliban start engaging more directly iinternational terrorism?3

Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Aghanistan (London: Hurs

2007), p. 13.

3 As a starting point, it is essential to distinguish betwe

the various layers o the Aghan insurgency. The Agha

Taliban leadership (Mullah Omar and his shura counc

also reerred to as the Quettashura) gives general direction

and speaks on behal o the organization, while local com

manders in Aghanistan and in the tribal areas o Pakista

carry out militant activities in the Talibans name, ote

with a high degree o autonomy. Foreign militant network

such as the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaìda suppo

Are the Aghan Talian Involvedin International Terrorism?By Anne Stenersen

Contents

FEATURE ARTICLE

1 Are the Aghan Talian Involved in

International Terrorism?

By Anne Stenersen

REpoRTS

5 The Insurgent-Narcotic Nexus in

Helmand Province

By Catain Michael Erwin, U.S. Army

8 The Expansion Strategy o Al-Qaìda

in the Araian PeninsulaBy Gregry D. Jhnsen

11 A Prole o Pakistans

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

By Ari Jamal

14 The Failure o Sala-Jihadi

Insurgent Movements in the Levant

By Bilal Y. Saab

18 The Dangerous Ideas o the

Neo-Zarqawist Movement

By Murad Batal al-Shishani

20 The July 17 Jakarta Suicide Attacks

and the Death o Noordin Top

By Nr Huda Ismail

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

24 CTC Sentinel Sta & Contacts

SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9

Aout the CTC SentinelThe Cmbating Terrrism Center is an

indeendent educatinal and research

institutin based in the Deartment ScialSciences at the United States Military Academy,

West pint. The CTC Sentinel harnesses

the Centers glbal netwrk schlars and

ractitiners t understand and cnrnt

cntemrary threats sed by terrrism and

ther rms litical vilence.

The views exressed in this rert are thse the authrs and nt the U.S. Military Academy,the Deartment the Army, r any ther agency the U.S. Gvernment.

C o M B A T I N G T E R R o R I S M C E N T E R A T W E S T p o I N T

o B J E C T I V E . R E L E V A N T . R I G o R o U S

CTC SENTINEL

Aghan Taliban walk through a bazaar in Quetta, Pakistan in 2005. - Photo by Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images


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This article assesses the likelihoodo the Aghan Taliban carrying outterrorist attacks in the homelands oNATO countries that are militarilyengaged in Aghanistan.4 It argues thatwhile individual insurgent commandershave issued threats to attack the West,the senior leaders o the Aghan Talibanare currently uninterested in pursuingsuch a strategy. While this may bedue to a number o actors, this articlestresses that such a venture couldeasily jeopardize the Aghan Talibanleaderships sanctuaries in Pakistan.At the same time, it cannot be excludedthat such attacks could be carried out by lower echelons o the network or byindividual sympathizers, especially i the opportunity arises. The BaitullahMehsud-led action o the PakistaniTaliban has already shown willingness

to exploit such opportunities, makingthem a greater immediate terrorismthreat to Western countries than theAghan Taliban.5

Attacks on Westerners Inside Aghanistan

The Aghan Talibans insurgentcampaign uses a mixture o guerrillawarare and terrorist tactics. Mostattacks have targeted Aghan policeand security orces, international

the Aghan Taliban insurgency, but they typically have

wider agendas and carry out attacks in their own name.

Moreover, in this article it has been assumed that the o-cial views o the senior Aghan Taliban leadership are

those that are expressed through the ocial websites,

communiqus and spokesmen o the Islamic Emirate o

Aghanistan. Mullah Omar himsel stated in 2007: The

comments o the Islamic Emirate are those which are

released by our ocial spokesmen and our al-Emarah

web page. For more, see Mukhtar A. Khan, Quetta:

The Headquarters o the Aghan Taliban, CTC Sentinel

2:5 (2009).

4 For other studies discussing the internationalization

o local conficts, see shild Kjk, Thomas Hegghammer,

Annika Hansen et al.,Restoring Peace or Provoking Terror-

ism? Exploring the Links between Multilateral Military Inter-

ventions and International Terrorism (Kjeller: NorwegianDeence Research Establishment, 2003); Brynjar Lia

and shild Kjk, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support

Networks, and Their Host States - The Case o the Algerian

GIA in Europe 1993-2000 (Kjeller: Norwegian Deence

Research Establishment, 2001); Matthew Levitt, Could

Hamas Target the West? Studies in Conict and Terrorism

30:11 (2007): pp. 925-945.

5 For more on the European plot that allegedly involved

the Baitullah Mehsud-led Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,

see Fernando Reinares, A Case Study o the January

2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona, CTC Sentinel2:1

(2009).

troops, and Aghan civilians. Foreigncivilians inside Aghanistan have alsobeen subjected to attacks. This includestargeted attacks on oreign diplomatsand NGO workers, but also terroristattacks against places requented byoreigners. The Aghan Taliban usethese attacks to achieve political andpropaganda aims and to support thewider insurgent eort. For example,the Aghan Taliban have claimed thatdiplomatic missions rom NATO statesare targeted because they have troopsstationed in Aghanistan. Ater the bombing o the German Embassy inKabul in 2008, a Taliban spokesman

justiied it by saying, The Germanshave orces in the north o Aghanistanand they are involved in the killing oinnocent Aghans. The spokesman alsothreatened that the Taliban will targetall those countries that have orces in

Aghanistan.6

The Aghan Taliban have also expressedenmity toward the West or otherreasons than the military occupationo their country. Countries that areperceived as insulting Islam or theProphet Muhammad, such as Denmarkand the Netherlands, have been directlythreatened.7 The Netherlands receivedseveral threats in 2008 ater a Dutchpolitician, Geert Wilders, released theIslam-critical movie called Fitna. TheAghan Taliban leaderships statements

encouraged all Muslims o the worldto take revenge against the insults.8At the same time, however, the Aghan

6 Two Dead in Explosion Near German Embassy,Der

Spiegel, January 17, 2009.

7 In 2005, a series o 12 cartoons representing the

Prophet Muhammad appeared in the Danish Newspaper

Jyllands-Posten, which sparked a wave o protests across

the Muslim world.

8 Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, The Eternal Enemies

o Islam Have Committed Another Historic Crime!

April 1, 2008.

Taliban said these retaliations would be limited to attacking Dutch soldiersinside Aghanistan, and they alsoclaimed to have carried out actualattacks to this end:

On our part we pledge revengeAllah willingon these Dutchsoldiers with the value o theirskulls, who came to our land asoccupiers and where most arepresent in Uruzgan Province. Thekilling o two o them yesterdayand the destruction o theirtanks are a part o the series orevenge...9

Overall, there is little doubt thatthe Aghan Taliban are hostile tothe West and that they do not shunattacking oreignerscivilian as well

as militaryinside Aghanistan. Yet,attacking Western targets outside oAghanistans conlict zone is a dierentmatter.

Specic Threats and Plots to Attack in Western

Countries

Mullah Dadullah and his brotherMansour Dadullah were the AghanTaliban leaders who most explicitlythreatened to take the battle outsideAghanistan s borders. Mullah Dadullah,who was a member o the AghanTalibans shura council and commander

in southern Aghanistan, was killedin May 2007. He was succeeded byhis brother, Mansour Dadullah, whosubsequently appeared in a series ointerviews and propaganda videosMansour Dadullah, or instance, wasthe leader who threatened to dispatchsuicide bombers to Western countriesin June 2007. 10 Interestingly, MansourDadullah was sacked rom the Talibanin December 2007, oicially because hereused to obey the chain o command.11

9 Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, Statement rom the

Shura Council on the Production o a Film Desecratingthe Quran by a Member o Parliament in Holland, March

30, 2008; Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, Heavy Casu

alties Were Inficted on the Dutch Forces in Uruzgan (in

revenge or the lm Fitna by Geert Wilders), March 31

2008; Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, Killing 8 Dutch

Occupiers, Including the Son o the Commander o the

Dutch Forces, in the Series o Revenge Operations in Re-

taliation or the Publishing o the Harmul Film Fitna,

April 21, 2008.

10 Inside the Taliban Graduation.

11 There was speculation that he was trying to establish

an independent power base with support rom his al-


The Aghan Taliban

leadership is probably

reluctant to carry out

actions that would

increase the pressure on its

sanctuaries in Pakistan.


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The exact nature o the relationship between the Dadullah brothers and al-Qaìda is not known. 12 Mullah Dadullahsstatements, and those o his brotherMansour, have on several occasionscontradicted the oicial statements othe Aghan Taliban leadership. TheDadullah brothers were also known torun their own media campaign (througha local media agency called UmarStudio), indicating a certain desire to actautonomously. Ultimately, there wereew indications that Mansour Dadullahhad the actual will or capabilities toollow up on his threat. In the two yearsater the video was issued, no irm linkshave been established between arrestedterrorist suspects in Western countriesand Dadullah or the Aghan Taliban.

Another example o threats against the

West was a video aired on al-Arabiyain November 2008. 13 The video showeda local Aghan Taliban commandernicknamed Farouq, who claimedresponsibility or killing 10 Frenchsoldiers in an ambush in Kabul Provinceon August 18, 2008. He warned Francethat they should withdraw romAghanistan or they will hear ourresponse in Paris. 14

The local commanders threats to carryout attacks in Paris appeared to be bravado. In December 2008, however,

explosives were ound in a departmentstore in Paris, and a group callingitsel the Aghan Revolutionary Frontclaimed responsibility. In a letter, thegroup stated,

Send the message to your presidentthat he must withdraw his troopsrom our country beore the endo February 2009 or else we will

Qaìda allies, and it was eared that he would become a

rival to Mullah Omar. See Dadullah Sacking Highlights

Taliban Rits,Janes Terrorism and Security Monitor, Jan-

uary 16, 2008.12 There are ew details o this relationship in open

sources. It can be noted, however, that besides Shaykh

Muhammed Yasir, Mullah Dadullah and his brother

Mansour are the only high-ranking Taliban members

who have been eatured by al-Qaìdas propaganda

agency al-Sahab.

13 Taliban Threatens to Carry Out Operations in Paris

Unless France Withdraws rom Aghanistan, al-Ar-

abiya, November 18, 2008; Taliban Video Warning to

France, Reuters, November 17, 2008.

14 Taliban Kill 10 French Troops in Aghanistan, Reu-

ters, August 19, 2008.

take action in your capitalistdepartment stores and this time,without warning. 15

It is not publicly known whether anymembers o the alleged group werearrested, but in any case there wereew indications that the group hadany organizational links to the AghanTaliban or al-Qaìda. As analysts noted,the language in the letter as well asthe groups modus operandi seemed toresemble let-wing activists more thanmilitant Islamists.16 As ar as is known,neither the Aghan Taliban leadershipnor Farouqs group issued any urthercomments in the case. The ailureo the Aghan Taliban leadership topublicly reute Farouqs statement, orstatements rom the Dadullah brothers,is not necessarily indicative o their

tacit approval; the Aghan Talibanleadership generally avoids criticizingmembers in public to avoid uelingrumors o splits or disagreementswithin the movement. 17

Pakistani Talian a Dierent Case

The Pakistani Taliban, which is distinctrom the Aghan Taliban, has a record oinvolvement in international terrorism.Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Baitullah Mehsud until his recentdeath, has made explicit threats toattack the West, and it has even claimed

responsibility or such attacks. Whilenot part o the Aghan Taliban, it isuseul to compare the TTPs claimswith those o Aghan Taliban militants.Some o the TTPs claims have beenunsubstantiated, such as in April2009 when Baitullah Mehsud claimedresponsibility or a irearms attackon a U.S. immigration center in NewYork State, carried out by a Vietnamesenational.18 A more interesting case isthe Barcelona plot, revealed in January2008, when a dozen Pakistanis andtwo Indians were arrested in Spain and

accused o plotting to attack Barcelonas

15 Explosives Found in Paris Store, BBC, December

16, 2008.

16 Explosives Found in Paris Department Store,Times

Online, December 17, 2008.

17 The ocial sacking o Mansour Dadullah by the Tali-

ban leadership in December 2007 was an exceptional

case.

18 Pakistani Taliban Chie Claims U.S. Shooting, Reu-

ters, April 13, 2009; FBI Rejects Mehsuds Claim or NY

Attack,Dawn, April 4, 2009.

public transportation system.19 In avideotaped interview released in Augustthat year, TTP spokesman Maulvi Omartook responsibility or the plot. He saidthat the men were under pledge toBaitullah Mehsud and indicated thathe attacks were motivated by Spainsmilitary presence in Aghanistan. 20

There were other indications o links between the arrested militants anthe TTP. Notably, one o the groupsmembers claimed to have receivedtraining in Waziristan and Aghanistanas well as having met with the TTPsleader.21

The Barcelona case indicates that theTTP leadership is willing to be associatedwith, and possibly also directly involvedin, international terrorist plots. Thisis in contrast to the Aghan Taliban

which have not yet been associated withany plots to launch attacks in Westerncountries.

Capailities and Opportunities

An important reason why the AghanTaliban leadership is not taking their battle to Western countries may bthe lack o capability. Unlike groupssuch as the Algerian Armed IslamicGroup (GIA) or al-Qaìda, which haveboth staged a series o terrorist attacksin Europe, the Taliban do not havestrong and active support networks in

the West. Most o its oreign suppornetworks are believed to be locatedin the Gul region and in Pakistan.2

Nevertheless, they could theoreticallycoordinate with the al-Qaìda networkor other oreign militants present inPakistan and Aghanistan to carryout attacks on their behal; it appearshowever, that they have decidedagainst this strategy. For example, theIslamic Jihad Union (IJU) has attractedvolunteers rom Europe who havecarried out operations in Aghanistanon behal o the Haqqani network. 2

In the most publicized incident, a

19 For a detailed analysis o this plot and its internationa

links, see Reinares.

20 NEFA Exclusives: Video Interviews with Top Paki

stani Taliban Spokesman Maulvi Omar, NEFA Foun

dation, August 29, 2008.

21 Reinares.

22 Talibans Foreign Support Vexes U.S., Wall Stree

Journal, June 1, 2009.

23 Einar Wigen, Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaidas Key to the

Turkic World?(Kjeller: Norwegian Deence Research Es

tablishment, 2009).



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German national o Turkish origin,Cneyt Citci, carried out a suicideattack against a U.S. military base inKhost.24 The attack was commended by Jalaluddin Haqqani himsel,illustrating the direct link between theoreign militants and the local group. 25It appears that i the Haqqani networkwanted to send militants to carry outattacks in Europe, it would have enoughcandidates. Notably, the Sauerlandcella group o German nationals whoplotted to carry out terrorist attacks inGermany in 2006was said to have tieswith the IJU and had received trainingin North Waziristan.26 Still, there wereno indications that they were acting on behal o the Aghan Taliban or otherlocal groups, despite the act that theAghan Taliban have identiied Germanyas one o its main enemies.

It appears that while Aghan militantsmay use oreign volunteers to ight intheir local guerrilla war, they seemless interested in using them to carryout attacks abroad. When SirajuddinHaqqani was asked about the oreignershe trainedin particular the militantsrom the IJUhe stated that weare concerned with the war here inAghanistan, and preer them to carryout attacks here. 27 In another interviewhe was even more explicit, saying:

We have asked our allies whetherliving in Pakistan or any otherpart o the world to carry outattacks against Americans only inAghanistan and not in any othercountry. Our policy is that wewould not interere in the aairs oany other country whether it is anIslamic or non-Islamic country. 28

This also appears to be the policy o theAghan Taliban leadership. In 2008,the oicial spokesman o the AghanTaliban, Zabihullah Mujahid, stated

that the Mujahideen o the IslamicEmirate are based in Aghanistan, the

24 Germanys First Suicide Bomber in Aghanistan?

Der Spiegel, March 15, 2008.

25 Video: Aghanistan: Veteran Mujahadeen Dees

West, Adnkronos International, undated.

26 Petter Nesser, Lessons Learned rom the September

2007 German Terrorist Plot, CTC Sentinel1:4 (2008).

27 Interview with Taliban Commander Sirajuddin

Haqqani, NEFA Foundation, August 18, 2008.

28 Talibans Siraj Haqqani Shrugs O $5m Bounty,

APax Insider, July 4, 2009.

leadership is in Aghanistan, and ouractivities are inside Aghanistan. 29Notably, the Aghan Taliban havealso distanced themselves rom al-Qaìdas global terrorist campaign.In an interview in 2009, ZabihullahMujahid said, Taliban is one thing andal Qaeda is another. They are globalwe are just in the region. 30 It should be noted that the Aghan Taliban

leadership has not oicially denouncedal-Qaìda or its activities, and they havestated that al-Qaìda and other oreignMuslims are welcome to join theiright in Aghanistan.31 Nevertheless, itappears that the Aghan Taliban leadersthemselves do not wish to be associatedwith al-Qaìdas global jihadiststrategy.

One might argue that it is merely a

question o ideology and traditions.The Aghan Taliban leadership,however, is not static and unchangeable;the endorsement o suicide bombingas a tactic ater 2001 is one exampleo that. A more accurate answer may be ound by looking at the incentivesand disincentives the Aghan Talibanleadership may have or carrying out aterrorist attack in the West.

Incentives and Disincentives

A possible incentive or the AghanTaliban to plot attacks in the West would

be to create a Madrid eect. Thisreers to the terrorist attack carried outby militant Islamists in Madrid in 2004.The attack was executed shortly beorethe Spanish elections, and probablycontributed to the opposition partys

29 Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zabiullah Muja-

hid, NEFA Foundation, February 1, 2008.

30 Transcript: Aghan Taliban Spokesman Discusses

War, CNN, May 5, 2009.

31 Agha Jan Mutasim: The Struggle in Aghanistan and

Opportunities or Dialogue, al-Jazira, May 10, 2009.

victory because it had promised to pulSpanish orces out o Iraq. A documenwas circulated on jihadist websites priorto the attack arguing in avor o sucha strategy, and it is possible that thedocument had inspired the attackers. 32

Similarly, the Aghan Taliban leadershipis ully aware o the disagreementsand ault lines within NATO, and theyunderstand that in several Europeancountries there is low public supportor the war. The Aghan Talibanhave issued statements33 to Europeanaudiences encouraging them to stopsupporting their countrys politics andto stop serving Americas interests. 3

Nevertheless, one might wonder whythe Taliban have not sought to betterexploit NATOs weak points.

The answer may lie in the act thathe Aghan Taliban have strongdisincentives or carrying out attacksabroad. Although not stated directlythe Aghan Taliban leadership isprobably reluctant to carry out activitiesthat would increase the pressure on itssanctuaries in Pakistan. Since 2001the Pakistani government has beenallied with the United States in the waron terrorism, but at the same timeit is widely believed that the AghanTaliban have enjoyed unoicial supporrom within Pakistans territory. This

might explain why the presence oAghan Taliban leaders on Pakistansoil has been somewhat tolerated byPakistan since 2001, while a number oal-Qaìda members have been activelypursued and arrested. In 2004, thePakistan Army started to crack down on

32 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, Jihadi Stra

tegic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preced

ing the Madrid Bombings, Studies in Conict and Terror

ism 27:5 (2004): pp. 355-375.

33 It should be noted that the Talibans propaganda doe

not resemble jihadist strategic literature with its quasi

neutral analyses and specic strategy recommendationsRather, the propaganda aims at justiying the Aghan

Talibans actions in retrospect, and it quotes sources se

lectively to convey the impression that a Taliban victory

is inevitable.

34 The IJU and al-Qa ida have been even more explicit

encouraging people in Germany to vote or politicians in

the upcoming elections who want to pull German troops

out o Aghanistan, and also threatening actual attacks

For example, the propaganda uses the low public suppor

or the war in Germany as proo that NATO is about to

collapse; it is not written as an explicit recommendation

to its ollowers to carry out attacks inside Germany.


It appears that while

Aghan militants may use

oreign volunteers to fght

in their local guerrilla war,

they seem less interested

in using them to carry out

attacks abroad.


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Pakistani militants in the tribal areas,initially because they were suspected ohiding international terrorists but morerecently because they have becomea security threat to the regime itsel.Today, Pakistani authorities are underincreasing pressure to do more aboutthe Aghan Talibans sanctuaries aswell, especially since these sanctuariesare seen as an impediment to the U.S.and NATO counterinsurgency campaignin Aghanistan.35

The Aghan Taliban have consistentlydenied having any organizationalailiation with the Pakistani Taliban,or to have any ambition outsideAghanistan at all. 36 Under the currentcircumstances, to start engaging ininternational terrorism would be toorisky or its overall strategy. As long

as the Aghan Taliban are experiencingrelative success with their presentstrategy, there is a lack o incentive toventure into new territory.

Anne Stenersen is a Research Fellow

and Ph.D. candidate with the Terrorism

Research Group at the Norwegian Deence

Research Establishment (FFI). She holds

an M.Phil. in Arabic studies rom the

University o Oslo and is the author o the

book Al-Qaidas Quest or Weapons oMass Destruction: The History Behindthe Hype. Her current research ocuses

on Islamist insurgencies in Aghanistanand Pakistan. She would like to thank Dr.

Thomas Hegghammer or his assistance

with this article.

35 Talibans Sanctuary Bases in Pakistan Must be Elim-

inated, RAND Corporation, June 9, 2008.

36 Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zabiullah Muja-

hid, NEFA Foundation, February 1, 2008.

The Insurgent-NarcoticNexus in HelmandProvince

By Catain Michael Erwin, U.S. Army

for the past four years,

there has beena rising level o collusion betweeninsurgents and narcotic powerbrokersin Aghanistans Helmand Province.Between 2002 and 2005, the AghanTaliban-led insurgency in southernAghanistan ocused its attentionprimarily in Kandahar and Uruzganprovinces.1 Coalition orces and AghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) largelylet the poppy ields alone in Helmand;in return, Helmand powerbrokersresisted opportunities to attackcoalition orces. Militants launched

sporadic attacks, but nothing similarto the level o violence in Helmandtoday. The violence and casualty ratesin Helmand currently surpass any otherprovince in Aghanistan.2 Moreover,despite the highest international trooppresence o anywhere in Aghanistan,the drug trade originating in Helmandis still a leading source o revenue orthe insurgency in the southern part othe country.3 With a limited numbero troops and resources, the hope orHelmand Province, and indeed theentire region, rests on the ability to

break down this relationship, known asthe insurgent-narcotic nexus.

This article will briely outline theproblems caused by past eorts o poppyeradication, relay recent successulcounter-nexus operations in HelmandProvince, and deine the challengesahead. Furthermore, it will explainthe signiicance o undermining theinsurgent-narcotic nexus to improvethe prospects or mission success inAghanistan.

A brie HistoryThe irst step to analyzing the currentstate o the insurgency in HelmandProvince is to identiy the provincesthree primary regions and theirassociated powerbrokers. In the north,

1 Personal discussion, MSG Tristan Schlientz, Kanda-

har, Aghanistan, August 2006.

2 Paul Waugh, 1,000 Killed or Wounded in Aghan

Confict,London Evening Standard, August 17, 2009.

3 Karen DeYoung, U.S. and Britain Again Target Pop-

py Crop, Washington Post, August 2009.

Rais Baghrani largely controls thecourse o the 100 mile-long valleystarting just north o Musa Qaladistrict.4 Sher Mohammed Akhundzadaand his ailiates exert the mostinluence in the central region, whereapproximately 75% o the provincespopulation resides. The historicallycorrupt Baluchi tribe controls a majorityo the provinces southern region.Together, these distinctly dierenregions o Helmand are responsibleor growing more than hal the worldspoppy. 7 These leaders and other narcopowerbrokers in Helmand have ormeda synergistic relationship with Talibaninsurgents where they work together toplant, protect and harvest poppy ieldsand then transport the product to druglabs and out o the country; in exchangethe Taliban tax the armers and also

earn money when the drugs exchangehands in neighboring countries. Mosmajor narcotics leaders have ties to thegovernment, whether at the nationaor local level, and thereore coalitionorces cannot target them eectively.

Until 2006, minimal coalition presencein Helmand clearly signaled to HelmandAghans that their livelihood o growingpoppies was secure. This changed inthe summer o 2006 when coalitionorces entered the province in sizeablenumbers and were accompanied by a

4 Rais Baghrani ought against the Russians in the 1980

and was ormerly a high-ranking member o the Taliban

in the 1990s under Mullah Omars leadership. In 2005

ater eluding coalition orces or more than three years

Baghrani accepted amnesty and abandoned the Taliban

movement. He still controls the Baghran Valley, howev

er, which is responsible or growing a signicant amoun

o poppy. He is clearly involved in the drug trade, but h

is no longer an ideological member o the Taliban move

ment.

5 Sher Mohammed Akhundzada is married to Presiden

Hamid Karzais sister. He was the ormer governor o

Helmand Province but was removed rom oce by Presi

dent Karzai under pressure rom the United Kingdom ohis role in narcotics; an estimated nine tons o poppy was

discovered in the basement o his house in 2005. Since

his departure rom governorship, violence has skyrock

eted in Helmand Province.

6 The Baluchi tribe numbers an estimated 120,000 in

southern Helmand and controls the southern-most dis

tricts, most notably the area called Baram Cha, which i

the gateway or drugs moving to Pakistan and weapons

ammunition moving into Aghanistan.

7 U.S. Aims to Deprive Taliban o Drug Revenue by

Promoting Alternate Crops to Opium, Associated Press

June 27, 2009.



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signiicantly more aggressive poppyeradication eort.8 The eradicationprogrambacked by both the Aghangovernment and coalition orcescultivated within the provincialpopulation intense eelings o mistrustand disdain or the government, Aghansecurity orces and coalition troops. 9While poppy eradication achievedrelative success in Nangarhar Provincein 2005, Aghans who stand against thenarcotics industry in Helmand are otentargeted with violence that extends totheir amily and tribe. 10 Indeed, sinceaggressive poppy eradication beganin 2006, narco-powerbrokers haveworked much closer with the Talibanthan ever beore. 11 Consequently,progress in Helmand Province will notcome quickly.

Needed Departure rom Eradication EortsThe irst meaningul step towardprogress occurred in June 2009 whenthe government and coalition orcesannounced that they would no longersupport poppy eradication. 12 As stated by the U.S. envoy to Aghanistanand Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke,eradication is a waste o moneyand has only worked to drive Aghanarmers to the Taliban. 13 The implicationo this decision means that insurgentand narcotic leaders can no longer usepoppy eradication as a rallying cry to

recruit more insurgents.

This does not mean, however, that theAghan government and coalition orceshave abandoned the eort to reduce theprovinces poppy production. Instead,ocus and resources have shited totargeting narcotics in the consolidation

8 This inormation is based on the authors personal ac-

count rom his deployment in 2006 and 2007.

9 Personal discussions, Special Forces soldiers deployed

to Helmand Province, Kandahar, Aghanistan, 2006,

2007, 2009.

10 Poppy eradication has achieved more success in Nan-garhar Province than in Helmand. One reason is that

Nangarhar has a more manageable number o poppy

elds located more closely together; this is not the case

in Helmand. Despite this success story, the lack o

government support and alternative crops has let many

armers rustrated in Nangarhar.

11 Gretchen Peters, Seeds o Terror: How Heroin Is Bank-

rolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: St. Martins

Press, 2009).

12 U.S. Aims to Deprive Taliban o Drug Revenue by

Promoting Alternate Crops to Opium.

13 Ibid.

and transportation phases by raidingdrug laboratories and interdictingnarcotics convoys. This change o policywill lead to more large-scale poppyinterdiction without directly aectingarmers livelihood.

The insurgent-narcotic nexus isthe biggest obstacle to progress inHelmand. Breaking down their abilityto cooperate reely is the key to success.While maintaining a signiicant numbero troops deployed to the provinceis essential, sending more orcesspeciically to Helmandespecially atthe expense o other provinces in the

southern region which are all under-resourcedis not necessary. As oneSpecial Forces oicer who served inHelmand rom January-July 2009explained,

75% o Helmands populationlives in the central portion o theprovince; we need to do more withless throughout the province, but especially in this area. Wecan accomplish this by ocusingour targeting eorts against highpay-o targets at the right timeor in other words, aggressivelyattacking the nexus and keepingthe pressure on both componentsuntil they turn on each other. 14

In his statement, the oicer accuratelyconveyed that there is a solution, butit revolves around targeting the nexusmore eectively and reraining romtargeting the armers crops.

Beore the policy shit regarding poppyeradication was announced, coalitionorces achieved enormous successin February-May 2009. This period

14 Personal discussion, Major Mark Smith, Bastion, Hel-

mand Province, Aghanistan, February 2009.

witnessed the most eective targetingo the insurgent-narcotic nexus inHelmand to date. Amid several othersigniicant counternarcotics operationsU.S. Special Forces conducted OperationSiege Engine during a period o iveweeks in April and May that interdictedmillions o dollars worth o poppyprecursor chemicals, weapons andammunition. It was not an eradicationeort, but an operation to attack thenarcotics industry where it is mosvulnerable: in its consolidation phases.1

The operation prevented approximately$4.3 million rom reaching the hands oinsurgent commanders. 16

While the amount o seized material isstaggering (39,000 lbs o wet opium300,000 lbs o poppy seed and anestimated 120,000 lbs o precursor

chemicalsammonium nitrate, sodaash, activated charcoal and AcidicAnhydride), these operations served anequally signiicant role o exposing thestrength and depth o the relationship between the Taliban-led insurgencand the narcotics world.17 Not only didcoalition orces uncover large quantitieso improvised explosive devices (IED)mortars, rockets, blasting caps andexplosives on each o the counternexusoperations, but every raid against thetargets also witnessed an aggressiveinsurgent response where they launched

attacks against coalition orces in anattempt to minimize destruction o theirnarcotics, weapons and ammunition. 1

Several o these missions uncoveredTaliban inirmaries and rooms whereinsurgent leadership met to plan utureattacks against Aghan security orcesand coalition orcesurther prooo these targets signiicance to theinsurgency.

Success has come at a price, howeverFueled by narco-powerbrokers undsinsurgents have ought especially ierce

in Helmand during the summer o2009 against the Aghan governmentANSF and coalition orces comprisedo the British, Danish and the newlyarrived U.S. 2 nd Marine ExpeditionaryBrigade. The insurgent-narcotic nexus

15 A month later, Ambassador Holbrooke announced

this policy shit.

16 Personal discussions, Drug Enorcement Administra

tion, Kandahar, Aghanistan, May 2009.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.


By moving away

rom government and

international poppy

eradication eorts,villagers and armers are

less likely to support the

insurgency.


7/24

7

is combining their eorts to maintaincontrol over the most ertile provincein the country because insurgents andnarcotic warlords, especially those withties to Sher Mohammed Akhundzada incentral Helmand, understand that losingtheir grip on the province means losing

money and inluenceand an indication

o progress or the government andcoalition orces. 19 As the summer drawsto a close, it is almost assured that theinsurgent operational tempo will remainhigher in Helmand Province thananywhere else in the country, preciselyor this reason.

Corruption Remains a block to Progress

One o the most signiicant obstaclesto progress in Helmand Province is

corruption within the government andAghan security orcesat the nationaland district levelswhich is directlytied to the poppy trade. As numerousinterviews with Aghans reveal, thesentiment many people in Helmandeel toward the government is evidentrom a single sentence spoken by a businessman in Helmands Musa Qaladistrict: The Taliban were not good, butthese people nowthe governmentthey are thieves and killers.20 Lastingsuccess in Helmand requires thegovernment and its security orces to

signiicantly reduce their connections(and protection) to the narcotics trade.

National and local level governmentand ANSF consistently accept bribesrom narco-powerbrokers to acilitateinstability and the booming poppy

19 M.J. Stephey, Stan McChrystal: The New U.S. Com-

mander in Aghanistan, Time Magazine, May 12, 2009.

20 Kathy Gannon, The Taliban Shadow Government,

Associated Press, August 18, 2009.

business. 21 There have been severalinstances in 2009 where IEDs haveexploded on coalition patrols betweentwo ANSF checkpoints only 600 metersapart.22 Aghan National Police (ANP)have allowed poppy shipments to passthrough their checkpoints, or worseyet use their government vehicles totransport the poppy themselves.23Failure to curb the rampant corruptionduring the past three years has enabledthe insurgent-narcotic nexus to expandand strengthen. In a country wherecorruption and bribery are widelyaccepted as part o day-to-day lie,this task is much easier said thandone. Although the current Helmandgovernor, Gulav Mangal, is struggling toreduce the provinces narcotics output,he continues to encounter resistanceand corruption and cannot reorm the

province on his own.

On the heels o the elections and inconjunction with the increase o coalitionorces in the province, the people oHelmand need to witness improvementin their government and security orces by early 2010; otherwise, the people oHelmand may permanently lose hopein their governments and coalitionorces ability to bring stability to theprovince.

Conclusion

The biggest overarching obstacle tostability in Aghanistan remains thevolatile southern region. Enhancingsecurity in the south requires progressin numerous areas, but reducing theinsurgencys rampant unding is anessential part o the equation. A largeportion o the insurgencys monetary backing originates in Helmand(estimates range rom 40-70% 24). It isused to pay or weapons and ammunitionand is distributed to locals who helpight Aghan government and coalition

21 There are numerous powerbrokers at the local levelthat bribe ANSF and government ocials, but the most

notorious is Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) who was the

ormer Helmand provincial chie o police. He has ties to

numerous leaders within ANSF and works with them to

ensure the movement o drugs.

22 Personal discussions, SFC Charles Rodriguez, Kanda-

har, Aghanistan, February 2009.

23 Ibid.; Numerous Aghans have made these assertions

to soldiers in the unit.

24 In Seeds o Terror, Gretchen Peters claims the number

to be at 70%; recent gures claim 40% with the remain-

ing unds originating rom patrons in the Gul states.

orces. This money uels the insurgencyand helps to expand its inluence.

The Taliban-led insurgency and theAghan narcotics trade rely on eachother; a weaker counterpart wouldsigniicantly hinder the othersmovement. Reducing the insurgencyslinks to the narcotics trade withinHelmand Province during the course othe next 18 months is critical to the uturesuccess o this objective. Moreover by moving away rom government andinternational poppy eradication eortsvillagers and armers are less likely tosupport the insurgency.

Working independently, the Aghangovernment, its security orces andcoalition troops are not strong enoughto undermine the insurgent-narcotic

nexus in Helmand Province. I theseentities work in concert, however, theAghan people and the internationacommunity will achieve progress andpreserve hope or Aghanistans uture

Captain Michael Erwin is currently enrolled

in the Ph.D. program at the University o

Michigans Psychology Department. Captain

Erwin was the senior intelligence oice

(S2) or 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces

Group rom June 2006 to August 2009

This assignment included two deployments

to southern and western Aghanistan as the

Special Operations Task Force-31 S2. Herecently returned rom his second rotation

in July 2009. In his previous assignment

Captain Erwin was the Tactical Intelligence

Oicer or Task Force 2-7 Cav during

Operation Iraqi Freedom II that included

participation in the battles o Falluja an

Naja in 2004. He is a graduate o the U.S

Military Academy at West Point with

Bachelor o Science degree.


Focus and resources

have shited to

targeting narcotics in

the consolidation and

transportation phases by

raiding drug laboratories

and interdicting narcotics

convoys.


8/24

8

The Expansion Strategy oAl-Qaìda in the AraianPeninsula

By Gregry D. Jhnsen

during the past year, the United Stateshas grown increasingly concernedabout the dangers o instability inYemen. This ear has translated into asharp increase in aid to the ragile state.It also helps to explain the slow butsteady trickle o oicial U.S. visitorsto the Yemeni capital, Sanaà. GeneralDavid Petraeus, or example, traveledto Yemen on July 26, 2009, bringingwith him both oicial conirmation othe uptick in aid along with the warningthat the United States would expect asigniicant return on its money.

The extra unding is largely a resulto a resurgent al-Qaìda threat in thecountry. In less than our years, al-Qaìda in Yemen has transormed itsel rom a ractured and ragmented groupo individuals into an organizationthat is intent on launching attacksthroughout the Arabian Peninsula. Thedevelopment o al-Qaìda into a regionalorganization, known as al-Qaìda in theArabian Peninsula (AQAP), has beenquick but methodical as the group hasarticulated and then attained each goal

set or itsel. AQAP is increasinglyestablishing roots in Yemen, allowing itto plan and execute attacks across theregion.

Take Two in Mari

A large part o Petraeus visit wasdevoted to counterterrorism. Duringthe meeting with President AliAbdullah Salih, Petraeus pressed himto take the ight to al-Qaìda. Salihdutiully responded by dispatchinghis nephew, Àmmar Muhammad,who is the principal deputy with the

National Security Bureau, to the easterngovernorate o Marib, which has beenthe center o al-Qaìda activity in recentyears. Àmmar negotiated the terms othe oensive with local shaykhs, but theoperation our days later did not go asplanned. First, a Yemeni supply truckgot lost and was subsequently captured by al-Qaìda ighters. Second, Yemenicounterterrorism orces mistakenlyshelled a tribal house rather than an al-Qaìda sae house. Their error sparkeda ireight with tribesmen and a handul

o al-Qaìda ighters opposing themilitary.

The Battle o Marib, as al-Qaìda isnow calling the incident, illustrates thedangers and pitalls o attempting tonavigate the murky and multiacetedconlict that ighting al-Qaìda inYemen has become. Al-Qaìdas budding alliance with some tribes inthe region means that any ight thatis designed to be a two-sided aair between the government and al-Qaìdawill not remain that way. The logic othese conlicts will evolve in a waythat increasingly incorporates moreactors, as tribesmen and other ightersare brought into the ight not out oany ideological loyalty to al-Qaìda, but rather as a way o reacting againstgovernment action and aggression. 1

In the end, the Battle o Marib costthe military ive tanks, a number odead and wounded as well as sevensoldiers captured, at least accordingto a statement released by AQAP.2The Yemeni government disputed thestatement, but a video about the battlewas subsequently released by AQAP,showing the seven captured soldiersand urther conirming al-Qaìdasclaims.3 The video also backed awayrom the claim made in the initialstatement that al-Qaìda had shelled

the Republican Palace in Marib whileÀmmar Muhammad was in the building. Instead, al-Qaìda used thevideo to modiy its earlier statement,saying only that oicers were in thepalace when it was shelled.

The clariications and runningcommentary throughout the video byQasim al-Raymi,4 one o al-Qaìdas

1 Tribes in this region o Yemen have oten accepted

money and assistance rom a variety o sources, which

they use as leverage against the central government in

Sanaà.2 Al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula, Statement on the

Battle o Marib, August 1, 2009.

3 Al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula, Video on the

Battle o Marib, September 8, 2009.

4 Qasim al-Raymi graduated rom one o Yemens reli-

gious institutes in the late 1990s beore traveling to A-

ghanistan where he met Usama bin Ladin and spent time

in an al-Qaìda training camp. He comes rom a amily

o ghters. One brother, Ali, is currently in Guantanamo

Bay and another, Faris, ought in Iraq and Aghanistan

beore being killed in mysterious circumstances in June

2007. Al-Raymi was one o the 23 men who escaped rom

military commanders, is a calculatedattempt by the organization to seizethe moral high ground in Yemen. In acountry where many are oten distrustuo government spokesmen and oiciastatements, al-Qaìda is attempting toshow that its statements are groundedin act. This was most orceully

illustrated in the video by ootage oYemens minister o inormation, Hasanal-Lawzi, discussing the governmentsversion o the events in Marib, whichwas then ollowed by al-Raymissuggestion that people are beginning toturn to jihadist web orums or a moreaccurate accounting o events.

In addition to brand protection, alQaìda also utilized the capturedsoldiers to its advantage, portrayingthem as pawns duped into obeying anun-Islamic regime. At the end o the

video, al-Qaìda announced that iwould not execute the soldiers, as thiswas not permitted, but that i the soldierswould not ight with the mujahidin thenneither should they ight against them by assisting the tyrants. The soldierswere eventually released as a resulo tribal mediation, which Àmmarwas orced to rely on ater his unitsembarrassing perormance.

In many ways, the Battle o Marib andthe events leading up to it were eerilysimilar to another series o incidentseight years earlier. In that casePresident George W. Bush pressuredSalih to arrest three al-Qaìda membersduring a November 2001 visit toWashington. The ensuing operation inMarib by Yemeni Special Forces was adisaster. The target o the attack, AbuAli al-Harithi, escaped along with a

a Yemen Political Security prison in February 2006.


Al-Qaìda frst wanted

to rebuild in Yemen, and

then it aimed to make

itsel relevant within the

country. Now that it has

accomplished both goals,

it is taking the next step by

expanding regionally.


9/24

9

comrade, while local tribesmen tookseveral Yemeni soldiers hostage. Tribalmediators later secured the release o thesoldiers, but not beore the governmentwas warned against a heavy ootprint inMarib. Al-Harithi was killed less thana year later by a U.S. unmanned aerialdrone.

Yet this is not 2001, and Yemen is lessinclined toward seeing U.S. prioritiesas its own. It has other securityproblemsa civil war in the north 5 an dcalls or secession in the souththat itdeems more pressing than the al-Qaìdathreat. Moreover, it has learned thatthe United States and its allies can beinconsistent when it comes to rewardingrisk.

Estalishing Roots

Both the statement and the videoabout the Battle o Marib express somesurprise that the Yemeni governmentwould even carry out an attack in thegovernorate. In the video, al-Raymiexplained the military operation bysuggesting that Salih is a slave to Saudiriyals and American dollars. Al-Qaìdais increasingly viewing Marib and someo the surrounding governorates, mostnotably al-Jaw and parts o Shabwa, asits own sphere o inluence where thegovernment has no role.

With a ew exceptionsthe two suicideattacks in March 2009 6 and the Battle oMaribal-Qaìda has been largely silentsince its attack on the U.S. Embassy inSanaà on Ramadan 17, 2008. 7 Yet thissilence does not equate to inactivity.Instead, al-Qaìda has been buildinga durable oundation or the uture.Speciically, it has been actively working

5 The sixth and most violent round o ghting to date be-

tween the government and the Huthis began on August

11, 2009. This sporadic confict has been ongoing since

2004 and continues to be a drain on both the govern-

ments political and military capital.6 A suicide bomber killed our South Korean tourists and

their local Yemeni guide on March 15, 2009. On March

18, a convoy o the victims relatives along with South

Korean investigators was targeted in another suicide at-

tack, although only the bomber was killed in the second

incident.

7 The date is signicant, as was pointed out in a later is-

sue o Sada al-Malahim, as the anniversary o the early

Islamic Battle o Badr. It corresponds to September

17, 2008. The recent attempted assassination o Saudi

Prince Muhammad bin Nayi is the beginning o some-

thing new or al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula.

to establish links and put down rootswith the tribes in Marib, al-Jaw andShabwa governorates.8 Most notably, itis accomplishing this by attempting tomarry into the local tribes. The personalpiety o many al-Qaìda members alsoresonates strongly with tribesmen as docell phone videos o the ighting in Iraq.At the moment, al-Qaìda is in the earlystages o a budding alliance with someo the tribes in these governorates.Despite early concerns immediatelyater September 11, 2001, al-Qaìda hasnot traditionally had a strong alliancewith the tribes in Yemen. There have

been cases o al-Qaìda members beingprovided reuge by tribes, but oten thiswas an issue o a tribesman who was also

a member o al-Qaìda playing on histribal identity to receive reuge. What ishappening now is entirely dierent.

Said Ali al-Shihri, the deputy commandero AQAP, recently brought his wie andchildren to Yemen rom Saudi Arabia. 9Not only did this put them beyond thereach o the Saudi government so it couldnot exert the same sort o pressure onhim as it did on Muhammad al-Àwi,10

8 Much o the analysis in this section is based on the au-

thors recent trip to Yemen in July and August 2009. The

author is indebted to the help and generosity o many Ye-menis who shared their views and thoughts with him.

9 Al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula, Statement o

Congratulations, Sada al-Malahim, No. 9, May 2009.

10 Muhammad al-Àw, a ormer Guantanamo detain-

ee, was one o the our individuals eatured in the video

that announced the merger o the Yemeni and Saudi

branches o al-Qaìda into the unied al-Qaìda in the

Arabian Peninsula in January 2009. One month later, al-

Àw turned himsel in to Saudi authorities. It is widely

believed that Saudi Arabia used a variety o dierent

tacticsincluding pressuring the women in his amily

to orce his surrender.

but it also indicates al-Shihris comorlevel in the country. Al-Qaìda is not onthe run in Yemen, but rather is largelyree to do what it wants in certain areasAl-Shihris move is also indicative o agrowing attempt by al-Qaìda to becomepart o the local scene by integratingitsel into the entire community in away that a single man is unable to do.

Speciic details on individuals marryinginto particular tribes is diicult toacquire, but anecdotal evidence receivedin Yemen combined with some speciiccases indicates that it is part o alQaìdas long-term strategy. In the latestissue oSada al-Malahim (Echo o Battles), orinstance, al-Qaìda congratulated oneo its members, Muhammad al-Ùmdaon his marriage. 11 It is unclear rom thestatement who al-Ùmda married, bu

the belie in Yemen is that he marriedinto one o the tribes and that his actionis being replicated by other ightersrom both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Thisdevelopment is both new and worryingbecause it has the potential to turn anycounterterrorism operation into a muchbroader war involving Yemens tribes.

The Perception and The Reality

Another worrying indicator or theuture o counterterrorism operations inYemen is the general apathy toward alQaìda in the country. There is a culture

o passivity and victimhood withinthe government. Nearly every sectoro society has bought into this ideaarguing that the al-Qaìda problem isreally a oreign problem, an outgrowtho the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan. 1

This is not the case, and by ailing toacknowledge the problem Yemen hasnever adequately addressed it.

There is silence rom major clerics whocould speak out against attacks rom alQaìda. The shaykhs and clerics who dopreach against al-Qaìda do not have the

intellectual weight or popular ollowingto counter al-Qaìdas arguments. Thishas essentially ceded the ield o debateand discussion within Yemen to al

11 Al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula, Statement o

Congratulations, Sada al-Malahim, No. 10, July 2009

Al-Ùmda is one o three escapees rom the February

2006 prison break still at large.

12 This conclusion is based on a number o interview

and conversations the author conducted with ministers

parliamentarians, journalists and tribesmen in July and

August 2009 in Yemen.


Al-Qaìdas budding

alliance with some tribes in

the region means that any

fght that is designed to be

a two-sided aair between

the government and al-

Qaìda will not remain that

way.


10/24

10

Qaìda. The United States has beencomplicit in this ailure by neglectingto seize opportunities to counter theorganizations propaganda in anymeaningul way.

The United States, or example, hada unique opportunity to go on theoensive in August 2009 when itreleased Muhammad al-Muayyad andhis assistant rom U.S. custody.13 Th ecase has been a contentious domesticissue in Yemen since 2003, witheveryone rom the president to al-

Qaìda calling or the pairs release.The United States could have easilyplaced an Arabic op-ed in the oicialdaily, al-Thawra, explaining its rationaleor the release. 14 Articulating that like

every country the United States makesmistakes but that it also attempts to learnrom those mistakes would have went along way toward repairing the tatteredimage o the United States in Yemen.Al-Qaìda has used al-Muayyads caseas a powerul piece o propaganda oryears, but when he was inally releasedthe United States was silent and did notbeneit. U.S. public diplomacy in Yemenis all deense and no oense.

13 In January 2003, the United States lured al-Muayyadand his assistant to Germany as part o a sting operation

in which they were promised money or groups such as

Hamas and al-Qaìda. The men were arrested and extra-

dited to the United States where they were convicted in

2005 o supporting Hamas but cleared o charges related

to al-Qaìda. Al-Muayyads popularity in Yemen stems

not only rom his role as a religious gure, but also rom

his charity work. He is oten reerred to as the Father o

orphans in the Arabic press.

14 The author asked a Yemeni ocial about the diculty

o placing such an op-ed, and he assured that such an op-

ed would have no problem getting printed.

Public diplomacy is not the only U.S.problem in Yemen. There is a righteningmix o ignorance and arrogance when itcomes to U.S. policy toward Yemen aswell as among many o those tasked withimplementing this policy. The UnitedStates must learn that its insistence onseeing everything through the prism ocounterterrorism has helped to induceexactly the type o results it is hopingto avoid. By ocusing on al-Qaìda tothe exclusion o nearly every otherchallenge, and by linking almost all o its aid to this single issue, the UnitedStates has ensured that the issue willnever be resolved. There is growing earin Yemen that the country would beorgotten and neglected in the absence othe threat rom al-Qaìda; this causes thegovernment to prolong the conlict. 15

This short-sighted and narrow ocus bythe United States has translated overtime into a lack o inluence within thecountry. The United States is not themost important player on the domesticYemeni scene. During the past severalyears, Washington has not spentnearly enough money in nearly enoughdierent places in Yemen to haveits desired diplomatic leverage. U.S.perceptions o its own importance andinluence within Yemen are inlated anddo not square with reality.

The Recruiting GroundWhile the United States and Yemen have both been distracted by other, seeminglymore pressing issues in recent years, al-Qaìda has been working single-mindedlyto create a durable inrastructure thatcan withstand the loss o key leadersand cells. It has done an excellent jobo tailoring its narrative or a localaudience.16 With the exception o suicideattacks within Yemen itsel, much othe groups message is broadly popularwithin the country. As one Yemenisaid, I can no longer tell the dierence

between al-Qaìda in the caves and al-Qaìda in the mosques, illustratingjust how popular the groups rhetoric ison many issues. 17

15 This is based on the authors interviews and conversa-

tions with government ocials, as well as his own analy-

sis o the situation in Yemen.

16 This is particularly evident rom the groups videos

and issues o Sada al-Malahim, where al-Qaìda uses

popular grievances to criticize the regime.

17 Personal interview, a Yemeni who requested ano-

nymity, Sanaà, Yemen, August 2009.


The organization is also beneitingrom other government mistakes. Theoverreaction o governments suchas Yemen, largely as a result o U.Spressure, o arresting nearly everyonesuspected o harboring sympathy oral-Qaìda in the atermath o September11 and periodically since then is notreducing radicalization; instead, it ishaving the opposite eect. Young men areleaving Yemens security prisons moreradical than when they were initiallyincarcerated. The countrys revolvingdoor prison policy is compoundingthe problem as more young men spendsigniicant time in prison. In a sensemany o these young men have beenprepared or recruitment by their timein prison. The initial groundwork isbeing laid not by al-Qaìda but rather bythe governments actions, which makes

these men tempting recruitment targetswhen they are eventually released.

Yemen reuses to allow monitoring o itssecurity prisons, which is a major causeor concern. Many o these men are beinghoused together, which only acilitatesa sort o mutual encouragementand strengthening as more radicamembers are able to inluence youngerindividuals.18 The various clerics andreligious shaykhs who visit the prisonsto preach also appear to be playing arole in the radicalization process. 1

Al-Qaìdas potential recruitingpool in Yemen is not drying up but isexpanding.

AQAPs Growing Amition

Since its reemergence in Yemen in2006, al-Qaìda has shown itselto be an ambitious but temperedorganization, methodically taking thesteps needed to rebuild and expand. Theattempted assassination o Saudi PrinceMuhammad bin Nayi is part o theorganizations shit in priorities sincethe January 2009 merger o the Yemen

and Saudi branches o al-Qaìda intoa single regional ranchise. The attackwas an early attempt by AQAP to matchaction with rhetoric.

18 Yemen does allow monitoring o its central prisons

but these are dierent rom the countrys many security

prisons.

19 Personal interviews, various Yemeni journalists and

ocials amiliar with the security prisons in the country

Sanaà, Yemen, July and August 2009.

By ocusing on al-Qaìda

to the exclusion o nearly

every other challenge, and

by linking almost all o its

aid to this single issue, theUnited States has ensured

that the issue will never be

resolved.


11/24

11

Following the merger, al-Qaìda hasprioritized attacks in Saudi Arabiaand other Gul states20 in an attemptto make itsel regionally relevant. Foral-Qaìda, this is the logical extensiono its development to date in Yemen.Al-Qaìda irst wanted to rebuild inYemen, and then it aimed to make itsel relevant within the country. Now that ithas accomplished both goals, it is takingthe next step by expanding regionally.

This process has ollowed a amiliarpattern: each new phase o activity begins with al-Qaìda announcingits rather ambitious goals and thenworking to meet those goals. The attackon Muhammad bin Nayi was an earlyattempt to accomplish this, but it isunlikely to be the last. AQAP currentlyeels little pressure in Yemen. It has

both the time and space to plot andlaunch attacks throughout the regionrom its base in the country. This isnot to say that the organization will nolonger carry out attacks in Yemen, butrather that these attacks are no longerits top priority. Al-Qaìda has reachedthe point where it is no longer satisiedwith local activity. It has its sights seton something bigger.

Gregory D. Johnsen, a ormer Fulbright

Fellow in Yemen, is currently a Ph.D.

candidate in Near Eastern Studies at

Princeton University. He is also the co-author o the Yemen blog, Waq al-Waq.

20 AQAP has not yet been ound responsible or attacks

in other Gul states. Its statements and some circumstan-

tial evidence, however, imply that it is plotting such op-

erations.

A Prole o PakistansLashkar-i-Jhangvi

By Ari Jamal

lashkar-i-jhangvi (lj) is one o theworlds most secretive terroristgroups. Little inormation exists onthe organization, even though it is anal-Qaìda ailiate that is regularlyblamed or terrorist attacks in Pakistan.Although the LJ was ormed as thearmed wing o Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan(SSP), it has morphed into the collectivearmed wing o various Deobanditerrorist groups. Statements about theLJ rom the Pakistani government andmedia suggest that the group is the mostdeadly Islamist terrorist organizationin the world outside the Indian-controlled state o Jammu and Kashmir.This description, however, is notcompletely accurate, and it has served both the handlers o jihadist groups inthe Pakistani military as well as otherIslamist terrorist groups who beneit byblaming the LJ or most terrorist attacksin Pakistan outside the tribal areas.

The LJ does exist as a dangerousorganization, but not in the orm otenportrayed by the Pakistani media andgovernment. Most terrorist attacksblamed on the LJ were in act carried out

by several Deobandi1

terrorist groups,o which the LJ is only one. Researchinto 40 terrorist incidents in Pakistan between September 11, 2001 andSeptember 2007 show that police andother sources were quoted in variousnewspapers oten attributing a terroristattack to multiple Deobandi terroristgroups. During this period, it wasnot uncommon or the same terroristact to be blamed on the SSP, the LJ,Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam, Jundallah,or another Deobandi group.2 Dierentauthority igures blamed dierent

1 Deobandis are a sub-sect o the Hana sect, which in

turn is one o the our major Sunni schools o jurispru-

dence in Islam. The other major sub-sect o the Hana

sect are the Barelvis who represent more mystical Islam.

Deobandis can also be described as the politicized Hana

sub-sect as they came into being in mid-19th century Brit-

ish India. Their principal objective at that time was to

puriy Islam o the accumulated bidà or religious inno-

vation to gain reedom rom the British colonial power.

2 This inormation is based on the authors accumulation

o press reports rom Pakistani newspapers and media

during the stated period.

groups. Moreover, Pakistani policewere unable to dierentiate between thegroups. In many cases, one militant hadoverlapping allegiances and belonged tomultiple groups at one time.

This article will discuss the LJsoundation, ideology, and organizationastructure. It will also show why the LJis blamed or a disproportionate numbeo terrorist incidents in Pakistan.

The Creation o the LJ

To understand the ormation o the LJ, iis necessary to outline the creation andideology o Sipah-i-Sahaba PakistanIn 1984, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvia irebrand and astute Deobandi clericrom the Punjabi town o Jhang anda member o Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam(JUI), ounded Anjuman-i-Sipah-i

Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP). Inspired bythe Islamist and jihadist policies o

General Zia-ul-Haq, Jhangvi createdthe group to ight the growing inluenceo the Iranian revolution among bothSunni and Shià youth. Jhangvi dreamedo uniting all Sunni sects under one banner to oppose Shià Muslims anIran; his goal was to establish a Sunnistate in Pakistan and later in the rest othe world.

For almost a year, the ASSP ailedto attract attention to its cause. Itsmembers spent their time writing graitsuch as Kafr, kafrShià kafr (Shià areinidels), and the group largely stuck topromoting this slogan. A shrewd clericJhangvi soon understood that he wouldnot succeed unless he ound supportersin Islamabad. By 1985, he had renamedthe group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan(Soldiers o the Companions o theProphet) and became a regular visitor toIslamabad. In Islamabad, he requented


During the mid-1990s,

the SSP decided to create

an underground terrorist

group that would take

orders rom SSP leaders

but operate independently.

This group became

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.


12/24

12

Arab embassies, particularly those oIraq and Saudi Arabia. 3 He ailed toconvince Iraqi diplomats that his groupcould ight an Iraqi proxy war againstIran in Pakistan, but he did succeedin winning over the Saudis to do thesame.4

At the time, there were not manyWahhabis among the Pakistanipopulation, so the Saudis patronizedDeobandi parties and groups as theirproxies. Nevertheless, none o thesegroups were prepared to ight a proxy waragainst Iran in Pakistan. The Saudis wereparticularly interested in establishingSunni terrorist inrastructuresuchas military training campsalong thePakistan-Iran border so that terroristscould carry out attacks inside Iran toincite the Sunni population against the

Shià regime; ater conducting attacks,they could lee back across the borderto their sanctuaries in Pakistan. TheSaudis even invited some Kashmiricommanders rom Indian-controlledKashmir to Saudi Arabia and oeredthem large sums o money to abandonjihad in Kashmir and establish terroristinrastructure in Baluchistan onthe Iranian border. 5 None o thesecommanders, however, accepted therole as a proxy army or the Saudis. 6

The SSP, however, did accept the

role, and became one o the irstterrorist groups to establish sizeableinrastructure in Baluchistan. 7 Th eSaudi money gave the SSP a shot inthe arm and allowed it to establishterrorist inrastructure.8 As a result,

3 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, late 1980s.

4 One reason or this ailure is that Iraqi diplomats were

sensitive ater the Z.A. Bhutto government raided the

Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad in the mid-1970s and uncov-

ered arms and ammunition. The weapons were allegedly

or Baluch rebels. The Iraqis did not want a replay o the

same incident. The Saudis, on the other hand, emerged

as close allies o the Pakistani military, which was man-aging the anti-Soviet jihad in Aghanistan with U.S. and

Saudi money.

5 Personal interview, Kashmiri Sala-jihadi commander

who had participated in several discussions with Saudis,

September 17, 2000.

6 Ibid.

7 During visits to Baluchistan since the mid-1980s, the

author observed that the SSP had a visible presence in

most villages along the Pakistan-Iran border. One o t he

SSPs avorite tactics was to write anti-Shià and anti-

Iran grati on the trains that went in and out o Iran.

8 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, Islamabad, Pak-

the SSP achieved tremendous growthin both numbers and inluence duringits early years. By 1990, it had plottedto assassinate Iranian diplomats alongwith Pakistani Shià Muslims. The SSPtried to kill Iranian diplomats in Lahore,Karachi and Multan.9 SSP memberssuch as Riaz Basra 10 and Shaykh HaqNawaz Jhangvi (not to be conusedwith its ounder) gained notorietyater they succeeded in killing Iraniandiplomats.11 Their operations did notcome without resistance. For example,the SSPs ounder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was gunned down in 1990,allegedly by Shià militants. Moreover,a group o Shià militants created theirown terrorist group in the mid-1990sknown as Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan(SMP)and began retaliating againstDeobandi Muslims in Pakistan. The

SMP assassinated various Deobandiclerics.

The SSPs killings o Iranians in Pakistanbrought tremendous embarrassment andpressure on the Pakistani government.General Zia-ul-Haq had died, and anelected government was in power inIslamabad. The Benazir Bhutto-ledgovernment began to apply pressure onthe SSP. The SSP at the time was alsoplaying a role in electoral politics andwanted to use parliament to urtherits agenda. Yet it could not accomplish

this because its involvement in terroristoperations barred it rom becoming alegitimate political party.

Thereore, during the mid-1990s theSSP decided to create an undergroundterrorist group that would takeorders rom SSP leaders but operateindependently. This group becameLashkar-i-Jhangvi.

LJ Splinters rom the SSP

As part o the SSPs strategy, the LJ wasestablished in the mid-1990s with the

objective o executing terrorist attacksagainst Shià Muslims and Iraniannationals. Its early leaders included RiazBasra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq.The real leader o the group, however,

istan, April 1990.

9 These incidents were widely reported in the Pakistani

media during the time.

10 Riaz Basra was involved in hundreds o sectarian ter-

rorist attacks, including the murder o Iranian diplomat

Sadiq Ganji in December 1990.

11 Ibid.

was Maulana Alam Tariq, the brother oMaulana Azam Tariq, the latter o whomlater became the head o the SSP and anelected member o parliament. 12 The LJwas named ater the SSPs martyredounder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.

The LJ established a training camp inAghanistans Sarobi district. They alsotrained in the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin(HuM) training camp Khalid BinWalid in Aghanistan. Among the LJsleaders, Riaz Basra 13 emerged as one othe most ruthless terrorist operativesHe was allegedly responsible or mostanti-Shià terrorist attacks. Basra wasalso responsible or making threateningphone calls to police oicers chargedwith investigating the LJs terrorisacts.14 The calls were eective, andpolice oicers became reluctant to

investigate the LJs terrorist acts ouo ear o reprisals. When authoritieswould interrogate an SSP or LJ terroristthey concealed their identities with acemasks to prevent possible LJ retaliationa trend that continues to this day. TheLJ made it a policy to assassinate policeoicers who investigated terrorist acts orinterrogated their members. One o themost signiicant o these assassinationswas the senior superintendant o policein Gujranwala, Ashra Marth, whowas gunned down in May 1997 ater heinvestigated the LJs inrastructure.1

Investigations into the SSP and LJ werehalted ater his death. 16

The SSP continued to kill ShiàMuslims under the name o the LJduring the second hal o the 1990s. 1

12 Personal interviews, SSP leaders, Jhang, Pakistan

December 2001. Maulana Alam Tariq resuraced to take

over the leadership o the SSP when his brother was as

sassinated outside Islamabad. He lost the power struggle

however, to Maulana Ludhianvi.

13 Riaz Basra was killed on May 14, 2002. Lahori suc

ceeded him.

14 Many police ocers told the author that they had received threatening phone calls rom individuals calling

rom public phones and claiming to be Riaz Basra.

15 Ashra Marth was gunned down in the city o Gujran

wala as he came out o his ocial residence to go to his

oce.

16 Personal interview, senior police ocer who investi

gated the murder, Islamabad, Pakistan, July 2003.

17 The SSP never claimed responsibility or these kill

ings; the purpose o creating the LJ was so that the SSP

could deny involvement in terrorist attacks. This inor

mation is based on the authors various interviews and

investigations into the SSP and LJ.



13/24

13

To gain resources rom the Pakistanimilitary, the SSP/LJ also joined the jihad in Kashmir. The date o thisdecision is not known, but accordingto one interview the LJ had lost morethan 100 ighters in the Kashmirconlict by the late 1990s. 18 By joiningthe jihad in Kashmir, SSP/LJ militantsreceived signiicant military trainingand expertise rom dierent Deobanditerrorist groups, particularly romHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad. These actors raised theproile o the SSP/LJ signiicantly andthe group curried avor with Pakistansmilitary establishment. 19

Post-Coup Period

General Pervez Musharras October1999 military coup posed one o the biggest challenges to the SSP/LJ.

The organization was aced with thedecision o continuing to kill ShiàMuslims, which would have destabilizedMusharras military regime, or remainpeaceul under the new government.

The hardliners such as the LJs Basraeven though they supported the militarycoupwanted to continue their missiono killing Shià in Pakistan. A smallergroup led by the LJs Qari Abdul Hayyewanted to restrain their sectarianviolence to achieve their larger interestso building an organization that could

eventually take power in the countryby cooperating with the military. Thesedierences caused a split in the group in2000. One action was led by hardlinerRiaz Basra. The other, more moderateaction was led by Qari Abdul Hayye(also known as Qari Asadullah, orTalha), who was the amir o the trainingcamp at Sarobi.

The Basra group maintained the policyo killing Shià even ater GeneralMusharra took power. Governmentsupport, however, was not orthcoming.

The killings o Shià in the earlyperiod o General Musharras regimedestabilized the government, and itultimately cracked down on the LJsactivities. In what was a replay o Prime

18 Personal interview, an SSP leader, Peshawar, Paki-

stan, April 2001.

19 Since the 1970s, the military has used various Isla-

mist groups to achieve political goals, and in this case the

military used militant Islamist parties to destabilize the

democratically-elected government o Prime Minister

Nawaz Shari in the post-Kargil period.

Minister Nawaz Sharis eorts to rein interrorists, Musharras interior minister,Lt. General Moinuddin Haider, visitedAghanistan in March 2001 to extraditesome LJ terrorists back to Pakistan.The Taliban reused. They also reusedto sign any extradition treaty with

Pakistan. This came as a surprise to themilitary; they expected the Taliban to bemore compliant considering they helped

install the regime to power in Kabul.

The links between the SSP and the LJonce again came into the open whenthe SSP ran a campaign in February2001 to save LJ terrorist Shaykh HaqNawaz Jhangvi, who was to be hangedor murdering an Iranian diplomat. Jhangvi conessed to the crime in spiteo pressure by the SSP to plead notguilty. Jhangvi reused to lie beore thecourt and was hanged. The SSP resortedto widespread violence across thecountry, with SSP workers storming the

streets in several urban centers. Theydestroyed public and private property.

Despite this violence, relations betweenthe Musharra regime and the SSPremained positive. The Musharraregime, or example, rewarded the SSP by helping to elect SSP chie MaulanaAzam Tariq to the National Assemblyin the 2002 elections. 20 MaulanaTariq returned the avor by casting

20 The 2002 general elections were rigged and ma-

nipulated in several ways, beore and during the elec-

toral process, to bring in Islamists to counter the demo-cratic political orces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim

League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Although General Musharras regime had ormally

banned the SSP and LJ beore the 2002 general elections,

the group was allowed to unction reely under a dier-

ent name. As the democratic candidates were disquali-

ed to run or elections, Islamists were encouraged to

unite and replace them. The bulk o the Islamists were

elected under the umbrella o Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal

(MMA). The SSP reused to join the MMA and decided

to contest elections as a separate party and sent Maulana

Azam Tariq to parliament.

his crucial vote in avor o GeneraMusharras candidate or the oice oprime minister, Mir Zaarullah Jamaliwho won by one vote. Later, MaulanaTariq boasted that only his supporsustained General Musharras primeminister in power. When Member othe National Assembly Maulana AzamTariq was assassinated in October 2003 just outside Islamabad, the Musharraregime reused to support anotherSSP candidate in the by-electionsit was exasperated with the groupsblackmailing.

Post-9/11 Period

In the atermath o the terrorist attackon September 11, the LJ aced anotherdilemma: whether or not to supporGeneral Musharras decision to join theUnited States in its war on terrorism.

Like most jihadist groups, the LJhardliners led by Basra again chose tooppose General Musharras decisionThe hardliners in other Deoband jihadist groups such as Harkat-u Jihad-al-Islam, Jaysh-i-Muhammand Harkat-ul-Mujahidin also opposedthe Pakistani military.

The post-9/11 situation orced the SSPLJ and other Deobandi jihadist groupsto orge closer cooperation, such as inthe killing o the Wall Street Journals DaniePearl.21 The unity among Deoband

terrorist groups led to unprecedentedviolence in Pakistan. Most terrorist actin Pakistan since 9/11 have been carriedout by Deobandi or quasi-Deobandterrorist groups, together or alone, buthe LJ has almost always been blamed.

I the government were to blame jihadist groups such as Harkat-u Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammador violence in Pakistan, it would bringa bad name to the jihad in Kashmir, andeventually discredit the governmentsoten-used policy o using jihadists

as an instrument o policy. It is mucheasier or the Pakistani government toscapegoat the LJ or most terrorist actsin Pakistan outside o the tribal areas.

21 A prominent case o cooperation among Deobandi ter

rorist groups was the kidnapping and murder o Wal

Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl. Terrorists rom

several groups were involved in the operation. Along

with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad

terrorists, Qari Ataur Rehman (also known as Naeem

Bukhari) o the LJ was implicated in Pearls murder.


The post-9/11 situation

orced the SSP/LJ and

other Deobandi jihadist

groups to orge closer

cooperation.


14/24

14

From the LJ to the TTP

Today, the LJ is still involved in terroristattacks in Pakistan. Little is knownabout the groups current activities, andit is not completely clear how the twoactions o the LJthe Basra group andthe Qari Hayye grouphave evolved.Both actions likely still exist, althoughdierent leaders are in charge. TheBasra group, or example, is now parto Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) andcontributes to its jihadist operations. LJoperatives probably help acilitate theTTPs terrorist acts in Punjab Province,where the LT/SSP has an establishedbase.22

In act, a similar paradigm is nowoccurring with the TTP. The Pakistanigovernment blames the TTP or nearlyevery terrorist attack in Pakistan, some

o which likely had little to do with theorganization. Yet just like the LJ, it iseasy to scapegoat the TTP rather thanreveal the true extent o jihadist violencein Pakistan and the many groups andactors involved.

Ari Jamal is a visiting scholar at New York

University and author o Shadow War:The Untold Story o Jihad in Kashmir.

22 Hassan Abbas, Dening the Punjabi Taliban Net-

work, CTC Sentinel2:4 (2009).

The Failure o Sala-JihadiInsurgent Movements inthe Levant

By Bilal Y. Saab

it is remarkable that the Levant, asub-region plagued by internal andexternal crisis conditions that aregenerally conducive to terrorism andpolitical violence, has been ree romany insurgent 1 Islamist group withveriiable material ties to al-Qaìdascentral leadership.2 The two ambitiousattempts by Arab Salai-jihadis to createinsurgent orces in the Levant occurredin Lebanon in May-September 2007when Fatah al-Islam 3 violently emergedin the northern part o the country, andon August 15, 2009 in Gaza when Jund

Ansar Allah4

declared war on Hamas.These two attempts sought to radicallychange the existing socio-politicalorders in Lebanon and Gaza through theuse o religiously-inspired insurgentviolence. Both attempts ailed, however.Although al-Qaìda has been tied to

1 The emphasis on the word insurgent is deliber-

ate and used to dierentiate rom the word terrorist.

While there are a number o analytical and practical di-

erences between an insurgent group (or insurgencies)

and a terrorist group (or cell), this article only ocuses on

our: one, insurgent groups enjoy a certain level o sup-port rom a segment o society, whereas terrorist groups

usually work alone and do not need indigenous sup-

port; two, insurgent groups are usually bigger and bet-

ter armed than terrorist groups; three, insurgent groups

work overtly, whereas terrorist groups operate most e-

ectively in a clandestine ashion; our, insurgent groups

nd it essential to seize territory or the realization o

their revolutionary objectives, while terrorist groups

generally do not.

2 Very ew comprehensive studies have been written on

al-Qaìdas presence and infuence in the Levant. For a

commendable paper on the subject, see Hassan Mneim-

neh, The Jihadist International: Al-Qaìdas Advance in the

Levant (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-tute, April 8, 2009).

3 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group that

is inspired by al-Qaìdas ideology. Its members are

mostly Arabs rom various Middle Eastern countries. It

emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian reugee camp

in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but

include the establishment o an Islamic state in northern

Lebanon.

4 Jund Ansar Allah was ounded in southern Gaza in

November 2008 as an armed Sunni Islamist group with

strong Sala-jihadi credentials. Its goals include the es-

tablishment o an Islamic state in Gaza.

terrorist plots in the Levant, it does notappear responsible or interested in theew Islamist insurgent movements thahave arisen in the region. 5

This article assesses why the Levanhas been a less attractive place orglobal Salai-jihadis and a morechallenging environment or them tomobilize and conduct operations. Itattributes these ailures to the existenceo well-established mainstream Islamicmovements in the Levant that see theviolent and extreme Salai-jihadisas a threat to their interests; thedistinct historical and socio-politicacircumstances in the Levant that make itless hospitable to Salai-jihadi ideologythe relative success o the regionssecurity and intelligence services toprevent the Salai-jihadi threat rom

inlating; the subduing eect o Iransdominant inluence in the Levant; andinally the lack o material support romal-Qaìdas central leadership to Salaijihadi insurgent groups in the region.

Al-Qaìdas Lack o Allies in the Levant

Other than Jund al-Sham6 and Fatah alIslam (and the now crushed Jund AnsarAllah), al-Qaìda does not have alliesin the Levant that could eectivelyhelp project its inluence and ideologyinto the region and to serve its variousstrategic objectives.7

Jund al-Shams lack o organizationacoherence, discipline, and ightingcapabilities make it an unreliable partneror al-Qaìda in the Levant. 8 Far rom

5 No hard evidence on direct material ties between thes

two groups and al-Qaìdas central leadership has ever

emerged, even though they appear to share the same

ideological agenda.

6 Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islami

extremist entities, all or none o which may be connected

These entities mostly operate in Lebanon, Syria and Jor

dan, and their goals include the establishment o an Is

lamic caliphate throughout the Levant.7 For instance, without the Taliban in Pakistan and

Aghanistan or the Salast Group or Preaching and

Combat in Algeria, al-Qaìda would have ound it ex

tremely dicult, i not impossible, to expand and oper

ate in South Asia or the Maghreb. More examples where

al-Qaìda relied on local support to expand its infuence

and pursue its goals in various regions around the world

include al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Qaìda in Iraq, and th

Abu Sayya Group in the Philippines.

8 There are three groupsHizb al-Tahrir, Jaysh al-Is

lam, and Jaysh al-Ummain the Palestinian Territories

that claim to be inspired by al-Qaìdas ideology, but they



15/24

15

being an al-Qaìda ranchise in theLevant, Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islamic extremistentities, all or none o which may beconnected. More like a movement, Jund al-Sham, whose alleged link tothe late al-Qaìda in Iraq (AQI) leaderAbu Musàb al-Zarqawi stems romreports that he had arranged trainingor the groups ighters at al-Qaìdacamps in Aghanistan, has a presencein Lebanons Palestinian reugee camps

and in Syria (possibly in Jordan too). 9 Jund al-Sham members have beendescribed by terrorism analysts andArab counterterrorism oicials as jihadist reelancers who are only tiedtogether by ideology and a desire toviolently deend a radical Islamic order.Many Islamic ighters tied to Jund al-Sham in Lebanon merged with Fatah al-Islam during its rise and all, while therest went into hiding and took reuge inthe Palestinian camp o Ain al-Hilwah. 10Lebanese press reports indicate that

one o the

Documents

CTC Sentinel Vol 2 Issue 9