CTBTO

C.T.B.T.O PREPARATORY COMMISSION

CBIT MUN 2012 Page 2

CBIT MUN 2012

Sreekar Reddy Secretary General

Suraj Peri

Deputy Secretary General

Yashwant Adiraju

Under Secretary General

Thanmay Krishna

chargé d’affaires

Sharat Chander


It gives me immense pleasure to welcome you all to the second edition of CBITMUN.

I am a second year mechanical engineering student but debate is something I enjoy doing the most.

As students of engineering it took a tremendous effort for the team of the 2011 conference to ensure that it was such a success.

The number of MUNs are growing at a rapid rate in India with the whole nation embracing this concept with open arms and with more and more students involving themselves in MUNs we could initiate a revolution that would lead to young minds assuming greater responsibility.

CBITMUN returns with 7 councils this year which shall ensure high quality debate and a very satisfactory council experience.

I take great pride in taking over as the Secretary General of CBITMUN and my team and I shall ensure that August – September 2012 is an experience each and everyone of you will cherish.

I thank all of you who participated in last year’s conference and I hope that we see your continued support this year as well.

Last year we promised an experience

This year we promise a phenomenon

Sreekar Reddy Secretary General CBITMUN 2012 [email protected]



CBIT MUN 2012


Suraj Peri


Yashwant Adiraju


Thanmay Krishna


Sharat Chander


Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the CBITMUN phenomenon! As the role of Deputy Secretary General, ensuring quality debate and MUNing satisfaction to all delegates present will be the highest priority and failure in achieving the said goals in not an option. The councils for this year have been planned, Keeping in mind the globalization and rapid changes in the geo-political scenario. I hope this encourages a dynamic and solution oriented debate in every council. I am active MUNner and MUN is an addiction which is hard to leave. Procedure is what i am and deviating from protocol is a rarity.

Representing such a phenomenon gives me great pride. This MUN is back by the best team that will ensure our delegates receive the best hospitality and service from our city and the CBIT family.

This is not just a competition, it’s an experience waiting to be encrypted into the hearts and mind of the delegates.

Reposting the words of our Secretary General

“Last year we promised an Experience,

This year, we promise a Phenomenon! ”

“Pangea Le Reunion!”

-Suraj Peri Deputy Secretary General CBITMUN 2012



CBIT MUN 2012


Suraj Peri


Yashwant Adiraju


Thanmay Krishna


Sharat Chander


Dear Honorable Delegates,

On behalf of the entire team here at CBITMUN 2012, it is an absolute privilege for me to wish you a very warm welcome to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation. As one of the new committees assembling for the first time CBITMUN this year, you will have the chance of truly shaping the future and progress of Model United Nations and fostering a culture of cosmopolitanism amongst people of different cultures and united values. Whether you are a new or experienced delegate, I can guarantee a fun and enriching learning experience and am certainly as excited as you to meet new people and learn new things. We have all arrived at CBITMUN for various reasons. Some of us have come to open up to a new challenge, or a new cycle of friends, to learn more about the world or to make a first step into making an impact on issues of global significance. For me, CBITMUN comes at an exciting time, having grown up constantly travelling and reading about world culture, always curious to travel the world and explore, not by merely peeking in but by personal immersion. That is what my story of growing up has been all about – travelling, meeting, learning, knowing people and the issues that affect them. CBITMUN will be my second adventure into MUN abroad after attending the Global Model United Nations in 2011 in Korea. For many of us who have lived most of our lives in the post-‐Cold War era, we are fortunate to have been brought up in a period of reconstruction and renaissance for global diplomacy. The CTBTO is a product of this new era which sought to learn the lessons from the dichotomous stalemate that gripped the world for over four decades. Yet, as such a fledgling alliance, it is yet to completely materialize, with at least eight more countries required to ratify the Treaty for it to enter force. When will that be? What will it achieve? How can we achieve consensus on the pathway to a world that shares nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes? Over these four days, you will be challenged to work together and explore this solution. In the spirit of making CBITMUN about the delegates, consider us directors as mere guides during the committee, there to ensure that everyone is able to make the most of their skills and experience. But while we will be there to work with and help you every step of the way, MUN is all about making your own discussions and solutions together. Good consensus comes from idea-‐sharing, principled discussion, mutual respect and acknowledging values with minimal

interference. Nevertheless, if you are new to the MUN experience, the CBITMUN CTBTO will provide no less an opportunity to familiarize yourself with, and become a part of, the MUN community. With variations in MUN procedure across the world, everyone encounters new challenges and learning opportunities with every MUN they visit. Part of our experience, and the experience you will gain, is the flexibility of networking across differing cultural settings, and we are always happy to assist you in taking every step.

And of course, if there is anything more you’d like to know about CBITMUN, us, or the MUN communities in general, feel free to contact us on the Executive Board.

We look forward to meeting you for a rewarding experience in Hyderabad!

Miguel Vera-‐Cruz Prateek Patnaik G Akshay Kulkarni Chair Vice-‐Chair Director

cc



C.T.B.T.O PREPARATORY COMMISSION TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION……………………………… .06 2. THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION……09

-‐PURPOSES AND ACTIVITIES…..11 3. CTBT AND NPT……………………………… …12 4. ENTRY INTO FORCE………………………….14 5. KEY COUNTRY POSITIONS………………….17 6. ON-‐SITE INSPECTIONS……………………… .22



INTRODUCTION

What is the CTBT?

The Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear explosions (CTBTO, n.d.) by everyone, everywhere: on the Earth's surface, in the atmosphere, under water and underground.

Why is the CTBT important?

It makes it very difficult for countries to develop nuclear bombs for the first time, or for countries that already have them, to make more powerful bombs. It also prevents the huge damage caused by radioactivity from nuclear explosions to humans, animals and plants.

Over 2000 nuclear explosions from 1945 to 1996

Over 2000 nuclear tests were carried out between 1945 and 1996, when the CTBT opened for signature: by the United States (1000+), the Soviet Union (700+), France (200+), the United Kingdom and China (45 each).

Three countries have broken the de facto moratorium and tested nuclear weapons since 1996: India and Pakistan in 1998, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2006 and 2009.



CTBT almost universal but has yet to become law

Many attempts were made during the Cold War to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, but it was only in the 1990s that the Treaty became a reality. The CTBT was negotiated in Geneva between 1994 and 1996. 183 countries have signed the Treaty, of which 157 have also ratified it (as of February 2012), including three of the nuclear weapon States: France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. But 44 specific nuclear technology holder countries must sign and ratify before the CTBT can enter into force. Of these, eight are still missing: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA. India, North Korea and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT. The last Annex 2 (CTBTO, n.d.) State to ratify the Treaty was Indonesia on 6 February 2012.

Headquarters in Vienna

Since the Treaty is not yet in force, the organization is called the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Organization (CTBTO, n.d.) . It was founded in 1996, has over 260 staff from over 70 countries, and is based in Vienna. It is headed by the Executive Secretary, Tibor Tóth from Hungary. The CTBTO’s main tasks are the promotion of the Treaty and the build-‐up of the verification regime so that it is operational when the Treaty enters into force. The annual budget is around US$120,000,000 or €82,000,000.



Verification regime to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes

Undetected

The Treaty has a unique and comprehensive verification regime (CTBTO, n.d.) to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected. This regime consists of three pillars:

The International Monitoring System (IMS) (CTBTO, n.d.) will, when complete, consist of 337 facilities worldwide to monitor the planet for signs of nuclear explosions. Around 85 percent -‐ or 285 -‐ of the facilities are already up and running. The IMS uses the following four state-‐of-‐the-‐art technologies:

• Seismic: 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations monitor shockwaves in the Earth. The vast majority of these shockwaves – many thousands every year – are caused by earthquakes. But man-‐made explosions such as mine explosions or the North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, are also detected.

• Hydro acoustic: 11 hydro acoustic stations “listen” for sound waves in the oceans. Sound waves from explosions can travel extremely far under water.

• Infrasound: 60 stations on the surface can detect ultra-‐low frequency sound waves (inaudible to the human ear) that are emitted by large explosions.

• Radionuclide: 80 stations measure the atmosphere for radioactive particles; 40 of them also pick up noble gas. Only these measurements can give a clear indication as to whether an explosion detected by the other methods was actually nuclear or not. They are supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories.



THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty Organization was established on 19 November 1996 by a Resolution adopted by the Meeting of States Signatories at the United Nations in New York.

Article II of the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) provides for the establishment of a Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty Organization to achieve the aims of the Treaty, ensure its implementation and to serve as a forum for its members. Since the activities will be very extensive and must be fully operational when the Treaty enters into force, the States signing the Treaty decided that it was necessary to establish an interim organization -‐ a Preparatory Commission. This Commission would lay the groundwork required and build up the global verification regime to monitor compliance with the Treaty.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty Organization was established on 19 November 1996 with its seat in Vienna. Its main purpose is to make the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the CTBT. The first meeting of the Commission was convened by the Secretary-‐General of the United Nations on 20 November 1996; that is, within 60 days after the Treaty had been signed by 50 States as stipulated by the Annex to the Resolution which establishes the Commission.

The seat of the Preparatory Commission is Vienna, Austria. This is in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Annex which establishes the Commission and states that the location of the Commission will be the same as that of the future CTBTO. Accordingly, on 18 March 1997 a host country agreement was entered into with the Republic of Austria, which came into force on 1 November 1997. The purpose



of the agreement was to recognize the right of the Commission to establish its seat in Vienna and to carry out its activities. To this end the PTS was established on 17 March 1997 and opened its doors for business on the same day. It is interesting to note that, even though the Treaty negotiations themselves were long, complex and hard fought, the period between the Treaty’s opening for signature, the establishment of the Commission, and the commencement of PTS operations comprised a bare six months. This swift pace showed the urgency with which States Signatories were getting on with the establishment of an efficient and effective CTBTO. In March 2006 the Preparatory Commission commemorated the ten year anniversary of the Treaty and the Commission.



Purpose and activities

According to the Annex establishing the Commission, its main purpose is to carry out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the CTBT and to prepare for the first session of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty which will take place when the Treaty has entered into force.

The Commission’s duties focus on the promotion of the signing and ratification of the Treaty so that it can enter into force as soon as possible. Entry into force takes place 180 days (i.e. six months) after the Treaty has been ratified by the 44 States listed in its Annex 2.

The Commission’s duties focus on the Treaty's entry into force, which will take place after it has been ratified by the 44 States listed in its Annex 2. Another duty of the Commission is to establish a global verification regime to monitor compliance with the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which must be operational when the Treaty enters into force. This prodigious task involves the build up of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories throughout the world. It also includes the provisional operation of an International Data Centre (IDC) (CTBTO, n.d.)and the preparation of on-‐site inspections in case of a suspected nuclear test.



CTBT AND NPT-‐

1995: NPT Review and Extension Conference

Article X of the Nuclear Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stipulates that twenty-‐five years after the Treaty enters into force, States Parties shall hold a conference and decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

In the build up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the political environment surrounding CTBT negotiations intensified. Those who wished to see Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) make more progress towards fulfilling their obligations in the preamble as well as under Article VI of the NPT challenged states seeking to secure an indefinite extension of the NPT.

The preamble of the NPT affirms that States Parties are “to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.” Article VI of the NPT obligates States Parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…”

The preamble of the NPT calls upon States Parties

“to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time …”Nuclear Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (1968)

Having made these commitments 25 years ago and still waiting to see substantial progress toward these aims by NWS, NNWS were reluctant to extend the Treaty without securing additional means with which to hold NWS accountable to their disarmament obligations.



The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted an agreement that provided for the indefinite extension of the NPT. This agreement was in essence a package deal. In order for the NWS to achieve an indefinite extension, they had to make a number of concessions to the NNWS, led by the non-‐aligned movement.

The decisions and resolution adopted by the Conference were as follows:

• Strengthening of the review process of the Treaty. • Principles and objectives on nuclear non-‐proliferation and disarmament. • Extension of the Treaty on the Non-‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. • A resolution on the Middle East.

The decision on principles and objectives on nuclear non-‐proliferation and disarmament was comprised, inter alia, of the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-‐off Treaty(FMCT), the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996 and the development of nuclear-‐weapon-‐free zones.

Successfully negotiating a CTBT required addressing issues on several levels: political, procedural and technical. Nuclear weapon testing was considered by many non-‐nuclear weapon States as a threat to their national security, but the non-‐aligned movement also considered the continued existence and development of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon States (NWS) unacceptable.

There remained tension over whether the NWS would live up to their disarmament obligations in the “grand bargain” between NWS and NNWS as outlined in the NPT. After having agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT, NNWS looked for opportunities to insert language into the Treaty that would ensure substantial progress towards disarmament. India wanted to include language in the text to establish a time-‐bound framework for achieving nuclear disarmament.



ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED:

As the Preparatory commission, our duty is to promote “Entry into force” and building up the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear –Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Entry into force:

Article XIV of the Treaty notes that it will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification of the 44 States listed in Annex 2. These 44 States participated in the negotiations of the Treaty in 1996 and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at the time.

Several developments will take place once the Treaty enters into force. Most importantly, it will be possible to use the CTBT verification regime for verification purposes. There will also be organizational changes. First, the Preparatory Commission will cease to exist. In its place, the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) will be established. Second, Ratifying States will



henceforth be known as States Parties. Third, the Provisional Technical Secretariat will also cease to exist and be replaced by a Technical Secretariat. Fourth, the Executive Secretary will be replaced by a Director-‐General.

Fifth, there will be a Review Conference every ten years after the Treaty’s entry into force to reassess its operation and effectiveness and to ascertain that its objectives and purposes are being upheld.

The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the 44 States listed in Annex 2 ratify it. At that time, the Preparatory Commission will be dissolved and the CTBTO will be established.

Sixth, according to Article II, paragraph 9, of the Treaty, assessed contributions levied on States Parties will be levied according to the same criteria as before Entry into Force, but, unlike the pre-‐entry into force period, non-‐payment of assessed contributions may lead to loss of voting rights only if the arrears equal or exceed the amount of the contribution due from the country in question for the preceding two years and not after only 365 days as is currently the case.

Other developments after the Treaty enters into force will include the establishment of three new CTBTO organs:

• The Conference of States Parties • The Executive Council • The Technical Secretariat.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) contains a special mechanism to promote its entry into force – a conference designed to facilitate this objective takes place every other year. While its official designation is the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT, it is more commonly known as the

“Article XIV conference” in accordance with the relevant Treaty article. Six such conferences have taken place every alternate year since 1999 in Vienna, Austria, and New York, United States, respectively.



Participation for ratifying States only

As the depository of the CTBT, the United Nations Secretary-‐General convenes the Article XIV conferences. Attendance is open, while active participation is limited to States that have ratified the CTBT. Signatory States, non-‐signatory States, intergovernmental organizations, specialized agencies, and non-‐governmental organizations are invited to attend, but limited to the role of observer.

What happens at the Article XIV Conferences?

The participating States typically negotiate and issue a joint statement urging States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. The significant worldwide support for the CTBT is reflected in the fact that the Article XIV conferences have always succeeded in adopting final documents, whereas most other international for a in this field have failed over the past decade.

Particular focus is traditionally on the so-‐called Annex 2 States, whose ratification is required for the Treaty’s entry into force. These were defined as countries that participated in the CTBT’s negotiations and had reached a “nuclear capable” status, i.e. were in possession of nuclear power or research reactors by 1996, the final year of the negotiations. The Treaty identifies 44 of these countries in Annex2.As of February 2012, the number of remaining Annex 2 States had been reduced to eight, namely: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States. India, Pakistan, and the DPRK are the only Annex 2 countries not to have signed the CTBT.



Commitment at the highest political level

At the Article XIV conferences, ratifying States commit themselves to promoting the Treaty at the highest political level and through all available bilateral and multilateral channels. Delegations also determine concrete measures to accelerate the entry into force and universalization process. Measures adopted at past conferences have included urging States with nuclear weapon research programmes to refrain from developing new types of nuclear devices and to cease activities at former test sites that could raise suspicion. Participants have also developed plans to work with governments, businesses and other groups in order to promote more decisive reactions to any future explosive nuclear tests.

Article XIV conferences also offer the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) an opportunity to inform participating delegations of progress in the establishment of the verification regime.

NOTE: Article XIV conferences are solely for the purpose of promoting “entry into force”. This simulation of the preparatory commission, however, will also look to build the verification regime.

COUNTRY POSITIONS

USA:

October 13, 1999, the US Senate decided not to ratify the CTBT. This drew condemnation from Bill Clinton and the White House Administration, environmental groups and other governments. The grounds for rejection(ignoring the bipartisan politics that some claim affected this decision) was that if the US ratified this treaty, it would not stop others trying to go nuclear and therefore the US should not ratify on the grounds of national security. The ironic thing is that many nations around the world feel threatened by recent US unilateral actions



and are thus beginning to feel that they will need to procure weapons that are more dangerous to assure their own national security. If the U.S. reduced its aggressive postures then other nations perhaps would not feel as threatened -‐-‐instead they do and are arming themselves as a result. The Obama government however has made it clear that one of their goals is ratification of the CTBT.

"One of our highest priorities is the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-‐Ban Treaty. The Treaty is an essential step toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, the vision President Obama articulated in Prague in April 2009."

-‐ Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher at the 2011 Article XIV Conference in New York

CHINA:

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is conducive to preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and promoting the nuclear disarmament process. It is an important step towards complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China supports an early entry into force of the CTBT and has signed the treaty on the first day that it opened for signature. The Chinese Government has submitted the Treaty to the National People's Congress (NPC). NPC will consider and ratify the Treaty according to the due legal procedures.

China has consistently supported the preparatory work of the Preparatory Commission (PC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has dedicated, in a constructive attitude, to the work of PC and Working Groups subsidiary to it. China is cooperating closely with the Provisional Technical Secretariat in the smooth construction of the International Monitoring System stations within the territory of China, which definitely contributes to the early entry into force of the Treaty. The Chinese White Papers on Defence propagate that China supports the early entry into force of the CTBT and that



China has strictly abided by its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing. Further, they also indicate that China has actively participated in the work of the

Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization, and is steadily preparing for the national implementation of the Treaty. However, it is logical that China is watching the domestic developments in the US on the Senate ratification.

It may not speed up efforts to ratify the treaty unless the US ratifies it.

ISRAEL:

Israel has signed the CTBT but has not ratified it citing various factors ranging from national interests to regional issues. While there is a possibility that the country may ratify the CTBT if the US were to do so, at the same time it cannot be ruled out that Israel might demand that its national security concerns stemming from regional nuclear developments be addressed first.

DPRK:

North Korea’s signing and ratification is going to be another clinching issue. Since 2000, North Korea has twice tested nuclear weapons in October 2006 and May 2009, and US efforts to resolve North Korean nuclear issue through the six-‐party talks has not yielded the desired results. The talks have been stalled since 2009 and it is not irrational to expect that North Korea will not yield till the nuclear issue is resolved.

INDIA:

India voted against the draft CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament when its demand for time bound nuclear disarmament was rejected. India also objected to its inclusion in the Annex 2 list of countries. As on date, India says that it will not



stand in the way of the treaty becoming operational. However, the treaty cannot become operational without India signing and ratifying it.

PAKISTAN:

Pakistan has always linked its signing and ratification of any international treaty to that of India’s. It always blames India as the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region and that it carried out its own nuclear tests in 1998 only in response to India’s tests. At the same time, Pakistan is also appearing as an observer in the Article XIV conferences to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT. However, given its objections to the mismatch of nuclear materials stocks with India, it is not sure whether Pakistan will sign the CTBT even if India signs at a later date. It may be noted that Pakistan had changed its tone on the issue of NPT vis-‐à-‐vis India last year.

IRAN:

While Iran did sign the treaty in September 1996, it has outlined its objection to ratification as being based on the fact that it “considers that the Treaty does not meet nuclear disarmament criteria as originally intended.” As is the case with Egypt and Israel, Iran’s ratification will largely be determined by the security situation in the Middle East.

EGYPT:

Like Israel, Egypt has linked its approval of CTBT to securing a comprehensive Mideast peace, but as a leader of the Non-‐Aligned Movement — the members of which have overwhelmingly approved the treaty — it could face it pressure to ratify soon. U.S ratification would also increase pressure on Egypt to ratify, given



Egyptian reliance on U.S economic aid. While Egyptian and Israeli ratification is unlikely in the near term, the progress made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East was a necessary perquisite.

BUILDING THE VERIFICATION REGIME:

The verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) is designed to detect any nuclear explosion conducted on Earth – in the underground, under water or in the atmosphere.

The purpose of the verification regime is to monitor countries’ compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans all nuclear explosions on the planet.

Besides promoting the CTBT, the main task of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is to build this regime and to ensure that it is operational by the time the Treaty enters into force.

The CTBT’s global alarm system is designed to detect any nuclear explosion conducted on Earth – in the underground, under water or in the atmosphere.

The verification regime consists of the following elements:

• International Monitoring System • International Data Centre • Global Communications Infrastructure • Consultation and clarification • On-‐Site Inspection • Confidence-‐building measures



On-‐site inspections (OSI)

States have the right to request an on-‐site inspection (CTBTO, n.d.), regardless of the results of the consultation and clarification process. Such inspections will be carried out to ascertain whether a nuclear explosion has occurred in violation of the Treaty. They will also be used to collect facts that might be of use in identifying possible violators. On-‐site inspections are regarded as the final verification measure under the Treaty and can only be invoked once the Treaty enters into force.

The article regarding on-‐site inspection:

Article IV, Section D. ON-‐SITE INSPECTIONS -‐ Request for an On-‐Site Inspection

34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-‐site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.

35. The sole purpose of an on-‐site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in



violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.

36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-‐site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.

37. The on-‐site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.

38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-‐site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-‐General for the latter to begin immediate processing. Once a request is made the executive council takes a decision. The process of decision taking is also explained in the article (clause 39-‐67)

But here is the problem, once a country makes a request for an on-‐site inspection, Differences are expected to emerge among State-‐Parties – members of the Executive Council adhering to one or more of the following positions or their variations:

• Every suspicion should be thoroughly checked; there are ways to conceal a nuclear explosion and hence on-‐site inspections should be conducted in each case one of State-‐Parties has suspicions; these countries will insist on the conduct of the inspection;



• On-‐site inspections should be a tool that is used rarely and sparingly, only in situations when there is sufficient evidence that possible violation of the Treaty has occurred; these countries will require additional information and proof that there is sufficient grounds for suspicion; their vote is uncertain at the beginning of the conference;

• On-‐site inspections are interference in internal affairs of states; they violate the principle of sovereignty and can only be conducted when evidence of violation is incontrovertible; these countries will claim that evidence is insufficient and request for OSI should be denied;

• Decision on the conduct of an OSI often depends on the reputation and the track record of country to be inspected as well as the presence and/or robustness of its nuclear program; some countries will insist that the country in question is a country in good standing with regard to CTBT and other international regimes and thus an inspection is not necessary; others will claim that its track record justifies suspicion and hence an inspectionis required.

These differences are bound to cause hindrances in effective and smooth functioning of the CTBT and as the preparatory commission of the CTBT, we need to ensure that once the treaty is in force, it functions smoothly.

EXPECTED OUTCOME:

• A positive step towards “entry into force”

• A clear stance on the issue of ON-‐SITE Inspections (OSI)



CTBTO, n.d. [Online].

-‐ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS http://www.ctbto.org/index.php?id=280&no_cache=1&letter=n#nuclear-‐explosions

-‐ THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION http://www.ctbto.org/the-‐organization/ctbto-‐preparatory-‐commission/establishment-‐purpose-‐and-‐activities/

-‐ VERIFICATION REGIME http://www.ctbto.org/verification-‐regime/

-‐ INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM http://www.ctbto.org/verification-‐regime/building-‐theinternational-‐monitoring-‐system/1994-‐1996-‐reaching-‐critical-‐mass/

-‐ INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE http://www.ctbto.org/verification-‐regime/the-‐international-‐data-‐centre/history-‐of-‐theinternational-‐data-‐centre/

-‐ ON-‐SITE INSPECTIONS http://www.ctbto.org/verification-‐regime/on-‐site-‐inspection/the-‐final-‐verification-‐measure/

Documents

CTBTO