CSCE 727 Awareness and Training Secure System Development and Monitoring

CSCE 727CSCE 727

Awareness and Training Awareness and Training Secure System Development Secure System Development

and Monitoringand Monitoring

Information Warfare - Farkas 2

ReadingReadingReading for this lecture:Denning: Chapter 14

Recommended:•Rainbow Series Library, http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow.htm Common Criteria, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/

SYSTEM CERTIFICATIONSYSTEM CERTIFICATION



Building It SecureBuilding It Secure

1960s: US Department of Defense (DoD) risk of unsecured information systems

1970s: – 1977: DoD Computer Security Initiative– US Government and private concerns – National Bureau of Standards (NBS – now NIST)

Responsible for stadards for acquisition and use of federal computing systems

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS PUBs)


NBSNBS Two initiatives for security:

– Cryptography standards 1973: invitation for technical proposals for ciphers 1977: Data Encryption Standard 2001: Advanced Encryption Standard (NIST)

– Development and evaluation processes for secure systems Conferences and workshops Involves researchers, constructors, vendors, software

developers, and users 1979: Mitre Corporation: entrusted to produce an initial

set of criteria to evaluate the security of a system handling classified data


National Computer Security CenterNational Computer Security Center

1981: National Computer Security Center (NCSC) was established within NSA– To provide technical support and reference for government

agencies– To define a set of criteria for the evaluation and assessment of

security– To encourage and perform research in the field of security– To develop verification and testing tools– To increase security awareness in both federal and private sector

1985: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) == Orange Book


Orange BookOrange Book

Orange Book objectives– Guidance of what security features to build into new

products– Provide measurement to evaluate security of systems– Basis for specifying security requirements

Security features and Assurances Trusted Computing Base (TCB) security

components of the system: hardware, software, and firmware + reference monitor



Support Users: evaluation metrics to assess the reliability of the

security system for protection of classified or sensitive information when– Commercial product– Internally developed system

Developers/vendors: design guide showing security features to be included in commercial systems

Designers: guide for the specification of security requirements


Orange bookOrange book

Set of criteria and requirementsThree main categories:

– Security policy – protection level offered by the system

– Accountability – of the users and user operations

– Assurance – of the reliability of the system


Security PolicySecurity Policy

Concerns the definition of the policy regulation the access of users to information– Discretionary Access Control– Mandatory Access Control– Labels: for objects and subjects– Reuse of objects: basic storage elements must

be cleaned before released to a new user


AccountabilityAccountability

Identification/authenticationAuditTrusted path: no users are attempting to

access the system fraudulently


AssuranceAssurance

Reliable hardware/software/firmware components that can be evaluated separately

Operation reliabilityDevelopment reliability


Operation reliabilityOperation reliability

During system operation – System architecture: TCB isolated from user processes,

security kernel isolated from non-security critical portions of the TCB

– System integrity: correct operation (use diagnostic software)

– Covert channel analysis– Trusted facility management: separation of duties– Trusted recovery: recover security features after TCB

failures


Development reliabilityDevelopment reliability

System reliable during the development process. Formal methods.– System testing: security features tested and verified– Design specification and verification: correct design

and implementation wrt security policy. TCB formal specifications proved

– Configuration management: configuration of the system components and its documentation

– Trusted distribution: no unauthorized modifications


DocumentationDocumentation

Defined set of documents Minimal set:

– Trusted facility manual– Security features user’s guide– Test documentation– Design documentation– Personnel info: Operators, Users, Developers,

Maintainers


Orange Book LevelsOrange Book Levels

Highest Security

– A1 Verified protection

– B3 Security Domains

– B2 Structured Protection

– B1 Labeled Security Protections

– C2 Controlled Access Protection

– C1 Discretionary Security Protection

– D Minimal Protection

No Security



C1, C2: simple enhancement of existing systems. Does not break applications.

B1: relatively simple enhancement of existing system. May break some of the applications.

B2: major enhancement of existing systems. Will break many applications.

B3: failed A1 A1: top-down design and implementation of a new

system from scratch.


NCSC Rainbow SeriesNCSC Rainbow Series

Orange: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria

Yellow: Guidance for applying the Orange Book

Red: Trusted Network InterpretationLavender: Trusted Database Interpretation


Evaluation ProcessEvaluation Process Preliminary technical review (PTR)

– Preliminary technical report: architecture potential for target rating Vendor assistance phase (VAP)

– Review of the documentation needed for the evaluation process, e.g., security features user’s guide, trusted facility manual, design documentation, test plan. For B or higher, additional documentations are needed, e.g., covert channel analysis, formal model, etc.

Design analysis phase (DAP)– Initial product assessment report (IPAR): 100-200 pages, detailed

info about the hardware, software architecture, security relevant features, team assessments, etc.

– Technical Review Board– Recommendation to the NCSC


Evaluation ProcessEvaluation Process Formal evaluation phase (FEP)

– Product Bulletin: formal and public announcement – Final Evaluation Report: information from IPAR and

testing results, additional tests, review code (B2 and up), formal policy model, proof.

– Recommends rating for the system– National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) decides final

rating Rating maintenance phase (RAMP)

– Minor changes and revisions– Reevaluated– Rating maintenance plan


European CriteriaEuropean Criteria

German Information Security Agency: German Green Book (1988)

British Department of Trade and Industry and Ministry of Defense: several volumes of criteria

Canada, Australia, France: works on evaluation criteria 1991: Information Technology Security Evaluation

Criteria (ITSEC) – For European community– Decoupled features from assurance– Introduced new functionality requirement classes– Accommodated commercial security requirements


Common CriteriaCommon Criteria

January 1996: Common Criteria– Joint work with Canada and Europe– Separates functionality from assurance– Nine classes of functionality: audit, communications,

user data protection, identification and authentication, privacy, protection of trusted functions, resource utilization, establishing user sessions, and trusted path.

– Seven classes of assurance: configuration management, delivery and operation, development, guidance documents, life cycle support, tests, and vulnerability assessment.


Common CriteriaCommon Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL)

Lowest Security– EAL1: functionally tested– EAL2: structurally tested– EAL3: methodologically tested and checked– EAL4: methodologically designed, tested and reviewed– EAL5: semi-formally designed and tested– EAL6: semi-formally verified and tested– EAL7: formally verified design and tested

Highest Security


National Information Assurance National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)Partnership (NIAP)

1997: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Security Agency (NSA), and Industry

Aims to improve the efficiency of evaluation Transfer methodologies and techniques to private

sector laboratories Functions: developing tests, test methods, tools for

evaluating and improving security products, developing protection profiles and associated tests, establish formal and international schema for CC

National Security IssuesNational Security Issues


Interesting read:

B. Baer Arnold, Cyber war in Ukraine – business as usual for the Russian bear, Homeland Security News Wire, March 13, 2014, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140313-cyber-war-in-ukraine-business-as-usual-for-the-russian-bear Roger C. Molander, Peter A. Wilson, B. David Mussington, Richard Mesic: What is Strategic Information Warfare?, 1996, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR661.pdf


National Security and IWNational Security and IW U.S. agencies responsible for national security:

large, complex information infrastructure 1990: defense information infrastructure (DOD).

Supports – Critical war-fighting functions– Peacetime defense planning– Information for logistical support– Defense support organizations

Need proper functioning of information infrastructure

“digitized battlefield”


National Security and IWNational Security and IW

Increased reliance on information infrastructure

Heavily connected to commercial infrastructure– 95% of DOD’s unclassified communication via

public networkNo boundaries, cost effectiveness,

ambiguous


National Security and IWNational Security and IW

Vital human services– Law enforcement– Firefighters– Emergency telephone system– Federal Emergency Management Agency

Other Government Services and public utilities– Financial sector– Transportation– Communications– Power – Health system


Information WarfareInformation Warfare

Persian Gulf War: first “information war”After the war:

– U.S. concern about own vulnerability for IW– “strategic” level of information warfare

No clear understanding of objectives, actors, and types of activities

What is IW? – Academia, national security community, intelligence

community, etc.


Strategic WarfareStrategic Warfare

Cold War: “single class of weapons delivered at a specific range” (Rattray)– E.g., use of nuclear weapons with intercontinental

range Current: “variety of means … can create

“strategic” effects, independent of considerations of distance and range.”

Center of gravity: – Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power

from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight (DOD)


Strategic IWStrategic IW

“…means for state and non-state actors to achieve objectives through digital attacks on an adversary’s center of gravity.” (Rattray)


SIW Operating EnvironmentSIW Operating Environment

Man-made environmentIncreased reliance on information

infrastructure new center of gravity


Strategic Warfare vs. SIWStrategic Warfare vs. SIW

Similar challengesHistorical observation: centers of gravity

are difficult to damage because of– Resistance– Adaptation


Dimensions of Strategic AnalysisDimensions of Strategic Analysis

Threads:– Need to engage in multiple related means to achieve

desired results– Interacting with opponent capable of independent

action Distinction between”

– “grand strategy”: achievement of political object of the war (includes economic strength and man power, financial pressure, etc.)

– “military strategy”: gain object of war (via battles as means)


Waging Strategic WarfareWaging Strategic Warfare

Creates new battlefields and realms of conflict

Need identification of center of gravity– WWI:

German submarines: strangle U.K. economy Airplanes: tactical use: reconnaissance and artillery

spotting. Strategic use: 1915: German zeppelin: striking cities in England


Strategic Air PowerStrategic Air Power

Targets center of gravity WWI:

– Deliver devastating strikes– Civilian morale

WWII: – U.S. targets German economic targets– Massive bombing campaigns– Crushing civilian morale– Paralyzing economy

Problems:– Difficulty to achieve general industrial collapse– Grossly overestimated the damage


Other Weapons – Cold WarOther Weapons – Cold War

Military capacity as means to achieve political leverage through strategic attacks:– E.g., nuclear weapons, ballistic missile, satellite

capability, WMD

Massive retaliation– Ability to use is limited, e.g., 1956 Soviet

invasion of Hungary


SW – PastSW – Past

Focused on offensive actions Largely ignored

– Interaction between adversaries difficult to determine utility of offensive action

– Defense capabilities, vulnerabilities, and commitment


Necessary conditions for SW Necessary conditions for SW

Offensive freedom of actionSignificant vulnerability to attackProspects for effective retaliation and

escalation are minimizedVulnerabilities can be identified, targeted,

and damage can be assessed


SIWSIW

Growing reliance new target of concernCommercial networks for crucial functionsRapid changeWidely available toolsSignificant uncertainties

– Determining political consequences– Predicting damage, including cascading effects


SIWSIW

Complexity and openness– Weakness– Strength

Difficult to distinguish offensive from defensive

Public information – Vulnerabilities– Incentives

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Midterm exam


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CSCE 727 Awareness and Training Secure System Development and Monitoring