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CSCE 715: Network Systems Security Chin-Tser Huang [email protected] University of South Carolina

CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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CSCE 715: Network Systems Security. Chin-Tser Huang [email protected] University of South Carolina. Security in Network Layer. Implementing security in application layer provides flexibility in security policy and key management - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

CSCE 715:Network Systems Security

Chin-Tser [email protected]

University of South Carolina

Page 2: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

10/04/2011 2

Security in Network Layer Implementing security in application layer

provides flexibility in security policy and key management

Problem is the need to implement security mechanism in every application individually

To reduce the overhead, implement security in network layer to provide security for all applications between selected pair of computers

Page 3: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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IPSec Current security standard for IP layer Provide general security services for IP

Authentication Confidentiality Anti-replay Key management

Applicable to use over LANs, across public and private WANs, and for the Internet

Page 4: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Scenario of IPSec Uses

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Benefits of IPSec Provide strong security to all traffic

crossing the perimeter if installed in a firewall/router

Resistant to bypass IPSec is below transport layer, hence

transparent to applications Can be transparent to end users Can provide security for individual users

if desired

Page 6: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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IP Security Architecture Specification is quite complex Defined in numerous RFC’s

Latest version in RFC 4301/4302/4303/4306

many others, grouped by category Two protocols

Authentication Header (AH) Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

Mandatory in IPv6, optional in IPv4

Page 7: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

IP Security Architecture

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Page 8: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

Transport Mode and Tunnel Mode

Transport mode provides protection for upper-layer protocols, namely on the payload of an IP packet

Suitable for end-to-end communication between two hosts

Tunnel mode provides protection to the entire IP packet

Entire packet plus security fields is treated as the payload of new outer IP packet with new outer IP header

Suitable when one or both ends of SA are a security gateway

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Page 9: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Security Association (SA) A unidirectional relationship between

sender and receiver that affords security for traffic flow

Each IPSec computer maintains a database of SA’s

Defined by 3 parameters Security Parameters Index (SPI) IP Destination Address Security Protocol Identifier

Page 10: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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SA Parameters

Sequence Number Counter Sequence Number Overflow Anti-Replay Window AH and ESP information Lifetime IPSec Protocol Mode Path MTU

Page 11: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

Security Policy Database Used to relate IP traffic to specific SAs (or no SA

if the given traffic is allowed to bypass IPsec) Each SPD entry is defined by selectors, which

are a set of IP and upper-layer protocol field values Remote IP address Local IP address Next layer protocol Name Local and remote ports

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Page 12: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

IP Traffic Processing:Outbound Packets

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Page 13: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

IP Traffic Processing:Inbound Packets

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Authentication Header (AH) Provide support for data integrity and

authentication of IP packets end system/router can authenticate user/app prevent address spoofing attacks guard against replay attacks by tracking sequence

numbers Based on use of a MAC

HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-1-96 MAC is calculated over IP header fields that are either

immutable or predictable, AH header other than authentication data, and entire upper-level protocol data

Parties must share a secret key

Page 15: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Authentication Header

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Transport vs Tunnel Mode AH Transport mode is used to authenticate

IP payload and selected portion of IP header good for host to host traffic

Tunnel mode authenticates entire IP packet and selected portion of outer IP header good for VPNs, gateway to gateway security

Page 17: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

Provide message content confidentiality and limited traffic flow confidentiality

Can optionally provide the same authentication services as AH

Support range of ciphers, modes, padding DES, Triple-DES, RC5, IDEA, CAST etc CBC most common pad to meet blocksize, for traffic flow

Page 18: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Encapsulating Security Payload

Page 19: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Padding

Serve several purposes expand the plaintext to required

length make Pad Length and Next Header

fields aligned to 32-bit word boundary conceal actual length of payload

Page 20: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP Transport mode is used to encrypt and

optionally authenticate IP data data protected but header left in clear can suffer from traffic analysis but is efficient good for ESP host-to-host traffic

Tunnel mode encrypts entire IP packet add new header for next hop can counter traffic analysis good for VPNs, gateway-to-gateway security

Page 21: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP

Page 22: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Scope of ESP Encryption and Authentication

Page 23: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Combining Security Associations

SAs can implement either AH or ESP, but each SA can implement only one

Some traffic flows may require services of both AH and ESP, while some other flows may require both transport and tunnel modes

To address these concerns, need to combine SAs to form a security association bundle

Page 24: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Authentication plus Confidentiality

Which one first? Three approaches to consider ESP with Authentication Option

Transport mode or tunnel mode Authentication after encryption

Transport Adjacency A bundle of two transport SAs, with the inner

being an ESP SA and the outer being an AH SA Authentication after encryption

Transport-Tunnel Bundle A bundle consisting of an inner AH transport SA

and an outer ESP tunnel SA Authentication before encryption

Page 25: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Combining Security Associations

Page 26: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Key Management Handle key generation and distribution Typically need 2 pairs of keys

2 per direction for AH & ESP Manual key management

sysadmin manually configures every system Automated key management

automated system for on demand creation of keys for SA’s in large systems

Oakley and ISAKMP are two essential elements IKEv2 does not use the terms Oakley and ISAKMP

but basic functionality is the same

Page 27: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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IKE Key Determination (OAKLEY) A key exchange protocol Based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange Add features to address weaknesses of

Diffie-Hellman cookies to counter clogging attacks nonces to counter replay attacks key exchange authentication to counter

man-in-the-middle attacks Can use arithmetic in prime fields or

elliptic curve fields

Page 28: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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Usage of Cookies Three basic requirements

Must depend on specific parties Impossible for anyone other than issuing entity

to generate cookies that will be accepted by issuing entity

Cookie generation and verification must be fast To create a cookie, perform a fast hash

over src and dst IP addresses, src and dst ports, and a locally generated secret value

Page 29: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key

Management Protocol Provide framework for key management Define procedures and packet formats

to establish, negotiate, modify, and delete SAs

Independent of key exchange protocol, encryption algorithm, and authentication method

Page 30: CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

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IKE Header

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IKE Payload

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IKE Exchange

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Next Class

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack Hop Integrity