Crowdfunding Public Interest Judicial Reviews

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Tomlinson, Joe (2019) Crowdfunding Public Interest Judicial Reviews. Public Law. pp. 166-185. ISSN 0033-3565

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1

CrowdfundingPublicInterestJudicialReviews:ARiskyNew

ResourceandtheCaseforaPracticalEthics

JoeTomlinson*

Intheirclassicworkonpublicinterestlitigation(‘PIL’),HarlowandRawlingsdefine“pressure

throughlaw”asthe“useofthelawandlegaltechniquesasaninstrumentforobtainingwider

collectiveobjectives.”1Theyobservethattheuseofthecourtsbyorganisationsseekingpolicy

changewasnotjustanAmericantrend,itwashappeningintheUKandnorwasitnew.2The

quickly-growingliteratureonPILhasstudiedhowsomeorganisationsdeploythelawandlegal

techniques to pursue wider objectives.3 Much of the international debate around this

“mobilization of law”—from Vose’s early account of disadvantage theory in the 1950s4

throughtocurrentdebateson“legalopportunitystructures”5—hasaconsistentthread:the

availabilityoffinancialresourcesoftenhasaprofoundeffectonthefateofindividualPILcases

andthewiderpatternofPILindifferentjurisdictions.Thepropositionthatfundingisakey

variableindeterminingpatternsofPILisanutterlyuncontroversialone,andonewhichhas

sustained over time. In the context of judicial review in the UK, traditional funding for

*LecturerinPublicLaw,DicksonPoonSchoolofLaw,King’sCollegeLondon,andResearchDirector,PublicLaw

Project.ThisarticleiswritteninmypersonalcapacityanditdoesnotexpresstheviewsofthePublicLawProject.

IamverygratefulforexceptionalresearchassistancefromRaviLow-Beer,aswellasindirectsupportfromthe

UCL Grand Challenges Fund, Tom Hickman, and Lisa Vanhala. Carol Harlow, Jo Hickman, Richard Kirkham,

MauriceSunkin,andGrahamGeeprovidedhelpfulcommentsonvariousdrafts.Anearlierversionofthispaper

waspresentedattheUniversityofOxfordCentreforSocio-LegalStudies,whereseminarparticipantsoffered

manyusefulcomments.AlaterdraftwasalsogivenasalectureattheUniversityofEssex.Avisitingpositionat

MelbourneLawSchoolprovidedtheenvironmentforthisarticletobecompleted.Anyerrorsaremyown.1C.HarlowandR.Rawlings,PressureThroughLaw(London:Routledge,1992).

2Abovep.1.

3Seee.g.V.Bondy,L.Platt,andM.Sunkin,TheValueandEffectsofJudicialReview:TheNatureofClaims,their

OutcomesandConsequences (London:ThePublicLawProject,2015);C.Hilson,“Newsocialmovements:the

roleoflegalopportunity”(2002)9(2)JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy238;ThePublicLawProject,ThirdParty

Interventions:APracticalGuide(London:PublicLawProject,2008);ThePublicLawProject,GuidetoStrategic

Litigation (London:PublicLawProject,2014). Iwillnotdiscuss the legitimacyof thisuseof thecourts, fora

criticalanalysissee:C.Harlow,“PublicLawandPopularJustice”(2002)65(1)M.L.R.1.4C.Vose,CaucasiansOnly(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1959),pp.119,240.

5e.g.C.Hilson,“Newsocialmovements:Theroleoflegalopportunity”(2002)9J.E.P.L238;E.A.Andersen,Out

oftheclosetsandintothecourts:Legalopportunitystructureandgayrightslitigation(AnnArbor:Universityof

MichiganPress,2006);L.Vanhala,“Legalopportunitystructuresandtheparadoxoflegalmobilizationbythe

environmentalmovementintheUK”(2012)45Law&SocietyReview523.Forearlier,similarwork,see.C.R.

Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago:

UniversityofChicagoPress,1998).


2

litigationhasbecomelessavailableinrecentyears.6Whileitisimportanttorecognisethat

therelationshipbetweenmoneyandaccesstojudicialreviewisadenselycomplexone,many

nowclaimthatfundingajudicialreviewisincreasinglydifficult.Inthisspace,crowdfunding—

usinganonlineplatformtoraisethird-partyfunds—hasbecomeanincreasingly-usedtool,

withmanyPILchallengesnowbeingfundedbythismethod.7Therehas,however,beenno

systematicanalysisofthisphenomenonintheUK,andrelativelylittleinternationally.8

In this article, it is considered whether crowdfunding is a possible answer to the

increasingscarcityoftraditionalresourcesinthecontextofPILintheUK.Inotherwords,can

crowdfunding support reformthrough theprovisionof resources forPIL?Thequestionof

whetherthismodeoflitigationfundingoughttobeencouragedorwhetheritisproblematic

is also addressed. I argue that crowdfunding can—in certain cases—solve the resource

shortageand,ultimately,beusefulinprocuringreform.9However,itisfarfromafoolproof

solutionandtherearemultiplerisksinherentinitsuse.Thenatureandextentoftheserisks

aresuchthatthecrowdfundingofPILshouldbeapproachedwithgreatcaution.Itistherefore

suggestedherethatweneedtodevelopapracticalethicsofcrowdfundinginthiscontext.

The analysis in this article has fourmain parts. The first part explains the present

fundingcontextforjudicialreviewintheUK.Itisimperativethiscontextisunderstoodasit

provides the conditions inwhich crowdfundinghas grown.The secondpartof this article

introduceshowcrowdfundingworks,howithasbecomeincreasinglyrelied-uponasamethod

forfundingjudicialreviewcases,whothekeyactorsare,andexamplesofcrowdfundingin

action. The third part considers the main benefits and risks of the increased role that

crowdfundingisplayingintheUK.Thefinalpartofthisarticlesetsoutthecasefordeveloping

6PILdoesnotnecessarilyhavetotaketheformofjudicialreview.Seeforinstancetheactionsdocumentedin

G.Howells,TheTobaccoChallenge:LegalPolicyandConsumerProtection(Abingdon:Routledge,2011).Thereis

an argument that all cases have, in away, a public interest justification, as explained in R (UNISON) v Lord

Chancellor[2017]UKSC51;[2017]3W.L.R.409.Thefocushere,however,isjudicialreview,whichistheprimary

meansofPILintheUK.7Thisisaninternationaltrend.HereIfocusonprovidingadetailedstudyoftheUKexperience.

8SeeE.Hamman,“SavetheReef!Civiccrowdfundingandpublicinterestenvironmentallitigation”(2015)15(1)

Q.U.T.L.R.159;M.A.Gomez,“CrowdfundedJustice:OnthePotentialBenefitsandChallengesofCrowdfunding

asaLitigationFinancingTool”(2015)49U.S.F.L.R.307;M.Elliot,“TrialbySocial-Media:TheRiseofLitigation

Crowdfunding”(2016)84(2)U.C.L.R.529;R.Perry,“CrowdfundingCivilJustice”(2018)B.C.L.R.(forthcoming).9Thenotionof“publicinterest”litigationisfiercelycontested.Isimplyuseitheretomeantheuseofthelaw

and legal techniquesasan instrument forobtainingwider collectiveobjectives.Thismaysimply involve the

settleoflegalquestionsandneednotbeinformedbyanyideology.


3

apracticalethicsforcrowdfundingPILandsketchesouttheformthatsuchapracticalethics

maytake.

AccesstoJudicialReview,FinancialResources,andFunding

Thesuggestionthatlegalprocedurescostsignificantamountsofmoneyandthatthereshould

bepracticalmechanismsformanagingsuchexpensesisnotnew,norisitparticulartopublic

law.10Theconcernthatjudicialreviewistooexpensiveforordinarycitizenshasalsolongbeen

discussed.11Yet,thecomplexsocio-economicdimensionsofjudicialreviewlitigationhavenot

beensquarelyconfrontedbypubliclawresearchersintheUK.12Indeed,thetopicissolittle

discussedbyscholarsthatRawlingssuggestsitispartof“thesecrethistory”ofjudicialreview:

wherethewidely-observedexpansionofjudicialreviewgroundsinrecentdecadeshasbeen

quietly“engenderedonthebackoflarge-scaleexclusion”ofpeople.13

Inrecentyears,concernsabouttheexpenseofjudicialreviewhavebeenputunder

the spotlightby thegeneralprogrammeofausterity implementedby theUKgovernment

from2010onwards,14aswellasthereformsundertakenandattemptedconcerningjudicial

review specifically.15Notably,when theUKGovernmentproposed changes to the judicial

reviewsystemin2012,theconsultationprocesscitedthegrowingnumberof“weakorill-

foundedclaims”thatweretakingup“largeamountsof judicialtimeandcostingthecourt

systemmoney.”16Theimpactofthesechanges—andtheassociatedpoliticalrhetoricabout

thegovernment-sideexpenseofjudicialreview—hasledtogrowingconcernaboutaccessto

justiceandthelimitingofwhoisabletoholdpublicbodiestoaccountviatheprocess.The

positionnowisthatthecostsofjudicialreviewforbothclaimantsandpublicauthoritieshave

beenlargelywithoutempiricalstudybutthosesameissueshavebecomemorecentraltothe

10See,forexample,thehistoricaldebateinciviljusticetracedinJ.Sorbaji,EnglishCivilJusticeaftertheWoolf

andJacksonReforms:ACriticalAnalysis(Cambridge:CUP,2014).11Thisissuewasrecentlyraisedagaininaprominentblog,see:T.Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”(February9

2017) UK Constitutional Law Blog, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/09/tom-hickman-public-laws-

disgrace/[AccessedFebruary22,2018].12SeethediscussioninBondy,Platt,andSunkin,TheValueandEffectsofJudicialReview:TheNatureofClaims,

theirOutcomesandConsequences(2015),pp.47-58.13R.Rawlings,“ModellingJudicialReview”(2008)61(1)C.L.P.95,109.

14Theeffectsofausterityhaveaffectedmanypartsoftheadministrativejusticesystem,notjustthejudicial

review system. For an overview and analysis, see R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, “Mapping current issues in

administrativejustice:austerityandthe‘morebureaucraticrationality’approach”(2017)39(3)J.S.W.F.L.380.15MinistryofJustice,JudicialReview:Proposalsforfurtherreform(London:Cm8703,2014).

16 Ministry of Justice, “Judicial review consultation–Press Release” (13 December 2012),

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/judicial-review-consultation[AccessedFebruary22,2018].


4

shapingofgovernmentpolicy—andthepublicdebate—onjudicialreview.Thoughthisarticle

isnottheplacetoprovideit,thereiscertainlyanurgentneedforathoroughandwide-ranging

assessmentofthe“economy”ofthemodernjudicialreviewsystem.

Thecoreconcernofthisarticle—crowdfunding—relatesspecificallytothefundingof

judicialreviewcases.17Inrespectoffundingacase,twoissuesneedtobeconsideredbyany

prospectivejudicialreviewclaimantattheoutset:payingtheirownlegalfeesandexpenses,

andbudgetingtopaytheotherside’scostsiftheclaimfails.Therearethreemainwaysfor

claimants to pay their own lawyer costs: paying from existing funds; entering into a

conditionalfeeagreement(a“CFA”)withsolicitorsand/orcounsel;orobtainingagrantof

legalaid.18

Forthosepayingfromtheirownpockets,solicitorstypicallybilltheirtimeathourly

ratesdependingontheseniorityofthefeeearner,oratafixedfee(forthewholecaseorfor

stages of it), or a combination of both. The level of funds needed for lawyer fees and

disbursementsvarieswidelypercase.Itisclear,however,thecostofbringingajudicialreview

claimthatgoestoafullhearingmaybeconsiderable(lessenediftheclaimantwantstobring

aclaimasalitigantinperson).A2007estimateplacedthecostsintheregionof£10,000to

£20,000forastraightforwardcase,possiblymuchhigherforamorecomplexmatter.19This

has likely increasedinthedecadesincetheestimatewasmade.Hickman,writingin2017,

estimatesthata“verysimpletwohour judicial reviewagainstagovernmentdepartment”

wouldcostaround£8,000to£10,000.20A“moderatelycomplexclaimlastingadayandnot

broughtagainstacentralgovernmentdepartment”wouldruninexcessof£40,000,plusVAT.

Fora“substantialtwodayjudicialreview,”Hickmanestimatescostswillrunto£80,000and

£200,000.Whilethereisanabsenceofrecentsystematicdata,legalfeesareclearlysignificant

amounts.Itmustalsobenotedthatifaclaimantisunsuccessful,theyarelikelytobeliable

forthedefendant’scostsaswellastheirown.Theyaretherefore lookingata legalbillof

17Otherkeyaspectsofthe“economy”ofjudicialreviewincludecourtfees,costsrules,etc.

18 Legal aid grants comewith a level of costs protection too. Before the event insurance policies (typically

included in home and motor insurance policies) fund various types of litigation, but are ill-suited to non-

monetaryclaimswhereremediesarediscretionary,andsoarenotgenerallyavailabletocoverjudicialreview

proceedings.19ThePublicLawProject,Howtofundajudicialreviewclaimwhenpublicfundingisnotavailable(London:The

PublicLawProject,2007),para.1,whichwas informedbydiscussionwhichpractitioners.Furtherandsimilar

estimates are available in a response to aMinistryof JusticeConsultationmadeavailable via a Freedomof

InformationAct2000(FOIA)request,seeFOIARequestNo.171204020.20Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”.


5

upwardsof£30,000iftheylose,andtheymustbepreparedforthiseventuality,whileallthe

timebearinginmindthegeneralunpredictabilityofjudicialreviewproceedings,adjudication,

andcostsorders.

CFAsare sometimes referred to as “nowinno feeagreements.” In judicial review

cases,theyareagreementsbetweenclaimantsandtheirlawyersthatrequirethelawyersto

agreetoactinacaseonthebasisthattheywillonlybepaidifthecaseissuccessful.Lawyers

areabletochargeasuccessfeeofupto100%ifthecaseiswontocompensatethemforthe

riskofbeingpaidnothing.However,sinceApril2013,successfeesarenolongerrecoverable

from the defendant, butmust instead be paid by the claimant. Given the non-monetary

natureofjudicialreview,theprospectofpayingasuccessfeeoftenmakesaCFAexpensive

andunattractive.Forthisreason,manyjudicialreviewclaimantswillonlybeabletoproceed

if they can agree a particular type of CFA commonly known as a “CFA-Lite”. This is an

agreementwhichlimitsthecostspayabletothesolicitortotheamountofcoststhatmaybe

recovered fromtheother side (which theclaimanthas toagree topursue),anddoesnot

requiretheclaimanttopaythelawyersasuccessfee.Ifthecaseissuccessfulandan inter

partescostsorder isobtained,theclaimant’s lawyerscanrecovertheir full fees.CFA-Lites

maybeusedinconjunctionwithfixedfees.

Afixedfeecanbeagreedwithlawyerstoperhapsgetaroundsomeofthedifficulties

facedwithhighfees.However,agreeingfixedfeesattheoutsetisriskyforlawyerssincethey

willnotgenerallyhavehadanopportunitytofullyengagewiththecasepapers,andjudicial

reviewlitigationisoftenunpredictableevenifwellprepared.Assuch,fixedfeesareoften

chargedinconjunctionwithaCFA,asameansofreducingthelawyers’exposure,withfull

feespayableintheeventthataninterpartescostsorderisobtained—thisiscommonlycalled

aDiscountedFeeAgreement.

Legalaidisanotherkeysourceoffunding.Thespecificprovisionsgoverningthegrant

oflegalaidinjudicialreviewhaveabyzantinecomplexity.Broadlyspeaking,therearetwo

typesoflegalaidrelevanttojudicialreview.ThereisLegalHelp,whichcoversinitialadvice

andassistance.ThereisalsoLegalRepresentation.LegalHelpisatypeof“controlledwork,”

whichsolicitorshavecontractualrightstoself-grant.Lawyersarepaidafixedfee,currently

£259,regardlessoftheamountofworkcarriedout,unlessactualcostsexceedthefixedfee

byafactorofthreeormore,inwhichcase,anhourlyratecanbeclaimedinthefullamount

(thisassessedonacasebycasebasisby theLegalAidAgency).TheLegalRepresentation


6

categoryitself involvestwotypesoflegalaid:InvestigativeRepresentation,whichtypically

coversworktobedonetoestablishthemeritsofapotentialclaim;andFullRepresentation,

which covers work to be done from the issuing of proceedings. Investigative and Full

Representationarecategoriesofworkknownas“licensedwork”forwhich,saveincertain

prescribedexceptionalcircumstances,permissionneedstobesought inadvancefromthe

LegalAidAgency.Lawyersarepaidperhouratratesfixedbyregulation.21Solicitorsprepare

abillattheendofacase,includingallthedisbursementsincurredsuchascounsels’,experts’,

andcourtfees.EachbillisassessedeitherbytheLegalAidAgency(ifeitherthebillislessthan

£2500,orifproceedingswerenotissued),orbythecourt.Ifanorderisobtainedthatanother

partymustpaythelegallyaidedperson’scosts,thesolicitorssendthebilltothepayingparty

forpayment. Ifagreementon thesizeof thebill cannotbe reached, thesolicitors for the

receivingpartycancommenceassessmentproceedingstogetthebillassessedbythecourt.

Eligibility for legal aid is governedby legislation, theprovisions and applicationsofwhich

determines:whether a claim if of a kind that is ‘within scope’ andeligible for legal aid;22

whethertheapplicantforlegalaidsatisfiesthe‘meanstest’;23andwhetherthemeritsofthe

claimaresufficienttosatisfythemeritstest.24

Recentreformstolegalaidhavecausedwidespreadconcerninthelegalcommunity.25

In the contextof judicial review,Hickmanhasarguedpowerfully that theyarepartof an

accessto justicecrisis that is“public law’sdisgrace.”26Hearguesthatthemost important

componentoflegalaid,atleastasitappliesinthefieldofpubliclaw,isnotthatitprovidesa

sourceof funding foraperson’s lawyersbutbecause it comeswithprotectionagainstan

adversecostsorder.Heobservesthat“todayveryfewpeoplenowqualifyforlegalaid.”27This

is, in large part, because of substantial restrictions on the scope of legal aid and the

applicationof themeanstest.28ForHickman, theground-level reality is that“peoplewho

have£169.15ormoreperweekforthemselvesandtheirfamilytoliveoff,orwhohaveany

21CivilLegalAid(Remuneration)Regulations2013(SI2013/422)Sch.1para.3.

22LegalAidSentencingandPunishmentofOffendersAct2012s.9ands.10.

23CivilLegalAid(FinancialResourcesandPaymentforServices)Regulations2013(SI2013/480)(asamended).

24CivilLegalAid(MeritsCriteria)Regulations2013(SI2013/104)(asamended).

25ThestatutorylynchpinofthesereformswastheLegalAid,SentencingandPunishmentofOffendersAct2012.

Suchconcernwas,forinstance,well-documentedinthediscussionaroundtheBachCommission,seeTheBach

Commission,TheRighttoJustice(London:FabienSociety,2017).26Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”.

27Above.

28LegalAidAgency,MeansAssessmentGuidance(April2015).Seefurther:D.Hirsch,PricedoutofJustice?Means

testinglegalaidandmakingendsmeet(LawSociety:London,2018).


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significant assets, do not qualify for legal aid.”29 Added to this, the government also

introduceda"nopermission,nofee"arrangement,whererepresentativesonlygetfeesfor

legal aid work at permission stage if the application is granted.30 The effect of these

arrangementswaschallengedviajudicialreviewand,asaresult,paymentisnowavailablein

caseswherethedefendantwithdrawsthedecisionunderchallenge,thecourtordersanoral

hearing,orthecourtordersarolled-uphearingofboththepermissionandsubstantiveissues

atthesametime.31Thegeneralprincipleofthearrangement,however,stillremainsinforce.

Hickman’s analysis—and its characterisationof access to judicial reviewas a “disgrace”—

struckachordwithpractitioners,bothinportrayingtheroleoflegalaidinjudicialreviewand

highlighting thewider issueof costs.Assessing theprecise sizeof theproblem is difficult

without clear empirical data.32 A limited amount of administrative data is, however,

available.33Table1showsthetotalamountofapplicationsforlegalaidmadeinjudicialreview

cases from2006 to2017.Table2 showsdata taken from theAdministrativeCourtCOINS

databaseonhowmanymay judicial reviewsare recordedasbeingsupportedby legalaid

from2000to2016.Theoverallupshotwhichcanbetakenfromthesetwodatasetsisthat

legalaidisnowalsomoredifficulttosecureforcaseswithaclearpublicinterestdimension.

Table1:totalamountofapplicationsforlegalaidmadeinjudicialreviewcasesoverthelasttenyears

Year Granted NotGranted

2006-07 5,085 758

2007-08 4,925 730

2008-09 5,605 724

2009-10 6,589 875

2010-11 5,484 914

2011-12 5,491 1,128

2012-13 6,298 1,103

2013-14 5,313 2,008

2014-15 3,718 1,311

29Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”.

30CivilLegalAid(Remuneration)(Amendment)(No3)Regulations2014(SI2014/607).

31R.(ontheapplicationofBenHoareBellSolicitors&Ors)vTheLordChancellor[2015]EWHC523(Admin);The

CivilLegalAid(Remuneration)(Amendment)Regulations2015(SI2015/898).32Much helpful data is kept by the government.Much of it is published butmuch ofwhat is available on

governmentsystemsmaybegenuinelyoutsideoftheprovisionsofFOIA.33ThiswasmadeavailableviaanFOIArequestbytheauthor,seeFOIARequestNo.171020004.


8

2015-16 3,842 1,560

2016-17 3,131 970

Table2:amountofjudicialreviewcasesrecordedasbeingsupportedbylegalaidontheAdministrative

CourtCOINSdatabase

Year Numberofjudicialreviews Numberofjudicialreviewswithlegalaid Asa%

2000 4238 1163 27.44%

2001 4722 1733 36.70%

2002 5372 1586 29.52%

2003 5938 1938 32.64%

2004 4200 913 21.74%

2005 5356 930 17.36%

2006 6421 1077 16.77%

2007 6684 921 13.78%

2008 7093 1024 14.44%

2009 9098 1440 15.83%

2010 10553 1340 12.70%

2011 11360 799 7.03%

2012 12429 1246 10.02%

2013 15594 933 5.98%

2014 4065 240 5.90%

2015 4679 205 4.38%

2016 4300 195 4.53%

Overall,thegeneralpictureofjudicialreviewfundingintheUK,atleastintermsof

thesourcesoffundingthathavebeenavailableinrecentyears,isoneofincreasingscarcity.

Feesarestillhigh,legalaidgrantsaredecreasing,andotherkindsofagreements—suchas

CFAs—arefarfromidealinjudicialreview.Inthiscontext,PILfindsitselfinanew,evenmore

hostile environment thanbefore; the key funding variables are shifting.Certainly, various

third-party funders—such as charitable trusts or the Equality and Human Rights

Commission—stillsometimesbackjudicialreviews,buttheoverallfundinglandscaperemains

morebaronthanitwasintherecentpast.34

34Thelongerhistoryoffundingforjudicialreviewsis,ofcourse,amorecomplexstory.


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CrowdfundingandJudicialReview

Arelatively recentphenomenon is thepossibilityof raisingmoney for litigationviaonline

crowdfunding platforms. Crowdfunding in general has risen in prominence across theUK

economy—a trend often attributed to the failure of banks and other traditional funding

sourcestomeetdemand—andthecrowdfundingmarkethasgrownmassivelyinsize,seeing

hugeyear-on-yeargrowth.In2013,£666millionwasraisedthroughcrowdfundingplatforms,

whichroseto£1.74billionand£3.2billionin2014and2015respectively.35AreviewbyNesta

adopted the view that crowdfunding is now a key aspect of the “alternative finance

economy,”andanindustrywhich“isquicklybecominganimportantpartoftheUKeconomy,”

onewherean“innovative,technologyledapproachhasimprovedaccesstofinancefor[small

andmediumenterprises]andseemstobehavingapositiveimpactonsocialandcharitable

enterprises.”36Themovetowardthisnewalternativefinanceindustrywassupportedbythe

government,andsowas theuseofcrowdfundingspecifically. In2012, todemonstrate its

support, the Coalition Government invested £20 million in businesses via crowdfunding

platformsandmadeafurther£40millioninvestmentin2014.37Atthesametime,therehave

beengrowingconcernsaboutthegeneralregulationofcrowdfundingactivitiesandincreased

regulationislikelytodevelopinthecomingyears.38

Inthelitigationcontext,crowdfundingis,inessence,aformofthirdpartylitigation

fundingarrangement.ThiswasdefinedbyJacksonLJasfundingbya“partywhohasnopre-

existinginterestinthelitigation,usuallyonthebasisthat(i)thefunderwillbepaidoutofthe

proceedsofanyamountsrecoveredasaconsequenceofthelitigation,oftenasapercentage

35B.Zhang,P.Baeck,T.Ziegler,J.BoneandK.Garvey,PushingBoundaries:The2015UKAlternativeFinance

IndustryReport(Nesta:London,2015).36Abovep.5.

37DepartmentforBusiness,Innovation&Skills,"New£40millioninvestmentbyBritishBusinessBanktosupport

£450million of lending to smaller businesses—Press" (25 February 2014),

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-40-million-investment-by-british-business-bank-to-support-450-

million-of-lending-to-smaller-businesses[AccessedFebruary22,2018].38 J. Armour and L. Enriques, “The Promise and Perils of Crowdfunding: Between Corporate Finance and

ConsumerContracts”(2018)81(1)M.L.R.51.TheFinancialConductAuthorityarealsonowtakingvarioussteps

inrespectofcrowdfundingplatforms.Forinstance,theyconsidercertainformsofcrowdfunding—loan-based

crowdfunding and investment-based crowdfunding—as regulated activities under the Financial Services and

MarketsAct2000.


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oftherecoverysum;and(ii)thefunderisnotentitledtopaymentshouldtheclaimfail.”39

Longprohibitedundertheancientprinciples40ofbarretry,maintenance,andchamperty,the

past century sawa gradual liberalisationon third-party funding for litigation.41 Jackson LJ

considered that third party funding is in principle “beneficial and should be supported,”

because,amongstotherbenefits,it“providesanadditionalmeansoffundinglitigationand,

forsomeparties,theonlymeansoffundinglitigation[andthus]promotesaccesstojustice.”42

Inacrowdfundingarrangement,onlinedonationsaremadetoacollectivepot.Thepotof

fundsthenessentiallyisthethird-partyfund,withthedonorsthefunders.Adistinctioncan

be drawn between “investment-based” crowdfunding models, where investors have a

financial stake in a monetary claim, and “non-investment based” crowdfunding models,

wheretheinvestors’rewardisnon-monetaryornon-existent.43

TwoorganisationsintheUKcurrentlyofferbespokecrowdfundingservicesforjudicial

review claims and are particularly prominent: CrowdJustice and the Good Law Project.

CrowdJustice offers a platform for case owners (those seeking funding) to publicise and

fundraiseforaprospectivecase.Caseowners,withsupport fromCrowdJustice,developa

webpagesettingoutdetailsofthecaseforwhichfundingissought,atargetamount,anda

deadline for raising it. The page is typically publicised through social media and online

donationsareaccepted.Ifthetargetismet,thenfundsaretransferredintothecaseowner’s

solicitors’clientaccount.CrowdJusticetakesa6%“platformfee,”plusVAT,fromtheoverall

totalraised.Thepaymentprocessalsohasachargeof1.7%plus20pperpledge.Ifthecase

owner’stargetisnotmet,CrowdJusticedonottakeafee,pledgesarecancelled,andbackers’

cardsarenotcharged.Ifthecaseproceeds,anyfundsthatareunusedattheconclusionof

thecasearereturnedbythesolicitorstoCrowdJustice.Thecaseownercanelecttoputsuch

unusedfundstowardsanothercaseonCrowdJustice,orfailingthat,theyaredonatedtothe

AccesstoJusticeFoundation.Thosewhodonateover£1,000aregiventheoptionofapro

39LordJusticeJackson,ReviewofCivilCosts:FinalReport(2009),p.xv.However,JacksonLJrecognisedthatthird

partyfundingis“notusuallyfeasiblewherenon-monetaryrelief,suchasaninjunctionordeclaration,isthemain

remedysought.”40M.Radin,‘MaintenancebyChamperty’(1935)24CaliforniaLawReview48,49;GilesvThompson[1994]1

AC142,p.153(LordMustill).41Foranoverview,seeLordNeuberger,“FromBarretry,MaintenanceandChampertytoLitigationFunding”

(HarbourLitigationFundingLecture,2013).42AboveCh.11,para.1.2.

43Perry,“CrowdfundingCivilJustice”(2018)B.C.L.R.(forthcoming).


11

rata refund. CrowdJustice does not offer any legal advice. All information about the case

comesfromthecaseownersandtheirlawyers.

TheGoodLawProjectwasfoundedbyitsDirector,JolyonMaughamQC—asuccessful

tax barrister. It is not itself a crowdfunding platform—it uses CrowdJustice—but

crowdfundingisakeypartofitsoperation.Itisanexpresslypoliticalproject,whoseaimsare

touselitigationtodrivethedemandforchange.Ithasparticularareasofinterest,including

tax,workers’rights,andBrexit.ThegeneralwayinwhichtheGoodLawProjectworkswasset

outinalecturebyitsDirector.44Inessence,theDirectorseekspotentialcaseswhichmeet

the Project’s case selection criteria, secures pro bono advice from counsel, and seeks

solicitorsandcounselwillingtoactontermsconsistentwiththecrowdfundingexerciseat

Governmentlawyerrates,andthencrowdfundsattheletterbeforeclaimstage.Thefirstcase

theGoodLawProjectrelatedtotheargumentultimatelydecidedbytheSupremeCourtin

Miller.45AftertheArticle50argumentwasfloatedinanonlineblog,Maughamcrowdfunded

initialadvice(thoughthiseffortwasoneofmultipleeffortsandtheGoodLawProjectdidnot

takepartinthelitigation).46Sincethen,ithascrowdfundedachallengetoUber’sallegedVAT

avoidance (valued at around £1bn) and a challenge to the Electoral Commission’s

investigation into Vote Leave’s spending returns, the latter arguing that the Electoral

Commission’sinvestigationappliedthewrongtestoflawandwasinadequateonthefacts.

Both CrowdJustice and the Good Law Project have taken a different approach to

vetting prospective claims, to try to ensure that they are supporting meritorious cases.

CrowdJustice requires that every individualor group takinga caseeitherhaveaqualified

solicitororbarristerwhohasbeeninstructed,orthatthecaseisbeingtakenbyanon-profit,

andthenleavesitto“campaign”topersuadedonorsofthemeritofthecase.TheGoodLaw

ProjectusestheresourcesofitsDirectorforthispurpose,whichplacesalimitonthenumber

ofcasesitcansupport.

Itisimportanttonotethatthoseengagedwithcrowdfundingjudicialreviewsarea

muchmorediversegroupthanthetwoorganisationshighlightedhere.Manycharities,for

44J.MaughamQC,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(AnnualQueenMaryUniversityofLondonLawandSociety

Lecture,2017).45R(Miller)vSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEuropeanUnion[2017]UKSC5;[2017]2W.L.R.583.

46 The legal argument was outlined in N. Barber, T. Hickman and J. King, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’:

Parliament’s Indispensable Role” (June 27 2016) UK Constitutional Law Blog,

https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-

trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/[AccessedFebruary22,2018].


12

instance, who bring litigation to pursue their aims rely upon crowdfunding. So too do

individualslackingsufficientmeanstobringacase.However,thecrowdfundingmodelisopen

tousebyawidevarietyofactorsandthereforepotentiallyabuseofvariouskindsbyboththe

malevolentormisguided.Therehavebeennomajorscandalsyetthatrelatetocrowdfunded

litigation, but there are anecdotal reports of dubious crowdfunding propositions being

circulatedandmuchofcrowdfundingactivity,despitebeingonline,maynotbeparticularly

visible.47 The landscape being effectively devoid of tailored regulation does not assist in

ensuringproblemsaredetected.Atpresent,thecrowdfunding“community”isanambiguous

entity.

OneexampleofacrowdfundedjudicialreviewintheUKisthejuniordoctors’case.48

Theclaimantgroup,JusticeforHealth,arguedthatanewcontractimposedbytheSecretary

ofStatewas“unsafeandunsustainable”andthattheSecretaryofStateforHealth—Jeremy

HuntMP—didnothavethelegalpowertoimposeit.Putsimply,thenewcontractchanged

the way doctors were to be reimbursed for weekend working. Instead of Saturdays and

Sundaysbeingdividedupbetween“normal”and“unsocial”hours,supplementsweretobe

paidwhichdependedonhowmanyweekendsadoctorworks.Healthministersarguedthat

thecontractwasnecessaryto improvemedicalcoveratweekends.49Theargument ledto

variousstrikesby juniordoctorsand ledtothefirstall-outstrike inNHShistory.GreenJ.,

sitting in the High Court, concluded thatMr. Hunt had acted “squarely” within his legal

powers.TheclaimantsalsoarguedthatMrHunt’sapproachlackedclarityandtransparency,

andthatitwasirrationaltocontendthatimposingthecontractwouldimproveweekendcare.

Green J. rejected all of these arguments, finding that the Secretary of State was legally

entitledtoadopttheviewthatchangingstaffingatweekendswouldhave“some,material”

impactonmedicalcover.Whatissignificantforthepurposesofthisarticleisthattheclaimant

inthiscase,JusticeforHealth,wasacompanyformedofjuniordoctorswhowere“directly

affected by the introduction of the contract.”50 They raised money—£300,000—via

CrowdJustice,basedondonationsbymorethan5,000donors.51Thelitigationwasledbyan

47Thisareaisripeforfurtherinvestigation.

48JusticeforHealthvSecretaryofStateforHealth[2016]EWHC2338;[2016]Med.L.R.599.

49Thereweredisputesabouttheevidenceusedbythegovernmenttosupportitscase.

50JusticeforHealth[2016]EWHC2338;[2016]Med.L.R.599[15].

51C.Dyer,“Juniordoctors'HighCourtchallengetoJeremyHunt”(13September2016)BritishMedicalJournal,

http://www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i4975[AccessedFebruary22,2018].


13

establishedpubliclawfirm.GreenJ.observedthatthecasewas“financedbyalargenumber

ofindividualswhohavecontributedonacrowd-fundingbasisallofwhomitissaidoppose

theintroductionofthenewcontract”andhowsupporthadbeen“forthcomingfrommany

sources,includingseniormembersofthemedicalprofession.”52Earlyoninthecase,acap

wasplacedonhowmuchcostscouldberecovered.53Itisunclearwhetherthiscase—though

itultimatelyfailed—wouldhavebeenpossiblewithoutcrowdfunding.Ifithadsucceeded,the

reformwouldhaveessentiallybeencrowdfunded.

Another example of a case supported by crowdfunding—a less well-managed

instance—isWebster.54Thiscaseformedpartofastringofcases,broughtaftertheMiller

litigation,whichsoughttochallengethenoticeofwithdrawalsentbytheUKtotheEU.After

theclaimwasbroughtconsiderablyoutoftime,permissionwasrejectedonthepapersby

SupperstoneJas ‘unarguable.’Theclaimantsrenewedtheirapplicationatanoralrenewal

hearing.Thesecondtimearound,GrossLJandGreenJfoundtheapplicationtobetotally

withoutmerit:“[p]utbluntly,thedebatewhichtheclaimantseekstopromotebelongsfirmly

inthepoliticalarena,notthecourts.”55Remarkably,despitethemeritsofthecasealways

beingweak,theunderlyingcrowdfundingcampaignraised£190,000.Itwasalsoacampaign

not conducted with much transparency—unlike some other examples of successful

crowdfunding,detailsoftheargumentstobeputandthekeylitigationdocumentswerenot

madepublic.

Awordofwarningaboutexamplessuchasthetwooutlinedaboveisneeded.Justas

thereareexamplesofsuccessfulcrowdfundingattempts,therearemanymoreexamplesof

cases that gather hardly any support. In many respects, these failed attempts are more

interestingthantheheadline-grabbingcasesastheymayexposesomeoftheground-level

fundinggapsinthejusticesystemand,morebroadly,failuresofthestate.Thesearenotthe

cases,however,thatgetmuchattentioninthediscussionaroundcrowdfunding.Greatcare

must be taken to ensure that focus is now directed only on high-profile, successful

crowdfundingcampaignswhichmay,inreality,thebeexceptiontotheusualresult.

52JusticeforHealth[2016]EWHC2338;[2016]Med.L.R.599[15].

53CostcappingwasagreedtobytheSecretaryofState.Costcappingreceivedseminaljudicialconsiderationby

theCourtofAppealinR(CornerHouseResearch)vSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry[2005]EWCACiv

192;[2005]1W.L.R.2600.Seefurther:CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015s.88.54R(Webster)vSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEU[2018]EWHC1543(Admin).

55Above[10];[24].


14

Finally,itshouldbenotethatcostcappingappearstobe]animportantpartofthe

evolving practice around crowdfunding. Costs capping orders (and their judge-made

predecessors, protective costs orders) are sought and made at an early stage in the

proceedings, conferring costs protection on a party regardless of the outcome of the

proceedings.56Thelawrelatingtoprotectivecostsorderswascodified,withsomechanges,

in theCriminal JusticeandCourtsAct2015,which introducedcosts cappingorders.57 The

conditionsthathavetobemetbeforethecourtcanmakeacostscappingorderarethat:

permission to apply for judicial review has been granted; the court is satisfied that the

proceedingsarepublicinterestproceedings;andthecourtissatisfiedthat,withoutacosts

capping order, the applicant would be acting reasonably by withdrawing or ceasing to

participateintheproceedings.Proceedingsareconsidered“publicinterestproceedings”only

if:anissuethatisthesubjectoftheproceedingsisofgeneralpublicimportance;thepublic

interest requires the issue to be resolved; and the proceedings are likely to provide an

appropriatemeansofresolvingit.Anumberoffactorsmustbetakenintoaccountbyjudges

consideringanapplication, including:thenumberofpeople likelytobedirectlyaffectedif

reliefisgrantedtotheapplicantforjudicialreview;howsignificanttheeffectonthosepeople

islikelytobe;andwhethertheproceedingsinvolveconsiderationofapointoflawofgeneral

publicimportance.58Ifanorderismade,areciprocalcapmustalsobeimposed,restricting

thecoststhebeneficiaryofthecostscappingorder isabletorecover.59Furthermore, it is

required that any application for a costs capping order is supported by evidence of the

applicant's financial resources, including “the financial resources of the parties to the

proceedings,includingthefinancialresourcesofanypersonwhoprovides,ormayprovide,

financialsupporttotheparties.”60Costcappingmaybehelpfultocrowdfundersoflimited

means and its appears to be the case that crowdfunded claimants do seek such orders

routinely. Recently, Cheema-Grubb J granted a cost capping order for a judicial review

broughtbyfiveclaimants,includingProfessorStephenHawking,challengingthelawfulness

56R(CornerHouseResearch)vSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry[2005]1W.L.R.2600.

57Sections88-90,CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.ACostsCappingOrderisdefinedinsection88(2)as‘an

orderlimitingorremovingtheliabilityofapartytojudicialreviewproceedingstopayanotherparty’scostsin

connectionwithanystageoftheproceedings.’58Section88(8),CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.

59Section89(2),CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.

60Section89(1)(a),CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.


15

ofthegovernment’spolicytocreateaccountablecareorganisations.61Thatparticularruling

demonstratedapositivejudicialattitudetocrowdfundedclaimsinrespectofcostcapping

orders.Cheema-GrubbJobservedthatwhereajudicialreviewapplicationiscrowdfunded,

the public is funding both sides: the government by tax payers and the claimants by

crowdfunding.Itwasalsonotedthatcrowdfundingisinherentlyuncertainandthecertainty

providedbyacostscappingorderwashelpfultoenableindividualstotakeapublicinterest

caseforward.Cheema-GrubbJorderedacapof£160,000intotalfordefendants’costs(two

wereinvolved)andareciprocalcapof£115,000inrespectoftheclaimant’scosts.Thiswas

againstabackdropof the claimants raisingnearly£265,000via crowdfundingandprivate

donations,meaningtherulingenabledrelativelysubstantialfundstomeetthecostsofthe

claimants’ lawyers. We are, with cases such as this, witnessing the start of practices

developingand little iscertain,but it is likelythatapplicationsforcostcappingordersare

likelytobeacommonfeatureofcrowdfundingjudicialreviewlitigationinthecomingyears.

SolvingtheResourceProblemthroughCrowdfunding?

Connectingthepointssetoutabove,animportantquestionarises:iscrowdfundingapossible

answertotheissueoflackofresourcesinthecontextofPIL?Canit,inotherwords,provide

newfuelforreformthroughPIL?Itisarguedherethatcrowdfundingcan—incertaincases—

solve the resource dilemma. There are, however, many risks that are attached to

crowdfundinginthiscontext.Myaiminthispartofthearticleis,therefore,toelaboratethe

mainpossiblebenefitsandrisks.62

At the outset, it must be observed that it is clear that crowdfunding models do

possesses thepotential toquickly raise the sums required for judicial reviews. The junior

doctorscaseisagoodexampleofthis,raisingover£300,000.Butsuchsuccessis,ofcourse,

notguaranteedandfailedattemptsappeartobemuchmorecommon.63Theproposedcase

ultimatelyneedstofindfavourwithsomewillingdonors.Unlessanissueintheproposedcase

alreadyhasa strongplacewithin thepublic consciousness,gainsmedia traction,orhasa

specialist(andpreferablynotpoor)setofsupporters,itmaybethecasethatsomelevelof

61 R. (on the application of Hawking) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (22 February 2018,

unreported).AcostscapwasinitiallyrefusedbyMrJusticePeterWalker,whenhegrantedpermission. 62 The analysis provided in this section—exceptwhere explicitly stated—is general and not targeted at any

particularplatformororganisation.63Thereisnocleardatapublishedonthis.


16

investmentisneededtopromotedonationsviathecrowdfundingplatform.Putsimply,itmay

costmoneytodrumupacrowdinthefirstplace.Inpractice,thiscouldprovetobeaserious

barrier to crowdfunding having wide-ranging impact on PIL. It could also have particular

implicationsfortheviabilityofcrowdfundingforgenuinelyunpopularclaimantsbriningpublic

lawchallenges.

Therearesometoughquestionsaroundthepracticalmanagementofcrowdfunding,

whichgivesrisetosomeethicalquandaries.First,whenshouldthefundingbesought?Too

early, and the action seems speculative. Too late, and delays—which can be fatal in the

judicialreviewcontext—mayarise.Second,howmuchshouldbecrowdfundedateachstage?

Thisinvolvesdeterminingwhatamountisrequiredandwhen.Somecrowdfundingcampaigns

seizeuponany initial“buzz”andraiseasmuchaspossibleat thestart.Thismaybegood

litigationstrategyinmanyrespects,butitalsohasproblems.Areputationmaybedamaged

byhavingtoreturnfunds(somethingwhichmaynotbelogisticallyeasy).Theremayalsobe

a“usefuldiscipline” in“puttingyourself inapositionwhereyouhavetomakeanongoing

caseforpeopletosupportthelitigation.”64Third,thereistheissueofwhatcrowdfundingis

soughtfor,i.e.whatshouldbepitchedtothepublic.Somecrowdfundingattemptsonlygive

veryboardoverviewsofthecasetheyintendtobring.Atthesametime,the“crowd”willbe

asectionofthepublicandapublic-facingpitchwillbenecessary.Furthermore,casesdevelop

andchangewhen,forinstance,moreinformationisdisclosedduringthecourseoflitigation;

whileanaccurate labelmaybeprintedwhenfundsaresought,there isachancethatthe

contentsofthetinmaychange.

There is also the question of the terms of the crowdfunding arrangement, and

particularlytheoperationofsections85and86oftheCriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.

Section85(1)providesthatnoapplicationforjudicialreviewwillbegrantedleaveunlessthe

applicanthas“providedthecourtwithanyinformationaboutthefinancingoftheapplication

thatisspecifiedinrulesofcourtforthepurposesofthisparagraph.”65Thecleareffectofthis

provisionistoeliminatethediscretionoftheHighCourttograntpermissionunlesscertain

financialinformationisprovided.Section86placesarequirementontheCourttohaveregard

to information provided under section 85when it is “determining bywhomand towhat

64J.MaughamQC,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(AnnualQueenMaryUniversityofLondonLawandSociety

Lecture,2017).65ThisamendstheSeniorCourtsAct1981s31(3).


17

extentcostsofandincidentaltojudicialreviewproceedingsaretobepaid.”66Thecourtmust

“consider whether to order costs to be paid by a person, other the proceedings, who is

identified in [the information referred to in section 86(3)] as someone who is providing

financialsupportforthepurposesoftheproceedingsorislikelyorabletodoso.”67Sections

85 and 86 sections are not yet in force, but are alluded to in CrowdJustice’s terms and

conditions,undertheheading“RisksofFundingLitigation”:

“In our viewUK case law indicates that pure funders – Backerswhodon’t have a

personal interest in theCase, don't stand tobenefit from it anddon’t control the

courseoftheCase–willnottypicallyhaveanyliabilitybeyondtheirinitialPledge…We

makenowarrantiesorrepresentationsastocostsorotherrisksofdonatingtoany

particularCase…NewlegislationthatcameintoeffectintheUKinApril2015indicates

thatinjudicialreviewcases,peoplewhodonateoveracertainamountmayhaveto

be identified to thecourts.Thatamounthasbeensetat£3,000.This requirement

couldexposebackerswhogiveover£3,000tojudicialreviewsincertaininstancesto

furthercostsrisks.Therequirementbroughtinbythislegislationwillexistwhether

youdonatetoacaseonlineoroffline.”

Inaddition,itisstipulatedthatbackers“acknowledgeandagreethat[they]donothave,and

[their] contribution (whether financial or otherwise) does not entitle [them] to have, any

rightsinortoanyCase,includinganyownership,controlorrightstoadviseontheconduct

orlegalstrategyofaCase.”Thepurposeofthisclauseappearstobetominimisetheriskthat

backers are held liable for in costs orders, since the exercise of some control over case

managementisoneofthefeaturesthatdistinguishesanon-partywhomaybesubjecttoa

non-partycostsorder,fromapurefunder(whoisnotnormallysosubject).Ifcrowdfunding

growsinthissphereandthesectionsarebroughtintoforce,theextenttowhichdonorsare

exposedtocourtordersmaybecomeakeyfactorindeterminingthevolumeofdonations

andtheiramount,andwillbringfurtherethicalconsiderationsintoplay.

Lookingmorebroadly,itisdifficulttoseeatwhatpointacrowdfundingprojectwill

be consideredauthentic. Inotherwords,howmanydonorsareneeded for there tobea

66CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015s86(1).

67CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015s86(3).


18

genuine “crowd” and not just a few private backers? One of themain distinctions often

observedbetweencrowdfundingandothertypesofonlinedonationmethodsisthat,with

crowdfunding,donorsbecomeawareofeachotherthroughthe“campaign.”This,ithasbeen

argued,producesa“collectiveenergy”andhastheeffectofinformingdonors.68Thejunior

doctorscase,forinstance,attracted5,000donors.69Thiscouldbesaidtostandasevidence

ofbroad-basedparticipation—agoodnumberofthecommunitywaswillingtoputmoneyto

thecauseinthecase.Thiscouldallowcasestomakeclaimstosomekindofpopularapproval.

However,wherethenumberofdonorsislimitedoracrowdfundingattemptfails,thatcould

standasevidence that thecrowdfundingattempt iseitheragimmickor lacks community

support.70Thesuggestionthatpopularitymatterstowhetheracaseisbroughtornotalsosits

particularlyuncomfortablywiththenatureofpubliclawandjudicialreview,whichisoften

observedtoprovide—atleastinpart—thefunctionofprotectingtheindividualandoftenthat

protectionisfrommajorityorpopularviews.Itwouldcertainlyrubupagainstmuchliberal

constitutional thought if the ability to fundraise from the community became somehow

conflatedwithwhethertherewasapublicinterestinacasebeingbrought.71

Another important question is how the distinction between “investment-based”

crowdfundingmodels,whereinvestorshaveafinancialstakeinamonetaryclaim,and“non-

investmentbased”crowdfundingmodels,wherethe investors’reward isnon-monetaryor

intangibleishandled.72Perryarguesthatthatuseoftheformershouldbeencouraged,but

thelatterconstrained.Thisisbecauseininvestment-basedcrowdfundingmodels,investors

havean interest in theproperevaluationof themeritsofaclaim,so the fundingprocess

facilitatesclaimsthatwouldnototherwisebebroughtbutminimisestheriskthattheclaims

willbeunmeritorious.Innon-investmentbasedcrowdfundingmodels,Perryconcludesthat

thelackofanyfinancialinterestinaclaimreducestheincentiveforinvestorstovetthemerits

ofthecase,legalorotherwise(indeed,investorsinthiscontextmaybebetterunderstoodas

“donors” or “backers”). Perry therefore recommends that in non-investment based

crowdfundingmodels,claimsshouldbesubjecttoaprofessionalvettingprocesstominimise

68R.Davies,CivicCrowdfunding:ParticipatoryCommunities,EntrepreneursandthePoliticalEconomyofPlace

(MasterofScienceThesis,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2014),p.26.69C.Dyer,“Juniordoctors'HighCourtchallengetoJeremyHunt”.

70This,ofcourse,maynotbefair,butitisapossibility.

71Thespecifictenetsthatmaybeintensionincludethenotionthatthelawcanprotectindividualsfromthe

“tyrannyofthemajority”andtheresponsivenessofdemocraticpoliticstoshort-terminterestsetc.72Perry,“CrowdfundingCivilJustice”(2018)B.C.L.R.(forthcoming).


19

the risk of generating unmeritorious claims. Different organisations involved with

crowdfundingtakedifferentapproachestovetting.Asoutlinedabove,CrowdJusticerequires

thateveryindividualorgrouptakingacaseeitherhaveaqualifiedsolicitororbarristerwho

hasbeeninstructed,orthatthecaseisbeingtakenbyanon-profit,TheGoodLawProject

usestheresourcesof itsDirectorforthispurpose. It isunclearwhatvettingstandardsare

operatingacrossthecrowdfunding“community”asawhole.

Generally speaking, the possible change in the vetting processes used raises the

prospectof a verydifferentbreedof PIL to thatwhich theUK is familiarwith,which are

typically brought by organisations with expertise in public law litigation (e.g. Liberty or

JUSTICE) or some specialist policy area (e.g.Greenpeace). Traditionally, litigation—being

perceivedascomplexandrisky—hasbeenapproachedcarefullybymanyorganisations.One

upshotisthatthesamefeworganisationsappearagainandagainontheheadnotesofjudicial

reviews—in recent history, UK public interest judicial reviews have often involved

organisationswithsimilarbundlesofcorebeliefs.73AsRawlingsobserves:“[a]schiefrepeat

players,LibertyandJUSTICEmaynotyethavebeenassignedofficesinthe…SupremeCourt

buildingbuttheymightaswellbe.”74Theimplicationsofcrowdfundinginthisrespectmay

bediverse.Onepossibleoutcome is thatwe could seemorePIL.Of course, anyonewith

moneycouldhavealwayssetupsomekindoforganisationorsimplybroughtcases.75But

crowdfundingpotentiallyopensupthispossibilitytothosecauseswhereconcentratedfunds

havenotbeenreadilyavailablepreviously,anditcouldalsobeseenasremovingthebarrier

ofthosewithfundshavingtoputtheirownmoneyin.

CrowdfundingcouldalsoseelessexperiencedparticipantscomingtothePILscene.

JolyonMaughamQC—thoughprobablyconsideredpartofaliberal,metropolitaneliteoften

associatedwithPILintheUK—isagoodexampleofthepossibilityofcrowdfundingopening-

upwhoisinvolvedinPIL.Nodoubt,Maughamhasthecredentialsofawell-regardedtaxsilk.

But tax law is a very different beast to public interest judicial review. This is something

Maughamfreelyadmits,acknowledgingthat“organisationsintheUKthathaveafarlonger

historyofengagementinthecauselawyeringfield”thanhimselfandthatthismeans,inhis

73Theseareoftenobservedtobe“left-of-centre”or“liberal.”

74Rawlings,“ModellingJudicialReview”(2008)61(1)CLP95,p.103.

75Thespread-bettingtycoonStuartWheeler,whochallengedtheUK’sratificationoftheLisbonTreaty,isagood

example,see:R(Wheeler)vOfficeofthePrimeMinister[2008]EWHC1409(Admin);[2008]A.C.D.70.


20

ownwords,thathesuffersthe“advantagesandsuffertheconsequencesofwho[heis].”76

ThisisnottosaythatMr.Maughamisnotsuitedtohisnewvocation,butdemonstrateshow

resources from crowdfunding can lead to an opening up of who can lead PIL. These

organisations, when considering and conducting PIL, have generally been responsive to

internal checks, governance systems (such as boards of trustees), and duties to wider

membership.Whilesuchorganisationscanofcourseusecrowdfunding,theplatformoffered

bycrowdfundingallowsforindividuallawyersandcampaignerstotranscendthetraditional

modelofPIL.The“causes”operatingbeyondsuchlitigationmaythereforebecomediversified

and, in the absence of traditional organisational structure, transfer more power to the

individuals bringing these cases and their lawyers. At the same time, there is also the

possibilitythatthe“craft”ofPIL—knowingwhentobringacase,knowingwhentoappeal,

knowingwhentogiveupetc.—maybediluted.Itmaybesaidthat,ultimately,vettingisdone

bythedonors.Afterall,“ifyouareaskingpeopletodiptheirhandsintotheirpocketstofund

acaseyouneedtobeabletojustifythatdecisiontoyourself–andtothem.”77But,again,

thisisadeparturefromconventionalvettingnorms—donorsareaverydifferentgroupthan

staffatcivilsocietyorganisations.

Thereisalsotheissueofhowthegovernmentmayrespondtoanyincreasedrolefor

crowdfundinginPIL.78Ifcrowdfunding(andotherprivatefundingmethods)canbeeffective

inpartiallyfillingtheresourcegap,governmentmaytakethisanindicatorthatpublicfunds

arenotnecessary.79Ithasbeenarguedthattheincreasedeffortsoftheprobonocommunity

inthewakeoflegalaidreformsstoppedthereformsfromfailingoutright,andthatthispro

bono work ultimately supports an ill-designed system through good deeds. If there are

crowdfundingsuccesses,governmentsinthefuturemightchoosetoleanonsuch“successes”

topromptotherwise restrictive reform in thearea.There is, tobeclear,notanounceof

systematicevidencethatcrowdfundingsomehowfillsthegapleftbyrecentreductionsinthe

76Maugham,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(2017).

77Maugham,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(2017).

78Thereismuchliteratureconsideringtheimpactofjudicialreview,seeP.Cane,“Understandingjudicialreview

anditsimpact”inM.HertoghandS.Halliday(eds.),JudicialReviewandBureaucraticImpact(Cambridge:CUP,

2004),p.16-17.79Someargue,though,thatpublicfundingmaynotbenecessaryinthewaymanyoftensuggest,seeA.Higgins,

“The Costs of Civil Justice andWho Pays” (2017) 37(3) O.J.L.S. 687. There is also a powerful argument for

consideringjudicialreviewcostsasdistinctfromstandardcivildisputes,seeM.Fordham,“RethinkingCostsin

JudicialReview” [2009] J.R.306;R (Davey)vAylesburyValeDistrictCouncil [2007]EWCACiv1166; [2008]1

W.L.R.878[18](SedleyLJ).


21

availabilityoflegalaid.

Morebroadly,howgovernmentmayrespondtopoorly-managedPIL,orsimplytoa

possibleincreaseofactivityinPIL,duetocrowdfundingisanimportantquestion.Braibant,in

aseminalarticle,outlinedthreemainstrategiesthatgovernmentbodiescouldusetoavoid

implementing judgments:theycoulddelay,e.g.throughappeals;theycouldsimplyretake

procedurallyflaweddecision;ortheycouldlegislate.80Harlowaddedafourthpossibility,that

“government would simply disobey.”81 Harlow and Rawlings further highlighted how

governmentmayreactbytakingpre-emptiveactionstocurbfurtherlitigation,whichtheycall

“clampingdown.”82Thisisa“process”thatinvolves“structuralorproceduralchangetothe

judicialreviewprocessor,putdifferently,proceduralconstraintdesignedtobluntsubstantive

legalaction.”InPressureThroughLaw,HarlowandRawlingsalsomakeclearthatpre-emptive

“clamping down” does not have to be directed at the judiciary but can be aimed at

discouraging particular claimants or groups. In that text—published in 1992—it was

suggestedthattheUKgovernmentmightmovetoclampdownonjudicialreview.Amongthe

possibilitiesdiscussedthenwere:directstepstoexcludeclaims,e.g.throughousterclauses;

procedural changes to judicial review, e.g. amendments to standing criteria and the

permissiontest;increasingthecostofjudicialreviewbyreducinglegalaidorincreasingcourt

fees.83SincePressureThroughLaw,therehavebeenmultipleexamplesofclampingdown—

aside from the costs and funding issues discussed above, there have been many other

instances.84 Indeed, itcouldbesaid that therehasbeenaprotractedprocessofclamping

downonjudicialreviewinrecentdecades.Ifcrowdfundingiseffectiveinprovidingresources

forpublicinterestjudicialreviews,newreactions—whether“strikingback”inindividualcases

or“clampingdown”onthejudicialreviewsystemitself—maybeonthecards.Ifcrowdfunded

casesarepoorlymanaged,itisdifficulttoimagineaclampdownofsomekindnothappening.

Beyondthequestionofthegovernment’sreaction,thereisalsothequestionofhow

thejudiciarymayrespondtoanyincreasedroleforcrowdfundinginPIL.Judicialreviewisin

80G.Braibant,“Remarquessurl’efficacitédesannulationspourexcèsdepouvoir”[1961]E.D.C.E.53.

81C.Harlow,“AdministrativeReactiontoJudicialReview”[1976]P.L.116.

82 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, “'Striking Back' and 'Clamping Down': An Alternative Perspective on Judicial

Review”inJ.Bell,M.Elliott,J.N.E.Varuhas,P,Murray(eds)PublicLawAdjudicationinCommonLawSystems:

ProcessandSubstance(Oxford:Hart,2016).83HarlowandRawlings,PressureThroughLaw(1992).

84Fordiscussionofonesuchepisode,see:R.Rawlings,“Review,RevengeandRetreat”(2005)68(3)M.L.R.378;

R.Thomas,“Aftertheouster:reviewandreconsiderationinasingletiertribunal”[2006]P.L.674.


22

many respects a discretionary jurisdiction, providing lots of scope for judicial attitudes

(whetherhostilityorembrace)tohavepracticalconsequences.Intheeventthatthereismore

poorly-managed,orsimplyagreatervolumeof,PILduetocrowdfunding,judicialdiscretion

maycometobepresumedtooperateagainstcrowdfundedcases.Itmayevenbethecase

that common lawprincipleswithbaked-inhostility follow.Themerepresenceanduseof

crowdfunding platform may also generate a—possibly very unhelpful and unrealistic—

expectationthatclaimantsseektofundraise independently.Ofcourse,theoppositecould

happentoo.Thereareexamplesof the judiciary liberalisinggateways forPIL funding.The

rulingonprotectivecostsorderinCornerHouseisafamousinstance85andtherehavebeen

somecaseswherejudgesappeartotakethepresenceofcrowdfundingaspositivefeatureof

aclaimant’scase.86Theconductofcrowdfundedcasesmaybeakeyfactorinthisrespect.

Crowdfunding of PIL can perhaps avoid the “ethical arguments” that investment-

basedcrowdfundersoftenface,i.e.thattheyareinittogetrich.Injudicialreview,thereis

likelytobenoimmediate“potofgold”tobeseizedbytakingacase,therebyalleviatingany

concerns that crowd fundersmight be chasing a pecuniary end or that theremight be a

conflictofinterestwitheitherthelitigantorthelawyersinthecase.Thatsaid,lawyerswill

likelygetpaidoutofcrowdfundedpotsofmoney.TheimpressionthatPILisa“feedingtrough

forlawyers”ispotentiallyproblematic.87

Finally,itiscommontoheartheargumentthatcrowdfundingisnotagenuinelynew

practice,itjustputsonlinesomethingthatcommunitieshavedoneformanyyears:getting

togethertoraisemoneyforlitigation.Somemightsaythat,onthisbasis,therisksidentified

hereoughtnottobeofconcern.Thereis,nodoubt,anelementoftruthtothis.Indeed,many

judicialreviewclaimantsmaystill,informally,askfamily,friendsortheirlocalcommunityfor

help with funding a case. But crowdfunding is more than simply the digitalisation of an

existing practice. Though it may be able to claim its heritage is in informal community

fundraising initiatives, crowdfunding is qualitatively different in multiple respects. For

instance,thefactthefundraisingtakesplaceonlinemeansitismorewidelyaccessibleand

that fundraisingcampaignsare likely tobemorewidelycirculated.Similar, campaignsare

85R(CornerHouseResearch)vSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry[2005]EWCACiv192.

86e.g.StephenHawkingandothersvSecretaryofStateforHealth&SocialCareandNationalHealthService

CommissioningBoard(unreported)(22February2018).87TheGoodLawProject’sapproachistopayGovernmentratestolawyersituses,andexplainthatcertainthings

mayhavetobedoneprobonoduringthecase.


23

perhaps more likely to become a national political issue or be connected to an existing

nationalissue.Thismaybebeneficialinmanyrespects,butitisstillasubstantialdifference.

Theuseofonlinesystemsalsocreatesanew,importantactor:theplatformthathoststhe

campaigns. Platforms such as CrowdJustice are now key players in this area and possess

powertoaffecthowfundraisingcampaignsoperate.Thecentralisationofthistasktherefore

represents a material change to the old practice. Crowdfunding could well be overall

beneficialbutweshouldcertainlyresistanysuggestionthatcrowdfundingcampaignsarethe

sameas,forinstance,afewmembersofalocalcommunitygettingtogethertochallengean

unwelcomeplanningdecision.

TowardsaPracticalEthics

Whattheaboveanalysisshowsisthatcrowdfundingisbestconsideredariskyresourceinthe

PILcontext.Itisriskyasitmayunsettlevariousestablishedpartsofthecurrentlandscapeand

havearangeofunforeseenconsequences.Atthesametime,crowdfundingisstillaresource

despite its possible flaws and consequences, and has the potential to provide litigation

fundingwhere thereotherwise isnone.Thenextchallenge isdevisinganapproachwhich

optimises itsbenefitswhileminimising risk. Inotherwords, tocreateapracticalethicsof

crowdfunding in the judicial review context.88 The demand for this is, in many ways,

exemplified by Jo Maugham QC’s reflections on his experiences of the practice of

crowdfunding PIL—which often can be read as a lawyer seeking to understand the

crowdfundingofPILwithintheframeworkhisownprofessionalethics.89Inthisfinalpartof

thearticle,IsketchtheshapeaspecificethicsofcrowdfundingPILcouldtake.

Thefirstkeyissueiswhooughttoberegulated.Thestoryoftheriseofcrowdfunding

isoneinvolvingnumerousactors:judges,lawyers,NGOs,crowdfundingplatformsetc.While

allof theseactorsought toactcarefullyandethically inrespectofcrowdfunding, lawyers

seemthebesttoorientateapracticalethicalcodeoncrowdfundingtowards. It is lawyers

whowieldthemostsignificantamountofpowerinthebringingandconductofcrowdfunded

PIL.Platformsoftenuselawyersasthevettingmechanismforcasestoo.Inaddition,lawyers

88Ofthebroadtypedescribed inP.Singer,PracticalEthics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,3

rdEdn,

2011).89Maugham,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(2017).


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arefamiliarwithdealingcloselywiththeethicsoftheirpracticeandthecomplexitiesthat

ariseoutofethicalcodes,andestablishedregulatorsarealreadyinplace.90

Thesecondandthirdissuesarehowlawyersoughttoberegulatedandhowweshould

reasonouttheprinciplesthatconstitutethepracticalethics.Instructiveguidanceonthese

questions can be found by looking at how solicitors’ and barristers’ ethics are presently

regulated.This isdoneprimarilythroughflexiblecodesenforcedbyestablishedregulatory

bodies.91 These codes—though often framed in the language of “duties”—are broad

principlesof ethical decision-makingwhich seek toprocurea rangeofoutcomes, suchas

accesstojustice,effectiverepresentation,fairhearingsetc.92Theyarenothardlegalrules

butsoft frameworkprinciplesthataredesignedtohelpthose involved in legalpracticeto

workthroughchallengeswhichariseinthecourseoftheirwork.Someoftheprinciples,such

as the cab-rank rule, have a longhistory butmanyprinciples shiftwith time and societal

development.Forinstance,inrecentyearstherulerelatingtowhatbarristerscansaytothe

presshavechanged.93Developments in theuseof technologyhavealsobeenacause for

revisitingtheethicalprinciplesregulatinglegalprofessionals.Recently,forexample,theBar

StandardsBoardissuednewguidanceontheuseofsocialmedia.94Thereisnoreasonwhy

the crowdfunding activities of legal professionals—or legal professionals involved in

crowdfundedlitigation—oughtnottobesubjecttoguidanceofthiskind.Itcouldbeargued

thatitisbesttoleavethisareaoflegalpracticeunregulatedandlawyersoughttobeableto

navigate their way through crowdfunding litigation themselves, relying out the general

principlesoflegalpracticeethics.However,suchaviewwouldfailtoproperlytakeaccount

oftheveryrealandparticularriskspresentedbycrowdfunding.Moreover,itisclear—merely

from examining common high-profile examples of crowdfunded PIL, such as the junior

doctors’case,Webster,andlitigationbytheGoodLawProject—thatlawyersaretakingvery

differentapproaches toconductingcases.For instance, theapproach to theextentwhich

skeletonargumentsandotherkeylitigationdocumentsaredisclosedviathecrowdfunding

90TheBarStandardsBoardandtheSolicitorsRegulationAuthorityarethetwokeyregulators.

91SeeBarStandardsBoard,Handbook(3

rdedn,2018);SolicitorsRegulationAuthority,SRAHandbook(Version

19,2017).92 See e.g. Bar Standards Board, Handbook (2018), p.22 (listing core duties demonstrative of a range of

underlyinggoals).93BarStandardsBoard,‘MediaCommentGuidance.’

94BarStandardsBoard,‘Guidanceforbarristersusingsocialmedia’(February2017).


25

platformdiffersradically.Thereisnoneedtoplaceastraightjacketonlitigationstrategy,but

settingageneralethicalbaselineonissuessuchasthisisapracticalnecessity.

Finally,thereisaneedtoengagecloselywithallstakeholdersincreatinganethical

frameworkforcrowdfunding.Theunderstandingofcrowdfundinginpracticeisdeveloping

quicklybutitisstillforming.Assuch,itisvitalthatexperienceandinsightisdrawnfroma

range of actors involved. At minimum, it seems important to involve judges, lawyers

(especially those experienced with crowdfunding), regulators, charities (again, especially

those experienced with crowdfunding PIL), professional associations, and crowdfunding

platforms.Alloftheseactorshaveaninterestinensuringanappropriateethicalbaselineisin

place.

Conclusion

ThisarticlehasshowntherolethatcrowdfundingmayplayinPILintheUKandhowithas

developedinrecentyears.Nodoubt,crowdfundingcan—incertaincases—solvetheresource

shortageandbeakeypartofprocuringreformviaPIL.Atthesametime,manyaspectsofit

areproblematicorholdthepotentialtobecomeproblematic.Thenatureandextentofthe

possiblerisksaresuchthatthecrowdfundingofPILshouldbeapproachedwithgreatcaution.

Theperilhereisthatthisapparentlyempoweringmeansofprovidingresourcetomobilise

thelawmayultimatelyhaveconsequenceswhichunderminestheprojectofPILasawhole.

To this end, there is clear merit in considering the production of new guidelines for

crowdfundingPIL—principleswhichseektobalancetherisksandopportunitiesinthisarea.

Todothis,thereisaneedtodeviseacoherentpracticalethicsofcrowdfundinginthiscontext.

Here,Ihavesketchedoutboththekeyconcernswhichapracticalethicsmustbeinformedby

andtheshapethatsuchanethicscouldtake.Itishopedthissuggestionistakenforwardin

thecomingyearsbytheBarStandardsBoardandtheSolicitorsRegulationAuthority.Atthe

same time, it is hoped that all actors involved in crowdfunding judicial reviews consider

closelywhattheirresponsibilitiesare.

Documents

Crowdfunding Public Interest Judicial Reviews