Crocker, S - On Deleuze's Reversal of Time and Mouvement

45INTO THE INTERVAL: ON DELEUZES REVERSAL OF TIME AND MOVEMENT Continental Philosophy Review 34: 4567, 2001. 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Into the interval: On Deleuzes reversal of time and movement

STEPHEN CROCKERDepartment of Sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, Newfoundland,Canada, A1C 5S7 (E-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. The reversal in the relation of time and movement which Deleuze describes in hisCinema books does not only concern a change in the filmic arts. Deleuze associates it with awider Copernican turn in science, philosophy, art and indeed modern experience as a whole.Experience no longer consists of an idea plus the time it takes to realize it. Instead, time isimplicated in the determination, literally the creation of the terminus of any movement ofexperience. Deleuze describes this open movement structure as determinable virtuality.Because it is determinable, experience as a whole is neither actual nor actualisable. Thewhole is virtual. I use the phrase determinable virtuality as a kind of organizational devicewith which to organise a study of the reversal of time and movement in Deleuzes work. Istudy the concept of determinability as it appears in Deleuzes reading of the relation of timeand movement in Kants description of the whole of possible experience, or the Transcen-dental Ideas. In a following section I take up the idea of virtuality which I trace back to DunsScotus who uses the idea of the virtual to distinguish between univocal and equivocal move-ments, forms of movement which, I argue, anticipate the kinostructures and chronogeneses,or movement and time-images which Deleuze places at the center of his work on cinema.

Introduction: Interval and movement

Movement of a dancer, an assembly line, or even a movement of the soul is a whole made of three moments: a beginning point, a final aim, and betweenthese an interval of time in which the change in motion takes place. Thesemoments can be organized in different ways. Most often, we imagine them toform a series in which times interval serves only to communicate an idea froman origin to a terminal point. The interval itself does nothing to determine thevalue, or purpose of the motion. Millenarian movements provide an exagger-ated version of this common structure of time and movement, but it is presenttoo in the more familiar motions of daily life. It is there in the time we wastewaiting for visas to arrive, for medical diagnoses to be processed, for com-puters to load up and shut down.

The desire we often feel, in these moments, to kill time originates in adifficult problem at the heart of our common perception of temporality. Weimagine times interval to be not only a means of consummating some idea,

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but also, paradoxically, an obstacle in the way of its consummation. A formalresemblance between the idea and the impending moment of its realization(i.e., an investment and its future maturation), seems to precede the intervalof time necessary to achieve the change. As a result, we experience time as anextraneous obstacle, the elimination of which is necessary to secure plans. Themore efficiently we can eliminate time with agenda, planners and efficiencyexperts the more readily we can accomplish our goals.

How does this confusion concerning the contradictory functions of timesinterval as both means and obstacle arise? Interval is intervallum, literallybetween the walls, or in the case of a temporal interval, between present andfuture. This spatial imagery creates the impression that the future is determinedat the same time (or in the same space) as the present. But if the future wasalready present, we would never have to wait for it to arrive. We have to waitand live through intervals because the sequences in which we find ourselvesare not yet complete. The intervals we live through do not impede our accessto anything actual and real. We remain caught in time, and are never able fi-nally to kill it, because the interval is that moment of hesitation in which thefuture, terminal point of our actions is de-termined. This image of timesinterval as period of determination suggests a much different structure of timeand movement, one in which the interval does not impede movement, but isitself the process of the creation of a movements terminal point.

In his Cinema books Gilles Deleuze shows that the history of cinema isdefined by a progressive tension between these two kinesiological structures,as they may be called. The kinostructures, or movement-images of classicalcinema subordinate times interval to a predetermined course of successiveshots, so that time is derived from movement, as Deleuze puts it. The post-war cinema introduces chronogeneses, or time-images which reverse therelation of time and movement so that the interval assumes a power to pro-duce unpredictable aberrant movements. What I want to show here is thatthe kinesiological theory (i.e., the theses on time and movement) whichDeleuze develops in the Cinema books does not only concern a change in thefilmic arts. The reversal in the relation of time and movement is, in Deleuzeswork, the basis of a wider Copernican turn in science, philosophy, art andindeed modern experience as a whole.1

What does it mean to speak of a Copernican turn in our experience oftime and movement? Kant likened himself to Copernicus because he discov-ered in reason what Copernicus had discovered in the heavens, namely thatwe participate in the movement we experience. Kants highest principle ofsynthetic judgement says that the object we experience, and our experienceof the object emerge in one and the same movement of reason. This Kantian

47INTO THE INTERVAL: ON DELEUZES REVERSAL OF TIME AND MOVEMENT

principle, which initiates philosophical modernity, and makes possible, amongother things, the reflexive basis of knowledge in the human sciences, supposesa wider kinesiological change, indeed a reversal, in the value we assign to timeand movement. Experience no longer consists of a movement of resemblancebetween being and phenomena, plus an interval of time it takes to actualizeit. With Kant, the subject participates in the determination of the objects ofexperience, and so what had formerly been an inert interval, and a space to beovercome, becomes now the site of an active ability to determine experience.In the Copernican turn, determinability, which Deleuze describes as the pre-cise moment when the indeterminate maintains its essential relation with thedeterminate thing, gets its own concept, and the relation of time, movementand the whole in which they participate is radically transformed (DR, p. 29).

The Copernican turn does not only produce a new image of the interval asperiod of determination. It also demands a new concept of the whole in whicheach of the moments of experience participates. Because it is determinable,experience as a whole is neither actual nor actualizable. The whole is virtual.Deleuze says that the whole is a determinable virtuality (DR, p. 201).

In what follows, I use this phrase (determinable virtuality) as a kind oforganizational device with which to structure my remarks on the reversal oftime and movement in Deleuzes work. I comment first on the concept ofdeterminability as it appears in Deleuzes reading of the structures of move-ment and time in Kants description of the whole of possible experience, orwhat Kant calls the Transcendental Ideas. In a following section I take up theidea of virtuality which, I argue, describes a certain kind of movement betweenan agent and its terminal effects.

It is common to regard the virtual as a kind of radicalized pure, Heideggerianpossibility. This image is partly correct, but it obscures a still more complexentwinement of the virtual in questions concerning time, movement and de-termination. I will argue that we stand to learn more about Deleuzes kine-siological use of virtuality if we return to the medieval sense of the term,which describes the modality the kind of existence possessed by a beingthat is able to give rise to terminal effects (roughly, causal results) differentin nature and kind than itself. In the 14th century, Duns Scotus used the con-cept of virtuality to challenge the basis of Greek and Thomist philosophy whenhe put forward the radical notion that Gods creatures were capable of mov-ing themselves, without the intervention of a prime mover. In his treatise onself-motion, Scotus refuted the idea that all movement could be divided intoan active origin (i.e., a prime mover) and a passive terminus (its creature). Inthe interval between these two moments, he located an equivocation a ca-pacity of an agent to produce terminal effects different in kind from itself.

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By means of the concept of virtual, equivocal movement Scotus broke withthe reigning conception of existence as a unilinear unfolding of resemblance,and ascribed to immanent, finite things a capacity to move themselves. I wantto show that the distinction Scotus established between univocal and equivocalmovements in many ways anticipates Deleuzes classification of kinostructuresand chronogeneses.

What is the point of returning today to medieval, scholastic philosophiesof virtuality and movement? It is not to locate ancestors or trace genealogies,but to better understand the metaphysical significance of the kinesiologicalelement in Deleuzes work, and develop it beyond its obvious uses for researchareas such as cultural and cinema studies. Important as those might be, theydo not always get to the wider cosmological changes in the relation of timeand movement that, Deleuze wants to show us, are at stake in modern phi-losophy, science and art.

In the final sections of the essay I try to address the social and politicalsignificance of the tension between competing structures of time and move-ment as it appears today in the imperative to speed up time, and to controland subordinate its interval to what too often appears to be an already deter-mined sequence of events.

Empiricism: Experience as movement and practical activity

Interpretation of Kants contribution to questions concerning time most oftenfocuses on his discussion of time as the form of the intuition. Heidegger, forexample, wonders whether, for Kant, time is something we simply receive, orwhether we have first to give ourselves what we receive, and so whether givingand receiving, action and passion are themselves rooted in some more primor-dial ecstatic time.2 Deleuzes reading of Kant is unique because he identifiesa tension between two different structures of time and movement that circu-late throughout Kants work. This tension is clearest in Kants discussion of therelation between the whole of experience (the Transcendental Ideas), and theinterval of time that separates the whole from its phenomenal appearance. It isDeleuzes description of the relation of time and movement in the Kantian Ideathat will initially concern us here. But we first need to set the stage a little. Forwhat leads Kant to suppose that there is a transcendental whole of experience ishis dissatisfaction with the program of empiricism as set out by Hume.

To best grasp the thesis of Deleuzes reading of Kant, we should thereforebegin with the relation of time, movement and determination in Deleuzes firstbook Empiricism and Subjectivity. In that text, Deleuze corrects the mistakenimage of empiricism as the derivation of knowledge from experience. The


mind does not derive knowledge from experience. Experience is itself cre-ated by the movement of the mind organizing sense impressions. Hume showsthat human nature participates in the creation of what it experiences, and indoing so he overturns the Platonic image of thought as a reminiscence ofalready existing connections and correspondence in the external world. Thereis no sequence of events that thought represents or remembers. It is humannature that allows us to infer relations, to create beliefs and posit rules, and soto produce sequences of experience.

For Hume, experience is a creative action, a practical activity of form-ing a distribution of discrete elements into a functional organization that isuseful for action in the world (ES, p. 107). When I say because, always, nec-essarily, or as a result, I am not pointing to any real or pre-existing connec-tions in the world. I am actively organizing the elements of experience into aform that, until now, they had not known. I eat something and it does not tasteright, later I get sick. These basic elements of experience are discontinuous first I eat, then I get sick. If these are to form the moments of an experiencethey must be contracted together.

Humes new image of thought as creative motion raises difficult questionsconcerning time and determination. Schelling said that Hume supposes thatthere is first a time when we do not judge experience according to laws ofassociation and causality, as though we first experience impressions in the raw,and then infer relations from them.3 But before we every subject them to prin-ciples of association, we have to first contract the impressions into a sequence.We have to provide a manifold or whole even if it is entirely projective orfictitious with which we can hold together a set of impressions. We are there-fore a priori involved in the creation of the object of knowledge in a way stillmore primitive than Hume supposes. Empiricism ultimately requires that weattribute a far greater constituting power to human nature than Hume had al-lowed. Kants Copernical turn should then be understood as a correction, ora fine-tuning of empiricism. Kant shows that human nature does not only createour knowledge of the object (e.g. the relations we infer among them), it alsoactively participates in the constitution of the object from which the inferenceis made. Kant dissolves the dualism between nature and human nature into asingle architectonic of human reason. The object and the conditions of itsexperience are given together. They form a whole. It is however, an odd sortof whole since it is immanent to experience, and must therefore be determinedin the very same movement which it conditions. The whole is not given. It isdeterminable. A capacity to determine a determinability thus becomesthe basis of any movement of actualization between impression and inference,Idea and phenomena, or conditions and contents.

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Kants Copernican turn supposes this changed relation of movement anddetermination, even though Kant himself falls back on a principle of whole-ness and pre-determination more in keeping with the dogmatism and theologyhe attacks. Somewhere between Humes empiricism and Kants transcenden-talism there lies an empiricism of the idea (DR, p. 278), or a transcenden-tal empiricism (DR, p. 56). Deleuzes aim is to get to that precise momentwithin Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even contin-ued by Kant (DR, p. 58). He does so, as we will see, through a reading of theambiguous relation of movement and time in Kants description of the wholeof reason, or the Transcendental Ideas.

Ideas and the difference between analogy and univocity

It is common to picture Kant as a kind of philosophical bureaucrat applyingconcepts to objects. But Kant knows that if thought were nothing more thana series of isolated, conceptual procedures we would have only a limited,episodic knowledge of things: this is an x, that is a y what passes for knowl-edge on quiz shows and multiple choice exams. Kant said that we all possessa greater, metaphysical impulse because reason is by its nature architectonic,and leads us to project a whole of which each of our separate moments ofexperience would form a part.

By itself, the conceptual faculty of the understanding would never allowus to ask about the whole sequence of which it forms a part. It is the faculty ofreason that leads us to wonder about the whole sum of conditions, and so theunconditioned in which all other conditions find not only their origin and truthcontent, but their purpose and value as well. Reason represents the uncondi-tioned whole in the form of what Kant calls Transcendental Ideas. Like Pla-tonic Ideas, these are neither inferred from sense, nor derived from re concepts.Unlike Platonic Ideas, however, they originate inside re architecture of thought.The Idea enables us to situate each separate conceptual event as a moment in awhole, so that each time a particular judgement is considered, the sum total ofall given judgements is already presupposed and implicit in our judgement.

The Idea is not a thing, but a projective movement in which we may dis-tinguish three separate moments. There is first the indeterminate whole whichis projected outside experience, and which unifies the concepts and, as a re-sult, the objects of sense experience; secondly, the concrete determination the phenomena in which the whole is represented; and finally, our maininterest in all of this, the act of determinability itself, the actual movement ofthought by means of which the indeterminate condition and the phenomenalthing encounter and structure one another.


Our understanding of the movement and structure of thought depends onthe relations and hierarchies we establish among these three moments of ex-perience. For it is here that we are compelled to say precisely what is theontological status of the indeterminate whole of experience, and what is thenature of the interval that separates the indeterminate from its actualization.

To describe the relation of the Idea to the experience it organizes, Kant turnsto a theory of analogical relation, more precisely to what Thomas Aquinascalled an analogy of proportionality. Aquinas saw in analogy a middle waybetween complete ignorance and knowledge of Gods nature. To speak of ananalogy of proportion between God and creatures does not mean that we com-pare our attributes and Gods attributes. Instead, we compare the relation thatexists between, on the one hand, humans and their attributes, and, on the other,God and his attributes. An analogy of proportionality is thus a comparison notof terms, but of relations between sets, or series of terms. The supreme causeof the world remains unthinkable, but we can nevertheless say that the causeholds, with respect to the world, the same relation that, by analogy, humanreason does with its own creations. Gods relation to the world is the same asour relation to, for example, works of art. It is by means of this equality ofrelation that we can establish some indirect knowledge of the unconditioned.

It is this sort of analogy of proportion, Kant suggests, that exists betweenthe Idea and the field of experience. The Idea shares with experience the samerelation that the concept maintains with the objects of experience. The abso-lute the Idea cannot itself be directly presented, but we can know that theIdea is related to the field of experience in the same way that the concept isrelated to the object. The conceptual unification of the object analogicallyrepresents the relation of the Idea to the understanding, and therefore to theobject as well.

It is, according to Deleuze, this recourse to analogy that steers Kant awayfrom the furtive, explosive moment of determination, and so from thechanged relation of time and movement implicit in the Copernican turn. Toretrieve that moment, Deleuze follows Duns Scotus criticisms of analogicalthought. Scotus argued that analogy must itself always depend upon a priorunivocal understanding of the kind of being attributed to God and creatures.To compare God and creatures supposes that a common conception of ex-istence is first attributed to each. Put simply, before we say what God andcreatures are, we have to say that they are. Deleuze restages this analogy-univocity debate on the empirical, immanent ground opened up by Hume.The question is no longer whether or how we can know God, but how canwe speak of a finite whole and, by what means does it become determinedas actuality?

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Analogical thought cannot help but steer us away from the period of deter-mination per se. Analogy establishes a difference between series, i.e., betweenthe general and specific, the infinite and finite, the genus and species. A dif-ference is established between the indeterminate and the individuals it deter-mines. This difference is thought in terms of proportion, of quantity and degree,in terms of the more or less, of the large and small, of degrees of resemblance.One series presents itself a second time in the other. Kant distributes the Ideain the separate judgements of the understanding. But it is in the nature ofanalogy that one series the infinite, the indeterminate contains not onlythe form of the other, but the relation of determination that exists between thetwo. Analogy therefore presupposes the relation it sets out to explain, or it canonly represent it indirectly. The second term mimics the first. If we think ofanalogy as a movement of actualization, or a kinesiological structure, we cansee that in this movement the interval of determination does not really add tothought anything that did not already exist. Determinability the precise mo-ment at which the indeterminate maintains a relation with the determinate thing is, in the analogical theory of relations, a consequence of the positive iden-tity and equality of the series it relates. Analogy subordinates the intervalbetween origin and terminus to a predetermined formal relation between themoments it relates.

The peculiar objectivity of Kants Idea, however, points to a more com-plex and more dynamic relation between the three moments of thought. Kantsays that the Idea has a problematic objectivity because it is itself depend-ent for its existence on the phenomena it unifies and determines. Kant callsthe Idea a focus imaginarius, and he likens it to the imaginary space whichwe must suppose to lie behind a mirror in order that, upon looking into it, weare able to see not only the objects which lie before us (the sink, our handswashing themselves), but those at a distance behind our backs.4 The mirrorillusion allows us to synthesize different elements and planes of experienceinto a whole, as though to transform the flat two-dimensional relation of con-cept and object into a three-dimensional plane with depth somewhat likethe device of depth of field in painting and photography, which occupies apivotal place in Deleuzes history of cinematic images.5 This reciprocal de-termination of whole and part, of Idea and phenomenon, makes it difficult tosupport the analogical view that a higher order series defines both the natureof the other series, and the relation that joins the two. The Idea, the whole,gives things unity, but the unity attained by the field of experience at the sametime confers a determination on the Idea, makes it concrete, gives it an actu-ality without which it would not be. There is then an empiricism of the ideathat is poorly understood or even misunderstood as a relation that comes


to be established between two series. It seems rather that Idea and phenom-ena have a common genesis and structure one another. Their co-existenceforms an idea-structure.

An idea-structure is an open whole. It is open, because both the elementsand relations that constitute it are in a state of mutual transformation, andneither can attain an identity apart from the other. The structure is whole andcompletely determined because the interaction of elements and relations re-sults in the creation of some phenomenal experience, which is in no way de-fined by a lack of a form, or principle which it must wait to receive, as Kantimagines the object must wait to receive its form from the Idea. What we needto examine more closely now is the modality the kind of existence weattribute to this open structure. The structure is whole because it is actualizedin some determinate phenomena. What gets determined though, is not any setof positive properties, or propositions of consciousness, but virtuality. Deleuzecalls the structure of finite experience a determinable virtuality. Thus far, Ihave focused on the first of these two terms: the determinable, and the natureof determinability. I now want to turn my attention to the meaning of virtuality,and its role in the reversal of time and movement, which we can trace not onlythrough Deleuzes work, but back to the dawn of early modernity in DunsScotus break with medieval Aristotelian theories of movement and time.

The virtual and the possible as kinds of movement

Deleuzes descriptions of virtuality are famously difficult. The virtual maywell be his most important and least understood idea. It is often associatedwith pure indeterminacy or pure possibility. What I wish to make clear is thatvirtuality describes a certain relation of time and movement. To be more pre-cise, it describes a kind of relation between an origin and a terminal point ofmotion. Virtuality is, on this account, closest to Duns Scotus, whose interestin the virtual was very similar to Deleuze. As we shall see, Scotus too usedthe idea of virtuality to reverse the relation of time and movement and toovercome the kinesiological principle, inherited from Aristotle, which regardedmovement as a relation of formal resemblance between an active agent anda passive recipient of change. Deleuze uses virtuality in a strikingly similarway to distinguish between two very different kinesiological structureswhich, in the Cinema books, he calls kinostructures and chronogeneses. Butbefore we proceed any further in discussing the kinesiological roots of thevirtual, let us recall how questions of time and movement figure into thedistinction Deleuze makes between virtuality and possibility, in his readingsof Bergson and Proust.

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Deleuze often opposes the virtual to the possible (B, pp. 96 ff.; DR, pp. 211ff.). In this respect, he remains a disciple of Bergson who criticized the clas-sical formulation of possibility because it described only a false movement,i.e., one in which nothing new was created or accomplished. The possible,according to Bergson, is not a rigorous concept on its own, but is defined byits lack of actuality.6 The possible is weak actuality. It is the real, minus thelife blood that makes it actual. This image of the possible can be traced backto Aristotle who, in the Metaphysics, says that the actual is both logically andtemporally prior to the potential. The potential is a being of the same kind asthe actual. Logically, a thing is potential because it can become actual, andreason or knowledge of its actuality must be present before we can speak ofa knowledge of its possibility. Temporally, an actual being is ahead of anotherbeing of the same kind that is only possible. The possible becomes actual byactualizing some previously existing form of being. Each being can be tracedto a previous one from which it derived, and ultimately to a first mover, i.e.,a primary eternal being. Aristotle says that actuality is prior in a more fun-damental sense. For eternal beings are by their very nature prior to those thatperish since nothing eternal is potentiality.7

In this Greek image of the possible, the interval of time between possi-ble and actual is subordinated to a false movement. Deleuze explains thatthere is no difference between the possible and the real (B, p. 97). Theinterval of time between origin and terminus is only an obstacle in the wayof a more efficient realization of a given end. It is the preformism of thisfalse movement that Deleuze wants to overcome with the concept of thevirtual. Virtuality facilitates a real, creative movement in which the intervalis no longer defined by a pre-existing formal or diachronic resemblance butis rather a difference that differentiates among the origin and terminus, andis thus the condition of any movement at all. In a moment we shall see thatthis is how Scotus used the concept. But Bergson had described somethingsimilar in his work on memory and this remains the main reference pointfor Deleuze.

We usually imagine memory to be the recollection of events which are nolonger present. In memory, an image which we recollect from the past seemsto co-exist along with a present perception. So long as we conceive of memory,in this way, as merely recollection, it involves only differences of degree be-tween presents, i.e., between a past present and a present present, and every-thing we said about the possible applies to memory. The past is, like the imageof the possible, a weak actuality that must borrow its presence and life-bloodfrom the new present in relation to which it is past. What Bergson wishes toshow is that this image of memory throws no light on the mechanism of


associationism8 which joins past and present and facilitates movement amongthem. Memory, understood as recollection runs up against all the same diffi-culties we found earlier in the model of analogy, namely that the moment ofassociation is derived from what is associated.

In Bergsons re-formulation, memory is more than simple recollection, itis a kind of creative movement. In memory, past events participate in rela-tions of association and resemblance with a new, present perception. Imagesof tensed events are disembeded from their original context, and reembededin a new empirical and diachronic continuum. Bergsons whole point aboutmemory is that it requires a capacity to differentiate among presents and con-struct among them relations of resemblance which make possible new move-ment structures. This difference is not a consequence of a movement ofresemblance. It is its a priori condition.

To describe, in a more precise way, this non-actual, virtual capacity to re-late presents and create movement structures, Bergson developed his famousconcept of the Past in General. It describes the organization the whole inwhich different moments of a movement structure participate. The Past inGeneral is not a property of any past present. Bergson describes it as a purerecollection. Deleuze explains that it has no psychological existence, whichis to say that is not defined by diachronic and empirical resemblance (B, p.55). It possesses an ontological character different in kind than the memoryimages and movement structures which it makes possible.

Deleuze liked to explain the peculiar ontological status of the virtual byborrowing from Prousts description of states of resonance. The virtual is,as Proust says of resonance, Real without being actual, ideal without beingabstract (quoted in B, p. 96). In what sense is real being used here? WhenDeleuze explains that The reality of the virtual is structure (DR, p. 209) wemust understand structure in a quite rigorous sense. A structure is a set of el-ements and relations which are separate but nevertheless related in so funda-mental a manner that neither moment of the structure can attain an identityoutside of this interrelation. In the case of memory, the present perceptionimage and the formerly present recollection image may be thought of as struc-tural elements which are joined by a relation of resemblance which makesrecollection possible.

Now if, in keeping with the empiricist impulse, we want to argue that thestructure is not an emanation of any extra-worldly, or extra-structural force,then the elements only exist to the extent that they are structured by relations,and the relations, in turn, do not have any reality apart from this activity ofrelating terms. In short, the elements have no identity apart from the relationswhich bind them into a system, and the relations are themselves dependent

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on their actualization in a set of terms. The elements and relations of a struc-ture reciprocally determine each other, and so neither is able to attain a finalidentity that would not be open to the transformative effects of the structureas a whole. It is important to insist on this reciprocal determination of elementand relation. Otherwise, the structure could be regarded as simply a functionof either the elements or relations. This is the trouble with various forms ofbiological or economic determinism where the determining moment classrelations or genetics, for example is not itself affected by the structure itmakes possible. If the elements and relations are structurally determined, thenstructure is a name we should reserve for the unity, the open whole in whichelements and relations participate. Structure is the relation of elements andrelations. This is how we should understand the difficult thesis Deleuze putsforward in the Cinema books, if one had to define the Whole, it would bedefined as relation (C1, p. 10). In other words, the whole is the relation ofelements and relations.

Perhaps now we can see in what sense the virtual whole is at once real andideal (as opposed to actual and abstract). It is real, and not actual, because theactual is what is defined by empirical and diachronic relations of resemblanceamong structured events. The virtual is real as opposed to abstract becausethe reciprocity of element and relation (the whole as relation) is not an ab-stract, detached condition, but is always realized in the structuration of events,and it has no existence or reality apart from this activity. The virtual is idealin the sense that it is an ideal whole that transcends any local moment. How-ever, as a whole, it is not a separate and abstract ideality but is rather, like theKantian Idea which we described earlier, a whole that can only be given inthe act of unifying its parts. In fact, in Cinema II, Deleuze says that theBergsonian past is to time what the Idea is to thought.9 The Kantian Idea, inthe sense discussed above, shares, with concept and object, the same relationthat the Bergsonian past does with recollection and perception images. In otherwords, both the Past and Idea are virtual because they facilitate the formationof formal and diachronic resemblance between different moments of experi-ence, and so form them into structures and sequences.

Like the Kantian Idea, the Past is a kind of whole that is neither an a prioriideal entity (form or Idea) that precedes the elements it unites. Nor is it assimply a sum, or the set of all sets. For each of these images of the whole sup-poses a fully determined totality that resembles the events and practices inwhich it is instantiated. In the place of the false, abstract movement of possi-bility, where time is an obstacle, a virtual whole allows objects and events tobe determinable, and time a generative force.

In order to more precisely describe the relation of virtuality, time and move-


ment, I want to situate these ideas in a wider history of kinesiology. For it isnot only in Deleuzes work that the concept of the virtual has played a pivotalrole in distinguishing kinesiological structures, and even reversing time andmovement. In his thesis on self-motion, Duns Scotus developed a concept ofvirtual act to try to overcome the image of resemblance and preformism atthe heart of Greek theories of movement that were then finding their way intoChristian cosmology. The distinction Scotus developed between univocal andequivocal forms of movement is a precursor, perhaps even a precondition ofDeleuzes reversal of time and movement, and the distinction of kinostructuresand chronogeneses.

Omne Quod Movetur Ab Alio Movetur

Everything moved is moved by another thing: Aristotles kinesiological prin-ciple comes into medieval thought by way of Thomas Aquinas. The principlestates that movement requires a mover which is in act, and contains a perfec-tion (or terminus of motion), and a moved thing which is passive and lacksthe perfection which it must wait to receive in order to accomplish the move-ment. The self-motion of Gods creatures is thus impossible for two relatedreasons: (i) all movement can be divided into active and passive parts; and(ii) no being can be simultaneously active and passive with respect to a givenend state (or perfection) since that would require that it both lack and possessthe perfection.

Aristotles principle directs our attention away from the observable motionof the world to, ultimately, a prime mover which is why Thomas Aquinas placedit at the center of his first proof for the existence of God.10 It separates the ter-tium a quo (the beginning of motion) from the tertium ad quom (the final aimof motion), and assigns to them active and passive functions. The mover is ac-tive, and contains the principle or cause of change. The moved thing is passive,and lacks the perfection which will define it as the terminal point of motion. Itis this separation of active and passive moments that Duns Scotus challengeswhen he sets out to show that Gods creatures may be capable of moving them-selves. He does so by distinguishing first, among different kinds of causal agents,and then among the different ways in which these agents can contain their per-fections.11 Both of these distinctions (of kinds of agency and modes of posses-sion) converge in what will be our main interest here, his concept of virtual act.

Self-motion is impossible because agent and patient are distinct, and onelacks the perfection which the other possesses. To move itself an agent wouldhave to possess and lack the same form. But, as Scotus shows, while all agents

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possess effects, there are different kinds of agents which produce effects likeor unlike themselves. In the language of scholasticism, causes may be univo-cal or equivocal in their effects. When agent and patient share the same form,we say that the agent is a univocal agent. Univocal here means that its termi-nal effect what it determines the patient to be is of the same nature andform as the agent. A univocal agent is one which communicates its own formto a patient which lacks that form, as when a man begets a man. Movementinvolves a mutual exclusivity of agent and patient, and a formal resemblancebetween them.

An equivocal agent, on the other hand, is not governed by the same rule ofresemblance. The equivocal cause does not possess the form to which it givesrise, but the virtus, or power to create a form. The relation of the agent to itsterminal effect is not based on the presence or absence of a given form, be-cause to possess the virtus, the agent need not formally resemble the effect itis capable of creating. It is able to produce effects that are different in natureand kind than itself.

Medieval thinkers commonly applied the distinction between formal andvirtual possession of a terminal effect to both divine and worldly causes.Aquinas, for example, taught that God does not formally resemble the crea-tures he brings into existence.12 God has the ability to create bodies withoutthese bodies actually formally existing, or formally resembling him. He pos-sesses our bodies in a virtual way. The sun maintains a similar relation tothe effects which it causes. The sun is not itself hot (because heat was thoughtto be a property of corruptible bodies, which the sun is not), but it producesheat. Like God, the sun is also outside the species of its effects, i.e., not of thesame form as its effects. Heat, therefore, is in virtual actuality in the formallycold properties of the sun. Or, still more interesting, the sun, through the proc-ess of putrification, causes maggots to form. Does the sun then have the formof a maggot? No, it possesses the virtual power to give rise to maggots with-out actually possessing this form. Heat and maggots are in virtual actualityin the formal actuality of the sun.

Henry of Ghent used this sense of virtuality to understand the relation of asubject to the cause of its accidents. The subject does not possess its acciden-tal quality formally or actually. For it is in the very nature of an accident thatwe do not possess it beforehand. The form of the accidental subject pos-sesses the form of its accident virtually. The Scotus scholar Allan Wolterexplains that an object too may be said to virtually contain a notion if theobject has the power or virtus of producing the notion in the mind.13 A spheri-cal object, for example, may be thought to contain the notion of a circle, eventhough it is not itself circular. It is this sense of virtuality that we commonly


use today when we speak, for example, of virtual reality. A computer programthat simulates architectural designs virtually contains a house, which meansthat it possesses the ability to evoke the image of a house on the screen, or inthe mind, but does not actually have the form of a house.

Returning now to the relation of virtuality and motion: According to thekinesiological principle, self-motion is impossible because it would requirethat a thing be simultaneously in act and in potency to act. Because I cannotpossess and lack the same thing at the same time, self motion is impossible.Why does virtuality challenge this principle? Because nothing prevents anequivocal agent from being effected by the form that its virtual quality evokes.If an agent can give rise to a form different than itself, then it may be possiblefor it to be subsequently acted upon by that other, now distinct form. In sucha case, mover and moved are not distinct. The mover is itself changed by theform to which it gives rise, as though it were the effect of its own secretionto borrow a fitting image from Deleuze (DR, p. 289).

It is conceivable then that one and the same thing might be in virtual actwith respect to one perfection (i.e., possessing the capacity to create differentform) and in formal potency to it (able to receive, or be acted upon by theperfection). In such a case, the active agent is not distinct from the passiverecipient of motion. This is not true of all equivocal agents. God is not trans-formed by the perfections he possesses, even though he may contain them ina virtual way. But it is true of some, and Scotus ultimately wants to show thatit is possible that God could create beings that are themselves capable of self-motion. Scotus will claim that this is true of many things. Many of his exam-ples the movement of heavy bodies and the local motion of animals areunderstandable only in light of obscure debates in medieval physics. Moreintelligible to us today are his comments on the will. The will is a power tocreate acts of volition, but it possesses this power without possessing the ac-tual form of the acts it brings about. And, since the agent or suppositum who possesses the will, is changed by the acts of volition to which the willgives rise, the suppositum is effected and moved by the acts it brings into being.

Kinostructures and chronogeneses: From cinema to kinesiology

Duns Scotus distinction of virtual and formal act blurs the boundaries betweenthe production and reception of a terminus. These moments collapse into theinterval that had separated them. The interval ceases to be an inert space be-tween agent and patient and now facilitates, and even produces movement. Inow want to suggest that this reversal in time and movement, initiated by

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Scotus, passes into modern philosophy via Kant, not only in his descriptionof the Idea, which we have already discussed, but in the problem of self-af-fection. For Deleuze, Kant defines the basic problem of modern thought whenhe questions the ability of the Cartesian cogito to appear as a phenomena inthought. The problem of self-affection which Kant raises eats away at thedistinction of active and passive moments of experience, and produces a ten-sion in modern thought between two different structures of time and move-ment which Deleuze will identify as kinostructures and chronogeneses.

Let us recall the problem of determination as Kant formulates it in his cri-tique of Descartes. According to Kant, the Cartesian proof of existence (cogitoergo sum) fails to explain precisely how indeterminate being (I am) becomesdeterminable, and thus capable of appearing in a phenomenal form (as whatI think). Kant argues that thinking cannot bear directly on a pure being sincebeing, in order to be an object of thought, must take the form of a phenomena(CPR, 331 ff.) I think is always an I think that. It is only as I receive thismemory, or experience this perception that I can know that I am. But how doesthe indeterminate being that I am actively present itself in the particular,determined phenomena that I think? Kant questions the form under whichthe indeterminate moment may become determinate. The determination Ithink appears to refer immediately to the indeterminate existence I am. Butwithout a form of determinability the Cogito remains only the possibility ofthinking (DR, p. 276). Descartes attributes to it both being and its sensibleappearance. And yet, his formulation of the cogito rests on an irreducible dif-ference between being and thinking. The self experiences its own being as another that affects it. Deleuze explains: I am therefore determined as a pas-sive self that necessarily represents its own thinking activity to itself as an Other(Autre) that affects it (WP, pp. 2435). The form of self-affection which thecogito assumes is then a difference, or an interval.

Let us see now how time and movement are implicated in this problem.When Kant raises the problem of determinability, he places in doubt the modelof movement and time that underlies the classical image of thought. The formof self-affection is the difference the interval between the indeterminatepossibility of thinking and its concrete determination as phenomena. Insteadof being an obstacle in the way of actualization, the interval in the movementof thought has become the very form of experience. This interval is not sim-ply an empty space. It is the condition of the possibility of any distinctionbetween being and phenomena. The interval the form of determinability produces difference. As a result, indeterminate being is determinable only intime. I am determines the existence of a self [moi] that changes in timeand presents a certain degree of consciousness at every moment.14 It is a


difference that differentiates. It is a difference that distributes itself through-out the self, and it is only on this basis that the self thinks and produces anymovement between I and ego, or concept and object.

Time is the form by which the mind affects itself. It is the form of differen-tiation on the basis of which it is possible to construct any movement of re-semblance and actualization among being and thought, I and ego, or conceptand object. This time may be described as an empty and pure form because itis not in the service of any given movement. It is a generalized principle ofdifferentiation. Time the form of determinability is the formal relationby which the mind affects itself (CC, p. 30). It is a machine that turns theindeterminate into a determinate phenomenon (DR, p. 276). Time is a prin-ciple of internal difference and it is in this difference that movement is pro-duced as an effect (DR, p. 57). We no longer have a resemblance of beingand phenomena, plus an interval of time it takes to realize it. Instead, Kantgives us a self-affecting subject which produces movement, and can give riseto new and different terminal effects.

We already saw how Deleuze finds in Kants presentation of the whole ofexperience the Transcendental Idea a tension between open and closedkinesiological structures. Underneath the analogical structure which Kantpresents. Deleuze finds a univocity of being. Underneath the closed and sealedarchitectonic an open, furtive and explosive moment. The very same tensionbetween two different structures of time and movement is expressed in theproblem of self-affection. Kants solution to the problem of determinationopens being directly onto difference (DR, p. 58). It introduces a schizo-phrenia in principle (DR, p. 58), a crack in the self, which remains at theheart of modern thought, in spite of all the efforts of Kant and his followers toexpunge it and bring thought back to a principle of identity. Deleuze writes:

. . . when Kant puts rational theology into question, in the same stroke heintroduces a kind of disequilibrium, a fissure or a crack in the pure Self ofthe I think, an alienation in principle, insurmountable: the subject canhenceforth represent its own spontaneity only as that of an Other . . . Itmatters little that synthetic identity and following that the morality ofpractical reason restore the integrity of the self, of the world and of god,thereby preparing the way for post-Kantian syntheses: for a brief momentwe enter into that schizophrenia in principle which characterizes the high-est power of thought, and opens being directly on to difference, despite allthe meditations, all the reconciliations, of the concept. (DR, p. 58)

This play between the latent and manifest structures of time surfaces inDeleuzes reading of Rimbauds poetic formula I is another which, he claims,summarizes the Kantian philosophy. In a letter to Georges Izambard, Rimbaud

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writes: I is an other . . . so much the worse for the wood that finds itself aviolin! . . . if the copper wakes up a bugle, that is not its fault (CC, p. 30).Deleuze reads this as a poetic formula which summarizes the problem of self-affection in Kant. The thinking being experiences the thing that thinks thething that it is as an other that arrives in thought: So much the worse for beingthat finds itself a phenomena. If the I wakes up an ego, that is not its fault.

However, the reading of Rimbaud is more subtle than at first appears. Whenhe reads the formula, Deleuze is careful to show that Kant goes further thanRimbaud (CC, p. 30). The images with which Rimbaud brings the formulato life are classically Aristotelian. The concept (wood-copper) remains theactive form and the object (violin-bugle) its potential matter, so that the twomoments are clearly separated into passive and active moments. I is anothermeans simply that I experience myself as an other subject, or I become an-other subject. At this level, however, there are still two entities which func-tion as origin and terminus, and if there is a becoming it is only a passagethrough an empty interval between cardinal points. But Deleuze takes fromRimbauds formula a far more radical image of a subject that is a becoming-other, or a determinable capacity to differentiate and build relations betweencardinal points of movement. Thus, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze explainsthat we are not referring to another subject but rather the subject who be-come another. (WP, pp. 3435). The self-affecting subject does not just movefrom one ideal point to another. In a medieval terminology, it is self-movingand able to produce terminal effects different in nature from itself. Kantsimage of determinability as self-affection gives us a cracked-I which experi-ences itself through a process of internal differentiation that ends in the pro-duction of something that did not previously exist.

There are then two kinesiological structures at work in Kant. In the rela-tion of concept and object, and in the analogical description of the Ideas, Kantmaintains a classical kinesiology where time remains an inert vehicle forconveying a given movement. But this is accompanied by another, more ex-plosive structure. Deleuze explains:

The concept-object relation subsists in Kant, but it is doubled by the I-Selfrelation, which constitutes a modulation, and no longer a mold (CC, p. 30).

Modernity, in Deleuzes work, is defined by the tension between these twovery different but nevertheless related kinesiological structures. The false andabstract movements of conceptual recognition, the form of movement that,as we have seen, can ultimately be traced back to the Greek kinesiologicalprinciple, are (in the lexicon of the Cinema books) kinostructures. These are


structures of experience which privilege movement (conceived as formal re-semblance) over time (conceived as simply space between agent and patient),and which steer us away from the specific nature of the interval and the powerof determination as such. The interval is subsumed as a part of an antecedentor succeeding block of movement. It is the last image of the first sequence,or the first of the second. (CII, p. 277).

Modernity not only of science, but philosophy and art too emerges fromout of a new kinesiological structure. Kinostructures give way to chronogeneses.Time no longer flows from movement, it produces aberrant movements. Theinterval is not superfluous or supplemental. Instead, it assumes a central rolein the determination of the whole of movement. Deleuze writes: The inter-val is set free, the interstice becomes irreducible and stands on its own. (CII,p. 277). The whole is determinable and virtual, or a determinable virtuality.Movement still involves a reciprocal action of moments or parts in change.The parts enter into relation. They form a unity and can be assigned value andsignificance because they participate in a whole. The whole, however, becauseit is dependent on the moments of movement for its actuality, is itself dividedin the parts. Objects change their relative positions and, through this change,the whole of which they form a part is transformed and changes qualitatively.Movement among the parts therefore expresses a qualitative change in theduration of the whole. This kind of qualitative change is possible because thewhole that is changing is neither given nor giveable. Whole now means thatthe interval is not superfluous to the determination of the sequence. A finitewhole does not complete the sequence, and insure against aberration. It in-sures that there is no absolute and finally fixed totality that either precedesthe parts (transcendentalism) or follows them (empiricism).

It is in his books on cinema that Deleuze goes furthest in differentiatingthese kinesiological structures. As concepts, though, kinostructures andchronogeneses do not concern only the reality of cinema. We might say thatthey describe the cinematic or kinesiological nature of any experiencewhatever. Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested that Deleuzes interest in the cin-ema is not just appended to his work: it is at the center, in the projective prin-ciple of this thought. It is a cinema-thought.15 Indeed, in the Cinema booksDeleuze descries the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema. (CI, p. 59)We miss the significance of this claim if we see in cinema only a kind of art,or a region of aesthetics. If the universe can be described as cinematic it isbecause kinesiological questions questions concerning the relation of timeand movement run like a watermark through our metaphysics, cosmologyand social and political theory.

Since I have already said a good deal about the metaphysics of cinema, it

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seems appropriate to say some final now words about the wider social andpolitical consequences of the tension between different temporal structuresin modernity. Kinostructures are different way of anaesthetizing time, andreducing it to a sort of a negative space between points of movement. Heretime plays two contradictory roles: it is both a means of communication be-tween agent and patient, and an obstacle in the way of a more expedient reali-zation of the perfection. Because it plays these two roles, time has an aura ofduplicity about it: time is a trickster, an avenger or a thief because it threatensto produce aberration in what should otherwise be a relation of formal resem-blance.

This, our common conception of time as obstacle rests on the illusion thatthe future is already given, and that the interval between now and then is onlyan obstacle. This image is, of course, illusory because if the future was alreadygiven we would not have to wait for it to arrive. But it is an illusion with veryreal social and political consequences. Isnt this illusory subordination of in-terval to movement what Marx found when he set out to study the laws of themotion of capital: Capital is a motion (M-C-M-C-M) that is dynamic andexpansive, but whose accomplishment does not end in the creation of any-thing whose form and nature was not already realized in its initial moment.And because the form of the final aim is realized in the movements begin-ning, the interval of time (and the forms of labour and nature that are con-sumed there) is only a means of relaying the cause (M) to the perfection (M),and is not itself the source of any potentiality or historical force. Marx saysthat The events that take place outside the sphere of circulation, in the inter-val between the buying and selling, do not affect the form of this movement.16

In fact, the effective realization of the movement of capital depends on anability to reduce, and, if possible, remove the interval.

Nowhere is this drive to eliminate times interval and its potential aberra-tion more evident today than in the so-called new modernization of financewith its sophisticated devices for compressing times interval and neutraliz-ing risk. Derivative financial instruments such as futures, options, andswaps are means of trading in profits derived from speculation on the assetsunderpinning them. The spread of global wide chains of systemic risk re-quires ever more sophisticated controls to produce a risk free environment.17

In the last 50 years, we have produced a dazzling array of social and politicaltechnologies which neutralize the potential aberrations of time: the manipu-lation of genetic systems; pesticides; growth hormones, the rapid exhaustionof species too costly to genetically manipulate (e.g., marine life), but also flex-ible labor, contracting out, rapid reskilling, NAFTA, FTAA, MAI all serve tosubordinate times interval to what seems to be a complete and determined


whole.18 These mechanisms rest on our continued belief that the whole ofwhich our actions form a part is already complete, that we are being propelledthrough time by a system of political and social relations that are formed inde-pendently of our actions and will. It is ultimately this transcendental illusionthat is at stake today in the tension between kinostructures and chronogeneses.

Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986 [1983]) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1989 [1985]), hereafter cited in the text as CI and CII, respectively. The most importanttexts of Deleuzes for this study of the reversal of time and movement are Empiricismand Subjectivity: An Essay on Humes Theory of Human Nature, trans. ConstantinBoundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991 [1953]), cited as ES; Bergsonism,trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), cited as B; KantsCritical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984 [1963]), cited as KCP; Differenceand Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 [1968]),cited as DR; The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1990 [1969]).

From a later period, we should mention Deleuzes book on Michel Foucault, Foucault,trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1988), What is Phi-losophy (co-written with Felix Guattari), trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (New York:Columbia University Press, 1994), cited as WP, and finally the interviews on Cinemawhich form Part Two of the collected interviews published as Negotiations 19721990,trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

This short bibliography by no means exhausts Deleuzes comments on time and move-ment. These texts have been the most important in my preparation of this study. There islittle secondary literature on the reversal of time and movement. The most compre-hensive is D.N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuzes Time Machine (Durham: Duke UniversityPress, 1997). This text is concerned almost exclusively with Deleuzes work on Cinema.Also helpful is Dorothea Olkowskis Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation (LosAngeles: University of California Press) and Constantin Boundas Deleuze-Bergson: AnOntology of the Virtual in Paul Patton (ed.) Deleuze: A Critical Reader (New York:Routledge, 1996).

2. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th ed., trans. Richard Taft(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).

3. F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 97.

4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St.Martins Press, 1965), p. 533, cited in the text as CPR.

5. It is through the device of depth of field that time-images are first achieved in the cinema.6. Henri Bergson, The Possible and the Real, in The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L.

Andison, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1946).

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7. Aristotle, Metapysics, Book Theta, 1050b, 30.8. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (Lon-

don: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1911), p. 212.9. What the past is to time, sense is to language and idea to thought. Deleuze, CII, 99.

10. The division and mutual exclusivity of active and passive moments of motion can beseen in the following passage, from Aquinas, on the first proof for the existence of God:

Now anything in process of change is being changed by something else. This is so be-cause it is characteristic of things in process of change that they do not yet have theperfection towards which they move, though able to have it; whereas it is characteristicof something causing change to have that perfection already. . . . A thing in process ofchange cannot actually cause that change, it cannot change itself of necessity, thereforeanything in process of change is being changed by something else. Moreover, this some-thing else, if in process of change, is itself being changed by yet another thing; and thislast by another. . . . Hence one is bound to arrive at some first cause of change not itselfbeing changed by anything, and this is what everyone understands by God. ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologica (London: Blackfriars, 1964), Ia, 2,3,1, pp. 1315.

11. Scotus discusses the kinesiological principle in John Duns Scotus, Questions on theMetaphysics, Book Nine: Potency and Act, trans. Alan Wolter (Washington: CatholicUniversity of America, 1981), see especially Question Fourteen Could Something beMoved by Itself? pp. 5777. For commentary see Peter King, Duns Scotus on theReality of Self-Change in Mary Louise Gill et al. (eds.), Self-Motion from Aristotleto Newton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) pp. 227290, and Roy Effler,John Duns Scotus and the Principle Omne Quod Movetur Ab Alio Movetur (St.Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1962). Joseph Owens discusses Scotus use ofvirtuality in The Conclusion of the Prima Via, The Modern Schoolman, 30 (1953),3353.

12. A similar distinction can be found in related medieval debates on mixed and pure per-fections and in questions concerning the resemblance of God and creatures. St. Thomas,for example, says that there are as many sorts of resemblance as there are ways of shar-ing a form. Thus, God possesses all the qualities of creatures. Some of these intel-lect, for example he possesses in a formal manner. Our intelligence is of the same formas Gods, though less perfect. But our corporeality, he possesses in a virtual way,because it differs in kind from our own. See his response to the question Can creaturesbe said to resemble God in Summa Theologica, Ia 4,30, pp. 5759.

13. See the glossary appended to John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The QuodlibetelQuestions, trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1975), p. 528.

14. On Four Poetic Formulas that Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy, in GillesDeleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 29, cited as CC.

15. Jean Luc Nancy, The Deluzian Fold of Thought in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. PaulPatton (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), p. 110.

16. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft),(London: Penguin, 1973), p. 451.

17. See Ibrahim Ware, The Banking System in Turmoil, Le Monde Diplomatique, Novem-ber 1998.


18. For more on the neutralization of time in capitalism see Teresa Brennan, Why the Timeis out of Joint: Marxs Political Economy Without the Subject, in South Atlantic Quar-terly, 97/2 (1998), 6380.

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Documents

Crocker, S - On Deleuze's Reversal of Time and Mouvement