556 / Philosophies of Art and Beautythe impressions which the mind gathers from practical life, i.e,t -,'|from its impulses, its desires, and its sensory awareness. The in- '"*tuitions, then, which make up the artist's consciousness are theproduct of feeling on the one hand and images on the other.These are brought together and fused in the unity of lyrical ex-pression. The artistic integrity of lyrical expression is due to thepervasiveness of feeling in it: because of feeling, an image can be-come an intuition. With this achievement art becomes a symbolof feeling.

"What gives coherence and unity to the intuition is feeling:the intuition is really such because it represents a feeling, andcan only appear from and upon that. Not the idea, but the feel-ing, is what confers upon art the airy lightness of the symbol:an aspiration enclosed in the circle of a representationthat isart: and in it the aspiration alone stands for the representation,and the representation alone for the aspiration." Croce's posi-tion clearly contains the doctrine which has been developed bySusanne Langer: art is a symbol of feeling.

The essay included here is the article on "Aesthetics" fromthe fourteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, whichis Croce's most concise presentation of his position. For afuller discussion, the reader is referred to The Breviary of Aes-thetics.

AESTHETICS

FROM Encyclopaedia Britannica(Fourteenth Edition)

If we examine a poern in order to determine what it is that mate Ijfeel it to be a poem, we at once find two constant and necessary *"aments: a complex of images, and a feeling that animates them,us, for instance, recall a passage learnt at school: Virgil's III(Aeneid, iii, 294, sqq.), in which Aeneas describes how on hearthat in the country to whose shores he had come the Trojan Hekwas reigning, with Andromache, now his wife, he was overcome \t and a great desire to see this surviving son of Priam

to hear of his strange adventures. Andromache, whom he m

CROCK 1557outside the walls of the city, by the waters of a river renamedSimois, celebrating funeral rites before a cenotaph of green turf andtwo altars to Hector and Astyanax; her astonishment on seeing him,her hesitation, the halting words in which she questions him, uncer-tain whether he is a man or a ghost; Aeneas's no less agitated repliesand interrogations, and the pain and confusion with which she recallsthe pasthow she lived through scenes of blood and shame, how shewas assigned by lot as slave and concubine to Pyrrhus, abandoned byhim and united to Helenus, another of his slaves, how Pyrrhus fell bythe hand of Orestes and Helenus became a free man and a king;the entry of Aeneas and his men into the city, and their receptionby the son of Priam in this little Troy, this mimic Pergamon with itsnew Xanthus, and its Scaean Gate whose threshold Aeneas greetswith a kissall these details, and others here omitted, are images ofpersons, things, attitudes, gestures, sayings, joy and sorrow; mereimages, not history or historical criticism, for which they are neithergiven nor taken. But through them all there runs a feeling, a feelingwhich is our own no less than the poet's, a human feeling of bitter *memories, of shuddering horror, of melancholy, of homesickness, oftenderness, of a kind of childish pietas that could prompt this vainrevival of things perished, these playthings fashioned by a religiousdevotion, the parva Trow, the Pergama simulata magnis, the aren-tem Xanthi cognomine rivum: something inexpressible in logicalterms, which only poetry can express in full. Moreover, these two ele-ments may appear as two in a first abstract analysis, but they cannotbe regarded as two distinct threads, however intertwined; for, ineffect, the feeling is altogether converted into images, into this com-plex of images, and is thus a feeling that is contemplated and there-lore resolved and transcended. Hence poetry must be called neitherfeeling, nor image, nor yet the sum of the two, but "contempla-tion of feeling" or "lyrical intuition" or (which is the same thing)"pure intuition"pure, that is, of all historical and critical referenceto the reality or unreality of the images of which it is woven, and ap-prehending the pure throb of life in its ideality. Doubtless, otherthings may be found in poetry besides these two elements or mo-ments and the synthesis of the two; but these other things are eitherpresent as extraneous elements in a compound (reflections, exhorta-tions, polemics, allegories, etc.), or else they are just these image-feelings themselves taken in abstraction from their context as somuch material, restored to the condition in which it was before theact of poetic creation. In the former case, they are non-poetic ele-

558 / Philosophies of Art and Beautyments merely interpolated into or attached to the poem; in the latthey are divested of poetry, rendered unpoetical by a reader eitunpoetical or not at the moment poetical, who has dispelledpoetry, either because he cannot live in its ideal realm, or for the ltimate ends of historical enquiry or other practical purposes winvolve the degradationor rather, the conversionof the poem ira document or an instrument.

ARTISTIC QUALITIES.What has been said of "poetry" applies tothe other "arts" commonly enumerated; painting, sculpture, arclecture, music. Whenever the artistic quality of any product ofmind is discussed, the dilemma must be faced, that either it islyrical intuition, or it is something else, something just as respectalbut not art. If painting (as some theorists have maintained) wthe imitation or reproduction of a given object, it would be, notbut something mechanical and practical; if the task of the painter (sother theorists have held) were to combine lines and lights arcolours with ingenious novelty of invention and effect, he wouldnot an artist, but an inventor; if music consisted in similar combirtions of notes, the paradox of Leibniz and Father Kircher would contrue, and a man could write music without being a musician; ortematively we should have to fear (as Proudhon did for poetry arJohn Stuart Mill for music) that the possible combinationswords or notes would one day be exhausted, and poetry or mtwould disappear. As in poetry, so in these other arts, it is notoricthat foreign elements sometimes intrude themselves; foreign eithea parte objecti or a parte subjecti, foreign either in fact or frompoint of view of an inartistic spectator or listener. Thus the criticsthese arts advise the artist to exclude, or at least not to rely upwhat they call the "literary" elements in painting, sculpture andsic, just as the critic of poetry advises the writer to look for "poetand not be led astray by mere literature. The reader who understarpoetry goes straight to this poetic heart and feels its beat uponown; where this beat is silent, he denies that poetry is present, whatever and however many other things may take its place, united tfithe work, and however valuable they may be for skill and wisdomjfnobility of intellect, quickness of wit and pleasantness of effect,reader who does not understand poetry loses his way in pursuitthese other things. He is wrong not because he admires them, bbecause he thinks he is admiring poetry.

C R O C EOTHER FORMS OF ACTIVITY AS DISTINCT FROM ART.By defining art 3Slyrical or pure intuition we have implicitly distinguished it from allother forms of mental production. If such distinctions are made ex-plicit, we obtain the following negations:

i. Art is not philosophy, because philosophy is the logical think-ing of the universal categories of being, and art is the unreflectiveintuition of being. Hence, while philosophy transcends the image anduses it for its own purposes, art lives in it as in a kingdom. It is saidthat art cannot behave in an irrational manner and cannot ignorelogic; and certainly it is neither irrational nor illogical; but its ownrationality, its own logic, is a quite different thing from the dalecticallogic of the concept, and it was in order to indicate this peculiar andunique character that the name "logic of sense" or "aesthetic" wasinvented. The not uncommon assertion that art has a logical char-acter, involves either an equivocation between conceptual logic and,aesthetic logic, or a symbolic expression of the latter in terms of theformer.

2. Art is not history, because history implies the critical distinc-"tion between reality and unreality; the reality of the passing momentand the reality of a fancied world: the reality of fact and the reality ofdesire. For art, these distinctions are as yet unmade; it lives, as wehave said, upon pure images. The historical existence of Helenus, An-dromache and Aeneas makes no difference to the poetical quality ofVirgil's poem. Here, too, an objection has been raised: namely thatart is not wholly indifferent to historical criteria, because it obeysthe laws of "verisimilitude"; but, here again, "verisimilitude" is onlya rather clumsy metaphor for the mutual coherence of images, whichwithout this internal coherence would fail to produce their effect asimages, like Horace's delphinus in silvis and aper in fluctibus.

3. Art is not natural science, because natural science is historicalfact classified and so made abstract; nor is it mathematical science,because mathematics performs operations with abstractions and doesnot contemplate. The analogy sometimes drawn between mathemati-cal and poetical creation is based on merely external and genericresemblances; and the alleged necessity of a mathematical or geomet-rical basis for the arts is only another metaphor, a symbolic expres-sion of the constructive, cohesive and unifying force of the poeticmind building itself a body of images.

4. Art is not the play of fancy, because the play of fancy passesfrom image to image, in search of variety, rest or diversion, seeking to

560 / Philosophies of Art and Beautyamuse itself with the likenesses of things that give pleasure or have \l and pathetic interest; whereas in art the fancy is so dotnated by the single problem of converting chaotic feeling into clintuition, that we recognize the propriety of ceasing to call it fanfland calling it imagination, poetic imagination or creative imagfotion. Fancy as such is as far removed from poetry as are the wot:of Mrs. Radcliffe or Dumas p&re.

5. Art is not feeling in its immediacy.Andromache, on sectsAeneas, becomes omens, diriguit visu in medio, labitur, longptempore fatur, and when she speaks longos cietbat incassum ftetus; 1the poet does not lose his wits or grow stiff as he gazes; he does nctotter or weep or cry; he expresses himself in harmonious vehaving made these various perturbations the object of whichsings. Feelings in their immediacy are "expressed" for if theynot, if they were not also sensible and bodily facts ("psycho-physicphenomena," as the positivists used to call them) they would notconcrete things, and so they would be nothing at all. Andromachepressed herself in the way described above. But "expression" insense, even when accompanied by consciousness, is a mere metaptfrom "mental" or "aesthetic expression" which alone really exprthat is, gives to feeling a theoretical form and converts it into wor

562 / Philosophies of Art and Beautysake, and close their hearts to the troubles of life and the caresthought, are found to be wholly unproductive, or at most rise toimitation of others or to an impressionism devoid of concentratHence the basis of all poetry is human personality, and, since burpersonality finds its completion in morality, the basis of all poetry'the moral consciousness. Of course this does not mean that themust be a profound thinker or an acute critic; nor that he mustpattern of virtue or a hero; but he must have a share in the worldthought and action which will enable him, either in his ownor by sympathy with others, to live the whole drama of human liftiHe may sin, lose the purity of his heart, and expose himself, aspractical agent, to blame; but he must have a keen sense of purand impurity, righteousness and sin, good and evil. He may notendowed with great practical courage; he may even betray signstimidity and cowardice; but he must feel the dignity of courMany artistic inspirations are due, not to what the artist, as a man,;in practice, but to what he is not, and feels that he ought to bemiring and enjoying the qualities he lacks when he sees them in otheiaMany, perhaps the finest, pages of heroic and warlike poetry are "men who never had the nerve or the skill to handle a weapon. Onother hand, we are not maintaining that the possession of apersonality is enough to make a poet or an artist. To be a virdoes not make a man even an orator, unless he is also dicendi perThe sine qua non of poetry is poetry, that form of theoretical sjthesis which we have defined above; the spark of poetical genius witout which all the rest is mere fuel, not burning because no fire ishand to light it. But the figure of the pure poet, the pure artist,votary of pure Beauty, aloof from contact with humanity, is nofigure but a caricature.

That poetry not only presupposes the other forms of human mentactivity but is presupposed by them, is proved by the fact that wout the poetic imagaination which gives contemplative form toworkings of feeling, intuitive expression to obscure impressions, an!thus becomes representations and words, whether spoken or sungpainted or otherwise uttered, logical thought could not arise. Logicthought is not language, but it never exists without language, anduses the language which poetry has created; by means of concepts,discerns and dominates the representations of poetry, and it cotnot dominate them unless they, its future subjects, had first anistence of their own. Further, without the discerning and criticizia|activity of thought, action would be impossible; and if action, the

f C R O C E / 503

good action, the moral consciousness, duty. Every man,much he may seem to be all logical thinker, critic, scientist, rdjiiSit

| absorbed in practical interests or devoted to duty, cherishes afc f^v| bottom of his heart his own private store of imagination and paeftcyiI even Faust's pedantic famulus, Wagner, confessed that he often had| his "grillenhafte Stunden." Had this element been altogether denied: him, he would not have been a man, and therefore not even a think-

ing or acting being. This extreme case is an absurdity; but in propor-tion as this private store is scanty, we find a certain superficially andaridity in thought, and a certain coldness in action.

THE SCIENCE OF ART, OR AESTHETICS, AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL CHAR-ACTER.The concept of art expounded above is in a sense the ordi-nary concept, which appears with greater or less clarity in all statementsabout art, and is constantly appealed to, explicitly or implicitly, as,the fixed point round which all discussions on the subject gravitate:and this, not only nowadays, but at all times, as could be shown bythe collection and interpretation of things said by writers, poets, art-'ists, laymen and even the common people. But it is desirable to dis-pel the illusion that this concept exists as an innate idea, and to re-place this by the truth, that it operates as an a. priori concept. Now ana. priori concept does not exist by itself, but only in the individualproducts which it generates. Just as the a priori reality called Art, Poe-try or Beauty does not exist in a transcendent region where it can beperceived and admired in itself, but only in the innumerable worksof poetry, of art and of beauty which it has formed and continues toform, so the logical a priori concept of art exists nowhere but in theparticular judgments which it has formed and continues to form,the refutations which it has effected and continues to effect, the demon-strations it makes, the theories it constructs, the problems and groupsof problems, which it solves and has solved. The definitions and dis-tinctions and negations and relations expounded above have each itsown history, and have been progressively worked out in the course ofcenturies, and in them we now possess the fruits of this complex andunremitting toil. Aesthetic, or the science of art, has not thereforethe task (attributed to it by certain scholastic conceptions) of defin-ing art once for all and deducing from this conception its various doc-trines, so as to cover the whole field of aesthetic science; it is onlythe perpetual systematization, always renewed and always growing, ofthe problems arising from time to time out of reflection upon art, andis identical with the solutions of the difficulties and the criticisms of

564 / Philosophies of Art and Beautythe errors which act as stimulus and material to the unceasingress of thought. This being so, no exposition of aesthetic (especiaa summary exposition such as can alone be given here) can claimdeal exhaustively with the innumerable problems which have arisen ?'may arise in the course of the history of aesthetics; it can only irtion and discuss the chief, and among these, by preference, thewhich still make themselves felt and resist solution in ordinjeducated thought; adding an implied "et cetera," so that the realmay pursue the subject according to the criteria set before him, eitlby going again over old discussions, or by entering into thoseto-day, which change and multiply and assume new shapes almidaily. Another warning must not be omitted: namely that aestheticthough a special philosophical science, having as its principle a spcial and distinct category of the mind, can never, just because itphilosophical, be detached from the main body of philosophy; for i(problems are concerned with the relations between art and the othfmental forms, and therefore imply both difference and identitAesthetics is really the whole of philosophy, but with special erphasis on that side of it which concerns art. Many have demandedimagined or desired a self-contained aesthetics, devoid of any gene*philosophical implications, and consistent with more than one,with any, philosophy; but the project is impossible of execution 1cause self-contradictor}'. Even those who promise to expound a natralistic, inductive, physical, physiological or psychological aestheticin a word, a non-philosophical aestheticswhen they pass fwrtjpromise to performance surreptitiously introduce a general posirivi*tic, naturalistic or even materialistic philosophy. And anyone wrthinks that the philosophical ideas of positivism, naturalism armaterialism are false and out of date, will find it an easy matter irefute the aesthetic or pseudo-aesthetic doctrines which mutually su|port them and are supported by them, and will not regard theproblems as problems still awaiting solution or worthy of discussioior, at least, protracted discussion. For instance, the downfall 0*psychological associationism (or the substitution of mechanism for /priori synthesis) implies the downfall not only of logical associationism but of aesthetics also, with its association of "content" are"form," or of two "representations," which (unlike Campanella'itactus intrinsecus, effected cum magna suavitate) was a contact"1extrinsecus whose terms were no sooner united than they discecbant. The collapse of biological and evolutionary explanationslogical and ethical values implies the same collapse in the case

C R O C K 7565aesthetic value. The proved inability of empirical methods to yieldknowledge of reality, which in fact they can only classify and reduceto types, involves the impossibility of an aesthetics arrived at by col-lecting aesthetic facts in classes and discovering their laws by induc-tion.

{ INTUITION AND EXPRESSION.One of the first problems to arise,when the work of art is defined as "lyrical image," concerns the re-lation of "intuition" to "expression" and the manner of the transi"tion from the one to the other. At bottom this is the same problem| which arises in other parts of philosophy: the problem of inner and6 outer, of mind and matter, of soul and body, and, in ethics, of in-

tention and will, will and action, and so forth. Thus stated, theproblem is insoluble; for once we have divided the inner from the

if outer, body from mind, will from action, or intuition from expres-I* sion, there is no way of passing from one to the other or of reunitingI them, unless we appeal for their reunion to a third term, variouslyg represented as God or the Unknowable. Dualism leads necessarily*| cither to transcendence or to agnosticism. But when a problem isH found to be insoluble in the terms in which it is stated the only courseSI open is to criticize these terms themselves, to inquire how they have

been arrived at, and whether their genesis was logically sound. Inthis case, such inquiry leads to the conclusion that the terms dependnot upon a philosophical principle, but upon an empirical and natu-

j| ralistic classification, which has created two groups of facts called in-I ternal and external respectively (as if internal facts were not also

external, and as if an external fact could exist without being also in-fernal), or souls and bodies, or images and expressions; and everyone

E knows that it is hopeless to try to find a dialectical unity between' terms that have been distinguished not philosophically or formallyIr lit only empirically and materially. The soul is only a soul in so far asm it is a body; the will is only a will in so far as it moves arms and legs,U" fir is action; intuition is only intuition in so far as it is, in that very

art, expression. An image that does not express, that is not speech, |t)ng, drawing, painting, sculpture or architecturespeech at least mur-uured to oneself, song at least echoing within one's own breast, linemid colour seen in imagination and colouring with its own tint thewhole soul and organismis an image that does not exist. We may

I* nvscrt its existence, but we cannot support our assertion; for thejf only thing we could adduce in support of it would be the fact thatp the image was embodied or expressed. This profound philosophical

566 / Philosophies of Art and Beautydoctrine, the identity of intuition and expression is, moreoveprinciple of ordinary common sense, which laughs at peopleclaim to have thoughts they cannot express or to have imagine^great picture which they cannot paint, Rem tene, verba sequentufmthere are no verba, there is no res. This identity, which applies.every sphere of the mind, has in the sphere of art a clearness andevidence lacking, perhaps, elsewhere. In the creation of a work of;try, we are present, as it were, at the mystery of the creation of thjworld; hence the value of the contribution made by aestheticsphilosophy as a whole, or the conception of the One that isAesthetics, by denying in the life of art an abstract spiritualism a*the resulting dualism, prepares the way and leads the mind tovidealism or absolute spiritualism.

EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION.Objections to the identity oftuition and expression generally arise from psychological illusicwhich lead us to believe that we possess at any given moment?profusion of concrete and lively images, when in fact wepossess signs and names for them; or else from faulty analysiscases like that of the artist who is believed to express mere fragmtof a world of images that exists in his mind in its entirety, whereas 1really has in his mind only these fragments, together withnotsupposed complete world, but at most an aspiration or obscfworking towards it, towards a greater and richer image whichtake shape or may not. But these objections also arise from afusion between expression and communication, the latter beingdistinct from the image and its expression. Communication isfixation of the intuition-expression upon an object metaphoriccalled material or physical; in reality, even here we are conenot with material or physical things but with a mental process,proof that the so-called physical object is unreal, and its resoluti|into terms of mind, is primarily of interest for our general philosical conceptions, and only indirectly for the elucidation of aesthequestions; hence for brevity's sake we may let the metaphor orbol stand and speak of matter or nature. It is clear that thecomplete as soon as the poet has expressed it in words whichrepeats to himself. When he comes to repeat them aloud,others to hear, or looks for someone to leam them by heart and ^peat them to others as in a schola. cantorum, or sets them dowwriting or in printing, he has entered upon a new stage, notthetic but practical, whose social and cultural importance need not,f

C R O C E 7567

course, be insisted upon. So with the painter; he paints on hisor canvas, but he could not paint unless at every stage in his WOll*from the original blur or sketch to the finishing touches, the intuttwimage, the line and colour painted in his imagination, preceded th

brush-stroke. Indeed, when the brush-stroke outruns the image, it i* cancelled and replaced by the artist's correction of his own work. The

exact line that divides expression from communication is difficultto draw in the concrete case, for in the concrete case the two proc-esses generally alternate rapidly and appear to mingle, but it is clearin idea, and it must be firmly grasped. Through overlooking it, orblurring it through insufficient attention, arise the confusions be-tween art and technique. Technique is not an intrinsic element of artbut has to do precisely with the concept of communication. In gen-eral it is a cognition or complex of cognitions disposed and directedto the furtherance of practical action; and, in the case of art, of the

I practical action which makes objects and instruments for the record-I ing and communicating of works of art; e.g., cognitions concerningI the preparation of panels, canvases or walls to be painted, pigments,i varnishes, ways of obtaining good pronunciation and declamation

and so forth. Technical treatises are not aesthetic treatises, nor yetparts or chapters of them. Provided, that is, that the ideas are rigor-

I ously conceived and the words used accurately in relation to them itt would not be worth while to pick a quarrel over the use of the word

"technique" as a synonym for the artistic work itself, regarded as"inner technique" or the formation of intuition-expressions. The con-fusion between art and technique is especially beloved by impotentar'ists, who hope to obtain from practical things and practical devicesand inventions the help which their strength does not enable them togive themselves.

ARTISTIC OBJECTS: THE THEORY OF THE SPECIAL ARTS, AND THE BEAUTYOF NATURE.The work of communicating and conserving artisticimages, with the help of technique, produces the material ob-jects metaphorically called "artistic objects" or "works of art": pic-tures, sculptures and buildings, and, in a more complicated manner,literary and musical writings, and, in our own times, gramophonesand records which make it possible to reproduce voices and sounds.But neither these voices and sounds nor the symbols of writing, sculp-ture and architecture, are works of art; works of art exist only in theminds that create or recreate them. To remove the appearance ofparadox from the truth that beautiful objects, beautiful things, do not

568 / Philosophies of Art and Beautyexist, it may be opportune to recall the analogous case of economicscience, which knows perfectly well that in the sphere of economicsthere are no naturally or physically useful things, but only demandand labour, from which physical things acquire, metaphorically, thisepithet. A student of economics who wished to deduce the economicvalue of things from their physical qualities would be perpetrating agross ignoratio elenchi.

Yet this same ignoratio elenchi has been, and still is, committedin aesthetic, by the theory of special arts, and the limits or peculiaraesthetic character of each. The divisions between the arts aremerely technical or physical, according as the artistic objects consistof physical sounds, notes, coloured objects, carved or modelled ob-jects, or constructed objects having no apparent correspondence withnatural bodies (poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, etc.).To ask what is the artistic character of each of these arts, what it can,and cannot do, what kinds of images can be expressed in sounds, wha,jin notes, what in colours, what in lines, and so forth, is like asking!in economics what things are entitled by their physical qualitieshave a value and what are not, and what relative values they are en-titled to have; whereas it is clear that physical qualities do not entinto the question, and anything may be desired or demandedvalued more than another, or more than anything else at all, accoring to circumstances and needs. Even Lessing found himself slippirdown the slope leading to this truth, and was forced to such strarconclusions as that actions belonged to poetry and bodies toture; even Richard Wagner attempted to find a place in the list for icomprehensive art, namely Opera, including in itself by a processaggregation the powers of all the arts. A reader with any artistsense finds in a single solitary line from a poet at once musical aipicturesque qualities, sculpturesque strength and architectural stture; and the same with a picture, which is never a mere thing ofeyes but an affair of the whole soul, and exists in the soul not only icolour but as sound and speech. But when we try to grasp thesesical or picturesque or other qualities, they elude us and turn io$|each other, and melt into a unity, however we may be accustomed 'distinguish them by different names; a practical proof that art isand cannot be divided into arts. One, and infinitely varied; notcording to the technical conceptions of the several arts, but acccing to the infinite variety of artistic personalities and their states

570 / Philosophies of Art and Beautydramas in another, poerns in a third and romances in a fourth; an$ Jis convenient, in fact, indispensable, to refer to works and groupsworks by these names in speaking and writing of them. But heagain we must deny and pronounce illegitimate the transitionthese classificatory concepts to the poetic laws of composition ataesthetic criteria of judgment, as when people try to decide that'tragedy must have a subject of a certain kind, characters of akind, a plot of a certain kind and a certain length; and, whenfronted by a work, instead of looking for and appraising its owntry, ask whether it is a tragedy or a poem, and whether it obeys"laws" of one or other "kind." The literary criticism of the ;century owed its great progress largely to its abandonment of theteria of kinds, in which the criticism of the Renaissance and the Flclassicists had always been entangled, as may be seen from thecussions arising out of the poems of Dante, Ariosto and Tasso, Gfiini's Pastor fido, Corneille's Cid, and Lope de Vega's conArtists have profited by this liberation less than critics; for arwith artistic genius bursts the fetters of such servitude, or even mathem the instruments of his power; and the artist with little ofgenius turns his very freedom into a new slavery.

It has been thought that the divisions of kinds could be saved*!giving them a philosophical significance; or at any rate one suchsion, that of lyric, epic and dramatic, regarded as the three meof a process of objectification passing from the lyric, the outpowof the ego, to the epic, in which the ego detaches its feeling fromlself by narrating it, and thence to the drama, in which it allowsfeeling to create of itself its own mouthpieces, the dramatis peBut the lyric is not a pouring-forth; it is not a cry or a lament;an objectification in which the ego sees itself on the stage,itself, and dramatizes itself; and this lyrical spirit forms theboth of epic and of drama, which are therefore distinguishedthe lyric only by external signs. A work which is altogetherlike Macbeth or Antony and Cleopatra, is substantially a lyrift*which the various tones and successive verses are representedcharacters and scenes.

In the old aesthetics, and even to-day in those whichthe type, an important place is given to the so-called categorfet?beauty: the sublime, the tragic, the comic, the graceful, the hutand so forth, which German philosophers not only claimed tophilosophical concepts, whereas they are really mere psycholand empirical concepts, but developed by means of that dia

C R O C E 757.1which belongs only to pure or speculative concepts, philosophicalcategories. Thus they arranged them in an imaginary progress culmi-nating now in the Beautiful, now in the Tragic, now in the Humorous.Taking these concepts at their face value, we may observe their sub-stantial correspondence with the concepts of the literary and artistickinds; and this is the source from which, as excerpts from manuals ofliterature, they have found their way into philosophy. As psychologicaland empirical concepts, they do not belong to aesthetics; and as awhole, in their common quality, they refer merely to the world offeelings, empirically grouped and classified, which forms the perma-nent matter of artistic intuition.

RHETORIC, GRAMMAR AND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.Every error hasin it an element of truth, and arises from an arbitrary combination ofthings which in themselves are legitimate. This principle may be con-firmed by an examination of other erroneous doctrines which havebeen prominent in the past and are still to a less degree prominentto-day. It is perfectly legitimate, in teaching people to write, to makeuse of distinctions like that between simple style, ornate style andmetaphorical style and its forms, and to point out that here the pupilought to express himself literally and there metaphorically, or thathere the metaphor used is incoherent or drawn out to excessivelength, and that here the figure of "preterition," there "hypotyposis"or "irony," would have been suitable. But when people lose sight ofthe merely practical and didactic origin of these distinctions and con-struct a philosophical theory of form as divisible into simple formand ornate form, logical form and affective form, and so forth, theyare introducing elements of rhetoric into aesthetics and vitiating thetrue concept of expression. For expression is never logical, but alwaysaffective, that is, lyrical and imaginative; and hence it is never meta-phorical but always "proper"; it is never simple in the sense of lackingelaboration, or ornate in the sense of being loaded with extraneouselements; it is always adorned with itself, simplex munditiis. Evenlogical thought or science, so far as it is expressed, becomes feelingand imagination, which is why a philosophical or historical or scientificbook can be not only true but beautiful, and must always be judgednot only logically but also aesthetically. Thus we sometimes saythat a book is a failure as theory, or criticism, or historical truth, buta success as a work of art, in view of the feeling animating it and ex-pressed in it. As for the element of truth which is obscurely at work inthis distinction between logical form and metaphorical form, dialec-

572 / Philosophies of Art and Beautytic and rhetoric, we may detect in it the need of a science of a|thetics side by side with that of logic; but it was a mistake to try 1distinguish the two sciences within the sphere of expression whichlongs to one of them alone.

Another element in education, namely the teaching of languag^Hhas no less legitimately, ever since ancient times, classifiedsions into periods, propositions and words, and words into varicspecies, and each species according to the variations and combii|jij|tions of roots and suffixes, syllables and letters; and hence have ;alphabets, grammars and vocabularies, just as in another way fortry has arisen a science of prosody, and for music and the figuratffand architectural arts there have arisen musical and pictorial grafmars and so forth. But here, too, the ancients did not succeedavoiding an illegitimate transition ab intellectu ad rem, from f|stractions to reality, from the empirical to the philosophical, such;we have already observed elsewhere; and this involved thinking!speech as an aggregation of words, and words as aggregations of Sjlables or of roots and suffixes; whereas the prius is speech itselfgcontinuum, resembling an organism, and words and syllables and reare a posterius, an anatomical preparation, the product of the ^stracting intellect, not the original or real fact. If grammar, likerhetoric in the case above considered, is transplanted into aesthfithe result is a distinction between expression and the means of