CRITIQUING AND EXPANDING THE SOCIOLOGY … and Services/CommunityOutreach...critiquing and expanding the sociology of inequality: comparing functionalist, conflict, and interactionist

CRITIQUING AND EXPANDING THE SOCIOLOGY OF

INEQUALITY: COMPARING FUNCTIONALIST, CONFLICT, AND

INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVES

Scott R. Harris*

Saint Louis University

ABSTRACT

Many sociologists appear to assume that there are only two broad

approaches to the study of inequality: functionalism and conflict theory.

Textbooks on introductory sociology and social stratification frequently compare

the two theoretical camps by distilling and juxtaposing their contradictory

premises. In this article, I argue that a third alternative, symbolic interactionism,

can make a distinctive contribution to the field of stratification and inequality. By

extrapolating from and building on Blumer’s fundamental principles of

interactionism, I articulate the basic features of this neglected viewpoint and

compare it to the general orientations of functionalism and conflict theory.

CRITIQUING AND EXPANDING THE SOCIOLOGY OF INEQUALITY: COMPARING FUNCTIONALIST, CONFLICT, AND INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVES

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CRITIQUING AND EXPANDING THE SOCIOLOGY OF

INEQUALITY: COMPARING FUNCTIONALIST, CONFLICT, AND

INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVES

The conventional wisdom in sociology, at least as expressed in the

discipline’s textbooks, is that there are only two major approaches to the study of

inequality: functionalism and conflict theory (Kerbo 1991, p. 92; Shapiro 1998,

pp. 29-30). In books that provide an introduction to the field of sociology, it is not

uncommon to see these two theoretical camps explicitly defined and

differentiated (Anderson and Taylor 2001, p. 176; Macionis 2001, pp. 257-8; Thio

1986, p. 212; Tischler 2002, p. 207). Usually, functionalism serves as the

weaker counterpart to more powerful conflict explanations of why inequality

exists in society and what consequences it has. In other chapters of the same

introductory texts, however, symbolic interactionism is listed as a major

sociological perspective. When the topic switches to deviance, family, or the self,

interactionism is much more likely to be presented as a distinct alternative to

functionalism and conflict theory. But in the chapters specifically devoted to

inequality, interactionism frequently disappears or is given short thrift (e.g.,

Macionis 2001).

In this article, I take issue with the conventional sociological wisdom that

there are only two broad approaches to inequality. I argue that interactionism is

a distinguishable and potentially enlightening option to functionalism and conflict

SCOTT R. HARRIS PAGE 3

theory. In order to clarify this option, I compare its guiding principles with those

that summarize and guide functionalist and conflict research on inequality. By

extrapolating from and building on Blumer’s (1969) fundamental premises of

interactionism, I articulate the special contribution interactionism can make to the

study of inequality.

FUNCTIONALIST AND CONFLICT PERSPECTIVES ON INEQUALITY

The wealth of literature that comprises the sociology of inequality is huge

and complex; any synopsis and analysis would be a highly selective and

interpretive feat. Nevertheless, many sociologists—myself included—often find it

useful to try to distill the key points of certain segments of that literature in order

to try to summarize work that has been done and to shape future research. A

third reason, of course, is to attempt to explain ―the field‖ to students and other

newcomers, as textbooks do.

In this section of my paper I draw heavily on Anderson and Taylor’s (2001)

well-crafted text on introductory sociology, as well as Davis and Moore’s (1945)

influential original statement of the functionalist approach and Tumin’s (1953)

famous conflict critique, in order to present pared-down versions of functionalist

and conflict perspectives on inequality. I limit my portrayals of these two camps

to six main points each, presented in two separate tables, in order to make my

comparison with interactionism more clear and manageable. The first table

summarizes the functionalist perspective.


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Table 1: Functionalism on Inequality (Adapted from Davis and Moore 1945; Tumin 1953)

1. Society is an organic system whose various components work

together to contribute to the health of the system. Some of the positions within the system, though, are more important than others for the survival of the society.

2. For a society to remain healthy, the most functionally important

positions must be filled by the most qualified people. However, the number of people with the talent and/or the training to fill these roles is limited.

3. Individuals must be induced to spend the time, effort, and

financial resources that training requires.

4. Consequently, society allocates greater rewards to those positions that are more important and require scarce talents.

5. Inequality is an unconsciously established system through

which societies fill the most crucial positions with the most skilled persons.

6. Some degree of inequality is inevitable because it contributes

positively to the functioning of societies.

Functionalism relies on the metaphor that society is a body or a living

system (Rigney 2001, p. 17). Just as a human organism consists of many parts

(e.g., brain, heart, stomach) working together for the survival of the person, so

too does society consist of multiple cooperative components. Functional analysis

proceeds not by examining the details of specific interactions but by looking at

the society as a whole and determining how it maintains itself. If some institution

or pattern exists, these analysts assume it probably serves some good purpose.


When functionalists consider the ubiquity of social deviance, for example, they

note the positive role that inappropriate behavior plays in maintaining the health

of societies. By prompting outrage in others, the deviant can clarify and reinforce

social norms while strengthening a group’s sense of community1.

When functionalists Davis and Moore (1945) turn to the topic of inequality,

the same sort of analysis occurs. These authors focus on occupational

stratification and wonder why it is that all societies tend to give unequal rewards

(e.g., income and prestige) to the different positions that comprise its social

structure. In modern terms, why do doctors, judges, and computer scientists

make more money and receive more respect than garbage collectors and

migrant farm workers? Their answer is that some positions are more important

to the survival of the society than others are. These positions require much

talent and education. However, the pool of potential position holders is limited,

and individuals must be encouraged to acquire the training and develop the

capabilities that are needed. Higher levels of rewards are thus given to those

occupations (e.g., in medicine or law) that require a large investment of time and

effort. Hierarchical arrangements, then, are ―unconsciously evolved‖ systems by

which a society fills its most important jobs with the most capable people (Davis

and Moore 1945).

In contrast to functionalism’s somewhat benign organismic viewpoint,

conflict theory adopts the metaphor ―society as war.‖ From this perspective, the

social realm is ―a figurative battlefield upon which contending social factions

1 Not every part of society is said to be functional, however. Sometimes functionalists

explain deviance and other social problems as the result of a structural strain that results when two (or more) of society’s parts become mis-aligned (e.g., Ogburn 1957).


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struggle for control of scarce resources such as wealth and power‖ (Rigney 2001,

p. 67). Whereas functionalists look for different functional components, conflict

theorists look for competing interest groups, exploitation, and struggle. Class,

race, and gender are the principal factors that shape ―who gets what,‖ not the

unconscious operation of a harmonious social system. Accordingly, conflict

theorists’ divergent metaphor leads them to criticize Davis and Moore’s

formulation on many counts. Unequal wages, conflict theorists argue, may have

more to do with elites dominating their workers than with talent, training, or

functional importance. Or, a conflict theorist might highlight the fact that some

people may earn more money primarily because they were born white or male or

upper class.

Table 2: Conflict Theory on Inequality (Adapted from Anderson and Taylor 2001, p. 176)

1. Different groups struggle over societal resources and compete

for social advantages. Classes exist in conflict with each other as they vie for power and economic, social, and political resources.

2. Inequality results from a system of domination and

subordination where those with the most resources exploit and control others.

3. The most powerful use their resources to reproduce their

position and advantages. Elites shape societal beliefs and laws to make their unequal privilege seem legitimate and fair.

4. There is blocked mobility in the system because the working

class and poor are denied the same opportunities as others.

5. The most vital jobs in society–those that sustain life and the quality of life–are often the least rewarded.


6. Inequality prevents the talents of those at the bottom from being discovered and used. Hence, the more stratified a society, the less likely that society will benefit from the talents of all its citizens.

I think it is safe to say that for the past few decades conflict theory has

been the main perspective sociologists use when researching and theorizing

about social inequality. Inequalities of class, race, and gender are most often

analyzed as unnecessary, unfair, and/or exploitive relations between rival groups

in society. Although some might question how much positive social reform has

come from all this research (Cancian 1995), few would deny that inequality has

become one of the central organizing themes of the discipline and that conflict

theory is sociologists’ perspective of choice (Kerbo 1991; Shapiro 1998).

INTERACTIONISM AND INEQUALITY

Functionalism and conflict theory appear to be diametrically opposed.

One’s guiding imagery assumes cooperative interdependence among society’s

parts; the other’s metaphor assumes the parts are in heated battle. The two

perspectives make different fundamental assumptions and arrive at differing sets

of conclusions. Despite their differences, though, some important commonalities

can be found. Specifically, both functionalists and conflict theories take it for

granted (1) that inequality exists as an objective entity ―out there‖ in society and

(2) that it is primarily their prerogative to define, identify, and explain it. An

interactionist perspective, I argue, would contradict the other camps on both of


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these points. Interactionism gives priority to the diverse meanings that things

(such as ―inequality‖) have for everyday people and assumes that people bring

those objects into existence through their interpretive practices. As a result, this

perspective tends to set aside many of the issues that concern functionalists and

conflict theorists. Instead, attention is focused on more basic and (arguably)

prior issues, such as how ―equal‖ and ―unequal‖ states of affairs come to be

defined, explained, and acted toward as consequential features of various social

worlds.

Table 3: Interactionism on Inequality (Adapted from Harris 2001; Blumer 1969)

1. Society is human beings interacting.

2. Human beings act based on the meanings that things have for them.

3. Nothing is inherently equal or unequal.

4. People act based on their interpretations of inequality, if and when

the issue is a relevant concern to them.

5. Equal and unequal situations are defined as such during the course of interaction.

6. The meaning of inequality is handled through an active, interpretive

process. Terms such as ―inequality‖ and ―unequal‖ are conceptual resources that people use creatively to make sense of the world around them.

The first two points of table 3 are meant to capture the gist of

interactionism’s view of society (Blumer 1969). Interactionism adopts a more


minimalist imagery—―society as symbolic interaction‖—than functionalism’s

―society as a body‖ and conflict theory’s ―society as war‖ metaphors. By orienting

to its field of inquiry as meaningful social conduct, symbolic interactionists tend to

leave themselves more open to discovery (Blumer 1969, pp. 53-4). They have

not colored the landscape from the outset as already body-like or war-like. They

are thus in a somewhat better position to investigate, rather than assume, what

the world looks like to people who are actually living it2. Is a particular situation

harmonious, war-like, or neither? Is it equal, unequal, or something else?

Interactionism puts people’s answers to these questions before analysts’.

Though it puts a heavy emphasis on interpretive variability, interactionism

does not assert that ―anything goes.‖ The perspective recognizes that people

cannot interpret reality any way they want—that the physical and social world out

there is somewhat obdurate. (I can try to treat my desk as an airplane, but it

probably won’t fly and others may shun me.) Nevertheless, interactionism does

suggest that the most basic place to begin learning about people is to study how

they define their own situations, even if those understandings seem strange or

unrealistic. The stories that people live by, interactionism holds, deserve at least

as much attention as the various scholarly tales that can be found in sociological

books and articles. In short, the meanings things have for everyday people are

central and should not be ignored (Blumer 1969, pp. 2-3).

The third point in table 3 may sound controversial to some. However, it

reflects one of the most longstanding and influential tenets of interactionism: the

2 In addition, interactionists are usually aware that their guiding metaphor also applies to

their own research. This makes them more conscious of how they are impacting the ―findings‖ that they create through their own interpretive methodological practices.


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idea that the meaning of things is not inherent. This counter-intuitive notion

arises repeatedly in Blumer’s (1969) agenda-setting book, and is crucial to

understanding his thinking. For Blumer, human beings live in worlds of objects

whose exact nature is not innate3. ―Instead of the individual being surrounded by

an environment of pre-existing objects which play upon him and call forth his

behavior, the proper picture is that he constructs his objects on the basis of his

on-going activity‖ (Blumer 1969, p. 80). This one premise has informed and

inspired a great deal of interactionist research. Over the past several decades

interactionists have studied how potentially troubling situations can be

designated as many different kinds of social problems or as not problematic at all

(Blumer 1971; Loseke 1999); how bad behavior is deviant not by design but by

definition (Becker 1973; Goode 1994); and how identity is shaped through the

way a person is labeled and acted towards by others and by the individual him-

or herself (Holstein and Gubrium 2000; Mead 1934).

The statement that ―nothing is inherently equal or unequal‖ thus reflects a

signature feature of the interactionist perspective, the idea that the meaning of

things in general is not inherent. Friendships, marriages, ethnic groups,

economic conditions—these do not come with the label ―equal‖ or ―unequal‖

already attached. Reality is indeterminate, massive, and complex; consequently,

any characterization of a given situation as equal or unequal will be a selective

and interpretive accomplishment. For example, describing the difference

between a $50,000 annual salary and a $25,000 salary as a serious inequality

3 For Blumer, objects are anything people can refer to.


may seem bizarre from the perspective of someone who is homeless and

hungry, or from the perspective of certain religious groups who view economic

matters as trivial compared to spiritual or otherworldly concerns. Or consider

how some conservatives might view a traditional nuclear family as highly

effective and adaptive, while a contemporary conflict scholar might argue that the

arrangement is thoroughly unequal. The fact that sociologists who teach about

inequality sometimes encounter opposition from their students can also be seen

as evidence of divergent perspectives on inequality, even though some

viewpoints may be more carefully conceived and documented than others.

For an interactionist, however, the point of invoking the idea that ―meaning

is not inherent‖ is not to argue with the claims made by lay persons,

functionalists, or conflict theorists–e.g., claims that there is (or is not) an

―occupational hierarchical structure‖ with particular causes and effects. Rather,

the main purpose is to encourage researchers to investigate the different

inequality objects that may exist in diverse social worlds, as well as the

contingent interpretive processes that bring those experienced objects into

existence. Another way to put it is that functionalist and conflict theorists tend to

do third-person sociology. They try to construct an overarching story about

―what’s really going on out there‖ with respect to inequality. Interactionism, in

contrast, fosters a more first-person sociology. It asks, what are the inequalities

that different individuals and groups delineate? How are these inequalities seen

and experienced from their perspectives? What do they think is going on?


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The reason for asking those kinds of question is reflected in the fourth

statement in table 3. This premise extrapolates from the interactionist

assumption that human beings’ behavior is informed by the interpretations that

they make, but adds an important caveat related to the issue of inequality. That

is, interactionism does hold that people act based on their own definitions of

―equal‖ and ―unequal‖ situations; however, just because inequality has become a

central theme of sociological research, it does not follow that everyday people

are as interested in the issue as scholars are. The methodological implication,

then, is to inquire whether inequality is a relevant concern for the person or group

under study. If it is, one can proceed to other interpretive matters, such as

discovering which form (or forms) of inequality members pay attention to4. Are

they interested in economics? race? gender? intelligence? beauty? athletic

prowess? How do they measure the differences? What constitutes a serious

inequality, and what qualifies as ―close enough‖ to be considered equal? Which

examples do they highlight, and which do they try to discount?

The criticism that may arise here is that an interactionist approach is

promoting a naïve and individualistic view of inequality. The complaint may be:

―You’re arguing that inequality is relevant only when some social actor thinks it is.

But what if the person is too ignorant or misguided to correctly see the inequality

that surrounds him or her?‖ My reply to this is to admit that sociologists and

other outside observers may in fact identify ―objective‖ inequalities that a

4 For example, traditional researchers who study marital inequality frequently make it their

prerogative to decide whether to study ―power,‖ ―the division of labor,‖ ―overall equity,‖ or some other issue. In contrast, in my research I allowed my respondents to tell me which form of inequality was relevant in their marriages (Harris 2001).


participant of an interaction is oblivious to. Scholars have and (undoubtedly) will

continue to tell useful and compelling stories about social inequalities, perhaps

encouraging certain segments of society to recognize their own exploitation5.

Nevertheless, those so-called objective inequalities are not inherent; they are

also ―worked up‖ or ―talked into being‖ by the outside observers (see Blumer

1969, p. 69; Heritage 1984, p. 290). Moreover, I would add that neither everyday

nor sociological understandings of inequality are individualistic creations. Both

are social constructions, with all the nuances and implications associated with

that phrase (especially as it is used by Gubrium and Holstein [1997], Loseke

[1999], and Potter [1996]). Both sociological and lay accounts of inequality are

built out of larger cultural and material resources, within particular social settings,

in collaboration and conflict with others, to accomplish particular interactive

agendas. I say this not to dismiss sociological accounts of inequality, but to

dignify lay accounts as important and instructive in their own right.

The fourth and fifth points in table 3 highlight the social dimensions of

meaning-making without succumbing to a sociological determinism. Yes,

individuals are socialized to perspectives, including perspectives on inequality;

yes, there are culturally approved ways of thinking and doing that group

members must conform to. After all, people must be taught that some ―races‖

are supposedly better than others, or that wealth is a sign of superiority rather

than sin or luck. But there is still considerable free play and idiosyncrasy in

social interaction. Meanings are not merely applied; they are actively used and

5 But there will always be a tension between benevolent consciousness-raising and cultural

imperialism—something that an interactionist reformer would keep at the forefront of his or her mind.


PAGE 14

revised (Blumer 1969, p. 5). For example, much ambiguity surrounds sentiments

such as ―All good marriages …are equal marriages‖ (Stapleton and Bright 1976,

p. 14; see also Harris 2001) or beliefs that close friends should treat each other

as equals (see Harris 1997). It takes a great deal of interpretive work to compare

these cultural maxims with the detailed complexity of reality and determine

exactly how equal or unequal a particular situation is. As with storytelling more

generally (Gubrium and Holstein 1998), sometimes individuals exhibit extreme

self-consciousness about the meanings they are creating: they may explicitly

doubt what they are saying, acknowledge other ways of seeing things, change

their minds, or make similar interactional moves that show (among other things)

that they are not slaves to a particular orientation. Accordingly, someone may

initially claim to have an unequal marriage, but in the next instant add that he or

she ―might be biased‖ or that the relationship is ―really not so bad‖ once

something else is taken into account. In short, people are not cultural dopes

(Garfinkel 1967), even when it comes to the issue of inequality.

DISCUSSION

By alternating back and forth between tables 1, 2, and 3, readers should

be able to appreciate the contrast that I am trying to make. Functionalism and

conflict theory, competitors though they may be, both tend to assume that there

is ―a‖ system or structure of inequality out there. Both assume that virtually all of

society is operating within this arrangement, and that it is their job to identify and


explain ―it.‖ Symbolic interactionism, in contrast, assumes that inequalities are

diverse and tenuous objects that people bring into and out of existence in the

course of social interaction. For interactionism, inequality is not ―out there‖ as an

independent, self-subsistent entity or system; rather, its identification is an

interpretive accomplishment. The perceived existence and nature of inequality is

thoroughly dependent on people creatively relating that loose concept to the

intricate complexities of their personal lives and the political issues of the day

(see Condit and Lucaites 1993; Harris 2001).

Another important contrast between the tables has to do with their

different scope. Much of the functionalist/conflict debate has grown out of and

hinged upon Davis and Moore’s (1945) controversial paper. That article,

however, centered on one kind of inequality: occupational stratification. As a

result, the main points of these perspectives (as they are listed here and in

sociology textbooks) tend to remain tied to the issues of income and occupational

prestige. The table I have constructed for interactionism is different in that I have

formulated it with reference to all kinds of inequality: occupational, marital,

political, intellectual, environmental, and so on. Upon comparing the tables,

functionalists, conflict theorists, and textbook authors might ask themselves,

―Why aren’t the main points articulated in the first two tables more widely

applicable? Could we make them so?‖ If those scholars are interested in

summarizing and developing general orientations to inequality, it seems that

some revision may be in order.


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As should be evident by now, I believe that constructing and comparing

even simplistic tables such as these can be a helpful exercise. Distinguishing

contradictory assumptions and distilling the key points of different ―camps‖ can

help sociologists assess what they have done and where they are going, in

addition to clarifying the field for students6. A particularly useful strategy may be

to continually move back and forth between basic overviews and intricate

studies, so that each informs the other. Just as the three simplistic tables I have

presented in this article can be made more problematic and complex by

comparing them to actual sociological work, researchers who consult such tables

may be prompted to pursue different lines of inquiry. Researchers could ask

themselves, ―Which analytical approach do I tend to take? What would be the

result if I attempted to include seemingly contradictory tools or if I focused more

exclusively on one set of tools?‖

In my own research, I have taken the latter route and have focused on

developing interactionism’s distinctive contribution by combining it only with

concepts from theoretical traditions that share its heavy emphasis on

interpretation, such as phenomenology (Schutz 1964), ethnomethodology

(Garfinkel 1967; Heritage 1984), and narrative analysis (Maines 1993; Gubrium

6 It is worth emphasizing that the kinds of tables I present here are simplified versions of

actual practice. When you leave the tables and textbooks behind and turn to actual research, things are much more complicated. A single sociologist may employ many seemingly ―contradictory‖ analytical tools in the course of completing a single project. For example, Hochschild’s (1989) impressive book The Second Shift draws on conflict ideas about gender inequality, functionalist ideas about cultural lags, and interactionist ideas about the negotiation of meaning. She views inequality in marriage as an outcome of exploitive relations between husbands and wives, as a consequence of uneven rates of change among various components of a cultural system (i.e., the workforce has changed but workplaces and men have not), and as a matter of interpretation (e.g., a husband’s perception of fairness depends on whether he compares his contribution to housework with what his wife does or with what other husbands do in their marriages).


and Holstein 1997). In contrast, when I look at most interactionist research on

inequality (Horowitz 1997; Schwalbe et al. 2000), I find that these scholars have

prematurely combined their perspective with more functionalist or (especially)

conflict orientations that conceive of inequality as an objective condition. While

these interactionists regularly highlight the importance of meaning, interaction,

and the qualitative investigation of everyday life, they still assume that inequality

exists objectively and that it is primarily their job, rather than the job of those they

study, to define inequality and identify its manifestations (e.g., Schwalbe et al.

2000, p. 421). Consequently, interactionists have failed to push their perspective

to its conceptual limits in order to develop its special strengths: an acute

sensitivity to the diverse meanings inequality may have and the interpretive

methods people use to create those meanings. As a result, there is no

significant tradition of work on the social construction of inequality like there is for

social problems (Loseke 1999) or the self (Holstein and Gubrium 2000).

I hope this article encourages at least a few sociologists to

challenge the conventional wisdom and try to remedy that neglect.

As it is currently practiced and presented in textbooks, the sociology

of inequality remains limited by its own reifications. As a result, it

obscures many experienced ―truths‖ and distorts others. Scholars

who are confident that inequality exists objectively (and that they

know exactly what ―it‖ is) are not likely to investigate the variety of

subjective meanings the concept might acquire through its everyday


PAGE 18

usage in diverse social contexts. I think a social science that aims to

understand people could devote more of its energies to respecting

and studying the meanings that they live by.

REFERENCES

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Cancian, Francesca. 1995. ―Truth and Goodness: Does the Sociology of

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*Direct correspondence to: Scott R. Harris Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice Saint Louis University 3500 Lindell Blvd. St. Louis, MO 63103. I thank the anonymous reviewers of the Quarterly Journal of Ideology for their comments.

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CRITIQUING AND EXPANDING THE SOCIOLOGY … and Services/CommunityOutreach...critiquing and expanding the sociology of inequality: comparing functionalist, conflict, and interactionist