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Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng) V&H, Chapter 5

Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

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Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng). V&H, Chapter 5. Research Questions. Do states learn anything from one crisis to the next? Are the bargaining tactics states employ affected by the outcomes and tactics of previous crises?. Definition of a Crisis. A situation that: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

V&H, Chapter 5

Page 2: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Research QuestionsDo states learn anything from one crisis to the next? Are the bargaining tactics states employ affected by the outcomes and tactics of previous crises?

Page 3: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Definition of a CrisisA situation that:

threatens the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit restricts the amount of time available for response surprises decision-makers by its occurrence

Page 4: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Two Models of Crisis BargainingExperiential Learning

The success or failure of the bargaining strategy employed in one crisis is likely to affect the bargaining strategy chosen in the next crisis.Especially true in a second or third crisis with the same adversary

Page 5: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Two Models of Crisis BargainingRealpolitik Conflict Model

Emphasis on coercive diplomacy, or the use of threats and commitments to demonstrate resolveAssumes that policymakers view failures in crises as a consequence of their own bargaining strategy

Page 6: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Combined ELR ModelOutcome of Preceding Change in

Hypothesis Crisis Coercion1 Diplomatic Victory No change2 Diplomatic Defeat More coercive3a Compromise (Satisfactory) No change3b Compromise (Unsatisfactory) More coercive4a War (Unwanted) More coercive4b War (Premeditated) Less coercive

Page 7: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Research DesignData: 18 crises involving six pairs of states, each in 3 successive crisesEvents tracking the disputants’ behavior coded (over 15,000 events)Dependent variable: change in state A’s bargaining strategy from one crisis to the next

Page 8: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Research DesignInfluence Strategy (IS):

S = Same+C = More Coercive-C = Less CoerciveN = no identifiable strategy

Host (Mean Hostility Level): based on events in a crisis coded from –3 (most hostile) to +3 (most cooperative)

Page 9: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Research DesignScore: + indicates the case supports the

hypothesis; – indicates that the case is contradictory to the hypothesis

Page 10: Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

ConclusionsELR Model predicts 18 of 24 cases correctly More coercive predicted in 17 of 24 cases, but A was never the first to threaten the use of force in the 7 cases where A achieved a diplomatic victory or launched a premeditated attack. The findings that successive disputes escalate and create further hostilities is similar to the idea of enduring rivalry.