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Antiporda, Jr. vs. GarchitorenaG.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999BUENA, J.:

Facts:

Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan comprised of the Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and Catalino Castañeda, Jr.

Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were inadequacies in the allegations in the Information for which reason she would beg leave to amend the same. The Court for its part expressed anxiety as to the Court’s jurisdiction over the case considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related. For this purpose, the Court issued an order giving the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30) days within which to submit the amendment to the Information.

The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an Amended Information, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution. Subsequently, petitioners then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred. An order by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommended the denial of the petitioners’ motion.

The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued which was likewise denied on the ground that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the original Information so that the petitioners could not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court ruled that 'since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the petitioners are not in a position to be heard on the matter.

Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Petitioners’ contention: The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the original information did not allege that one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Elmer Ramos.  They likewise assert that lacking jurisdiction a court can not order the amendment of the information.  In the same breath, they contend however that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused.

Issue:

Can the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the original information, subsequently acquire such jurisdiction by the simple expedient of amending

information to supply, for the first time, jurisdictional facts not previously averred in the original information?

Held:

Yes. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases.  In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.[14]

Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

“Sec. 4.  Jurisdiction.  --  The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

“(a)           Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

x x x

“(2)  Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.  Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.”

The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction.  Criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs. Mariano[15], is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.

The case of Arula vs. Espino[16]enumerates the requirements wherein a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:

“To paraphrase:  beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur:  (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.”

It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case.

And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court’s authority.  In the case of Layosa

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vs. Rodriguez, it was ruled that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the court’s jurisdiction even if no warrant of arrest has yet been issued.

With regard to the jurisdiction over the offense charged, Sandiganbayan did not acquire such jurisdiction.  The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related.  It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997[20]filed with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[21]

We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

Colmenares vs. Judge Villar and ATTY. OTHELO CABALESG.R. No. L-27124. May 29, 1970REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:

A complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of La Castellana, Negros Occidental, by the Chief of Police of the same municipality against Francisco Colmenares for illegal possession of firearms stating that it was taken from his possession in the municipality of La Castellana.

The accused filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was claimed that venue was improperly laid, because the firearms mentioned in the complaint were taken from the possession of the accused in the municipality of La Carlota, Negros Occidental, by the La Carlota policemen, and not in La Castellana where the complaint was filed.

Respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La Castellana contended that although the alleged unlicensed firearms were taken from the custody of the accused by La Carlota policemen such unlawful act of carrying unlicensed firearms started from La Castellana; that the La Carlota policemen intercepted the accused and took the firearms from him only because they were earlier requested, by telephone, by the policemen of La Castellana, then a pursuit of the accused, who was fleeing in a taxicab, to assist them in the apprehension of the latter.

Thus, the instant case is filed by the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the municipal court of La Castellana has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case for illegal possession of firearms found in the municipality of La Carlota.

Held:

Yes. It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the court over a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Here, the complaint filed with the municipal court of La Castellana recited that the accused, Francisco Colmenares, was found in possession of two unlicensed firearms in the municipality of La Castellana. That allegation makes the filing of the case in the La Castellana municipal court proper. Under the Rules, criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. That the firearms were confiscated from him by the La Carlota policemen within the territorial boundaries of that municipality would not sustain the motion for quashal of the complaint in this case nor affect the merits thereof. It is not altogether improbable that the offense of unlawful possession of firearms could have been committed in La Castellana, as stated in the complaint, and also in La Carlota, as manifested by the appellant. For, being malum prohibitum the crime is consummated by the very fact of its performance; by the firearms being possessed or held by the accused without proper authorization therefor. The place where the said firearms were finally confiscated and taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have added anything to the nature of the unlawful act completed and consummated earlier.

Thus, for purposes of the proceeding instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is sufficient that, according to the prosecution, the accused was in possession of the unlicensed firearms while he was in La Castellana. To determine the correct venue, the vital point is the allegation of the situs of the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that is satisfied in this case.

People vs. PurisimaG.R. No. L-40902 February 18, 1976MARTIN, J.:

Facts:

The City Fiscal of Manila charged private respondent Josefa Pesimo before the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 16, Act 3753, otherwise known as the "Civil Register Law" by making false statements in the Certificate of Birth that her son, Carlos Pesimo Cucueco, Jr., is the legitimate child of Carlos Layug Cucueco and that said accused was married to the latter.

This criminal act is punishable with imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or a fine of not less than P200.00 nor more than P500.00, or both, in the discretion of the court.

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Respondent court dismissed the case ex mere motu for the reason that the offense complained of does not come within the perimeter of its jurisdiction. Respondent court maintains that the prescribed penalty of one (1) month to six (6) months imprisonment is below the floor limit of its original jurisdiction in criminal cases, since the said jurisdiction starts only from those offenses where the penalty of imprisonment, in particular, exceeds six (6) months. Because of this, jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the City Court of Manila which has the competence to impose the penalty of imprisonment and fine, alternatively or jointly.

Issue:

Whether or not there is concurrent jurisdiction between a court of first instance and a city court in the trial of a criminal indictment where the penalty provided for by law is imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or a fine of not less than P200.00 nor more than P500.00, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Held:

Yes. Section 44 (f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides that Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction "(i)n all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos."

On the other hand, Section 87 (c) of the same Act confers on municipal courts original jurisdiction to try "offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three hundred pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment" except violations of election laws. The same section provides that municipal courts of provincial capitals and city courts "shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correcional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both."

These quoted statutory provisions plainly import that the exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts in criminal cases, which is commonly shared by city courts and municipal courts of the provincial capitals, covers only those offenses where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or two hundred pesos fine. The moment the penalty for the offense exceeds 6-month imprisonment or P200 fine, jurisdiction inevitably becomes concurrent with the courts of first instance: for municipal courts, up to those offenses punishable with three (3) years imprisonment or P3,000.00 fine; and for city courts and municipal courts of provincial capitals, up to those offense with penalty of six (6) years imprisonment or P6,000.00 fine.

Section 44 (f) reveals no inconsistency with Section 87 (c). These two sections can stand together and can be given "conjoint, not discordant, effect. There is no constitutional impediment to the conferment on courts of different levels of concurrent jurisdiction over the same offense or offenses.

The respondent court erred in disclaiming jurisdiction over the case for the expedient reason that the penalty of imprisonment prescribed by law for the offense charged reaches only the maximum of six (6) months. It must be observed that imprisonment is not the sole penalty for the crime

charged. There is also the alternative penalty of fine not less than P200.00 nor more than P500.00. This penalty of fine alone sufficiently brings the offense charged within the jurisdictional range of the court of first instance, since the jurisdiction of said court originates "(i)n all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is ... a fine of more than two hundred pesos." Moreover, the violated law allows the imposition of both imprisonment and fine, or arresto mayor and fine not exceeding P500.00, a clear source from which the court of first instance could validly draw authority to take cognizance of the case.

Respondent court further refused jurisdiction because the discretion afforded it under the law, i.e., to impose the penalty imprisonment, or fine, or both, cannot be exercised by it, since the Penalty of imprisonment "is basically below its jurisdictional reach." Respondent court's thesis suffers from a congenital failure to properly seize the issue involved. The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origene. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.

PANFILO M. LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts:

Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led petitioner and intervenors.

cting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in the incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment

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for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the information, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.

All the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof" is constitutional as to confer jurisdiction to Sandiganbayan over the case at hand.

Held:

Yes. A perusal of Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed

is a violation of (a) the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (b) the law on ill-gotten wealth, (c) the law on bribery, (d) sequestration cases, or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and ROMMEL M. LUARCA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 144261-62. May 9, 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:

Two (2) Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 charging petitioners for committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. They conspired to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this motion was opposed by respondent People. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused. The Order stated that “the accused is the Mayor of the

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municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal offense committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before this Court.”

In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that, necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer elevates the entire case to this Court primarily because somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with the lower ranking officer.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that it has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held:

In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.[5] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist.  It cannot be presumed or implied.  For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.

The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829.  The applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606 as last amended by the Republic Act No. 8249.  Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as pertinent:

“SEC. 4.  Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

xxx  xxx       xxx

(5)  All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

xxx  xxx       xxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

xxx  xxx       xxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.

xxx  xxx       xxx”

In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners were described as being “all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife”, there was no allegation that the offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy report “would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller”. Thus there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.

F.) PEOPLE AND PHOTOKINA VS. BENIPAYO (G.R. NO. 155573 APRIL 24, 2009)

Facts: In the first libel case filed against him, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman COMELEC, delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at UP Diliman which was subsequently published in the Manila Bulletin. Petitioner corporation (PHOTOKINA), believing that it was the on referred to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that “Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5

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billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn’t even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.”, PHOTOKINA filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit- Complaint for libel. Benipayo, opposed claiming that he is an impeachable officer, thus the prosecutor had no jurisdiction, despite such opposition, the prosecutor still filed the complaint in the RTC. While the case was unresolved, Benipayo asserted that he cannot be the RTC had no jurisdiction over his person because he is an impeachable officer, thus he could not be prosecuted during his incumbency, and that assuming that he can, only the Office of the Ombudsman can investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. The case was dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction since the offense was committed in relation to his office, hence vesting the jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. No. 155573 Respondent as COMELEC Chair was a guest of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show’s episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars.", where Respondent against discussed that Photokina’s funds are being used to campaign against him. Again, another information for libel was instituted against Respondent but also dismissed by the RTC rationating that being an impeachable officer, the jurisdiction must be with the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of libel filed against Benipayo.

Held: YES. The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, and it is with the RTC. The passage of RA 7691which confers jurisdiction to MTC’s over cases punishable by imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and two months (pasok ang libel) also did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over libel cases because although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the RTCs by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail a general law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.

G.) Uy vs. Sandiganbayan

GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 ]

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70.  August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. Uy filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.

The court ruled that :

1.      It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”

2.      As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the “rank” requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court.  The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

So, instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that

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the prosecuting power of the ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.

Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of theOmbudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

H.) G.R. No. L-62075 April 15, 1987 NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE PERALTA, CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG, EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, petitioners, vs. TANODBAYAN OF THE

PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN L. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND ESTEBAN MANGASER, respondents

Facts: Petitioners are members of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980 elections Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand E. Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting centers during the election.The COMELEC ordered an investigation but after the investigation, the Regional Election Director recommended its dismissal. Mangaser, then withdrew the complaint and stated his intention to refile with the Tanodbayan. Later on, COMELEC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. The provincial prosecutor then started the preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by respondent with the tanodbayan. The COMELEC legal assistance office entered its appearance and moved for its dismissal of the complaint, but it was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in relation to their office.

Issue: WON the power to investigate, try and prosecute election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office belongs to the COMELEC and the CFI (now RTC) or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan.

Held: An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC the exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.

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I.) PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS, and TEOFISTO L. GUINGONA III, Oppositors-Intervenors. WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS), represented by ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN; and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA (PAKISAMA), represented by VICENTE FABE, Movants-Intervenors.

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G.R. No. 178193

DANILO B. URUSA, Petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

J.) HECTOR TREÑAS,  Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS: December 1999,when Margarita Alocilja desired to buy a house and lot mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, expenses shall be incurred, amounting to 144, 000. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.  

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth, checks. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the

account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.

 On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City, for Estafa.RTC found Hector guilty.

On Appeal, Hector asserted that the prosecution failed to present evidence that money was given and received by him in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: No. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,[18] this Court explained:  

 

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

 

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In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.  There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.