CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGESTG.R. No. L-976 October 22, 1902THE UNITED STATES,complainant-appellee,vs.MAXIMO ABAD,defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The defendant is a former insurgent officer. Assuming, for the purposes of the present motion, that the defendant is guilty of the offense, there is no evidence in the record showing that it was committed pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities, or that it grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards of the Spanish authorities, or that it resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves. If it is covered by the amnesty it must be because it is embraced within the words employed in the proclamation to designate the first class of offenses amnestied, namely, "offenses of treason and sedition.

In the present case the act by which the defendant is found by the court below to have violated the oath was that of denying to an officer of the United States Army the existence of certain rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and of the existence and whereabouts of which he was cognizant at the time of the denial.ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellant should be held liable

HELD:There are a variety of offenses in the criminal codes of all countries which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the state, the authority of the government or the general public tranquility.

G.R. Nos. 145357-59 August 23, 2006PEDRO S. GIRON, JR., LETICIA GUJILDE-CRIZALDO, and FELIXBERTO B. ARREZA,Petitioners,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.

FACTS:The present petition involves alleged irregularities in the construction of a two-kilometer road connecting Barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.

The accused Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Gertrude S. Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, all public officers being then District Engineer, Civil Engineer Aide II, Chief, Construction Section, and Supervising Civil Engineer I, respectively, of the Office of the District Engineer of Surigao del Sur, conspiring together and with accused Felixberto B. Arreza, of the same office who was the project engineer of the road project treated herein, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Physical Status Report of Projects costingP2.0M and Below under CY 1988 Infrastructure Program as of January 1989, an official document required for submission to the XIth DPWH Regional Office, by stating on page 14 thereof that the Kinayan-Kauswagan barangay road project at Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was fully completed as of January 25, 1989, a matter the truth of which accused was under obligation to disclose, when in truth and in fact, as accused fully well knew, the said road project as of said date was not yet finished as the road surfacing materials for use therein were not yet delivered then and were only delivered on March 18-21, 1989, thereby making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts.

ISSUE: whether or not the accused took advantage of their official position to falsify a document.

HELD: No. The offender takes advantage of his official position when he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document, or he has the official custody of the document which he falsified.

There is no doubt that all three are public officials, as they were employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) at the time of the questioned act. There is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone among Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza actually took advantage of his official position. The offender takes advantage of his official position when he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document, or he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.

Giron testified that:In preparing these reports, the project engineer reports to the Construction Section the degree of work they had accomplished with respect to the project assigned to them. The reports of the project engineers were to be consolidated into one hence arriving at a Monthly Status Report. These reports were being submitted every 25th of the month and it takes the Office of the District Engineer three (3) to five (5) days to prepare the said report.14

The Monthly Status Report was typed by Crizaldo, checked by Cedro, and submitted by Salang in lieu of Giron. Engr. Cedro, who supervised the preparation of the Monthly Status Report and checked the same, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "he never signed the subject reports."15Salang was also acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "his participation [was] seemingly limited to the acts before the actual construction of the project."16Crizaldos item was that of a General Construction Foreman but she was not assigned to the project site.17Crizaldo was assigned in the office and was tasked to type the Monthly Status Report. The prosecution never proved that Crizaldo had knowledge of the actual status of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project at the time she prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could have merely relied on field reports submitted to her, precluding her from making, on her own, untruthful statements at the time she prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could not have conspired with any other party because the Sandiganbayan found that "there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy on the part of the accused herein to falsify the subject reports."18The Sandiganbayan ruled that "any criminal liability should be based on their individual participation in the questioned act."19

Girons testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be used against him because he did not sign the Monthly Status Report. Girons facsimile signature was merely stamped on the Monthly Status Report. The stamped facsimile signatures of Giron do not establish his personal participation in the preparation of the Monthly Status Report. To use this portion of Girons testimony to establish his personal participation is to extrapolate and speculate. This will not suffice in a criminal action, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction.20Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project. However, like Giron and Crizaldo, the prosecution was unable to prove his actual participation in the questioned reports. The Sandiganbayan found that Arreza "had no participation in the preparation and execution of the said document[s]."21The Sandiganbayan also found that Arreza "did not take advantage of his public position,"22and thus Arreza is liable under Artcle 172 of the Revised Penal code for falsification of a private document. In the dispositive portion of its Decision of 9 May 1997, however, the Sandiganbayan adjudged Arreza guilty as charged in Criminal Case No. 17352, which was for falsification of a public document.

In sum, we acquit Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza for failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites for the conviction of the crime of falsification of public documents. All are public officers, however, the prosecution has failed to prove their criminal culpability beyond reasonable doubt. There is no moral certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took advantage of their positions to make a false statement in a narration of facts in a public document.

WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 9 May 1997 and the Resolution promulgated on 4 October 2000 of the Sandiganbayan areSET ASIDE. Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, and Felixberto B. Arreza areACQUITTEDbased on reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. L-7447 January 2, 1913THE UNITED STATES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.NICASIO CAPULE,defendant-appellant.FACTS: Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to himself a tract of coconut land without the knowledge or consent of the owners thereof, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died, prepared and drew up a document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said land, pretending that it was made and executed by the said owners of the tract, stating in the document that they had made the declaration that they had sold said land for the sum of 550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors, and Jacinto Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said document as witnesses of the execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia as the signers of the deed of sale, because the alleged vendors did not know how to do so. Recorded at the bottom of the document was their ratification of its contents in the presence of said notary, before whom the said married couple appeared. The defendant Capule exhibited said document later, although he had been assured that it was false, in a trial before the justice of the peace of that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said piece of land.ISSUE: WON the accused is liableHELD: Yes. Nicasio Capule is not a public officer and, moreover, as he is accused of the crime of falsification of a notarial document of official character equivalent to a public document the principle laid down in said decision is totally inapplicable in his favor. Further keeping in mind that the act of falsification of a public document in itself constitutes a crime, morally and legally punishable, even though to date the penal law with respect to falsification of a public document committed by public officers, in lieu of said article 300 of the code, has not yet been promulgated; but article 301, applicable to the present case, has not been repealed and subsists in all its force.A person who, taking advantage of the occasion when a power of attorney is presumably being drawn up, prepares instead thereof, contrary to the wishes of the interested parties and with malice aforethought, an instrument of sale in his own favor, using deceit as to the parties and the witnesses, and afterwards induces a notary to certify falsely that the supposed vendors actually appeared and ratified such instrument, is guilty of the falsification of a notarial or public document.

People vs. Quasha, GR L-6055, June 12, 1953FACTS:William H. Quashaoa member of the Philippine bar, committed a crime of falsification of a public and commercial document for causing it to appear that Arsenio Baylon, a Filipino citizen, had subscribed to and was the owner of 60.005 % of the subscribed capital stock of Pacific Airways Corp. (Pacific) when in reality the money paid belongs to an American citizen whose name did not appear in the article of incorporation,to circumvent the constitutional mandate that no corp. shall be authorize to operate as a public utility in the Philippines unless 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos.oFound guilty after trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a fineQuasha appealed to this CourtPrimary purpose: to carry on the business of a common carrier by air, land or waterBaylon did not have the controlling vote because of the difference in voting power between the preferred shares and the common sharesART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document.

ISSUE: W/N Quasha should be criminally liable

HELD: NO. Acquitted.falsification consists in not disclosing in the articles of incorporation that Baylon was a mere trustee ( or dummy as the prosecution chooses to call him) of his American co-incorporators, thus giving the impression that Baylon was the owner of the shares subscribed to by him For the mere formation of the corporation such revelation was not essential, and the Corporation Law does not require itThe moment for determining whether a corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is when it applies for a franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for that purpose. othat can be done after the corporation has already come into being and not while it is still being formedso far as American citizens are concerned, the said act has ceased to be an offense within the meaning of the law, so that defendant can no longer be held criminally liable therefor.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PO GIOK TO

FACTS:In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of falsification. He misrepresented to the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his place of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino. From such misrepresentation of facts the City Treasurer issued him a residence certificate.The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the crime of falsification. The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash claiming that the information alleges all the integral elements of the offense charged as defined by the statute. The lower Court, however, found the motion to quash meritorious and ordered the amendment of the information. Hence, this appeal by the Government.ISSUE:Whether or not the information in question should allege the following facts in order to be sufficient to convict the defendant of the crime of falsification:1) That the accused had the obligation to disclose the truth in the document allegedly falsified;2) That the accused had the wrongful intent to injure a third HELD:We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element allegedly lacking in the information, that is, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document. Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 provides:"that the residence certificate for persons shall contain the full name, place and date of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is issued, occupation or calling.Needless to say, this provision implies that the person to whom the certificate is issued must state to the officer who issues the same, the true facts, required to appear therein, the latter having merely the ministerial function of recording thereon the facts as supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the facts given correctly and truly identify the holder of the certificate, he is also required by Sec. 3 above to sign the document and affix his right hand thumb mark thereon. There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who issued his residence certificate and such duty being inherent in the transaction, there was no need for the criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty.Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the information in question, the law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:ART. 171.Falsification by the public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayorand a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.ART. 172.Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty ofprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any other kind of commercial document.On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the crime falsification of private document, provides:2. Any person who,to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceeding article.The distinction made by the law between falsification by private persons of PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS IS CLEAR.The first (FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed by the mere performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171While the second (FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed not only by the performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171 but it must likewise be shown that such act of falsification was committed to the damage of a third party or with intent to cause such damage.The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain in the case ofPeople vs. Pacana that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in confusion in the government records, since the fingerprint of the accused would not correspond to that of the person whose personal circumstances are recited in the certificate. Such confusion in its records evidently operates to the Government's prejudice. Being the natural and direct result of the criminal act charged, the accused must be presumed to have intended it.Side issue: It is argued for the defendant that there being a special law with respect to residence certificates expressly punishing their falsification (Commonwealth Act No. 465), this special law, and not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, should apply in this case. RPC can still apply since under Art. 10 of the RPC has supplementary application to all special laws, unless the latter should provide the contrary, and CA No. 465 makes no provision that it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence certificates. Thus the information was sufficient, and its dismissal for insufficiency by the Court below was improper and erroneous.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-36345 November 25, 1932THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,plaintiff-appellee,vs.PEDRO MONTANO and WENCESLAO CABAGSANG,defendants-appellants.BUTTE,J.:FACTS: The defendant WenceslaoCabagsang was the chief of police and the defendant Pedro Montano was the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month of September, 1930, when the crimes for which they were convicted occurred. It appears from the evidence that on September 5, 1930, a criminal complaint against one Arturo A. Soriano for the crime of qualified seduction was filed with the said justice of the peace. The justice, apparently to favor Soriano, delayed the preliminary investigation until the offended woman on September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion demanding immediate action and calling his attention to the fact that his delay was a violation of the circular of instructions of the judge of the Court of First Instance of said province. The case was then set for hearing on September 22, 1930. Thereafter administrative charges against the justice of the peace were filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, alleging that the delay in the preliminary investigation was a violation of the circular of the Court of First Instance, dated November 15, 1928, requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all preliminary investigations within ten days from the date on which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.lawphil.netThe evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior to the hearing of said administrative case, the defendants, in order to make it appear that there had been no violation of the said instructions to the justices of the peace, falsified official records in their custody as follows:The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and falsified the municipal police blotter and the book of records of arrests and the return of the warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail bond so as to make them show that the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the 13th day of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as said records showed before said falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond on the 6th day of September, 1930; that the defendant Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his codefendant in making said falsifications in order to meet the administrative charges then pending against him. HELD: The court below rejected the defense of the accused that said alterations were made in good faith and corresponded to the true facts of the case. There is no issue of law raised in the assignment of errors. We have made a careful review of the evidence and have come to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

People vs Felix ManansalaFacts: Manansala was accused of altering the duplicate copy of the Traffic Violation Report (TVR) previouslyissued to him as a temporary drivers permit. He erased the originally written figure III and the wordthree after the words pending cases, and superimposed thereon number I and the word one. Thealterations made changed the meaning of the document. It was made to appear that he has only one pending case of traffic violation. The practice was proved to be to arrest a driver who commits a fourth traffic violation instead of merely issuing to him a TVR, which is usually done for the first, second and third violations. The accused had in his possession the falsified TVR and had been using it as a temporarydrivers permit from its issuance to the time he was caught committing the fourth traffic violation.Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsifying an official document.Ruling: It is an established rule that when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption is justified that such person is the forger. The circumstances that the accused made use of and benefited from the falsified TVR is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be falsified.Us vsalejandromateoFacts: Falsification of cedula; erroneous conviction; defendant acquitted. Mateo being required in October, 1911, for the purposes of an affidavit, to present his cedula for the year 1911 to a justice of the peace, produced also his cedula for the year 1910; on reading the cedula for the year 1910, something which he had not done before, mateo discovered that his age was stated incorrectly therein and he, fearing the result of presenting to a public official a cedula which contained an incorrect statement regarding his own age, changed his age, making it 25 instead of 23; the change having been discovered by the justice of the peace on the presentation of the cedula, mateo, without hesitation, detailed the part he had taken in the change and the reason therefor; it is admitted that the age in the cedula was incorrect and that the change made the cedula give his true age; mateo was tried for falsification of a cedula and was convicted. Held: In the case in hand, the change did not affect in the remotest degree the privileges or immunities which the accused could enjoy under the cedula. The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted.LeonilaBatulanon, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006Criminal case: Falsification of private documents and EstafaFACTS: Petitioner LeonilaBatulanon was employed as cashier/manager of Polomok (Polomok) Credit Cooperative Inc. from May 1980 up to December 1982 (so thats two years). She was in charge with the receiving of deposits and releasing loans to members of the said cooperative (Polomok).During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities were found out. Thereafter, four informations of estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against herein petitioner.1. Criminal case 3625 petitioner Batulanon falsified CASH/CHECK VOUCHER of PCCI in the name of ERLINDA OMADLAO, making it appear that latter was granted loan where in truth and in fact said person never received, never granted a loan and never signed such document.2. Criminal case 3626 same situation as above stated but this time in the name of GONAFREDA ORACION.3. Criminal case 3453 Batulanon falsified commercial documents namely Individual deposits and ledger of FERLYN ARROYO making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit and was granted a loan where in truth and in fact ARROYO never made such deposit and never received such loan.4. Criminal case 3627 same situation as the next preceding case but this time in the name of his son Dennis Batulanon.In all cases, accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted them into her own use and benefit. Also in all cases, she refused to bring back the same despite demands.These informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. Petitioner pleaded not guilty.Prosecution presented its witnesses:Modallo (posting clerk) testified that Batulanon released 4 cash vouchers. He also said that Omadlao, Oracion and Batulanon were not eligible and not members of Polomok Cooperative. Moreover, according to him, although Arroyo was a member but there was no proof that she applied for a loan. He also said he witnessed Petitioner Batulanon signed Oracion and Arroyo in cash vouchers.Jayoma (Vice chairman of the PCCI Board of directors) testified that laons to Omadlao and Oracion never passed through the PCCI board of directors.Petitioner Batulanon denied charges against her. She contended that she did not sigh vouchers of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo who according to her are nonetheless members of the cooperative. Lastly, she said that its been an accepted practice that she can release loan in the absence of GopioJr who is in charge with such responsibility.RTC convicted her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner brought it to Court of Appeals (CA)but the latter affirmed with modifications the ruling of RTC. CA modification is that petitioner is guilty of falsification of PRIVATE documents.Petitioner moved for reconsideration but CA denied it.Petitioner brought it up to the Supreme Court (SC) and contended that:1. Best witness is person whose signature is forged2. Requires prejudice to 3rd person3. PCCI not prejudiced by loan transactions because loans are accounts receivable by cooperativeHELD:SC: Petition lacks merit.Although the offense charged is estafa through falsification of commercial documents, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private documents.Elements of falsification of private document are present in this case:1. She made it appear that Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo were granted loans2. She made it in private document ****(cash/check vouchers are not public documents because they are not notarized and not documents used by merchants to promote trade nor regulated by Code of commerce)3. It caused damage to the cooperative.Regarding best witness SC cites sec. 22 of Rule 132 according to this rule handwriting may be proved by any person who believes it to be belonging to such person; or who acquired knowledge of such handwritingRegarding prejudice to Polomok such loans could have granted to other members but werent because of illegal acts done by Batulanon such constituted damage or prejudice to PolomokOn complex crime of estafa through falsification:Falsification committed as means to commit estafaEstafa may be carried out even without falsificationSC ruled that 1st, 2nd, and 3rd criminal cases herein fall within the purview of falsification of private documents but the 4th criminal case (with Dennis Batulanon) falls within the ambit of the crime of estafa. The latter having no untruthful statements but there was conversion and misappropriation; hence elements of estafa are present in the last criminal case.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 68203 September 13, 1989METUROGAN L. SAREP,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,respondent.PADILLA,J.:FACTS:Petitioner, Meturogan L. Sarep, appeals from the decision1of the Sandiganbayan. That on or about December 30, 1977, or sometime prior thereto, in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then employed as Soil Technologist II under the Bureau of Soils, Region XII, Cotabato City, with a Temporary Appointment,did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take without permission from the records of said Office the appointment paper proposed in his name dated January 19, 1976, which appointment paper was replaced due to an incorrect entry, by another one bearing the same date; and theaccused once in possession of saidappointment paper, did then and therewilfully, unlawfully and feloniously change, alter and falsify the date, figures and words written thereon, thus changing its meaning and attributing to the person who caused the preparation of the same, statements other than those in fact made by him; that the falsification and alteration were committed forthepurpose of converting the Temporary Status of his appointment to a Permanent Status, and which accused succeeded by having said falsified appointment paper attested by the Civil Service Commission in Manila without the knowledge of the Civil Service Commission, Region XII, who has the jurisdiction and authority to attest appointments under Region XII.2petitioner appealed to this Court, after his motion for reconsideration was denied.On 19 January 1976, Director KundoPahm of the Bureau of Soils, Region XII, extended an appointment in favor of Meturogen L. Sarep (herein petitioner) to the position of Soil Technologist II (Exh. "C"). After signing the appointment paper, Pahm noticed an error in the item on civil service eligibility. The entry therein read "First Grade Unassembled" instead of "Unassembled Examination" which was the appropriate eligibility for the position of Soil Technologist; whereupon, Director Pahm called the attention of the acting personnel officer, Usman Salic, to the error and directed him to prepare another appointment paper (Exh. "B") which Pahm signed after noting the correction made by the personnel officer. The appointment was approved by the Assistant Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as "temporary."It was ruled that there can be no conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the defendant maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injuring third person.6Finally, petitioner invokes good faith in his defense. He claims that after the personnel officer handed him the questioned document, which bore the erasures and alterations as well as the Director's signature, he brought it to the Civil Service Commission in Manila upon suggestion and with the permission of the personnel officer.The Court does not accept petitioner's defense of good faith. He admitted that he knew that Director Pahm was not only uninclined to extend him a permanent appointment due to his lack of civil service eligibility but he also did not authorize him (Sarep) to follow up his appointment with the Civil Service Commission in Manila. More importantly, he knew that if the falsified document had been presented before the CSC Regional Office, it would have surely been attested as temporary only. Hence, he purposely avoided filing the appointment paper with the CSC Regional Office, which is the practice and standard procedure in the regional office of the Bureau of Soils and, instead, personally brought it to Manila where somehow he was able to have it stamped approved as permanent.The Court also rejects Sarep's argument that there is no falsification, as the alleged falsified document bears the correct item number and appropriate eligibility. We agree with the respondent court that "(I)t is falsification, and not a correction, which the law punishes (People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324; Arriola vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 730)." Likewise, "(I)n the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 23, 1885, cited in People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 56)."9Since petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document that was found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. Petitioner has failed to convince the Court that a person other than himself made the erasures, alterations and superimpositions on the questioned appointment paper (Exh. "C").The Sandiganbayan in qualifying the offense and arriving at the penalty imposed on the petitioner held:We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937, People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).HELD:The Court finds no reversible error in the Sandiganbayan's decision finding petitioner, Meturogan L. Sarep, guilty of the crime of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence. However, the penalty imposed should be imprisonment of THREE MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO ONE YEAR, SEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS, instead of imprisonment of THREE MONTHS under the appealed decision, since the period of the penalty imposed, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its medium period is four months and one day to four years and two months reduced by appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.KOH TIECK HENG VS PEOPLE FACTS:Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P. Flores was charged of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document in the following manner: after opening a savings account with SBTC under the name Tomas P. Flores and somehow illegally obtained a PBC check issued by one F. Dycaico, accused making or causing alterations and changes in a genuine document w/c changed its meaning and thereby affixing his signature at the back of the check, which check was cleared by the PBC. On the second instance, accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, by timely discovery made by officials/employees of said bank of the forgery and falsification made on the aforesaid check before payment could be made which led then and there to the apprehension of said accused. Under the two Informations, the mode of falsification attributed to the accused is that of having erased and altered the dates and amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing over the original dates and amounts, thereby making alterations and changes in genuine documents which changed their meaning. Accused misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit checks in various amounts. ISSUE:Did accused committed the crime of attempted estafa in the absence of deceit and damage? HELD: Yes. The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question and having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon. The use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit. The appellant made use of and benefited from the falsified document is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be falsified, he being criminally responsible in either case. Since Heng is the only person who stood to be benefited by the falsification of the document that wasfound in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of such falsification.LOPEZ VS PARASFACTS: In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin (Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those of Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that they made it appear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the "guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No. C-2268).ISSUE: whether or not there is a commission of art.172? and when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed?RULING:YES but the court of angeles has no jurisdiction over the criminal act, but the importance of this case is when and where a falsification of document comes in.In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners a claim supported by the record that Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private document wherein they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact, the first within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the province of Rizal.We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed. Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended.Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that the information was defective, in that it fails to set forth expressly the place where improper and illegal use was made of the falsified document, an allegation which counsel for appellant insists was absolutely essential for the proper determination of the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the definition of the crime of falsification of a private document as set forth in Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense is consummated at the time when and at the place where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether the falsified document is or is not put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document; . . . .Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the private document subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of falsification the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond question.ALFELOR SR. VS BONIFACIOJurisprudence sited in this case to serve as a guide for art.172FERNANDO, J.:

The Judiciary Act 1 and the Rules of Court 2 set forth with clarity the jurisdiction of a municipal court over crimes. That was the point stressed by petitioners to respondent Judge. 3 It did not avail, their motion to dismiss a falsification charge against them having been denied. They did point out that in the very complaint itself it was admitted that it was in another municipality where such alleged falsification took place. Respondent Judge was not persuaded; he accepted the view set forth in the objection to the motion to dismiss that the municipal court of Tigaon, his station, was vested with jurisdiction as it "is one of the intervening municipalities where the jeep carrying the ballot box (the contents of which were allegedly falsified) passed through." 4 He maintained that falsification is a continuing offense. He did not budge, notwithstanding his attention being called to authoritative decisions that affirmed the contrary. Clearly then, there is merit to this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie.The principal petitioner, Felix O. Alfelor, and respondent Felix A. Fuentebella were congressional candidates in the second district of Camarines Sur in the 1965 elections, with the latter being proclaimed as winner resulting in the filing of an electoral protest by the former. 5 Respondent Fuentebella in turn charged his opponent and the other petitioners in the municipal court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent Judge, with falsification of public or official documents contained in the ballot box of a precinct in Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged criminal act having taken place in still another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 6 There was on the part of petitioners a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the situs of the alleged falsification being in another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 7 Respondent Judge in the challenged order issued on April 29, 1967 denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that falsification was a continuing offense. 8 A motion for reconsideration was filed. It was denied. 9 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.As noted at the outset, the petition merit.

1.Reference was previously made both to the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court as to the jurisdiction of municipal courts to try criminal cases being confined only to such offenses committed within the limits of the territories appertaining to their position. 10 In the latest case in point, Lopez v. City Judge, 11 Justice Dizon, as ponente, restated the basic rule thus: "It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction." 12 As was pointed out by him, such a doctrine goes back to U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 13 a 1905 decision. Beltran v. Ramos, 14 Ragpala v. Justice of the Peace of Tubod, 15 People v. Yumang 16 and People v. San Antonio 17 may likewise be cited on this point.2.That much, as was pointed out by Justice Dizon, is settled law. It is to be assumed that respondent Judge would not deliberately ignore what it commands. His persistence can be ascribed to his view that falsification is a continuing offense. He was led to conclude, therefore, that an ingredient thereof took place within his jurisdiction. Here his stand is decidedly opposed to what this court has uniformly and consistently held. Again, Lopez v. City Judge 18 points the way: "We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed? Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. v. Infante, ... that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended." 19 United States v. Infante 20 was decided as far back as 1917, almost sixty years ago. Less than a month later that same year, United States v. Barreto, 21 which spoke to the same effect, was promulgated. As was pointed out by Justice Carson who likewise penned the Infante opinion: "It is evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document; and even if it were otherwise, the charge that the crime was committed in a specific place would seem to be a sufficient allegation that all of the acts necessary to its consummation were in fact done at the place indicated." 22 There is also this opinion of Chief Justice Avancena in People v. Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of each of these six money orders committed separately by means of different acts constitutes independent crimes of falsification. (U.S. v. Infante and Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes different crimes of malversation." 24 All of the above cases explicitly ruled on the specific point at issue. It does not admit of doubt though that while no such categorical statement may be found in other decisions of this Court, it has always been assumed that falsification is not a continuing offense. 25WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of April 29, 1967 and the order of May 25, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration are reversed, nullified and set aside and declared to be of no force and effect. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Judge being enjoined to desist from taking any further action on the complaint for falsification of public and/or official documents filed against petitioners in his sala except for the purpose of dismissing the same. No costs.PEOPLE VS DIZONFACTS; That in or about the month of January, 1922, at Camp Stotsenburg, in the province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance, the above-named defendant Jose S. Dizon, at that time assistant bookkeeper of the Post Exchange of said Camp, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, and with intent to defraud said Post Exchange, altered and falsified the entries on the books kept by him, and destroyed and rendered unless certain documents and papers relative to the accounts of said Post Exchange, succeeding, through such fraudulent means, to swindle away the amount of three thousand nine hundred and sixty-four pesos and ninety-one centavos (P3,964.91), equivalent to 19,824 pesetas, belonging to the Post Exchange, said defendant having embezzled said amount to the prejudice of said Post Exchange, and in violation of law.

ISSUE: whether or not the accused committed acts of falsification. And estafaRULING:Yes,A thorough study of the evidence shows that the accused, Jose S. Dizon, during the period from October, 1920, to January, 1922, was in the employ, as assistant bookkeeper at the Post Exchange of Camp Stotsenburg, an army post in the Province of Pampanga; that during the time of his employment he brought on credit various articles from the several stores of the Post Exchange, for which he signed chits (vales) showing the nature and value of the articles so brought; that said chits as well as chits signed by other customers were recorded in the books of the corresponding stores from which the articles were bought; that every morning all of the chits of the preceding day were turned over to the office of the Post Exchange, also to be recorded in the books of said office, including the ledger (personal accounts) of the customers; that said chits were kept in the office of the Post Exchange, and were returned to the customers only upon payment of their account; that Jose S. Dizon, as such assistant bookkeeper, was the employee in charge of recording the sales of the several stores, in cash as well as on credit, in the books of the office of the Post Exchange, and also of the keeping of the said chits and the recording thereof in the personal accounts of the customers; that he voluntarily did not record in his personal account most of the chits signed by him for articles bought on credit, amounting to P3,964.91 (Exhibit J-2), except a few of them amounting only to P653.77, which latter amount he paid, leaving only a balance of P29.43 (Exhibit J-1); that all the chits for the said amount of P3,964.91 have disappeared, and that only a few chits amounting to P199.99 were found properly kept in separate envelopes (Exhibits I to I-4).The foregoing facts clearly show that the accused voluntarily falsified the ledger (personal accounts) of the office of the Post Exchange, which was a commercial document, by not recording in his own personal account the chits for articles bought by him from the stores of the Post Exchange amounting to P3,964.91, thereby violating article 301 in relation with No. 4 of article 300 of the Penal Code, evidently for the purpose of evading the payment of said amount. The same facts also lead us to the conviction that the accused maliciously destroyed those chits, for the same purpose, and also to obliterate, to some extent, the traces of his indebtedness, which act constitutes a violation of paragraph 9 of article 535 of the Penal Code. (U.S. vs. Tan Jenjua, 1 Phil., 38; U.S. vs. Kilayko, 31 Phil., 371.)

The evidence clearly establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and the findings of facts of the lower court are in full harmony therewith. The fifty thousand errors attributed to the lower court by counsel for appellant could not be found in spite of our careful and painstaking study of the whole record. The only error of said court noted by us is the finding, that in the commission of the crime of estafa the accused violated article 534 instead of article 535, No. 9, of the Penal Code. This error, however, is immaterial as far as the appellant is concerned, in view of the fact that under the provisions of either article the penalty remains the same.US VS PONTEFACTS: That on or about the 6th day of September, 1909, the defendant Rufino Ponte was a bonded employee of the provincial and municipal government of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as municipal treasurer of said pueblo had in his possession and in his charge the sum of P3,795.53 and safe valued at P50. The defendant Pedro Pedraza was the janitor or porter of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, and Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram and Esteban Verata were municipal policemen of said pueblo of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as such officers had committed to them the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, where the said sum of P3,795.93 and the safe containing it were kept.That the said defendant Rufino Ponte did maliciously, criminally and unlawfully misappropriate and make personal use of the said sum of P3,795.93, and refused and failed to render account of the same, as well as of the safe containing it.That the defendants Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, did, each and every one of them, maliciously, criminally and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this malversation by taking said safe with the said amount from the municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of Inarian: in violation of law.Counsel for the defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, demurred to the information on the ground that as to these defendants the facts set out in the information did not constitute the crime with which they were charged. The grounds upon which they base this contention are stated by counsel as follows:The crime with which the above-named defendants are charged is provided for and penalized by a special Act, No. 1740, which has repealed such provisions of the Penal Code relating to malversation and misappropriation as conflict with the provisions of said Act.According to the information cited, the above-named accused were municipal policemen of Calabanga, where the crime was committed, and their sole participation therein was that they directly aided Rufino Ponte, the municipal treasurer, in said malversation by taking the safe with the sum misappropriate and carrying it from the municipal treasury to the sitio of Inarian.ISSUE: whether or not Public malversation extends to those who aid the prinicipalRULING:YES, Groizard, in his Commentaries on article 405 of the Spanish Penal Code, which is substantially identical with article 390 of the Philippine Code, says that:Doubt, weighty doubt may arise, nevertheless, regarding the definition of the crime and of the penalty to be imposed upon the private party who abstracts funds with the consent of the officer charged with their custody. Shall the person so doing be guilty of the crime of malversation here provided for, and shall he suffer the same penalty as the unfaithful officer, or shall he be guilty only to the crime of theft and undergo the punishment he deserves therefor?Without overlooking the force of the arguments we have just cited, we are inclined to take the first point of view. We are led thereto by the consideration that in contending for the imposition of the same penalty upon the private party who abstracts public funds as upon the employee who gives his consent thereto we recognize the differentiation with which crimes are always described and penalized in the code. In the action which the text describes as a crime there is perfect unity: the private party does not act independently from the public officer: rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstracts them by circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means for accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a social crime. If the article were not so interpreted, it would be necessary to agree that the act, in spite of its evident unity, would constitute not one but two distinct crimes, and the persons participating therein, although they acted together throughout, would be guilty of two different kinds of wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule of article 80, which prevents extension from some culprits to others of the responsibility that arises from their personal qualities, is restricted by fundamental principles and by the article itself, wherein it is applied to the consideration of the extenuating and aggravating circumstances which may affect the persons respectively responsible for the crime, and it neither can nor must influence in any way the characterization of the facts. One who helps a son kill his father is an accomplice of parricide: one who plans with a servant to commit a theft (hurto), and does commit it, is guilty of hurtodomestic. When the law clearly defines a crime, as it has here defined the crime of malversation, those who in any way participate therein must be principals, accomplices or abettors thereof. (Vol. 4, p. 275.)Viada, in his Commentaries upon the same article, says:Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of malversation of public funds, committed by a public officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some jurists and commentators (among others the learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already advanced in Question I of the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same way on the ground that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime.(Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 652.)The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of public funds by a public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty prescribed by this section of the code upon a public official who took part with another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly appeared, that those funds were not in his handy by virtue of his office, though it did appear that they were in the hands of his coprincipal by virtue of the public office held by him

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANILO REYES (ROBBERY)G.R. NO. 135682. MARCH 26, 2003

Facts:

This is an appeal for the decision rendered by the RTC. On October 12, 1997 in Navotas City, the herein appellant was charged of robbery with homicide. And that he conspired, confederated and mutually helped one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away one (1) gold necklace, one (1) gold ring, one wristwatch, all of an undetermined value, and a wallet containing unspecified amount of cash owned by and belonging to DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS to the damage and prejudice of the latter, and that on the occasion of or by reason of the said robbery the said accused, conspiring with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab with a bladed weapon, the said DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in convicting him notwithstanding the fact that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt

Held:

No. The court did not err in its decision. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.Accused-appellants contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.[footnoteRef:2][6] In the case at bar, the act of taking the victims wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption. [2: ]

US VS. PIO CASTILLO (FALSIFICATION)G.R. NO. 2829 SEPTEMBER 19, 1906

Facts:It was proven at the trial of the case on the morning of the 2d of December, 1905, the appellant Pio Castillo, presented a check for the sum of 56 pesos, Philippine currency, to Chinese merchant named Lim Ponso; that the said check was made payable to bearer and purported to be drawn by one James J. Watkins; that the amount of the check was paid to Pio Castillo; that the signature of the drawer upon said check was a forgery made in imitation of the genuine signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of the city of Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J. Watkins never signed or issued the said check; that the blank upon which the check was written was stolen from a book of blank checks between the hours of 12 noon on the 1st of December, 1903, and 11 a. m. on the 2d of December, 1903, when the check was presented for payment; that this blank check book was kept in a drawer in the office of the said James J. Watkins, and that Pio Castillo was one of three clerks employed by Watkins in the office; that Castillo was in the office on the evening of December 1 and early in the morning of December 2, and that he was the last person let alone in the office on the evening of December 1, he having locked the office after all the other clerks had gone.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification

Held:The court held that the evidence is not enough to render the accused guilty of falsification but found the accused guilty of the crime of knowingly using with intent to gain a falsified mercantile document as defined and penalized in article 302 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to five months imprisonment (arresto mayor) with the accessory penalties.In Massachusetts, wherein it has been held that the mere fact of uttering is not proof of forgery (Com. vs.Parmenter, 5 Pick., 279, 1827), it has been decided, nevertheless, that "possession of a forged instrument by a person claiming under it is strong evidence tending to prove that he forged it or caused it to be forged." (Com. vs. Talbot, 84 Mass. (2 Allen), 161.) In several jurisdiction it has been held that one found in the possession of a forged order issued in his own favor is presumed either to have forged it or procured it to be forged. (Hobbs vs. State, 75 Ala., 1; State vs. Britt, 14 N. C. (3 Div.), 122.)For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the accused uttered the check in question is proof of the fact that he also forged it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold that the utterance of such an instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the utterer either himself forged the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken together with the further evidence set out above and brought out on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.It is urged on appeal that the information filed in this case is fatally deficient because it charges the accused with falsification and further alleges that he received the sum of money realized as a result of said falsification, and it is contended that the accused was thus charged as principal and as accessory after the fact. It is sufficient answer to this connection to say no objection was raised on this ground at the trial; and it is further to be observed that this allegation was not in fact or intention a charge against the accused as accessory after the fact, and appears to have been set out in the information merely to fix the civil responsibility upon which the court is required to pass, under the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code.

ONG HOCK LIAN ALIAS JULIAN ONG VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. NO. L-21197 MAY 19, 1966

Facts:

MAKALINTAL, J.:This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental which granted the petition for naturalization of Ong Hock Lianalias Julian Ong.Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used to reside in Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has been living in Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan KoKiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese national, by whom he has three children, two of whom are school age and are enrolled at the St. Paul's College, Dumaguete City, an educational institution recognized by the government, not limited to any particular race or nationality and where subjects on Philippine history, government and civics are part of the curriculum. Appellee himself finished his first year high school education at the Zamboanga Chinese High School, Zamboanga City. He speaks the English, language and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. A merchant by occupation, he has a store in Colon Street, Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and general merchandise. He has two cargo trucks worth P17,000 and office equipment worth about P200. His net income was P5,939.36 in 1958; P4,114.49 in 1959, and P5,659.30 in 1960. To prove that he has none of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, he presented tax and police clearances; clearances from the Philippine Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the Provincial Fiscal, the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and the Municipal Court of Dumaguete City; and a medical certificate of the City Health Officer.Issue:

Whether or not the accused violated the anti-alias law

Held:

Yes. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.

THE UNITED STATES VS FRANCISCO JURADOG.R. NO. 10719G.R. NO. 10719

Facts:

This is an appeal by the accused on the decision rendered which convicted him guilty of the crime of perjury.

On July 9, 1913, the acting provincial fiscal of Cebu, DionisioJacosalem, proceeded to investigate the matter of the robbery of some tins of opium, committed in the house of Francisco Jurado by Alejandro Albao, a municipal policeman, through threats and intimidation and by availing himself of his office. This opium belonged to Vicente Lizarraga who had taken it to the said house to sell it to some residents of the town. Lizarraga, the owner of the drug, stated that Francisco Jurado was present, among others, at the time of the robbery; but when Jurado was called to testify as an eyewitness to the crime he denied that he was at home on the night of the robbery, as he was then in a cinematograph with his family. He further testified that he did not know either Vicente Lizarraga or Alejandro Albao. Such was his testimony given under oath before the provincial fiscal Jacosalem, but in the proceedings brought against CiriacoSingson for robbery, commenced on September 24, 1913, Jurado, testifying as a witness for the defense, stated under oath that he had known Vicente Lizarraga since the month of June, 1913, and that he was already acquainted with Alejandro Albao on the date of the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of perjury

Held:

No. The testimony of Juradois not contradicted by any evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient proof of the falsity of that statement by the owner of the house, the defendant Jurado, for it was not proven that it was false and, as he certainly was in his own house on the said night of the robbery, it cannot be held that, in testifying as he did, he perjured himself.

Moreover, the testimony of the witness does not determine whether or not the defendant's testimony, alleged to be false, was material and important in its bearings on the said testimony of the other witnesses given in connection with the said crime of robbery.

In order that a witness, in testifying under oath before a public official authorized to administer same commit the crime of perjury and incur the penalty prescribed by section 3 of Act No. 1697 , it is necessary and indispensable that he testify to and declare under oath with regard to some material matter which he does not believe to be true, or that such false testimony tend to establish something which conflicts with the truth of an essential or important fact which has been proven by the evidence; because, if the false testimony of the witness is not important, essential, or material to the principal matte under investigation, it can not properly be held that the crime of perjury has been committed.

People vs Michael MadarangFacts:Madarang, together with Cirilo Juan, was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amendedby Presidential Decree No. 1675).The two were arrested in an entrapment operation, conducted by a combined team of Integrated National Police (INP)/Naval Intelligence Bureau(NIB) composed of Alejandro Basallo, Roberto Viloria, Eduardo Pascua and Douglas Abalos of Poro Point, La Union, for selling Eight Hundred (800) grams of dried Marijuana with flowering tops to the poseurbuyer for 600.00 inside a jeepney.They were apprehended and brought to the police station in San Fernando, La Union, where they were investigated, detained and subsequently released.The Provincial Fiscalordered that theybe re-arrested wherein Madarang voluntarily surrendered and upon arraignment pleaded not guilty.Issue:1.Whether or notthe trial court erredin discrediting the eyewitness testimony of FelixBiwang.2.Whether or notthe trial court erredin finding himguilty of thecrime charged beyondreasonable doubt.Ruling:The lower court correctly rejected the testimony ofBiwang.By his ownadmission, he was too far tohear what was beingsaid by the persons inside thejeepney.His version therefore cannot prevail overthat of the police officers who were actually present in the vehicle when Madarang, in conspiracy with Juan, negotiated the sale of the marijuana leaves for 600.00 a kilo.Madarangs defense that he only accompanied Juan and that he was completely unaware that the plasticbag actually contained illegal drugs cannot overcome the positive and unequivocal statements of the two peace officers that it was none other than Madarang who personally fixed the price of the marijuana leaves of 600.00 a kilo and who stood firm against Vilorias (who posed as buyer) attempts at haggling.Ownership and possessionare not indispensableelements of thecrime under consideration.The mere act of selling or even acting as broker in a sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime underSection4.When Madarang negotiated the sale without authority of Juans marijuana leaves to Viloria, he took a directand active part in thecrime.His guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.PEOPLE VS. DE JESUSFacts: Carlito de Jesus (alias "Carling") appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124 in Caloocan City, convicting him in Criminal Case No. C-21861 for violating Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and in Criminal Case No. C-21862 for violating Sec. 8 of the same Act and sentencing him to:(1) Life imprisonment-together with all the accessory penalties provided by law-and a fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 21861; and(2) TWELVE (12) Years and a fine of P12,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 21862.The two informations filed against the accused.The prosecution's evidence upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt was summarized by the court as follows:... Tipped of drug-trafficking at the Bisig Ng Nayon area, a heaven for drug users/pushers, the anti-narcotics group of the Caloocan City Police conducted a campaign thereat on January 17, 1984. Apprehended on that occasion-it was around one o'clock in the afternoon-was accused Carlito de Jesusalias"Carling." Aside from selling five sticks of marijuana (worth P10.00) to police officer Jesus Nadonga, who had posed as a drug-buyer, accused Carlito de Jesusalias"Carling" was also found in possession of 32 sticks of marijuana-when frisked by the police. Those sold by and confiscated from accused Carlito de Jesusalias"Carling" were examined by the forensic-chemistry unit of the National Bureau of Investigation-and were found "positively marijuana." Immediately after his apprehension, accused Carlito de Jesusalias"Carling owned the crime charged-and even gave a statement which he acknowledged before the inquest fiscal.On the other hand, the defense adduced evidence as follows:. . . Carlito de Jesusalias"Carling" had a tooth-extraction on the date he was arrested-and, therefore, he could not have perpetrated the crimes charged as he was then resting when apprehended. Carlito de Jesusalias"Carling" did not give any statement to the police-he was merely coerced by the police into signing a prepared statement. Fistic blows were rained on him by the police soon after his arrest-on the way to and at the police headquarters. Nonetheless, no step was taken by him and his family relative to what happened to him (particularly the alleged injuries inflicted).ISSUE: Whether or not the courta quoerred in convicting the accused on two separate informations (for violation of section 4 and section 8, art. ii, r.a. 6425 as amended) despite the fact that the latter offense is an essential element and inherent in the offense for violation of section 4, art. 11 of r.a. 6425 and therefore deemed absorbed in the former offense;HELD:0On the first assigned error, the appellant claims that possession of marijuana as prohibited under Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 is absorbed in the offense of selling marijuana as prohibited in Sec. 4 of the same Act. He, therefore, contends that there should have been only one charge which is that of unlawful sale of marijuana.The fiscal filed two separate informations because when the appellant was bodily searched, after he was apprehended for selling 5 marijuana sticks, 32 more such sticks were found in his pants back pocket. Thus, he was also charged for possession of prohibited drugs.The lower court justified conviction on the basis of two informations by stating:As a last-ditch effort to lighten the resulting criminal liability, the defense tried to convince the Court that the charge in Criminal Case No. 21861 has absorbed that in Criminal Case No. 21862. Considering the gravity of the offenses charged-taking note of the ill-effects of dangerous drugs and the proliferation thereof-such interpretation should not be countenanced. Use of prohibited drugs is bad in itself. But pushing, vending, selling or circulating the same is worse. Such act is worse than murder-and the perpetrator/ perpetrators thereof should be meted out the maximum penalty allowable, if only to deter others from doing the same. Let this be a warning for those who deal with dangerous drugs-that the law will give them the severest blow possible.Dura lex, sedlex.We agree with the appellant's first assigned error, sustained by the Solicitor General, that the trial court erred in penalizing de Jesus separately under the two informations:As the Solicitor General stated:The trial court's severe stand against traffic in drugs is understandable. But the assumption is that the legislature will not indulge in absurdities. Since possession of prohibited drugs is inherent in the crime of selling them, it is to be assumed that, in punishing selling, the legislature took into account the need to possess them first.The penalty for selling-life imprisonment to death-is already quite harsh. The legislature should not have intended to attach a further penalty of 12 years to 20 years for possession It would be superfluous especially if the accused have been imposed a death sentence for selling.The second and third assigned errors center on the issue of whether or not the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. C-21861.The appellant contends that the court erred in giving fun weight to his extrajudicial confession taken during custodial investigation. He repudiated this confession during trial on the ground that it was extorted by force, coercion, and intimidation.The appellant's defense that he was beaten up by the police and forced to admit the sale of marijuana is negated by his testimony that he suffered no injuries. However, we completely disregard the extrajudicial confession, there being no showing by the prosecution that there was sufficient compliance with the constitutional duty to inform the accused of his rights to silence and to counsel, without which there could be no intelligent waiver of said rights. (See People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).With the extrajudicial confession completely disregarded, there is still more than enough evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction.Pat. Jesus Nadonga who acted as poseur-buyer clearly and positively Identified appellant de Jesus as the seller of the marijuana. The appellant's defense is that he was not there at the scene of the crime. He was recuperating from a tooth extraction. The denial and explanations cannot overcome the positive evidence. (People v. Chavez, 117 SCRA 221; People v. Dondoy, G.R. No. 63728, September 15, 1986). We agree with the lower court when it cited the well-established rule that greater weight is given to the positive testimony of the prosecution witness than to the accused 's denial (People v. Mostoles, Jr., 124 SCRA 906).Regarding the alibi offered by the appellant, as stated in the case ofPeople v. Dondoy, supra:it is well settled that against the positive Identification of the accused, alibi is unavailing (People v. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321) and that as a minimum requirement for the theory of alibi to be accepted, the accused must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People v. Bihasa, 130 SCRA 62; People v. Munoz, 107 SCRA 313; People v. Capillas, 108 SCRA 173; and People v. Sambangan, 125 SCRA 726).De Jesus testified that he was resting outside their house at BisigngNayon Street at about the time of the incident. It was not impossible for him to be at the scene of the sale of marijuana as it was transacted in the same street.We have carefully examined the records and we find no reason to depart from the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defense. The trial court stressed the inconsistencies and incredulities in the testimony of De Jesus, his evasive answers, and failure to respond spontaneously. It believed the prosecution witnesses. On the credibility of the witnesses, it is a well-established rule that we have usually accorded the highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court, the latter being in the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses.We give credence to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, more so as they happen to be law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. (Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), Rules of Court).Furthermore, there is nothing in the records to suggest that they were motivated by any reason other than to accomplish their mission. As stated inPeople v. Patog(G.R. No. 69620, September 24, 1986) Where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. (See also People v. Campana, 124 SCRA 271).And finally, the accused manifested before trial his willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offense of unlawful possession of marijuana but the prosecuting fiscal objected and insisted on the prosecution of both offenses.All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant de Jesus has been established beyond reasonable doubt.WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. C-21861 for the sale of prohibited drugs is AFFIRMED. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-21862 for possession, custody, and control of prohibited drugs is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.QUELNAN VS. PEOPLEG.R. No. 166061, July 06, 2007FACTS:Sometime in 1996, the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) was tasked to implement a search warrant to acertain Berard Lim for probably possessingMA HCI (Shabu).The team was escorted to the unit by the security officer (Punsaran), upon arrival at the place to be searched, a male person naked from the waist up opened thedoor, which was later identified asQuelnan.The team presented the search warrant andproceeded with the search.In the presence of Quelnan andPunsaran, they found on top of a bedroom table 3 pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was later examined asShabu.The next day, Quelnan was arrested for violation of Sec.16 Art. III of RA 6425.Quelnan in his defense averred that he is not residing in the said unit, but he is the registered owner of the said unit, which he lwased to Sung KokLee beginning May 1996.That he was there during the search for he was collecting the rent. That he was forced to sign some documents at gun point, handcuffed and brought to PARACOffice.Two days later, he was brought to Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest and a case was filed against him.ISSUE:Whether or not the search warrant was properly enforced provided that he was not the subject of the search warrant.Whether or not Quelnan was validly arrested.RULING:Yes.There is no provision oflaw that requires the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises, that where the search warrant is issued for the search of a specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, and failure to name to owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant. Yes.Quelnan wasarrested inflagrante delicto.In theprosecution ofillegal possession ofshabu the following requisites must be present: 1.theaccusedisfoundinpossessionofregulateddrug.2.thepersonisnotauthorizedbylaworbydulyconstitutedauthorities;and3.theaccusedhasknowledgethatthesaiddrugisaregulateddrug.That there must be intent to possess the drug, which includes actual possession or constructive possession.Actual possession exist when the drugis immediate physical possession or control ofthe accused, while constructive possession exist when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion over the place where it is found. Quelnan was found and caught in flagrante when the shabu was found in his constructive possession.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO ORTEZAG.R. No. 173051 July 31, 2007Justice Tinga

FACTS: The information charged appellant with illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. In the course of the trial, the prosecution alleged that a team comprised of police officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend suspected drug peddlers. The suspects have previously been under a week-long surveillance after the police officers received reports about their illegal activities. The appointed poseur-buyer SPO1 Ramos, together with the informant, approached the two (2) suspects LengLeng and Buboy while the back-up team positioned itself nearby. SPO1 Ramos purchased one (1) sachet of shabu for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) from Buboy. Then, SPO1 Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the scene and placed the two (2) suspects under arrest. After a body search, the marked money was recovered from Buboy and another sachet of shabu was confiscated from LengLeng. Thereafter, the suspects were brought to Camp Macabulos where Buboy identified himself as Gerardo Orteza. Later upon examination, Engr. MarceneAgala of the Regional Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, confirmed that the two (2) sachets recovered from the scene were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

ISSUE: Is the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer fatal to this case?HELD: Yes. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (a) that the transaction or sale took place; (b) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (c) that the buyer and seller were identified. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.

The Court believes that the prosecution was not able to establish with certainty all the elements necessary for the conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu.

First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Secondly, the Court observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction. In this case, though, after the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Ramos, failed to appear in court despite having been subpoenaed six (6) times, the prosecution did not even bother to offer any explanation for his non-appearance considering that he, a police officer, was no different from the other witnesses who were presented in the end by the prosecution. In Ramos's place, the prosecution presented two other police officers,