REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0773-0774For: Falsification of Public

Documents (Art. 171 [4] ofthe Revised Penal Code)and Splitting of Contracts(Sec. 65 [4] in relation toSec. 52 & 54 of RepublicAct [R.A.] No. 9184 andSec. 52 & 54 of IRR-A ofR.A. No. 9184)

ELPIDIO TAGAAN MAGANTEet al.,

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, S.J., J. andFERNANDEZ, B., J.

For resolution is accused Elpidio Tagaan Magante's "Motionfor Reconsideration" dated January 23, 2017,1 praying that theCourt's Resolution promulgated on January 9, 2017 be set aside

, pp. 352-358, Record r

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and the case against him be dismissed on the ground that hisconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases had beenviolated.

The accused-movant asserts anew that there was a verydisturbing inaction of five (5)years, which remains unexplainedby Office of the Ombudsman.2 Allegedly, the following datesshow the existence of inordinate delay, thus:

Year 2011 the case was docketed against therespondents, meanmg a formalcharge began.

February 15, 2011 - an Order was issued directing therespondents to submit their counter-affidavits.

May 3, 2011 OMB-VISAYASreceived the counter-affidavits of respondents Candug,Renegado, Jaum and Castolo.

May 6,2011 OMB-Visayas received the counter-affidavits of Magante, Orillos,Sarigumba, Rulida and Aparri.

Apri115,2016 Office of the Ombudsman issued itsadverse Resolution against all therespondents.3

In support of theaccused-movant invokesSandiganbayan.4

Furthermore, the accused-movant cites the case ofPeople v. Sandiganbayan, First and Third Division andPeople v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division,s wherein theSupremeCourtruled that the fact-findinginvestigationSh/?

2 pp. 353-354, Record3 p. 353, Record4701 SCRA188 (2013)5712 SCRA359 (2013)

above-mentionedthe case of

averments, theCoscollue la v.

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-0773-0774People vs. Magante, et al.

not be deemed separate from the preliminary investigationconducted by the Officeof the Ombudsman, to wit:

The guarantee of the speedy disposition of casesunder Section 16 of Article III of the Constitutionapplies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Thus, the fact-findinginvestigation should not be deemed separate from thepreliminary investigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman if the aggregate time spent for bothconstitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in thedisposition of any case.

In its ((Comment/Opposition to the Motion forReconsideration" dated January 26, 2017, the prosecutionsubmits that the arguments raised by the accused-movant inhis motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of theaverments he had raised in his motion to dismiss which werealready passed upon by the Court in its questionedResolution.6 The prosecution points to the fact that theaccused-movant had raised no new matters; hence, hispresent motion should be denied.?

The Court finds the subject motion bereft of merit.

Notably, the assertion of the accused-movant that therewas an unexplained inaction of five (5)years on the part of theOffice of the Ombudsman in resolving the preliminaryinvestigation of these cases;8 and, that there is clear proof ofinordinate delay on the part of the Office of the ombUr6 p. 361, Record7 p. 361, Record8 p. 354, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-0773-0774People vs. Magante, et aI.

thereby warranting the dismissal of the present cases9 merelyreiterates the arguments in his Motion to Dismiss datedNovember 21, 2016. These arguments were squarely passedupon by the Court in its assailed Resolution promulgated onJanuary 9,2017, viz:

In contrast to the abovementioned cases, theattendant circumstances in these cases do not show adeliberate attempt to delay the proceedings. Theprosecution appropriately explained the circumstancessurrounding the drafting of the two (2) Informationsagainst the ten (10) respondents, all of whom wereaccorded their constitutional right to be heard. Basedthereon, this Court does not find that the proceedingsbefore the Office of the Ombudsman were attended byany vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.Io

Moreover, the accused-movant's continued reliance on thecase of CoscollueZa v. Sandiganbayan11 is misplaced.

In its questioned Resolution promulgated on January 9,2017, the Court elucidated on the inapplicability of the above-mentioned case to the present cases because of the differencein their factual milieu, to wit:

Also, accused-movant's reliance on CoscoZluela ismisplaced.

In the said case, the Supreme Court ruled in favorof the dismissal of the Information since thecircumstances of the case showed that the petitionerstherein were unaware that a preliminary investigationagainst themwas on-going;hence,the Courtruled/"?

9 p. 354, Reord10 pp. 9-10, Resolution, pp. 336-337, Record11 701 SeRA 188 (2013)

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they could not be faulted for their alleged failure toassert their right to speedy disposition of cases.

Here, accused-movant was very much aware thatthere was a pending preliminary investigation againsthim, as in fact, he filed his counter-affidavit before theOMB-Visayas on May 6, 2011. He also later filed aMotion for Reconsideration of an adverse Resolution ofthe Office of the Ombudsman on May 31, 2015.12

Surely, he cannot now invoke Coscolluela for heactively participated in the proceedings before the Office

. of the Ombudsman and failed to assert his right to aspeedy disposition of cases.13

Finally, the accused-movant invokes the consolidatedcases of People v. Sandiganbayan, First and Third Divisionand People v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division,14 whereinthe Supreme Court ruled that the fact-finding investigationshould not be deemed separate from the preliminaryinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman if theaggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate andoppressive delay in the disposition of any case.

In the afore-cited case, the Supreme Court included theduration of the fact-finding investigation in the determinationof the existence of inordinate delay in the proceedings beforethe Office of the Ombudsman since the State miserably failedto prove that the delay in the fact-finding investigation as wellas the preliminary investigation was reasonable. In People,the Supreme Court ruled that there was really no sufficientjustificationtenderedby the Stateforthe longdelayOf?

12 p. 279, Record13 pp. 10-11, Resolution, pp. 337-338, Record14712 SeRA 359 (2013)

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than five (5) years In bringing the charges before the propercourt. IS

In the present cases, the prosecutionfollowing circumstances surrounding theinvestigation, to wit:

narrated thefact-finding

The letter16 of Delfin Aguilar (Aguilar), RegionalDirector (RD) of the Commission on Audit Region VIIDATED August 25, 2009 requesting the filing ofadministrative and criminal charges against theaccused was received by [the] OMB-Visayas onSeptember 1, 2009. In a letter dated October 8, 2009,OMB-Visayas requested RD for original or certified truecopies of the documents necessary in the investigation.It was only on December 4, 200917 that OMB-Visayasreceived the requested documents from COARegion VII.The Final Evaluation Report dated June 30, 2010 wasthereafter forwarded to the Ombudsman Central Officeon September 24, 201018 which was approved by thenOmbudsman Gutierrez on November 18, 2010.19

The afore-mentioned events show that there was nosignificant hiatus of action from the filing of the complaint-letter in 2009 up to the approval of the Final EvaluationReport by then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez in 2010.The Court is of the view that there is no indication of anyintentional, oppressive or inordinate delay in the fact-findinginvestigation of this case; hence, the ruling in the case ofPeople v. Sandiganbagan, First and Third Di 'sion~

~ p. 416, People v. Sandlganbayan, Fi"t and Th"d Division and People v. sandlganbayan, S",ond¥\Division, 712 SeRA 359 (2013) I -16 Footnote omitted17 Jd18 Jd

19 p. 280, Record

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People v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division20 IS notcontrolling.

To stress, it is jurisprudentially settled that the right to aspeedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept wherein thefacts and circumstances surrounding each case must beevaluated and taken into account. Only when the proceedingsare attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, orwhen without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of timeis allowed to elapse, would there be a violation of the right tospeedy disposition of cases.21

In sum, the accused-movant had failed to raise any newor substantial matters that would warrant a reconsideration ofthe Court's Resolution promulgated on January 9,2017.

WHEREFORE, the accused-movant's Motion forReconsideration dated January 23, 2017 is DENIED for beingpro forma and/ or lack of merit.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

20712 SCRA359 (2013)21 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA135 (2008)