Crim Pro 4th Amend Briefs

7/30/2019 Crim Pro 4th Amend Briefs

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Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

Justice Clark

1. Facts of the Case:The police entered the home of Ms. Mapp without a search warrant and proceeded in a

thorough search of her home. During the search they found obscene material that Mapp was

convicted on.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Should the exclusionary rule, which excludes evidence at trial that has been obtained in

violation of the 4th Amendment rules of search and seizure, be applicable to the states?

3. Holding:The exclusionary rule as a means of protecting the 4th Amendment rights against search and

seizure is applicable to the states just as it is applicable to the federal government.

4. Rationale: Wolf v. Colorado selectively incorporated the 4th Amendment to the states via the 14th

Amendment, but did not do this with the exclusionary rule

This is being applied to the states to close the only courtroom door remaining open toevidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right

Since the 4thAmendments right of privacy has been declared enforceable against theStates through the Due Process Clause, it is enforceable against them by the same

sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government

The admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently toleratedenial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the

evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure

The State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, had served to encouragedisobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold

The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing candestroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its

disregard ofthe charter of its own existence

United States v. Leon (1984)

Justice White

1. Facts of the Case:After an extensive drug investigation, police submitted an affidavit and received a search

warrant. Upon entering Leons home they seized significant amounts of drugs. The trial court


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threw out much of the evidence because the affidavit did not meet previously established

standards. The Court of appeals upheld the decision.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Should the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be modified so as not to bar the use in

the prosecutions case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable

reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately

found to be unsupported by probable cause?

3. Holding:Suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-

case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the

exclusionary rule. (Established the good-faith exception). Court of Appeals is reversed.

4. Rationale: The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the

errors of judges and magistrates

There exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignoreor subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires

application of the extreme sanction of exclusion

There is no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrantwill have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate

The marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained inobjectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot

justify the substantial costs of exclusion

The officers reliance on the magistrates probable-cause determination and on thetechnical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable

In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutralrole, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in

preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in

the existence of probable cause

Hudson v. Michigan (2006)

Justice Scalia

1. Facts of the Case:Police were executing a warrant to search Hudsons home for drugs and firearms and

announced their presence but did not wait more than 3 to 5 seconds. Hudson moved to have

the evidence suppressed because the premature entry violated his 4th Amendment rights. The

trial court granted the potion but the appellate court reversed.


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2. Legal Questions Presented: Is the exclusionary rule the appropriate remedy for violation of the knock-and-announce

requirement?

3. Holding:The social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are

considerable and the incentive to such violations is minimal. Therefore, suppressing evidence of

guilt is unjustified.

4. Rationale: Wilson v. Arkansas established the knock-and-announce requirement as a command

of the Fourth Amendment.

Exceptions to this requirement occur when there is a threat of physical violence, ifthere is reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed, or if knocking and

announcing would be futile

Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executedthe warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the

house (arguing inevitable discovery exception)

Interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are different than those ofprotection against warrantless searches including: protection of human life, protection

of property, and the elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden

entrance

What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected is ones interest in preventingthe government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the

interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of theevidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable

What constitutes reasonable wait time in a case or if there was reasonable suspicionfor the Richards exceptions would be difficult for courts to determine

Another consequence of applying the exclusionary rule would be police officersrefraining from timely entry after knocking and announcing

Hudson could use S1983 to seek damages for violation of his civil rightsHerring v. United States (2009)

Chief Justice Roberts

1. Facts of the Case:Officer Anderson spotted Herring, and knowing he has criminal history, asked the countys

warrant clerk to check for outstanding arrest warrants for Herring. She found none, but the

clerk of a neighboring county did. Anderson arrested Herring and found drugs and a firearm in

his possession. It was later found that the arrest warrant for Herring in the neighboring county


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had been recalled. Herring claimed the evidence should be excluded. The district court denied

this motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: If an officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant and finds

contraband in the search incident to the arrest, should this evidence be excluded if it is

discovered the search was a 4th Amendment violation due to negligent bookkeeping

errors by a police employee?

3. Holding:In the circumstances of this case, the jury should not be barred from considering all of the

evidence. The exclusionary rule should not be applied. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

4. Rationale: The exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in

appreciable deterrence

To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate thatexclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is

worth the price paid by the justice system. The error in this case does not rise to that

level

Franks v. Delaware negligent police miscommunications in the course of acquiring awarrant do not provide a basis to rescind a warrant and render a search or arrest invalid

We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from theexclusionary rule, however

California v. Greenwood (1988)

Justice White

1. Facts of the Case:A police officer received information that Greenwood might be involved in narcotics trafficking.

The officer asked the trash collector to separate Greenwoods trash from the rest and bring it to

her. After going through the trash, the police found evidence of narcotics. Based on this

probable cause, police got a search warrant and arrested Greenwood. The same was repeated

resulting in a second arrest of Greenwood. The Superior Court dismissed the charges based on

People v. Krivda which said warrantless trash searches violate the 4

th

Amendment. The Court ofAppeals affirmed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does searching the trash left on the side of the road for trash collection violate the 4 th

Amendment rights of the person whose trash it is?


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3. Holding:Greenwood did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, therefore the search of his trash

does not violate the 4th Amendment. The Court of Appeals is reversed.

4. Rationale The search and seizure of the garbage bags would violate the Fourth Amendment only if

respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society

accepts as objectively reasonable

An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection unlesssociety is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable

By placing his garbage on the street, Greenwood left it accessible to animals, children,scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public therefore he has no reasonable

expectation of privacy

What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not asubject of Fourth Amendment protection Katz

Police cannot be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity thatcould have been observed by any member of the public

Florida v. Riley (1989)

Justice White

1. Facts of the Case:After observing a partially covered greenhouse from a helicopter 400 feet above it, the police

saw that the owner was growing marijuana inside and took legal action against the owner. On

appeal, the Florida Supreme Court answered that this violated the 4th Amendment requirement

for a warrant before executing a search.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential

backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse

constitute a search for which a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment?

3. Holding:The surveillance does not constitute a search requiring a warrant under the 4 th Amendment.

The Florida Supreme Court is reversed.

4. Rationale: California v. Ciraolo controls in this case In Ciraolo it was decided that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police

traveling in the public airways at the altitude of 1000 feet to obtain a warrant in order to

observe what is visible to the naked eye


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In this day, it is not reasonable to believe there could be no aircraft flying over onesproperty in which any member of the public could see the illegal material

The helicopter was flying at a legal altitude, therefore, there is no reasonableexpectation of privacy

The Court noted that this does not mean that the inspection of the cartilage of a housefrom an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because

the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law

Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Justice Scalia

1. Facts of the Case:Police used a thermal imaging device to determine that the heat emanating from certain areas

of Kyllos home was indicative of an indoor growing of marijuana. Based on this, as well as tips

and utility bills, police obtained a search warrant and found the indoor growing of marijuana.

Kyllo moved to have the evidence suppressed but was denied and then entered a conditional

guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: What are the limits upon the power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed

privacy?

Does the use of thermal imaging on a home constitute a search under the protection ofthe Fourth Amendment?

3. Holding:The use of thermal imaging on a home does constitute a search under the protections of the

Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals is reversed. Remanded to the District Court to

decide about the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the illegal search and invalid search

warrant.

4. Rationale: Obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the

home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a

constitutionally protected area constitutes a search at least where (as here) the

technology in question is not in general public use Taking into consideration future developments in through-the-wall surveillance

technology

Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to intimate details would be wrong inprinciple and would be impractical in application

Spinelli v. United States (1969)


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Justice Harlan

1. Facts of the Case:Spinelli was convicted of traveling to Missouri from Illinois with the intention of conducting

gambling activities illegal under Missouri law. Spinelli challenged the constitutionality of the

search warrant that allowed the FBI to uncover evidence necessary for the conviction. TheCourt of Appeals upheld the search warrant.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Is there probable cause behind the search warrant in which the FBI found evidence used

to convict Spinelli of his crime?

Does the informants information on the affidavit meet the Aguilar test?3. Holding:

The informants tip even when corroborated to the extent indicated was not sufficient to

provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. The Court of Appeals is reversed.

4. Rationale: Aguilar v. Texas an affidavit was inadequate because it failed to set forth any of the

underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge

of the validity of the informants conclusion and the affiant-officers did not attempt to

support their claim that their informant was credible or his information reliable

The fourth allegation in the affidavit of this case had the fundamental place in thiswarrant application. This allegation was that the FBI had been informed by a

confidential reliable informant that Spinelli was conducting illegal gambling

Applying the Aguilar test Though the affiant swore that his confidant was reliable, he offered the magistrate no

reason in support of this conclusion

The tip does not contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances fromwhich the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation

Draper v. United States held an affidavit legitimate and the warrant legal because theinformant had given great detail from which one could reasonably infer that he had

received his information in a reliable way

This case does not meet that standard.Illinois v. Gates (1983)

Justice Rehnquist

1. Facts of the Case:The police department received an anonymous letter detailing illegal drug trafficking by Lance

and Sue Gates. The police investigation confirmed that some of the details of the anonymous

letter were correct. Based on this, the police got a search warrant and found marijuana in the


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Gates home and car. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of the evidence on the

ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary

determination of probable cause. This was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the

Supreme Court of Illinois.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Was there sufficient probable cause for the search warrant that led to the police finding

the illegal drugs in the possession of Lance and Sue Gates?

3. Holding:The two-pronged test is abandoned, in its place the totality of the circumstances analysis is

reaffirmed. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding probable

cause to search the Gates home and car existed. The Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed.

4. Rationale: The totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior

treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific tests be satisfied

by every informants tip

The two-pronged test (the informants veracity or reliability and his basis ofknowledge) are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of

circumstances: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall

reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indica of

reliability

The totality of circumstances approach recognizes that affidavits are normally draftedby non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation

If the affidavits submitted by police are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courtshave deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the

hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might

develop at the time of search

The traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrates probable causedetermination has been that so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth

Amendment requires no more.

Maryland v. Pringle (2003)

Chief Justice Rehnquist

1. Facts of the Case:A police officer pulled over a vehicle for speeding. 3 men were in the car, including Pringle in

the front seat. After a search of the car, the officer found a large sum of cash in the glove box

and cocaine stored behind the armrest of the passenger seat. None of the three men confessed


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to ownership of the cocaine and the officer arrested all three of them. The next day, Pringle

confessed to having sole ownership of the cocaine. The trial court denied Pringles motion to

suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding that the officer had probable

cause to arrest Pringle. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Did the officer have probable cause to believe that Pringle committed the crime?

3. Holding:The officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of

a controlled substance. Pringles arrest therefore did not violate the 4th and 14th Amendments.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed.

4. Rationale: Based on the facts, it is a reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had

knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a

reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle

committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly

Pringles attempt to characterize this case as a guilt-by-association case is unavailing.Maryland v. Garrison (1987)

Justice Stevens

1. Facts of the Cases:Baltimore police executed a warrant to search McWebb and the premises known as 2036

Park Avenue third floor apartment. The police believed there was only one apartment on

the third floor. Upon executing the warrant, the police realized that the third floor

consisted of two apartments, one belonging to McWebb and the other belonging to

Garrison. Before this realization though, police had found contraband in Garrisons

apartment on which he was charged. The trial court did not suppress the evidence and the

Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals for Maryland reversed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the seizure of the contraband in Garrisons apartment violate the 4th

Amendment?

What is the proper interpretation of the warrant? Is the warrant valid and was it executed reasonably by police?

3. Holding:The warrant was valid when it was issued. The police acted reasonably in their execution of

the warrant. There is no 4th Amendment violation. The Court of Appeals is reversed.


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4. Rationale: The Warrant Clause of the 4th Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of a

warrant except one particularly describing the place to be searched and the

persons or things to be seized

This requirement ensures that eh search will be carefully tailored to its justifications,and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the

Framers intended to prohibit

The question is whether the factual mistake made by the police in regards to thenumber of apartments on the third floor invalidated the warrant that would have

been valid if it had reflected a completely accurate understanding of the buildings

floor plan

The discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broaddoes not retroactively invalidate the warrant

Hill v. Californiaan officers reasonable misidentification of a person does notinvalidate a valid arrest; this is equally applicable to an officers reasonable failure to

appreciate that a valid warrant describes too broadly the premises to be secured

Richards v. Wisconsin (1997)

Justice Stevens

1. Facts of the Case:Police obtained a search warrant for Richards hotel room to search for drugs. The attempted to

obtain a no-knock warrant but the magistrate deleted these portions of the warrant. The police

approached Richards hotel room, with at least one officer in uniform, and others disguised.

Richards answered the door, recognized the police, and then shut the door again. Police then

forced entry. The trial court denied Richards motion to suppress the evidence and the

Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, also concluding that police officers are never required to

knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug

investigation.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Is the Wisconsin Supreme Courts blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule

legal under the 4th Amendment?

Were Richards 4

th

Amendment rights violated by the polices search and seizure in hishotel room?

3. Holding:Wisconsins blanket exception the knock-and-announce rule is reversed. Richards 4th

Amendment rights were not violated by the officers no-knock entry because they had

reasonable suspicion he was destroying evidence.


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4. Rationale: Wilson v. Arkansas Reasons the State gave for their blanket exception: violence involved in drug

investigations and the easy potential for disposal

Not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree In these situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and

maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a

no-knock entry. Wisconsins blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from

judicial review

The reasons for creating an exception in one category (felony drug investigations) can,relatively easily, be applied to others

If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation thatincluded a considerable albeit hypothetical risk of danger to officers or destruction

of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendments

reasonableness requirement would be meaningless

In each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determinewhether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the

knock-and-announce requirement

The fact that the magistrate did not issue a no-knock warrant does not alter thereasonableness of the officers decision, which must be evaluated at the time the

entered the hotel room

United States v. Watson (1976)

Justice White

1. Facts of the Case:An informant told a federal postal inspector that Watson was supplying stolen credit cards and

would be supplying more at their next meeting. At this meeting, the informant signaled the

inspector that Watson had the cards and the officer arrested Watson without a warrant. The

court of appeals held the arrest unconstitutional because the inspector failed to secure an arrest

warrant although he had time to do so.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Is an arrest without a prior arrest warrant in violation of the 4

th

Amendment?

3. Holding:An arrest warrant is not required to make an arrest in a felony charge. There is no 4th

Amendment violation. The court of appeals is reversed.

4. Rationale:


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whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason

given

The Court has never held (outside the context of inventory searches or administrativeinspection) that an officers motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the

4th Amendment; but has repeatedly held the contrary

United States v. Robinsonestablished that the fact that the officer does not have thestate of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification

for the officers action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances,

viewed objectively, justify that action

The making of a traffic stop out-of-uniform does not remotely qualify as an extremepractice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has

been broken outbalances private interest in avoiding police contact

There is no principle to allow the Court to decide at what point a code of law becomesso expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the

ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)

Justice Souter

1. Facts of the Case:Atwater was pulled over for violation of a Texas law requiring front seat passengers to be

buckled up in a car. The police officer decided to arrest Atwater for the violation that carried

the penalty of a fine between $25 and $50. Atwater filed suit in a Texas state court under

Section 1983 against the officer, the police chief, and the city. The city removed to federal

district court which granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals

affirmed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the 4th Amendment forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such

as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine?

3. Holding:If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor

criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 4 th Amendment, arrest the

offender. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

4. Rationale: Atwater claims that common law supports her argument, the Court decided it did not Atwater argues for a modern arrest rule, one not necessarily requiring violent breach of

the peace, but nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when


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conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no

compelling need for immediate detention

If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case,Atwater might well prevail

The Court has traditionally recognized that a responsible 4th Amendment valance is notwell served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of

government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an

occasion for constitutional review

Atwaters general rule and limiting proviso promise very little in the way ofadministrability

The costs to society of the under-enforcement that would result from Atwaters rulecould easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked

Tennessee v. Garner (1985)

Justice White

1. Facts of the Case:Memphis police were informed of a nighttime burglary in progress by a neighbor. When the

police arrived, Officer Hymon went around behind the house and saw the suspect, Garner,

trying to escape. Hymon noted that Garner was young and small and did not believe he was

armed. Hymon ordered Garner to halt and when Garner did not do so, Hymon shot him in the

back of the head, from which Garner died. Hymon was legally allowed to do this under a TN

statute which provided if, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either fleeor

forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest. Garners father

filed suit under Section 1983for asserted violations of his sons constitutional rights. The District

Court found the TN statute and Hymons actions constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Is a seizure by the means of deadly force constitutionally allowable under the 4 th

Amendment in all felony cases?

3. Holding:The use of deadly force is not automatically constitutional in all felony cases. It is not

constitutional in the situation of an unarmed, un-dangerous suspect such as the current

situation. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

4. Rationale: The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the

circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable


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A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting himdead. The TN statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force

against such fleeing suspects

The state is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the officer has probablecause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the

officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using

deadly force

Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance on thecommon-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes

of a historical inquiry

In light of the rules adopted by those who must actually administer them, the older andfading common law view is a dubious indicium of the constitutionality of the TN statute

now before the Court

Officer Hymon could not reasonably have believed that Garner young, slight, andunarmed posed any thread. Hymon never even attempted to justify his actions on any

other basis than the need to prevent an escape

Agrees with the dissenters that burglary is a serious crime, but cannot agree that it is sodangerous as automatically to justify the use of deadly force

Payton v. New York (1980)

Justice Stevens

1. Facts of the Case:Police arrived at Paytons apartment with the intent to arrest him. There was no response to

their knock although music was playing inside, so they forcibly broke into the apartment.

Payton was not there, but police did find a weapon that was used as evidence against him. 4

years later, police went to the home of Riddick to arrest him. His young son answered the door

and police entered before Riddick was given a chance to consent to entry. In their search of

Riddicks immediate area, they found drugs on which he was charged. The New York Court of

Appeals, in a single opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Riddick and Payton.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the execution of an arrest without a warrant inside a persons home violate the 4th

Amendment?

3. Holding:Home invasions for arrest should be treated as home invasions for search, requiring a warrant.

Since no arrest warrant was obtained in these cases, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are

reversed.

4. Rationale:


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The Court of Appeals treated both cases as involving routine arrests in which there wasample time to obtain a warrant, and this Court will do the same.

Thus, there is no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation(exigent circumstances) that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the

purpose or arrest or search

Judge Leventhal of the Court of Appeals for D.C. reasoned that the constitutionalprotection afforded to the individuals interest in the privacy of his own home is equally

applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of the house

The Court found this reasoning persuasive and in accord with prior 4th Amendmentdecisions

Any differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merelyones of degree rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental

characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individuals home

The Court rejected the States argument that only a search warrant based on probablecause to believe the suspect is at home at a given time can adequately protect the

privacy interests at stake and since such a warrant requirement is manifestly

impractical, there need be no warrant of any kind

Chimel v. California (1969)

Justice Stewart

1. Facts of the Case:Police went to the home of Chimel to arrest him for burglary of a coin shop. When they arrived

at the home the wife let them in and they waited a few minutes for Chimel to return home.

Upon his arrival, the arrested him, for which they had a warrant, and then searched the entire

home, for which they did not have a warrant. They found coins and medals that were used to

convict Chimel. The appellate court affirmed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Can a warrantless search of the petitioners entire house be constitutionally justified as

incident to that arrest?

Does a full search of the house of a person being arrested without a search warrantviolate the 4th Amendment rights of the arrestee?

3. Holding:If the search of an arrestee extends beyond his person and the area within his immediatecontrol, a search warrant is required under the 4

th Amendment. The appellate court is

reversed. Rabinowitz and Harris are reversed.

4. Rationale:


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United States v. Rabinowitzwarrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest maygenerally extend to the area that is considered to be in the possession or under the

control of the person arrested.

That doctrine as applied to this case is not rational and possibly not rational even limitedto its own facts

There is ample justification for a search of the arrestees person and the area within hisimmediate control construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he

might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence

Searching that include rooms other than that of the arrest or closed or concealed areas,in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be done only under the authority of a

search warrant

Arizona v. Gant (2009)

Justice Stevens

1. Facts of the Case:Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a

police car. Police then searched his car and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the

backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the

time of search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to

the 4th Amendment warrant requirement as defined in Chimeland applied to vehicles in Belton

did not justify the search in this case.

2. Legal Questions Presented: What are the limitations on the search-incident-to-arrest exception under the Belton

decision and the 4th Amendment?

3. Holding:Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only if the arrestee is within

reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to

believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Otherwise, search of the vehicle

will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show another exception to the warrant

requirement. The State Supreme Court is affirmed.

4.

Rationale: New York v. Beltonheld that when an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of an

automobile, he may, as an incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of

the automobile and any containers therein.

This holding was based in large part on our assumption that articles inside therelatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of the automobile are in fact

generally, even if not inevitably, within the area into which an arrestee might reach


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We hold now that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident toa recent occupants arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching

distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search

We also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a searchincident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the

crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle

Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-relatedevidence authorized the search in this case, thus the search is unreasonable

The privacy interest one has in his vehicle is still important and deserving ofconstitutional protection

California v. Acevedo (1991)

Justice Blackmun

1. Facts of the Case:Daza picked up a package the police knew contained marijuana and took it to his apartment.

Acevedo entered that apartment shortly after and left carrying a brown paper bag the size of

one of the wrapped marijuana packages which he placed in the trunk of his car. Police stopped

his car, opened the trunk and bag and found marijuana. The California Court of Appeals held

the marijuana should have been suppressed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in

a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car?

3. Holding:The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable

cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained. The Fourth Amendment does not compel

separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle.

4. Rationale: U.S. v. Ross Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll

doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside the car when

such a search was supported by probable cause

U.S. v. Chadwick a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effectsthan he does in his automobile

Arkansas v. Sanders extended Chadwicks rule to apply to a suitcase actually beingtransported in the trunk of a car

Thus, in Ross the Court took the step of saying closed containers in cars could besearched without a warrant because of their presence within the automobile. Despite


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the protection Sanders purported to extend to closed containers, the privacy interest in

those containers yielded to the broad scope of an automobile search

The privacy protection under Chadwick-Sanders is minimal The Chadwick-Sanders rule has also confused courts and police officers and impeded

effective law enforcement

It is better for the Court to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches andeliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders

Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)

Justice Scalia

1. Facts of the Case:An officer pulled over a car for traffic violations. Respondent was one of two passengers in the

front of the car. The officer noticed the driver had a syringe in his pocket and when he asked

the driver why he had a syringe the driver told him it was for drugs. Backup officers then asked

for identification from the two passengers and respondent falsely identified herself and claimed

she had no ID. The first officer began a search of the car in light of the drivers admission. In the

backseat he found a purse which respondent claimed as hers. Upon search of the purse an ID

with respondents real name and methamphetamine was found. The trial court denied

suppression but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding the search of the

purse violated the 4th and 14thAmendments because the officer knew or should have known

that the purse did not belong to the driver, but to one of the passengers and because there

was no probable cause to search the passengers personal effects.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Can police search containers belonging to passengers in an automobile without a

warrant when they have probable cause to believe the driver has committed a crime?

3. Holding:Police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers belongings found in

the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.

4. Rationale: Using balancing test privacy interests vs. legitimate governmental interests; weighs

decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passengers belongings If the rule of law that Ross announced were limited to contents belonging to the driver,

or contents other than those belonging to passengers, one would have expected that

substantial limitation to be expressed (in that decision)

When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable forpolice officers like customs officials in the Founding era 0 to examine packages and

containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one


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A passengers property rule would dramatically reduce the ability to find and seizecontraband and evidence of crime

If we were to invent an exception, why should it protect only property belonging to apassenger rather than (the more logical choice) property belonging to anyone other

than the driver

Terry v. Ohio (1968)

Chief Justice Warren

1. Facts of the Case:A plainclothes officer observed suspicious behavior between three men indicating they may be

planning a burglary and could be armed. The officer approached the men and asked their

names but they just mumbled a response. The officer patted down Terry and found a pistol and

also found a pistol the same way with another of the men. A frisk of the third man did not

indicate he was armed and therefore he was not searched further. Terrys motion to suppress

the evidence was dismissed, the state court of appeals affirmed and the state supreme court

dismissed the appeal.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited

search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest?

Does violation of 4thAmendment rights through a stop and frisk make theexclusionary rule applicable?

3. Holding:An officer can conduct a limited search of the outer clothing of persons he reasonably believes

to be armed and dangerous in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault

him. Such a search is reasonable under the 4th Amendment and any weapons seized may be

introduced as evidence.

4. Rationale: A rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against

practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in

human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime

Dual inquiry in determining whether the seizure and search were unreasonable: (1)whether the officers action was justified at its inception and (2) whether it was

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the

first place

Balancing test


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More is involved than the governmental interest in investigating crime, there is themore immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the

person with whom he is dealing is not armed

Petitioner argues it is unreasonable for an officer to search for weapons until thesituation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest

Two weaknesses of this argument: (1) recognizes no distinction between a searchincident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons and (2) assumes that the law of

arrest has already worked out the balance between the particular interests involved

here, the neutralization of danger to the policeman in investigative circumstance and

the sanctity of the individual

There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weaponsfor the protection of the police officer where he has reason to believe that he is dealing

with an armed and dangerous individual regardless of whether he has probable cause to

arrest the individual for a crime

In this situation, it was reasonable for the officer to believe the men were armed anddangerous; he confined his search strictly to what was necessary to learn whether the

men were armed and to disarm them

Florida v. J.L. (2000)

Justice Ginsburg

1. Facts of the Case:Someone called in an anonymous tip that a black male at a certain location wearing a plaid shirt

was carrying a gun. Police were sent to this location and on arriving conducted a frisk of three

black males at that locale, only one of which was wearing a plaid shirt. J.L., wearing the plaid

shirt, was found with a gun, and the other two males were found with nothing. The trial court

suppressed the evidence. The intermediate appellate court reversed and the Supreme Court of

Florida held the search invalid under the 4 th Amendment.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Is an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, sufficient to justify a

police officers stop and frisk of that person?

Does the tip pointing to J.L. meet the indicia of reliability?

3.

Holding:An anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated inAdams and White

does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a

firearm

4. Rationale:


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The tip in this case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White (which wasconsidered a close case) and essential to the Courts decision in that case

The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knewbefore they conducted their search

An automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would go too far The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under

which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search

even without a showing of reliability

The requirement that an anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order tojustify a stop in no way diminishes a police officers prerogative to conduct a protective

search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)

Chief Justice Rehnquist

1. Facts of the Case:Officers were patrolling in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. When Wardlow saw

the officers, he fled. The officers caught up to him and one patted him down and in this process

found a handgun on which he was arrested.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Wardlow based on the facts

of the case?

3. Holding:The officer was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity and

therefore in investigation further. The officers stop did not violate the 4th Amendment.

4. Rationale: While the location in a high crime area alone is not enough for reasonable suspicion,

officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in

determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further

investigation

Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion This decision is consistent with Florida v. Royerin which the Court held when an officerapproaches and individual the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about

his business; unprovoked flight is different than mere refusal to cooperate

The fact that flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity does notestablish a violation of the 4th Amendment.

Florida v. Royer (1983)


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Justice White

1. Facts of the Case:Royer purchased a one-way airline ticket to New York City under an assumed name.

Detectives had observed him and believed he fit the drug courier profile. Upon request, but

without oral consent, Royer produced his ticket and identification. He explained thediscrepancy in names by saying a friend had purchased the ticket under the assumed name.

Without returning his ticket or ID, he was asked to accompany them to a small room. Without

Royers consent one of the detectives retrieved his luggage. Whilehe did not respond to the

request that he consent to a search of the luggage, he did present the key and marijuana was

found. The trial court did not suppress the evidence and he was convicted. The Florida District

Court of Appeal reversed, holding that respondent had been involuntarily confined without

probable cause and at the time his consent to search was obtained the involuntary detention

had exceeded the limited restraint ofTerryand such consent was therefore invalid.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Was Royer being illegally detained? Should the evidence obtained from consent to search during the illegal detention be

suppressed?

3. Holding:Because we affirm the Florida District Court of Appeals conclusion that Royer was being illegally

detained when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was

tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search.

4. Rationale: An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop. The investigative methods employed should be the

least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officers suspicion in a

short period of time

Statements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even thoughvoluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an

independent act of free will

If the events in this case amounted to no more than a permissible police encounter in apublic place or a justifiable Terry- type detention, Royers consent, if voluntary, would

have been effective to legalize the search

Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the 4 th Amendment Police had adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily

detaining him. Had Royer voluntarily consented to the search of his luggage while he

was justifiably being detained on reasonable suspicion, the product of the search would

be admissible. However, at the time Royer produced the key to his suitcase, the


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detention to which he was then subjected was a more serious intrusion on his personal

liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity

Had Royer consented to a search on the spot, the search could have been conductedwith Royer present in the area where the bags were retrieved by Detective Johnson and

any evidence recovered would have been admissible against him

The Florida District Court of Appeal cannot be faulted in concluding that the limits of aTerry-stop had been exceeded

United States v. Drayton (2002)

Justice Kennedy

1. Facts of the Case:Drayton and Brown were travelling on bus together. During a stop, 3 police officers

entered the bus as part of a drug interdiction. One officer stationed himself at the front of the

bus, one at the back, and the other walked up the aisle, speaking to passengers. When they

came to Brown and Drayton, they asked to search their bag. The men consented and no

contraband was found. Noticing the baggy clothes the men were wearing, the officer asked to

pat them down. Brown consented and the officer found drug packets on which he was arrested.

Drayton then proceeded to consent and was also arrested based on a finding of drug packets.

The trial court did not suppress the cocaine, but the respondents prevailed on appeal.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Were the passengers of a bus seized in terms of the 4th Amendment when police

entered the bus for the drug interdiction?

3. Holding:Applying the Bostickframework to the facts of this particular case, we conclude that the police

did not seize respondents when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers.

4. Rationale: Florida v. Bostick Florida Supreme Court had adopted a per se rule that due to the

cramped confines onboard a bus the act of questioning would deprive a person of his or

her freedom of movement and so constitute a seizure under the 4th Amendment

The Court reversed, saying the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person wouldfeel free to decline the officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter

Now, the 11th Circuit has adopted what in effect is a per se rule that evidence obtainedduring suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses must be suppressed unless

the officers have advised passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse

consent to a search

The Court of Appeals erred in adopted this approach


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The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does not on its own transform standardpolice questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure

Officer Hoovers position at the exit does not tip the scale in respondents favor The arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by

police. If anything, Browns arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the

consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers questions

Brendlin v. California (2007)

Justice Souter

1. Facts of the Case:Following a traffic stop conceded to be illegal for lack of reasonable suspicion, passenger

Brendlin was found to have an outstanding arrest warrant. He was arrested and drugs were

found on his person and in the car on a search incident to arrest. Brendlin claimed the evidence

should be excluded because the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure. The California

Supreme Court rejected this, claiming as a passenger, Brendlin had not been seized by the

vehicle being stopped.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the stop of a vehicle constitute a seizure of the passenger of that vehicle?

3. Holding:In the circumstances any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be

exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police

permission. Therefore, the passenger was also seized by the stop of the vehicle and the seizure

was illegal. The California Supreme Court is reversed.

4. Rationale: United States v. Mendenhalla seizure occurs if in view of all the circumstances

surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free

to leave

A traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger has chosen just as much as ithalts the driver

It is reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime,arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize hissafety

To the extent that there is anything ambiguous in the show of force the test resolves theambiguity, and here leads to the intuitive conclusion that all the occupants were subject

to like control by the successful display of authority


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Brendlin had no effective way to signal submission while the car was still moving on theroadway, but once it came to a stop he could, and apparently did, submit by staying

inside

Holding that the passenger in a private car is not (without more) seized in a traffic stopwould invite police officers to stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause or

reasonable suspicion of anything illegal

United States v. Place (1983)

Justice OConnor

1. Facts of the Case:Place was stopped in two different airports and questioned by police because they believed him

to be transporting narcotics. In the second airport Place was questioned at, police asked to

search his luggage and he refused. The police then seized the luggage and transported it to

another location where they had drug dogs sniff the luggage. 90 minutes later the police got a

search warrant for the luggage and found large amounts of cocaine on which Place was charged.

He attempted to have the luggage contents suppressed and the District Court denied. The Court

of Appeals reversed.

2. Legal Questions Presented: Should Terrybe applied to cases involving detention of luggage based on the polices

reasonable suspicion that it contains narcotics?

If so, did the police act reasonably in this case or were the 4th Amendment rights ofPlace violated?

3. Holding:When an officers observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage

that contains narcotics, the principle ofTerryand its progeny would permit the officer to detain

the luggage briefly to investigation the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that

investigative detention is properly limited in scope. The detention of respondents luggage in

this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage

reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. Court of Appeals is affirmed.

4. Rationale: Where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a reasonable

belief that a travelers luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing

the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial

When the police seizure luggage from the suspects custody the limitations applicable toinvestigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an

investigative detention of the persons luggage on less than probable cause


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Under this standard, it is clear the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limitsof a Terry-type investigative stop

Although the 90 minute detention of respondents luggage is sufficient to render theseizure unreasonable, the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to

inform him of the place they were taking the luggage, the length of time they would

possess it, and of arrangements for the return of the luggage if nothing was found.

Documents

Crim Pro 4th Amend Briefs