Laurel vs. Desierto [G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002]

Post under case digests, Political Law at  Posted by Schizophrenic MindFacts: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee which was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the said Committee and renamed it as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. 

Vice President Laurel by virtue of his chairmanship also became the chairman of EXPOCORP, a corporation organized to undertake the Freedom Ring Project in relation to the centennial celebration. Later in 1999, investigation was conducted by an independent committed due to allegations of graft and corruption against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP chair. The committee recommended the filing of charges by the Ombudsman upon which the Office of the Ombudsman took cognizance of the case. Laurel then questioned the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by filing this petition, saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a private corporation, (2) that NCC is not a public office and (3) that he is not a public officer as defined in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 

Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Vice President Laurel are correct. 

Held: No. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. However, is NCC a public office? Yes, it is because itexercises executive functions by implementing the policies set forth in the Constitution regarding history and cultural heritage, thus satisfying an important element of public office: the delegation of sovereign functions. It also follows that Laurel is a public officer. That he did not receive compensation is of no consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. 

Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not one receives compensation, thus: Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive

aravata vs. Sandigan

 

Duman \ I-E \ CRIM

compensation, regardless of amount.

MANIPON VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a return within thirty (30) days from said date. 3 The labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract. 4Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. 5 The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.

On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.

However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." 6 Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder. 7

Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. 8 Then Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for P2,500.00. 9 As soon as Dominguez received the money from the teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P 700.00 in marked bills and handed the total amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was subjected to an ultraviolet light test and found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. 10 He filed his sheriff's return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. 11

Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having demanded and received P l,000.00 from Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him to the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to Comtrust which was his official duty. However, in an amended information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code. 12

Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. 13

In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense theory that there was novation of the money judgment and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. 14 The promise of a public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be express or implied. 15

It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.

It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on December 28, 1979 was not a bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek had agreed.

Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27, 1979, Dominguez requested Manipon to convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay for the time being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be paid after the New Year. 16 So he visited Longog Tabek who was the "lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to the lesser amount because he needed money badly. 17 His arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal. At that time he found no reason to have some written memorandum for his own protection.

At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a temporary receipt but Dominguez brushed it aside and said he was in ahurry. 18

Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented. 19

The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.

It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place.

The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.

The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and is therefore biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness. While he claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other creditors, he could not present any authority that would allow him to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in their behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names. 21

Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.

Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation. 23 That affidavit contained two annexes but the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December 28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only several weeks after he had made the affidavit. 24 This leads us to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary receipt at all at the time of payment on December 28 and that it was concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what had transpired was not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a judgment debt.

In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution witnesses have acquitted themselves welt The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible.

The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. 25

In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on December 28,1979, NISA Sub-Station Commander Colonel Luisito Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some operatives from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning the planned entrapment. He had earlier received word from Dominguez that the lifting of the garnishment would be effected that afternoon and he informed them that Manipon was asking money from Dominguez. 26As Colonel Sanchez earlier testified, part of the money to be withdrawn after lifting the garnishment was to be given to the accused 27 for agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which lasted from ten to fifteen minutes, they an headed for the Comtrust bank.

NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the bank so that he could observe what transpired inside the bank. 28 He testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked money to Manipon which the latter accepted and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the money from Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the agents positioned nearby by placing his right hand on his head to indicate that the money had changed hands. Immediately thereafter, Dominguez left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed suit. As Manipon walked past Murla on his way out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand on his left breast to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast pocket. 29

Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC operatives approached Manipon and his two companions. After Identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P l,000.00 from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained amazingly silent and voiced no protest. 30

The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would therefore fall within the first exception. The search was made as an incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our pronouncement in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon 76 Phil. 637, to wit:

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or

escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.

The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying evidence within his reach. 31

Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need not be discuss here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner-accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 30, 1981 is affirmed.

Manipon vs. Sandiganbayan•Case where the deputy sheriff said that hecan remedy the withdrawal of the garnishedamount so that they can have something forNew Year.•Direct bribery: The crime of direct bribery asdef ined in  210 in  RPC consists of   the f f  elements:1)that the accused is a public officer2)that he received d i rect ly  or through anothersome gift or present, offer or promise3)that such g i ft , present or promise has been given ion consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constitutiong acrime, or to refrain from doing somethingwhich it is his official duty to do and4)that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as public officer•The promise of a public officer to perform anact or to refrain from doing it may be expressor implied.

Dacumas vs. Sandiganbayan•The settlement of tax liability which reducedthe tax of the Revilla Interiors.•Pulling out assessment papers and the likewas not  part  of  h is of f ic ia l  dut ies ,   thuselements for direct bribery were not all met.•Besides the promised act was not impossibleto carry out given his 29 years in service, hesurely knows his way around. (expandedmeaning of official duties)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 46 November 10, 1972MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO

RECEIVE, AND FOR PRIVATE PERSONS TO GIVE, GIFTS ON ANY OCCASION, INCLUDING CHRISTMAS

WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service rules, it is prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any gift, present or any other form of benefit in the course of official duties;

WHEREAS, it is believed necessary to put more teeth to existing laws and regulations to wipe out all conceivable forms of graft and corruption in the public service, the members of which should not only be honest but above suspicion and reproach; and

WHEREAS, the stoppage of the practice of gift-giving to government men is a concrete step in the administration's program of reforms for the development of new moral values in the social structure of the country, one of the main objectives of the New Society;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable for any public official or employee, whether of the national or local governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other valuable thing to any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of the official or employees or his immediate relatives.

For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and perpetual disqualification from public office shall be imposed. The official or employee concerned shall likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action and, if found guilty, shall be meted out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness of the offense.

Any provision of law, executive order, rule or regulation or circular inconsistent with this Decree is hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

This Decree shall take effect immediately after its publication.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

PD 749: GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT CASES AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

WHEREAS, public office is a public trust: public officers are but servants of the people, whom they must serve with utmost fidelity and integrity;WHEREAS, it has heretofore been virtually impossible to secure the conviction and removal of dishonest public servants owing to the lack of witnesses: the bribe or gift-givers being always reluctant to testify against the corrupt public officials and employees concerned for fear of being indicted and convicted themselves of bribery and corruption;

WHEREAS, it is better by far and more socially desirable, as well as just, that the bribe or gift giver be granted immunity from prosecution so that he may freely testify as to the official corruption, than that the official who receives the bribe or gift should be allowed to go free, insolently remaining in public office, and continuing with his nefarious and corrupt practices, to the great detriment of the public service and the public interest.NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the Revised Penal Code; Republic Act Numbered Three Thousand Nineteen, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies against any public official or employee for such violation shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the public official or his accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; and Provided, finally, that the following conditions concur:1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer;3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false and malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing,molesting or in any way prejudicing the public officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer so denounced shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal, against said informant or witness. Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a prosecuting fiscal, judge or committee, and all proceedings undertaken in connection therewith, shall be strictly confidential or private in order to protect the reputation of the official under investigation in the event that the report proves to be unfounded or no prima facie case is established. Section 4. All acts, decrees and rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER

OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.

Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled corporation or enterprise.

(b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which the respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof) already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include:

1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.

2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.

3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.

Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or within three months before any special election.

The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or employment in the Government or in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however, That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except as to those who have ceased to hold office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall prescribe after four years from the approval hereof.

Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following information:

(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has previously held.

(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.

Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within which to present his answer.

Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.

Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State: Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.

Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of Court for appeals in civil cases.

Section 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-

incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings.

Section 9. Immunity. The Solicitor General may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies to the unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired any of the property in question in cases where such testimony is necessary to prove violations of this Act.

Section 10. Effect of record of title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or office of the Register of Deeds in the name of the respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the judgment referred to in section six of this Act.

Section 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect of any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or convey any unlawfully acquired property shall be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine. The same repression shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.

Section 13. Separability of provisions. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 14. Effective date. This Act shall take effect on its approval, and shall apply not only to property thereafter unlawfully acquired but also to property unlawfully acquired before the effective date of this Act.

Approved: June 18, 1955

ALMEDA VS PEREZ

In October, 1961, Epifanio T. Villegas and Jesus A. Mendoza, filed a complaint with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. with having acquired, during his incumbency as government employee, cash and properties from unknown sources in the total amount of P121,407.98 which acquisitions, according to the complaint, were manifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful income of said Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., and, therefore, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law. Pursuant to the provisions of said Act, a preliminary investigation was conducted by a committee of investigators designated by the Secretary of Justice. In a resolution of said investigators, dated November 4, 1960, it was certified that there is reasonable ground to believe that from 1950 to 1959, Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as Assistant

Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and to his other lawful income.

On the basis of the findings of the investigators, the Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines as petitioner, filed on November 12, 1960, with, Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for forfeiture against Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 44693. It charges him with having committed while engaged in the performance of his official and, in consequence of said graft, had acquired properties and made cash disbursements from 1950 to 1959 grossly disproportionate to his lawful income. His wife was included as a co-respondent in her capacity as wife of Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. and as co-owner of their conjugal properties.

Petitioners herein filed their answer on December 1960 and thereafter the case was set for hearing, but February 15, 1961, the Solicitor General filed a "Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture". The judge granted the motion but rejected the inclusion of Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as party respondent. On March 25, 196 the Solicitor General filed the amended petition for forfeiture, adding other counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and disbursements thus increasing the alleged cash from unexplained sources received by the respondent from the years 1950-59 to P208,682.45, as against respondent's salary and other lawful income of only P59,860.97. Respondents, petitioners herein, objected to the amendment on the ground that the new counts or charges already been investigated and dismissed after investigation, and respondents had not been given a new preliminary investigation with respect to the new counts or charges that the proceeding under Republic Act No. 1379 being criminal in nature, the petition may not be amended as substance without respondents' consent. It is also claim that the amendments were presented only to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of the respondents, and that the new counts or charges could not be included because one year had already elapsed after a general election in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379. After the filing of memoranda by the parties the respondent judge issued the order sought to be reviewed, authorizing the presentation of the second amended petition but without including therein Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as a party respondent. The court ruled as follows:

The Court finds no merit to the contention that the amended petition seeks to include new counts which were previously dismissed by the investigating Fiscals because no such dismissal appears in the resolution of said investigating fiscal and moreover, the only function of the investigating fiscals in the preliminary investigation was to determine whether or not there is probable cause that respondents have acquired properties beyond their means. The items of receipts and disbursements or acquisitions referred to as new counts by the respondents are but allegations in detail respecting the main allegation that respondents unlawfully acquired the properties described in the amended petition. The new allegations of receipts and disbursements embodied in the amended petition objected to by the respondents merely supplement or amplify the facts of unlawful acquisition originally alleged in the original petition. These amendments hence relate back to the date of the filing of the original petition so that the prohibition contained in Rep. Act 1379 that no petition shall be filed within one year before a general election cannot apply with respect to the new

items of receipts and disbursements. The Court finds no merit in the respondents' contention that the amended petition should not be admitted on the allegation that this proceeding is penal in nature and no amendment as to matters of substance can be admitted after the respondents have filed their answer because this is a civil case and the rules respecting amendments in civil cases and not of informations in criminal cases should govern the admission of amendments in this case. The mere fact that a preliminary investigation is required to be held in a proceeding of this nature does not make the same a criminal proceeding. Hence, the rule that amendments of pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice should be applied.

With reference to the objection that no preliminary investigation was conducted insofar as the new respondent Mariano P. Almeda is concerned, the Court finds said objection to be well-founded because no preliminary investigation was in fact conducted insofar as said new respondent is concerned in violation of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act 1379.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the petitioner to file, within ten days, a second amended petition without including therein, Mariano F. Almeda as party respondent or make reference therein with respect to said person.

SO ORDERED.

The principal contention of the petitioners herein, respondents in the court below, is that Republic Act No. 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence the presentation of the amended petition without the benefit of a previous preliminary investigation under the Act cannot be allowed; that the amendment would have the effect of presenting charge (under Republic Act No. 1379) within one year from the date of a general election; and lastly that amendment may not be made on a matter of substance after the defendants had pleaded.

A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379 readily discloses that the proceeding for forfeiture is in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the petitioners. A test has been suggested to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or criminal, thus:

. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they are in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provision where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for recovered in a civil action. (37 CJS, Forfeitures, Sec. 5, pp. 15-16).

In the first place a proceedings under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does, not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the

procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is require prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Had it been a criminal proceeding there would been, after a preliminary investigation, a reading of information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, and a trial thereafter, with the publication of the judgement in the presence of the defendant. But these proceedings as above set forth, are not provided for in the law.1äwphï1.ñët

Section 12 of the law provides a penalty to the public officer, but said penalty is against the employee or officer for the transfer or conveyance of any unlawfully acquired properties. The law therefore penalizes an officer for transferring or conveying properties unlawfully acquired but does not do so for making the unlawful acquisition; it merely imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired.

As the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as provided for in the law, is not a penal proceeding but a civil one for the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired, and as the procedure outlined in the law is that which is followed in civil actions, amendment of the charges or the petition for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions; i.e., the amendments may be made before trial or in the course of trial without need of another investigation. It also follows that amendments setting forth newly discovered acquisitions may be in the petition without obtaining the consent of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs. So ordered.

.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents. 

CONCEPCION, J.: Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in theadministrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.

The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD: Yes.Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term

(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches.

(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph.

(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.

(d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.

The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency.

It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest.

Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a

Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.

Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.

Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of such thing.

(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.

The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance.

Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.

Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of

the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act.

Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration.

Approved: August 17, 1960

Republic Act No. 6713             February 20, 1989

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,

GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING

PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and all other instrumentalities, agencies or branches of the Republic of the Philippines including government-owned or controlled corporations, and their subsidiaries.lawphi1.net

(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.

(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act or liberality, in favor of another who accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee.

(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of his family or relative as defined in this Act, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither nominal nor insignificant, or the gift is given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.

(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees, financing arrangements or accommodations intended to ensure its approval.

(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns, directly or indirectly, shares of stock sufficient to elect a director of a corporation. This term shall also apply to the parties to a voting trust.

(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age.

(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise.

(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official duty.

(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in property by voluntarily, completely and actually depriving or dispossessing oneself of his right or title to it in favor of a person or persons other than his spouse and relatives as defined in this Act.

(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso and balae.

Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the

supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.

Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:lawphi1.net

(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.

(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other responsible officers of offices and agencies of the government and of government-owned or controlled corporations shall, within forty-five (45) working days from the end of the year, render a performance report of the agency or office or corporation concerned. Such report shall be open and available to the public within regular office hours.

(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official papers and documents must be processed and completed within a reasonable time from the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as practicable, not more than three (3) signatories therein. In the absence of duly authorized signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall sign for and in their behalf.

(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All public officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.

(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours.

Section 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. - A system of annual incentives and rewards is hereby established in order to motivate and inspire public servants to uphold the highest standards of ethics. For this purpose, a Committee on Awards to Outstanding Public Officials and Employees is hereby created composed

of the following: the Ombudsman and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-Chairmen, and the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and two government employees to be appointed by the President, as members.

It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a periodic, continuing review of the performance of public officials and employees, in all the branches and agencies of Government and establish a system of annual incentives and rewards to the end that due recognition is given to public officials and employees of outstanding merit on the basis of the standards set forth in this Act.

The conferment of awards shall take into account, among other things, the following: the years of service and the quality and consistency of performance, the obscurity of the position, the level of salary, the unique and exemplary quality of a certain achievement, and the risks or temptations inherent in the work. Incentives and rewards to government officials and employees of the year to be announced in public ceremonies honoring them may take the form of bonuses, citations, directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations, local and foreign scholarship grants, paid vacations and the like. They shall likewise be automatically promoted to the next higher position with the commensurate salary suitable to their qualifications. In case there is no next higher position or it is not vacant, said position shall be included in the budget of the office in the next General Appropriations Act. The Committee on Awards shall adopt its own rules to govern the conduct of its activities.

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or

(2) To prejudice the public interest.

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;

(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or

(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs.

The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to national security requirements.

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;

(b) personal property and acquisition cost;

(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;

(d) liabilities, and;

(e) all business interests and financial connections.

The documents must be filed:

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.

All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.

Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:

(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;

(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.

(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;

(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and

(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency

prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.

(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law.

(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.

(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:

(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or

(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.

Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption.

The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership.

The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity nor to laborers and casual or temporary workers.

Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said statements which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.

(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have the power within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House concerned.

The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act.

(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.

Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with public officials or employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.

(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000). If another sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.

Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of this Act. - The Civil Service Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this Act. It shall transmit all cases for prosecution arising from violations of this Act to the proper authorities for appropriate action: Provided, however, That it may institute such administrative actions and disciplinary measures as may be warranted in accordance with law. Nothing in this provision shall be construed as a deprivation of the right of each House of Congress to discipline its Members for disorderly behavior.

The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, including guidelines for individuals who render free voluntary service to the Government. The Ombudsman shall likewise take steps to protect citizens who denounce acts or omissions of public officials and employees which are in violation of this Act.

Section 13. Provisions for More Stringent Standards. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to derogate from any law, or any regulation prescribed by any body or

agency, which provides for more stringent standards for its official and employees.

Section 14. Appropriations. - The sum necessary for the effective implementation of this Act shall be taken from the appropriations of the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, such sum as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 15. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent herewith, are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same provide for a heavier penalty.

Section 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after thirty (30) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved, February 20, 1989.

laintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)

Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive Secretary) et al.

Facts:

The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)

Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of

office “and within the month of January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon

termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to

which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,

including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of

his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the

next preceding calendar year”.

Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within

the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of

assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of

police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy

implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together

with the prohibition against self-incrimination.

Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:

Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation

Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general

welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of

police power.

CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the

police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause

 

Issue/s:

Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive

exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of

the right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure

construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to

the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

 

Ruling: Decision reversed.

Ratio:

1.Presumption of validity

Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for

employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon

assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of

validity.

“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for

the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where

the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible scope of

regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)

1.Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause

“inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things

hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)

The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits

of its domain  (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)

Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to

regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the

protection of due process.

It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect

the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore

he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an

infringement of his liberty.

Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due

process is observed.

The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action

must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.

“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and

compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the

call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement

as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement

of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming

office…There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.”

1.Right to privacy

Right to be let alone

“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for

disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to

privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement

possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent

to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue

of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize

that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and

liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of personal and family

expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar

year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a

private sphere.”

1.Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not

give freedom from testimonial compulsion.

1.Right against self-incrimination

We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s

conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.

1.Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken,

mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

G.R. No. L-56170 January 31, 1984

HILARIO JARAVATA petitioner, vs.THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Franco L. Loyola and Sabas Cacananta for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

 

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 873.

Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, said to have been committed in the following manner:

That on or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25, 1979, in the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High School and with the use of his influence as such public official and taking advantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with deliberate intent did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received payments from other classroom teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELA BAUTISTA, and FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely: P118.00, P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary differentials, in consideration of accused having officially intervened in the release of the salary differentials of the six classroom teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency. (Decision, p.1-2.)

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ONE (1) YEAR, is minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, as maximum, to further suffer perpetual special disqualification from public office and to pay the costs.

No pronouncement as to the civil liability it appearing that the money given to the accused was already refunded by him. (Id. pp, 16-17.)

The petition raises factual and legal issues but for obvious reasons Our decision shall deal with the legal issue only.

The Sandiganbayan states in its decision the following:

A perusal of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense shows that there is no dispute that [complainants] Ramos, Lloren, Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista are classroom teachers of the Leones Barangay High School with accused as their assistant principal and [Conrado Baltazar as the administrator; that on January 5, 1979, accused informed the classroom teachers of the approval of the release of their salary differentials for 1978 and to facilitate its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses; that accused incurred expenses in the total amount of P220.00 and there being six classroom teachers, he divided said amount by six or at the rate of P36.00 each; that the classroom teachers actually received their salary differentials and pursuant to said agreement, they, with the exception of Lloren and Ramos, gave the accused varying amounts but as Baltazar did not approve it, he ordered the accused to return the money given to him by Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista, and accused complied (Pp. 7-8.)

The decision also recites that "the evidence is overwhelming to show that accused received more than the rightful contribution of P36.00 from four classroom teachers, namely: Lopez, Dulay, Dacayanan and Bautista. Lopez categorically declared that he gave the accused P100.00 (TSN, p. 5, August 21, 1980 hearing) after he received his salary differential or an excess of P64.00. So with Dulay, that he gave P70.00 to the accused (TSN, p. 16, supra) or an excess of P34.00; Dacayanan, that he gave to the accused P118.00 (TSN, p. 26, supra) or an excess of P82.00, and Bautista, that he gave to the accused P50.00 (TSN, p. 38, supra) or an excess of P14.00. In short, the total amount received by the accused in excess of the share of the classroom teachers in the reimbursement of his expenses is P194.00. " (P. 9.)

Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides, inter alia the following:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

xxx xxx xxx

The legal issue is whether or not, under the facts stated, petitioner Jaravata violated the above-quoted provision of the statute.

A simple reading of the provision has to yield a negative answer.

There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even normal from the government." It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit. The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It should be noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses.

In Our opinion, Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction.

There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is set aside. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124067.  March 27, 1998]

PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners vs. The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:

The special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar seeks nullification of two (2) Resolutions  of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan  issued in Criminal Case No. 21711 -- in which petitioners are prosecuted for violation  of the Anti-Graft  and Corrupt Practices Act : Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The resolution assailed are:

1) that dated February 1, 1996, which ordered petitioners ‘ preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of said R.A 3019; and

2) that dated February 23, 1996, which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.

The primary issue raised is whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to said Section 13 of the law. Section 13 reads:

Sec. 13 Suspension and Loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or propertty, whether as a simple or as a complex offense in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. ** **”

It is petitioners' submission that preventive suspension under this section “rest in the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan despite the ostensibly mandatory language” of the statute, and that that discretion was gravely abused by the Sandiganbayan, or it exceeded its jurisdiction, when it decreed their suspension.

Petitioners -- Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan -- all hold regular executive positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC). They -- together with two other officers who have since resigned from the NPC, namely: Gilberto A. Pastoral and Cecilia D. Vales -- were designated by the NPC Board to compose the Contracts Committee for said NPC’s “Mindanao Grid LDC & SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project.”

The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted the prequalification and bidding procedures for the project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc.,respectively. The Technical Task Force on Bid Evaluation of the NPC reviewed all the bids submitted and recommended approval of the results. The contracts Committee, however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified after verification from the Philippines Contractors Accredition Board that that group, as well as the second lowest bidder (Urban) had been “downgraded,” thereby rending both ineligible as bidders.

The Contracts Committee also stated that since a review of relevant factors disclosed that the other bids had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and

the Allowable Government Estimates for Options A and B of the Project, it was was needful for the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-bidding. The recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board; but for reasons not appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the project was eventually cancelled.

Obviously feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors of NPC; the Chairman (Gilberto Pascual) and Members of the NPC Contracts Awards Committee; the Chairman (Perla Segovia) of the Pre-Qualification Bids & Awards Committee; the Manager (Cecilia D. Vales) of the Contracts Management Office, and two others.[1] Urban alleged that before the bidding, Joint Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts Committee, without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its disqualification and thus enabled it to take  part in the bidding and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that the NPC was “already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture” but because Urban protested, it was compelled to "post-disqualify" the former; however, intead of awarding the contract for the project to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of bidding and ultimately  cancelled the project.  These acts, it is claimed, constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Ombudsman’s Office after which Graft Investigation Officer A.A. Amante submitted a Resolution dated August 2, 1994[2]recommending, among others, that:

1) petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, Winifredo SM Pangilinan, as well as Gilberto Pastoral and Cecilia Vales be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 of having in “one way or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence;” and

2) the NPC President, NPC charman and Members of the Board of Directors be cleared of the ** complaint as their official actuation of sustaining a failure of bidding and the consequent re-bidding is supported by factual and legal basis.”

Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., favorably endorsed the recommendation which was eventually approved on December 6, 1994 by Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, then the Ombudsman.[3]

An information was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia, Santiago, and Pangilinan, as well as Pastoral and Vales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21711. They were charged with infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: i,e., “causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function through manifest partiality, evident bad faithy or gross inexcusable negligence.”

Petioners sought and obtained a reinvestigation of their case but gained no

benefit thereby.  For although the reinvestigating officer made a recommendation on March 7, 1995 that the information against petitioners be withdrawn --  because the “prima facie case had already been overthrown, considering that, as it now stands, the evidence at hand cannot stand judicial scrunity”[4] -- and that recommendation met with the aprroval of the Special Prosecutor, it was ultimately turned down by the chief Special Prosecutor[5] on April 18, 1995, and on April 20, 1995, by the Ombudsman himself.[6]

The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan.  The accused were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty; and a pre-trial was held which resulted in stipulation of facts embodied in an order dated January 11, 1996.[7]

Earlier, the People had filed a “Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite” dated October 24, 1995, invoking Section 13 of RA 3019., as amended, and relevant jurisprudence, and alleging that the “information/s is /are valid.”[8]

Petitioner opposed the motion.[9] In  their pleading dated November 28, 1995, the theorized that the explicit terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises. They claimed that the admissions at the pre-trial show that the transactions in question resulted in  no unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or injury, to anyone; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC; that the positions that Segovia, Pangilinan and Santiago continued to occupy in the NPC were quite sentitive and had no relation to prequalification of contractors, biddings or awards -- which was an additional function temporarily assigned to them and for which the received no compensation at all -- and their suspension might cause delay of vital projects of the NPC; and that under the circumstances obtaining, they were in no position to tamper with any evidence.

Petitioners’ opposition was overruled.  On January 31, 1996 the Sandiganbayan[10] handed down its Resolution suspending them for a period of ninety (90) days.[11] The Sandiganbayan held that the suspension was mandated  under the law upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had been conducted , the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of the crimes specified in the law; and stressed that its “authority and power to suspend the accused had been repeatedly upheld” in several  precedents.  It subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration dated February 14, 1996, “(c)onsidering the paucity of the(ir) arguments ** and in the light of the mass of jurisprudence involving the power and authority of this Court to issue orders for preventive suspension of the accused **.”[12]

Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolution because supposedly rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.  The court will not do so.  In no sense may the challeged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary writ

of certiorari.  On the contrary, in promulgating those resolution, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a “mass of jurispudence” emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed, that the theory of “discretionary suspension” should still be advocated to this late date, despite the “mass  of jurisprudence” relevant to the issue, it little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest court of the land.

Republic Act no. 3019 was enacted by Congress more than 37 years ago, on August 17, 1960, becoming effective on the same date.  The law was later amended by Republic Act No. 3047, Presidential Decree 677 and Presidential Decree No. 1288.  The last amendment -- to Section 13 thereof -- was introduced by Batas Pambansa Bilang 195, approved on March 16, 1972.

The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended -- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer -- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.  As early as 1984, in Bayot v.Sandiganbayan,[13] the Court held by this Court.  As suspension was not penal in character but merely a preventive measure before final judgement; hence, the suspension of a public officer charged with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment, does not violate the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law.  The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence, or from  committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.[14] Substantially to the same effect was the Court’s holding in 1991, in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,[15] that preventive suspension is not violative suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability must still be established.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions -- including preventive suspension -- should be aknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment.[16]

The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicated upon a valid information under Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permenent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.[17] It appears to a Public High School Principal;[18] a Municipal Mayor;[19] a Governor;[20] a Congressman;[21] a Department of Science and Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager;[22] a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[23] The term “office” in Section 13 of the law applies to any office in relation to which he is charged.[24]

It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public

officer accused before it.[25] Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A precondition therefor is the existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for speedy determination of the issues involved in the case.[26]  The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to detrmine the validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.27 The accused should be given adequate oppurtunity to challege the validity or regularity of the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been  afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that he has not been  afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.28 But once a proper determination of the validity of the Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension of the accused official on the pretext that the order denying the latter’s motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts.29

However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of time; it would be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal protection of the laws.30 The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), noew Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987.31

While petitioners concede that this Court has “almost consistently ruled that the preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandantory in character,” they nonetheless urge the Court to consider their case an exception because of the “peculiar circumstances” thereof. They assert that the evils sought to be avoidedby “seperating a public official from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated”32 -- e.g., “to preclude the abuse of the prerogative of ** (his) office, such as through intimidation of witnesses,”33 or the tampering with documentary evidence -- will not occur in the present situation where:

“1. The Project has been cancelled.

2. (Their) ** official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of contractors dealing with the NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or awarding of contracts, ** it (being) emphasized (in this connection) that they were merely designated as ad hoc members of the Committee without additional compensation for their additional duties.

3. All the relevant documentary evidence had been submitted either to the Ombudsman or the Honorable Sandiganbayan.”

They conclude that their preventive suspension “at this point would actually be purposeless, as there is no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their office.”

The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases. They will again be so rejected in this case.

The Court’s pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, supra.,34  are germane:

“Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 30 19, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty of the court to place the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioner’s other contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate prosecution’s witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, ** to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.”

Bolastig also disposes of the other contention that vital projects of NPC may be delayed by their preventive suspension, viz.:35

“Finally, the fact that petitioner’s preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed  by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. (The Local Government Code of 1991, sec. 46[a]) Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, (Art. VI, sec. 16[3]) thus rejecting the view expressed in one case (Alejandrino v. Quezon. 46 Phil. 83, 96 [1924]) that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constitutents are deprived of reprensation.”

The firmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of  the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose.

In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,36 decided fairly recently, the Court again expatiated on the mandatory character of suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the nature of the pre-suspension hearing.

“This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the Court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismissed the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash (See People vs. Albano, etc., et. al., L-45376-77, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511)

“In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. (L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187), we have set  out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:

‘(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he shoud not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the contrary case.

‘(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation, the act for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in the Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the act upon determination of the pendency in court or crimianl prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the  quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the merits.’

“With the aforequoted jurisrudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it bacomes mandatory for  the court to immmediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the court’s discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is  required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filling of the  information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act. No. 3019 or of the provisions of title 7, Book II of the revised Penal Code, or (3) the information against him can  be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rules 117 of the Rules of Court. (People vs. Albana, etc., at al. Supra, fn. 26)

“Once the information is found to be  sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this  latter provisions, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information  is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 61776-61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383)

“To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying the case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue commiting malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.”

The Court is satisfied that the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, after upholding the validity of the information against petitioners, correctly ordered their preventive suspension from any public office for period of ninety (90) days.

As was stressed in Libanan v. Sandiganbayan 37

“ ** When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act  No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory **, and there are no ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ about it.”

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 175482ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.

Issues:1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

Held:The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.

The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code andAdministrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the

case at hand even if the act was not one relative to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper.

Santiago vs GarchitorenaG.R. No. 109266December, 2 1993Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.

Facts:

On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment.

More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the

Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country.

The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment onApril 12, 1993.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is

concerned.

Republic Act No. 7080             July 12, 1991AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term -

a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract.

b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise.

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the

Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions or proceedings, or those which may be instituted under Executive Order No. 1, issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986.

Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: July 12, 1991

Estrada vs. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito EstradaRespondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the PhilippinesPonente: J. BellosilloFACTS:Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.ISSUE:Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.HELD:No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is amalum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.

SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYANCONSOLIDATED CASES January 28, 2003G.R. No. 148468, G.R. No. 148769, G.R. No. 149116

FACTS:

Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from various institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000,Chavit accused then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and

recipient. The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan.

The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to bail but consequently due to numerous petitions and motion to quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed for issuance of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his petition for bail;

WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended information during                 pendency of his petition to bail; and

WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas       corpus.

HELD:

A. Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes cognizance and held that arraignment is not a prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for bail.

B. The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion to quash. Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency of its facts in posits law. This tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each other.

C. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the court even when the person is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar, there is no showing of any basis for the issuance of the writ. The general rule is that the writ does not apply when the person alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by competent court; more so, petitioner is under detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.

The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The petition for habeas corpus and bail was DISMISSED.

Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan•Paymaster case.•In crime of malversation, all that is necessaryfor conviction is proof that accountable officerhad received the public funds and that he

didn o t   h a v e   t h e m   i n   h i s   p o s s e s s i o n   w h e n demand therefore was made and he could notsatisfactorily explain his failure so to account.•An accountable officer may be convicted formalversat ion  even  i f   there  is  not  d i rectevidence of personal misappropriation wherehe has not been able to explain satisfactorilythe absence of the funds involved.•Under 217 there is prima facie evidence of malverdation where the accountable publicofficer fails to have duly forthcoming anypublic funds with which he is chargeable upondemand by duly authorized officer.Ilogon vs. Sandiganbayan•Vales case.•The fact that petitioner did not personally usethe missing funds is not a valid defense andwi l l  not  exculpate  h im from his  cr iminal liability. And as aptly found by respondentSandiganbayan,   the  fact   the  immediatesuperiors of the accused have acquiesced tothe practice of giving out case advances forc o n v e n i e n c e   d i d   n o t   l e g a l i z e   t h e disbursements.Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan•Case where Azarcon was requested by theDirector of the BIR to distraint the goods,c h a t t e l s   o r   o t h e r   p r o p s   o f   A n c l a   b e c   a delinquent taxpayer.•Although sec 206 of the NIRC authorizes theBIR to effect a constructive distraint byrequiring any person to preserve distrainedprop there is no provision in the NIRCconstituting such person a public officer byreason of such requirement. The BIR’s powerauthorizing a private indiv to act asdepositary cannot be stretched to include thepower to appoint him as a public officer.•Consideration of ART. 222 private indiv aspublic officer. SC ruled that a private indivwho has in his charge any of the public fundsor prop enumerated and commits any of theacts defined should likewise be penelized withthe same penalty meted to erring publicofficers. Nowhere in the said provision is itexpressed or implied that a private indiv bedeemed a public officer. Azarcon and Ancla,his co-accused, are both private indivs.INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERSRodillas vs. Sandiganbayan•Case where the police allowed the woman togo to the CR without inspecting first if therewas a way for her to escape.•It was improper for pet to allow pris to havelunch with family when he was supposed tobring the pris back to jail which is 1K awayfrom the sala of the judge. It is his duty totake necessary precautions to assure theabsence of any

means of escape. A failure toundertake these precautions will make his actone of definite laxity of negligence amountingto deliberate non-performance of duty.