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© Barry M Frohlinger 1981 - 2012
CREDIT PROCESS, Avon
Barry M Frohlinger
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Company 12 pt. Profiles Scorecard
1
Analysis KSF/Credit Implication Recommendation
Business Risk Profile Recommendation
Earnings Profile
Asset Profile Recommendation
Liquidity Profile Recommendation
Cash Flow Profile
Capital Structure Profile Recommendation
Debt Instrument Profile Recommendation
Debt Maturity Profile Recommendation
Financial Profile
Legal Structure Profile Recommendation
Cash Flow Projections Profile
Credit Structuring Profile Recommendation
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 2
Transaction Assessment
• AsofApril2015,Avonhasathree-year,$1billionrevolvingcreditfacility,whichexpiresinMarch2017;theywouldlikeanextension.• WerecommendthatwedonotextendtherevolveratthisGme.• Avonrequiresfinancingbecause
– ItsNorthAmericaoperaGonhasexperiencedprolongedearningsproblems– Thefirmhadbeenpayinganoutsizeddividend
• Dividendpaymentisnowreasonable– Significantamountofcashistrapped,creaGngasignificantmismatchbetweencashneedsandcashsources.– Withthestrengtheningdollar,thefirm’sfinancialcondiGonhasweakened.– Thefirmhasasignificant2016paymentofdebt.
• BorrowingsunderthiscreditfacilityisbasedonaspreadoverLIBOR;reflecGngAvon’screditdefaultswaprate,withaninterestcoveragecovenantequaltoorexceeding4:1,alimitonsubsidiarydebtandleverageof3.75:1;and3.5:1starGngDecember31,2014.Thefull$1billionlineisnotavailabletothefirmwithoutviolaGngcovenants.
• OnJuly31,2012,thefirmneededwaiversfromthebanksforafinancialcovenantbreach,duetotheimpairmentchargeofSilpada.• OnDecember21,2012,theinterestcoverageraGo[revolver]wasamendedtoexclude(i)extraordinaryandothernon-cashlossesand
expenses,(ii)one-GmefeesorchargesincurredinconnecGonwithanyassetsale,equityissuanceorrepaymentofdebtorrefinancingoramendmentofanydebtinstrumentand(iii)cashchargesandothercashexpenses,premiumsorpenalGesincurredinconnecGonwithanyrestructuringorrelaGngtoanylegalorregulatoryacGoninanaggregateamountnottoexceed$400fromOctober1,2012unGltheterminaGonofcommitmentsundertherevolvingcreditfacility.Avonhasnomoreheadroomtoexcludecharges.
• Therevolverbacksupthefirm’s$1billionCPprogram,whichhas$0millionoutstandingatFYE2013&2014;– AvonhasnoaccesstoCPmarket,becauseofitsraGngs.– PrivateNoteswererepaidin2013,givingAvonincreasedliquidity,butsGllnoCPaccessduetoAvonraGngs
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Executive Summary
• LoanCause:Avoniscurrentlyunderarestructuringprogramtorecoverprofitabilitywhichhassignificantlydecreasedsince2007– EBITDAMargin:750bpsreducGonbetween2004and2014[17.5%to10.0%]
• Seasonalityfurtherleadstoincreasedworkingcapital[inventory]financingneedsinthehighseason• Purpose:RaGngagenciesrequiresufficientcreditlinestoensureliquidityofthefirm.TheCompany’scostofdebtisGedtoitscreditraGngwhichhasbeenrecentlycorrecteddownwardsbyallraGngagencies.Strongerliquidity,togetherwithmarginimprovementsfromtherestructuringacGviGes,willallowtheCompanytoimproveitsraGngs,whicharenonIGbyS&P,Moody’sandFitch.
• LendingRaGonale:AvonborrowsthroughitsUSoperaGons,whichhaspoorperformance,significantcashis“trapped”outsidetheUS;bothduetotaxreasonsandcertaincountryrestricGons.
• Thisshouldbecashflowloan– althoughthefirmalsohassomeseasonality
• Wearecomfortablereviewingtherequestlaterin2015,andincreasingthetenorproposedbyAvonbasedon:– Management’sprovencommitmenttoboostcashflow(4Q2012DividendCut)
• CapXcutin2014– However,neitherearningsorleveragehaveimproved
• Evenwiththecurrentprofitabilityissues,thefirmgeneratessaGsfactorycashflow– SuccessfulrefinancingoftheirPrivateNotesandTermLoanPrepaymentthroughtheissuanceofnewpublic
notesdue2016,2020,2023and2043
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 4
Avon Overview
Revenue Breakdown by Region
• GlobalmanufacturerandmarketerofbeautyandrelatedproductsoperaGngworldwide.Unlike most of Avon’s CPG competitors, which sell their products through third-party retail establishments, Avon’s business is conducted worldwide primarily in one channel, direct selling throughthedirectsellingchannelwithabout6millionsellingrepresentaGves
• Significant management changes in 2012 to address key issues of Avon business:
• Competition from large scale global beauty products in developing markets
• Execution problems: inventory management, misjudging product demand, poor representative recruitment
• Significant legal issues
Latin America,
48% North
America, 14%
Europe, 31%
Asia, 8%
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Industry
5
Skin and Sun Care29%
Fragrance12%
Hair Care20%
Color Cosmetic14%
Personal care16%
Mens Grooming9%
207 212 215 224 234 244 253
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Revenue in Bn
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Business Operations & Corporate Strategy
• Sellingprocess:• IndependentrepresentaGvescontactcustomerssellingprimarilythroughbrochures• RepresentaGvesforwardordersfromcustomerstoaAvondistribuGoncenters• AvonselltheproductstotherepresentaGvesatadiscountpriceandtheyon-selltothecustomer.
• PromoGonandmarkeGng:• Salescampaignsgenerallyrunfor2-4weeks• SupporGngacGviGessuchasnewbrochures,samplesanddemonstraGonproductsareprovidedtosupporttherepresentaGves
toreachnewcustomers• Print,TVandotheradverGsingisusedtoincreaseawarenessofAvonproducts• Trainingandsupportisprovidedthroughdistrictsalesmanagers
• Drivingprofitablegrowthbyimprovingaccesstobrandsandproducts.• Strengthenandleveragethedirectsalesforce• Maximizegeographicporpolioandexpandbrandsandchannels• ReduceOperaGonalcoststoachievelowdoubledigitoperaGngmarginby2016• Restructuringorclosureofcertainsmaller,underperformingmarkets,includingexitfromtheSouthKorea,Vietnamand
Irelandmarkets
Corporate Strategy
Business Operations
4
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Industry Overview - Consumer Staples
ChanginglifestylesindevelopinginternaGonalmarketsshouldprovidegrowthopportuniGes
• Thebeautyandbeauty-relatedproductsindustryishighlycompeGGve.• Seasonalinnature–holidaysalespeakinQ4Worldwide,AvoncompeteagainstproductssoldtoconsumersinanumberofdistribuGonmethods,including;
• Otherdirect-sellingcompanies,• Internet• Productssoldthroughthemassmarketand• PresGgeretailchannels.• Directsellingaccountsfor
• 29%ofBrazil’sbeautyandpersonal-caremarket• 14%ofChina• Andonly8%intheU.S.
Outlook
5
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 8
Significant Events • OnDecember13,2011,AvoniniGatedasearchforanewchiefexecuGveandstatedAndreaJungwillconGnueaschairmanoftheboardforthenext
twoyears.– JungjoinedAvonin1994asthecompany'spresidentinitsproductmarkeGnggroupandinNovember1999,Jungwaspromotedto
chairmanoftheboardandchiefexecuGveofficer.ManyfeltshedidanatrociousjobasCEOandhertenurewasreflecGveofcorporategovernanceproblems.OnOctober5,2012AndreaJung,announcedherresignaGonButremainasasenioradvisorthroughApril2014.
• AmulGtudeofcontroversiescompelledJungtoannounceherresignaGon.– Thecompany'sstockdropped45%in2011.
• Stockwasdown58%inpast5yearswhileS&Pup9%andpeersup21%– AvondisclosedthatthereweretwoongoingSECinquiries.– Thefinancialresultstrailedanalysts’projecGonsforyears.– Therewasalsoathree-yearprobeintoanallegedbriberyofforeignofficials,whichledtotheformerinterimCFOtoleave
• OnApril2,2012,AvonreceivedanunsolicitedbidfromCotyInc.toacquireAvonfor$23.25pershare,a20%premiumtothethenpriceof$18.60.OnMay14,Cotywithdrewitsproposal.ByYE2012,Avon’ssharepricewas$16.50.
– InFebruary2014,AvonbeganmarkeGngCotyProductsthroughits1.5millionBrazilianreps.• InApril2012,AvonbroughtinSheriMcCoy,aJohnson&Johnson(JNJ)vicechairmanasCEO.
– AtJ&JsheoverseestheglobalpharmaceuGcalbusinessandtheconsumerunit,whichincludesskin-carebrandslikeNeutrogena.• McCoyhasembarkedonanambiGousturnaroundplanthatincludeswringingout$400millionincosts,sharplyincreasingsalesand
almostdoublingoperaGngmarginswithinthreeyears.• Thisisthethirdturnaroundsince2005
– Management is attempting to correct many problems • Senior talent • Stabilization key markets, North America, Brazil and China • Prioritize product categories, Fast track mobile and social media • Reduce cost base and improve focus on cash management, Improve capital structure • New management states they have “relentless focus on our Representative and consumer”
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 9
Recent Events • Avon’s peers include the following
– NuSkin, Estee Lauder, P&G, Clorox, Revlon, Tupperware, L’Oreal, Colgate-Palmolive and Kimberly Clark
• Avon’s segments are based on geographic operations in four regions [was 5]: – North America – Latin America – Western and Central Europe – Asia Pacific
• In conjunction with organizational changes, effective in the second quarter of 2012, the results of Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, Middle East & Africa were managed as a single operating segment.
• The firm made a similar organizational change in 2011, managing China as part of the Asia Pacific segment. In the two years since the reporting/organizational change in Asia Pacific/China, China revenue is down over 50%.
• Avon had reported three product categories – Beauty - cosmetics, fragrances and skin care. – Fashion - jewelry, watches, and apparel. – Home - gift and decorative products, housewares, leisure products and nutritional products
• Now, reporting 2 product categories – Beauty and Fashion
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 10
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Management Assessment
Sheri McCoy CEO and Dir
Sheri McCoy CEO and Director More than 30 years experience Johnson and Johnson most recently serving as Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee In 2013, Ms. McCoy ranked #20 on Fortune magazine's "50 Most Powerful Women in Business" list, which she has been on since 2008
Kimberly A. Rose EVP and CFO Joined Avon in 2011 after after 10 years at Royal Ahold, a Netherlands-based international group. [credited with helping Ahold after its 2003 accounting crisis]
Fernando J. Acosta SVP & President, Latin America Joined Avon in 2011 after 19 years in Unilever [Latin America and Europe are key]
• Avon has a new management team led by Sheri McCoy who joined Avon in April 2012
• CEO Andrea Jung and CFO, Charles Cramb stepped aside at the end of 2012 following multi-year restructuring programs and regulatory challenges in China
• New financial goals of the new management team include mid-single digit constant dollar revenue growth and low double digit operating margin over the next three years
• Cost savings of at least $400 million is also targeted in the next 3 years
• While the new management changes may be positive, there is risk in their ability in direct sales business
Brief Overview Executive Management
2
Douglas R. Canant Chairman Former President & Chief Executive Officer, Campbell Soup Company; Founder & Chief Executive Officer, Conant Leadership
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Management Assessment
Kimberly A. Rose EVP and CFO Joined Avon in 2011 after after 10 years at Royal Ahold, a Netherlands-based international group but left Avon in October 2014.
On September 8, 2014, Avon announced that Kimberly Ross will be resigning as of October 2, 2014. Robert Loughran, Vice President and Corporate Controller of the Company will serve as acting Chief Financial Officer, effective October 2, 2014, while the Company completes its search process for a Chief Financial Officer. Loughran, has been Vice President and Corporate Controller of the Company since May 2012, and prior to that, served as Vice President and Assistant Controller since 2009 and Executive Director and Assistant Controller since joining the Company in July 2004. Avon announced February 1, 2015 the hiring of a new CFO, James Scully, previous COO of J Crew, apparel retailer, who led J Crew through 2 years of poor performance.
Brief Overview Executive Management
2
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Management Assessment: Medium/High Risk
YEAR ROLE NAME RATIONALE COMMENTS
2011 CFO Charles Cramb Steps Down. Continues as Vice-Chairman
Interim CFO Replaced by Kimberly Ross
May 2011
CFO Kimberly Ross CFO appointed
Replacing Charles Cramb Previously CFO of AHOLD
May 2011
Various Executives
S.K. Kao, G.Manager Jimmy Beh, CFO China C.Q. Sun, Head Corporate affairs for China Ian Rossetter, Head of global internal audit and security
In conncetion to alleged Avon bribery in China investigation that started in 2008
Dec 2011
CEO Andrea Jung Steps Down as CEO. Remains Chairman
2001-2011 CEO of AVON. Under allegations of bribery in China, replaced in Apr 2012
Replaced by J&J vice-chairman Sherilyn McCoy
6
• High turnover of key senior management since 2011, notably CFOs • CEO remains stable • Lack of execution on key areas (Cost reduction, IT development, Internal audit, amongst others)
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Management Assessment – Medium/High Risk Continued
YEAR ROLE NAME ACTION RATIONALE COMMENTS
Apr 2012
CEO Sherilyn McCoy Appointed Previously 30 yrs at J&J, latest position Vice-Chairman
Replacing Andrea Jung as CEO
Jan 2012
Vice-Cairman
Charles Cramb Dismissed AVON alleged bribery China
Dec 2012
Chairnan Andrea Jung
Resigned Replaced by Fred Hassan (independent Director at AVON)
Apr 2013
Non-Executive Chairman
Fred Hassan Resigned from the Board
To spend more time on other profesional commitments
Replaced by Doug Conant (Board Director)
Apr 2013
Chairman Doug Conant
Appointed
Sept 2014
CFO Kimberly Ross Resigns Move to Baker Hughes as CFO
Replaced by Robert Loughran
Sept 2014
CFO Robert Loughran
Appointed Acting CFO Corporate Controller at AVON
Jan 2015
CFO James Scully Appointed Replacing acting CFO Robert Loughran
9 years at JC Crew, latest CEO
7
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Share purchases
15
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Acquisitions and Disposals
Announced Closed Type Entity Value Description
12 02 Jul '13 03 Jul '13 MBO Silpada Designs, Inc. 100 Acquired by Silpada Designs Management
11 08 Nov '10 21 Dec '10 Disposal Avon Products Co. Ltd 50 TPG acquired 93.8% stake in Avon Ltd (Japan)
10 12 Jul '10 28 Jul '10 Acquisition Silpada Designs, Inc. 650 US-based manufacturer of Handcrafted jew elry
9 25 Mar '10 25 Mar '10 Acquisition Liz Earle Beauty Co. Ltd. -- UK-based manufacturer and (direct) distributor of beauty products
8 28 Nov '05 28 Nov '05 Acquisition Avon Manufacturing (Guangzhou) Ltd.
28 Nov '05 28 Nov '05 Acquisition Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd.
7 07 Oct '05 18 Oct '05 Acquisition Maverick Holdings 154 Cayman Islands-based HoldCo w ith business in Colombia
6 15 Mar '04 15 Mar '04 Acquisition Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd. 50 Minority Stakes in China business
5 20 Jan '99 20 Jan '99 Disposal Discovery Toys LLC -- Kids Toys business
4 22 Jan '97 22 Jan '97 Acquisition Discovery Toys LLC -- Kids Toys business
3 05 Feb '96 05 Feb '96 Acquisition Justine Pty Ltd -- South Africa-based direct seller of cosmetics
2 26 Jul '94 29 Aug '94 Disposal Giorgio Beverly Hills, Inc. 150 US-based manufacturer of natural & synthetic perfumes
1 01 Sep '93 01 Sep '93 Acquisition Avon Cosmetics SA -- Remaining stake of Avon's Spanish business
Remaining stakes of Avon's Chinese business39
1 2
34
5
6
7
89
1011
12
05101520253035404550
01.01.1990 01.25.1993 02.19.1996 03.15.1999 04.08.2002 05.02.2005 05.26.2008 06.20.2011
7
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 17
Significant Events
• DuringJune2012,Avonenteredintoa$550million3yeartermloaninordertorefinancecommercialpaper;thisfreedupsomeliquidityforAvonastheypaiddowncommercialpaper.
• Avonissued$1.5billionbondsin2013,including2043noteswitha6.95%yield,inordertorepaymaturingdebt,prepaytheir2010privatenotes,withamakewholepaymentof$68million,andrepay$380millionofthe2012termloan.
• Thecompany'sstockhitamulG-yearlowof$13.81inNovember2012averAvonslasheditsdividend;itreboundedto$22withinayearbuthasfallenbackto$8.90
• InFebruary2013,FitchloweredAvon’sCreditRaGngfromBBB-toBB+andMoody’stoBaa2[StableOutlook]fromBaa1[negaGveOutlook].S&PRaGngBBB-.FitchloweredtheraGngagaininNovember2013toBBandMoody’sloweredraGngagaininFebruary2014toBaa3,andS&PloweredraGngtoBB+inNovember2014.
• Fourthqtrof2012,bookedaDTLforrepatriaGonofforeignincome[cash]• SignificantliquidityandnetworthtrappedinVenezuela
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Competitors
AmericasEMEAAsia Pacif ic
FragrancesColor CosmeticsSkin & Body CareOther
N/A
8
L'Oreal Revlon Estee Lauder Shiseido Beiersdorf Coty NuSkin Average
Revenue 30,500 1,500 10,400 7,500 8,200 4,500 3,200 9,400
EBITDA 6,300 280 1900 930 1150 680 580 1,689
EBITDA margin 20.7% 18.7% 18.3% 12.4% 14.0% 15.1% 18.1% 16.8%
Operating Profit 5,100 200 1,500 540 1,000 420 550 1,330
OPM 16.7% 13.3% 14.4% 7.2% 12.2% 9.3% 17.2% 12.9%
EV 95,000 3,100 25,500 7,900 22,000 7,400 4,600 23,643
EV/EBITDA 15.1 11.1 13.4 8.5 19.1 10.9 7.9 12.3
EV/Sales 3.1 2.1 2.5 1.1 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.1
Debt/EV 6% 62% 5% 21% 1% 35% 4% 19%
AVON
Revenue 8,766 Op Profit 649 EBITDA 880 EBITDA margin 10.0% EV 5,118 EV multiple 5.8
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Business Risk Profile Risk Description Probability Impact Mitigant Recomendatiion
FX CashFlowsandLoansareindifferentlegalenGGesanddifferentcurrencies Very High Very High
Repatriate cash to US. Increase Local Currency borrowings
Representa2ves Fundamentalchallengeindirectsellingisgeyngpeopletosellproducts,notgeyngbuyers.5%declineinrepsin2014.Repswantraiseincommissions,lowercostbrochuresandeaseuponpressuretorecruitmorereps
Very High Very High
Newmanagementfocus
Management PriorManagementdemonstratedexecuGonweakness&acquisiGonfailures;mulGyearunsuccessfulrestructuringandweakcorporategovernance.Weakmanagementofreps New management team, however, untested and recent departure of CFO and new CFO. New Board.
High Very High
73-89%ofcompGedtoperformance;srleadershipmustholdstockmorethan6Xcomp
TowersofDebt LargeTowersin2016,2018and2019
Very High HIgh
DCM still open to the firm, however, at a cost. 2016 prepaid with asset sales
Compe22on NaturainBrazilNorthAmericaoperaGonsareunprofitable
High High
Over1millionrepsinBrazil
Sale of North America
5
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Business Risk Profile Risk Description Probability Impact Mitigants Recomendatiion
PoorFinancialResults
AvonStockpricedown75%whilepeersup88%overpastfiveyears
High High
EV reflects existing core business is still somewhat acceptable. Business Model requires limited CFOps.
Governmentregula2ons
FCPA
High Moderate
Managementbelievestheyhaveasezlementfor$135butagreedtoan18monthregulatorysupervision
BusinessModel Avonmodelwasbuiltonconvenienceofbuyingfromcomfortofhome.InternethasmadeaccesstocosmeGcseasy
High Moderate
Product and Business Model work in selected countries, requires proper strategy and execution.
Bring In IB for Strategy Discussions
Operational Reliance on direct selling model IT InfrastructureManagement of Inventory levels (Seasonality) Instability of IT system can lead to loss of sales High costs in maintaining a working and stable IT infrastructure platform across 50+ countries
Moderate Moderate
5
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Identification of the problem
• Management Weakness • Weak internal controls
– Financial and/or non financial • Weakness in business
– Cost structure • Weakness in strategy
– Unrelated acquisitions, excessive cap X • Inappropriate financial policies
– Excessive debt, wrong currencies • Competition
21
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 22
“customer reps” Get product at discount
“casual sellers” Earn 2X
min wage
“top sellers” 15 hours per week
“top leadership” Full time Provides
median income
“top leadership” “wealth creator”
2 - 3 X median income
Earnings Potential from Avon
Time spent
Reps
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 23
Invest-Rising Stars China, India, Turkey
Exit South Korea, Vietnam
Fix Big Guns US and Uk
Drive Growth Russia and Brazil
Leverage Australia and Italy
Strategy
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 24
Seasonality
AR Inventory
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 25
Revenue, change in reporting
Beauty 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Beauty 69% 69% 69% 70% 72% 72% 71% 73% 73% 73% 73%
Fashion 31% 31% 31% 30% 28% 28% 29% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Beauty
Fashion
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 26
Revenue – Geographic
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
North AmericaLatin AmericaEuropeAsia
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 27
Contribution Revenue per segment
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Latin AmericaNorth AmericaEuropeAsia
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 28
Non Beauty sales
0%5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%45%
2014
USRest of WorldGlobal
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 29
KPI’s, Avon utilizes key performance indicators (“KPIs”) to evaluate its business.
-6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
10% 12% 14%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Reps 13% 3% 5% 7% 1% 9% 4% -1% -1% -2% -5% Units 11% 6% 2% 9% 7% 3% 1% -2% 0% -5% -5%
Reps
Units
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 30
Revenue - Geographic
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
USBrazilRest Of World
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 31
Revenue – Geographic [China business off 42%,20%, 22%, 10% in past 4 years, different model, Russia business up in 2014]
BRC 18% 21% 23% 26% 28% 29% 29% 27% 26% 27%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 32
OPM, adjusted
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
OPM
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 33
OPM per segment
-4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
10% 12% 14% 16%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Latin America North America Europe Asia
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 34
OPM compared to peers
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
AvonNu SkinRevlonL'OrealTupperwareColgate PalmoliveCloroxKimberly ClarkP&G
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 35
OPM compared to peers
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
AvonComps
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 36
ReturnsonAssetsandCapitalLeveliss2llok,buttrendsaredown,un2l2013
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
OPMRROOARROIC
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 37
Efficiency, Revenue/Invested Capital
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rev/IC
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 38
Efficiency
Revenue Op Profit Op Assets Inv CapitalCAGR 07 - 14 -2% -9% 0% 9%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
CAGR 07 - 14
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Earnings
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GPM RROIC RROOA OPM
39
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 40
Profitability
• Year2014– Avon’sprofitabilitymetricsaremediocre.Managementbelievesfourthquarterof2014beginstoshowsomeimprovementsbutimpactedto
duedollarstrength.LaGnAmericaremainsthelargestsegment,butEuroperemainsthemostprofitablesegment,duetoastrongbusinessinCentralEurope,wherethedirectsalesmodelappearswellmatchedtothemarket.NorthAmerica,thethirdlargestsegment,performedverypoorlyduring2014.AvonstruggleswithaNorthAmericacoststructurenotinlinewiththerevenue.NorthAmericawasunprofitableattheoperaGngprofitlevel,onanadjusted.Venezuelaisalsoaproblemforthefirm.Avonperformsmuchbelowpeers,azributabletomanagementinabilitytoexecute.
– Oneofthekeymetricsforthefirmisreps,thefirmhas6millionrepsglobally;Avonhashadproblemsretainingrepsinkeymarkets,includingNorthAmerica,wherethefirmlost18%ofrepsin2014.Avon’sfieldrepresentaGveshavethrowninthetowelsincethecompanylauncheditstransformaGonal“OneSimpleSalesModel”iniGaGvein2011,whichinvolvedslashingdistrictsalesmanagerposiGonsandreassigningexisGngrepresentaGves.Nonbeautysales,whichhavelowermarginsthanbeauty,represent45%ofUSsales,consistentwithprioryears.
– IntheprocessofreducingthenumberofdistrictmanagersandreassigningrepresentaGves,AvonbrokesomecriGcalrelaGonships,• directsalesisarelaGonshipbusiness• AndtherecruiGngengine“fellapart”asthedisrupGveprogramwasrolledout.
– AvonsGllgeneratesacceptablereturnsoncapital,becauseitisnotacapitalintensivebusiness;ithasashortcashcyclewithlimitedfixedassets.Thefirmismanagementintensive.
• Year2013– Avon’sprofitabilitymetricsremainmediocre.Fourthquarter2013resultswereveryweak,witha5%declineinreps.LaGnAmericaremains
thelargestsegment,butEuroperemainsthemostprofitablesegment,duetoastrongbusinessinCentralEurope,wherethedirectsalesmodelappearswellmatchedtothemarket.NorthAmerica,thethirdlargestsegment,performedverypoorlyduring2013,duetoitscoststructure.2013markedthefirstGmeNorthAmericawasunprofitableattheoperaGngprofitlevel,onanadjustedbasisThefirmlost16%ofrepsin2013.
• Trend2014versus2013– RevenuedeclinedinFY2014,duetoastrongdollaralongwithareducGoninunitsshipped.Revenuedeclinedinallsegments,andmargins
remainedessenGallyflatintwolargestsegments.
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 41
Profitability
• Trend2013versus2012– RevenuedeclinedinFY2013,duetoastrongdollaralongwithareducGoninunitsshipped.Revenuedeclinedinallsegments,althoughmarginsreboundedintwolargest
segments,EuropeandLaGnAmericaduetoimprovedproductmixandlowersupplychaincosts.ManagementalsoazributestheturnaroundintheUKduetoimprovedrepresentaGveengagement.
• Year 2012 – Avon’s earnings are significantly lower than peers; and most profitability metrics for Avon are mediocre. For segment reporting, Central
Europe was merged with Western Europe and now is the most profitable segment, due to a strong business in Central Europe, where the direct sales model appears well matched to the market. North America, the third largest segment, performed very poorly during 2012.
• Trend 2012 versus 2011 – Revenue declined modestly in FY2012, mostly due to a strong dollar as most of Avon’s business is transacted in currencies not the US
dollar. Along with revenue decline, profitability fell significantly. The firm continues to struggle with implementation of its stabilization strategies, cost savings initiatives, multi-year restructuring programs and other initiatives, including Service Model Transformation in order to achieve anticipated savings and benefits from such programs and initiatives. The firm has been attempting to implement these strategies since 2004, with no success; Consolidated Operating Profit Margin fell in 2012 due to increases product costs, the product mix and increases in selling, general and administration costs; due to unfavorable operating leverage. Revenues and margins fell in all four of the segments; Latin America and Europe, accounting for 74% of revenue, were both impacted by currency and profits impacted due to supply chain problems and currency. Also, Europe was impacted due to bad debts. North America remained weak in 2012, due to reduction in the number of reps, units shipped and the investment in the RVP.
– In summary, margins declined in all segments. • Earnings Trend
– Over the past 11 years, Avon has experienced a significant decline in earnings, operating profit margins in addition to reduced returns on assets and capital. The reduced earnings have occurred throughout the entire firm. The year 2008 represented a possible turnabout in the firms results; however, this has not been sustained with operating failures in key markets. The sad story really starts around 2005, when Ms. Jung was in her sixth year as C.E.O. Rising competition, an outdated electronic supply system in Brazil, missteps in Russia and China, bloated management, misdirected marketing — all combined to choke off profits. By 2009, Liz Smith, the company’s highly regarded president, left. A flurry of regional managers exited as well. Even after Ms. Jung cut $1 billion in costs in the latest of two restructurings, profitability kept dwindling. As the share price sank, the company began to look like takeover bait. Rumors circulated that L’Oréal might swoop in. Ms. Jung simply made bad decisions. Avon spent $3 million on a Super Bowl ad in 2009 to recruit sales representatives but didn’t invest enough to train the new employees. It spent $650 million in 2010 to acquire Silpada, a direct seller of silver jewelry, only to write down the investment the next year largely because of a rise in silver prices. Then legal and regulatory issues rocked Avon. In 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission started an investigation into possible breaches of the Regulation Fair Disclosure rule, known as Reg FD, related to corporate information that the company shared with financial analysts. That same year, Avon became the focus of an investigation into accusations that it violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by bribing officials in China — an issue that has cost the company more than $250 million in legal costs and led to the dismissal of at least four executives. (Ms. Jung wasn’t accused of wrongdoing.)
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Balance Sheet Profile
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
WC needs PPE intangibles
42
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Balance Sheet Profile
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
WC needs PPE Intangibles
43
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Balance Sheet Profile
Intangibles
Equity
PPE LT Debt
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Assets Financing
44
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 45
Cash cycle
0
50
100
150
200
250
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AvonNu SkinEstee LauderCloroxColgate PalmoliveKimberly ClarkP&G
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 46
Cash cycle, Avon
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AR daysInventory daysAP days
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 47
BS Management
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
OPWC/SalesIntangibles/SalesPPE/SalesIC/Sales
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 48
BS Management
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
IC/Sales
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 49
BS Management • Avon has a moderately short cash cycle, shorter than cosmetic peers, due to short
ar days and good financing from suppliers. Avon has short ar days due to its business models; where they sell to almost 6 million global reps and provide little financing to these customers.
– Receivable risk has increased in recent years as 3% of sales are uncollectable and operating margins have been reduced.
• In addition, inventory days for Avon are significantly shorter than other cosmetic firms because Avon has a continuous introduction of new products, as a sales technique for its reps.
• Avon’s cash cycle is consistent to other packaged goods companies. • Avon has a moderate need for capital to finance non current assets, with a
nominal investment in tangible fixed assets. Avon had a noticeable increase in intangibles assets, in 2010 due to the Silpada acquisition. The firm has few intangible assets, but a large DTA.
• Overall, the capital financing requirements of Avon are moderate, which is very favorable. However, asset growth over the past 5 years has not produced revenue or additional profits, which is very troubling.The firm has begun to show an improved efficiency in using invested capital as the firm has pared back Cap X.
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 50
Cash Flow Profile
0200400600800
1,0001,2001,4001,6001,800
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
EBITDA
Funds Flow
Cash Flow fromOperations
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 51
Cash Flows
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Cash Flow fromOperationsCapital Spending
Dividends
Actual Cash Flow[Credit-SR]
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 52
Cash Flows
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Funds Flow
Mandatory CapitalSpendingDividends
Long Run Free CashFlow
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 53
Cash Flows
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Funds Flow
Cash Flow fromOperationsMandatory CapitalSpendingDividends
Long Run Free CashFlow
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 54
Cash Flows
050
100150200250300350400450
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Capital Spending
Mandatory CapitalSpending
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 55
Cash Flows
050
100150200250300350400450
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Capital Spending
Mandatory CapitalSpendingDividends
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 56
Cash Flows
(200)0
200400600800
1,0001,2001,4001,6001,800
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
EBITDA
Funds Flow
Cash Flow fromOperationsCapital Spending
Mandatory CapitalSpendingDividends
Credit Free CashFlowsLong Run Free CashFlow
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 57
Cash Flows
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Actual Cash Flowsto repay debtLong Run CashFlow
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 58
Cash Flows
02,0004,0006,0008,000
10,00012,00014,00016,000
Total 2004 - 2014
Total 2004 -2014
14,271 10,319 7,444 EBITDA Funds Flow CFOps
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 59
Cash Flows
01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,000
Total 04 - 14
Total 04 - 14 7,444 2,753 3,157 1,534
CFOps CAP X Dividends Credit FCF
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 60
Debt Maturity Profile Towers, Actual and Projected
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Actual CF to repay debt CPLTD
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 61
Cash Flow Profile
• Avon’s Cash Flows during 2014 were good. Avon generated modest earnings, but as the firm is not capital intensive and has a modest dividend payout, Avon generated residual cash flows for debt payment. The firm had a small tower of debt due in fiscal 2014. In the short run, cash flows during 2014 were acceptable; Avon’s maturity schedule allowed considerable financial flexibility, as the next tower is due in 2016.
• Avon’s Cash Flows during 2013 were acceptable. Avon generated modest earnings, but as the firm is not capital intensive and has a modest dividend payout, Avon generated residual cash flows for debt payment. The firm had a sizeable tower of debt due in fiscal 2013. In the short run, cash flows during 2013 were acceptable; Avon’s maturity schedule allowed them some financial flexibility, as the next tower is due in 2016.
• Avon’s Cash Flows during 2012 were not strong. Avon generated modest earnings and with a large dividend payout, the firm has no residual cash flows for debt payment. Avon converted most of earning into cash flow; however, the actual cash flow from operations just covered both the capital spending and dividends, as the firm is slightly expanding and has a very high dividend payout ratio. The firm had a small tower of debt due in fiscal 2012. In the short run, cash flows during 2012 were not very good.
– The 74% dividend cut at YE 2012 helped stabilize the firms cash flows • During 2011, Avon did not convert a noticeable amount of earning into cash flow; this is concerning. The actual cash flow from operations didn’t cover both the capital spending and dividends, as the firm is expanding tangible fixed assets and has a very high dividend payout ratio. In the short run, cash flows during 2011 were not very good, but the firm has good potential in the long run to satisfy all its requirements.
• Over the past 11 years, EBITDA and Funds Flow haven’t increased as Avon has an earnings problem. Free Cash Flows weakened from 2007 - 2012. With the smaller dividend, long run cash flows could approximate $262 million p.a.
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 62
Liquidity Profile
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Working CapitalNeedsWorking Capital
Cash
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 63
Liquidity
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
CashUnused RevolverLiquidity
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 64
Liquidity
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cash + unusedrevolver/Sales
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Liquidity Profile
65
Avon Estee Lauder
Sales 8,851 10,969
Cash 917 1,629
Unused Revolver 825 1,000
Total Liquidity 1,742 2,629
Liquidity 20% 24%
CFOps 360 1,535
Maturity date revolver 2017 2019
Rating BB+ A+
Towers in next 5 years $260 million in 2016, $507 million in 2018 and $367 million in 2019
$300 million in 2017
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 66
Liquidity Profile
• With a short cash cycle, Avon appears to have sufficient working capital at FYE 2014; however, some of the liquidity [cash] is trapped in foreign subs; this could cause a liquidity issue. Some is tax trapped and some is actually restricted.
• Avon reported during the fourth quarter of 2012, as a result of the uncertainty of financing arrangements and the domestic liquidity profile, Avon determined that the Company may repatriate offshore cash to meet certain domestic funding needs. Accordingly, Avon no longer asserted that these undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries are indefinitely reinvested and, therefore, recorded an additional provision for income taxes of $168million on such earnings.
• Cash Flows during 2014 were adequate [because no towers of debt were due]; 2013 were almost adequate; 2012 were not strong; the firm has some seasonality.
• The firm’s revolver provides some access to credit, but the facility is used to support the firm’s commercial paper program [none outstanding at FYE 2012]. Unused availability is $1,000 million, but based upon financial covenant restrictions the firm can only access $825 million. The firm is not using CP as it has been effectively shut out of the market, due to rating.
• Avon’s liquidity relative to Estee Lauder is weak.
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 67
Capital Structure Profile Debt/EBITDA
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Avon Nu SkinEstee Lauder
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 68
Solvency, also do not miss litigation and SEC
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Underfundedpensionrent adjustment
Securitizations
Total
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 69
Solvency, also do not miss litigation and SEC
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
debt+pension+leaseEBITDARP
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 70
Solvency [debt+pension+lease]/EBITDARP
0.000.501.001.502.002.503.003.504.004.505.00
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
leverage
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 71
Solvency
0510152025303540
20042005200620072008200920102011201220132014
EBIT/InterestEBITDA/Interest
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 72
Solvency
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Funds Flow/TotalDebtFree OCF/Total Debt
EBIT/Capital
Total Debt/Capital
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 73
Solvency
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%20%
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
EBITDA marginCAP X marginNet
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 74
Solvency
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
EBITDA margin
EBITDA-CAPX -dividendsEBITDA/Assets
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 75
Solvency
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%20%
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
EBITDA marginCAP X marginDividends/revenue
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 76
Solvency
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%20%
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
EBITDA margin
EBITDA-CAPX -dividends
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 77
Equity Cushion
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2011 2012 2013 2014
EquityDTASoftwareGoodwillIntangiblesBrochure
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 78
Capital Structure Profile Equity Cushion
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2011 2012 2013 2014
EquityIntangibles
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Balance Sheet
equity
Ltd
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
assets Financing
Cash other AR&Inv PPE Intangibles
79
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 80
Debt Rating Profile
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EBIT/Interest AAA AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB
EBITDA/Interest AAA AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
Funds Flow/Debt AA+ A+ A+ A A BBB+ BBB- BBB B+ BB BB
FCF/Debt
AA+ AA- A+ BBB- BBB- BBB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB+
EBIT/Capital
AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AA- A+ BBB A A
EBITDA margin
A BBB BBB BB BB B- B- B- CCC- B- B-
LTD/Cap
BB+ BB+ BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- B+ B+ CCC
TD/Cap
BBB BB- BB- B B BB- BB- BB- B+ B+ CCC
Debt/EBITDA
AAA A+ A A A A- BBB BBB- BB- BBB- BB
EBITDA/Assets
AA+ AA+ AA AA+ AA+ A+ A A B BBB BBB
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 81
FINANCIAL RISK PROFILE
BUSINESS RISK PROFILE Minimal Modest Intermediate Significant Aggressive Highly
Leveraged
Excellent AAA AA A A- BBB -
Strong AA A A- BBB BB BB-
Satisfactory A- BBB+ BBB BB+ BB- B+
Fair - BBB- BB+ BB BB- B
Weak - - BB BB- B+ B-
Vulnerable - - - B+ B CCC+
Financial Risk Indicative Ratios*:
FFO / Total Debt Total Debt / Capital
Total Debt / EBITDA
>60% <25% <1.5x
45 – 60% 25 – 35% 1.5 – 2.0x
30 – 45% 35 – 45% 2.0 – 3.0x
20 – 30% 45 – 50% 3.0 – 4.0x
12 – 20% 50 – 60% 4.0 – 5.0x
<12% >60% >5.0x
Business Risk Factors
1) Metrics: Adjusted leverage ratios, cash flow, margins / profitability
Financial Risk Factors
We estimate the Company’s business risk profile as ‘Satisfactory/Fair’ and its financial risk profile as Significant/Aggressive, suggesting a BB indicative rating.
1) Industry Factors
Cyclical, Competition 2) Company
Management, FX, Hedging of Debt, Liquidity, Dividend Policy, Reps, Government Regulations
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 82
Solvency
• Avon is the world's largest direct selling company; it has a good brand and acceptable earnings along with broad geographic diversification.
• However, there is concern about the current value of the brand.
• Avon uses significant debt to finance its nominal capital needs.
• The debt/cap ratio is has consistently been an outlier for Avon, signaling the use of debt to finance the balance sheet, even though financing needs are not significant. This was not a concern until the recent downturn in earnings. Also, there is large risk in the balance sheet; intangibles, deferred tax assets, foreign operations and assets and pension.
• Leasing is not significant for the firm; although litigation is. The current pension underfunding is not significant, although the assumed rate of return on pension assets seems unreasonable Also, the switch to debt investments and hedging appears to be a risk. Also, the firm has significant capital spending commitments and product purchase obligations.
• Solvency has declined considerably over the past 10 years. Financial Risk looks synthetically like a BB firm, the business risk is just satisfactory, due to weak management, which now is untested. With a change in management and changes in operations, the firm may regain its IG rating, but this will require a profitability turnabout.
– Equity has been reduced due to currency and pension concerns
• FX is difficult to hedge; hedging pension may be a risk
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Debt Instrument Profile
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Sr Secured Debt
Fixed Rate Sr Notes
ST Debt Sub Debt Revolver Unused Revolver
83
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Debt Instrument Profile
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
US Dollar Debt US$ EBITDA Non US Dollar Debt Non US Dollar EBITDA
Revolver USD
84
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Debt Profile
2013 2014 Price Avon Debt 99.2 91.0 10 yr Treasury 3.04% 2.17%
85
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Hedging Profile [Notional]
Avon Estee Lauder
F/X Forwards 174 1,597
F/X Translation [net assets]
0 [ended in 2012] 0
Interest Rate 0 [terminated fixed to floating in 2011]
0 [terminated fixed to floating in 2011]
Commodity 0 0
86
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 87
Enterprise Value, Year end 2014
Book Value Fair Value [market survey]
Cash =961+21+36.4 1,018
Operating Assets 4,479
Total Assets 5,497
Supplier Financing 2,590
Debt Financing 2,601 2,380
Min Int Financing 16 16
Equity 290 3,869
Total Financing 5,497
1,889 5,246
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 88
Enterprise Value, 2014
Peers Avon
Operating EBITDA 880
Peer Multiple 12.3X
Enterprise Value by Comp 10,824
Enterprise Value by Market Survey 5,246
Total Debt 2,601
Debt/EV 50%
EV by DCF
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 89
Risk
Peers Avon
Equity Beta [Avon] 2.24
Equity Beta, EL 1.35
Debt/EV, EL 8%
Debt/EV, Avon 50%
Equity Beta, Nu Skin 2.89
Equity Beta, Herbalife 3.30
Equity Beta, L’Oreal 1.10
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 90
2015 Cash Flows, repayment from cash flow or cash?
2012 2013 2014 Long run
Funds Flow 587 722 513 513
CFOps 556 540 360 513
CapX -229 -197 -131 -141?
Dividends -329 -107 -110 -110?
Free Cash Flow
0 236 119 262
Total Debt 2,692 2,692
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 91
Projections [from 2013]
• A key success factor for Avon is the generation of earnings. • The firm has weakness in its key markets, the year 2012 was a very bad year for earnings, 2013 was better. • In addition, working capital management, investment in fixed assets and the dividend policy influence the firms
cash flows and ability to repay debt. • During early 2013, Avon’s three year outlook was mixed because
– operating improvements will be delayed as a result of sluggish macroeconomic conditions, – heightened competition in the direct selling channel – Corporate governance issues and the uncertainty surrounding the financial impact of certain SEC
investigations into potential compliance violations. Also, new management is untested. • Equity Research, guided by management, suggested no revenue growth for 2013, followed by modest growth in
2014 and significant 2015 growth. OPM improves in 2013 and continues through 2015. Under this scenario, Avon faced a refinancing risk in 2013, unless they can unlock the trapped cash outside the US.
• However, the firm did much better in 2013 than originally forecast, due to slightly better margins and significantly lower CapX.
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 92
Forecasting, Base Case, from 2013
Originalforecast Actualresults 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014Sales 10,610 10,939 11,365 9,955 8,851OperatingProfit 796 941 1,091 791 649OPM 7.5% 8.6% 9.6% 7.9% 7.3%EBITDA 1,071 1,231 1,397 1,059 880FundsFlow 703 822 949 751 513CFO 409 637 829 540 360CapX -319 -351 -364 -198 -131Dividends -104 -104 -104 -107 -110ResidualCashFlows -14 182 361 235 119CPLTD -390 -652 -566 -390 -29
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 93
Credit Decision
• Lenders mitigate risk using several methods: – Risk-based pricing – Guarantees – Collateral – Credit derivatives – Covenants
• Borrowers with high profitability and low earnings volatility generally have interest coverage and/or debt to EBITDA covenants. These ratios, are informative for stable, profitable firms.
• In contrast, borrowers with low profitability and high volatility earnings are likely to have net worth covenants. – Tightening
• Tightness is defined as the distance between the threshold and the initial value of a covenant ratio. • Business risk
– Are you monitoring changes [acquisitions, disposals]? • Financial risk
– collateral helps to manage financial risk • Collateral Risk
– How will we be repaid in the event of a default? – What is the appraised value, volatility and salability of the collateral?
• Structure risk – Have we properly boxed the risks with the appropriate covenants and term? – Are you lending to the correct entity? – Guarantees
• Reporting Risk – Is there any change in the firms reporting?
• Funding risk – Conditions Precedent? MAC
• Position Risk – Cross Default?
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
When a firm has financial problems
• Stabilize the business • Gather information • Evaluate Options
– Short or Medium term • Repayment of debt
– Full or part • Sale of assets, entire business or subsidiaries • Sale of the debt • Reduce debt, improve operating working capital, extend maturities • Inject equity • Buy Protection
– Long run • Restructure the operations • Create joint venture • Debt for equity swap • Strategic investor • Restructure debt and/or interest payments
• Formulate proposal • Negotiate
94
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 95
OPM, adjusted
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
OPM
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Current forecast [2015/2016]
• Management guidance led Equity Research to the following scenario – 2015 revenue decline of 12% due to FX, spotty execution and competitive challenges; followed by modest
revenue growth after 2016, due to increased representative engagement – Stabilization of margins due to continued cost cutting – Weak Conversion of Earnings to Cash Flows in 2015, but improvements in cash conversion rate in 2016 – Modest Capital Spending and Dividends – Minimal towers of debt in 2015 but significant in 2016
96
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Management Case
97
actual Management 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Cumulative Revenue 10,717 9,926 8,767 7,747 7,844 7,980 8,225 8,590 40,385 EBITDA 963.3 1,030 880 777 819 886 959 1,008 4,449 EBITDA margin 9.0% 10.4% 10.0% 10.0% 10.4% 11.1% 11.7% 11.7% 11.0% Interest -104 -121 -111 -116 -112 -105 -99 -87 -518 tax -257 -164 -185 -173 -196 -228 -261 -287 -1,146 Funds Flow 602 745 584 488 511 553 599 635 2,785 WC changes -46 -205 -224 -189 -73 66 30 35 -131 Cash Flow from Operations 556 540 360 299 438 619 630 669 2,654 Capital Spending -241 -197 -131 -135 -137 -140 -140 -140 -692 Maintance CapX -162 -165 -141 -124 -124 -123 -123 -123 -616 Dividends -329 -107 -110 -111 -114 -100 -100 -100 -525 Free Cash Flow for Debt Repayment -14 236 119 53 187 379 390 429 1,437 Cumulative FCF for Debt Repayment 53 240 618 1,008 1,437 Debt Maturity -17 -390 -29 -29 -54 -259 -6 -507 Surplus/[Shortfall] -31 -154 90 24 133 120 383 -77 Other -83 20 20 10 10 Cash 1,108 961 902 1,055 1,195 1,588 1,521 Long Run Free Cash Flow 111 474 333 253 273 329 376 412 1,644
Total Debt 2,692 2,464 2,410 2,152 2,146 1,639 % debt repaid 8% 11% 22% 25% 49%
Total Debt/EBITDA 3.06 3.17 2.94 2.43 2.24 1.63 Covenant 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Pass/Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
EBITDA 880 777 819 886 959 1,008 Interest 111 116 112 105 99 87 EBITDA/Interest 7.9 6.7 7.3 8.4 9.7 11.6 Covenant 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Pass/Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Management Case Forecast summary
• Base case forecasts shows – 2015 modest generation of cash flow for debt repayment but – 2016 generation of cash flow not able to repay large tower of debt – Over the next 5 years, Avon can repay 49% of total debt in addition to building cash of $560
million
98
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Projection/Sensitivity Analysis
Assumptions: • Revenue headwinds − Recovery in main markets 2016 − Operating Margins start to improve
in 2017 − EBITDA margin improvement by
170bp − Effective Working Capital
Management in late 2015 − Restraint in CapX and dividends
Management
Assumptions: • Revenue headwinds continue
though end of 2016 • Continued loss of reps − EBITDA margins fall to 8.9% due to
unfavorable operating leverage − Effective Working Capital
Management by end of 2017
Bank Downside
Key Drivers:
• Revenue driven by reps, units and currency
• Cost controls, High Operating Leverage in many markets
• Working Capital Management
• Capital Spending
• Refinancing large towers of debt
Assumptions: • Revenue headwinds continue
though end of 2018 due to loss or reps and currencies
• Continued loss of reps
30
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Bank Case
100
actual Bank
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Cumulative Revenue 10,717 9,926 8,767 7,735 7,269 7,159 7,159 7,159 36,481 EBITDA 963.3 1,030 880 715 672 673 705 702 3,467 EBITDA margin 9.0% 10.4% 10.0% 9.2% 9.3% 9.4% 9.9% 9.8% 9.5% Interest -104 -121 -111 -119 -120 -118 -111 -105 -573 tax -257 -164 -185 -148 -137 -142 -159 -162 -749 Funds Flow 602 745 584 447 415 413 435 435 2,146 WC changes -46 -205 -224 -269 -78 -57 -18 -49 -470 Cash Flow from Operations 556 540 360 179 338 356 417 386 1,676 Capital Spending -241 -197 -131 -135 -137 -140 -140 -140 -692 Maintance CapX -162 -165 -141 -124 -124 -123 -123 -123 -616 Dividends -329 -107 -110 -111 -114 -100 -100 -100 -525 Free Cash Flow for Debt Repayment -14 236 119 -67 87 116 177 146 459 Cumulative FCF for Debt Repayment -67 19 135 312 459 Debt Maturity -17 -390 -29 -29 -54 -259 -6 -507 Surplus/[Shortfall] -31 -154 90 -96 33 -143 171 -360 Other 97 -32 144 -170 361 Cash 1,108 961 961 961 961 961 961 Long Run Free Cash Flow 111 474 333 212 178 189 212 212 1,004
Total Debt 2,692 2,654 2,554 2,424 2,243 2,092 % debt repaid 1% 5% 11% 19% 27%
Total Debt/EBITDA 3.06 3.71 3.80 3.60 3.18 2.98 Covenant 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Pass/Fail Pass FAIL FAIL FAIL Pass Pass
EBITDA 880 715 672 673 705 702 Interest 111 119 120 118 111 105 EBITDA/Interest 7.9 6.0 5.6 5.7 6.4 6.7 Covenant 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Pass/Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Bank Case Forecast summary
• With lower sales and no margin improvement, Avon produces modest cash flow for debt repayment • Covenant violation in 2015 through 2017, due to earning decline, although leverage modestly reduces by the end of
2019.
101
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Downside Case
102
actual Downside
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Cumulative Revenue 10,717 9,926 8,767 7,735 7,323 6,956 6,726 6,535 35,274 EBITDA 963.3 1,030 880 725 671 635 601 580 3,213 EBITDA margin 9.0% 10.4% 10.0% 9.4% 9.2% 9.1% 8.9% 8.9% 9.1% Interest -104 -121 -111 -120 -126 -132 -128 -132 -638 tax -257 -164 -185 -151 -134 -122 -112 -105 -624 Funds Flow 602 745 584 454 411 382 361 344 1,952 WC changes -46 -205 -224 -272 -148 -61 -18 -37 -536 Cash Flow from Operations 556 540 360 182 263 321 343 307 1,416 Capital Spending -241 -197 -131 -135 -137 -140 -140 -140 -692 Maintance CapX -162 -165 -141 -124 -124 -123 -123 -123 -616 Dividends -329 -107 -110 -111 -114 -100 -100 -100 -525 Free Cash Flow for Debt Repayment -14 236 119 -64 12 81 103 67 199 Cumulative FCF for Debt Repayment -64 -52 29 132 199 Debt Maturity -17 -390 -29 -29 -54 -259 -6 -507 Surplus/[Shortfall] -31 -154 90 -93 -41 -177 96 -440 Other 94 42 178 -95 441 Cash 1,108 961 961 961 961 961 961 Long Run Free Cash Flow 111 474 333 219 174 159 138 121 811
Total Debt 2,692 2,651 2,625 2,530 2,423 2,352 % debt repaid 2% 3% 6% 11% 14%
Total Debt/EBITDA 3.06 3.66 3.91 3.98 4.03 4.05 Covenant 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Pass/Fail Pass FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
EBITDA 880 725 671 635 601 580 Interest 111 120 126 132 128 132 EBITDA/Interest 7.9 6.1 5.3 4.8 4.7 4.4 Covenant 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Pass/Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015
Downside Case
103
With lower sales and margin pressure, Avon produces modest cash flow for debt repayment Covenant violation in through 2019, due to earning decline, although leverage modestly reduces by
the end of 2019, with 14% of debt repaid over 5 years.
© Barry M Frohlinger, Inc. copyright 1981 - 2015 104
Credit Decision
• There has been significant risk in Avon's generation of free cash flow
– due to profitability problems along, along with working capital needs as well as the recent volatility in active representative and organic revenue growth trends
• The dividend cut has been very helpful as has been conservative spend on PPE
• Improving profitability is further challenged by the highly competitive nature of the global beauty and personal care category which has required Avon to sustain high levels of brand advertising and representative investments.
• FY 2013 looked like a turnaround year until 4th quarter of 2013, when the dollar strength and the loss of reps has again put pressure on earnings.
• There are also risks inherent in a direct selling model, even when this business model is well-managed.
• Avon's ratings have been cut as the company fails to reinvigorate growth and credit metrics deteriorate such as earnings margins.
• The 2012 cut in dividend is a credit improvement, the firms focus on working capital management along with fixed asset investment and margins could stabilize the firm. However, the bank should not be the equity risk taker in this transaction.
• Under the management case, there is risk minimal risk in debt repayment during 2015; gives management the year 2015 to work on a plan. Under a the bank and downside case, violation of covenants is a problem.