CreatingRefugees:

DisplacementCausedbytheUnitedStates’Post-9/11Wars

DavidVine,CalaCoffman,KatalinaKhoury,MadisonLovasz,HelenBush,RachelLeduc,andJenniferWalkup1

September8,2020EXECUTIVESUMMARY

SincePresidentGeorgeW.Bushannounceda“globalwaronterror”followingAlQaeda’sSeptember11,2001attacksontheUnitedStates,theU.S.militaryhasengagedincombataroundtheworld.Asinpastconflicts,theUnitedStates’post-9/11warshaveresultedinmasspopulationdisplacements.Thisreportisthefirsttomeasurecomprehensivelyhowmanypeoplethesewarshavedisplaced.Usingthebestavailableinternationaldata,thisreportconservativelyestimatesthatatleast37millionpeoplehavefledtheirhomesintheeightmostviolentwarstheU.S.militaryhaslaunchedorparticipatedinsince2001.Thereportdetailsamethodologyforcalculatingwartimedisplacement,providesanoverviewofdisplacementineachwar-affectedcountry,andpointstodisplacement’sindividualandsocietalimpacts.

Wartimedisplacement(alongsidewardeathsandinjuries)mustbecentraltoanyanalysisofthepost-9/11warsandtheirshort-andlong-termconsequences.DisplacementalsomustbecentraltoanypossibleconsiderationofthefutureuseofmilitaryforcebytheUnitedStatesorothers.Ultimately,displacing37million—andperhapsasmanyas59million—raisesthequestionofwhobearsresponsibilityforrepairingthedamageinflictedonthosedisplaced.

1DavidVineisProfessorofAnthropologyatAmericanUniversityinWashington,DC.TheotherauthorswerestudentsintheSpring2020AmericanUniversityPublicAnthropologyClinic.Thesecond,third,andfourthauthorsarelistedalphabeticallyandcollectivelyshouldbeconsideredsecondauthor;thefifththroughseventhauthorsshouldbeconsideredthethirdauthor.TheauthorsthankHeidiPeltier,StephanieSavell,NetaCrawford,CatherineLutz,andtheotherauthorsof“20YearsofWar”papersfortheirhelpfulfeedbackandassistancewiththispaper.ThanksalsotoFrancescaEmanueleforhelpwithdatacollectionandtoErnestoCastañeda-Tinocoforhiscarefulreadingandextremelyhelpfulfeedbackonanearlydraft.

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MAJORFINDINGS§TheU.S.post-9/11warshaveforciblydisplacedatleast37millionpeopleinandfromAfghanistan,Iraq,Pakistan,Yemen,Somalia,thePhilippines,Libya,andSyria.Thisexceedsthosedisplacedbyeverywarsince1900,exceptWorldWarII.

§Millionsmorehavebeendisplacedbyotherpost-9/11conflictsinvolvingU.S.troopsinsmallercombatoperations,includingin:BurkinaFaso,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Mali,Niger,SaudiArabia,andTunisia.

§37millionisaveryconservativeestimate.ThetotaldisplacedbytheU.S.post-9/11warscouldbecloserto48–59million.

§25.3millionpeoplehavereturnedafterbeingdisplaced,althoughreturndoesnoterasethetraumaofdisplacementormeanthatthosedisplacedhavereturnedtotheiroriginalhomesortoasecurelife.

§Anynumberislimitedinwhatitcanconveyaboutdisplacement’sdamage.Thepeoplebehindthenumberscanbedifficulttosee,andnumberscannotcommunicatehowitmightfeeltoloseone’shome,belongings,community,andmuchmore.Displacementhascausedincalculableharmtoindividuals,families,towns,cities,regions,andentirecountriesphysically,socially,emotionally,andeconomically.

Introduction

SincetheGeorgeW.Bushadministrationlauncheda“globalwaronterror”followingAlQaeda’sSeptember11,2001attacksontheUnitedStates,theU.S.militaryhaswagedwarcontinuouslyforalmosttwodecades.2Inthattime,U.S.forceshavefoughtinwarsorparticipatedinothercombatoperationsinatleast24countries.3Thedestructioninflictedbywarfareinthesecountrieshasbeenincalculableforciviliansandcombatants,forU.S.militarypersonnelandtheirfamilymembers,andforentiresocieties.Deathsandinjuriesnumberinthemillions.

Likeotherwarsthroughouthistory,theU.S.post-9/11warshavecausedmillionsofpeople—thevastmajority,civilians—tofearfortheirlivesandfleeinsearchofsafety.Millionshavefledairstrikes,bombings,artilleryfire,droneattacks,gunbattles,andrape.Peoplehavefledthedestructionoftheirhomes,neighborhoods,hospitals,schools,jobs,

2 Weput“terrorism”andvariationsofthewordinquotationmarkstoindicatethepoliticizednatureoftheconcept—asthesayinggoes,oneperson’sterroristisanotherperson’sfreedomfighter.TheU.S.governmentandothergovernmentshaveusedthetermflexiblysince2001tojustifywarsandattacksonalmostanygroupdefinedasanenemy.3BarbaraSalazarTorreonandSofiaPlagakis,InstancesofUseofUnitedStatesArmedForcesAbroad,1798–2018(Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,2018);DavidVine,TheUnitedStatesofWar:AGlobalHistoryofAmerica'sEndlessConflicts,fromColumbustotheIslamicState(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,forthcoming[October13,2020]).

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andlocalfoodandwatersources.Theyhaveescapedforcedevictions,deaththreats,andlarge-scaleethniccleansingsetoffbytheU.SwarsinAfghanistanandIraqinparticular.4

Toourknowledge,noonehascalculatedhowmanypeoplehavebeendisplacedbytheUnitedStates’post-9/11wars.Somescholars,journalists,andinternationalorganizationshaveprovideddisplacementdataforsomeofthesewars,suchasthoseinAfghanistanandIraq.Howeverthesestatisticstendtobesnapshotsofthenumberofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpeople(IDP)ataparticularpointintimeratherthanafullaccountingofthetotalnumberofpeopledisplacedovertimesincethestartofthewars.5

Thispapercalculatesthetotalnumberofdisplacedpeopleintheeightpost-9/11warsinwhichU.S.forceshavebeenmostsignificantlyinvolved.WefocusonwarswheretheU.S.governmentbearsaclearresponsibilityforinitiatingarmedcombat(theoverlappingAfghanistan/Pakistanwarandthepost-2003warinIraq);forescalatingarmedconflict(U.S.andEuropeaninterventionintheLibyanuprisingagainstMuammarGaddafiandLibya’songoingcivilwarandU.S.involvementinSyria);orforbeingasignificantparticipantincombatthroughdronestrikes,battlefieldadvising,logisticalsupport,armssales,andothermeans(U.S.forces’involvementinwarsinYemen,Somalia,andthePhilippines).6

IndocumentingdisplacementcausedbytheU.S.post-9/11wars,wearenotsuggestingtheU.S.governmentortheUnitedStatesasacountryissolelyresponsibleforthedisplacement.Causationisneversosimple.Causationalwaysinvolvesamultiplicityofcombatantsandotherpowerfulactors,centuriesofhistory,andlarge-scalepolitical,economic,andsocialforces.Eveninthesimplestofcases,conditionsofpre-existingpoverty,environmentalchange,priorwars,andotherformsofviolenceshapewhoisdisplacedandwhoisnot.

Thispaperanditsaccompanyingtablesdocumentseveralcategoriesofpeopledisplacedbythepost-9/11wars:1)refugees,2)asylumseekerspursuingprotectionasrefugees,and3)internallydisplacedpersonsorpeople(IDPs).Wealsocalculatethenumberof4)refugees,asylumseekers,andIDPswhohavereturnedtotheircountryorareaoforigin.

Ultimately,weestimatethatatleast37millionpeoplehavebeendisplacedinjusteightcountriessince2001(Table1).Thisincludes8millionpeopledisplacedacrossinternationalbordersasrefugeesandasylumseekersand29millionpeopledisplacedinternallytootherpartsoftheircountries.Toputthesefiguresinperspective,displacing

4Homelessveteransfromthepost-9/11warsrepresentothersdisplacedinindirectwaysbythesewars.IntheUnitedStates,alone,thereweremorethan31,000homelessveteransfromthepost-9/11warsasof2015(StephenMetraux,etal.,“PathwaysIntoHomelessnessAmongPost-9/11-EraVeterans,”PsychologicalServices14,no.2(2017):230).5E.g.,SonjaFransenandHeindeHaas,“TheVolumeandGeographyofForcedMigration,”workingpaper,MigrationPolicyInstituteDecember2019.6WhiletheintensityoffightinginAfghanistanandIraqencouraginglyhasdissipatedinrecentyears,thewarsinSomalia,Yemen,andSyriahavenot;theyremainamongthetoptencountriesexperiencingthemostsevereinternaldisplacementintheworld.

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37millionpeopleisequivalenttoremovingnearlyalltheresidentsofthestateofCaliforniaorallthepeopleinTexasandVirginiacombined.7ThefigureisalmostaslargeasthepopulationofCanada.8Inhistoricalterms,37milliondisplacedismorethanthosedisplacedbyanyotherwarordisastersinceatleastthestartofthetwentiethcenturywiththesoleexceptionofWorldWarII(seeTable2).9

TheUnitedStates’post-9/11warshavecontributedsignificantlytothedramaticincreaseinrecentyearsinthenumberofpeopledisplacedbywarandviolentconflictworldwide:Between2010and2019,thetotalnumberofrefugeesandIDPsgloballyhasnearlydoubledfrom41millionto79.5million.10

Inthenextsection,thispaperproceedswithanoverviewofourmethodologyandapproachtocalculatingwartimedisplacement.AmoredetaileddiscussionisintheAppendix.Wenextprovideanoverviewofdisplacementineachwar-affectedcountry.Wethenpresenttheresultsofourcalculationsanddiscussthelimitsofquantitativemeasurement.Weconcludebydiscussingthesignificanceofourfindingstoassessmentsofthepost-9/11wars,todebatesabouttheuseofmilitaryforcemorebroadly,andtoquestionsaboutwhobearsresponsibilityforrepairingdamagesufferedbythedisplaced.

Definitions

Definitionsfollowthoseoftheinternationalorganizations,includingtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR),thatarethesourcesofourdata.Refugees:Peopleoutsidetheircountryoforiginwhohavebeengrantedprotected“refugee”status,accordingtoapplicableinternationalconventionsanddefinitions,bythegovernmentsofcountriestowhichpeoplehavefled.Thiscategoryalsoincludespeoplein“refugee-like”situationswhomayneitherhavereceivedprotectedstatusorbeanasylumseeker.11AsylumSeekers:Peoplewhoareseekingbuthavenotyetbeengrantedrefugeestatusandprotectionoutsidetheircountryoforigin.12InternallyDisplacedPersons/People(IDPs):Peoplewhoremainwithintheircountriesoforiginandwhohavebeenforcedtofleeorleavetheirhomesorplacesofhabitual

7UnitedStatesCensusBureau,“StatePopulationTotalsandComponentsofChange:2010-2019,”December30,2019,https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html.8WorldBankGroup,“WorldPopulationProspects:2019Revision,”accessedAugust10,2020,https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.9Populationgrowthsincethestartofthetwentiethcenturymakestheseincidentsofdisplacementimperfectcomparisons.10UNHCR,GlobalTrends:ForcedDisplacementin2019(Geneva:UnitedNations,2020),8.11UNHCR,GlobalTrends:2019,64.12UNHCR,GlobalTrends:2019,64.

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residenceasaresultofortoavoidtheviolenteffectsofwar.13(IDPscanincludepeopleforcedtofleedisasterssuchasfloodsandearthquakes,howeverweexcludetheseIDPsfromourcalculations.)14ReturnedRefugeesandAsylumSeekersandReturnedIDPs(Returnees):Peoplewhohavereturnedtotheircountryoforiginfromabroadorhavereturnedtotheirareaoforiginfromanotherpartoftheircountry.Includeschildrenborntodisplacedmotherswhentheyreturntoamother’shomecountryorareaoforigin.MethodsandApproach

Thestatisticsthatprovidethebasisforourcalculationsare,webelieve,thebestavailable.StatisticsforrefugeesandasylumseekersprimarilycomefromtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR),whichhascompileddataonforceddisplacementworldwidesince1951.Statisticsforpeopledisplacedwithintheircountries—IDPs—comesfromtheInternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre(IDMC),UNHCR,theInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM),andtheUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA).Wesoughtoutandusedmultipledatasourceswherepossibletocompareandcheckfigures.

Aswithourdefinitions(above),wefollowthestandardsbywhichtheseleadinginternationalorganizationsdeterminewhoqualifiesasapersondisplacedbywar.Liketheseorganizations,andotherinternationaldisplacementexperts,wedonotsuggestthatwaristhesingularcauseofdisplacementforthosecategorizedasdisplacedbywar.Instead,wefollowUNHCR,IDMC,andothersinfocusingoncasesinwhichtheviolenceofwarbearsprimaryresponsibilityfor,oristheprecipitatingincidentbehind,people’sflightfromtheirhome.

Documentingwar-induceddisplacementraisesnumerousothermethodologicalchallenges.Foremostamongthemisthereliabilityofdisplacementstatistics.Thisisa

13IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement[GRID]2020MethodologicalAnnex(Geneva:NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,April2020),5.IDPsincludepastoralistandnomadicpeopleswhoaredisplacedfromtheirplacesofregularhabitationbywarorviolentconflict.IDPsaregenerallycountedregardlessofcitizenshipstatusinacountryiftheyaredisplacedfromtheirplaceofhabitualresidence(IDMC,GRID2020MethodologicalAnnex,5).IDMCalsogenerallydefinespeopleasIDPsregardlessofthedistanceofdisplacementordurationofdisplacementfromhome.SeeIDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2017MethodologicalAnnex(Geneva:NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,2017),102.14Excludingall“disasterIDPs”isonewayourcalculationisconservative:warfrequentlymakespeoplevulnerabletootherformsofdisplacementgivenhowwardestroysinfrastructure,damageshousing,andcausesthelossofincomeandwealththatcanprotectpeoplefromdisaster-induceddisplacement.“Anoverlapofconflictanddisastersrepeatedlydisplacedpeopleinanumberofcountries,”IDMCwrotein2019.“ExtendedrainyseasonsdisplacedmillionsofpeopleinareasofNigeriaandSomaliaalreadyaffectedbyconflict.MostofthepeopledisplacedbydisastersinIraqandSyriawere[war-displaced]IDPslivingincampsthatwereflooded.”IDMC,GRID2019,v.

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perennialproblemreflectingthescaleofdisplacement;thedifficultyofdatacollectioninwarzones,refugeecamps,andothercontextswhererefugeesfrequentlyliveclandestinelives;andthefactthatdataaboutthedisplacedfrequentlyhaspolitical,economic,anddiplomaticconsequences.Unfortunatelyinternationalorganizationsanddisplacementscholarshavereachednoconsensusaboutwhetherdisplacementstatisticstendtounderestimateoroverestimatethenumberdisplaced.WediscusstheseandotherproblemsindetailintheAppendix.Giventhesechallenges,wealwayserredontheconservativesideinourestimates.Wealsowanttoavoidanyperceptionthatwehaveexaggeratedthescaleofdisplacement.

DisplacementlinkedtoU.S.militaryactivityinSyriaisparticularlychallengingtoquantify.Throughoutthecountry’scivilwar,morethanhalfofSyria’spre-warpopulationhasbeendisplaced,totalingsome13.3millionpeoplein2018.15WeconsideredincludingmostorallofthisdisplacementinourcalculationgiventheimportantroletheU.S.warinIraqanditsbirthingoftheIslamicStatehaveplayedinshapingtheSyriancivilwar.WeoptedinsteadforamoreconservativeapproachgiventhatU.S.involvementinthewarhasbeenrelativelylimitedcomparedtothatoftheSyriangovernment,rebelforces,foreignmilitants,andRussian,Turkish,andotherforeignmilitaries.WhiletheU.S.governmenthasprovidedfunding,training,andothersupportforsomerebelgroups,U.S.forcesonlystartedfightinginSyriain2014withthestartoftheU.S.waragainsttheso-calledIslamicState.Asaresult,wefocusedourcalculationsonpeopledisplacedfromfiveSyrianprovinceswhereU.S.forceshavefoughtandoperatedsince2014.16AlessconservativeandarguablymoreaccurateapproachwouldincludethedisplacedfromallofSyria’sprovincessince2014orasearlyas2013whentheU.S.governmentbeganbackingSyrianrebelgroups.

Ourtotaldisplacementcalculationdoesnotincludemillionsmorewhohavebeendisplacedinotherpost–2001conflictsinwhichtheU.S.governmenthasbeeninvolvedaspartofthe“waronterror.”WehavenotincludedthesedisplacedpeoplesbecauseU.S.militaryinvolvementinotherconflictshasbeensignificantlynarrowerinscope,duration,anddegreeofcombatinvolvement.Thedisplacementis,however,nolesssignificantforthoseaffectedanddeservesadditionalinvestigation.Weprovideabriefoverviewofdisplacementintheseotherconflictsinthesection,below,thatdiscussesouroverallcalculation(“DisplacementintheU.S.Post-9/11Wars:37million”).First,wereviewthehistoryandcontoursofdisplacementintheeightcountriesthatarethefocusofthispaper.

15UNHCR,GlobalTrends:ForcedDisplacementin2018(Geneva:UnitedNations,2019),4,6.16ThefiveareAleppo,Al-Hasakeh,Ar-Raqqa,Deir-ez-Zor,andHoms.See,e.g.,CongressionalResearchServicereportsonSyria,whichincludemapsofU.S.militarybasesinSyriaandadiscussionofU.S.operationsinthecountry.CongressionalResearchServicereportsforSyriacanbefoundathttps://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33487.html.Seealso,IDMC,“Syria:DriversofDisplacement,”webpage,Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria,accessedJune13,2020.

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DisplacementinWar-AffectedCountriesAfghanistan(2001–present)

The2001U.S.invasionofAfghanistanandnearlytwodecadesofwarhavedisplacedmillionsinacountrywheremassdisplacementhasbeenafixtureoflifesincetheSovietUnion’sinvasionin1979.BythetimeoftheSovietwithdrawalfromAfghanistan,therewere5.6millionAfghanrefugees.17In2000,theyearbeforethestartoftheU.S.-ledwar,4.4millionAfghanrefugeesandasylumseekersremainedabroad,alongwithmorethan758,000IDPs.18SincethestartoftheU.S.-ledwar,atleast2.1millionAfghansfledthecountrywithanother3.2milliondisplacedinternally(Table1).Therefugeeandasylumseekercalculation,inparticular,couldbeasignificantunderestimategivenotherdatashowingthat2.4millionfledthecountryjustbetween2012and2019.19Until2013,Afghansremainedthelargestrefugeepopulationintheworld,withanestimatedthreemillionrefugeesinPakistanalone.20

Inrecentyears,displacementhasgrownastheintensityoffightinghasincreasedbetweentheAfghanarmy,itsU.S.allies,andinsurgentTalibanforces,coupledwithgrowingIslamicStateattacksinthecountry.By2019,around3millionAfghanswere

17See,e.g.,UNHCR,TheStateofTheWorld'sRefugees2000:FiftyYearsofHumanitarianAction(Geneva:UnitedNations,2000),314;AlessandroMonsutti,“TheTransnationalTurninMigrationStudiesandtheAfghanSocialNetworks,”inDispossessionandDisplacement:ForcedMigrationintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,eds.DawnChattyandBillFinlayson(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),47;AshleyJackson,“TheCostofWarAfghanExperiencesofConflict,1978–2009,”OxfamInternational,November2009,https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/afghanistan-the-cost-of-war_14.pdf.18UNHCR,“UNHCR’sPopulationsofConcernOriginatingfromAfghanistan,”dataset,https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-originating-afg,accessedMarch6,2020.Note:Thepreviouslinkappearstobebroken.TheclosestdatasettothatcitedappearstobeUNHCR,“End-YearStockPopulationFiguresForForciblyDisplacedPersonsOriginatingfromAfghanistan,”whichwasavailableasofAugust10,2020,athttps://data.humdata.org/dataset/unhcr-population-data-for-afg.UNHCRappearsrecentlytohaveupdateditsdatasetsforallcountriesavailableviatheHumanitarianDataExchange(HDX).UNHCRalsorecentlychangedthefunctionalityofanddataavailableviaitswebsiteprovidingstatisticsaboutdisplacedpeoples.Thismakesitdifficulttoaccesstheprecisedatasetsthatweemployed.Forthosewhowouldlikeaccesstoanyofthedataweused,pleaseemailvine@american.edu.19InternationalOrganizationforMigrationAfghanistan,“BaselineMobilityAssessment:SummaryResultsRound8Mar–Jun2019,”DisplacementTrackingMatrix/Afghanistan,2019,https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IOM-Afghanistan-Baseline-Mobility-Assessment-Summary-Results-June-2019-English.pdf.20NoWomen,NoPeace/MahwashBhimjee,“AfghanRefugeeWomeninPakistan:TheInvisibleCausalitiesoftheWarinAfghanistan,”TheFWordBlog,March28,2013,http://www.thefword.org.uk/blog/2013/03/afghan_refugee_women.

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displacedinternally—anall-timehigh.21Anequivalentnumberarerefugeesandasylumseekers,mostlyinPakistanandIran.22

Withpeacenegotiationsunderway,thereissomehopethatdisplacedAfghanscouldreturnhome.Indeed,whentheU.S.governmentanditsAfghanalliesinitiallydeposedtheTalibanfrompower,millionsofAfghansdisplacedbefore2001returnedhome.By2005,around5millionAfghanrefugeesandIDPshadreturnedtotheirhomeareas(returneesoftencouldnotreturntotheirphysicalhomes,sometimesbecausetheyweredestroyed).Inthesubsequent15years,around2.5millionrefugeesandIDPshavegonebacktosomesemblanceofhome,representingaboutoneinfivepeopleinthecountrytoday.23WhilesomereturnedbecauseofincreasedsafetyandstabilityinpartsofAfghanistan,othersreturnedbecauseofsubsequentdisplacement:forexample,someAfghanrefugeesreturnedtoAfghanistantoescapeviolenceinPakistan.Inrecentyears,theIraniangovernmenthasforcedhundredsofthousandsofAfghanrefugeestoleaveIran;othershaveleftasaresultofIran’sinternational-sanctions-batteredeconomy.24

Pakistan(2001–present)

AfterTalibanandAlQaedafightersfledAfghanistanintonorthwestPakistanfollowingthe2001U.S.-ledinvasion,asingle,interconnectedwarhasbeenfoughtonbothsidesoftheborder.TheU.S.governmenthasparticipatedinthewaronthePakistanisideoftheborderwithdroneandairstrikes,aerialsurveillance,andfinancialbackingforthePakistanimilitary.

LikeAfghanistan,Pakistan’shistoryhasbeenmarkedbydisplacement,mostnotablywiththemillionsviolentlydisplacedduringthe1947India/Pakistanpartition.Since2001,PakistanishavealsosuffereddisplacementrelatedtofightingbetweenthePakistanigovernmentandAfghanandPakistaniTalibanorganizations,alongwithotherinsurgentgroupsoperatingonbothsidesoftheborder.WiththesupportofU.S.dronestrikesandotherU.S.militaryaid,thePakistanimilitarybattledforyearstopushinsurgentsoutofNorthwestPakistan.25Priortotheendofmostborderfightingin2017,anestimated1.56millionPakistanislivinginareasneartheAfghanborderhadbecomeIDPs,withmostliving

21IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2020,49.22Onthe2,367,220millionlivinginPakistanandIran,seeUNHCRAfghanistan,“OperationalUpdate,”report,Kabul,Afghanistan,December2019,2.Onthe3,007,546totalrefugeesreportedbyUNHCRasof2018,seeUNHCR,“PopulationStatistics,”website,http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concernorUNHCR,“UNHCR’sPopulationsofConcernOriginatingfromAfghanistan,”dataset,https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-originating-afg,accessedMarch6,2020.23UNHCR,“FactSheetAfghanistanasof31December2019,”Geneva,December31,2019,2.24IDMC,“Afghanistan:PatternsofDisplacement”Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,2019,https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/afghanistan.25IDMC,“Pakistan:DisplacementOngoinginaNumberofRegions,”May15,2008,18,https://www.refworld.org/docid/482d32972.htm;IDMC,“PakistanSolutionstoDisplacementElusiveforBothNewandProtractedIDPs,”August24,2015,4-5,https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201508-ap-pakistan-overview-en.pdf.

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inotherpartsofNorthwestPakistan.Around90,000remainedIDPsattheendof2019.26Since2002,morethan3.4millionpeoplehavebecomeIDPswhilemorethan360,000havefledthecountryasrefugees(Table1).(WhileweincludethedisplacementinNorthwestPakistaninourtotalcount,weexcludesmallernumbersofpeopledisplacedinseparateconflictsinotherpartsofPakistan,includinginJammuandKashmirandBalochistan.)27

Yemen(2002–present)

U.S.militaryinvolvementinYemendatesto2002,whentheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)begandroneassassinationsofaccusedAl-QaedaoperativeswiththecooperationofYemen’sthengovernment.AccordingtotheBureauofInvestigativeJournalism,from2002to2019theU.S.launchedatleast336confirmeddronestrikes,reportedlykillingbetween1,020and1,389civilians,includingchildren,inadditiontoallegedmilitants.28

Beginningin2014,theHouthi(orAnsarAllah)movement,aShiaMuslim-basedpoliticalandarmedgroupformedinthe1990s,graduallytookcontrolofYemen.In2015,SaudiArabia,backedbytheU.S.governmentandacoalitionofregionalandEuropeanpowers,invadedYemeninanattempttooverthrowtheHouthis,believedtobebackedbySaudirivalIran.29TheU.S.militaryhasusedregionalbasestoproviderefueling,logistical,weapons,andothersupportfortheSaudimilitaryanditsotherallies.30Atthesametime,militants,includingAlQaedaintheArabianPeninsula(AQAP)andtheIslamicState,beganoperatinginanincreasinglycomplexconflictthatcontinuestothisday.

Since2015,warhasmeantthatYemenishavefacedwidespreaddisplacementandwhattheUNconsiderstheworld’sworsthumanitariancrisis.AccordingtotheUN’sOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA),“nearly250,000Yemenipeoplehavediedsince2015,including100,000peopleasadirectresultofcombatand130,000fromhungeranddisease.”31Thecountryhasfaced“theworstcholeraoutbreakinrecordedhistory.”Two-thirdsofYemenisexperiencingfoodinsecurity,with14millionatriskof

26Weassumethatapproximately15%ofPakistan’sdisplacementoccurredoutsideofNorthwestPakistan,andthussubtractthispercentagefromtotalsforthecountry.27IDMC,“PakistanSolutions,”5.28TheBureauofInvestigativeJournalism,“DroneStrikesinYemen,”website,https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/yemen,accessedJune12,2020.29Almosawa,ShuaibandMaryamSaleh,“A13-year-oldBoyandOtherYemeniCiviliansWereKilledinU.S.DroneStrikesThisMonth.”TheIntercept,March26,2018,https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/yemen-drone-strike-civilians-war-on-terror/.30OrianaPawlyk,“2YearsintoYemenWar,USRampsUpRefuelingofSaudiJets,”Military.com,February15,2017,https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/02/15/2-years-yemen-war-us-ramps-up-refueling-saudi-jets.html;OrianaPawlyk,“GeneralArguestoContinueRefuelingSaudiPlanesinYemenFight,”March13,2018,https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/03/13/general-argues-continue-refueling-saudi-planes-yemen-fight.html;RobertF.Worth,“‘TheyBreakUsorWeBreakThem,’”NewYorkTimesMagazine,November4,2018,50–51.31OCHA,“GlobalHumanitarianOverview2020,”Geneva,December10,2019,49https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO-2020_v9.1.pdf.

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starvationinwhatistheworld’sworstfoodinsecuritycrisis.32TheU.S.-backedSaudi-ledwar“hasturnedmuchofYemenintoawasteland,”writesaNewYorkTimesreporter.33TheUNestimatesthataround24.1millionofYemen’s30.4millionpeopleneedhumanitarianassistanceofsomekind.34

Mostofthe4.4milliondisplacedhavebeendisplacedwithinYemen.“PovertyandthesheerdifficultyoftravelingoutofthecountryhasleftfarmorepeoplewhoaretryingtoescapeactivefrontlinesmovingaboutinsideYemen,rentingroomsandflats,movinginwithrelatives,fillingIDPcampsandshelters,”explainsSalaKhaled,aformerIDPwhobecameoneoflessthan15,000YemenirefugeesinJordan.35

Inthefirstyearofwar,thereweremorethan2millioncasesofdisplacement.Hundredsofthousandsmorehavebeendisplacedeveryyearsince2015.Therewerearound400,000newdisplacementincidentsin2019(althoughIDMCsuggeststhisfigure“islikelytobeagrossunderestimate”givenaccessconstraintsondatacollectioninthemidstofthewar).36MorethanoneintenYemenis—around3.6millionpeople—iscurrentlyanIDP.37

Somalia(2002–present)

DisplacementhasshapedlifeinSomaliafordecades.38In2004,theNorwegianRefugeeCouncilreportedthat“virtuallyall[emphasisadded]Somalishavebeendisplaced 32OCHA,“2019HumanitarianNeedsOverview:Yemen,”NewYork,December2018,15,42,https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf;OCHA,“GlobalHumanitarianOverview2020.”33RobertF.Worth,“HowtheWarinYemenBecameaBloodyStalemate—AndtheWorstHumanitarianCrisisintheWorld,”inNewYorkTimesMagazine,October31,2018,https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/31/magazine/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html.34OCHA,“2019HumanitarianNeedsOverview,”5.35SalaKhaled,“Oneof3.65MillionStories:AYemeniJourneyofDisplacement,”Sana’aCenterforStrategicStudies,Sana’a,Yemen,January4,2020,3,https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/8593;UNHCR,“UNHCR’sPopulationsofConcernOriginatingfromYemen,”dataset,https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-originating-yem,accessedMay6,2020.Linknowbroken.Theclosestcomparabledatasetisnowavailableathttps://data.humdata.org/dataset/unhcr-population-data-for-yem.Seen.18foradiscussionofthisdataaccessproblem.36IDMC,“Yemen:DriversofDisplacement,”accessedJune12,2020,https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/yemen,.37IDMC,“Yemen:TheImplications,”1.38ConflictinSomaliahasbeenongoingsincetheearly1990s,whensome3millionweredisplacedandonequartermilliondied;therootsoftheviolencedatetoatleasttheU.S.-SovietColdWarandinvolvelongstandingcompetitionoverterritory,regionalautonomy,andresources.Inthe1990s,theU.S.militarysent25,000troopsaspartofUNhumanitarianoperations.TheyleftaftersoldierstookheavycasualtiesduringfightinginMogadishuin1993.See,e.g.,GlobalIDPProject,“InternallyDisplacedSomalis,”4–5,11–13;CatherineBesteman,“TheCostsofWarinSomalia,”BrownUniversity,CostsofWarProject,September5,2019;AnnaLindleyandAnitaHaslie,“UnlockingProtractedDisplacement:SomaliCaseStudy,”WorkingPaperSeriesNo.79,OxfordUniversity,August2011,301,https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp79-unlocking-protracted-displacement-somalia-2011.pdf.

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byviolenceatleastonceintheirlife.”39TheU.S.governmenthasbeeninvolvedinfightingtheresince2002,shortlyaftertheGeorgeW.Bushadministrationdeclaredits“waronterrorism.”Formostofthelast19years,U.S.forceshaveusedmilitarybasesinDjiboutiandelsewhereintheregiontocarryoutdroneassassinationsofallegedmilitants.In2006,theU.S.militaryandCIAbackedanEthiopian-ledinvasionofSomaliatoremovetheIslamicCourtsUnion(ICU)frompower.U.S.andEthiopianleadersclaimedtheICUwasanAlQaedaally;ICUleadersdeniedthecharge.TheinvasionsucceededinfurtherradicalizingtheICU’sarmedwing,AlShabaab,whichdeclaredallegiancetoAlQaedain2012.40AwarbetweenAlShabaabandaUN-recognizedSomaligovernmentanditsU.S.andotherforeignalliescontinuestothisday.U.S.forceshaveexpandedtheirpresenceinSomaliainrecentyears:thereareatleastfivesmallU.S.militarybasesandatleastoneCIAbaseinthecountry.TheDonaldTrumpadministrationhasdramaticallyincreasedairstrikesagainstAlShabaabandanIslamicStatepresence;civiliancasualtieshavealsoincreased,withanestimated15killedin2020andscoreskilledsince2007.41

Politicalinstabilityandviolentconflicthaveheightenedandbeenmutuallyreinforcingwithhumanitariancrisescausedbydrought,flooding,attendantfamine,andwidespreadpoverty.42Bytheendof2010,amidafaminethatwouldkillhundredsofthousands,43almost1.5millionpeoplehadbeendisplacedduetoconflictandviolence.In2019alone,therewerealmost200,000newcasesofinternaldisplacement,mostlyaroundAlShabaab’sstrongholdinsoutheastSomalia.44Intotal,bytheendof2019,approximately4.2millionSomalishadbeendisplacedwithinthecountry(3.4million)orbeyonditsbordersasrefugeesorasylumseekers(800,000).MostrefugeesendedupinneighboringcountriessuchasKenya,Ethiopia,andYemen.SmallernumbershavereachedUganda,Djibouti,SouthAfrica,Germany,andSweden.ThousandsreachedtheUnitedStatesduringeachyearoftheGeorgeW.BushandObamaadministrations,whilelessthan700havearrivedinthelastthreeyearsoftheTrumpadministration.45

39GlobalIDPProject,“InternallyDisplacedSomalisFaceUncertainFutureAfterYearsofStateCollapse,”Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,November24,2004,11,https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/200411-af-somalia-internally-displaced-somalis-face-uncertain-future-country-en.pdf.40Turse,“U.S.MilitarySays”;AmandaSperber,“The‘CollateralDamage’oftheU.S.’sUnofficialWarinSomalia,”InTheseTimes,December16,2019,https://inthesetimes.com/article/us-air-strikes-somalia-al-shabab-isis-pentagon-civilian-casualities.41QuotedinTurse,“U.S.MilitarySays”:RichardReeveandZoëPelter,“FromNewFrontiertoNewNormal:Counter-terrorismOperationsintheSahel-Sahara,”London:RemoteControlGroup/OxfordResearchGroup,August2014,25;NickTurse,“TheTrumpAdministration'sAirStrikesinSomaliaAreOntheRiseAgain—andCiviliansArePayingthePrice,”Time,August16,2020,https://time.com/5879354/civilian-deaths-airstrikes-somalia/.42BBCNews,“SomaliaProfile—Timeline,”January4,2018,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632.43BBCNews,“SomaliaProfile.”44IDMC,“GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2020,”Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,April2020,20.45Davis,Rochelle,AbbieTaylor,WillTodman,andEmmaMurphy,“SudaneseandSomaliRefugeesinJordan:HierarchiesofAidinProtractedDisplacementCrises,”MiddleEastReport,no.279

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Philippines(2002–present)

Since2002,U.S.specialforcestroopsandmilitaryadvisorshavedeployedtothePhilippinestosupportthePhilippinegovernmentinafourdecades-oldconflictwithmultipleinsurgentgroupsinthesouthernislandsofMindanao.Thegroups,whichthePhilippineandU.S.governmentshavelabeled“terrorists,”includetheMoroIslamicLiberationFrontandtheformerlyAlQaeda-alliedAbuSayyafGroup,whichalongwiththeMauteGroupandothermilitantsclaimedallegiancetotheIslamicStatein2016.46

RotationaldeploymentsofU.S.forcesandlarge-scalemilitaryexercisesinvolvingasmanyas6,000U.S.personnelhavedisguisedadefactopermanentU.S.deploymentinvolvedincounterinsurgencyoperations.Aidedbya1998VisitingForcesAgreement,asmanyaseightsmall,secretive“lilypad”stylemilitarybasescurrentlysupporttheU.S.presencedespitethePhilippines’constitutionalbanonforeignbases.47AlthoughtheextentofU.S.participationincombatisunclear,U.S.troopshavecarriedout“awiderangeofenablingandadvisoryactivities[withPhilippinesforces]onornearthebattlefield”;in2017,U.S.officialsconsideredlaunchingtheirownairstrikes.48

Whatisclearisthatthousandshavebeendisplacedonayearlybasis.WhenAbuSayyafandalliedgroupsseizedcontroloflargepartsofthecityofMarawiin2017,U.S.forcesbackedthePhilippinemilitaryinretakingthecityduringfivemonthsofbrutalfightinginvolvingthebombingofentireneighborhoodsandthousandsofciviliandeaths.Inthefirstmonthoffighting,360,000peoplefledtheirhomes,includingeffectivelyall200,000residentsofMarawi.49Somehavesincereturnedtoacityinruins.Attheendof2019,therewerearound182,000FilipinosstilllivingasIDPs,accordingtotheIDMC.50

(2016):2-10;UNHCR2018,15.DepartmentofState,BureauofPopulation,Refugees,andMigration,OfficeofAdmissions-RefugeeProcessingCenter,SummaryofRefugeeAdmissions,July31,2020.46See,e.g.,LindaRobinson,PatrickB.Johnston,GillianS.Oak,U.S.SpecialOperationsForcesinthePhilippines,2001–2014(SantaMonica,CA:RAND,2016);MappingMilitants,“AbuSayyafGroup,”StanfordUniversity,lastmodifiedAugust2018,https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/abu-sayyaf-group.47HerbertDocena,“TheUSBaseinthePhilippines,”Inquirer.net,February20,2012,http://opinion.inquirer.net/23405/the-us-base-in-the-philippines;“Philippines—SecurityandForeignForces,”Jane’sSentinelSecurityAssessment,May14,2009;RobertD.Kaplan,HogPilots,BlueWaterGrunts:TheAmericanMilitaryintheAir,atSea,andontheGround(NewYork:Vintage,2008),315;RobertD.Kaplan,ImperialGrunts:OntheGroundwiththeAmericanMilitary(NewYork:VintageDepartures,2005),131-184;CarloMuñoz,“ThePhilippinesRe-opensMilitaryBasestoUSForces,”June6,2012,http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/231257-philippines-re-opens-military-bases-to-us-forces-.48Robinson,etal.U.S.SpecialOperationsForces,iii;CourtneyKube,“U.S.MayBeginAirstrikesAgainstISISinPhilippines,”NBCNews,August7,2017,https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-may-begin-airstrikes-against-isis-philippines-n790271.49““TheBattleofMarawi”:DeathandDestructioninthePhilippines”,AmnestyInternational,2017,5.50IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2020,42.

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Iraq(2003–present)

AsinAfghanistan,displacementresultingfromtheU.S.warinIraqfollowsmorethanthreedecadesofnear-continuouswaranddisplacement.51ConditionsworsenedsignificantlyaftertheUnitedStatesinvadedanddeposedSaddamHusseinin2003.Widespreadarmedoppositiontotheoccupationgrewintoasectariancivilwar.Millionsfledtheviolence.Wealthyelitesweresomeofthefirsttoleave.Middleclassprofessionals,includingdoctors,engineers,andteachers,whoformedthebackboneofthecountry’spublichealthinfrastructureandmanyofitsgovernmentministries,werenexttoleavetheirhomes.52By2007,morethan4.7millionwerelivingindisplacementasIDPsandrefugeesorasylumseekersoutsidethecountry.53

Beginningin2014,theIslamicStatebegantoconquerlargeswathsofterritoryinIraq(andSyria).ThisseizureoflandandthesubsequentU.S.-ledwaragainsttheIslamicStatehasdisplacedmillions.Inasinglemonth,August2014,morethan450,000peoplebecameIDPs.54Inthewholeof2014,therewere2.2millioninternaldisplacementevents.Thousandsmorebecamerefugeesabroad.By2020,around650,000and1.4millionremainedrefugeesandIDPs,respectively.55

51TheIran-IraqWar(1980–1988)killed250,000–500,000Iraqis.The1990–1991GulfWarkilledtensofthousandsmore.Between1991and2003,amidharshinternationalsanctions,sporadicU.S.bombingaspartofano-flyzone,andgrowingpoverty,aconservativelyestimated1.25millionpeoplefledthecountry.Between800,000and2millionfledtootherpartsofIraq.Weonlyincludethosedisplacedsince2003inourcalculations.IanBlack,“IranandIraqRememberWarthatCostMorethanaMillionLives,”Guardian,September23,2010,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary;JohnF.Burns,“UncoveringIraq'sHorrorsinDesertGraves,”NewYorkTimes,June5,2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/middleeast/05grave.html?_r=0;Frontline,“IraqiDeathToll,”n.d.,http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/appendix/death.html;“SomeFactsandStats,”n.d.,http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/appendix/stats.html;Crawford,“CivilianDeathandInjuryinIraq”;HardingandLibalinTheWarMachine,67-68,61.52By2007,around40%ofprofessionalsandhalfofregistereddoctorshadfledIraq(combatantsofvariousstripesmurderedanestimated2,000doctorsandkidnappedhundredsmore).HardingandLibal,72.Seealso,NabilAl-Tikriti,“ThereGotheNeighbourhoods:PolicyEffectsvia-à-visIraqiForcedMigration,inDispossessionandDisplacement:ForcedMigrationintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,editedbyDawnChattyandBillFinlayson(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),268.53Thetwogroupsnumberedaround2.3millionand2.4millionrespectively.UNHCR,“UNHCR’sPopulationsofConcernOriginatingfromAfghanistan,”dataset,https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-originating-afg,accessedMarch6,2020.Note:Thepreviouslinkisbroken.TheclosestdatasettothatcitedappearstobeUNHCR,“End-YearStockPopulationFiguresForForciblyDisplacedPersonsOriginatingfromIraq,”whichwasavailableasofAugust10,2020,athttps://data.humdata.org/dataset/unhcr-population-data-for-irq.Seen.35foradiscussionofthisdataaccessproblem.54DisplacementTrackingMatrix,“IraqIDPsMasterLists,DatasetRound115,”Geneva,IOM,June2,2020.55UNHCR,“UNHCR’sPopulationsofConcernOriginatingfromAfghanistan”;Seealso,MaryanneLoughry,“TheExperienceofDisplacementbyConflict:ThePlightofIraqiRefugees,”inDrivenfromHome:ProtectingtheRightsofForcedMigrants,editedbyDavidHollenbach,169-84(Washington,D.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2010);NancyRiordan,“InternalDisplacementinIraq:Internally

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WiththeIslamicStatenowreducedtoasmallcornerofitsformerterritory,anestimated4.7millionhavebeenabletoreturnhome.IDMCresearchwithanon-representativesampleofIraqireturneessuggeststhatmanywereabletoreturnbecauseofimprovedsecuritybutwere“mostlymotivatedbypoorconditionsinhostcommunities.”56Manycouldnotreturntotheirspecificplacesoforiginbecausetheylackedhousing,sanitation,orotherservices.Onequarterofthosesurveyedstill“aspiredtoleavethecountry.”57

Libya(2011–present)

HundredsofthousandsofLibyanshavebeendisplacedintheyearsfollowingthe2011ArabSpringuprisingagainstlongtimerulerMuammarGaddafiandtheU.S.,U.K.,French,andQatariinvasionthatsubsequentlyhelpedoverthrowhisregime.Violenceincreasedfollowingtheoutsidemilitaryintervention,andthecountryplungedintoacivilwarinvolving“myriadsofmilitias”andagrowingIslamicStatepresence.ThesubtitleofanIDMCreportsummarizeswhatensued:“StateCollapseTriggersMassDisplacement.”In2011,alone,around150,000fledthecountry,mostlytoTunisia.58MostreturnedtoLibyawithinamatterofmonths,butby2015,therewereatotalof500,000IDPsacrossthecountry.Morethan8%ofthepopulationhadbeendisplacedinternally.59

Thewar’sdestabilizationofLibyaalsosignificantlyimpactedmigrationpatternsinAfrica’sSahelregion.Darker-skinnedimmigrantsfromWestAfricanandSub-SaharanAfricancountries,whomGaddafihadwelcomedasalaborforceinLibya,experiencedincreasedviolence,racism,anddisplacementfollowingGaddafi’sdownfall.60SomeLibyansattackedBlackAfricansandotherswhosupportedGaddafiorwereperceivedtohavebenefittedfromhisrule,fuelingdisplacement.Around15,000,mostlysub-Saharanmigrantlaborers,fledabroadin2011.Insubsequentyears,violenceandinstabilityinLibyahasmadethecountryacenterofhumantraffickingandthemainpointofdepartureformigrantsattemptingtocrosstheMediterraneanSeatoEurope.61

DisplacedPersonsandDisputedTerritory,”NewEnglandJournalofPublicPolicy28,no.2(2016):Article10;UNHCR,“IraqFactSheet,”Geneva,January2020,1.56ChloeSydney,“NowheretoReturnto:Iraqis’SearchforDurableSolutionsContinues,”Geneva,IDMC,2018,6,https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201811-iraq-case-study-report.pdf.57Sydney,“NowheretoReturnto,”6.58IDMC,“Libya:StateCollapseTriggersMassDisplacement,”Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,2015,1,4.59IDMC,“AssessingtheSeverityofDisplacement,”Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,2019,14,https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Severity%20Report%202019.pdf;IDMC,“Libya:StateCollapse,”1.60MaximilianForte,SlouchingTowardsSirte:NATO'sWaronLibyaandAfrica(Quebec:BarakaBooks,2012),172-177,139,182-185.61UNHCR,“UNHCRUpdate:Libya,”May29,2020,1;IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2019(Geneva:NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,May2019),26,https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC-GRID.pdf.

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Violenceanddisplacementdecreasedafter2016butreboundedin2019afteranintensificationoftheongoingcivilwarbetweentheLibyanNationalArmyandtheUN-backedGovernmentofNationalAccord.Bothsidesarebackedbyexternalpowers,includingRussiaandTurkey,respectively,inwhathasbecomeafull-fledgedproxywar.In2019,newinternaldisplacementincidentstripledovertheprioryearto215,000.Atotalofaround451,000werelivingasIDPsbyyear’send.62

Asof2019,IDMCreportsthat97%ofLibyanIDPswerestrugglingtocoverbasicexpenses,17%werefoodinsecure(53%inthecapital,Tripoli),and46%couldnotaffordhealthcare.63Amongworking-ageIDPs,29%reportedthattheirincomeshaddecreasedbyupto50%.64Despitesomeprogresstowardaceasefireandpeace,thesituationremains“extremelyfragile.”65

Syria(2014–present)

TheU.S.waragainsttheIslamicStatehasgeneratednewdisplacementinbothIraqandSyria.Prominentexamplesofdisplacementincludethe2017U.S.-ledbattletoseizeRaqqafromtheIslamicState,whichresultedin470,000displacementincidents.Muchofthecitywasdestroyed.Morethan1,600civilianscouldnotescapeanddiedasaresultofthefighting;thousandswereinjured.66Inlate2019theabruptrepositioningofU.S.troopsinnortheasternSyriaallowedtheTurkishmilitarytolaunchathreatenedoffensiveagainstKurdishforcespreviouslyalliedwiththeU.S.military.ThemassdisplacementofmostlySyrianKurdsfollowed:220,000casesofinternaldisplacementand17,900whofledintonorthernIraqasrefugees.67WhiletheTurkishmilitarybearsprimaryresponsibilityforthisdisplacement,U.S.officialschosetomoveU.S.troopstobasesnearSyrianoilfieldswithfullknowledgethatitslongstandingTurkishallyintendedtocarryoutlarge-scaleethniccleansingafterU.S.forcesdeparted.OtherU.S.militaryoperations,includingwidespreadaerialbombingofIStargets,haveresultedinadditionaldisplacement.

DisplacementintheU.S.Post-9/11Wars:37million

BasedonthemethodologydiscussedindetailintheAppendix,wenowpresentourtotaldisplacementcalculations.AsweexplainintheAppendix,wewereconservativein

62IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2020,31.63IDMC,“UnveilingtheCostofInternalDisplacement,”Geneva,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,February2019,39,https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201902-economic-impact-cost-estimates.pdf.64IDMC,“AssessingtheSeverity,”14.65IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2020,31.66AmnestyInternational,“USCoalitionAdmissionof1,300CivilianDeathsinIraqandSyria,”May31,2019,https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/us-coalition-admission-of-1300-civilian-deaths-in-iraq-and-syria/.67IDMC,“Syria:Drivers.”

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ourcalculationsgiventheimprecisionofeventhebestinternationaldisplacementstatistics.

Intotal,weestimatethattheeightU.S.post-9/11warsthatarethefocusofthisstudyhavedisplaced36,869,026people(seeTable1,below).Weroundthistotalto37milliongiventhatourcalculationisanestimate,notaprecisecount.Thistotalincludesrefugees,asylumseekers,andIDPsnumbering:

▪ 5.3millionAfghans(representing26%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 3.7millionPakistanis(3%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 4.4millionYemenis(24%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 4.2millionSomalis(46%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 1.7millionFilipinos(2%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 9.2millionIraqis(37%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 1.2millionLibyans(19%ofthepre-warpopulation)▪ 7.1millionSyrians(37%ofthepre-warpopulation)

WeareparticularlyconservativeinourestimateofdisplacementlinkedtoU.S.militaryinvolvementintheSyriancivilwar.The7.1millionSyriansdisplacedrepresentonlythosewhohavefledtheirhomesinthefiveSyrianprovinceswhereU.S.forceshavealmostexclusivelyfoughtandoperatedsincethebeginningoftheU.S.waragainsttheIslamicStateinSyriain2014.ThefiveareAleppo,Al-Hasakeh,Ar-Raqqa,Deir-ez-Zor,andHoms.68OurcalculationthusexcludespeopledisplacedfromotherpartsofSyria.

AlessconservativeapproachwouldincludethedisplacedfromallofSyria’sprovincessincethebeginningofdirectU.S.militaryoperationsin2014orasearlyas2013whentheU.S.governmentbeganbackingSyrianrebelgroups.Thiscouldtakethetotaltobetween44millionand51million,comparabletothescaleofdisplacementinWorldWarII.69(SomewouldarguethatweshouldincludealldisplacedSyriansgiventheroletheU.S.warinIraqplayedinshapingtheSyriancivilwarandthecreationoftheIslamicState.AddingallofSyria’sdisplacedlikelywouldtakethetotaltoaround54million.)70

68See,e.g.,CongressionalResearchServicereportsonSyria,https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33487.html.69Forthedetailsonthesecalculations,pleaseemailvine@american.edu.70Therewerearound2.8milliondisplacedSyriansattheendof2012.SeeUNHCR,GlobalTrends2012(Geneva:UnitedNations,2013),45.

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Table1:TotalDisplacement

Refugees+AsylumSeekers IDPs Total

%Pre-WarPopulation

AFGHANISTAN(2001–)2,083,126

3,218,827

5,301,953 26

PAKISTAN(2001–)360,643 3,363,753

3,724,396 3

YEMEN(2002–)71,067

4,283,701

4,354,768 24

SOMALIA(2002–)813,215

3,383,610

4,196,825 46

PHILIPPINES(2002–) 9,4811,715,376

1,724,857 2

IRAQ(2003–)2,249,037

6,963,138

9,212,175 37

LIBYA(2011–)169,027

1,037,733

1,206,760 19

SYRIA(2014–) 2,142,304 5,004,9887,147,292 37

TOTALDISPLACED7,897,900

28,971,126

36,869,026

Givenourconservativecalculationmethodology,wesuspectthatourrefugeecalculationinparticularmaybeasignificantunderestimate.Researchhasshownthatin2015therewerealmostasmanyunregisteredAfghanrefugeesinPakistan(1.3million)astherewereregisteredrefugees(1.5million).Internationalstatisticsgenerallyonlycountregisteredrefugees,meaningthatmostofthe1.3millionunregisteredAfghansinPakistanarenotincludedinourcalculation.71ForunderstandablereasonsdisplacedpopulationsoftenavoidregisteringwithUNHCRandotherinternationalorganizationsandnationalgovernments.Forthisandotherreasons,webelievethetruenumberofrefugeesandasylumseekerscouldbe1.5to2timeshigherthanthe7.9millionestimatefoundinthesecondcolumnofTable1.Thiscouldaddapproximately4millionto8millionadditionaldisplacedpeopletoourinitial37millionestimate,yieldingatotalof41millionand45millionpeopledisplaced.WithourexpandedestimatesfordisplacementinSyria,totaldisplacementcouldrisetobetween48millionand59million.

Our37millionestimateisalsoconservativebecauseitdoesnotincludemillionsmorewhohavebeendisplacedduringotherpost-9/11warsandconflictswhereU.S.forces 71IDMC,“Pakistan:SolutionstoDisplacementElusiveforBothNewandProtractedIDPs,”Geneva,August24,2015,3–4.

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havebeeninvolvedinrelativelylimitedbutstillsubstantialways.TheU.S.governmenthasemployedcombattroops,dronestrikesandsurveillance,militarytraining,armssales,andotherpro-governmentaidincountriesincludingBurkinaFaso,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Kenya,Mali,Mauritania,Niger,Nigeria,SaudiArabia(relatedtothewarinYemen),SouthSudan,Tunisia,andUganda.72Inmostofthesecountries,theU.S.militaryandalliedEuropeanforceshavebackednationalgovernments’counter-insurgencycampaignsand“counter-terrorism”operationsagainstIslamistmilitantsandotherinsurgents.InBurkinaFaso,forexample,thereweremorethanhalfamillionincidentsofdisplacementin2019;byyear’send,around560,000BurkinabewerelivingasIDPs.InMali,208,000werelivingasIDPsbytheendof2019asaresultofyearsofviolentconflict.73Since2001,U.S.combattroopshaveoperatedineverysingleoneofthetencountriesnowsufferingfromthemostsevereinternaldisplacementintheworld,accordingtoIDMC.TheCentralAfricanRepublicjoinsBurkinaFasoandMaliinthetopthree.TherestofthetoptenincludeNiger,Chad,Cameroon,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,aswellasSomalia,Syria,andYemen.74

HistoricalComparisons

Thereislimitedvalueincomparingpopulationdisplacementsacrosstimeandplacegivenpopulationgrowth.Suchcomparisonsalsoriskinadvertentlysuggestinghierarchiesofsufferingandthusinadvertentlydiminishingthesignificanceofsmaller-scaledisplacement.Fromtheperspectiveofsomeonewhohasbeenforcedtofleetheirhome,thescaleofdisplacementgenerallymatterslittle.Thedisplacementofasingleperson,asinglefamily,asinglecommunityshouldcauseasmuchalarmandshouldbeconsideredasgrievousahumanrightsviolationasthedisplacementoflargerpopulations.

Mindfuloftheselimitations,comparingthesizeofdisplacementeventshelpsdemonstratetherelativemagnitudeofpopulationmovementsandofwars’destructivepower.Thus,wenotethatthe37milliondisplacedbythepost-9/11warsexceedsallthosedisplacedduringWorldWarI(approximately10million).ItexceedsthedisplacementcausedbythepartitionofIndiaandPakistan(14million);theU.S.warinVietnam(13million);theSovietinvasionofAfghanistan(6.3million);andtheongoingwarintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(6million);amongothercases(Table2).75

DisplacementintheU.S.post-9/11warsinAfghanistanandIraqaloneexceeds14.5millionpeopleandthuseveryothercaseofdisplacementsincethestartofthetwentiethcenturyexceptWorldWarII.If,aswesuspect,ourcalculationof37milliondisplacedis

72See,e.g.,DavidVine,TheUnitedStatesofWar:AGlobalHistoryofAmerica'sEndlessConflicts,fromColumbustotheIslamicState(Oakland:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,forthcoming[October13,2020]).73IDMC,GlobalReportonInternalDisplacement2020,23.74IDMC,“AssessingtheSeverity,”13–15.75PeterGatrell,“Refugees,”1914–1918Online:EncyclopediaoftheFirstWorldWar,editedbyUteDaniel,etal.FreieUniversitätBerlin,Berlin,October8,2014,https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/refugees,DOI:10.15463/ie1418.10134;UNHCR,TheStateoftheWorld’sRefugees,80–81,116;UNHCR,GlobalReport2019(Geneva:UnitedNations),75.

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overlyconservative,andifalessconservativeestimateof48–59millionismoreaccurate,thescaleofdisplacementacrosstheeightcountriessurveyedlikelyreacheslevelsonlyseeninthesecondworldwar.

Table2:DisplacementComparisonCasesCOMPARISONCASE

REFUGEES+IDPs(estimate)76

1.RussianRevolution 6million2.WorldWarI 10million3.WorldWarII 30-64+million4.India/PakistanPartition 14million5.North&SouthVietnam(1960s-1972) 13million6.EastBengal 10million7.SovietInvasionofAfghanistan 6.3million8.Colombia 8million(asof2019)9.DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo 6million(2019)10.Venezuela 4.5(2019)ReturningHome:25.3million

Inadditiontoourcalculationof37millionormoredisplaced,weestimatethat25,311,331millionpeoplehavereturnedtotheircountriesoforigin(inthecaseofrefugeesandasylumseekers)ortotheareasfromwhichtheyfledinternally(inthecaseofIDPs)(Table3).Whilereturncanbeasignofimprovedlivingconditionsandgreaterpeaceandsecurityathome,thescaleandsignificanceofrefugeesandIDPsreturninghomeshouldbeinterpretedcarefully.Tostart,someofthe25.3millionIDPswerenotamongtheoriginal37milliondisplaced.ThisisbecauseinternationalorganizationscountthechildrenofreturnedrefugeeorIDPmothersas“returnees.”Bornindisplacement,thesechildrenreturntoplacesandhomestheyhaveneverknown.77

76EstimatesfordisplacementduringWorldWarIIfocusonEurope,justasinternationalhumanitarianaidfocusedondisplacedEuropeans.AccordingtotheUNHCR,“millions”weredisplacedinChina.Citationsforcases1,3,4:AristideR.Zolberg,AstriSuhrke,andSergioAguayo,“WhoIsaRefugee?”inEscapefromViolence:ConflictandtheRefugeeCrisisintheDevelopingWorld(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989),16–17,18,21,24.Cases3,4,5,6,7:UNHCR,TheStateoftheWorld’sRefugees,13,59,80–81,116.Cases8,9,10:UNHCR,GlobalReport2019,101,75,101.77Displacementstatisticsgenerallycountchildrenborntoarefugee,asylumseeker,orIDPmotherwhilesheisdisplacedasanadditionaldisplacedperson.Contrarily,statisticiansgenerallysubtractfrom“stock”totalsthoserefugees,asylumseekers,andIDPswhodieduringdisplacement.Wedonotsubtractthedeadfromourcalculationbecauseweareestimatingthetotalnumberofpeoplewhoweredisplacedacrosstime.

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Inothercases,suchasYemen,someIDPreturneeshavereturnedtohomesthatarenearwar’sfrontlinesbecausetheycouldnotaffordtoleavethecountryorbecausetheycouldnotaffordthecostsoflivingintheareaswheretheyhadfledtosafety.78YetotherrefugeesandIDPs,suchasAfghansinPakistanandAfghanistan,returnbecausetheyarefleeingnewviolence.Othersreturnbecausehostgovernmentsdeportthemorpressurethemintoleavingwiththreatsorbycuttingoffemploymentandothernecessities,amongothertactics.AfghansforcedtoleaveIranareagainanexample.79Inotherwords,some“returnees”areactuallythevictimsoffurtherforceddisplacement.

Table3:TotalReturnees

Returneesare1)refugeesandasylumseekersand2)IDPswho,fortheformer,havereturnedtotheircountryoforiginfromabroadand,forthelatter,havereturnedtotheirareaoforiginfromanotherpartoftheircountryoforigin.

ReturneesAfghanistan(2001–) 7,496,684Pakistan(2001–) 4,153,046Yemen(2002–) 1,689,283Somalia(2002–) 480,737Philippines(2002–) 2,036,258Iraq(2003–) 6,482,433Libya(2011–) 1,438,691Syria(2014–) 1,534,200TOTAL 25,311,331

Eveninthebestcircumstancesofreturn,goinghomedoesnoterasetheexperienceoffleeingforone’slifeorthestruggletosurviveafterbeingdisplaced.Theexperiencesofwartimedisplacementareprofound,traumatic,andlong-lasting.Returninghomeshouldnotbeequatedwithareturntonormalortoapriorstateofbeing.Displacementtendstotransformandremakeentiresocialworldsforthedisplaced,impoverishingpeopleintheprocess.80SomeofcourseneverreturnhomeeitherbecausetheyresettleelsewhereorbecausetheydieasrefugeesorIDPs.

78IDMC,“PatternsofDisplacement,”InternalDisplacement,accessedJune12,2020https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/yemen.79IDMC,“Afghanistan:PatternsofDisplacement.”80See,e.g.,MichaelCernea,“AnthropologicalandSociologicalResearchforPolicyDevelopmentonPopulationResettlement,”inAnthropologicalApproachestoResettlement:Policy,Practice,andTheory,ed.MichaelM.CerneaandScottE.Guggenheim(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1993),12;MichaelCernea,“Risks,Safeguards,andReconstruction:AModelforPopulationDisplacementandResettlement,”inRisksandReconstruction:ExperiencesofResettlersandRefugees,editedbyMichaelCerneaandChristopherMcDowell(Washington,DC:WorldBank,2000).

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BeyondNumbers:TheHumanImpactsofDisplacement

Numbersonlycantellussomuch.Numbersquicklycanbecomenumbing.Especiallywhennumbersaresolarge,whendisplacementreachesthemillions,itiseasytoforgetwhatthenumbersrepresent.Onecanloseanysenseofhowitwouldfeeltofleeforone’slife,toloseone’shome,tohaveone’sconnectiontoaplacetornasunder,tohaveone’scommunityshattered.Oneeasilycanforgetthatthenumbersreflectindividualpeoplewithindividualnamesandlivesthathavebeendamagedforever.

Mostpeople(ourselvesincluded)havegreatdifficultycomprehendingthescaleofnumberslike37milliondisplaced.Mostpeople(ourselvesincluded)havegreatdifficultycomprehendingthemeaningandeffectsofdisplacementforthosedisplaced.Grapplingwiththehumansignificanceofdisplacementonthisscalerequires,webelieve,consciouseffortandattentiontotheindividuallivesinvolved.YemeniSalaKhaleddescribesherexperienceofbecoming“an‘internallydisplacedperson’…astatistic.”Inrecountinghowsheandherfamilyfledtheirhomefearingfortheirlives,Khaledremindsreadershowmuchstatisticsobscureabouttheuniqueexperienceofeachdisplacedperson:“Conditionsvaryasmuchasindividualstoriesdo.”81

Whilethereisnoadequatewaytoconveytheimmensityofdisplacement’sdamage,understandingthedamageinqualitativeandpersonaltermsremainsimportantwork.InYemen,forexample,hundredsofthousandsofIDPs,likeSalaKhaled,liveinoneofhundredsofinformal“sites”acrossthecountry.Thesitesincludepublicinfrastructure,unfinishedbuildingsunderconstruction,andspontaneouslyconstructedinformalsettlementswhere“servicesareoftenlimited,andresidentsfacesignificantprotectionrisks,includingexploitation,harassmentandgender-basedviolence,”accordingtotheUN.Mostoftheselocationslackanyformalmanagementoraccesstohealthservices.Inmanyofthesites,peoplelackreliablewatersuppliesandtoiletaccess.IDPsreport“feelingunsafe,[a]lackofprivacy,limitedrepresentationoftheirneeds,limitedfreedomofmovementandharassmentfromotherIDPsorthehostcommunity.”82

ThedisplacementcausedbytheU.S.post-9/11warshastornapartneighborhoods,communities,andentiresocietiesalongsideotherformsofwartimeviolence.InIraq,forexample,sectarianfightinganddisplacementfollowingthe2003U.S.-ledinvasiondestroyedwhathadbeena“mosaicpatchwork”ofmixedcommunitiesinwhichShiaandSunniandotherreligiousandethnicgroupslivedside-by-side,workingtogetherandintermarrying.WhatreplaceditwasanIraqdividedintothreelargeethno-sectarianregionsdefinedbyincreasinglyhomogenousShia,Sunni,andKurdishidentities.IncitieslikeBaghdad,U.S.forcescontributedtothehardeningofethno-sectariandivisionswhen,assecuritymeasures,theywalledoffwhathadbecomelargelysinglesectneighborhoodsduetowartimedisplacement.SeveralsmallminoritycommunitiesliketheSabean-Mandeans

81Khaled,“Oneof3.65Million,”3.82OCHA,“2019HumanitarianNeedsOverview:Yemen,”NewYork,December2018,15,29,42,https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf.

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andtheShabakalmostcompletelydisappearedfromIraqthroughdisplacementandviolence.Thenewlyentrencheddivisionsaresoprofoundtheymayneverbereversed.83

Theeffectsofdisplacementextendtohostcommunitiesandcountries.TheworkofhousingandhostingrefugeesandIDPsoverextendedperiodscanbeasignificantburdentohostfamiliesandcommunities,manyofwhichareoftenonthemarginsofpovertyalready.84TheexampleofYemenagainshowsthataroundhalfamillionIDPsonlyhadsomeformofhousingthankstohostfamiliesandcommunities,includinginmakeshiftsettlements.85ThearrivalofrefugeesandIDPscantriggergrievances,inflamepre-existingxenophobia,andspurcompetitionforresources,amongmanyothersociocultural,economic,andpoliticaleffects.

Hostsocietiesalsoexperiencebeneficialeffectssuchasgreatersocietaldiversity,increasedeconomicactivityandvitalityinsomecases,anddirectfinancialassistancefrominternationalorganizationsandforeigngovernments.Documentingthefullsocietalimpactsofdisplacement—aswellastheimpactsatindividualandintermediatelevels—inthecountriesdiscussedhereisbeyondthescopeofthispaperbutremainsvitalworkforscholars,journalists,andaffectedpeoplesthemselves.

SignificanceandConclusion

Neitherqualitativenorquantitativemethodscanadequatelymeasureorconveytheeffectsofwartimedisplacement.Still,itisimportanttoattempttoquantifyhowmanypeoplehavebeendisplacedasonedimensionofthedamagebroughtaboutbytheUnitedStates’post-9/11wars.Displacementcausedbythesewarsindeedhasintersectedwithandexacerbatedotherformsofdamage.Inadditiontodisplacingatleast37million,thewarshavekilledandinjuredmillionsandtornapartneighborhoods,communities,andentiresocieties,impoverishingpeopleineconomicandotherways.86Anestimated770,000

83ElaineA.HillsandDahliaS.Wasfi,“TheCausesandHumanCostsofTargetingIraq,”inTheWarMachineandGlobalHealth:ACriticalMedicalAnthropologicalExaminationoftheHumanCostsofArmedConflictandtheInternationalViolenceIndustry,editedbyMerrillSingerandG.DerrickHodge(Lanham,MD:AltaMira,2010),268-270,250-252;Al-Tikriti,“ThereGotheNeighbourhoods,”265-267,270.84OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,Yemen:HumanitarianNeedsOverview2019(NewYork:UnitedNations:December2018),15,43.85OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,Yemen:HumanitarianNeeds,15.86See,e.g.,NetaC.Crawford,“War-RelatedDeath,Injury,andDisplacementinAfghanistanandPakistan,2001–2014,”CostsofWarProject,BrownUniversity,May22,2015,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN.pdf;Crawford,“CivilianDeathandInjuryinIraq,2003–2011,”CostsofWarProject,BrownUniversity,September2011,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/Civilian%20Death%20and%20Injury%20in%20Iraq%2C%202003-2011.pdf;ScottHardingandKathrynLibal,“WarandthePublicHealthDisasterinIraq,”inTheWarMachineandGlobalHealth:ACriticalMedicalAnthropologicalExaminationoftheHumanCostsofArmedConflictandtheInternationalViolenceIndustry,ed.MerrillSingerandG.DerrickHodge(Lanham,MD:AltaMira,2010),59–88;Officeofthe

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to801,000civiliansandcombatants,onallsides,havediedinjustAfghanistan,Iraq,Syria,Pakistan,andYemensinceU.S.forcesbeganfightinginthosecountries.87Thatisonlythenumberofcombatantsandcivilianswhohavediedincombat.Manymorehavediedasaresultofdisease,hunger,andmalnutritioncausedbythewarsandthedestructionofhealthcaresystems,employment,sanitation,andotherlocalinfrastructures.Whilethese“indirectdeaths”arestillbeingcalculatedbyresearchers,thetotalmayexceed3.1million.88Thetotalnumberinjuredandtraumatizedsurelyextendsintothetensofmillions.

Thedisplacementdocumentedinthispaper,alongwiththewars’deathtollandotherintersectingformsofharm,cannotsimplybedismissedornormalizedas“unintendedconsequences”or“collateraldamage.”Thedisplacementandothersufferingmustbecentraltoanyanalysisofthepost-9/11warsandtoanyconceivableconsiderationofthefutureuseofmilitaryforcebytheUnitedStatesoranyothercountry.Thelegitimacyandefficacyofwarshouldbequestionedmorethanevergivennearlytwodecadesofdisastrousoutcomes.OnemustalsoaskwhatstepstheU.S.government,U.S.citizens,andotherresponsiblepartieshavetaken—andwhatstepstheywilltake—torepairandmakeamendsforthedamageinflictedonthe37millionormorepeopledisplacedbythepost-9/11wars.

UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,GlobalTrends:ForcedDisplacementin2018(NewYork:UnitedNations,2018).87NetaC.CrawfordandCatherineLutz,“HumanCostofPost-9/11Wars:DirectWarDeathsinMajorWarZones,AfghanistanandPakistan(October2001–October2019);Iraq(March2003–October2019);Syria(September2014-October2019);Yemen(October2002-October2019);andOther,”CostsofWarProject,BrownUniversity,Providence,RI,November13,2019,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/Direct%20War%20Deaths%20COW%20Estimate%20November%2013%202019%20FINAL.pdf.88Fourmillionappearstobeabetterthoughstillconservativeestimategiventhatahigh-endcalculationexceeds12milliondeaths.AccordingtotheGenevaDeclaration’sstudyofrecentwars,therewillbeatleastthreeandasmanyasfifteen“indirectdeaths”foreverydirectcombatdeath.Thestudysuggeststhataratiooffourtooneisareasonableaverageestimate.SeeGenevaDeclaration,GlobalBurdenofArmedViolence(Geneva:GenevaDeclarationSecretariat,2008),31–32.

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Appendix:DetailedMethodology,DataSources,andLimitations

Estimatingthenumberofpeopledisplacedinthepost-9/11warsischallenging.Countingthedisplacedisalwayschallengingfortheinternationalorganizationsthatprovidethemostauthoritativestatistics,buttheirworkisespeciallydifficultindangerouswarzoneswherethescaleofdisplacementhasreachedtensofmillionsovernearlytwodecadesofwar.Thepoliticalandeconomicstakesofdisplacementstatisticsarealsohigh.Inmanycases,governmentshavevestedfinancialandpoliticalinterestsineitherinflatingordeflatingthenumberofrefugees,IDPs,andreturneeswithinorbeyondtheirborders.Forexample,displacementfigurescanpotentiallyaffectlevelsofinternationalaidforhostgovernments,mediaandpoliticalperceptionsofhosts,inter-governmentalnegotiationsofmanykinds,amongotherfactors.Thismeansthatthedefinitionsgovernmentsusetodefinearefugee,anIDP,andareturneeaffectdisplacementstatistics,makingdefinitionsdeeplypoliticalandfarfromamatterofobjectivefact.“Statisticsonforceddisplacementreflectdiversedefinitionsemployedbynationalgovernmentsandorganizationsresponsibleforcollectingandcompilingdata,”explainsscholarZaraSarzininaWorldBankreport.“Thesestatisticaldefinitionsvarywithinandbetweencountriesdependingonthedifferentobjectivesandmethodologiesofdatacollectionefforts.Politicalfactorscandeterminehowthesedefinitionsarecraftedandappliedinpractice,contributingtothesubstantialvariationindataacrossdisplacementsituations.”89

Generally,itisunclearwhetherdisplacementstatisticsoverestimateorunderestimatethetruescaleofdisplacement.Internationalorganizationshaveworkedovermanyyearstoaccountforthepoliticalandeconomicforcesshapingthenumbersandtoimprovetheaccuracyandreliabilityoftheunderlyingdatathatwerelyonhere.“Existingfiguresprovidetheonlysourcetodetermineordersofmagnitudes,relativenumbers,andtrends,”writesSarzin.“Theymayprovideimportantinsightsintotheforceddisplacementcrisis,buttheyoughttobetakenwithagreatdegreeofcaution.Datausersshouldbeawareoftheirlimitationsandofthe[possibilityof]correspondingerrormargins.”90

Giventhisambiguityaboutdatareliabilityandothermethodologicalchallenges,whichwediscussbelow,wehaveerredonthesideofbeingconservativeinourestimates.Thereislittlewecandoaboutthedataaccuracyproblemsotherthantoacknowledgethemaslimitations.Overtime,displacementdatahasimprovedandlikelywillcontinuetoimprove.Weencourageotherstoimproveonourestimatesforthepost-9/11wars.

DataSources

Eachofourdatasourceshasstrengthsandweaknesses.WehaveassembledourdataforrefugeesandasylumseekersprimarilyfromtheUN’srefugeeagency,UNHCR.OurIDPdatacomesfromtheInternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre(IDMC),UNHCR,andtheUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA).DataforrefugeeandIDP 89ZaraSarzin,“StocktakingofGlobalForcedDisplacementData,”PolicyResearchWorkingPaper7985,Washington,DC,WorldBankGroup,42.90Sarzin,“StockTaking,”6,7.

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returneescomesprimarilyfromUNHCR.UNHCRdataisavailablesince2001.IDMCdataisavailablefortheperiod2009–2019;forprioryears,werelyonUNHCR’sIDPdata,whichisthebestavailable.

UNHCRrefugeedatatendstobeparticularlyaccurateand“robust”becauseitisbasedprimarilyontheregistrationandcountingofindividualsandfamilieswithUNHCRand/orhostcountryofficials(UNHCRemploysestimatesinsomewealthycountrieswhereUNHCRprovidesfewerdirectservices).91Ontheotherhand,giventhattheactofcrossinginternationalbordersandlivinginforeigncountrieswithoutgovernmentauthorizationisfrequentlycriminalized,manypeoplefleeingtheirhomecountriestofindsafetyabroadarenotregisteredandthusnotcountedinrefugeeandasylumseekerstatistics.PeoplelivingoutsiderefugeecampsareespeciallyunlikelytoberegisteredandcountedbyUNHCR.Researchshowingthat1.3millionoutof2.8millionAfghanrefugeesinPakistanwereunregisteredsuggeststhatUNHCR’sfigurescouldbeasignificantundercountinmanycountries.92

ForthedocumentationofIDPs,IDMCdataisauthoritativeandthebestavailable.TheInternationalOrganizationforMigrationcallsIDMC,“theglobalreferencepointfordataonIDPs.”93A2017WorldBankstudyrecognizedIDMCas“theleadingproviderofinformationandanalysisoninternaldisplacementworldwide.”94Initspublications,UNHCRregularlyreportsIDMCdataonIDPsasauthoritative.95UnlikeUNHCR,IDMCprimarilyusesestimatesofIDPsratherthancountsofindividuals.IDMCdevelopsitsestimatesfromreportingbytheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM),OCHA,UNHCR,governments,andnon-governmentalorganizations.96Whilemanyexpertsconsiderdisplacementdatabasedontheregistrationandcountingofindividualstobehighlyreliable,thelargenumbersofunregistered—andthusuncounted—refugeesandasylumseekerssuggeststhatmethodologiesbasedonestimatingdisplacedpopulationsmaybeequallyifnotmoreaccurateandreliable.

CalculatingRefugeesandAsylumSeekers

UNHCRdatacomplicatesourcalculationmethodologybecauseUNHCRonlyreportsthetotal“stock”numberofrefugees,asylumseekers,andIDPsfromaparticularcountryoforiginattheendofeachyear.UNHCRdoesnotprovidedataaboutthenumberofnewrefugees,asylumseekers,andIDPsfromaparticularcountryoforigininayear.Inotherwords,UNHCRdoesnotdisaggregatethosenewlydisplacedinagivenyearfromthosedisplacedinprioryears,makingitimpossibletosumyearlydisplacements.

91UNHCR,“GlobalTrends,”2019,82n2–7.92IDMC,“Pakistan:SolutionstoDisplacementElusive,”3–4.93MigrationDataPortal,“ForcedMigrationorDisplacement,”Geneva,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,June9,2020,https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/forced-migration-or-displacement.94Sarzin,“StockTaking,”5n3.95See,e.g.,UNHCR,“GlobalTrends,”2019.96Sarzin,“StockTaking,”31–4,41–2.

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Thus,toestimatethenumberofpeopledisplacedacrossinternationalbordersasrefugeesorasylumseekersinagivenyear,wesubtractedthetotalnumberofrefugeesandasylumseekersfromthatcountryineachrelevantyearfromthenumberofrefugeesandasylumseekersintheprioryear.Theequationis:

(YearXTotalRefugees+YearXTotalAsylumSeekers)–(YearX-1TotalRefugees+YearX-1TotalAsylumSeekers)EstimatedNewlyDisplacedRefugeesandAsylumSeekersinYearX

Subtractingthestockcountfromtheprioryearstockcountdoesnotnecessarilyyieldthenumberofpeoplenewlydisplacedinagivenyear,onlytherelativenumberofdisplacedrefugeesandasylumseekersfromyeartoyear.Duringyearswhenthetotalnumberofrefugeesandasylumseekersdeclinedrelativetotheprioryear(usuallybecausepeoplereturnedhomeandbecausefewerpeoplefledtheirhomes),thecalculationyieldsanegativenumberofrefugees,whichwerecordaszero.Somemayaskwhywedonotrecordthenegativenumbertoreflectreturningrefugeesandasylumseekers.Wedonotfollowthisapproachasourgoaliscalculatingthetotalnumberofpeopledisplacedratherthanthenetnumberofpeopledisplaced.Wealsocapturereturningrefugeesandasylumseekersinourseparatecalculationofreturnees.

Ourmethodologyactuallyunderestimatesthetruescaleofdisplacementinkeepingwithourconservativeapproach:evenwhenthetotalnumberofrefugeesdeclinesfromoneyeartothenext,othersoftenbecomerefugeeseitherthroughnewdisplacementorwhenbabiesareborntorefugeemothersandarecountedamongthedisplaced.97OurcalculationisalsoanunderestimategiventhatsomeonedisplacedandthenreturnedtotheircountryoforigininthesameyearwouldnottypicallybecountedinUNHCR’send-of-year“stock”enumeration.Whileoursisanimperfectmethodology,webelieveitatleastprovidesuswithalow-endestimateofrefugeesandasylumseekersovertime.

Wehavenotprovidedtheseandourothercalculationsinthisreporttoavoidsuggestingtoreadersthatthetotalsindicatedaretheactualnumberofpeopledisplacedor,forexample,thatnoonewasdisplacedinyearswherewerecordtotalsaszero.Thoseinterestedinreviewingtheseandourothercalculationsshouldemailvine@american.edu.

97RefugeeandIDPfiguresgenerallyaccountforbirthsanddeathsfollowingdisplacement.BabiesborntoarefugeemotherandregisteredwiththeUNHCRwillbecountedinrefugeestatistics.HostgovernmentsalsotendtocapturebirthsdatainthestatisticstheyprovidetoUNHCR(exceptincountriesthatprovidebirthrightcitizenshiptobabiesbornontheirsoil).Manyrefugees,includingthosefearfulofgovernmentauthorities,willavoidregistrationforthemselvesandtheirchildren,meaningtheyareuncountedinUNHCRstatistics.Ontheotherhand,deathsinsomecasesgounreportedforyearsbecauseofbureaucraticoversightsortheincentivetoleavepeopleonrefugeelistsgiventheservicesandfundingtiedtorefugeestatus.Overtime,UNHCRandotherorganizationscorrectpastdata,makingolderdatainourstudygenerallymorereliablethannewerdata.

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CalculatingIDPs

ForthepurposeofcalculatingindividualswhohavebecomeIDPs,werelyonIDMC(2009–2019)andUNHCRfigures(2001–2019).(ForSyria,wealsouseOCHAdatabecauseitallowsustoidentifydisplacedpeoplefromthefiveSyrianprovinceswhereU.S.militaryforceshaveprimarilyoperated.)Fortheyearsbefore2009,weusethesamemethodaswedoforourrefugeesandasylumseekerscalculation:wesubtractthetotalnumberofUNHCR-enumeratedIDPsinYearXfromthetotalnumberofIDPsintheprioryeartoyieldanestimateofthescaleofinternaldisplacement.Forrelevantyearsbetween2001and2008,theequationis:

(TotalIDPsinYearX)–(TotalIDPsinYearX-1) EstimatedNewlyDisplacedIDPsinYearX

Weagaintreatnegativesumsaszeroforthesamereasonsthatwedosowithrefugeesandasylumseekers.ThisisagainaconservativeapproachinlikelyunderestimatingthetruescaleofdisplacementgiventhatpeopleareoftendisplacedevenwhenthetotalnumberofIDPsdeclinesfromoneyeartothenext.WecapturethereturnofIDPstotheirhomesinourreturneesdata.

For2009–2019,wecombineUNHCRdataandIDMCdataaboutIDPsdisplacedbyviolentconflict(weexcludethosedisplacedbydisasters).IDMCdataunfortunatelydiffersfromUNHCR’sinmeasuringthetotalnumberofdisplacementincidentsratherthanthetotalnumberofpeopledisplaced.EstimatingdisplacementincidentsallowsIDMCtoaccountformultiplediscretedisplacementsexperiencedbysingleindividuals,whichhasbeencommonacrosstheU.S.post-9/11wars(amongotherconflicts).InYemen,forexample,15.4%ofdisplaceeshadbeendisplacedthreeormoretimesasof2020.98UNHCRIDPdataismorelimitedinfocusingonanenumerationofindividualIDPswhohavereceivedassistanceofsomekindfromUNHCR;thedatathusexcludeshundredsofthousandsofIDPswhohavenotreceivedUNHCRaid.

IfweweretouseIDMCfigureswithoutadjustment,wewouldlikelyoverestimatethenumberofpeopledisplacedasIDPsbecauseIDMCnumbersreflectdisplacementincidents.(Thereisanargumentthatweshouldcalculatedisplacementincidentsratherthandisplacedpeoplebecauseanindividualorfamilycanexperiencemultiplediscretedisplacementeventsthatarenotcapturedbyfiguresfocusingonindividualsregardlessofhowmanytimesoneisdisplaced.)

Ontheotherhand,UNHCRfiguresunderestimateIDPsbecausetheyonlyreflectpeoplewhohavereceivedUNHCRservices.Thus,inyearswhenIDMCdataisavailable(2009–2019),weaverageIDMCandUNHCRfigurestoarriveatourestimate.BecausewetreatanynegativesumsintheUNHCRdataaszero,ouraverageofIDMCandUNHCRfiguresyieldsanestimateofnolessthanone-halfthenumberofIDMCdisplacementincidents.Thisisagainaveryconservativeestimate,asthetruenumberofIDPscouldbe 98IDMC,“Yemen:TheImplicationsofForcedImmobility,”policypaper,Geneva,June2020,3.

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closertotwo-thirdstothree-quartersormoreofthetotalnumberofdisplacementincidentsinagivencountry.99Fortheyears2009–2019,theequationis:

(IDMCIDPDisplacementIncidentsinYearX)+((UNHCRTotalIDPsinYearX)–(UNHCRTotalIDPsinYearX-1))÷2

CalculatingDisplacementinSyria InSyria,OCHAprovidesprovince-leveldatathatallowsustoidentifyIDPsdisplacedfromthefiveSyrianprovinceswhereU.S.troopshaveprimarilyoperated.Displacementfromthoseprovincesrepresents46.8%ofthetotalnumberofSyrianIDPsfromJanuary2016throughJuly2020.Weroundthispercentageto50%andusethisfiguretoestimatethenumberofSyrianrefugees,employingthesamemethodologydescribedabove.Unlikeourothercalculations,whichusedatathrough2019,weuseOCHA’s2020figuresratherthanattemptingtoestimatedatafor2014and2015whennodataisavailable.CalculatingReturnees

UNHCRreportsfiguresforrefugeereturneesandIDPreturneesperyear,makingacalculationofthesumofreturneesaneasiertask.ForeachcountryotherthanSyria,wehavesummedrefugeeandIDPreturneesforrelevantwaryears.

ThecalculationforSyrianreturneesrepresentsourestimateofonlythosereturnees

whowereoriginallyfromthefiveSyrianprovincesthatarethefocusofourSyriadisplacementcalculation.IDPsfromthefiveprovincesrepresent49.8%ofIDPreturneesfromallofSyria.100Thus,weassumethatasimilarpercentage(50%)oftotalrefugeereturneesarefromthefiveprovinces.UNHCRcurrentlyestimatesthattherewillbebetween250,000and500,000Syrianrefugeereturneesfor2020.Althoughdataforotherreturneesisonlythrough2019,wehaveincludeddatathroughJuly2020forSyrianreturneesbecausenodataisavailablepriorto2017(thismaybebecausethereweresofewSyriansreturningbetween2014and2017).101

Forreasonsexplainedabove,wehavenotsubtractedreturnees—thosereturningto

theirhomesfromabroadorfrominternaldisplacement—fromourcalculationofdisplaced

99InIDMC’s2020surveyofIDPsinYemen,forexample,68%ofrespondentshadexperiencedasingledisplacement.IDMC,“Yemen:TheImplications,”3.100ReturnedIDPdatacomesfromOCHATurkey,“SyrianArabRepublic:IDPMovementsandIDPSpontaneousReturnMovementsData,”dataset,updatedAugust27,2020,accessedSeptember4,2020,https://data.humdata.org/dataset/syrian-arab-republic-idp-movements-and-idp-spontaneous-return-movements-data101Returnedrefugeedatacomesfromthe“PersonsofConcerns”tabsforeachoftheyearsavailableatUNHCR,“SyrianArabRepublic,”GlobalFocus,accessedSeptember4,2020,https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2530?y=2020#year.

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people.Wealsohavenotcountedreturneesasadditionalcasesofdisplacement,althoughmigratinghomeofteninvolvesitsownhardships.

Thereare,however,twocasesinwhichIDMCcountsreturneesasnewIDPdisplacements:first,whenrefugeesaredeportedbyahostgovernmentbacktotheirhomecountry(akindofforceddisplacementandaviolationoftheinternationalrefugeelawprincipleofnon-refoulementbarringgovernmentsfromforcingrefugeestoreturntoacountryfromwhichtheyfled);second,whenrefugeesreturnvoluntarilytotheirhomecountriesbutareunabletoreturntotheirformerareasofresidence,leavingtheminternallydisplacedintheirhomecountry.BothtypesofdisplacementarecapturedinourdatagivenouruseofIDMCdata.