CP Ragland - Descartes on the Princple of Alternative Possibilities

8/11/2019 CP Ragland - Descartes on the Princple of Alternative Possibilities

1/19

Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

C. P. Ragland

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 44, Number 3, July 2006,

pp. 377-394 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2006.0049

For additional information about this article

Access provided by Niedersaechsische Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Goettingen (8 Apr 2014 03:48 GMT)

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v044/44.3ragland.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v044/44.3ragland.htmlhttp://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v044/44.3ragland.html


2/19

377descartes on alternative possibilities

Journal of the History of Philosophy,vol. 44, no. 3(2006) 37794

[377]

Descartes on the Principle ofAlternative Possibilities

C . P . R A G L A N D *

descartes certainly believedin free will, but it is far from clear how he un-

derstood the nature of freedom. This paper aims to clarify Descartess view of

freedom to some extent by determining whether he accepted the principle ofalternative possibilities(PAP).1According to PAP, doing something freely impliesbeing able to do otherwise; freedom consists in a two-way power to do or not do.

Commentators do not agree about Descartess relation to PAP: some suggest that

he never accepted it,2others that he did so only in later texts;3and still others

that he accepted it throughout his career.4Commentators also disagree about

whether or not PAP conflicts with other things Descartes says about freedom

(thus some accuse Descartes of incoherence).5Here I will argue that Descartes

* C. P. Raglandis Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University.

1This terminology follows Harry Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,

Journal of Philosophy66(1969), 82939.2See Anthony Kenny, Descartes on the Will, in Cartesian Studies, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1972), 131; and Jean-Marie Beyssade, La Philosophie Premire de Descartes: Le temps et la co-hrence de la mtaphysique(Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 177214.

3See Etienne Gilson, La libert chez Descartes et la thologie[La libert] (Paris: Alcan, 1913), 31019;Alexander Boyce Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes(London: Methuen, 1932), 33239; and MichelleBeyssade, Descartess Doctrine of Freedom: Differences between the French and Latin Texts of the

Fourth Meditation [Descartess Doctrine], in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartess Meta-physics, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 191206.

4See S. V. Keeling, Descartes(London: Ernest Benn, 1934), 18690; Lucien Laberthonnire,

tudes sur Descartesin Oeuvres de Laberthonnire, vol. 1(Paris: J. Vrin, 1935) 41831; Jean Laporte, Lalibert selon Descartes, Revue de Mtaphysique et de Morale44(1937): 10164; Jean-Marc Gabaude,Libert et raison (La libert cartsienne et sa rfraction chez Spinoza et chez Leibniz), Vol. I: Philosophie rflexivede la volont(Toulouse: Association des publications de la facult des lettres et sciences humanines deToulouse, 1970), 16197; Robert Imlay, Descartes and Indifference, Studia Leibnitiana14(1982):8797; Georges J. D. Moyal, The Unity of Descartes Conception of Freedom [Unity], InternationalStudies in Philosophy19(1987): 3351; James Petrik,Descartes Theory of the Will(Durango, CO: Hol-lowbrook Publishing, 1992); and Joseph Keim Campbell, Descartes on Spontaneity, Indifference,

and Alternatives [Descartes on Spontaneity], in New Essays on the Rationalists, ed. Rocco J. Gennaroand Charles Huenemann(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17999.

5On the basis of Descartess apparent waffling on PAP, Gilson concluded that he had no real

theory of freedom, but simply told various interlocutors what they wanted to hear. Focusing on problems

regarding PAP, Imlay and Laberthonnire accuse Descartes of holding an incoherent theory


3/19

378 jour na l of the hist or y of phi losophy 44 :3 j uly 2006

embraced PAP throughout his career in a way that coheres with his other main

claims about freedom.

In what follows, I examine each of Descartess main texts on freedom in chrono-

logical order: the Meditations(1641), the Principles(1644), and the two letters toMesland (164445). Each of these works, read in isolation, is best interpreted as

endorsing PAP.6Joined together and read in light of one another, they make it

virtually certain that Descartes believed in PAP throughout his career.

But first, a disclaimer. Philosophers who agree that freedom requires alterna-

tive possibilities may still disagree about whether such alternatives are compatible

with determinism. The incompatibilists among them say that if our every choice

were predetermined, we could never choose otherwise and hence would not be

free. The compatibilists claim that there is more than one sense of could have

done otherwise, and that the sense of could have done otherwise. . . denied

by determinism is irrelevant to the sense required for freedom.7My goal in this

paper is simply to establish thatDescartes uniformly endorsed PAP. With respectto exactly howhe understood PAPs relation to determinism, I explore some op-tions, but leave the question open.

1 . m e d i t a t i o n s o n f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y

In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes defines the will as follows:

. . . [i] the will, or freedom of choice . . . simply consists in this: that we are able to

do or not do (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); [ii] or rather [vel potius],simply in this: that we are carried in such a way toward what the intellect proposes for

affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, that we feel ourselves determined

to it by no external force. (AT 7:57/ CSM 2:40)8

This passage contains two important claims. First, the opening seems straightfor-

wardly committed to PAP. Whether we are engaged in an act of judgment (affirming

of freedom. For similar reasons, Vere Chappell suggests Descartess theory maybe incoherent (VereChappell, Descartess Compatibilism, in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartess Metaphysics,ed. John Cottingham [Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994], 181). Kenny sees Descartess theory of freedom

as incoherent for different reasons (Descartes on the will, 3031). Randal Marlin defends Descartes

against Kennys criticisms, but raises some worries of his own about the coherence of Descartess view

(Randal Marlin, Cartesian Freedom and the Problem of the Mesland Letters [Cartesian Freedom],

inEarly Modern Philosophy: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Politics, ed. Georges J. D. Moyal and StanleyTweyman (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1985), 195216.

6In saying this, I treat the letters to Mesland as one work because they constitute an ongoing

philosophical interchange about the same topic. It does not become clear that the 1644 letter to

Mesland endorses PAP until we read it in light of the 1645letter.7Daniel Dennett,Elbow Room: Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984),

131.8Parenthetical references to Descartes in the body of the paper use the following abbrevia-

tions:

AT: Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., Oeuvres de Descartes, 2nd ed., 11 vols. (Paris:Vrin/C.N.R.S., 197486).

CSM: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans., The PhilosophicalWritings of Descartes,vols. 1and 2(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).CSMK: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, trans., ThePhilosophical Writings of Descartes,vol. 3(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Translations are from CSM or CSMK unless otherwise noted.


4/19

379desc a r t es on a lt er nat i v e poss i b i l i t i es

or denying a proposition) or choice (pursuing or avoiding a course of action),

our freedom consists in our power to do otherwise. Second, Descartes here uses

freedom of choice (arbitrii libertas) as a synonym for the will (voluntas), suggest-ing the principle thatfreedom is essential to the will(FEW): the will is free by its verynature, and every voluntary act is free.9FEW combines with PAP to imply that the

will can always do otherwise than it does, that we enjoy two-way power with respect

to every one of our voluntary actions.

However, a few paragraphs later, Descartes seems to give a counterexample to

this conclusion. In what I call the great light passage, Descartes reflects on his

experience of the cogitoargument, and says:

. . . I could not but judge[non potui . . . non judicare] something which I understoodso clearly to be true; not because I was compelled so to judge by any external force,

but because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the

will, and thus I have believed this more spontaneously and freely as I have been lessindifferent to it. (AT 7:5859/ CSM 2:41; my translation and italics)

Like the earlier passage, this one seems to express two key assumptions. The first

is a doctrine of clear and distinct determinism(CDD): in at least some cases wherewe perceive a proposition Pclearly and distinctly, wecannotrefrainfromassent-ing to P. CDD implies that we lack two-way power with respect to at least someacts of will. Second, Descartes assumes that judgment is a voluntary act (JVA).10These two assumptions combine to imply that the will cannotalways do otherwisethan it does, that we do notenjoy two-way power with respect to every one of our

voluntary actions.Therefore, the definition of the will and the great light passage seem diametri-

cally opposed, each implying the opposite of the other. More generally, PAP, FEW,

CDD, and JVA form an inconsistent quartet: the truth of any three of them logically

entails the falsehood of the fourth. There is little wonder that some commentators

question the coherence of Descartess remarks on freedom.11

But Descartes was too smart to miss such an obvious contradiction. Interpre-

tive charity requires us to look for some coherent doctrine beneath the surface of

these two passages. Descartes seems clearly committed to FEW and JVA, so I will

concentrate on the tension between PAP and CDD. Commentators have tried twobasic strategies for resolving it. The first is to deny that Descartes really endorsed

PAP. The second is to claim that Descartes uses power in two different senses: the

two-way power that PAP requires for freedom is not the same as the power ruled

out by CDD. I will now explain what I take to be the most plausible version of the

first strategy, show why I do not find it promising, and then explore the second

strategy in more detail.

9Descartes states FEW explicitly in several other places: AT 7:166/ CSM 2:117; AT 7:191/ CSM

2:134; AT 11:359/ CSM 1:343.10In PrinciplesI.32, Descartes says that assertion, denial, and doubt are various modes of willing

(AT 8a:17/ CSM 1:204). JVA is also expressed in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet(AT 8b:363/ CSM1:307) and above, in the definition of freedom, where Descartes suggests that voluntary acts are of two

kinds: acts of judgment (to affirm or deny) and acts of choice (to pursue or avoid).11Laberthonniere,tudes sur Descartes, 43032.


5/19


Though the definition of freedoms first part seemsto endorse PAP, the latterpart may show that Descartes does not accept PAP after all. Anthony Kenny offers

the most plausible version of this sort of reading.12Kenny distinguishes between

liberty of indifference (two-way power) and liberty of spontaneity, which we

enjoy with respect to an act if and only if we do it because we want to do it.13

According to Kenny, the first clause defines freedom as liberty of indifference,

the second as liberty of spontaneity, and the or rather means that freewill oftendoesconsist in liberty of indifference, but that sometimes it consists only in libertyof spontaneity, and that is all that is essential to it.14In other words, Descartes addsthe or rather and second clause to make it clear that alternative possibilities are

not necessaryfor freedom.Though Kenny does not mention this, on his interpretation Cartesian freedom

is asymmetrical in Susan Wolfs sense: if we are doing the right thing, freedom

does not require that we be able to do otherwise, but if we are doing the wrong

thing, it does.15On such a view, freedom is ultimately just the ability to avoid error.

God has given me the freedom to assent or not assent in those cases where he

did not endow my intellect with a clear and distinct perception (AT 7:61/ CSM

2:42) because when obscurity in the intellect makes it possible for us to err, our

freedom requires that it is alsopossible for us to suspend judgment, and henceavoiderror (AT 7:59/ CSM 2:41). That is why freedom often consists in libertyof indifference. However, as the great light passage seems to illustrate, when clear

perceptions determine us to assent to the truth (and thus avoid error), freedom

does notrequire that we also be able to suspend judgment. That is whyspontaneityalone is essentialto freedom.

Kenny interprets Descartes viaa distinction (indifference vs. spontaneity) fromHume (Treatise[III.2.1]), and thus may seem guilty of anachronism. However,the term spontaneumis Descartess own (see AT 4:175/ CSMK 246), and Kennyis correct that the second clause defines spontaneity: in the great light passage,

Descartes suggests that he assented to the cogitospontaneously because he satis-fied the conditions laid down in the second clause.

But does Kenny offer an accurate account of Cartesian spontaneity? Doing

what you want to do may look more like an account of voluntarinessthan sponta-neity.16However, the second clause of Descartess definition identifies spontaneityas a way of being carried, and the very next sentence reads: For in order to be

free it is not necessary that I can be carried [ferri posse] in both directions, but onthe contrary, the more I incline [propendeo] in one direction . . . the more freelydo I choose it (AT 7:5758/ CSM 2:40; my translation). This suggests that we

can be carried in both directions only if we are inclined in both directions, which

in turn suggests that what carries us is an inclination or desire. Furthermore, the

great light passage associates spontaneity with a great inclination in the will. So

Kenny is right to associate spontaneity with doing what we want to do.12For other versions of this sort of reading, see Gilson, La libert, 310, and M. Beyssade, Descartess

Doctrine, 194, 206.13Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 17.14Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 18; my italics.15Susan Wolf, Asymmetrical Freedom,Journal of Philosophy77(1980): 15166.16I am grateful to an anonymous referee of JHP for calling this to my attention.


6/19


However, Kennys account ignores Descartess reference to external determina-

tion. In the second clause, Descartes says that freedom consists in being carried

in such a way toward what the intellect proposes . . . that we feel ourselves deter-

mined to it by no external force (a nullavi externa nos ad id determinari sentiamus)(AT 7:57/ CSM 2:40). Vere Chappell glosses this passage as follows: an action

is spontaneous if it is performed by its agent entirely on his own, without being

forced . . . by any external factor.17Descartess text itself requires for spontaneity

only that wefeelundetermined, not that we actually beundetermined. However,there are at least two reasons to think that Chappells gloss is correct. First, Des-

cartes is probably using the word feel (sentiamus) here to reiterate his frequentlystated opinion that we have an inner feeling or experience of freedom.18Descartes

suggests that this experience of freedom is clear and distinct, and hence (given

the divine guarantee) veridical.19So if in the experience of freedom wefeelun-determined, we really areundetermined. Second, one of the main points of theFourth Meditation seems to be that because we are certain that we err freely, we

can also be certain that God is not causing our errors.20But if freedom is merelyafeeling, and is thus consistent with behind-the-scenes external control, then how

can we be sure that God is not making us err after all?

So Kennys account of spontaneity is incomplete. Cartesian spontaneity involves

bothacting on inclination andbeing free from external determination. However,Kenny could easily rectify this problem without giving up his basic interpretation

of the or rather. The real trouble with Kennys reading is this: Descartes intends

his definition of freedom to explain why there is an analogy between the divineand human will, and Kennys reading is hard pressed to deal with this aspect of

the definition. A reading on which the definition endorses PAP does a much

better job. Before discussing the analogy, I must first lay some groundwork by

explaining Descartess notion of indifference as it relates to both divine and hu-

man freedom.

As Descartes normally uses the term, indifference denotes a motivational

state that comes in degrees. Perfect indifference is the state the will is in when it

is not impelled more in one direction than in another by any perception of truth

or goodness (AT 4:173/ CSMK 245; see also AT 7:58/ CSM 2:40; AT 4:174/CSMK 245). In a state of perfect indifference, the motivations for and against a

given act of will are perfectly balanced. We become progressively less indifferent

as the motivations on one side outweigh those on the other, and we lose indiffer-

ence altogether when we are motivated in only one direction (AT 4:115/ CSMK

233; AT 4:174/ CSMK 24546; AT 4:155/ CSMK 233).21

17Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, 180.18AT 7:56, 191, 377/ CSM 2:39, 134, 259; AT 8a:6/ CSM 1:194; AT 4:332/ CSMK 277; AT

5:159/ CSMK 342. See also Campbell, Descartes on Spontaneity, 181.19See especially PrinciplesI.39(AT 8a:1920/ CSM 1:20506). See also AT 3:259/ CSMK 161;AT 7:191/ CSM 2:134; and Campbell, 181.

20As PrinciplesI.29says: God is not the Cause of our Errors (AT 8a:16/ CSM 1:203). See alsoPrinciplesI.31and I.38and the Fourth Meditation (AT 7:54,60/ CSM 2:38, 41).

21For an excellent alternative discussion of indifference as it relates to divine and human freedom,

see Dan Kaufman, Infimus gradus libertatis?Descartes on indifference and divine freedom, ReligiousStudies39(2003): 391406.


7/19


Perfect indifference comes in two forms. The first is balanced multi-directionalmotivation, in which we recognize many reasonsprobut as many reasons contra (AT4:174/CSMK 245). For example, we might be motivated to affirm a proposition,

but equally motivated notto affirm it. The second form of perfect indifference isnon-motivation. If we recognize no reasons at all, eitherproor contra, then we arenot inclined more in one direction than in another.

In the Sixth Replies, Descartes ascribes the second sort of indifference to

God:

It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from eternity

with respect to everything which has happened or will ever happen; for it is impos-

sible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true,

or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to

make it so . . . Thus the supreme indifference to be found in God is the supreme

indication of his omnipotence. (AT 7:43132/ CSM 2:291)

Because Gods creative decisions are not motivated at all, God has (trivially) aperfect balance with respect to them, and thus enjoys the supreme degree of

indifference. As a direct implication of Gods power over standards of truth and

goodness, this indifference signifies Gods omnipotence.

Human indifference, on the other hand, is very different from divine indif-

ference:

But as for man, since he finds that the nature of all goodness and truth is already

determined by God, and his will cannot tend toward anything else, it is evident that

he will embrace what is good and true all the more willingly, and hence more freely,in proportion as he sees it more clearly. He is never indifferent except when he does

not know which of the two alternatives is the better or truer, or at least when he

does not see this clearly enough to rule out any possibility of doubt. (AT 7:43233

/ CSM 2:292)

Unlike the divine will, the human will cannot act unless the intellect first puts

forward some object for its consideration.22The intellect must conceive this object

as goodor truein some respect,23so that the will is inclined toward it. Therefore,unlike the divine will, the human will cannot choose from a state of non-motivation;

insofar as it bears on choice, human indifference always involves multi-directionalmotivation. Because we experience indifference only if we fail to see things withperfect clarity,24it is a sign of our weakness.

Despite these differences, Descartes insists that it is principally because of

this infinite will within us that we can say we are created in [Gods] image . . .

22According to the Fifth Replies, when we direct our will towards something, we always have some

sort of understanding of some aspect of it (AT 7:377; CSM 2:259); and PrinciplesI.34says: In orderto make a judgment, the intellect is of course required since, in the case of something which we do not

in any way perceive, there is no judgment we can make (AT8a:18; CSM 1:204). See also Comments ona Certain Broadsheet(AT 8b:363; CSM 1:307) and Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, 187.23Further evidence: the will does not tend toward evil except in so far as it is presented to it by

the intellect under some aspect of goodness (AT 1:366; CSMK 56).24Descartes may mean that the human will never experiences multidirectional motivation unless

there is obscurity in the intellect. Or he may reserve the term indifference to denote only instances

of multidirectional motivation produced by ignorance, leaving it open that there could be other

multidirectional motivation not thus produced.


8/19


(AT 2:628; CSMK 14142). Descartes expands on this idea in the passage that

introduces his definition of freedom:

It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great

that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is aboveall in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and

likeness of God. For although Gods will is incomparably greater than mine, both

in virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and

efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater number

of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when viewed as will

formally and precisely in itself [in se formaliter & praecise spectata]. This is because thewill simply consists in this: that we are able to do or not do, or rather . . . (AT7:5657

/ CSM 2:3940; my translation)

Note the phrase this is because (quia): the definition of freedom is supposed to

explain why Gods will isquawillno greater than ours. It does so by explain-ing what will is, as CSM puts it, in the essential and strict sense. Descartes mightseem to be claiming that the divine and human will share the same essence. But

in his reply to an objection about this passage, he states clearly: no essence can

belong univocally to both God and his creatures (AT 7:433/ CSM 2:292). How,

then, is our will an image of Gods?

Descartess position seems to be that there is an analogybetween divine andhuman will, just as there is an analogy between divine and created substance.25In

PrinciplesI.51Descartes defines substance as a thing which exists in such a wayas to depend on no other things for its existence, and notes that only God is a

substance in this sense. Therefore, he concludes that the term substance does

not apply univocally . . . to God and to other things (AT 8a:24; CSM 1:210).

However, he goes on to define created substances as things that need only the

ordinary concurrence of God in order to exist, and hence do not depend on any

other createdthings (AT 9b:47; CSM 1:210). The essence of divine substance isdifferent from that of created substance, but there is an analogy between the two

because they share a common feature: both involve the general idea of ontologi-

cal independence. In the same way, Descartes seems to think that there is some

point of similarity between the divine will and the human will, and the definition

of freedom is supposed to explain what it is.26

25Other passages asserting similarity between divine and human will include AT 11:445/ CSM

1:384and AT 5:85/ CSMK 326. The idea of an analogy between divine and created substance is also

suggested near the end of the Third Meditation (AT 7:51/ CSM 2:35) and discussed at length in the

Conversation with Burman(AT 5:156/ CSMK 33940). For an excellent discussion of these passagesand relevant scholastic background, see Tad Schmaltz, The Disappearance of Analogy in Descartes,

Spinoza, and Regis, Canadian Journal of Philosophy30(2000): 85114. Schmaltz argues, in effect, thatDescartess understanding of divine simplicity conflicts with his belief in an analogy between the divine

and human wills. Schmaltz may be correct, but it still seems that the Fourth Meditation (coherently

or not) posits an analogy.26Descartess denial of univocity might seem to mean that (1) there is nofeature that belongsessentially to both divine and human wills. However, the denial responds to the following argument

in the Sixth Set of Objections: if indifference cannot be a proper part of human freedom, neither

will it find a place in divine freedom, since the essences of things are, like numbers, indivisible and

immutable (AT 7:417/ CSM 2:281). The objectors assume that (2) a feature is essential to the divine

will if and only if it is also essential to the human will. Descartes intends his remark as a denial of (2),

not as an assertion of (1).


9/19


The first clause of the definition seems to identify two-way power as the point

of similarity. This makes sense because Descartes identifies divine freedom with

two-way power: God was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle

are equaljust as free as he was not to create the world (AT 1:152; CSMK 25).

However, on Kennys reading, two-way power is not essential to humanfreedom,so we must look to the second clause to find the point of similarity. As we have

seen, the second clause involves two main ideas: doing what we want to do, and

being free from external determination. Unfortunately for Kenny, neither of these

notions works very well.

Doing what we want to do cannot be the point of resemblance because it involves

being carried toward what the intellect puts forwardfor our consideration, and forDescartes such motivation (reasons of truth or goodness grasped prior to choice)

cannot possibly apply to Gods will. Spontaneity is essential to the human will, but

not the divine will. Self-determination, or freedom from outside constraint, is a

more plausible candidate for the point of similarity: God must be essentially free

from external determination because there is nothing outside him before he freely

creates.27However, three considerations make self-determination less plausible

than two-way power as the point of similarity.

First, to identify self-determination as the point of similarity, we must gloss over

a key detail in the second clause: the phrase in such a way . . . that we feel ourselves

determined by no external force modifies that we are carried . . . toward what

the intellect proposes. Strictly speaking, the second clause identifies freedom not

simply with being undetermined, but with beingcarried in an undetermined way.As I noted earlier, the second clause describes a kind of spontaneity that involves

bothbeing undetermined by external forces and doing what we want to do. Sincethe latter notion does not apply to God, and infects (as it were) the entire second

clause, it seems unlikely that Descartes intended the second clause to describe

divine freedom at all. It looks more like a clarification of the nature of humanfreedom.

Second, and more worrying: if self-determination is the point of similarity, then

it is hard to make sense of the first clause. In context, the definition would mean

something like: Divine and human freedom have two-way power in common.Well, actually, no. Rather they have self-determination in common. If two-way

power is not essential to human freedom, then the first clause fails to explain the

point of similarity and is extremely misleading. It is hard to see why Descartes

would leave it in place.28

Finally, the best textual evidence for the idea that self-determination is essen-

tial to Gods freedom alsosuggests that self-determination implieshaving two-waypower. Descartes says that God cannot have been determined to make it true that

27

Charles Larmore, who seems to agree with Kennys reading of the definition of freedom, notesthat the similarity between the divine and human will creates a problem for his interpretation, and

suggests that the idea of freedom from external determination may provide a solution. See Charles

Larmore, Descartes Psychologistic Theory of Assent [Descartes Psychologistic], History of PhilosophyQuarterly1(1984): 6668.

28Especially in the early parts, the Meditationsinvolve internal dialogue or thinking out loud,and in some cases use the process of assertion and retraction to make a philosophical point. In this

case, however, that process would only create confusion.


10/19


contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore . . . he could have done the

opposite (AT 4:118/ CSMK 235). Descartess inference here seems to depend

on the following suppressed premise: if an agent is not determined to perform an

action, then that agent could have not performed it. This premise seems correct:

to be determined by some factor Fjust isto be unable to do otherwise, given F, soto be notdetermined by F just is to be ableto do otherwise, given F. So if Descartesidentifies human freedom with being undetermined by external forces, it seems

he would also take this lack of determinism to imply that we are able to do otherwise,given external forces.

I cannot pretend that these considerations completely rule out Kennys read-

ing, but I do think they should motivate us to explore alternatives. The obvious

alternative is to consider two-way power the point of similarity, in which case it

must be essential to human freedom. The or rather does not retract PAP, but

clarifies Descartess understanding of it. Or rather means in other words, so

that the second clause spells out necessary and sufficient conditions for humans

to possess the two-way power mentioned in the first clause. For humans, being

undetermined by external forces and being able to do otherwisein the sense

necessary for freedomare two sides of the same coin.

On this alternative reading, the first clause of the definition of freedom explains

the essential similarity between divine and human freedom: both involve two-way

power. The second clause shifts the focus exclusively to human freedom in order to

forestall a potential misunderstanding. Descartes thinks that indifference is neces-

sary for divine freedom: If some reason for a things being good had preceded[Gods] preordination, Descartes says, that reasonwould have determined him tomake that which is best (AT 7:435/ CSM 2:294; my translation and italics).29Werehe not indifferent, God would be unable to refrain from making the best, and

hence would not be free. Descartess readers might conclude that our freedom is

like Gods not only in being a two-way power, but also in requiring indifference.

Descartes adds the or rather and second clause to clarify that human freedom

does notrequire indifference: For in order to be free it is not necessary that Ican be carried [i.e., motivated] in both directions, but on the contrary, the more

I incline in one direction . . . the more freely do I choose it (AT 7:5758/ CSM2:40).30So there is a further parallel with the analogy of substance. Just as divine

and created substances enjoy two different kinds of ontological independence,

the divine and created will enjoy two different kinds of two-way power: Gods kind

requires indifference, but our kind does not.

29The relevant sentence reads: nam si quae ratio boni eius praeordinationem antecessisset, illa ipsumdeterminasset ad id quod optimum est faciendum.CSM translates it thus: If some reason for somethings

being good had existed prior to his preordination, this would have determined God to prefer thosethings which it was best to do. Unfortunately, in English to prefer sometimes means to choose,

and sometimes merely to be inclined toward. However, the idiomatic Latin phrase ad id faciendumisnot ambiguous at all: it means to make it.

30This passage immediately follows the second clause. The for indicates that it is supposed

to explain Descartess reason for adding the or rather (see M. Beyssade, Descartess Doctrine,

19899). Descartes reiterates that human freedom does not require indifference at AT 7:433/ CSM

2:292and AT 4:116/ CSMK 234.


11/19


At the same time, the second clause also clarifies the sense in which human

freedom requires alternative possibilities. When discussing freedom, Descartes

uses the modal terms can and could in two distinct ways. Sometimes, as in the

passage above, being able to go in more than one direction is associated with be-

ing motivated in more than one direction: I could have done otherwise means

I had a reason or motive for doing otherwise. Whenever the will is indifferent, it

has alternative possibilities in this sense, because it has motives bothproand contraa course of action. So we can call these alternatives of indifference. In other places,Descartes uses I could have done otherwise to mean external forces did not

determine me to do what I did. Call these alternatives of self-determination. Giventhese two senses of can, the first clause is ambiguous in requiring the ability to

do or not do for freedom. Sensing this ambiguity, Descartes added the second

clause to clarify that he means to require alternatives of self-determination. He

then followed the second clause with the passage quoted just above, to further

clarify that freedom does notrequire alternatives of indifference.If, as I have suggested, Descartes distinguished implicitly between two senses

of could have done otherwise, this would explain why he was not fazed by the

apparent contradiction between the first clause of the definition (which endorses

PAP), and the great light passage (which seems to deny PAP). When Descartes

says that he could not but judge the cogitotrue, he means that he had no reasonto do otherwise, that all of his inclinations were on the side of assent. But he states

explicitly that he was not determined to assent by any external force. He lacked

alternatives of indifference, but still enjoyed alternatives of self-determination. Andthe first clause requires only alternatives of self-determination for freedom.

Thus far I have explained a general strategy of interpretation that makes two

key claims. First, the second part of Descartess definition clarifiesrather than re-tracts his commitment to PAP, and second, the great light passage does not conflict

with the definition because each employs a different sense of can. All things

considered, I believe this reading fits the texts more snugly than Kennys reading.

My general strategy can develop into at least three more specific interpretations,

depending on how we answer two key questions about the second clauses crucial

phrase, determined to it by no external force.First, what does determined mean? There are two basic answers. On a com-

patibilist reading, an act of will is determined in Descartess sense just in case an

external force directlydetermines the act of will at the time of action and therebyblocks the causal efficacy of the wills own motives, as in the following diagram.

External Force

Internal Forces (Motives) // Act of Will

In other words, an act is determined only if it would have occurred no matterwhatthe wills inclinations were. On this reading, free actions can be sufficientlycaused by internal forces, even if those internal forces are themselves causally

determined by external forces acting at an earlier time, like this:

External Forces Internal Forces Act of Will.


12/19


On an incompatibilist reading, we are determined to an action just in case an

external force sufficiently causes the act of will either directlyor indirectly. So inthe situation just diagrammed, the act of will would be externally determined.

On this reading, freedom requires both that the act of will not be causally deter-

mined by an external force at the time of action, and that if the act is determined

by internal forces, those internal forces cannot themselves be causally determined

by prior external forces.

Now for the second key question: what does Descartes count as an external

force? It seems God would be such a force, and that is perhaps why Descartes

insists, in PrinciplesI.41, that Gods providence leaves the free actions of menundetermined (AT 8a:20/ CSM 1:206).31The body, too, seems external (see

Passions of the Soul, esp. AT 11:328/ CSM 1:328). But Descartess position regard-ing the intellectis ambiguous: does external mean external to the self (thinkingsubstance), so that the intellect is internal, or does it mean external to the will,so that the intellect is external?

If we assume an incompatibilist interpretation of determined and further

suppose that the intellect is an external force, then we will be led to what I call the

radical freedom interpretation. Consider again the great light passage, where

a clear perception in Descartess intellect causes him to be inclined in only one

direction (to assent to the cogito). If that inclination in turn determined the willsact, then Descartess assent would be indirectly determined by an external force.

Since Descartes was notthus determined, it must have been psychologically pos-

sible for him to withhold assent in the face of this one-way motivation. In scholasticterms, he must retain freedom with regard to the exercise of his will (to act or

not act) even if (due to his motives) he lacks freedom with regard to the specifi-

cation of his act (say, to affirm or deny).32On this view, the claim that Descartes

lacked alternatives of indifferencethat he had no reason or motive for doing

otherwisemeans that for him to do otherwise would be immoral or irrational,

but notpsychologically impossible.33The two remaining interpretations agree that for Descartes it is psychologically

impossible to withhold assent unless we have a reasonfor holding back. Therefore,

if Descartes had no motive to do otherwise than assent to the cogito, then he was(at that moment) psychologically unable to do otherwise. The two interpreta-tions differ over why this psychological inability to do otherwise is compatible

with freedom.

31For more on this topic, see my Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom, Archivfr Geschichte der Philosophie87(2005):15988.

32See Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philoso-phy, vol. 2(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119899. For an argument that Descartesfollows Duns Scotus in claiming that the will always enjoys the power to elicit or not elicit its acts, see

Lilli Alanen, Descartes on the Will and the Power to Do Otherwise [Do Otherwise], in Emotionsand Choice from Boethius to Descartes, eds. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjnsuuri (Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Publishers, 2002) 27998.

33This general sort of reading is advanced by Ferdinand Alqui, La dcouverte mtaphysique delhomme chez Descartes, 2nded. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), 286, and in Alanen, DoOtherwise, 294; Moyal, Unity, 39; and Marlin, Cartesian Freedom, 20708. Moyal defends it at

length in his Magicians, Doubters, and Perverts: On Doubting the Clear and Distinct [Magicians],

Revue Internationale de Philosophie50(1996): 73107.


13/19


The first adopts the compatibilist reading of determined. On this view, the

clear perception in the intellect determines the will to be inclined in only one

way, which in turn determines the will to act in that way. However, even if the intel-

lect is external, this indirect determinism is no threat to freedom. If the wills

inclinations had been different, the will would have done something else, and so

the agent could have done otherwise in the only sense necessary for freedom. On

this reading, Descartes endorses what Joseph K. Campbell calls two-way compati-

bilism, which endorses PAP, but then gives a hypothetical account of alternative

possibilities, rendering them compatible with determinism.34

The final interpretation adopts the incompatibilist reading of determined,

but insists that in the great light passage (and all relevantly similar situations), the

intellect is not an external force. On this view, external really means external

to the will or its influence. In the great light passage, Descartess clear perceptionsare internal because they were brought about by an earlier act of will regarding

how to focus attention (and this earlier act was notdetermined by the intellectscontents). On this reading, the will can be both free and determined by the

intellect in specific cases, but it could not be free if alwaysdetermined by theintellect.35So on this reading, Descartes does not endorse what Laura Eckstrom

calls a narrowly construed version of PAP, according to which an act of will is

free at a given time only if the agent is psychologically able to do otherwise at thattime. Rather he endorses a broader version of PAP that allows for inability to dootherwise at the time of action, provided that the agent enjoyed the relevant sort

of alternatives at some earliertime.36There is much to be said both for and against each of these interpretations.

However, this is not the place to determine how exactly Descartes understood PAP.

We must move on to examine whether he also affirms PAP in his later writings.

2 . p r i n c i p l e s o f p h i l o s o p h y

In the Part One of the Principles, Descartess discussion of freedom is less detailedthan in the Meditations. He claims neither that divine and human freedoms areessentially similar, nor that indifference is unnecessary for human freedom. He

is also silent concerning liberty of spontaneous self-determination. However, hesays nothing to contradict any of those earlier claims, and he clearly remains com-

mitted to PAP, FEW, CDD, and JVA.

He asserts CDD in Principle 43: the minds of all of us have been so molded

by nature that whenever we perceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our

assent to it and are quite unable to doubt its truth (AT 8a:21/ CSM 1:207). As

before, clear and distinct perceptions determine the will.

34Campbell, Descartes on Spontaneity, 180. Petrik also defends this sort of interpretation (see

note 4).35Laporte advances this sort of interpretation. On this view, Descartess core condition for freedom

is basically the same as Robert Kanes: the will must be the ultimate causal origin of its own acts. See

Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3740.36Laura Waddell Eckstrom, Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases, in The Oxford Handbook

of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 31015.


14/19


Principle 39could be taken to suggest that the when the will is thus determined,

it does not enjoy two-way power. Descartes says that we have power in manycasesto give or withhold assent at will, and that in the past when we imagined ourselves

the victims of an omnipotent deceiver, our freedom was nonetheless so great as to

enable us to abstain from believing whatever was not quite certainor fully examined(AT 8a:1920/ CSM 1:20506; my italics) These remarks could be taken to mean

that we lack any sort of two-way power with respect to what isfully certain.37However, consider the following passage from Principle 37:

it is a supreme perfection in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely; this makes

him in a special way the author of his actions and deserving of praise for what he does.

We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements they were

designed to perform, because the production of these movements occurs necessarily.

It is the designer who is praised . . . for in constructing [automatons] he acted not

out of necessity but freely. By the same principle, when we embrace the truth, ourdoing so voluntarily is much more to our credit than would be the case if we could

not do otherwise [quam si non possemus non amplecti]. (AT 8a:19/ CSM 1:205)

The opening of this passage might seem to work against my reading, for Descartes

equates freedom with voluntariness (FEW again), and it seems that we can do

something voluntarily even if we could not have done otherwise (as Frankfurt-Style

Counterexamples to PAP show). However, the rest of the passage indicates that

in Descartess opinion, we act voluntarily only if we could have done otherwise.

The example of the automatons and their designer suggests that for Descartes, a

good action is worthy of praise (i.e., to our credit) only if we perform it freely (i.e.,voluntarily), and we perform an action freely only if we do not do so necessarily.

In this context, the locution Doing so voluntarily is more to our credit than

would be the case leads us to expect the completion if we did so necessarily. Butinstead, Descartes says: if we could not do otherwise. This suggests that for Descartesthe phrases we did so necessarily and we could not have done otherwise are

equivalent. And if these phrases are equivalent, then Descartes must think that weperform an action freely or voluntarily only if we could have done otherwise.

Furthermore, Descartes here imagines a case where we deserve credit for em-

bracingi.e., believingthe truth. But for Descartes, we deserve credit for believ-

ing something only if we perceive it clearly and distinctly. We deserve blame for

believing what we do not clearly perceive: when we give our assent to something

which is not clearly perceived, this is always a misuse of our judgment, even if by

chance we stumble on the truth (AT8a:21/ CSM 1:207). So in the passage above,

Descartes must be imagining a case in which we assent to a clearly perceived truth.

In such a case, he maintains, we assent voluntarily (JVA) and freely, and therefore

could have done otherwise (PAP).

Principle 37thus commits Descartes to JVA, FEW, and PAP; Principle 43com-

mits him to CDD. His apparent problem is the samehe seems to maintain both

that we can and that we cannot withhold assent from clear perceptionsand

there is nothing to suggest that he has altered his solution to this problem since

the Meditations.

37See Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 21.


15/19


3 . t h e l e t t e r s t o m e s l a n d

In the mid-1640s the young Jesuit Denis Mesland wrote to Descartes with some

questions about the Meditations. One of these concerned free will, particularly our

ability to suspend judgment. In a letter dated 2May 1644, Descartes respondedto Mesland as follows:

I agree with you when you say that we can suspend our judgment; but I tried to

explain in what manner this can be done. For it seems to me certain that a great

light in the intellect is followed by a great inclination in the will; so that upon see-

ing very clearly that a thing is good for us, it is very difficult, and even, as I believe,

impossible, while one remains in this thought, to stop the course of our desire. But

the nature of the soul is such that it hardly attends for more than a moment to a

single thing; hence, as soon as our attention turns from the reasons which show us

that the thing is good for us, and we merely keep in our memory the thought that

it appeared desirable to us, we can call up before our mind some other reason tomake us doubt it, and so suspend our judgment, and perhaps even form a contrary

judgment. (AT 4:116/ CSMK 23334)

This passage implies an analogue of CDD, affirming with respect to the Good

what earlier texts said about the True: if we see it clearly, it is impossible to hold

back from it.

However, Descartess commitment to PAP is less clear in this text. He says that to

suspend judgment, we must turn our attention away from the reasons that make a

things goodness clear and distinct to us. This seems to imply that we can suspend

judgment only after our perceptions are no longer clear. Descartes may mean thatat the timeof clear perception, we are unable to refrain from pursuing the good.Nevertheless, our pursuit is voluntary, and Descartes goes on to say (re-asserting

FEW): I call free in the general sense whatever is voluntary (AT 4:116/ CSMK

234). So this 1644letter leaves it open that we can be free at a time without hav-

ing two-way power at that time.

In a subsequent letter to Mesland from 1645, Descartes expands on the rela-

tion of free will to time. He says: freedom considered in the acts of the will at

the moment when they are elicited does not involve two-way power, for what

is done cannot remain undone as long as it is being done (AT 4:174/ CSMK

246). This shows that Descartes would reject a version or interpretation of PAP

requiring that the will be able to do otherwise both before and during its act.However, in the same letter Descartes explicitly accepts a more modest version of

PAP, according to which being free implies having alternative possibilities during

the interval after the intellect puts forward an object for deliberation but before

the will elicits its act of choice or judgment. Considered with respect to the time

before[acts of will] are elicited, Descartes says, freedom entails a positive facultyof determining oneself to one or other of two contraries, that is to say, to pursue

or avoid, to affirm or deny (my italics; AT 4:173/ CSMK 245).

This last quotation reaffirms both JVA and PAP. It also suggests that Descartes

was committed to PAP in his earlier letter to Mesland. The quotation identifies

the wills essential positive power of self-determination as a two-way power. ThusDescartes was probably hinting at the wills two-way power in 1644, when he told

Mesland: since you regard freedom not simply as indifference but rather as a real

andpositive power to determine oneself, the difference between us is merely a verbal


16/19


onefor I agree that the will has such a power (AT 4:116/ CSMK 234;my italics).

It seems that in his correspondence with Mesland, Descartes is still committed to

FEW, JVA, PAP, and CDD. His apparent problem is still the same.

In what I call the two senses passage from the 1645letter, Descartes tries to

solve his problem by further explaining our positive two-way power:

I do not deny that the will has this positive faculty. Indeed, I think it has it not only

with respect to those actions to which it is not pushed by any evident reasons on one

side rather than on the other, but also with respect to all other actions; so that when

a very evident reason moves us in one direction, although morally speakingwe canhardly move in the contrary direction, absolutely speakingwe can. For it is always opento us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly

perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom

of our will by so doing. (AT 4:173; CSMK 245; my italics)

Descartes reiterates that that two-way power is essentialto the will (PAP). He rec-onciles PAP with CDD by distinguishing two different senses of can, explicitly

employing the sort of strategy that (I claim) he used implicitly in the Fourth

Meditation. Georges Moyal is correct in saying that this passage provides the key

to the unity of Descartes thoughts on freedom.38

But before declaring the two senses passage a smoking gun, we should pause

to consider Kennys reading of it. Kenny takes the Meditations, Principles, and 1644letter all to deny that two-way power is essential to freedom, and he thinks that

this 1645letter is no exception.39He builds his case on the last sentence of the

two senses passage. According to Kenny,when Descartes says . . . that it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a

clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, he need not mean

that we can do this at the very moment of perceiving the good and the true. Rather,

we must distract our attention, as he said in the 1644letter. One way of doing this

would be to dwell on the thought that it would be a good thing to demonstrate our

free will . . . this would render the perception of truth and goodness unclear. (Des-

cartes on the Will, 2829)

As Kenny reads them, neither letter to Mesland claims that we enjoy two-way power

during clear perception. We enjoy it only after we have distracted our attention.Kenny reads the last sentence of the two senses passage as a gloss on the proce-

dure for suspending judgment outlined in the 1644letter. This reading of the last

sentence mightbe correct, but it does not support Kennys overall interpretation of thepassage. Kenny ignoresthe distinction between moral and absolute senses of can, butDescartes clearly intends the last sentence of the passage to elucidate that distinction.

It explains why, absolutely speaking, the will has two-way power with respect to allitsacts, including those that occur when a very evident reason moves us in one direc-

tion (and thus determines the will morally speaking). Therefore, the last sentence

cannot be denying that two-way power is in some sense essential to freedom.40

38Moyal, Unity, 47.39Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 26.40If Kenny reads it correctly, the last sentence implies that morally speakingwe cannot hold back

until a later time, and Descartess point must be that we count as absolutely able to hold back from

what we nowclearly perceive precisely because we could (morally speaking) turn our attention fromit in the future.


17/19


Furthermore, the last sentence is probably notmerely a gloss on the 1644re-marks about suspending judgment. In the Second Replies, Descartes distinguishes

two classes of clear and distinct truths: some are so transparently clear and at the

same time so simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to

be true (these are clear and distinctper se), while others are perceived very clearlyby our intellect so long as we attend to the arguments on which our knowledge of

them depends (these are clear and distinctper aliud) (AT 7:14546/ CSM 2:104).The 1644passage explains how to suspend judgment with respect to pursuing an

object that is goodper aliud(by turning our attention from the reasons whichshow us that the thing is good for us), but does not show how we could suspend

judgment with respect to objects that areper seclear and distinct. The two-sensespassage, however, concerns an ability to hold back that we have with respect to

bothper seandper aliudclear truths. Thus it is unwise to use the 1644passage asour primary lens for understanding the two-senses passage.

As I understand it, the two senses passage maintains that with respect to one

and the same act of will, and at the same time, we can be both morally unabletohold back and absolutely ableto hold back. Much about this moral/absolute distinc-tion is puzzling, but I suspect that it maps onto the earlier distinction between two

senses of can in the Fourth Meditation: moral alternatives are alternatives of

indifference, and absolute alternatives are alternative of self-determination. If I

am right, then the moral/absolute distinction could mean at least three different

things, corresponding to the three interpretations discussed above.

First, moral necessity may be a kind of deontic necessity. If so, Descartess claimthat we are morally unable to hold back means that morality (or rationality) does

notpermitus to hold back, that we oughtto act in accord with a very evident reason.Though this normative reading of moral necessity is compatible with the other

two interpretations below,41it has been stressed mainly by advocates of the radical

freedom interpretation, who insist that for Descartes it is always psychologically

possible for us to flout the rules of reason or morality (hence we can hold back

absolutely speaking).42On this reading, the phrase we can hardly move in the

contrary direction is making onlya normative point, and does not mean that clear

perceptions can psychologically determine assent. The last sentence of the passage(for it is always open to us to hold back . . . provided we consider it a good thing

to demonstrate the freedom of our will) seems to cause a problem for this read-

ing: if we can hold back when our motives drive us in only one direction, then why

does Descartes seem to make our ability to hold back depend on the presence of

a countervailing motive? Perhaps Descartes means that such a motive is needed

notto render holding back psychologically possible, but to render it rational.43

When Descartes says that it is morally impossible to hold back from an evident

reason, he may mean not only that we oughtto act in accord with the reason, but

41I am grateful to an anonymous referee of JHP for calling this to my attention.42For a very interesting discussion of the normative interpretation of moral necessity, see Lilli

Alanen, Intuition, Assent, and Necessity: The Question of Descartess Psychologism, Acta PhilosophicaFennica64(1999): 99121.

43For an argument to this effect, see Moyal, Magicians, 8991.


18/19


also that it is psychologically impossible for us not to.44On the two-way compati-

bilist reading, what is morallypossible is what is psychologically possible in theactual circumstances of choice. Given my awareness of a very evident reason to

do A, I cannot but do A. What is absolutely possible is what would (or could) havehappened in a relevantly similar choice situation: if, in addition to being aware of

A, I were also experiencing a countervailing motive (such as the desire to provemy freedom), I would be psychologically able to hold back from A.45

The distinction is similar on the less radical incompatibilist interpretation, but

with an important twist. On that reading, moral possibility would be psychological

possibility in the actual choice situation. But to say that an action is absolutely

possible for me would be to say boththat I could have performed it in an alterna-tive situation, andthat in the past it was in my powermorally speakingto bringabout that alternative situation, or not. On this view, it is not enough that I could

have held back if there had been a countervailing motive: I must also have been

able to determine whether or not such a motive would be present.

4 . C o n c l u s i o n

I have argued that over time Descartes consistently believed in PAP, FEW, JVA,

and CDD. I have also tried to show that the language of the Fourth Meditation

suggests a distinction between two different kinds of alternatives: to say that we

can do or not do means either that we are motivatedin alternative directions, orthat no external force determines our action. This distinction allows Descartes

to claim that PAP and CDD can be true of one and the same action, because PAP

requires alternatives in the lattersense, and CDD removes them only in the for-mersense. I have argued, further, that with his appeal to the difference betweenmoral and absolute possibility in the 1645letter to Mesland, Descartes attempts

to make basically the same distinction. So Descartes not only consistently affirmed

both PAP and CDD, but also consistently employed the same general strategy for

reconciling them with each other.

Because it is not immediately obvious how Descartes understood the nature

of moral and absolute alternatives, I have explored three different ways of

cashing out the distinction between them. In doing so, I do not mean to suggestthat Descartes had no clear or precise view about the nature of these alternatives

(though that is possible, and it is also possible that his view of these alternatives

developed across time). On the contrary, I think it likely that Descartes did have

a clear and consistent view about the nature of moral and absolute alternatives.

But I cannot argue for my opinion here, because doing so is beyond the scope of

this paper. It would require making an involved textual case for one of the three

interpretations discussed above, and that effort is best left for another time.46

44It is also possible that he intends only to make the descriptive psychological point, and not the

normative point at all. This seems to be the reading favored by Larmore, Descartes Psychologistic,

61.45See Campbell, Descartess Compatibilism, 19294.46See my Is Descartes a Libertarian, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy,

vol. 3, eds. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).


19/19


Some might object that my interpretation makes too much of the final letter

to Mesland. Although in that letter Descartes purports to clarify the Meditationsaccount of freedom,47there is some reason to doubt his sincerity. Mesland was a

Jesuit, and Jesuits were fierce defenders of PAP-like principles. Descartes may have

simply been telling Mesland what he wanted to hear. For it seems that at that stage

of his career, Descartes was trying to curry favor with Jesuits.48

Though I am inclined to take Descartes at his word, I agree that it would be a

dubious procedure to simply (as Vere Chappell says) read the qualification ex-

pressed by the phrase morally speaking back into Descartes earlier statement.49

But that is not what I have done. I have argued that the Fourth Meditation itselfsuggests a distinction between two different kinds of alternatives. Indeed, I think

considerations about the analogy between divine and human freedom would make

this the most plausible reading of the Fourth Meditation even if we did not have

the 1645letter to Mesland. If I am correct, there is good reason to think that in

the 1645letter Descartes was sincere after all: he had accepted PAP all along.50

47The letter refers to two different remarks from the Fourth Meditation and explains the sense

in which Descartes intended them.48Gilson makes an extensive case for this view. See La libert, especially chapters 37and theconclusion. See also Imlay, Descartes and Indifference, 90.

49Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, 183.50I am grateful to Robert Adams, Marilyn Adams, and Michael Della Rocca, who discussed this

material with me extensively and read many early drafts of this paper. I also benefited from discussions

with Keith DeRose, Sukjae Lee, and Dan Kaufman. Finally, I would like to thank William Charron and

two anonymous referees of JHP for their very helpful comments on the penultimate draft.

Documents

CP Ragland - Descartes on the Princple of Alternative Possibilities