Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore April 18, 2023//

Computer-Mediated Communication

Collective Action and Public Goods

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Public Good

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The Tragedy of the “Commons”

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Cornucopia of the Commons?

(Bricklin 2001)

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Private versus Public Good

The Free-Rider Problem

Individual interests tend to make non-contribution tempting, especially if other people will do the work.

In collective action, we can view this as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma (more on that in a moment…)

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Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action

“If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as a member of the community.”

(Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp. 946-7)

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Public Goods

(1) Non-Rival Goods (Jointness of Supply)

(2) Non-Excludability

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Fallacy of Individuals and Collectives

See: Mancur Olson (1965) “The Logic of Collective Action”

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N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma

The situation:

1) Each person has 2 options: cooperate or defect.

2) defection is the dominant strategy.

3) The dominant strategies (defection) intersect at a deficient equilibrium point.

  Coop Defect

Coop3,3(R)

0,5(S)

Defect5,0(T)

1,1(P)

T > R > P > S

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Explaining Collective Action

Selective Incentives

Self-Interest

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Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups

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Repeated Interactions in Public Goods and Collective Action

Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?

Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1651)

Respect my authoritaah!

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The Emergence of Cooperation

Consider two individuals who interact repeatedly over time

1) No mechanisms for enforceable commitments.

2) No way to be sure what the other will do on each ‘turn’.

3) No way to eliminate the other player or leave the interaction.

4) No way to change the other player’s payoffs.

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Strategizing 101

Always defect!

Always cooperate!

Randomly cooperate!

Do whatever your partner just did!

Mostly cooperate, randomly defect!

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Can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?

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For Thursday…

No reading, but please try to show up on time so that we can get started ~ 12:40

Problem Statements and Advising