Counting the Costs of Genetic

8/3/2019 Counting the Costs of Genetic

1/22

GE (genetically-engineered) crops have repeatedlyfailed to perform as intended in the field and havegiven rise to new agronomic problems.Commercialised GE crops depend upon theconsistent expression of inserted herbicideresistance and/or toxin genes in order to perform.If these genes do not function as intended, croplosses may result. GE varieties have alsodemonstrated new susceptibility to pests anddiseases, for unknown reasons. Geneticallyengineering plants to resist insects also has animpact upon pest populations, since troublesomenew pests - that require heavy use of insecticides can emerge as a result.

Bt Cotton susceptible to hotter daysIn China, scientists have demonstrated that high temperatures canlead to problems with cotton varieties genetically engineered toproduce Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) toxins. Investigating reports of Btcotton failing to control bollworms, scientists noted that the problemappeared to correlate to periods of high temperature. Theyhypothesised that heat may reduce the Bt plants resistance to insects.

To test the theory, the Yangzhou University-based group grew GE

cotton under controlled conditions. At key stages, such as flowering,they exposed the plants to high (37C) temperatures encountered inChinas cotton-growing areas. The plants exposed to heat produced30-63% less Bt toxin, making them less resistant to the caterpillarpests. Control plants not exposed to the heat did not show the sameproblem. The experiments were repeated a second year with similarresults (Chen et al, 2005).

Scientists are uncertain why the GE cotton varieties react to hightemperatures in this fashion, showing once again that theconsequences of genetic engineering are not fully understood.

Roundup Ready crops not quite readyIn glyphosate-resistant Roundup Ready crops, there is growingevidence that heat and water stresses cause reduced herbicideresistance (Cerdeira & Duke 2006). When their resistance is reduced,plants are damaged when Roundup is sprayed to control weeds,resulting in crop losses.

Cotton farmers in Texas report that they have experienced this problemand that Monsanto has failed to warn farmers of it. Charging thecompany with a longstanding campaign of deception, 82 Texasfarmers have sued Monsanto, alleging deceptive trade practices(Musick v. Monsanto Co. 2006).

According to the Texas farmers complaint, GE cotton planted in 2004and 2005 was damaged by glyphosate: In truth, even [glyphosate]applications applied strictly in compliance with Monsantos instructionscan, and often do, significantly damage the reproductive tissues in thecotton plants. This damage substantially reduces cotton yields fromotherwise healthy plants (Musick v. Monsanto Co. 2006).

Texas farmers additionally allege that Monsanto knew that the cottonwould be damaged by glyphosate, but failed to disclose this fact. Wefeel like Monsantos been lying to us all along, one farmer told Reuters. Another said that glyphosate damage to his Roundup Ready cottonreduced his yield by nearly 40% (Gillam, 2006).

The case is pending in US federal court in Texas.

Field failures

Field failures

Problems withgenetically-engineeredcrops in the field

GR E E N P E A C E / H E I K OME Y E R


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Unanticipated susceptibility to disease and insectsChinese and Norwegian scientists have compared the susceptibility of GE and non-GE cotton to infection by the destructive fungus Fusariumoxysporum . They found that conventional Chinese soya varietiesresisted F . oxysporum better than the same varieties when they weregenetically engineered (Li, 2009). Similarly, Swiss and UK scientistshave found that insect-resistant GE maize varieties are moresusceptible to the corn leaf aphid than the conventional parent plants(Faria, 2007).

The genetic mechanisms of these disease and insect susceptibilitiesare not understood. It is clear, however, that they are related to geneticengineering because in both cases conventional parent varieties of GEplants do not show the same susceptibility as the GE types.

Emergence of secondary pests All major field crops are threatened by not just one but many pestspecies. These threats are unevenly distributed; a major pest in oneregion may be of little concern elsewhere, and vice versa.

GE crops do not incorporate complex transgenic traits that allow plantsto respond to changing pest threats and to resist a wide variety of theirenemies. For example, Bt cotton, which kills bollworms ( Helicoverpa ),has succumbed to a related genus, armyworms ( Spodoptera ) inColombia (Lopez Gonzales, 2008).

Thus, even if successful at controlling a target pest species, other

pests (called secondary pests) may then emerge as more prominentthreats to the plants, resulting in crop loss and the need to applyadditional pesticides.

For example, Bt cotton is designed to resist bollworms and reduce theneed for pesticides to control them - but researchers have found thatChinese farmers spray as many pesticides on Bt varieties asconventional ones. What has prompted farmers to do this is theincreased prevalence of secondary pests that Bt toxins do not control. The cost of additional spraying made Bt cotton less profitable than itsconventional counterpart in five provinces surveyed: Economic gainsexperienced by adopters of Bt cotton seed in 1999-2001 evaporatedby 2004 largely due to the rapid increase in the pressure fromsecondary pests. (Wang, 2008).

Sources

CerdeiraAL andDuke SO (2006).The Current Statusand EnvironmentalImpactsof Glyphosate-ResistantCrops:A Review. J.Environ. Qual. 35:16331658.

ChenD, YeG, Yang C,Chen Y andWu Y.(2005).The effectof hightemperature onthe insecticidalproperties ofBt cotton.Environmental andExperimental Botany 53:333342.

FariaC et al.(2007).HighSusceptibility ofBt Maize to AphidsEnhances the Performanceof Parasitoidsof Leptidopteran Pests.PLoSONE (2)7: e600, July 2007.

Gilliam, C (2006).US: Cotton Farmers sue Monsanto,Bayer,and Delta & Pinefor croploss.Reuters,24 February2006.

KhanM, Quade P andMurrayD (2007). Reduced rateof chemical plusadditive - aneffectiveIPM tool formanaging mirids,Creontiadesspp.in Australiancottonin Goodell PBand EllsworthPC (2008).SecondInternationalLygus Symposium.JournalofInsect Science 8:49.

Li X (2009).The effectof rootexudatesfromtwo transgenic insect-resistant cottonlineson the growthof Fusariumoxysporum. Transgenic Res.Epub 25 April 2009.

LopezGonzales E (2008).El fracaso delalgodntansgnicoen el campo Colombiano,Grupo Semillas.http://www.semillas.org.co/sitio.shtml?apc=c1a1--&x=20155139g

Musickv. Monsanto Co. (2006).PlaintiffsOriginal ClassActionComplaint. USDistrictCourt forthe Eastern District ofTexas.

Wang S, Just D andPinstrup-Andersen P (2008).Bt-cottonand secondarypests,Int. J.Biotechnology 10:113-121.

Field failures

Greenpeace International Ottho Heldringstraat5, 1066 AZAmsterdam,The Netherlands Published in2010. Written byEdwardHammond


3/22

After years of very heavy use of the herbicideglyphosate on Roundup Ready GE (genetically-engineered) crops in the US, weeds are developingresistance to the chemical. The rapidly-spreadingproblem shows how reliance on genetically-engineered herbicide-resistance is a short-sightedstrategy that is resulting in more difficult-to-controlweeds.

I think this threatens our way of farming more than anythingI've seen in the 30-plus years I've worked in agriculture."Ken Smith, Universityof Arkansas weed scientist, 2009

The most problematic weed in all of cottonPalmer pigweed (Amaranthus palmeri) is a troublesome weed that hasrecently acquired glyphosate resistance and is rapidly spreading in theUS South and Midwest, infesting fields of Roundup Ready cotton,soya, and maize. Weed scientists are alarmed, and warn of ruin formany farmers. No effective control exists for resistant Palmer pigweedexcept large increases in the use of persistent herbicides, hand-weeding of crops, and increased tillage (ploughing), resulting in topsoilloss.

Glyphosate-resistant Palmer pigweed was first confirmed in the stateof Georgia in 2005 (Culpepper, 2006). The pigweed is wind-pollinated,

and the resistance trait is spreading far and fast via the plants highlymobile pollen (Sosnoski, 2007). Carried on the wind, resistantpopulations of the weed are moving so quickly that no reliable nationalestimates of affected acreage exist. In 2009, in the states of Arkansasand Tennessee alone, it is believed to have infested more than 500,000farm hectares (Charlier, 2009).

Were now seeing [Palmer pigweed] that is resistant to glyphosateThats going to be a major problem. We can go back to ploughing and controlling what we can that way, but so far, theres no chemical that will take care of it.Ronnie Qualls,Arkansas cotton farmer, 2009.

Stanley Culpepperof the University of Georgia is theweed scientistwho first confirmed the resistant pigweed. He now calls it surely the

most problematic weed in all of cotton. To control it, Culpepperrecommends use of additional herbicides and hand-weeding cottonwith hoes a labour-intensive anachronism in Americas landscapeof large and highly mechanised farms.

A return to hand-weeding and garden hoesWith glyphosate ineffective against the weed, agricultural supply storesin theMississippi Delta region have reported that common gardenhoes have returned from obscurity to become one of the fastest-sellingitems (Charlier, 2009). We havent chopped [weeded] cotton in a longtime, says an Arkansas cotton grower. Hand-weeding on heavily-infested plantings is costing Georgia cotton farmers as much as $240US dollars per hectare (Hollis, 2009). Farmers who dont hand weed orapply additional herbicides are risking disaster, say weed scientists.

I continue to see growers who are just spraying Roundup inRoundup Ready cotton. If you continue to do that, you will not survive. Even if youve survived this far, you will not survive in thefuture.Stanley Culpepper, Universityof Georgia weed scientist, 2009.

Strengthening resistance The glyphosate resistance appears not only to be physically spreading;but also to be growing stronger: In the past, when you applied 22ounces of Roundup WeatherMax to a resistantpigweed, itd at leastcause symptoms, says University of Tennessee weed specialist LarrySteckel. Now, in some cases, we can spray 152 ounces and not seeany symptoms. Its hard to believe how quickly and strong theresistance has become and spread. (Bennett, 2008b).

Weed scientists are telling farmers to use residual herbicides that relyon different chemistries in order to compensate for the failure of theRoundup Ready system to control pigweed in maize, soya, and cotton.Residual herbicides are applied early in the season and are designed topersist in the soil, killing newly-sprouted weeds for weeks afterapplication.

As the Palmer pigweed problem continues to spread, farmers andscientists are scrambling to come up with solutions. As a result of heavy reliance on glyphosate, there are no good control optionsavailable. Those that do exist are labourand chemical intensive,raising costs for farmers and the environment. The short-term gainsthat attracted US farmers to Roundup Ready crops are rapidly beingundermined by natures predictable response to overuse of a singleherbicide.

Fieldfailures

Field failures

Herbicide resistanceforces farmers toweed by hand

SourcesBaldwinF (2009a)Pigweedin ConventionalSoybeans. DeltaFarmPress,2 September2009.

Baldwin F (2009b)Pigweedpredictionsbecoming reality.DeltaFarm Press, 4 August2009.

BaldwinF (2009c).Residualsshowedvalue thisyear.DeltaFarm Press, 23 September2009.

BennettD (2008a).High incidence Arkansasresistant pigweeds.Delta Farm Press, 11 April 2008.

BennettD (2008b).Resistant pigweedblowing upin Mid-South.Delta FarmPress,30 July2008.

CharlierT (2009).'The perfectweed':An oldbotanicalnemesisrefusesto be roundedup. MemphisCommercialAppeal, 9 August 2009.

CulpepperAS, GreyTL, VencillWK, KichlerJM, WebsterTM, Brown SM,YorkAC, DavisJW andHanna WW(2006).Glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth(Amaranthus palmeri)confirmed in Georgia.Weed Science 54:620-626.

HollisP (2009).Resistant Pigweed:Reduce SeedBank.Southeast FarmPress,18 September2009.

RobinsonE (2009a).TripleG pushes yields,efficiency.Delta FarmPress,22 September2009.

RobinsonE (2009b).Land,labor,water cottonkeys. DeltaFarmPress,3 September2009.

Scott R andSmithK (2007).Preventionand Control ofGlyphosate-Resistant Pigweedin RoundupReady Soybeanand Cotton.University ofArkansasCooperative Extension Service,n.d. (c.2007).http://www.uaex.edu/Other_Areas/publications/PDF/FSA-2152.pdf

Sosnoski LM,WebsterTM,KichlerJM, MacRae AW andCulpepperAS (2007).An estimationof pollen flight timeand dispersaldistance for glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth(Amaranthus palmeri).Proc. South.Weed Sci. Soc 60:229.


4/22

image Pigweedgrowingin cotton

fields. Farmers in theUS are having to

resort to handweeding to beattheherbicide-resistant

weed.

Greenpeace International Ottho Heldringstraat5, 1066 AZAmsterdam, The Netherlands Published in2010. Written byEdward Hammond

GR E E N P E A C E / MI C H A E L P A T T E R S ON


5/22

The failure of GE (genetically-engineered) cotton inColombia deepened already hard times for manyfarmers in the 2008/2009 growing season. In thefield, two new varieties of GE cotton proveddisastrous in Cordoba Province, Colombias mostimportant cotton-growing region. Farmers there havesued Monsanto, saying it misled them about thevarieties, which were reportedly attacked bycaterpillars and damaged by herbicides that theplants were supposed to resist.

Economically,GE seedsand accompanying herbicides contribute tohigh farm costs that have made more than half of Colombiancottonfarms unprofitable, despite government subsidies.Overall, both thetotal national harvest and its profitability have declined after Colombiaplanted the latest GE seeds, even though acreage undercottoncultivation has recently expanded.

The president of the national cotton growers federation,CONALGODON, says that the 2008 season was surrounded by greatexpectations for new stacked GE varieties withmultiple transgenes,which were sown in Colombia for the first time. But hopes provedmisplaced. Cotton growers say the varieties underperformed or failedcompletely in the field. CONALGODON grimly concluded The finalresults of the harvest, measured by yield in the field andat the gin,confirm that hopes were higher thanachievements.

What went wrong?

GE cotton failureIn Cordoba province,which normally produces nearly 50% of Colombias cotton, two new varieties of GE cotton failed. The typescontained both herbicide (glyphosate) and insect resistance (Bt(Bacillus thuringiensis ) genes). Farmers say that, contrary to companyassertions, the cotton was highly susceptible to armyworms 1 anddamaged by theherbicideglyphosate, both of which were notsupposed to happen.CONALGODON estimates that Cordobas

farmers lost 12.8% of their total harvest as a result (Fonseca Prada2009a).

Cotton growers in Tolima province, in central Colombia, also reportedfailure of a new Monsanto GE variety, noting lower fiber yields(CONALGODON 2008).

In contrast to the problems withnew GE varieties, the best-performingvariety in Cordoba in 2008/09 was the conventional seed Delta Opal,which out-yielded both herbicide-resistant and Bt GE seed types.

Yield of cotton varieties, Cordoba, Colombia,2008/2009 growing season

Some of the farmers whose cotton failedbought GE seed because itwas the only kind available. According to CONALGODON, due to

insufficient supply of conventional seed some farmers had to buy aMonsanto GE variety that cost nearly three times as much as theconventionalDelta Opal.

A catastrophe is what happened. The lack of wider portfolio of varieties means farmers dont have alternatives for planting.Jorge Patio, spokesman for Remolino, a cotton growers federationin Tolima, Colombia, 2009 (CONALGODON 2008).

That some farmers hadno seed choices but GE varieties isunsurprising given Monsantos dominance of Colombias cottonseedmarket. CONALGODON has criticised the offerings as an insufficient,inadequate, and inopportune supply. The growers charge thatMonsantos narrow portfolio lacks diversity and note highseedprices relative to the net benefits observed. (Fonseca Prada 2008).

VARIETY

Delta Opal(conventional)

NuOpal

NuOpal BG RR

DP 164 BG2 RRFLEX

DP 455 BG RR

(Source: FonsecaPrada 2009)

TRANSGENES

-

Bt gene

Herbicide resistanceBt gene (Bollgard)

Herbicide resistanceBt gene (Bollgard2)

Herbicide resistanceBt gene (Bollgard)

YIELD/HECTARE(Observed,CordobaProvince, 2008/2009)

2,027kg

1,905 kg

1,883 kg

1,762 kg

956 kg

Field failures

Field failures

Genetically-engineeredcotton fails to performin Colombia

1 While Btcottonvarieties weredeveloped to resistcaterpillarsof the genus Leptidoptera , Monsantorepresentedthatthe Bt geneswouldalso reduce armyworm( Spodoptera )infestationsby 50-70%.Farmers saythis proved to befalse. (See:LopezGonzales E (2008). El fracaso del algodn tansgnico en el campo Colombiano , Grupo Semillas.http://www.semillas.org.co/sitio.shtml?apc=c1a1--&x=20155139g

GREENPEACE / NICKCOBBING


6/22

Limited choices: availability of certified cotton seed,Colombian Coastal Production Zone, 2009/2010 growingseason (Source: CONALGODON)

An industry in crisisColombian cotton is subsidised by a government minimum priceguarantee. In recent years, the subsidy amount has fluctuated near$0.09 US dollars per kilogram (ICAC 2006), nearly 1/3 of cottonsinternational price of $0.281 per kilogram as of late August 2009.

Despite the subsidies, rising production costs have made more thanhalf of Colombian cotton farms unprofitable (CONALGODON 2008). In2008/2009, average production costs surged from 13%-30%,depending on the province. Genetically-engineered crops are asignificant contributor to rising costs. In some areas, the price of Monsantos glyphosate (Roundup) has recently doubled (Mejia 2009),and GE seed prices are two to three times higher than those of

conventional seed (see chart).

In the major cotton growing regions of Cordoba and Bolivar, GE seed isdriving planting costs upwards, while herbicide and pesticide costshave also increasedor failed to fall sufficiently to compensate forincreased seed expenses (Fonseca Prada 2009b, 2009c).

GE cotton is thus clearly not steering Colombian farmers away fromfailure and, in response to the sectors deepening problems, theColombian government has increased subsidies for 2010(CONALGODON 2009).

Monsanto sued

As a result of the failure of Monsanto GE varieties in Cordoba andproblems elsewhere, the Colombian government has imposed a newregulation on Monsanto (Resolution 682/09, February 2009) requiring itto provide more extensionassistance to farmers.

Cordoba farmers have sued Monsanto seeking damages for their loss. Tacitly acknowledging the failure, Monsanto officials first offered cashcompensation. But talks broke down in mid-2009 when farmersrefused to sign legal releases upon which Monsanto conditionedpayments (Arroyo Muoz 2009). The case now appears to be headedto court.

Sources

Arroyo Muoz J (2009). Conalgodnvs. Monsanto.El Meridiano de Crdoba (Monteria,Colombia), 10 June 2009.

CONALGODON (2008).Cosecha delinterior 2008: lascifrasse mantienen. RevistaCONALGODON,October- December2008.

CONALGODON(2009). Ministrode Agricultura anunci Nuevo Precio Mnimo de Garantapara 2010:$5 millonespor toneladade fibra (news release), n.d. (c. June 2009). http://www.conalgodon.com/portal/index.php

FonsecaPrada LA (2008).Los transgnico exigen ajustesen lasprcticasagrcolasin Revista CONALGODON,October-December 2008.

Fonseca Prada LA (2009a).Balance y perspectivasdel cultivo,Evaluacin Valledupar(CONALGODON harvest evaluationconference presentation),5 June 2009.http://www.conalgodon.com/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid=9

Fonseca Prada LA (2009b).Apertura temporada algodoneraCsar y BolvarSur 2009/10.CONALGODON. September2009.http://www.conalgodon.com.co/02estadisticas/reportes/Aperturas/Bolivar%202009%2010.pdf

Fonseca Prada LA (2009c). Apertura temporada algodonera Crdoba 2009/10.CONALGODON. September2009.http://www.conalgodon.com.co/02estadisticas/reportes/Aperturas/Cordoba%202009%2010.pdf

International CottonAdvisory Committee(ICAC) (2006).Production and Trade PoliciesAffecting the CottonIndustry,Washington,2006. URL: http://www.icac.org/govt_measures/documents/govt_measures06.pdf

Mejia J (2009).Resultados y propuestascosecha algodoneraSucre yBolvar, EvaluacinValledupar, 5 June 2009.

Ruiz Moreno L (2009).Indicadores cosecha Costa 2008/09,Evaluacin Valledupar,5 June2009.

Vargas C (2009).Presentation by Monsanto (no title).Evaluacin Valledupar.5 June2009.

Field failures

Monsanto (transgenic) - 7 Varieties

250

704

308

Monsanto (conventional) - 1 Variety

Public sector (conventional) - 1 Variety

Bayer (transgenic, semi-commercial trials) - 1 Variety

Tonnes (M) available

Variety Seed cost Technology fee Cost (25kgsack)

Delta Opal(conventional) $179 $0 $179

NuOpal (Bt) $179 $176 $355

DP 455 (Bt/RR)* $187 $234 $421

DP 164 (Bt 2/RR/flex)* $168 $329 $497

*Experienced fieldfailurein one or more regionsof Colombia in 2008/09.

Monsanto cottonseed prices and technology fees,Colombia, 2009 (Source: Monsanto, converted to US dollarsat 1900 Colombian pesos= $1, rounded to nearest dollar)



7/22

Studies demonstrate that Monsantos RoundupReady (glyphosate-tolerant) soya has a 5-10%lower harvest compared to modern conventionalsoya lines. These lower-yielding GE (genetically-engineered) soya varieties cost farmers billionsof dollars every year.

Evidence of lower yields, called yield drag, is anexample of the unpredictability and unintendedconsequences of GE. Yield drag losses were andremain avoidable through the use of modernconventional varieties. Yield drag documented Yield drag surfaced quickly as GE soya was adopted in the US in thelate 1990s. Early studies by Charles Benbrook, a former USgovernment science advisor, and RogerElmore at the University of Nebraska documented the problem.

Analysing multiple US field trials in 1999 Benbrook found an averageyield drag of 5.3% for Roundup Ready soya and that, in somelocations, the best conventional varieties beat Roundup Ready yieldsby more than 10% (Benbrook1999).

In 2001, Elmore and colleagues directly compared sister RoundupReady and conventional soya lines in field trials. They demonstratedthat yield drag was due to GEand not to other factors (Elmore 2001a).Elmore also estimated theyield drag of Roundup Ready soya at 5% -10%, depending upon exact variety and conditions (Elmore 2001b)

The cost of yield dragIn the US, where 95% of soya is Roundup Ready, farmers planted 30.6million hectares of the crop in 2008, harvesting 80.54 million metrictonnes (USDA 2009). Yield drag thus chopped between 4 and 8 millionmetric tonnes (Mt) off the2008 US soybean harvest. That loss isgreater than annualUS soya exports to the EU (3.7 Mt) or Mexico (3.6Mt), and may be greater than the two combined.

Cumulatively, the loss is staggering. By opting for thedeceptive weed

control simplicity of Roundup Ready soya rather than using thebestconventional varieties, it is estimated that from 2006 through 2009, USfarmers produced 31 million metric tonnes less soya than they shouldhave. In the last four years, the cumulative cost of that loss is over $11billion US dollars (at a farm price of $9.65/bushel).

Similar losses occur in other Roundup Ready soya producingcountries, such as Brazil, which is expected to overtake the US as theworlds largest soya producer within a few years, and Argentina.

Industry belatedly admits the problemIt was only recently that Monsanto admitted that Roundup Readysoya yields less. The tacit admission hascome in the form of marketingfor Roundup Ready 2, a newer type of glyphosate-resistant plant.Monsanto claims that Roundup Ready 2, which was introduced onlimited acreage in the US in 2009, has 7-11% higher yield than itspredecessor (Monsanto 2009).

But Roundup Ready 2 does not yield more than appropriateconventional soya lines, rather it is claimed to yield more than RoundupReady 2s draggedpredecessors. After all, the Roundup Readygenes confer chemical herbicide resistance and not productivity traits. According to Monsanto, Roundup Ready 2 was made by inserting theherbicide resistance gene in a different place on the soya genome(Meyer 2006), allegedly reducing yield drag.

Two years ago, I went to a meeting about a new soybeantechnology. The trait company claimed there was now no yield dragwith the new technology. When the original technology was released, it was touted as having no yield drag. What are we to believe about new soybean technologies?Chris Jeffries in The Seed Consultant (newsletter), May 2009

Like the first generation of Monsantos glyphosate-resistant soya,however, there are indications that Roundup Ready 2 geneticengineering also has unintended consequences. Roundup Ready 2plants are 5% shorter than conventionalplants of the same type (Meyer

2006). Nobody knows why this is the case.

SourcesBenbrookC (1999)Evidence of the Magnitude andConsequencesof the RoundupReady SoybeanYieldDrag fromUniversity-BasedVarietal Trialsin 1998,AgBioTechInfoNetTechnicalPaper #1,13 July1999.

Elmore RW,RoethFW, Klein RN,Knezevic SZ, MartinA, Nelson LA andShapiroCA (2001a).Glyphosate-ResistantSoybeanCultivarResponse to Glyphosate.Agron J. 93:404-407.

Elmore RW,RoethFW, NelsonLA, ShapiroCA, Klein RN,KnezevicSZ andMartinA (2001b).Glyphosate-ResistantSoybeanCultivarYieldsComparedwith SisterLines.Agron J.93: 408-412.

MeyerJ, HorakM,Rosenbaum E andSchneider R (2006).Petitionfor the Determination ofNonregulatedStatusforRoundupReady2YieldSoybeanMON 89788,Monsanto Company (Submissionto the USAnimaland PlantHealth Inspection Service).

Monsanto (2009).Roundup Ready 2 Yield.November 2009.http://www.monsanto.com/rr2y/

United StatesDepartment ofAgriculture (USDA).2009.U.S. Soybean Industry:BackgroundStatisticsand Information,May2009.http://www.ers

Fieldfailures

Field failures

Genetically-engineeredsoya yields less


8/22

image Harvestedsoya beans. Studies

have shown thatconventional

varieties of soya yieldbetween 5 and10%

more than GEvarieties.


GR E E N P E A C E / D A N I E L B E L T R


9/22

In August 2006, rice markets worldwide wererocked by the US Department of Agricultures(USDA) announcement that the US rice crop hadbeen contaminated by unapproved Bayer GE ricewith genetically-engineered herbicide resistance.

A cascade of costly events ensued. The ultimate costto the US rice industry was between $741 million and$1.29 billion US dollars, plus costs to foreigncompanies and still-undetermined legal damagesagainst Bayer. The origin of the contamination

remains unexplained to this day.Costly contamination The GE contamination was first found in the 2006 long grain rice cropin Arkansas and neighbouring US states. The chain of events that wasunleashed impacted notonly US farmers and processors but riceshippers, importers and retailers the world over.

Withindays of the announcement, Japan, the EU and others closedtheir markets to US rice imports. Nevertheless,GE rice contaminationwas detected in Europe, Africa and elsewhere in the following months,promptingproduct recalls from the Philippines to Ghana andimplementation of a strict EU testing regime.

The result was a near-immediate $168 million loss of value in theUSharvest registered on US futures markets (Raun 2007). By the endof the 2006-2007 marketing season, the futures market downturn pluslost exports cost an average of $70,000 for each of the 6,085 ricefarms in the US as of 2007 (USDA 2009).

Further undermining confidence in US rice, in October 2006 Franceannounced that it had found a second illegal Bayer transgene in riceimported from the US (EU RAS 2006).

With prices plummeting, US farmers and processors spent nearly $100million to eliminate GE contamination from farms, elevators and seedsupplies. Shipping companies, retailers and others also suffered lossesdue to paralysed shipments and rice supplies that could not bemarketed.

In total, the scandal is estimated to have cost theUS rice industry atleast $741 million dollars and as much as $1.29 billion. This estimatedoes not include costs to companies in Europe andelsewhere, whowere forced to test for and clean up LL601 contamination, andpayment of as yet undetermined compensatory and punitive legalclaims filed against Bayer (see overleaf).

Economic failures 1

Economic failures

Rice producers pay for accidental release of Bayersgenetically-engineered rice

Period ofreference

Clean-up (2006-07)

Farm clean-up and seed testing

Processor and elevator clean-up costs

Lost farm and business income

Lost farm revenue (06-07)Export losses (06-07)

Post-2007 export losses

Commodity markets

US futures market losses (2006)

Other losses (shippers, retailers, etc.)

Total loss (Millions US dollars)

Table 1) LL601 rice contamination cost estimate

Lowestimate

4.3

87.6

27.4254.0

89.0

168.0

50.9

741.2

Highestimate

5.4

91.0

27.4254.0

445.0

168.0

112.8

1,284.6

GR E E N P E A C E / J OH N N OV I S


10/22

1999 -2001

SourcesEuropeanUnionRapidAlert System forFoodand Feed(EU RAS)(2006).Reportof Week41.http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/reports/week41-2006_en.pdf Greenpeace(2007).RiskyBusiness-Economicand Regulatory Impactsfrom the UnintendedRelease of Genetically Engineered Rice Varieties intothe RiceMerchandisingSystemof the US (Reportby NealBlueConsulting). http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/risky-businessHarris,A. 2009. BayerBlamed atTrial forCropsContaminatedby ModifiedRice.Bloomberg News,November4th 2009.http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&sid=aT1kD1GOt0N0Smith D andMantheyT (2009).Ricefarmersin state,elsewherefile lawsuit on engineeredstrain.ArkansasDemocrat-Gazette,20 August2009.United States District Courtfor the EasternDistrict of Missouri.Genetically ModifiedRice Litigation.http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/mdl/06-1811.aspUSDA (2009).US Censusof Agriculture 2007.http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/ USDA(2007). USDAConcludesGeneticallyEngineered RiceInvestigation(Release No.0284.07).http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2007/10/0284.xml

Economic failures

Origin of the contamination never explained An especially disturbing aspect is the lack of explanation for how thecontamination occurred - even to this day - prompting questions aboutthe safety of GE field trials and negligence by developers of GE crops.

LL601 was developed in the late 1990s by Bayer Cropscience (then Aventis), and grown experimentally in Louisiana. Commercialdevelopment was terminated in 2001.

Following detection of the contamination five years later, the UnitedStates Department of Agriculture (USDA) spent14 months and 8,500staff hours trying to determine how it happened. Despite the effort, inOctober 2007 USDA investigators concluded that insufficient

documentation existed of Bayers prior handling of LL601 and thusthe exact mechanismfor introduction [intoconventional rice] could notbe determined (USDA2007).

Timeline of contamination:

Experimental trials of Bayer GE rice (calledLL601) conducted in

Louisiana,development

terminated in 2001.

Compensation soughtBayer and US rice millers are facing more than 1,200 lawsuits fromthose who suffered losses as a result of the failure to contain BayersGE rice. Claimshave been filed by farmers, rice merchants andEuropean food processors who unwittingly imported illegal GE rice.

Bayer is fighting the lawsuits and refusing to accept full financialresponsibility for the escape of itsunapproved GE rice. In August2008,Bayer blocked US farmers from suing it collectively as group (a classaction) in a US court. This means that farmers must pursue their claimsindividually. As a result, in August 2009, nearly 1,500 farmers filed newclaims in Arkansas, adding to hundreds of other individual suitspreviously filed in several US jurisdictions.

In December 2009, the first verdict was passed in the case of twoMissouri farmers. The farmers were awarded $2 million US dollars forthedamages they sustained as a result of thecontamination. Inpassing its verdict, the jury indicatedBayer had been lax in itshandling of the seed.Bayer countered that it exceeded industrystandards in its attempt to avoid contamination, and went as far as tosay [e]ven the best practices cant guarantee perfection (Harris2009). This admission makes it clear that contamination, and the costlyconsequences documented here, will remain a constant threat whileGE crops exist.


2006 2007 2008 2009

USDA announcesLL601 isin theUSfoodsupply.Japan

and the EU suspendUS rice imports.

1999 - 2001 August

LL601 is found inmorethan 20%

of samplestested in EU.

Internationalricemerchandisersstop

buying US rice.

France detectsanotherunapproved

Bayer transgene(LL62) inUS rice.

S ep te mbe r Oc tobe r

The EUstarts stricttesting afterLL601 is

foundin rice thatwas certifiedby USsuppliers to be GE-

free.Majorriceexporters Thailand

andVietnamcommitto staying GE-free.

Lawsuits filedagainst Bayer andUSricemillsby US

farmers andEuropean

companies.

November Jan - Aug

After a 14 monthinvestigation, USDA admits thatit cannot

explain howthecontamination

occurred.

US farmers deniedstatus asa classin

lawsuit againstBayer, must sue

individually.

October August

1500 mainly Arkansas farmers

sue Bayer forLL601damages,addingtohundredsof previousindividualclaimsbyfarmers in various

jurisdictions.

Firstlawsuits againstBayerheardin US

federal court.

August November


11/22

Opinion polls around the world have repeatedlydemonstrated that the majority of people areconcerned about the safety of GE (genetically-engineered) foods and expect that, if they aremarketed, then they should be separated andlabelled (Harris Poll (2004), European Commission(2001), Yomiyuri Shimbum (1997) etc). Thus, market,safety and political demands often require that GEcrops and harvests be maintained separately fromconventional ones.

The burden on food production systems that stemsfrom GE crops imposes economic costs on farmers,grain merchants, the food industry and, ultimately,the public. In the broadest perspective, costsgenerated by GE crops are reflected in major grainmarkets. Since 2000, the Tokyo Grain Exchange hasoperated a futures market in non-GE soya. Non-GEsoya futures consistently price higher than other soyacontracts (TGE, 2009). This reflects both consumerdemand for GE-free foods and the additional costs toconventional farmers of preventing contaminationfrom GE soya.

Increased costs for the seed producer The cost of GE food begins at the level of producingseeds for sale.GE seed is well-known to be more expensive than conventional seed;but what is less appreciated is that GE seeds can also add to the costof conventional ones.

Because of the danger of cross-pollination between GE and non-GEvarieties, conventional seed producers must takemeasures to preventcontamination. Thesemeasures must be rigorously followed to avoidGE contamination such as hasoccurred in Chile, where GE maizesown to produce seed for export contaminated seeds used locally(INTA, 2008).

European Commission scientists estimate that if GE canola (oilseedrape) was introduced in Europe, keeping conventional canola frombeing contaminated at the seed production level would add 10% toseed duplication costs (Bock, 2002).

Increased costs for the farmer On the farm, GE imposes another set of expenditures. These includethe costs of maintaining physical and/or temporal separation betweenGE and non-GE crops in the field, duringand after harvest. Forexample, whena seeder (planting machine) switches between types,it must be thoroughly cleaned, costing farmers additional labour eachtime it is necessary. Alternatively, farmers can flush out equipmentbyplanting conventional crops after GE ones; but this practice requiresthat the farmer then sells a portion of thenon-GE harvest at the GEprice, due to potential contamination.

Preventing on-farm GE contamination also requires the expense of cleaning other equipment such as harvesters, trucks, storage bins,and dryers.

An additional on-farm cost caused by GE seed is control of volunteerplants. When conventionalvarieties are sown in the same field, or nearwhere GE crops have previously grown, fallenor windswept GE seedsfrom prior seasons may germinate. Once the seeds have germinated,theplants must be killed with herbicides or be chopped down beforeflowering in order to prevent the conventional crop from beingcontaminated.

Eliminating volunteerplants can be very expensive to farmers. A Canadian study projecting costs of the proposed introduction of GE wheat determined that volunteer control would be largest singleon-farm expense, at $5.15 Canadian dollars a tonne (at a 0.1%

contamination threshold) (Huygen 2003). This amounts to 3.96% of the Canadian Wheat Board farm price for wheat for the study year(variety: red spring straight wheat).

Increased costs during storage and distributionHarvests must be kept separate as they make their way from thefield to silos and elevators, and through shipping channels to foodprocessors. Here again, GE crops impose price penaltiesonconventional crops, requiringspatial or temporal segregation.

The total combined on farm and shipping penaltiesvary by crop andlocation. The total projected cost to keep conventional Canadian wheatfree of GE contamination was 5.4% - 6% from farm to food processor(Huygen et al 2003).

Other recent studies include a 2006 estimate placing the costof preventing GE contamination in Western Australian canola exports at5-9% of farm cost (Crowe 2006). A 2009 projection of costs in Europeif GE canola were introduced put the total expense to seed producers,farmers, and grain elevators at a debilitating 21% of the farm price(Menrad et al, 2009).

Economicfailures

Economic failures

The costs ofstaying GE-free


12/22

Economic failures

Increased costs for food processorsFinally, if food processors must separately handle GE and non-GEharvests, as consumers and labelling requirements frequently demand,another layer of costs is imposed.A 2009 study on costs to Germanindustry estimated up to 12.8% added cost for canola, 4.9% forsugarbeet and 10.7% for wheat (Menrad el at, 2009). These are inaddition to farm andgrain merchant costs.

GE avoidance costsRather than segregate GE grains and cereals from conventionalones,some food processors (especially in Europe) simply dont buy GEingredients. This too creates costs, because companies mustverify

their compliance with GE avoidance policies.

A 2007 study surveyed German food processors on their expendituresto avoid use of GE canola andmaize. Companies identified a variety of costs related to staying GE-free. The costs cited most often were forsampling and laboratory testing of incomingshipments, additionaldocumentation and additional labour. The food processors reportedwidely-ranging costs to avoid GE maize and canola, which wereestimated to average between2.46 and 23.70 per metric tonne of canola and maize (Gawrun 2007).

The cost penalties imposed by GE seeds on farmers, grain merchantsand the food industry are significant and have been found in studiesfrom differentparts of the world. Costs are incurred at every level of theproduction system, from seed multiplication through to foodprocessing. This problem currently affects globally important bulk foodcommodities (maize, soya, and canola) and has thepotential to impactmore if newGE crops are approved.

Sources

Anonymous(1997). Survey on GeneticallyEngineered AgriculturalProducts, YomiyuriShimbum,26 April 1997. Resultsavailable inEnglishat the RoperCenterJapanese PublicOpinionDatabase. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/jpoll/JPOLL.html

BockA-K,LheureuxK, Libeau-DulosM, NilsagardH andRodriguez-Cerezo E (2002).Scenariosforco-existenceof genetically modified,conventionaland organiccrops inEuropeanagriculture.EuropeanCommission Joint Research Centre, May 2002.

Crowe Band Pluske J (2006).Is it Cost Effective to Segregate Canola inWA? Australasian AgribusinessReview,V. 14.2006.

EuropeanCommission (2001).Europeans, Science, and Technology.Eurobarometer 55.2.

Gawron J-Cand TheuvsenL (2007).Costsof Processing Genetically ModifiedOrganisms: Analysisof the Rapeseedand CornIndustries.47thAnnualConference of theGerman Associationof AgriculturalEconomists.September 2007.http://purl.umn.edu/7601

Harris Interactive (2004).HarrisPoll#49: Genetically ModifiedFoodsand Crops: PublicStillDivided onBenefitsand Risks.2 July2004.

Huygen I,VeemanM andLerohl M (2004).Cost Implicationsof Alternative GMTolerance Levels:Non-Genetically ModifiedWheatin WesternCanada.AgBioForum6, pp.s169-177.

Menrad K,GabrielA andZapilko M (2009).Costof GMO-relatedco-existence andtraceabilitysystemsin foodproductionin Germany.International Associationof AgriculturalEconomistsConferencePaper, Beijing,16-22 August 2009.

Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) (2009).Monthly Trading Data.

http://www.tge.or.jp/english/trading/tra_m01.shtml



13/22

Linseed, called flax in North America, is a cropadapted to northern latitudes that is primarily grownfor its oil-rich seeds, which have food, animal feed,and industrial uses. In 2009, contamination from aGE (genetically-engineered) linseed variety wasdetected in Canadian exports to Europe and Japan,triggering a market collapse that has caused hugeeconomic losses for Canadian farmers. Europeanprocessors and retailers have also suffered theeconomic repercussions, with products beingrecalled in several countries.In September 2009, GE contamination was first confirmed in ashipment of Canadian linseed exported to Germany.The marketreacted swiftly. Only days later, thePresidentof theSaskatchewan FlaxDevelopment Commission grimly concluded that the flax market hasbasically collapsed. (Kuhlmann, 2009).

At theend of the year the situation was no better, andmuch of Canadas 2009 harvest remained in storage for lack of a buyer. Askedin December if exports to Europe - the traditional destination of about70% of Canadas linseed - had improved, thePresident of theCanadian Flax Council (a national organisation of linseed farmers) toldReuters I dont think anything has shipped at all. (Nickel, 2009)

Contamination from a deregistered GE linseed varietyLinseed went from being a profitable crop to an economic disasterbecause of the unexplained presence of Triffid, a GE variety designedto resist herbicide, in Canadian exports.

Triffid was developed by theUniversity of Saskatchewan CropDevelopment Centre (CDC). It received final regulatory approval fromCanadian authorities in 1998 and was placed on the register of varieties approved for commercial production.

Linseed farmers opposed Triffid, fearing market rejection of GE linseed,and prevented it from being sold for commercial production. FarmersconvincedCDC to deregister the variety in 2001, only three years afterits approval (CGC 2009).

CDC allowed small packages of the GE seed to be distributed by thescientist that created the variety until the Canadian Flax Councilobjected in 2000. In that year, thePresident of the Flax Councilpresciently noted that if Triffid were found in Europe, it could literally killour market. (Warick, 2000 & Pratt, 2009).

Although the source of the widespread contamination identified inCanadian linseed in 2009 has not been conclusivelydetermined, it hasbeen suggested that the samples distributed nearly a decade ago mayultimately prove to be the origin. In an attempt to understand howcontamination occurred, Canadas Flax Council has urged farmers tosubmit samples of their 2009 harvest for testing.

Linseed markets paralysed The first confirmed reportof Triffid contamination came on 15September 2009, when a German food company found evidence of GE material in a shipment of Canadian linseed that it hadsampled in August. More intensive testing of linseed quickly ensued in theEU, andby 10 December 2009, eighty six more cases of Triffid contaminationhad been confirmed(EC RASFF, 2009). In November, Triffidcontamination was found in linseed exported to Japan, Canadas thirdlargest linseed customer (Yoshikawa & Maeda, 2009).

At the end of 2009, the dozens of contamination incidents have hadtheeffect of paralysing Canadas linseed exports. Because mostCanadian linseed is exported via the St.Lawrence Seaway, whichfreezes in winter, most of Canadas 2009 linseed harvest will likelyremain in storage well into 2010, when the industry will again seek buyers for the crop.

Economic consequencesNews of the Triffid contamination caused an immediate slump inlinseed prices paid to Canadian farmers. From early summerhighs inexcess of $12.50Canadian dollars per bushel, prices dropped by lateSeptember to $7.87 at port in Ontario and $6.80 in Saskatchewan. Atthe beginning of October, a Manitoba processor ceased bidding forlinseed harvests (SFDC, 2009), an indication of how Triffidcontamination has severely weakened linseed demand.

Canadian prices have since risen to the $9.00 per bushel range.However, prices remain lowand harvests in storage. Optimists inCanada cite a recovery of linseed prices in European markets (SFDC,2009); however, this recovery is illusory because shipping volumesare practically non-existent. This is evidence that, due to Triffidcontamination, Canada cant meet EU biosafety requirements for newcontracts.

Agriculture Canada forecasts the 2009 linseed harvest at 965,000metric tons, over 35 million bushels (Agriculture Canada, 2009). Withprices to farmers down by an average of $3.00 per bushel, Canadianfarmers have lost $106 million or more from the value of their harvest. Itcould get worse:Farmers who retained their harvest and processorsthat have linseed in storage currently face great uncertainty about

future prices.

Economic failures

Economic failures

GE contaminationdevastates Canadianlinseed industry


14/22

The rough road ahead Triffids ultimatecost to Canadas linseed industry will certainly beeven higher, although it is too early to calculatewith precision. A 24% decline in planting is forecast for 2010 (SFDC,2009), andburdensome stock levels mean recovery cannot occur until wellinto 2010 (Agriculture Canada 2009). Before then, Canadian linseedfarmers must test their harvests to identify andattempt to eliminateall Triffid contamination a complex andcostly task that theCanadian Flax Council hasdeemed mandatory for survival of theindustry.

Linseed is marketed as a healthy choice in baked goods and otherproducts for human consumption, often citing its high concentrationof unsaturated fats andprotein. Triffid contamination is likely to raisesafety questions in the minds of consumers, and the damage to thisreputation of linseed and linseed oil could prove to be more costlythan the direct damage to the linseed market.

Sources Agriculture Canada (2009).Canada: Grains and OilseedsOutlook, 8October 2009.CGC (CanadianGrains Commission) (2009).Background informationongenetically modifiedmaterial found inCanadianflaxseed.http://www.grainscanada.gc.ca/gmflax-lingm/pfsb-plcc-eng.htmECRASFF(EuropeanCommissionRapidAlert System forFoodandFeed) (2009).http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/rasff_portal_database_en.htmFlax Councilof Canada (2009).Message to Producers:Flax Sampling.30 October2009.KuhlmannA (2009).Chairs Report.In SaskatchewanFlax Grower(newsletterof the SaskatchewanFlax Development Commission),September2009.Nikel R (2009). Canada Flax Not Shipping to EU;Key Portto Close.Reuters,9 December2009.PrattS (2009).GM flaxbreederdeflects criticism. WesternProducer,22October 2009.SFDC (SaskatchewanFlax DevelopmentCommission)(2009). MarketSupport Program,November 2009.Warick J (2000).Flax farmersfear EU wrath: GMOsamples could scareaway biggestconsumer group. SaskatoonStarPhoenix, 19 July 2000. Yoshikawa Mand Maeda R (2009). JapanfindsGMO inCanadianflaxseed shipments.Reuters, 16 November2009.

Economic failures


1998

Timeline

Final approvals arereceived

from CanadianauthoritiesandTriffidis placed on register

of commercialvarieties(but never

sown commercially).

2000 2009

CDCallowssmall packetsof Triffid to be

distributed forfree,despite farmers

concernsabout GE

contamination

1998

2001

FlaxCouncil of Canada succeeds in

having Triffidderegistered

19982000

2001 -early2009

Triffid is thoughttohavebeen

eliminatedfromcultivation

2001-2009

1) GE contaminationconfirmedin

CanadianlinseedimportedtoGermany.

2) Followingconfirmation

ofthecontamination,Canadianmarkets

register majordeclinesin linseed

prices

September August

Product recallsin Europe

Rumours of GEcontamination inCanadianlinseed

circulatein

the industry,prompting a decline

in prices

Sept - now

Exports toEurope cometo a halt and,withmarkets

paralysed, onelinseed buyer in

Manitoba ceases tobidfor the crop

October

1) Triffidcontamination

detectedin Japan

2) Linseedpricesrebound slightlybuttrade remains at a

standstill,forfearthat

Canadianexportswillbe rejected at

Europeanports dueto Triffid

contamination

November

1) A total of 86 Triffid

contamination casesconfirmedin Europe

since September

2) Mostof Canadas2009 harvest to

remain in storageuntil spring 2010

December


15/22

The first comprehensive global assessment of agricultural development ever conducted recentlyconcluded that business-as-usual is not an option forthe future of agriculture. The 400 scientists whoparticipated in the review concluded that GE(genetically-engineered) crops are not a priority forfeeding the world in 2050. To ensure a healthy, habitable world in coming decades, theassessment preferred a systems-oriented approach adapted to localconditions and cultures. This, it concluded, was more responsive toagricultural needs in the coming decades than focusing on newtechnologies exclusively aimed at market productivity:

Historically the path of global agricultural development has been narrowly focused on increased productivity rather than on a more holisitic integration of natural resources management (NRM) withfood and nutritional security. A holisitic, or systems-oriented approach, is preferable because it can address the difficult issues associated with the complexity of food and other production systems in different ecologies, locations, and cultures.IAASTD, 2009.

The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology (IAASTD) was established in 2002. The Assessment wasorganised and included the participation of international agencies such

as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World HealthOrganisation and the UN Development Programme, among others. Also participating were national governments, and non-governmentaland scientific organisations from across the world.

After a series of regional and global meetings, the IAASTD presented itsfindings in South Africa in 2008 in a lengthy report titled Agriculture at aCrossroads . The report reflects the fact that participants held divergentviews of the potential of genetically-engineered crops. The approachthe IAASTD took to this and other issues was to first define mutuallyagreed agricultural problems and then to seek to identify the best waysof solving them. In doing so, a decision was made to focus on theevidence at hand, rather than the futures imagined by the varied groupof participants or a priori assumptions about the best technological

approaches.In the end, to the disappointment of private sector genetic engineers(who walked out of the process), the IAASTD proved far lessenthusiastic about the future use of genetic engineering than thetechnologys promoters hoped. Among GE problems that were notedby the IAASTD are those of both farmers and scientists being stymiedby the legal barriers imposed by biotechnology patents, ecologicalconcern about gene-flow from GE crops, market disruptions causedby political and ethical objections, and the lack of long-termenvironment and health monitoring in the few countries that currentlygrow GE crops on a large scale.

The IAASTD found other approaches more promising for agriculturesfuture:

Given the new challenges we confront today, there is increasing recognition within formal [science and technology] organisations that the current [agricultural knowledge, science, and technology] model requires adaptation and revision. Business as usual is not an option.One area of potential adaptation is to move from an exclusive focuson public and private research as the site for R&D toward thedemocratisation of knowledge production.

Once [agricultural knowledge, science, and technology] is directed simultaneously towards production, profitability, ecosystem services and food systems that are site-specific and evolving, then formal,

traditional and local knowledge need to be integrated. Traditional and local knowledge constitutes an extensive realm of accumulated practical knowledge and knowledge-generating capacity that is needed if sustainability and development goals are to be reached.

An international priority now is to move forward with the changes tonational and international agriculture policies in line with theconclusions of the IAASTD. These include measures related topromoting the role and knowledge of small farmers and increasedpublic investment in agricultural research. GE crops, however, are nota promising option to address the challenges confronting agriculture.

Economic Solutions 1

Solutions

Genetic engineering not a priorityfor agriculture, International Assessment concludes

Sources

This articleis a summaryof a recent GreenpeaceReportentitledAgriculture at a Crossroads:Food forSurvival, releasedin October 2009 andavailable at:http://www.greenpeace.org/international/agriculture-at-a-crossroads

IAASTD (2009).InternationalAssessmentof AgriculturalKnowledge,Science andTechnologyforDevelopment - Executive Summaryof the SynthesisReport.IslandPress.p. 3,9 and 10.


16/22


GR E E N P E A C E / G U S T A V O GR A F


17/22

Responding to climate change is a challengefor global agriculture. In the coming decades,differences in rainfall, temperatures and the rangesof plants and pest species will transform agriculture.Developing countries are predicted to experiencestronger impacts than others. For example, by the2050s, densely populated river deltas in South andSoutheast Asia are predicted to be prone toseawater flooding. At the same time, fresh watersupplies are projected to decrease (IPCC 2007).

While GE (genetic engineering) continues to promisesolutions, ecological farming delivers.

Genetically-engineered crops and climate change:hype vs. realityCommercial GE crops remain focused on crops that are resistant toherbicides or that produce an insecticide. These traits are not related toclimate change adaption.

GE is ill-adapted to the task of making cultivars more durable in theface of climate change-related stresses such as heat and drought. Thisis because management of such stresses in plants is usually controlledby complex genetic systems that involve interaction between large setsof genes and between the plant and its environment. By comparison,GE is limited to insertion of one (or a few) genes with relativelyunsophisticated control over the timing and extent of gene expression,making GE far clumsier at gene expression than the complexregulatory systems naturally developed in plants.

Review of scientific literature, including the recent International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology forDevelopment (IAASTD), 1 indicates that the most effective strategy toadapt agriculture to climate change is by growing a greater diversity of crops and increasing genetic diversity of the crop varieties we grow.

Diversity adapts to changeSeveral recent studies have indicated the importance of diverse

ecological farming in modern agricultural systems. These benefits caninclude improved resistance to disease and drought, as well asincreased yields.

Faced with crop losses from rice blast disease, farmers in Chinas Yunnan Province who adopted a system of growing diverse ricevarieties improved their yields by as much as 89%. At the same time,they conserved the genetic diversity of local rice types and reduced useof fungicides (Zhu 2000, 2003). It has also been found that a high levelof genetic diversity protects Italian wheat harvests against drought(DiFalco 2006, 2008).

Similarly, planting different species more often is beneficial. In the US,researchers recently compared maize yields under different farmingsystems. They found that farmers who rotated their crop most often,and who planted cover crops, had yields over 100% higher than maizemonocultures (Smith 2008).

Ecological breeding technique means better crop performanceIn addition to growing more species and more diverse varieties,developing new varieties that include stress-related traits is a step thatcould help adaptation to climate change. If commonly cultivated typeshad greater tolerance of multiple stresses for example heat, drought,

and disease - they would be better suited for unpredictable and/orextreme climate change. The way to do this is through conservation of local germplasm and plant breeding, including use of a new techniquecalled marker assisted selection (MAS).

Diverse ecological farming and modern conventional plant-breedingare the methods of choice to respond to climate change in agriculture.Genetic engineering does not provide the complex traits andsophisticated control over them that is needed to create crop varietiesprimed to withstand climate change. Investment in maintenance anddevelopment of on-farm diversity and plant breeding is agriculturesbest option for food security in a changing world.

MAS is a genetic technique that can make plant-breeding involvingcomplex traits faster by taking advantage of gene-mapping. Bytracking specific DNA fragments (markers) in the breeding process,breeders can more easily see the result of their work, and morequickly and precisely move genes of interest into new varietiesthrough conventional breeding. MAS breeding takes advantage of genetic markers but does not result in a transgenic plant.

Economic Solutions

Solutions

Diverse farmingprotects againstclimate change

1 The InternationalAssessment ofAgriculturalKnowledge,Scienceand Technology forDevelopment,completed in2008,was a major internationalreviewof agriculture sponsoredby theUnitedNationsand

governments.Its final report, Agriculture at a Crossroadsis available online at http://www.agassessment.org/

SourcesChapin FS et al (2000).Consequences of changing biodiversity.Nature 405:234-242.

DiFalcoS andChavasJ-P (2006).Cropgenetic diversity, farmproductivity,and the management ofenvironmentalrisk in rain fed agriculture.European Review of Agricultural Economics33:289-314.

DiFalcoS andChavasJ-P (2008).Rainfall shocks,resilience,and the effects ofcrop biodiversity onagroecosystemproductivity.Land Economics84:83-96.

Durable Rust Resistance in Wheat (DRRW)(2008). Project Objectives. http://www.wheatrust.cornell.edu/about/

IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC)(2007). Climate Change 2007:Synthesis Report.http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm

Monsanto (2007).Agriculture CanHelp KeepCarbonin Balance.http://www.monsanto.com/responsibility/our_pledge/healthier_environment/climate_change.asp

Sasaki T (2006).Ricein DeepWater.Nature 442:635-36.

SmithR, GrossK andRobertson G (2008).Effectsof CropDiversity onAgroecosystemFunction:Crop Yield Response.Ecosystems 11:355-66.

XuK, XuX, Fukao T,CanlasP, Maghirang-Rodriguez R,Heuer S, Ismail AM,Bailey-SerresJ, RonaldPC andMackillDJ(2006).Sub1A isan ethylene-response-factor-like gene thatconferssubmergencetolerance to rice.Nature442:705-08.

ZhuY,ChenH,FanJ, YangY, Li Y,Chen J,FanJX,Yang S, HuL,Leung H,Mew TW,TangPS, Wang Z andMundtCC(2000).Geneticdiversity anddiseasecontrolin rice.Nature 406:718-722.

ZhuY, Wang Y, ChenH andLu B (2003).Conserving traditionalrice varietiesthroughmanagementfor cropdiversity.Bioscience53: 158-162.

GREENPEACE/ ATHITPERAWONGMETHA


18/22

image Organic RiceArt07/25/2009

Thaifarmerstransferredorganic riceseedlings

to a specially-designatedrice field.


GR E E N P E A C E / A T H I T P E R A W ON GME T H A


19/22

In East Africa, maize farmers are overcoming someof their most damaging plant and insect pests in anecologically sustainable manner. A proven approachcalled thepush-pull system utilises ecology toimprove yields by stopping plant and insect pests. A multi-year study in six districts of Kenya showedconsistent maize yield gains for the push-pull systemover monoculture, sometimes as high as 350%(Khan 2008). The integrated approach relies onecological knowledge and diverse farming methodsrather than chemicals or GE (genetic engineering).

Pest and weed problems in East AfricaMaize is Africas largest cereal crop, with cultivation particularlyimportant in East and Southern Africa. But many maize fields areplagued by witchweed, also called striga ( Striga spp.). Witchweed isa parasitic plant that attaches itself to maize roots, depriving its hostplant of nutrients. It is a problem that infests 40% of the arable land in Africas savannas and is estimated to cost farmers US$7-13 billion peryear (Khan 2007).

Stem-boring caterpillars are also a serious problem in African maize.Particularly harmful are Chilo partellus and, at higher altitudes,Busseola fusca , both of whose larvae chew holes in maize stalks and

consume the plants from within. Stemborers destroy 20-40% of Africas maize harvest onaverage, andas much as 80% in heavyinfestations (Gatsby 2005).

Working with Kenyan farmers, scientists from the International Centreof InsectPhysiology and Ecology (ICIPE) in Nairobi have developed anintegrated ecological approach that controls both witchweed and stemborers in maize without chemicals and other expensive inputs, makingit especially appropriate for Africas many resource-poor farmers.

The push-pull system

Red arrow: 'Push': Compounds released into the air by intercroppedplants repel moths away from the maize.

Orange arrow: Compounds released into theair by border'trapplants'attract moths to lay eggs, away from the maize.

White arrow: In addition, compounds secreted by desmodiumrootsinhibitthe attachment of witchweed to maize roots andcauses suicidalgermination of witchweed seed in soil (see overleaf).

The scientific nameof the system is stimulo-deterrent diversion. It ispopularly known as push-pull, a name that describes howthesystemworks to divert pests from maize. Push-pull farmers plant two species

in addition to maize - one that repels pests from the maize plants (thepush), andanother that attracts the pests away from the maize (thepull), called a trap crop.

The push is provided by an African native legume called silverleaf desmodium( Desmodium uncinatum ). Desmodium is planted in rowsbeside maize. It naturally produces compounds that have a repellenteffect on stem borers. Desmodiumcauses stem borers to perceive thearea to be infested with fellow caterpillars, and thus already heavilyexploited. Consequently, stem borermoths avoid the desmodium(andthemaize beside it), and look elsewhere to lay their eggs (Khan 2007).

The pull in the system is provided by Napier grass ( Pennisetum purpureum ), which is planted on theperimeterof maize fields. Stemborers areattracted to Napiergrass and prefer to lay eggs on its leavesover maize. In addition to luring stem borers away, the Napiergrass isoftena reproductive dead-end for the caterpillars, because it has aparticularly effective response to stemborer infestation. When the eggshatch and attempt to bore into the plant, it releases a sticky substancethat immobilises the larvae, reducing damage and increasing thechances that the larvae will be eatenby a predator, such as a bird.

Economicsolutions

Solutions

Kenya overcomespests and weeds withecological solutions

Napier Grass Napier GrassMaize

Maize

Desmodium Desmodium

Maize

GREENPEACE / PIETER BOER


20/22

Sources

Gatsby CharitableFoundation (2005).The QuietRevolution: Push-Pull Technologyand the African Farmer.Gatsby OccasionalPaper,April2005.

Midega CAO,Khan ZR,Van denBerg J,Ogol CKPO,BruceTJ and PickettJA (2009). Non-target effects ofthe push-pullhabitatmanagement strategy:parasitoid activityand soilfauna abundance. Crop Protection,doi:10.1016/j.cropro.2009.08.005.

KhanZR, Midega CAO, Njuguna EM,Amudavi DM, Wanyama JM andPickettJA (2008).Economicperformance of the 'push-pull' technology forstemborer andStriga control insmallholderfarming systemsin westernKenya.Crop Protection 27:1084-1097.

KhanZR, PickettJA, HassanaliA, HooperA andMidegaCAO (2008).Desmodiumfor controlling Africanwitchweed: presentandfuture prospects.WeedResearch48:302-306.

KhanZR, Muyekho FN,Njuguna E, PickettJA, WadhamsLJ, PittcharJ, Ndiege A,Genga G,NyagolD andLuswetC (2007).A Primer onPlanting andManaging Push-PullFieldsfor Stemborerand StrigaWeed Control in Maize (2ndEd.).ICIPE,Nairobi.

Solutions

Witchweed control and other benefits ofecological farmingBeyond controlling stem borers, both plants serveother importantfunctions.

Desmodiumcontrols witchweed. It does this by acting as a false hostof the parasite. Witchweed seedsare stimulated to germinate when inproximity to the desmodium. They seek to attach to the desmodium;but the legume does not support their continuedgrowth, and thewitchweed dies.

While other legumes are also false hosts of witchweed, for reasons thatare not fully understood, silverleaf desmodium is particularly effective at

reducing and even eliminating witchweed in maize fields. ICIPEscientists are studying the plant to learn why.

Both desmodium andNapiergrass are also useful as animal feed, andcanbe harvested by push-pull farmers for sale or to feed to their owncattle. Once established, both plants grow back to protect the nextcrop of maize. Finally, desmodium is a nitrogen-fixing legume thatimproves soil fertility, boosting maize yields.

Push-pull has potential to expand to other crops, notably sorghum andmillet, both important African food sources. Research is underway toadapt the systemto these and other crops.

Push-pull is enabling African farmers to overcome some of their mostdamaging plant and insect pests in an ecologically sustainable manner.

The system depends on diversity, rather than pesticides andherbicides, reducing use of chemical inputs and meaning thatestablished push-pull fields have significantly lower costs to farmersthan conventional maize farming.



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China is the worlds largest rice producer in terms of harvest and the second largest in terms of acreagesown; 93% of Chinas rice is irrigated. In 2008,Chinese farmers harvested 193 million tonnes of ricefrom over 28 million hectares (IRRI 2009). Chinashigh proportion of irrigated rice acreage means thatmany of the countrys rice fields are suitable habitatfor domesticated ducks and fish species. Traditionally, farmers have cared for these speciestogether, in systems called rice-duck and rice-fish-duck.Recent studies indicate benefits of using biodiverse methods in ricefarming in China. These include greater yields, pest and weed control,disease resistance, increased nitrogen efficiency and reduced outputof greenhouse gases. The studies demonstrate distinct advantages of diverse systems over monocultures and are an example of howtraditional knowledge fused with modern science solves problemswithout genetic engineering.

The rice-duck and rice-fish-duck systems:controlling weeds, pests and diseaseIn the systems, ducklings and/or fish are released in flooded rice fields,growing alongside the rice plants and eventually providing a source of

food. Ducks eat many broadleaf weeds of rice and, through theirwalking and swimming, reduce germination of weed seeds (Zhang,2009). Over four year, ducks were found to control 99% of rice fieldweeds (Ju 2008). Ducks also eat insects including the rice planthopperpest. By controlling pest and weed populations, the ducks reduce theincidence of rice diseases including sheath blight and stripe (Ju 2008, Ahmed 2004).

Other agronomic and ecological benefits of the rice-duck and rice-fish-duck systems are coming to be understood and characterised byscientists, whose studies are demonstrating that these diverse farmingsystems present distinct agricultural advantages over ricemonoculture.

Less need for chemical fertiliser with rice-duck and rice-fish-duck systemsOne problem in paddy rice is retaining nitrogen in the soil. Appliednitrogen leaks from flooded rice through leaching and chemicalprocesses. This can result in comparatively heavy use of fertilisers tomaintain crop yields, which raises farm costs and can increasedownstream nitrogen pollution. It has been found, however, that thepresence of fish and ducks in rice paddies reduces overall nitrogenleakage by 5-7% over rice cultivated alone (Li 2008). This increasednitrogen efficiency can benefit farmers and the environment throughreduced input costs and improved water quality.

Making rice cultivation more climate-friendlyCompared to rice monoculture, the rice-duck and rice-fish-duck systems have also been found to increase carbon dioxide uptake andto reduce emission of the greenhouse gas methane (CH 4 ) (Yuan 2008).

Yunnan rice model: more varieties means lessdisease and higher yields Another recently popularised technique, the Yunnan rice model, hasreduced disease losses through the intercropping of diverse ricevarieties in the same field. The technique is effective at reducing lossfrom rice blast disease, a particularly destructive fungus that causesdamage on panicles (and leaves), killing them before rice grains form.

To fend off rice blast, farmers in Chinas Yunnan Province cooperatedwith scientists to develop a system of growing diverse rice varietiestogether. By increasing the diversity of cultivars, losses from rice blast

have been reduced, improving yields by as much as 89% incomparison to single variety monoculture. At the same time asreducing disease losses, the farmers have conserved the geneticdiversity of local rice types and reduced their use of fungicides (Zhu2000, 2003).

The Yunnan rice model has proven so popular among farmers that by2004 it had been adopted on more than 2,000,000 hectares in China(Xinhua, 2006).

Economic failures 1

Solutions

Benefits of diversityin rice farming

Table (Adapted from Yuan 2008, figures are the calculatedmean in milligrams per square meter-hour (mg/m 2 h).)

System Carbon benefit Reduced methane outputCO 2 Uptake CH 4 Output

Rice 402.70 12.56Rice-Duck 527.40 9.95

Rice-Fish-Duck 557.39 8.52

Sources

Ahmed et al(2004).Rice-duckfarming reducesweeding andinsecticide requirementand increasesgrainyieldandincomce of farmers.InternationalRiceResearchNotes29.1 :74 -77.http://www.irri.org/publications/irrn/pdfs/vol29no1/IRRN29-1.pdf

IRRI (2009).IRRI World Rice Statistics(website). http://www.irri.org/statistics.

Juhui et al(2008).Climate change andFood securityin China. Beijing,XueyuanPress.

http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/china/zh/press/reports/eco-farming.pdf (in Chinese)Li C et al (2008).Nitrogen lossesfrom integratedrice-duck andrice-fish-duck ecosystemsin southernChina.PlantSoil307:207-217.

Xinhua news agency (2006).Zhu youyong:A agriculturalscientist with outstanding contributions.http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/people/2006-07/13/content_7506671_1.htm (in Chinese)

YuanW et al (2008). Economic valuation of gas regulationas a service by rice-duck-fishcomplexecosystem.Ecological Economy 4:266-272.

Zhang Jet al(2009).Effectsof duckactivities ona weedcommunity undera transplantedrice-duck farmingsystemin southernChina.Weed Biologyand Management9: 250-257.

ZhuYY et al(2000).Genetic diversity anddiseasecontrol inrice.Nature 406:718-722.

ZhuYY et al(2003).Conserving traditional rice varietiesthroughmanagementfor cropdiversity.Bioscience53:158-162.


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image Hani womenat theirrice paddycarrying ducks,Lao Bo Village, YunnanProvince,China. Biodiversemethods offarming,suchas'rice-duck' farming, includea numberof benefits notpresent inGEmonocultures.

GR E E N P E A C E / J OH N N OV I S

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