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Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack Zicheng Chi 1 , Yan Li 1 , Xin Liu 1 , Wei Wang 1 , Yao Yao 1 , Ting Zhu 1 , and Yanchao Zhang 2 University of Maryland, Baltimore County 1 Arizona State University 2

Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

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Page 1: Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

Zicheng Chi1, Yan Li1, Xin Liu1, Wei Wang1, Yao Yao1, Ting Zhu1, and Yanchao Zhang2

University of Maryland, Baltimore County1

Arizona State University2

Page 2: Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

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The Internet of things is changing the world

Page 3: Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

The Rapidly Growing Trend of IoT Devices

Source: Statista 3

80 billion

Page 4: Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

Spectrum is shared by IoT Devices

WiFi Bluetooth

ZigBee4

2.4 GHz ISM band

Page 5: Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

To share the spectrum and avoid collision, we use CSMA

5

TimeCollisions

Page 6: Countering Cross-technology Jamming Attack

To share the spectrum and avoid collision, we use CSMA

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Time

• Carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA)

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What if a malicious WiFi device intentionally disables CSMA?

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TimeCollisions

ZigBee device is concealed jammed by WiFi device• Channel Overlapping• Wider Bandwidth• WiFi is everywhere

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ZigBee Packet Reception Ratio (PRR) under concealed jamming

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Impact on popular IoTs

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Pro-Grade Motion Detector

Door Sensor

Acoustic Glass-break Detector

Smoke & CO Sensor

Severe

Severe

Severe

Severe

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Attack model 1: Channel Access Prevention

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Attack model 2: Packet Corruption

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Basic Idea of defense

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• Instead of dropping WiFi and ZigBee collided signals, we disentangle the combined signals to extract ZigBee signal

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Observation

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WiFi Symbol Rate: the WiFi subcarriers (312.5 KHz) of the OFDM signal carry data at the symbol rate of 250,000 symbols per second. ZigBee Chip Rate: the ZigBee’s OQPSK-DSSS modulation scheme carries data at the chip rate of 2,000,000 chips per second.

WiFi symbol rate and ZigBee chip rate reveal signal varying speed in WiFi and ZigBee signals, respectively. By utilizing this property, it is possible to disentangle the two signals if they are collided with each other.

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ZigBee Signal Recovering

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• First, utilizing the diverse chip/symbol rate of ZigBee and symbol to implement a band-stop filter bank.

• Second, the distorted ZigBee signals can be compensated by the robust DSSS scheme.

• Third, using FEC to increase the probability of correct receptions

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Other Challenges

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Handling Partially Collided Packets

Handling Multiple ZigBee Senders Handling an Adversary using a Different WiFi Channel

Concealed Jamming Detection

Please refer to our paper for details

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Experimental Setup

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Baseline:• No Attack• Victim

Protege: our defending scheme

Metrics:• Throughput• Latency• Bit Error Rate• Packet Reception Ratio

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Overall throughput performance

• Our defense scheme shows much better performance than “victim” and very similar to “no attack”.

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Impact of WiFi Signal Strength

• Higher WiFi signal strength affects “victim” more while “protege” keeps stable

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Overall throughput performance

• “Victim” is vulnerable to longer WiFi packets while “protege” is stable. 19

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Conclusion

• We discovered a new set of attacks: concealed jamming attack in IoT networks.

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• We proposed methods to defend against these attacks. Our generic scheme has the potential to be applied to defend from attacks among other spectrum sharing devices.

• Our extensive evaluation shows the packet reception delay can be reduced by a factor of 16 while the jammed device is protected by using our proposed method.

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Q & A

Thanks!

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