28 l LAW OFFICER MAGAZINE l March 2014 LawOfficer.com

Counter-Gang

StrategyCounter-

Gang Strategy

part 1By John A. Bertetto

LawOfficer.com March 2014 l LAW OFFICER MAGAZINE l 29

It’s hyperbole to claim that street gang members are domestic insurgents. Street gangs are not terror cells and street gang members are not insurgents. There are, however, distinct similarities between the two, includ-

ing: • Streetgangmembershavetheabilitytoeasilyblendinto

the population, making identification and apprehension difficult.

• Illegal and often violent activities hold the populationthey operate within “hostage.”

• Streetgangsareabletoexistandoperatebasedonhowthe community responds to them, be that support, coer-cion through fear or reprisal, or acquiescence.

• Streetgangsandgangmembersmakeconcertedeffortsto recruit new members from the local community, in-cluding local schools.

• Actsofviolencecommittedbystreetgangmembersarenot limited to rival gang members or law enforcement but often include local community members.

• Theexistenceofstreetgangsandtheircontinuedillegaland violent actions undermine the credibility of legiti-mate authority—law enforcement and civic government.These similarities were noted by members of the military.

Inpreparingforcounterinsurgencyoperations,themilitarybrought in several members of local law enforcement to both pick their brains and provide basic law enforcement train-ing. Such training included street patrol tactics, conducting of vehicle stops, forensic investigations and the basic tenets of community policing.

Of particular interest is a study written in 2005 by Ma-jor Gary Calese, entitled “Law Enforcement Methods for CounterinsurgencyOperations.”Caleseexaminedthesimi-larities between insurgent groups and street gangs and out-lined five shared characteristics: 1) leadership within the organization; 2) organizational structure; 3) culture within the organization; 4) recruitment; and 5) finances. He con-cludedbysuggestingfiveconceptstheArmyshouldadoptfrom law enforcement for use against insurgent groups: 1) a “cultural shift” from killing the enemy to winning popular support in the local population; 2) the need to accurately de-termine the identity of insurgent members within the popu-lation; 3) a use of intelligence software to track insurgents and manage crime data; 4) a “community policing” style of operations aimed at working with local civic leaders; and 5) the development of “street knowledge”—learning the moti-vators and cultural mores for the local population.

TheArmy appeared to be either listening or thinking

similarly, and in 2006 published FM-24, “Counterinsurgen-cy.” This new field manual describes a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, with emphasis on establishing host nation government legitimacy and working with and through locals to build trust and support, increasing secu-rity, providing service restoration, and effectively cutting off insurgents from local support. While the effectiveness of this strategy in war is likely to be debated for some time, for policing it provides what amounts to a well-tested appli-cation of community policing against violent groups—like street gangs. It’s therefore in the interest of law enforce-ment to look at those competencies that were passed on the military and attempt to derive lessons from them to create a specific counter-gang strategy.

Background The use of lessons learned for creating guiding principles is notnew.In1917,T.E.Lawrence—a.k.a.,LawrenceofAra-bia—wrote“Twenty-SevenArticles”describingtheguidingprinciples needed formilitary advisors inArab-populatedregionstobesuccessful.In2006,Dr.DavidKilcullenwrote“Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-LevelCounterinsurgency,” a modern rendition of Lawrence based upon his observations as a strategist and military leader in Iraq.

Usingthistemplate,whatfollowsarethe“19ArticlesofPolicing Criminal Street Gangs.” These principles are cre-ated by combining what law enforcement already knows about policing street gangs with lessons learned from the adapted community policing and patrol tactics used in mod-erncounterinsurgencywarfare.Asguidingprinciples,theyshould be considered criteria collectively required in order to have the best chance of strategic success.

The 19 Articles of Policing Criminal Street GangsFirst, do no harm. Donothingto tarnishyour integrity,youragency’sintegrity,oryourprofession’sintegrity.Arep-utation for justness will increase your legitimacy. Citizens are more likely to actively assist you by providing informa-tion if they know you will treat them and others fairly.

Know your turf.Know the local geography—physicaland human.

Diagnose the problem.Determinethewidthanddepthof the problem. Sit with your commanders and officers, so-licit opinion, determine what has worked, and design opera-tions. Work the problem as often as is necessary.

Organize for intelligence. Ensure that infor-

Creating guiding principles through lessons learned in the fight against gangs & terrorEdITor’S NoTE: This article is the first of two in a series adapted from the author’s longer works, “Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace” and “Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs.” For a complete description of the principles and strategy described, visit the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive website at www.iletsbei.com/forum.

30 l LAW OFFICER MAGAZINE l March 2014 LawOfficer.com

mation is collected and shared by your street officers. Resist the temptation to leave intelligence gathering and distribu-tion to units outside your command. Shape your operations around the intelligence you produce.

Organize for intra- and inter-agency operations. Meet regularly with your own people—as well as people from support units and outside agencies operating in your area—to share information and pool resources. Coordina-tion of law enforcement operations with other civic service providers is also required.

Identify and build trust with local community advi-sors. Find trusted local people and include them in your op-erations.Incorporatetheirsuggestionswherepossible.Wintheir public support and use it to collect more information.

Develop your field supervisors—then trust them. Set a standard, train to that standard, and hold your su-pervisors accountable to that standard. Empower supervisors with the authority to make critical tactical decisions.

Push operational decision-making down the chain. Requiring field commanders and su-pervisors to constantly seek approval up through the chain of command takes time, stifles creativ-ity,andkills initiative.Developing field supervi-sors and granting them the authority to act is part of the solution. Organize your intelligence and op-erational efforts around your field units and allow them to make the operational decisions they need to make on a daily basis.

Rank is important—talent is more impor-tant. Capability is not granted by rank alone. Put the most capable people in the most appropriate spots, even if that means personnel report directly to persons two or three ranks ahead of them.

Stability in strategy; agility in operations. Set a strategicplanandgoalandsticktoit,butremainflexibleinhowyoureachthatgoal.Buildflexibilityintothestrategyso that you can adapt as situations require.

Avoid the vacuum. Removing gang leaders alone cre-ates a power vacuum. Target and remove mid-level gang members with or before them. This prevents the power vac-uum and the violence that often accompanies it.

Be there. There is no substitute for engagement. Domore than be seen: interact.

Prepare for your handover from Day One. Culti-vate buy-in and ensure that any transition in command is as seamless as possible.

Maintain proactive patrolling. Supplement regular patrol presence with periods of heightened presence. Re-main unpredictable and keep the initiative.

Be prepared for setbacks. Donotletsetbacksconvinceyouthatyourstrategicplanhasnecessarilyfailed.Expectthem; adapt through them.

Develop meaningful metrics and evaluate them regularly. Developqualitativemetricsandratepublicper-ception of safety and law enforcement efficacy. When the

perceptions of your officers and your trusted community ad-visors are aligned, then your qualitative data is meaningful and useful.

Keep local initiatives small. Part of your strategy should include programs that directly connect your officers withthecommunity.Keeptheseprogramsoryourinvolve-mentinthemsmallandinexpensive—and,mostimportantly,sustainable. Create positive engagement that’s built to last.

Put a premium on leadership. Developyourownlead-ership capabilities and the leadership capabilities of all of your field commanders, supervisors and officers.

Maintain the initiative. Develop adaptive strategiesthatevolveastheenvironmentevolves.Aconstant,desta-bilizing series of law enforcement operations puts the street ganginareactiveposture.Inefficiencyleadstochaos;chaosleads to collapse.

ConclusionPopulation-centric counterinsurgency strategy closely resem-bles contemporary community policing efforts and provides law enforcement with the opportunity to look to counterin-surgency operations for lessons learned. The adaptation and application of these lessons learned, combined with what law enforcement already knows about policing criminal street gangs, allows for the creation of general principles for guid-ing operations against criminal street gangs. These princi-ples must be used in total to provide the best opportunity for creating a successful counter-gang strategy. Each principle neglected decreases your chances for success.

InPartTwo,wewilldiscusstherollofcounter-gangef-forts within community policing, re-define community polic-ing, and outline the individual strategic elements of coun-ter-gang strategy. LOM

JohN A. BErTETTo is a sworn member of the Chicago Police Department. He is the author of Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs, Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace, Designing Law Enforcement: Adaptive Strategies for the Complex Environment, and Toward a Police Ethos: Defining Our Values as a Call to Action. Officer Bertetto holds a Master of Science degree from Western Illinois University and a Master of Business Administration degree from St. Xavier University.

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