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Jasmine Boatner
Howard University
Costs and Benefits of WMATA Metrorail for D.C. and Suburban Residents
Simpson-Curtin rule-of-thumb claims each 3 percent fare increase reduces ridership by 1 percent (Litman 2004)
Transportation studies indicate that travel time is a more significant demand determinant than out-of-pocket costs, so that many transportation demand curves have travel time as the independent variable” (Dodson 1975)
In Slovenia, “according to the aggregate values of demand elasticities, the railway passenger demand is price and income inelastic…For the average consumer, the services of railway passenger transportation in Slovenia can be classified among essential consumer expenditures” (Bekő 2004)
Literature
WMATA Metrorail SubsidySource: WMATA
Do Washington D.C. residents receive fewer WMATA Metrorail benefits while paying more of the costs for the system?
Central Research Question
Most data comes from WMATA’s websites
OLS and fixed effect regressions used to calculate average price elasticity.
6 months of Metrorail ride time data to see if performance could have impact on price elasticity.
Data and Methodology
Elasticity
Coefficient
P>|t|
1.22 .000
Absorbing
Elasticity
Coefficient
P>|t|
Region .616 .000
Year 3.589 .000
Fixed Effects RegressionAbsorbing Region
Log Ridership= - 4.795 - .616(Log Real Price) + 1.06 (Log Population) + .0439(Number of Stations) + .024(Real Gas Prices) +.120(Log Bus Ridership)
Absorbing YearLog Ridership= 7.937 - 3.589(Log Real Price) + .532
(Log Population) + .0099(Number of Stations)
Compared to less accurate
OLS Regression of
Panel Data with same variables OLS
Log Ridership = 10.487 - 1.22(Log Real Price) + .115 (Log Population) - .0159(Log Bus Ridership) + .0459(Number of Stations) + .0982(Real Gas Prices)
Region
Elasticity
Coefficient P-Value
R squared
of Model
Whole System .401 .056 .9496
D.C. 1.214 .000 .9151
Maryland .4501 .163 .9498
Virginia .7665 .000 .9586
OLS Regression ResultsWhole System
Log Ridership= .337 - .401 (Log Real Price) + .695 (Log Population) + .0077 (Miles of Metro) + .036 (Real Gas Prices) + .159 (Log Bus Ridership)
D.C. Log Ridership = - 15.45 – 1.214 (Log Real Price) + .043 (Number of
Stations) + 2.266 (Log Population) + .0266 (Real Gas Prices) -.205 (Log Bus Ridership)
Maryland Log Ridership = - 4.269 – .450 (Log Real Price) + .054 (Number of
Stations) + .812 (Log Population) - .0179 (Real Gas Prices) + .2788 (Log Bus Ridership)
Virginia Log Ridership = .999 – .766 (Log Real Price) + .0495 (Number of Stations)
+ .698 (Log Population) + .0782 (Real Gas Prices) + .0555 (Log Bus Ridership)
OLS Regional Equations
D.C. exhibits price elastic demand
Both Maryland and Virginia exhibit price inelastic demand
On the whole, demand is price inelastic
Why is demand in D.C. price elastic?
OLS Regression Results
Metrorail Performance Data
0.0
05.0
1.0
15.0
2D
ensi
ty
0 100 200 300Percent Deviation
Metrorail Ride Time Histogram
Percent Deviation
Coefficient
P>t
Red Line -13.96 0.199
Green Line -58.95 0.015
Green/Yellow Line
-62.09 0.001
Orange/Silver Line
-29.73 0.044
Orange/Silver/Blue
Line
-56.51 0.008
Morning Peak -8.52 0.437
Evening Peak 9.55 0.470
Weekend 46.51 0.000
Mileage Shortest Route
-5.72 0.000
Constant 106.73 0.000
Shorter routes have longer delays
Orange Line appears to be slowest
Riding during peak times does not significantly reduce deviations
Metrorail Performance Regression
Fare does seem to have an impact on ridership
On average, demand is most price elastic in Washington D.C.
Significant deviations between WMATA quoted ride time and actual ride time
Suburban commuters do seem to benefit more from Metrorail
Key Findings