The African e-Journals Project has digitized full text of articles of eleven social science and humanities journals.   This item is from the digital archive maintained by Michigan State University Library. Find more at: http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/

Available through a partnership with

Scroll down to read the article.

Article

COSATU, the ANC and the Election:Whither the Alliance?

Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood

South Africa's 'liberation election' of 1994 registered a triumph for the'Tripartite Alliance', which brought together the African National Congresswith the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress ofSouth African Trade Unions (COSATU) into a formal relationship. Basedupon an organic relationship between the dominant and most progressivestream of the trade union movement and the liberation movement (whichhad its roots far back in history but which during the late-1980s hadenjoyed spectacular success in spearheading resistance against apartheid),the Alliance was viewed from within the labour movement as designed toensure that a working class bias prevailed in the policies and programmesadopted by the ANC once it became the principal party of government.Although it was always realised that as a governing party the ANC wouldhave responsibilities to its wider support base (which extends far beyondthe organised working class) and indeed, that in keeping with its characteras a non-racial, inclusive party open to all South Africans, it would have tobe committed to pursuing the national interest, the Tripartite Alliance wasforged to ensure that, henceforth, newly democratic government in SouthAfrica would be labour friendly.

In the event, as we all know now, the relationship between COSATU andthe ANC-in-government has not been free of tensions. Most particularly,the ANC's effective abandonment of the progressive Reconstruction andDevelopment Plan (RDP) - on which it fought the 1994 election - infavour, in June 1996, of the neo-liberal and fiscally conservative Growth,Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) continues to be a sourceof major stress, with COSATU being highly critical both of the substanceas well as of the lack of consultation which preceded the adoption of the

TRANSFORMATION 38 (1999) ISSN 0258-7696

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

new programme. In consequence, COSATU has joined the SACP as theother partner in the Alliance in being openly critical of GEAR, and in sodoing has earned the wrath of government, having been publicly dresseddown by both President Nelson Mandela and Deputy President ThaboMbeki. Yet, in the run-up to the 1999 election, differences between thevarious partners in the Alliance appear to have been smoothed over, andCOSATU has given its full backing to the ANC manifesto, pronouncing itas biased in favour of workers and the poor. Furthermore, followingnomination of some of 20 COSATU union leaders to the ANC's nationallist in 1994, four additional leading COSATU figures - including presentgeneral secretary Mbhazima Shilowa (since appointed premier of Gauteng)and President John Gomomo - ran for parliament in party colours in 1999.For the duration of the election campaign, at least, it would seem that theAlliance is firm and safe - even though COSATU has warned that it wantstalks with the ANC before the election to develop a programme for thespeedy implementation of the manifesto. In Shilowa's words, such anagreement would ensure that the new government 'hits the ground runningfrom day one' (Business Day January 1, 1999).

However, the issue of the quality of the relationship between COSATUand the ANC simply won't lie down that easily. Indeed, it has recently beenbrought into focus academically by Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor, whoargue in the latest issue of the Review of African Political Economy(1999:109-15) the virtues of a break in the Alliance. As we will elaborate,they are arguing that only the progressive labour movement has thecapacity to forge an effective parliamentary opposition, and thereby toconsolidate democracy and ensure a proper hearing for the poor in thecorridors of power. However, the present writers believe that Habib andTaylor are reading the political tea leaves peculiarly mechanically, and that- quite simply - their argument has no particular virtue in the politicalcontext of South Africa prior to the election of 1999. We are going to arguethis in terms of (i) querying their reading of the relationship betweenCOSATU and the ANC since 1994; (ii) proposing, via reference to a recentsurvey of COSATU member attitudes, that there is as yet little basisamongst workers for any breach in the Alliance; and (iii) suggesting that afracture in the Alliance is likely to.be extremely dangerous in the foreseeablefuture.

We begin by what we trust is a brief accurate summary of Habib andTaylor's argument.

69

Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood

In Favour of Opposition: The Argument for Fracturing theTripartite AllianceHabib and Taylor start not with the state of COSATU-ANC relations butthe state of South African democracy. Basically they argue that, whether ornot the ANC obtains a two-thirds majority in the 1999 election, that SouthAfrica is stuck with the 'emergence' (1999:114) of a dominant partysystem.1 They quite correctly point to the dangers this poses, arguing thatfor democracy in South Africa to be properly consolidated there is need fora party or parties capable of alternating with the ANC in power, as well asfor opposition parties capable of monitoring government performance -the watchdog function. However, whilst strongly contesting the view thatthe electoral preferences of South Africans are determined by 'race', theyargue that the existing parliamentary opposition parties 'are not seriouscontenders for power because they do not offer policies that would enablethem to attract a significant electoral constituency' (1999:111-2). Inconsequence, they argue that a strong opposition party would only beviable if it were able to 'weave a policy programme capable of attractingthe support of a diverse set of constituencies', and in particular 'thegrowing number of independent African voters' whose political loyaltiesare demonstrated by survey data which they cite as having becomeincreasingly fluid. To break the mould:

such a party would have to offer a set of socio-economic policies thatwould attract the support of the lower middle-class, working class,poor and unemployed of all 'racial groups'. This would entail advocatinga socio-economic programme similar to the Reconstruction andDevelopment Programme (RDP) advocated by the ANC prior to itsascension to office. (1999:112)

In short, the failure to develop a strong parliamentary opposition is notthe fault of the electorate, but that of present opposition leaders who are'incapable of smashing the racial prism through which they view theirelectoral strategies'. So far, we might say, so good. But it is then, in ourview, that they simply begin to push their argument too far.

After reviewing COSATU-ANC relations since 1994, they argue thatthere are now two views within the Alliance about its future. On the onehand, there is a layer of 'newly ascendant and recently converted' leaderswho argue that the ANC's role is a de-racialising one, so that 'the Africanbourgeoisie and managerial and professional middle classes can have theirplace in the sun'. For this layer, they argue, an alliance with Inkatha is more

70

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

strategic than one with COSATU and the SACP. On the other hand, thereis 'the leadership and activist layer of COSATU and the SACP' which iscommitted to a social democratic economy, and which places its hope in thefact that 'a struggle can still be waged for the heart and soul of the A N CIt is then, they argue, that 'this latter view seems unrealistic'. Rather thanenabling COSATU and the SACP to imprint a devclopmentalist politicaleconomy on the post-apartheid ANC, continued participation in the Alliancehas placed increasing pressure upon them to abandon their progressivecommitments. In short, precisely because they retain their social democraticideals and because their natural support base of 'the working class, lowermiddle class and unemployed' is increasingly politically independent, theyare 'well placed to break the racial divide and create a truly non-racial, andthereby viable parliamentary opposition'. This would serve as a counter tothe ANC's neo-liberalism, allow the voices of ordinary people to be heardin the corridors of power, and also allow for the consolidation of democracy.But they add (and here is their let out clause) this can be viewed as 'a long-term project that is only likely to fully unfold in the new millennium'(1999:114). Having slowly climbed off the fence throughout the course oftheir article, they leap back on to it with a jump and a bound in theirconcluding sentence!

We do not fault the progressive motivation which drives Habib andTaylor's argument. However, we will proceed to suggest they areunintentionally offering a prescription for disaster.

COSATU and the ANC after 1994Habib and Taylor are quite correct that there are many within COSATUwho believe that GEAR was adopted by the cabinet without adequateconsultation with the partners in the Alliance, and that its macro-economicsubstance is actually regressive and unlikely to stimulate pro-poor friendlygrowth. However, we believe that the jump to the suggestion that there are,as a result (apparently only) two views on whether the Tripartite Allianceshould be maintained is simplistic.

The strains and stresses in COSATU's relationship with the post-apartheid 1994 ANC was foreshadowed by Taking Democracy Seriously:Worker Expectations and Parliamentary Democracy in South Africa(Ginsberg et al 1995). This analysis and interpretation of COSATU workerattitudes noted (1995:61) that, inter alia, COSATU would be faced with anumber of strategic questions, viz:

71

Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood

• Should it continue its membership of the Alliance in the hope ofdelivering what workers expect from the new democracy?

• Should it break from the Alliance on the grounds that the ANC-in-governmcnt will be forced to compromise with non-popular andinternational capitalist forces, and that, therefore, there would be a needfor it to become subject to external, popularly-based counter pressures?

• Should COSATU end its alliance with the ANC, the party of nation, butretain its alliance with the SACP, the party of class? Or, should it alignto some other party, or seek to create a new workers' party free ofStalinist baggage?

• Should COSATU detach itself from all political parties and devote itselfto democratising the political economy from below?

• Should COSATU consider whether a genuinely participatory democracyis attainable within the confines of bourgeois liberal democracy, and ifit decides it is not, should it not commit itself to a revolutionary socialistobjective?Taking Democracy Seriously did not attempt to prescribe any of these

particular options. However - unlike Habib and Taylor - it did keep its feetplanted firmly on the ground, noting that the good news for the ANC, asdelivered by the 1994 survey, was that there was 'overwhelming' workersupport for the new parliament, the then Government of National Unity,and for the continuation of the Tripartite Alliance. As we will argue below,that situation shows no sign of changing. But that is to anticipate, for wemust also note that our authors have also ignored another major studywhich followed on from this earlier work.

Rather than focussing directly upon the Tripartite Alliance, Maree(1998) asks whether COSATU workers' expectations of parliamentarydemocracy have proved to be reconcilable with the actual way in which thatdemocracy is being practised in the new South Africa. He locates thisagainst the historical evolution of what he terms 'the COSATU participatorydemocratic tradition', and elaborates - on the back of the 1994 andsubsequent surveys—how workers generally transferred their understandingof trade union shop-floor democracy directly to their expectations ofparliamentary democracy. That is, no less than 68 per cent of respondentsin the 1994 survey were of the view that their political party should consultwith them on all issues, and when the party made decisions in parliamentthat affected its supporters it should report back to them each time(1998:40). Meanwhile, whereas fully 94 per cent of workers were of the

72

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

opinion that workers would always need trade unions, a bare majority (51per cent) were of the opinion that they could not rely on parties to protecttheir interests. Even so, 60 per cent regarded parliament as the best forumfor workers to pursue their own interests, with 79 per cent agreeing that thebest way to ensure that political parties look after worker interests was tohave former trade unionists amongst their parliamentary representatives.

Maree goes on to examine how what he terms this' limited understandingof parliamentary democracy' apparently led on to some disappointment ofworker expectations after 1994, citing further data aboutpopular perceptionsof the ANC's poor delivery record. In considerable measure he finds a basisfor these disappointments in the nature of the new electoral system, whichvia adoption of proportional representation had substituted party lists forconstituency-based representatives, depriving voters of 'their' particularMPs who could be rendered accountable. He then goes on to explain howCOSATU attempted to deal with the emergent problems of accountabilityby adopting a three-pronged strategy, it resolved to (i) build its capacity toinfluence and lobby the ANC; (ii) support the ANC component of the GNU;and (iii) resist government decisions that challenged its interest (1998:44).Thereafter, in pursuance of these aims, COSATU came to stress how itintended to 'fortify' its alliance with the ANC by engaging in a dualstrategy of mass struggle outside parliament as a complement to strugglesinternal to parliament and the Alliance. An example was the LabourRelations Act campaign. As explained by one senior official: 'We took itto the streets, but we all knew that it's not going to end up in the streets,because at the end you need a law' (1998:44).

Thereafter, COSATU interacted with the state principally via the NationalEconomic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and its improvedinteraction with parliament. By April 1997, notes Maree, although NEDLACfell far short of COSATU's expectations, it had reached 21 agreements,including the highly contested negotiations between the state, labour andbusiness over the LRA. Meanwhile, to firm up its relationships with theANC in parliament, COSATU had opened up a parliamentary office late in1995, so that it could have a constant pressuring presence in those hallowedquarters. Again, the results of this move were uneven, but by the end of1996, the parliamentary office was judged as having achieved a number ofstrategic gains for workers, including the entrenchment of workers' rightsin the new constitution, as well having made a host of submissions toparliamentary committees on different issues. But these triumphs were not

73

Roger Southatl and Geoffrey Wood

merely the result of elite endeavour, for COSATU corporatist andparliamentary initiatives had been backed up by key instances of massmobilisation: around the LRA, around the constitution, and in 1997 aroundthe Basic Conditions of Employment Bill. These successes did not preventthe later stresses between COSATU and the ANC over GEAR (whichHabib and Taylor make their sole focus), but importantly, Marec also goeson to cite Shilowa's refutation of the idea that COSATU should withdrawfrom the Alliance. The Alliance, according to Shilowa, is not only the mainforce for transformation and democratisation available to COSATU, butCOSATU also has no intention of handing over the ANC to conservativeforces

All in all, Maree concludes that 'COSATU has made significant stridesin defending and advancing workers' rights and interests in parliament',even though it has not done so in the participatory democratic mannerenvisaged by the rank and file. In contrast, it has recognised that 'thepolitical terrain is more complex, and that more sophisticated strategies arerequired' (1998:50).

In sum, Habib and Taylor can be faulted, amongst other reasons, for (i)grossly simplifying the strategic options available to COSATU; (ii) simplydismissing all the different gains achieved by COSATU since 1994 underthe formula that the labour movement has been coming under increasingpressure to abandon its progressive commitments; and, as we shall proceedto show (iii) failing to found their arguments upon any reference whateverto the current political attitudes of COSATU workers.

COSATU Worker Attitudes in the Run Up to the ForthcomingElectionA follow up to the 1994 COSATU worker survey was undertaken in late1998.2 What is interesting from our immediate perspective is how limiteda basis current worker attitudes would appear to offer to the idea ofCOSATU fracturing the Tripartite Alliance and moving into opposition.The findings that we would like to highlight are as follows:• The mode of respondents (54 per cent) felt that workers could not rely

on political parties to protect their interests. Most workers felt that,whatever the desirability of the Alliance, it was not advisable to placetheir entire trust in any particular political party. By implication therefore,they were saying that COSATU should retain its distinct identity.Similarly, 93 per cent of respondents said that workers would alwaysneed trade unions to protect their interests. However:

74

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

The mode of respondents (57 per cent) also felt that parliament wasultimately the most desirable forum for workers to pursue their interests.In short, they seem to agree with Maree that COSATU's engagementwith the first democratic parliament has delivered considerable benefits.At the same time, some 70 per cent indicated the need for workers tomaintain strong pressure upon their trade union representatives inparliament. In turn, this belief in the need to render such MPs accountableclearly flows from workers' continued adherence to the shop-floorbased notion of participatory democracy. Worker MPs continue to beconceived of as mandated delegates, rather than representatives.In accordance with their belief in the efficacy of parliamentary action,approximately 67 per cent of respondents agreed that COSATU'sdecision to nominate 20 of its leaders to parliament in 1994 (via theirplacement in electable positions on the ANC national election list) wasthe correct one. Even so, workers were most certainly divided as to whatthese former unionists had achieved. The mode (33 per cent) felt thatthey had managed to represent workers interests, whereas the majoritywere unsure - although they tended to agree that inter alia they hadgained useful experience, and worked for redistribution and improvedindustrial relations. Very few felt that they had achieved little ornothing.The overwhelming majority of respondents (72 per cent) agreed that thepolitical party they supported should consult with its constituency on allissues. In contrast, only 59 per cent of respondents said that their shopsteward should consult with them every time s/he acted on their behalf.In other words, workers were more inclined to trust their shop stewardsthan their parliamentary representatives. This would seem to reflect thefact that shop floor democracy is more immediately visible, with wellestablished structures for recall. However, notwithstanding their beliefin the efficacy of parliamentary action, it would also seem to reflectworkers' wariness about leaving their representatives on too loose arein. Again, 66 per cent of respondents stated that when a party makesdecisions in parliament that affect its supporters, it should report backevery time. In contrast, only 59 per cent of respondents felt that whentheir shop stewards made decisions on their behalf, they should berequired to report back. Correspondingly, 77 per cent of respondents feltthat if a party did not do what its supporters desired, it should be removedfrom office, just as 93 per cent claimed the right to dismiss an errant shop

75

Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood

steward should s/he similarly stray. Interestingly, therefore, it seemsthat whereas workers feel that shop stewards should be granted moreimmediate local autonomy, this is highly dependent upon theirunambiguously pursuing worker interests. The apparent paradox ofworkers wanting their unionist MPs to report back more intensively thantheir shop stewards is perhaps indicative of a growing appreciation ofthe often practical problems of exacting political accountability.

• Alongside their demands for political accountability, the mode ofrespondents (66 per cent) said that when they voted for a party, theirdecision was based both on the composition of the leadership and theparty's practical policies. Only 11 per cent said that their choice wasguided by the leadership alone. Furthermore, over 80 per cent believedthat the political party they supported had worker interests at heart. Inshort, although workers' choice of political party seems to be inextricablybound up with personality (the 'Mandela factor' if you will), trade unionmembers do place a particular importance on their party's perceivedability to adequately represent their specific interests.

• In this context, it is important to note that although the former tradeunionists nominated for political office by COSATU have since 1994been no longer directly accountable to the federation, the TripartiteAlliance remains overwhelmingly popular. Over 70 per cent ofrespondents said that the Alliance represents the most effectivemechanism for safeguarding worker interests in parliament. In contrast,only 13 per cent felt that COSATU should not be politically aligned.Again, as in 1994, there was negligible support (a mere three per cent)for the view that worker interests would be best represented by the S ACPon its own. There was similarly little support for the notion of anindependent workers' party. Indeed:

• Almost two-thirds of respondents felt that the Alliance should continueand contest the 2004 elections, and only ten per cent of respondents feltthat COSATU should form an independent workers' party. Even fewer(four per cent) believed that COSATU should be in alliance with theSACP alone. In short, despite increasing ties between the SACP andCOSATU in recent years, the former is not seen as a serious politicaloption by the latter's rank and file.

• Given the above, it therefore does not come as a surprise - despite theconventional wisdom widely expounded about popular attitudes by themainstream media - that most respondents felt that the ANC government

76

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

had delivered in a wide range of areas since the 1994 elections. Indeed,it was only with regard to real wages that a near majority (49 per cent)ofrespondents felt there had been no improvement since 1994. Otherwise,respondents felt that there had been particularly noticeable improvementsin the areas of electricity provision, water reticulation and with regardto access to telephones (in all three areas, well over 80 per cent). Sixty-three per cent stated that they had enjoyed improved access to healthcare since 1994. Furthermore, over 71 per cent felt that workingconditions had become cleaner and safer since the transition, in partprobably due to beefed up health and safety legislation. And mostrespondents ascribed these improvements to the ANC government'sactions at either national or provincial levels. To be sure, fully 41 percent of workers were doubtful whether GEAR had indeed achieved itsobjectives of 'growth, employment and redistribution', yet only 26 percent of workers were prepared to condemn it as an outright failure. Forthe moment at least, COSATU workers are prepared to wait and see, andto give the ANC government the benefit of the doubt.

• Finally, it has to be stressed that, although the loyalty of the majority ofCOSATU workers to the Alliance and to the ANC is clearly not in doubt,very few respondents indicated that they would be inactive were thegovernment to fail to deliver in the future. In line with establishedCOSATU strategy, overwhelming majorities favoured resorting to massaction in such an event (77 per cent), and/or to putting pressure on unionMPs in parliament (89 per cent). There was very little interest in votingfor parties other than the ANC, and as already indicated, virtually nosupport for the idea of the creation of a specialist workers' party.

Where, in sum, does this take us? Space considerations do not allow amore detailed analysis of the survey.3 However, from our particularperspective, we believe that this preliminary plunge into the 1998 findingsindicates that the current COSATU leadership's energetic backing of theANC in the current election campaign is much more closely in touch withrank and file feelings than those who argue for breaking with the TripartiteAlliance. These findings suggest to us that COSATU workers have anincreasingly nuanced and sophisticated set of political attitudes. Many ofthem do not presume to have a detailed knowledge of the higher institutionsand eddies of policy, and many of them clearly harbour doubts about themacro direction of policy under GEAR. Even so, they clearly hold to theopinion that the best deal they are going to get in South Africa is if the ANC

77

Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood

is in power and if COSATU continues to struggle for influence within theTripartite Alliance. Yet they are not so naive as to believe that the ANC willdeliver unless it is continuously rendered accountable. And, no doubt,COSATU workers survey the party political scene in South Africa andreckon that for the workers' movement to cut its links with the ruling partywould be to risk the threat of marginalisation.

Fracturing the Alliance: Consolidating Democracy orMarginalising COSATU?It remains to examine the curious logic which underpins the entire thesisput forward by Habib and Taylor. Our suggestion is that they confuse twoquite different arguments.

Let us recap. Habib and Taylor argue that the dominant party systemrequires the establishment of a strong opposition if 'people's preferences'are to be taken on board by the ruling party. We have no argument with that.However, we do object strongly to their non sequitur that because COSATUand the SACP together are (at present) the only faintly viable force whichcould form such an opposition, that therefore they should break with theTripartite Alliance in order to allow for the consolidation of democracy.For a start, we have already dealt with their misleading suggestion thatCOSATU has not had any significant influence on government since 1994.We have also indicated that, quite clearly, COSATU workers themselvesdo feel very strongly that they have benefitted from the ANC being inpower. But going beyond all that, Habib and Taylor are - extremelydangerously in our view - proffering a prescription not for greater influencefor COSATU and for the consolidation of democracy, but for the splittingand marginalisation of the South African labour movement. Let us look atsome of the principal reasons.

First and foremost, there is a naivety in any suggestion that if theTripartite Alliance split and if COSATU and the SACP moved intoopposition, that they would do so in a coherent fashion. It is scarcelynecessary to remind ourselves that the history of the international left islittered with damaging internal splits, where more energy is spent byactivists fighting each other than any class or political enemy. In short, ifCOSATU were to break from the Alliance, it is extremely unlikely (i) thatit could take all its cadres with it; or (ii) that it could take even the bulk ofthe rank and file out of the ANC camp. What we would probably have,instead, is some combination of a split within COSATU and within its

78

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

individual affiliates, bitter struggles for ownership of union assets inextremely expensive court room battles, formation by the ANC of a rivalunion federation, and so on. The very prospect makes one shudder, so muchwould be thrown away - as reactionary forces would meanwhile move into exploit (and fund) divisions, reverse labour friendly legislation, and soon. (Note that the United Democratic Movement (UDM) is already talkingabout forming its own union movement to counter COSATU). And whilstHabib and Taylor would doubtless argue that any such break away wouldhave to be fully debated, and launched upon the basis of a social-movementunion-style coalition with other popular forces, let it be remembered thatwhat would go for the labour movement would go for popular movementsas well. The ANC would inevitably play the populist card, accuse COSATUof ignoring the plight of the unemployed, accuse it of betraying theliberation struggle, and so on.

Second, whilst we cannot agree with the argument that, at present, theANC's competitors give little indication that they can forge a viableopposition, it is a misreading to suggest that they view their electoralstrategies through a 'racial prism'. Of course, 'race thinking' colours manyof their strategies and actions, but simple reference to the New(?) NationalParty increasinglyjturning to 'Coloureds' for support, and the launch of theUDM as a party designed to span the chasm between different communitiesindicates that, whatever their historical and political constraints, theopposition parties arij - unevenly, haltingly - realising the need to come outof the laager if they are to effectively confront the ANC. That they fail todo so may be less because they view politics through a 'racial prism' thanbecause of the short-term electoral advantages they see in exploiting the'politics of identity' (Southall 1998). Of course, this does not mean that theexisting parties will claw their way to what progressive opinion wouldregard as a legitimate non-racialism. Nor does it mean that they will seetheir way to forging a really effective opposition - in the form of analternative government - in the foreseeable future. We do not disagree thatwill constitute a major project for the next millennium. Yet that is scarcelya good reason for recommending that the labour movement should sacrificeits present relatively advantageous position in the political spectrum inorder to'consolidate democracy'.

Third, there must be no doubting that Habib and Taylor underestimatethe practical difficulties which would be attached to the launching of alabour-based popular party to counter the ANC. A 'dominant party' is more

79

Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood

than simply a party which wins recurrent elections. Rather, it keeps onwinning those elections because it dominates the political economy, thenational agenda and so on, as well as the electoral system. And successattracts the financial support needed to win elections. Let's remember thatelections are extremely expensive. Indeed, relatively speaking the electionin 1994 was, rand per voter, one of the more expensive that the democraticworld has yet seen (Southall and Wood 1998). This is not to say that anydemocratic forces should be discouraged from opposing authoritarianismand championing liberty, democracy and human rights. There is more tothe struggle for democracy than the search for financial sponsors. Yet itwould be verging on the suicidal for any forces seeking to break away fromthe Alliance not to take such mundane matters into consideration.

In short, it would only be in exceptional - and probably crisis-ridden -circumstances that COSATU could break from the Tripartite Alliance andform the backbone of a popularly based opposition party which could havea real chance of power. It would seem instead that the present COSATUleadership has got it right: whatever the present limitations on COSATU'sinfluence over policy, the way forward for extending worker rights andpro-poor policies is by remaining within the Alliance, using a combinationof mass action and parliamentary lobbying, and forming coalitions withother progressive forces to render the ANC in government accountable.

This is not to say that, at some point in Habib and Taylor's nextmillennium, that there will not be real strains in the Alliance, and that, atsome point, COSATU might have to take drastic action to counter a newauthoritarianism. But for the moment, speculation around such a scenariois artificial, dangerous and premature. Habib and Taylor seem to haveforgotten one of the most basic rules of the trade union game: Unity isStrength. Rather than wondering how, why and when COSATU shouldbreak the Alliance, we should concentrate instead upon how the labourmovement can struggle to keep the ANC on track to deliver to its popularconstituencies.

Notes1. As if 40 years of hegemony by the National Party was not enough to qualify for

this epithet. As one of the present writers (Southall 1994) has suggested, it isfar more sound to describe a pre-existing dominant party system as having been'remade'.

80

COSATU, the ANC and the Election

2. The survey was funded by the Centre for Science Development. The researchteam included David Ginsberg (University of Natal), Glen Adler, ChristinePsoulise (University of the Witwatersrand), Janet Cherry (University of PortElizabeth) and Conrad Jardine and Vishwas Satgar (NALEDI) as well as thepresent writers. Neither the CSD nor the other members of the research teamhold any responsibility for the views we are expressing in this article.

3. Refer to Christine Psoulise's (1999) recent article in the South African LabourBulletin for such an analysis.

ReferencesGinsberg, D, et al. 1995. Taking Democracy Seriously: Worker Expectations

and Parliamentary Democracy in South Africa. Universityof Natal: Indicator Press.

Habib, A and R Taylor. 1999. 'Parliamentary Opposition and DemocraticConsolidation in South Africa', Review of African PoliticalEconomy 79.

Marcc, J. 1998. 'The COSATU Participatory Democratic Traditionand South Africa's New Parliament: Are They Reconcilable?'African Affairs 97.

Psoulise, C. 1999. 'COSATU Members" Attitudes Towards the 1999Elections', South African Labour Bulletin 23(4).

Southall, R. 1994. "The South African Elections of 1994: Remaking aDominant Party State', The Journal of Modern AfricanStudies 32(4).1998. 'The Centralization and Fragmentation of SouthAfrica's Dominant Party System', African Affairs 97.

Southall, R and G Wood. 1998. "Political Party funding in Southern Africa'. In: PBurncll and A Ware (eds). Funding Democratization.Manchester: Manchester University Press.

81