CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DURING TIMES ...social impact in response to the crisis brought positive stakeholder attributions. However, organisations accepting accommodative strategies

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITYDURING TIMES OF CRISIS

Choity Jones

BBus (IntBus/Marketing)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Philosophy

School of Advertising, Marketing and Public Relations

QUT Business School

Queensland University of Technology

2020

Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis i

Keywords

Apparel industry, attribution theory, corporate social responsibility, crisis

communication, crisis spillover, Situational Crisis Communication Theory, fast

fashion, public relations, Rana Plaza.

ii Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

Abstract

A crisis is represented by an unpredictable event that poses a serious threat to

the image, profitability and long-term viability of organisations (Coombs, 2007a,

2007b; Janssen et al., 2015). It would be natural for organisations to distance

themselves from such risks (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c). This research, however, explored

organisational responses to a crisis that has moved beyond its focal crisis organisations

to affect industry, hereafter referred to as a crisis spillover (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c;

Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai, 2011, 2014).

Through the lens of the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, which

killed more than 1,100 garment workers and implicated global fast fashion

organisations, this study employed Coombs’ (2007b, 2015c) Situational Crisis

Communication Theory (SCCT) which draws on attribution theory (Weiner, 1985).

Based on the crisis type, SCCT adopts a two-step model that firstly evaluates factors

that could intensify or moderate the situation before prescribing responses to reduce

attributions of responsibility among stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).

SCCT focuses on single organisational responses to a crisis rather than multiple

organisations affected by the same crisis and also adopts a cross-sectional view which

excludes long-term crisis responses. Coombs (2015c) has, however, recognised the

need to keep testing and examining SCCT for its alignment with changing

environmental factors, such as technology, and also meet evolving social expectations.

In this respect, an important link has been made between attribution theory, SCCT and

corporate social responsibility (CSR; Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Zhou & Ki, 2018a). The

latter describes organisationally shared economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic

values with society (Carroll, 1979, p. 500, 1991, p. 283; Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p.

Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis iii

89; Maon et al., 2009; Zhou & Ki, 2018a). Essentially, organisational CSR within the

crisis context could bring heightened attention from stakeholders and influence their

blame attribution process. When stakeholders’ social expectations are met, outcomes

are expected to be positive (Kim, 2014; Janssen et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2018; Zhou &

Ki, 2018a, 2018b). With CSR now being a standard activity of many of today’s

organisations, the effective uses of this construct within crisis settings have become

more complex and have required more evidence-based research outcomes (Zhou & Ki,

2018a). As such, this study distinguishes CSR into two categories: (1) explicit CSR,

which represents voluntary, non-binding CSR activity by organisations; and (2)

implicit CSR, which represents collective efforts with the involvement of legal or

mandatory requirements (Matten & Moon, 2008).

This dissertation corresponds with the study of Comyn and Franklin-Johnson

(2016) in that the authors focused on SCCT and CSR through the lens of the Rana

Plaza. Comyn and Franklin-Johnson (2016) provided valuable insights into the Rana

Plaza case through a one-year, post-crisis exploration by an inductive approach. Their

study argued that the burden of responsibility among organisations was not equally

shared during a crisis spillover, and also that organisations responded differently to a

crisis in a collective setting in comparison to individual organisations exposed to

similar reputational risks. Furthermore, Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) focused

solely on organisations with prior business links with the Rana Plaza factory, referred

to as Connected Organisations within the context of this study.

This dissertation differed from Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study

through its deductive, longitudinal, four-year timeline from the crisis spillover

perspective. The timeline of this study was categorised into three different periods to

gradually explore short- and long-term developments within the data. This dissertation

iv Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

has further examined a second sample consisting of organisations that became

implicated through guilt by association (Desai, 2011; Yu et al., 2008, 2014).

Findings of the present study show that all organisations arrived at collective

rebuild responses or crisis spillover responses. Connected Organisations, however,

attempted to distance themselves from responsibility through concurrent bolstering or

diminishing responses. Such has been viewed as crisis detachment strategies for the

content of this study. Unconnected Organisations more readily assumed responsibility

for a crisis they were not immediately implicated by; however, by acknowledging the

Rana Plaza as a catalyst for change and industry reforms, the sample addressed

stakeholders’ post-crisis expectations through social impact.

This study made initial contributions at both a theoretical and practical level for

the context of a large-scale industrial accident affecting industry in the short- and long-

term. It has been found that crisis responsibility was not shared equally among

Connected and Unconnected Organisations, however that long-term CSR practises for

social impact in response to the crisis brought positive stakeholder attributions.

However, organisations accepting accommodative strategies in the short-term have

been found to bear the burden of reputational threats by prior research (Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson, 2016) which the findings of this study has supported.

As a practical implication, this dissertation provides organisations with

evidence-based guidelines to manage reputation in the short- and long-term following

a large-scale industrial accident. Larger organisations are expected and pressured to

lead peers to post-crisis industry reforms. Similarly, smaller organisations follow

successful CSR-leads of larger organisations to remain competitive within their

industry sphere.

Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis v

Table of Contents

Keywords .................................................................................................................................. i

Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................v

List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... viii

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... ix

List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................x

Statement of Original Authorship ........................................................................................... xi

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xii

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................... 13

1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................13

1.2 Background to research ................................................................................................13

1.3 Theoretical framework ..................................................................................................15

1.4 Research gaps ...............................................................................................................17

1.5 Fast fashion ...................................................................................................................19

1.6 Rana Plaza ....................................................................................................................19

1.7 Methodology .................................................................................................................21

1.8 Definition of key constructs and theory ........................................................................22 1.8.1 Attribution theory ...............................................................................................22 1.8.2 Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) ............................................23 1.8.3 Crisis communication .........................................................................................23 1.8.4 Crisis spillover ....................................................................................................23 1.8.5 Collective crisis ..................................................................................................24 1.8.6 Stakeholder pressures .........................................................................................24 1.8.7 Corporate social responsibility ...........................................................................25

1.9 Outline of thesis ............................................................................................................26

Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................... 27

2.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................27

2.2 Crisis and crisis spillover ..............................................................................................27 2.2.1 Defining ‘crisis’ ..................................................................................................27 2.2.2 SCCT and attribution theory ..............................................................................28

2.3 Beyond the situational focus of crisis research .............................................................34 2.3.1 The difference between a collective crisis and the crisis spillover

phenomenon .......................................................................................................34 2.3.2 Crisis spillover ....................................................................................................36 2.3.3 Stakeholder pressures .........................................................................................40

2.4 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) ..........................................................................41 2.4.1 The link between CSR and crisis communication ..............................................41 2.4.2 Implicit and explicit CSR ...................................................................................45

2.5 Research questions........................................................................................................47

vi Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

Chapter 3: Method and Research Design ........................................................ 50

3.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 50 3.1.1 Philosophical underpinnings .............................................................................. 50 3.1.2 Qualitative case study design ............................................................................. 51 3.1.3 Three principles of data collection ..................................................................... 52 3.1.4 Sample ............................................................................................................... 52 3.1.4.1 Selection criteria .............................................................................................. 53 3.1.5 Screening of organisational profiles .................................................................. 56

3.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................................ 57 3.2.1 Sampling of data ................................................................................................ 59 3.2.2 Data analysis ...................................................................................................... 60 3.2.3 The content analysis method .............................................................................. 61

3.3 Enhancement of the Research Design .......................................................................... 65 3.3.1 Credibility .......................................................................................................... 65 3.3.2 Dependability ..................................................................................................... 66 3.3.3 Confirmability .................................................................................................... 67 3.3.4 Transferability .................................................................................................... 68

3.4 Ethics considerations .................................................................................................... 68 3.4.1 QUT ethics clearance ID# 1700000515 ............................................................. 68

Chapter 4: Findings ........................................................................................... 71

4.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 71

4.2 Time Period 1: The immediate crisis response ............................................................ 72 4.2.1 Crisis response ................................................................................................... 72 4.2.1.1 Connected Organisations................................................................................. 73 4.2.1.2 Unconnected Organisations............................................................................. 77 4.2.2 Description of stakeholder pressures ................................................................. 80 4.2.3 Implicit and explicit CSR .................................................................................. 83 4.2.4 Summary ............................................................................................................ 86

4.3 Time Period 2: The short-term post-crisis response ..................................................... 88 4.3.1 Crisis response ................................................................................................... 88 4.3.2 Description of stakeholder pressures ................................................................. 94 4.3.3 Implicit and explicit CSR .................................................................................. 96 4.3.4 Summary .......................................................................................................... 102

4.4 Time Period 3: Long-term crisis response ................................................................. 104 4.4.1 Crisis response ................................................................................................. 104 4.4.2 Description of stakeholder pressures ............................................................... 109 4.4.3 Supply chain transparency ............................................................................... 112 4.4.4 Implicit and explicit CSR ................................................................................ 114 4.4.5 Summary .......................................................................................................... 120

4.5 Organisational response patterns and trends .............................................................. 121 4.5.1 Connected Organisations ................................................................................. 121 4.5.2 Unconnected Organisations: Geographical CSR trends .................................. 122 4.5.3 Summary .......................................................................................................... 126

Chapter 5: Discussion ...................................................................................... 127

5.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 127

5.2 Research Question 1 ................................................................................................... 127 5.2.1 Connected Organisations ................................................................................. 128 5.2.2 Unconnected Organisations ............................................................................. 131

Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis vii

5.2.3 Summary ..........................................................................................................133

5.3 Research Question 2 ...................................................................................................134 5.3.1 Connected Organisations ..................................................................................134 5.3.2 Unconnected Organisations ..............................................................................137 5.3.3 Summary ..........................................................................................................139

5.4 Research Question 3 ...................................................................................................141 5.4.1 Connected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR .....................................141 5.4.2 Unconnected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR .................................144 5.4.3 Summary ..........................................................................................................146

5.5 Limitations ..................................................................................................................148

5.6 Implications for theory ...............................................................................................150

5.7 Implications for practice .............................................................................................152

5.8 Directions for future research .....................................................................................153

References ............................................................................................................... 155

Appendices .............................................................................................................. 173

Appendix A ...........................................................................................................................173

Coombs’ (2007b) Original SCCT Primary and Secondary Crisis Response Strategies .......173

Appendix B ...........................................................................................................................174

Coombs’ (2007b, p. 173) Original SCCT Crisis Response Strategy Guidelines ..................174

Appendix C ...........................................................................................................................175

Organisational Profiles Pertinent to Sample Selection Criteria ............................................175

Appendix D ...........................................................................................................................176

Data Extracts of Organisational SCCT Responses in Time Period 1 ...................................176

Appendix E ...........................................................................................................................177

Impact of H&M’s commitment to The Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1 .....................177

Appendix F............................................................................................................................178

Data Extracts of SCCT Responses in Time Period 2 ............................................................178

Appendix G ...........................................................................................................................179

Data Extracts of Crisis Responses in Time Period 3.............................................................179

viii Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

List of Figures

Figure 2.1. Conceptual map of key constructs and time periods. .............................. 48

Figure 3.1. Connected Organisations and the regions of Unconnected Organisations. .............................................................................................. 55

Figure 3.2. Operationalisation of codes through NVivo. ........................................... 62

Figure 4.1. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources in Time Period 1, April-June 2014. .................................................................. 81

Figure 4.2. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 2, July 2013 – June 2014. ........................................................ 94

Figure 4.3. Patterns of crisis response strategies undertaken by Connected and Unconnected Organisations. ...................................................................... 105

Figure 4.4. Reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 3, July 2014 - June 2017. ................................................................ 110

Figure 4.5. Annual break-down of pressures facing the fashion industry in Time Period 3. ............................................................................................ 113

Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis ix

List of Tables

Table 2.1 SCCT Crisis Response Strategies (Coombs, 2007b, p. 170) .................... 31

Table 3.1 Overview of Sample Groups and Their Organisational Profiles .............. 57

Table 3.2 Focus of data collection over three periods of time .................................. 58

Table 3.3 Example of Operationalisation of Codes .................................................. 64

Table 4.1 Evolution of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 1 ....................... 73

Table 4.2 Implicit/Explicit CSR in Time Period 1 .................................................... 84

Table 4.3 Overview of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 2 ....................... 90

Table 4.4 Rebuild Strategies: Victim Compensation by Implicit or Explicit CSR .............................................................................................................. 97

Table 4.5 Prevalent Strategy and Visibility of CSR for Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 2 ........................................... 101

Table 4.6 Long-Term crisis responses through conformity to the supply chain transparency pledge by Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 3 ............................................................................................. 107

Table 4.7 Trends for implicit and explicit CSR by Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 3 ........................................... 115

x Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

List of Abbreviations

BRAC Building resources across communities

CSR Corporate social responsibility

RMG Ready-made garment

SCCT Situational Crisis Communication Theory

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

UN United Nations

QUT Verified Signature

xii Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

Acknowledgements

“When you’ve worked hard, and done well, and walked through that doorway of

opportunity, you do not slam it shut behind you. You reach back, and you give other

folks the same chances that helped you succeed.” -- Michelle Obama

I state this quote with the intention of expressing my sincere gratitude to my

supervisors, Associate Professor Amisha Mehta, Dr Bree Devin and Dr Amanda

Beatson. As I reflect over the past years, I can appreciate how your mentorship have

guided me to view the world around me in a way that I haven’t before. This journey

has, indeed, been a catalyst for growth on so many levels and I feel privileged to have

learned from you. Thank you for this opportunity and for keeping your faith in me.

At the core of my acknowledgements, I dedicate this work to my late Father,

Mesbah Uddin Ahmed. My greatest supporter whom did not get to see me reach the

finish line. I thank you, Pappa, for your guidance, for your sacrifices in life, and your

unconditional love. You live on in my heart and I will always strive to make you proud.

To my husband, Benjamin Jones. Thank you for being my constant rock. You

have kept me (somewhat) sane through this research journey. I could not have

accomplished this work without your continuous love, support and patience.

I further thank my Mum, my wonderful sisters, my cousin Tania and my long-

time friend Sabinor – although you’re all back home in Sweden, your encouragement

has remained close and the distance has been inconsequential. Last and certainly not

the least, my wonderful in-laws and friends in Australia, you know who you are, I am

fortunate to have each of you in my life. Thanks for always having my back.

A special thanks for Bill Wrigley for editing this thesis.

Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 13

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of this thesis together with the background

and justification of methodology undertaken for this research, followed by key theory,

constructs and the methods that have guided the study. The chapter concludes with an

outline of the structure of this thesis.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH

The past two decades has presented a boom in the global marketplace for

organisations through free-trade agreements and the internet (Avnet & Laufer, 2015).

Whilst the world is more connected than ever before, other risks have surfaced for

managers to be vigilant about events involving their industry environments. Even

though such development has also enabled stakeholders to become increasingly

interconnected on a global scale, organisations have been faced with an increased risk

of becoming collectively crisis-affiliated with events causing disruptions to their

industry environment (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai, 2011, 2014).

This study seeks explores the extent of responsibility that organisations are

willing to accept in their communication to stakeholders during an industry facing

crisis. Crisis responsibility refers to the amount of responsibility that stakeholders

attribute to the organisation in relation to a crisis event (Coombs, 1995, 2015c).

Organisational perception among stakeholders becomes vital following a crisis as this

could ultimately pose threats to sales, organisational image and reputation, and in the

worst case, their long-term viability (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b, 2015c).

14 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis

Prior research on attribution theory has suggested that individuals can attribute

responsibility to negative and unexpected events, which can result in emotional

reactions (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Weiner, 1985). Communication related to crisis

events can thereby play a particularly important role in this view, as it could influence

the blame attribution process among stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b; Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2014). Ultimately, this blame attribution

process can lead to a crisis that overflows its boundaries to affect an industry through

guilt by association, hereafter referred to as a crisis spillover.

An example of a high-profile crisis spillover was evident in the airline industry

in 2017 when passengers captured footage of a man being violently removed by airport

security from an overbooked flight (Laufer & Wang, 2018). Video recordings of the

incident went viral through news media and social media, which in turn caused issue

scrutiny of the wider airline industry’s tendency to overbook flights (Laufer & Wang,

2018). This focal crisis event essentially placed other airlines at risk of reputational

damage and highlights the importance for organisations to strategically manage

negative events that spill over and affect industry (Laufer & Wang, 2018). Authors

have claimed that the higher the industry similarity to the scandal attribute, the more

likely it is for the focal crisis to spill over and affect the industry (Laufer & Wang,

2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006).

For organisations to recover from reputational damage from a crisis spillover, it

could be necessary to undertake short- and long-term corporate social responsibility

(CSR) to minimise the attribution of blame. As such, through the lens of the 2013 Rana

Plaza factory collapse, this study aimed to contribute to emerging crisis spillover

literature with a focus on the nexus between crisis and CSR. Crisis responses of two

sample groups were explored through Coombs’ (2007b, 2015c) Situational Crisis


Communication Theory (SCCT): (1) organisations collectively perceived as

responsible for the crisis event through business ties with Rana Plaza; and (2)

organisations that became crisis-affiliated as a result of stakeholder’s attributing

responsibility to them.

This was considered an important topic to study in a time when communication

has the power to influence public perception of the world (Desai 2011, 2014; Ihlen,

2010). The ease of accessibility to news media and social media in developed regions

may have contributed to the crisis spillover effect. Through continuous, evidence-

based research on various crisis situations, organisations can be provided with

pragmatic guidelines on predicted crisis-response strategies to minimise relevant

operational disruptions.

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Literature has commonly explored the field of crisis communication from the

perspective of single organisations responding to a crisis over shorter time periods than

the four year timeline of this study, for example, up to a year or two (Boutinot et al.,

2015; Claeys et al., 2010; Fredriksson 2014; Hasford & Farmer, 2016). Examples of

prior research topics have been Johnson & Johnson’s baby powder scandal in 2002

and Nike’s child labour revelations by media in the 90’s.

To date, there has been limited knowledge around a real-life crisis spillover and

how stakeholder pressure may influence organisational responses. Notable exceptions

are a handful of studies that have differentiated an individual and collective crisis (see,

e.g., Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai 2011, 2014; Laufer & Wang, 2018; Yu

et al., 2008). For example, crisis spillover researchers have put forward that a denial

statement issued in the light of a crisis spillover by an organisation may backfire if it

is not necessary (Laufer & Wang, 2018). The organisational denial could instead


influence stakeholders to believe there is reason for concern (Laufer & Wang, 2018;

Yu et al., 2008) and thereafter influence a crisis spillover.

This dissertation corresponds with the study of Comyns & Franklin-Johnson

(2016) which also explored attribution theory through a dual focus on post-crisis SCCT

responses and the CSR of organisations with prior business links with the Rana Plaza

factory, which were considered to be Connected Organisations within the context of

this study. Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study was released during the process

of this dissertation and was thereby able to provide an inductive insight into crisis

responses for the duration of one year following the factory collapse. The authors

found that organisations responded differently within a collective setting than

individual organisations that responded to similar reputational risks; the collective

behaviour was further moderated by the crisis setting. The key differentiation between

the present study and Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) is the longer, four-year,

post-crisis exploration of both Connected and Unconnected Organisations through a

deductive approach, which aimed to provide more robust outcomes to extend their

claims. The present study further distinguished trends and patterns in the type of CSR

undertaken by the two sample groups, that is, for example, through an exploration of

explicit and explicit organisational CSR practises.

Yu et al. (2008) explored strategies to moderate attributions of responsibility for

organisations implicated by a crisis spillover through “preferential detachment” (Yu et

al., 2008, p. 453). This could be achieved through the reduction of linkage or similar

risky attributes to that of the focal crisis organisation/s (Yu et al., 2008). In the long-

term, this could lead to changed industry structures and may have been evident in the

data of the present study (Yu et al., 2008). Similarly, intermediaries in the

organisational social, legal, and economic environment, such as news media and


industry watchdogs, could mediate the effects of a crisis spilling over (Yu et al., 2008).

These were important factors to consider for the context of the present study, given its

multi-faceted focus and the industrial scrutiny that may be placed on the individual

organisational crisis responses.

Similarly, in the crisis context, Zhou and Ki (2018a) found that engagement in

CSR could be used as strategic efforts to reduce similarities with the focal crisis

organisation/s to weaken negative effects brought by the crisis spillover. Crisis

literature has recognised CSR as an important factor in crisis management (Janssen et

al., 2015; Laufer, 2015). Four important reactions can be brought by post-crisis CSR:

(1) increased stakeholders’ attention to the crisis; (2) influence over the crisis

attribution process; (3) raised expectations; (4) stakeholders’ evaluations of the crisis

are changed or influenced (Janssen et al., 2015; Laufer, 2015). The outcomes of these

reactions are ultimately linked with the perceived post-crisis responsibility among

stakeholders.

The importance in incorporating the CSR construct in examining the crisis

spillover phenomenon is recognised with the purpose of understanding the crisis

response of collective organisations that are directly linked with a crisis event against

organisations that have become crisis-affiliated through stakeholders’ guilt by

association, for example, the crisis spillover. The data of the present study provided

broader guidelines for organisations affected by an industry-facing crisis event.

1.4 RESEARCH GAPS

This chapter has so far provided an overview of the aims and rationale of this

study. It remains important to understand the effective ways to minimise damage from

a crisis (Coombs, 2015c). To do so, we must understand how different crisis situations


may cause harm to organisations (Coombs, 2015c). To date, there has been limited

understanding of the extent of responsibility that organisations assume in their

communication with stakeholders for a crisis for which they are not directly

responsible.

Previous crisis research has typically explored single organisations affected by

crisis situations from a short-term perspective (Boutinot et al., 2015; Claeys et al.,

2010; Fredriksson, 2014; Hasford & Farmer, 2016). Similarly, the Rana Plaza case has

previously been studied inductively through SCCT and CSR responses over a one-year

period for a single sample group1 (Comyns & Johnson-Franklin, 2016). As some time

had now passed since the Rana Plaza disaster, the opportunity existed to explore the

crisis spillover phenomenon through this case over a longer timeline, as the fashion

industry had not yet seemed to have suffered from a level of post-crisis scrutiny

(Comyns & Johnson-Franklin, 2016). In generating such theoretical and practical

contributions the following research questions (RQs) were explored:

(1) How does attribution theory explain organisational responses to a crisis

spillover?

(2) What SCCT strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations

employ in the short- and long-term?

This research aimed to contribute towards gaps in the literature by exploring a

longitudinal timeline for a crisis spillover that involved organisations that were directly

and indirectly implicated by an industry facing crisis, which is the crisis spillover. This

included the exploration of CSR-based responses that were motivated by stakeholder

1The use of a single sample group did not enable a comparative overview of the responses undertaken by those linked with the Rana Plaza factory and organisations that became crisis-affiliated through the crisis spillover.


pressures as it was in the interest of this research to explore if the scale and scope of

the Rana Plaza crisis may have required organisations to make a social impact.

Through a focus on the fast fashion industry, this study aimed to make a

theoretical contribution to the nexus of CSR and crisis spillover literature. Moreover,

because the crisis spillover was explored from a macro perspective based on responses

from individual organisations within two sample groups, findings aimed to provide

practical guidelines for organisations undergoing the effects of future crisis spillovers.

1.5 FAST FASHION

Fast fashion is a contemporary reference to mass-produced clothing based on

catwalk trends and designs; these are sold relatively inexpensively in comparison to

the designer labels (Cashon & Swinney, 2011). The overall process from the catwalk

to the retailers occurs at a fast pace and retailers can often offer customers new product

lines as often as on a weekly basis (Cashon & Swinney, 2011). Examples of such fast

fashion organisations are H&M, Zara, and Mango. As a result of the fast fashion

movement, garment factories have been expected to produce greater product quantities

with a quick turnaround so as to not lose business opportunities. This has added

immense pressure on garment workers, including those working at Rana Plaza factory.

1.6 RANA PLAZA

The focus of the present study is on Rana Plaza, which was a Bangladeshi

garment factory that collapsed in 2013. It has been deemed as one of the most fatal

industrial accidents in modern history, killing more than 1,100 factory workers and

leaving more than 4,000 injured (Coomyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016). This was a

preventable disaster caused by the factory owner who knowingly placed workers at


risk despite a structural engineering report deeming the building unsafe (Wright, 2017,

Just-Style Apparel Sourcing Strategy – online news portal). Garment workers had

walked out of the factory in protest in the morning of the factory collapse; however,

they were forced back to continue their labour and the building collapsed shortly after

(Wright, 2017, Just-Style Apparel Sourcing Strategy – online news portal).

Through the lens of SCCT and CSR, Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016)

study has provided a valuable insight into the Rana Plaza case over the course of one

year following the factory collapse. Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) suggested

that organisations responded differently to a crisis in a collective setting in comparison

to individual organisations exposed to similar reputational risks. The authors explored

various channels of secondary data, including organisational CSR reports. They

concluded that the burden of responsibility among organisations is not equally shared

during a crisis spillover and some organisations ‘free ride’ under the efforts and

expenses of other implicated organisations (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).

According to Coombs (2007b, p. 168), preventable crisis events such as the Rana

Plaza disaster go beyond severe reputational to threaten the organisation’s social

perception based on strong attributions of crisis responsibility among stakeholders. In

the Rana Plaza case, 31 international organisations with pre-existing or current links

to the factory at the time of the crisis were attributed immediate responsibility by

stakeholders. Attributions were extended beyond the 31 organisations that

manufactured garments in the factory as the broader fashion industry became crisis-

affiliated through guilt by association (Yu et al., 2008). The scale and scope of this

fatal crisis brought stakeholder pressures that influenced parts of the industry to

collectively accept responsibility for a crisis with which they were not directly linked

(Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016). Social expectations among stakeholders


required organisations to communicate collective and individual, CSR-based

responses to recover reputational damage caused by the crisis. The collective CSR

responses offered an opportunity to change prior industry practices perceived as

unethical by stakeholders.

Rana Plaza is a powerful case that has addressed educational trends for emerging

crisis spillover literature and CSR. With rising social concerns and expectations for

global organisations to operate ethically, the Rana Plaza crisis offers insights into how

CSR may be utilised strategically and pragmatically in the short- and long-term by

unpacking attribution theory and SCCT.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

This study employed a qualitative, case-study approach over a four-year, post-

crisis period with the purpose of capturing in-depth contextual conditions linked with

the selected case study. This timeline was structured into three periods to provide a

short- and long-term perspective to the crisis spillover phenomenon. Those refer to:

Time period 1: April to June 2013

Time period 2: July 2013 to June 2014

Time period 3: July 2014 to June 2017

Two sample groups were explored through the collection of evidence-based

secondary data of organisations that became directly and indirectly implicated in the

Rana Plaza crisis.

Secondary data, based on organisational and industry reports, and social and

news media were explored because these sources were critical in exploring the framing

of crisis events to stakeholders (Carroll 2004; Coombs 2007a, 2007b). The selected


design enhanced the exploration of smaller, individual organisational responses as

situated within the Rana Plaza case study to better describe the broader crisis spillover

(Yin, 2009). The longitudinal timeline additionally enabled an overview of how

individual organisations responded to the crisis to understand broader trends within

each sample group.

The unpacking of the RQs was accomplished through a deductive coding method

using NVivo which assisted in exploring the interaction between the case and its

context. This approach enables the building of intensity and depth to the data (Marshall

& Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2009). The deductive approach was also suitable in extending

existing theory and knowledge of the nexus between CSR and crisis communication

through the SCCT framework.

1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS AND THEORY

This section provides brief definitions of key constructs and theories employed

by this study, which are further elaborated in Chapter 2.

1.8.1 Attribution theory

Attribution theory is defined as the cognitive process through which people are

driven to find causes to an event (Weiner, 1985, p. 548). Crisis responsibility

essentially derives from attribution theory and in the light of a crisis event,

organisations are expected to respond to their stakeholders in ways that influence

perceptions of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).


1.8.2 Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT)

Coombs’ (2007b) drew from attribution theory in the development of his

evidence-based situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) framework. The key

purpose of SCCT is to provide theoretical guidelines for organisations on how to

maximise their reputational protection and/or reputational recovery following a crisis

event (Coombs, 2007b). In a two-step process, SCCT firstly establishes the crisis type,

for example, the frame used to outline the crisis situation, followed by an evaluation

of factors that would intensify or moderate the situation (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).

More simply, SCCT prescribes appropriate crisis responses to moderate blame

attributions and predicts relevant outcomes.

1.8.3 Crisis communication

Crisis communication refers to communication responses undertaken by

organisations faced with different crisis situations; these could be released in the form

of actions and/or statements (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Verhoeven & Meer, 2014). The

purpose of crisis communication is to assist stakeholders to make sense of the crisis

and influence their attribution of blame. Coombs (2015c) stated that simple crisis

communication does not mean that the situation is improving, which highlights the

significance for organisations of having a good understanding of effective options

when faced with different crisis situations.

1.8.4 Crisis spillover

The definition of a crisis spillover is when a crisis moves beyond the frame of

one or more organisations that are directly linked with the events leading to the crisis

event to affect industry change. Organisations affected by the crisis spillover can often


have similar corporate characteristics to that of the focal crisis organisation (Desai,

2014; Yu et al., 2008) and can become affiliated with the crisis by stakeholders

ascribing guilt by association (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008). Such cognitive processes

are particularly applicable to industry fields with prior histories of disruption (Desai,

2014) such as the fashion industry.

1.8.5 Collective crisis

This study differentiates the crisis spillover from a collective crisis, for which

the latter was explored in the study by Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016). Whilst the

collective crisis explores multiple organisations affected by the same event, it is

differentiated by a cohort of organisations directly affiliated with a crisis event.

The crisis spillover on the other hand includes other organisations operating in

the same industry environment as the focal crisis organisations, however by holding

similar organisational characteristics, the crisis spills over to affect them also.

1.8.6 Stakeholder pressures

Stakeholders refer to those who affect or are affected by the sample

organisations’ goals and operations, either through network links (Allen & Caillouet,

1994) or by any form of interest to the Connected or Unconnected Organisations.

For the context of this study, stakeholder pressures represent the post-crisis

pressures or influences placed on organisations involved in the crisis by external

stakeholders, such as consumers, industry watchdogs or non-government

organisations (NGOs). These stakeholders can exert pressures, such as calling for

reforms to industry practices, setting up new standards for the industry, and boycotting

suppliers.


1.8.7 Corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the economic, legal, ethical, and

discretionary [in later work referred to as philanthropic] expectations that society, for

example, stakeholders, has of organisations at a given point in time (Carroll, 1979, p.

500; Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p. 89). The construct derives from the ideology that

organisations hold a level of responsibility to society that falls beyond its profit-

making operations (Carroll & Shabana, 2010).

The purpose of CSR is for organisations to build an intangible, sustainable and

positive attribution with their stakeholders by addressing issues, such as economic

development, education or human rights issues (Janssen et al., 2014).

1.8.6.1 Implicit CSR

Implicit CSR refers to “values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and

customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues and that define

proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms”

(Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). For the context of this study, implicit CSR is

considered in relation to the post-crisis collective actions undertaken by organisations.

In addition, mandatory and customary requirements for organisations were observed

through commitments to The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety, the

Alliance for Bangladesh Workers Safety, and other long-term sustainability

requirements affecting supply chain management, such as the UN’s 2020 Sustainable

Development Goals.

1.8.6.2 Explicit CSR

Explicit CSR refers to voluntary corporate strategies and policies that “assume

and articulate responsibility for some societal interests” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p.


409). Examples of such corporate activities are disaster relief programs, partnerships

with governmental agencies or company codes of conduct. Explicit CSR is suggested

to be motivated by “the perceived expectations of different stakeholders of the

corporation” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409; Morsing et al., 2008). For the purpose of

this study, explicit CSR was observed through non-collective and voluntary

organisational initiatives to meet stakeholders’ social expectations.

1.9 OUTLINE OF THESIS

This dissertation is presented across five chapters. The present chapter has

outlined the research phenomenon being explored with the theoretical and practical

justification of this study. Crisis communication is an ever-evolving construct with

important linkages to SCCT and CSR. It is the intent of this research to explore this

nexus from the lens of the crisis spillover phenomenon.

Chapter Two links pertinent theory and constructs employed by this research and

acknowledges the research gaps for the undertaking of this study. Chapter Three

explores the philosophical underpinnings and outlines the qualitative method and

research design adopted by this study. Chapter Three further discusses how criteria to

evaluate the selected method and research design were addressed.

Chapter Four focuses on the findings of this study and is presented by three

different time periods to describe short- and long-term developments from the analysis

of the data.

Chapter Five outlines discussions around each of the three RQs asked by this

study. The chapter concludes with an overview of the limitations, implications for

theory and practice, limitations to the research design and finally directions for future

research.


Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter presents the key constructs and theories that were employed for the

objectives of this research. The chapter first explores the crisis and crisis

communication constructs, followed by attribution theory and crisis communication

strategies, including Coombs’ (2007b) Situational Crisis Communication Theory

(SCCT), and lastly, the crisis spillover literature.

Next, the literature review looks at corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its

imperative linkage with the crisis communication field. This is followed by an

exploration of two different CSR types, implicit and explicit. The chapter concludes

with an overview of stakeholders’ roles within this study.

2.2 CRISIS AND CRISIS SPILLOVER

2.2.1 Defining ‘crisis’

Coombs (2007b) defined a crisis as “a sudden and unexpected event that

threatens to disrupt an organization’s operations and poses both a financial and

reputational threat. It is a negative event that can harm stakeholders physically,

emotionally and/or financially” (Coombs, 2007b p. 164). Each crisis situation is

different and therefore requires brings demands of customised communication

strategies; for example, organisations’ communication during a crisis does not reduce

their level of publicly perceived responsibility (Coombs 2015c; Ihlen 2010), making

crisis communication an important line of research (Coombs, 2015c).

Several scholars have conducted empirical studies on organisations undergoing

various crisis events (Coombs 2015; Coombs & Holladay, 2012; Yehya & Coombs


2017) as it remains imperative for crisis managers to understand how impulsive

responses may influence stakeholders’ crisis perception and blame attributions

(Coombs 2007b, 2015c; Coombs & Holladay, 2014; Park, 2017), which the

subsequent sections of this chapter explore further.

2.2.2 SCCT and attribution theory

There are types of crises that differ from those that are caused by organisations,

such as preventable situations caused by neglect and those that are not caused by

organisations, such as false rumours or natural disasters (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).

Attribution theory defines the cognitive process through which people are driven

to find the causal process leading to intended or unintended outcomes or end results of

events (Weiner, 1985) such as an organisational crisis. Attribution theory, however,

should not be mistaken for the justification of such outcomes or end results (Weiner,

2010), e.g. an organisational crisis caused by a natural disaster would be expected to

attribute little to no crisis responsibility to an organisation as the outcomes of the

disaster would likely be beyond the organisation’s control (Coombs, 2007b).

However, not all outcomes of events motivate individuals to search for causal

processes (Weiner, 2010), they rather need to be significant enough to cause emotion

within individuals (Weiner, 2010). Crisis events motivate individuals to adopt a

cognitive process of causal attribution (Coombs, 1995, 2007, 2007b, 2015c), for

example, a process to make sense of the actions and events leading to the crisis.

Stakeholders affected by the crisis may tend to undergo various negative

emotions, such as anger and frustration, and consider causal attributions which have

led to the crisis, including factors of blame. Many scholars have, therefore, explored

the negative emotional consequences among stakeholders when trust has been


compromised followed by appropriate rebuilding strategies (Coombs 2007a, 2007b;

Meyer et al., 1995; Weiner, 2010).

In this respect, Weiner (1985, 1991) developed attribution theory, which posits

that there are three main goals to public excuse-giving following a wrongdoing: (1)

causal locus, which explores if an internal or external locus of control caused the crisis,

with stakeholders attributing more responsibility in events with internal locus of

control; (2) controllability, which refers to whether the excuse given may or may not

influence the crisis situation; and (3) stability, that is, whether the cause of the crisis

remains in the organisational environment or is a temporary factor (Coombs, 1995;

Weiner, et al. 1991, p. 5).

The expected outcomes of public excuse-giving vary between different crisis

events, making crisis communication a complex and subjective construct to study.

Coombs (2007b), therefore, drew from attribution theory in his development of SCCT

(Coombs, 2007b, 2015c) with the rationale that “the attributions of responsibility and

emotions can serve as motivations for action” (Coombs, 2007b, p. 166). Attribution

theory thereby fits with SCCT as it can guide organisations in how and where people

place blame for crises (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).

Authors have made early links between attribution theory and organisational

crises by finding that the unexpectedness and negativity could be key driving forces in

the processes of how individuals make and evaluate attributions of blame (Coombs,

2007a, 2007b). It would be in management’s best interests to appropriately manage

angry or upset stakeholder emotions to prevent reputational damage and impacts on

long-term operational viability (Coombs, 2007b).

For the context of this research, attribution theory was particularly important in

the exploration to how organisations responded to a crisis event based on their


stakeholders’ organisational perception and expectations. For example, once a crisis

has occurred and stakeholders are exposed to initial crisis-related information, they

can begin to form a view about the crisis type and form attributions of crisis

responsibility (Coombs, 1995).

Whilst organisations may be able to influence stakeholders’ attribution processes

through appropriate crisis responses, third-parties, such as infomediares or “media,

financial analysts, regulators, and consumer organizations” can do so at the same time

(Zavyalova, et al., 2012, p. 1079). For example, information infomediaries could be

reporting the crisis with conflicting messages and thereby interrupt stakeholders’

cognitive blame attribution processes (Zavyalova et al., 2012).

Lastly, crisis communication is a complex field as crisis events occur in different

contexts (Coombs, 2015). The continuous development of the crisis communication

literature is vital to ensure research is up-to-date with evolving demands of real-world

issues (Coombs, 2015c). Examples are the rapid development of telecommunications

and different social media platforms that may affect the process of attribution theory

among stakeholders. From an attribution theory perspective, Weiner (1985) stated the

analogy that “the warrior needs to know why he is winning battles so he can survive

the next one” (p. 549), which depicts the relevance of attribution theory in ongoing

crisis communication research for real-world application. One must understand the

factors behind success or failure to consider suitable responses during future events,

which this study aims to contribute to through the exploration of a real-life crisis case.

Coombs (2007b) developed SCCT which predicts reputational outcomes for

different crisis situations and prescribes response strategies, as outlined in Table 2.1.

The framework has frequently been used in crisis literature (Comyns & Franklin-

Johnson 2016; Kim, 2017; Ma, 2018; Ma & Zhan, 2016; Park, 2017) and can act as


evidence-based guidelines for organisations seeking to optimise reputational recovery

in the light of a crisis.

Table 2.1

SCCT Crisis Response Strategies (Coombs, 2007b, p. 170) Strategies Responses

(1) Deny strategies:

Purpose is to establish a crisis frame and eliminate connections between the organisation and the crisis. If the organization is not involved in a crisis, it will not suffer any damage from the event.

Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the organization. Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis. Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis.

(2) Diminish crisis response strategies:

Argues that a crisis is not as bad as people think or that the organization lacked control over the crisis. A diminished connection to the crisis will lessen negative attributions and decrease the harmful effects of the crisis.

Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis. Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.

(3) Rebuild strategies:

A segue for generating new reputational assets. Rebuilding strategies attempts to improve the organization’s reputation by offering material and/or symbolic forms of aid to victims.

Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. Apology: Crisis manager indicates that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.

(4) Bolstering strategy:

Offers a minimal opportunity to develop reputational assets. Organisations may draw on positive stakeholder relationships to help protect the organizational reputation, praise stakeholders for their efforts during the crisis or draw sympathy from being a victim of the crisis.

Reminder: Tells stakeholders about the past good works of the organization. Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works by the organization. Victimhood: Crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too.


This study adopted Coombs’ (2007) work, which was available when the data

analysis began and captures specific details about the individual crisis response

strategies (see Table 2.1).

Coombs’ (2015c) more recent work on SCCT includes instructional and risk

communication as part of the crisis response phase of crisis management. In doing so,

SCCT suggests that organisations firstly direct their communication to stakeholders to

ensure their safety, followed by an adjustment of communication as more crisis-related

information becomes available.

Coombs (2015c) suggest that organisations should be cautious with the denial

strategy (Coombs, 2015c). Once this is issued, a denial could be more problematic to

retract and could even cause a subsequent organisational crisis should it become public

that the organisation was culpable for the event (Coombs, 2015c). It would rather serve

the organisation’s perceived integrity better to indicate that it accepts a level of

responsibility as the outcome could otherwise result in a trust violation with

stakeholders (Coombs, 2015c). This thesis explored whether similar response patterns

applied to organisations that were implicated by a crisis spillover.

In cases where crisis responsibility is strong, or organisations are undergoing an

integrity-based, competence-based or long-term threat, SCCT proposes that

organisations offer stakeholders an apology, compensation or both to reduce anger,

anxiety, and the likelihood of negative word-of-mouth (Coombs, 2015c).

Applicable to this study is Coombs’ (2015c) argument that just because an

organisation communicates with stakeholders through words or actions during a crisis

does not necessarily mean that they are improving their circumstances. Suitable

response strategies must be considered to appropriately accommodate stakeholder

expectations and their attribution of crisis responsibility.


Coombs (2015c) stated that the timing of the responses is paramount and should

be addressed from two aspects. First, the timing is the point in time that the initial

crisis-related communication is released by the organisation (Coombs, 2015c). This

particularly applies when possible information infomediaries report on the crisis before

the organisation as this would likely intensify the situation (Coombs, 2015c;

Zavyalova et al., 2012). Similar response patterns could emerge in the data for the

present study and would in such case provide further support for Coombs’ (2015c)

claim. Secondly, Coombs (2015c) referred to the term ‘stealing thunder’ in that the

organisation to first report on a crisis ahead of peers or media steals the thunder, which

is likely to be applicable to a crisis involving multiple organisations.

Ma and Zhan (2016) recently undertook a meta-analysis of SCCT. The authors

found that attributed responsibility was strongly associated with organisational

reputation, but also that organisational reputation was weakly associated with response

strategies that resembled SCCT (Ma & Zhan, 2016).

Ma and Zhan (2016) further found that organisational responses that only

addressed crisis responsibility did not fully alleviate reputational threats in the light of

a crisis. For a preventable crisis, a sole focus on the rebuild SCCT period was found

to have a greater advantage to mitigate attributions of responsibility than for

organisations to undertake responses through mismatched SCCT periods, for example,

by mixing denial with bolstering. Given that this study explored crisis responsibility,

its findings may support or challenge the claims by Ma and Zhan (2016).

Coombs (2016) acknowledged Ma and Zhan’s (2016) meta-analysis as a

measure to crystallise the strengths and weaknesses of SCCT to determine the way

forward for future research in the crisis communications field. Coombs (2016) has

supported that ongoing crisis communication research is required, covering different


settings. Among future directions of crisis communication research using SCCT,

Coombs (2016) highlighted a range of important areas that justified the undertaking of

this study. For example, whilst the exploration of the long-term effects of appropriate

and inappropriate crisis responses strategies may be challenging to undertake, Coombs

(2016) has indicated a need for such SCCT-related knowledge.

Coombs (2016) further suggested that research emphasis should move beyond

outcomes for reputation and strategies for reputational recovery to explore the value

of organisations instructing and adjusting their crisis information for stakeholders. It

was in the interest of the present study to explore such long-term data and contribute

towards the broader crisis communications field from a macro perspective.

2.3 BEYOND THE SITUATIONAL FOCUS OF CRISIS RESEARCH

This study explored existing research that has looked at the crisis phenomenon

involving the attribution of responsibility towards multiple organisations. Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson (2016) employed similar terminology in relation to a crisis spillover

as they referred to a ‘collective crisis’ whilst looking at SCCT and CSR.

This chapter followed Coombs’ (2016) suggestion by going beyond SCCT to

discuss Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) application of the framework to a non-

traditional crisis setting.

2.3.1 The difference between a collective crisis and the crisis spillover phenomenon

Some interesting insights from the perspective of a crisis spillover can be taken

from the study of Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016). The authors explored the Rana


Plaza case from the date of the building collapse from 24 April 2014 to 12 months

after the collapse for eight of the directly implicated organisations2.

This dissertation corresponds with Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study

but used a deductive approach to examine longitudinal data, that is, four years,

covering organisations that were linked with prior garment production at Rana Plaza

as well as organisations that became implicated through guilt by association with the

crisis, for example, the crisis spillover phenomenon. As with this thesis, Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson (2016) examined SCCT alongside CSR; unlike the present study,

they employed an inductive approach that focused on the first post-crisis year focusing

only on organisations that were associated with prior garment production at Rana

Plaza, for example, a collective crisis.

Comyn and Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study was published during the process

of this thesis and was influential to the present study through short-term insights to the

Rana Plaza case from the collective crisis perspective. For example, the authors

proposed that “in a collective crisis, the burden of responsibility will not be equally

shared among organizations. Those companies who adopt accommodative strategies

accept the burden of responsibility and the burden of negative reputation” (Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 177). They further argued that organisations in a collective

setting can respond differently to a crisis than individual organisations exposed to

similar reputational risks. This suggests that outcomes to corporate reputation and

financial expenditures could be different for individual organisational crisis settings

2Out of the eight organisations explored by Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016), three of these organisations were also used in this study, namely, Benetton, Mango and Primark.


and may include some organisational ‘free riders’ during the crisis recovery process

(Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).

Further research, such as the present study, is required to provide more

understanding of Comyn & Franklin-Johnson-Franklin’s (2016) findings, which the

present study aims to address. As such, the main emphasis of this dissertation explored

the dual focus of responsibility from the crisis and CSR perspectives, rather than

looking at post-crisis reputation. Moreover, trends and patterns in the type of CSR

undertaken by the two sample groups was examined to identify the application of

explicit and explicit CSR practises by organisations (Matten & Moon, 2008).

The next section discusses current knowledge around the crisis spillover

phenomenon and its meaning for the aims of this study.

2.3.2 Crisis spillover

A crisis spillover is defined as a crisis that moves beyond a single organisation

to affect industry change. This has been referred to in the literature by various terms,

such as ‘disruptions in the field’ (Desai, 2011, 2014) or ‘reputational spillover’

(Boutinot et al., 2015). The present study refers to the phenomenon as a crisis spillover

to address a crisis that has “overflowed the boundaries” (Yu et al., 2008, p. 452) to

affect industry. This is based on scholarly discussions of negative disruptions that can

spill over organisational boundaries (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012).

Peer-reviewed literature on the crisis spillover phenomenon has been emerging

(Boutinot et al., 2015; Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai, 2011; Yu et al.,

2008). It is an important field to study to provide guidance to organisations on how to

minimise reputational damage during disruptions that industries may face (Boutinot et

al., 2015), whether they are directly or indirectly linked with the focal crisis.


To date, it is known that similar to crisis events, organisations of both small and

large sizes are susceptible to crisis spillovers, particularly as the global market place

can have a greater impact on small- to medium-sized businesses through free trade

agreements and the internet (Avnet & Laufer, 2015). Effectively, it has become

increasingly important for management to guide organisations through different global

crisis events with minimum disruption and reputational damage (Avnet & Laufer,

2015). Additionally, industrial accidents, particularly those involving fatalities, have

been known to attract increasing organisational scrutiny and blame attributions among

stakeholders (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b, 2015c; Desai, 2014). The intensity of such

scrutiny and attribution of crisis responsibility could be intensified by organisational

size and industry visibility, for example, through marketing efforts (Desai, 2014).

These factors are motivated the present study to explore crisis responses of both large

and small to medium-sized entities.

Organisations affected by the crisis spillover can often have similar corporate

characteristics to that of the focal crisis organisation (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008) and

can become affiliated with the crisis by stakeholders ascribing guilt by association

(Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008). Such cognitive processes are particularly applicable to

industry fields with prior histories of disruption (Desai, 2014) such as the fashion

industry.

Desai (2011, p. 274, 2014) found that public relations responses provided by an

organisation implicated by a crisis spillover could sometimes carry a greater influence

than of those involved with the focal crisis. For example, Desai (2011) found that

organisations in fields “characterized by greater scrutiny of contested issues” were

more likely to try to create positive impressions of their field following a crisis

spillover (p. 274). Moreover, Zhou and Ki (2018b) found marketing strategies did not


always help organisations recover from a crisis spillover uniformly. Moreover,

organisations with larger advertising budgets prior to a crisis spillover, could suffer

more from reputational damage as a result of the crisis spillover (Zhou & Ki, 2018b)

if they were not able to live up to their social expectations.

Whilst the present study focused on responsibility rather than reputation, it

aimed to examine how organisational responses may have been influenced by positive

or negative reinforcement from stakeholders in the short- and long-term. Desai (2014)

argued that organisations must take into account the ongoing activities of other

organisations within the industry field to maximise the effects of any strategic

responses to stakeholders. This can be monitored through media coverage and the

organisation’s own experience of the industry climate, following which resources are

allocated for responses to take place (Desai, 2014). In doing so, the impact of crisis

communication responses could carry a great potential in influencing the crisis

attribution process, which is relevant to this study. Some have proposed collective

industry responses to overcome “crisis spillover” events. Whilst these can be a costly

and a challenging option to coordinate (Yu et al., 2008), if successfully implemented,

they can considerably influence positive cognitive attribution processes among

stakeholders (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008).

Existing perceptions on specific industries could, however, also determine how

rapidly a crisis spills over, especially across those “characterized by prior scrutiny of

issues related to the disruptions” (Desai, 2011, p. 265), such as the fast fashion

industry. Disruptions in past performance history could set stakeholders to expect

negative performance-related issues and cause a crisis to become more intense and

rapidly spill over (Desai, 2011, p. 265; Yu et al., 2008). Desai (2011) further suggested

that blame can often be attributed to organisations where the crisis is internally induced


and could have been “prevented or controlled”, such as in the Rana Plaza case which

was caused by operator neglect (p. 267). Whilst Yu et al. (2008) limited their study to

the negative impacts of a crisis spillover, they suggested that the crisis spillover could

become positive through the creation of new business opportunities and the gaining of

portions of competitors’ market shares.

From a similar aspect, Desai (2011) argued that a crisis spillover can present the

opportunity for organisations to instigate incentives to create change across an industry

field. Desai (2011), however, added that some prior examples of real-life crisis

spillovers presented a failure to improve or transform the industry following a crisis

(Desai, 2011). This has generally been caused by the lack of theoretical comprehension

for appropriate actions during industry-wide disruptions (Desai, 2011). The

longitudinal timeline of the present study, therefore, presented an opportunity to re-

visit such prior scientific claims to review the long-term effects on the fast fashion

industry through the lens of the Rana Plaza case. There has been a need to expand

scholarly knowledge to explore the crisis spillover phenomenon within different

contexts (Desai, 2011, 2014; Yu et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Due to the

emergent phase of crisis spillover research, challenges have remained for organisations

to successfully develop and implement relevant communication strategies that have

been empirically tested.

It has been acknowledged that crisis events typically spill over through issue

scrutiny by media and stakeholders (Desai, 2014; Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008;

Zavyalova et al., 2012) and pressures of accountability by stakeholders following a

crisis (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). As a part of this causal

process, stakeholders can attempt to find the reasons for the crisis event, as explained

by attribution theory (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c). Recent literature has further found that


organisations can be susceptible to reputational threats during a crisis event even when

they are not responsible for the crisis (Avnet & Laufer, 2015), which highlights the

importance of expanding knowledge on crisis spillovers and supports the rationale for

this study.

The external image of organisations ultimately can often lie in in the perception

of their stakeholders rather than internally within the organisation (Yu et al., 2008).

During a crisis, stakeholders can use the cognitive approach relevant to attribution

theory to assess the industry field where the organisation has failed to provide an

appropriate crisis response (Yu et al., 2008). The next section explores the role of

stakeholders in the context of this study and how they may impact on a crisis situation

to spill over its boundaries to affect industry.

2.3.3 Stakeholder pressures

Stakeholders are those who affect or are affected by the sample organisations’

goals and operations. This could be through network links (Allen & Caillouet, 1994)

or by any other form of interest to the organisations.

Stakeholders are key to organisational image and reputation given that their

perception and attributions contribute towards broader organisational perceptions

(Allen & Caillouet, 1994). The perceived crisis responsibility among stakeholders can

determine the reputational damage inflicted on an organisation (Coombs & Holladay,

2004; Comyns & Franklin, 2016; Shim & Yang, 2016; Weiner, 2010; Zhou & Ki,

2018b). This process ultimately makes public relations a powerful tool in influencing

the perception of crisis events to stakeholders (Ihlen 2010) – the development of

relevant strategies is expected to emerge in the data of this study to provide evidence-

based outcomes.


2.4 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the economic, legal, ethical, and

discretionary [in later work referred to as philanthropic] expectations that society, for

example stakeholders, has of organisations at a given point in time (Carroll, 1979, p.

500; Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p. 89). According to Zhou and Ki (2018a), a majority

of Fortune 500 organisations today have provided a dedicated space for their CSR or

sustainability achievements and practices available on their websites.

Although organisations are more commonly expected and encouraged by the

public to engage in CSR, it has also not been perceived well when organisations

communicate about relevant activities too loudly, also referred to as the ‘catch 22’ of

CSR (Bartlett, 2011; Morsing et al., 2008, p. 97). By engaging in CSR, however,

organisations can develop intangible organisational assets, gain a competitive

advantage through differentiation strategies, which can proactively reduce risks and

costs and create a win-win relationship with stakeholders (Carroll, 1979, 1991, 2015;

Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Ihlen et al., 2011).

2.4.1 The link between CSR and crisis communication

CSR is an interdisciplinary concept and has recently been identified as a key area

of emerging crisis management research (Laufer, 2015; Zhou & Ki, 2018a, 2018b). To

date, however, there has been emergent knowledge around the role and impact of CSR

within the crisis communication sphere. This is where stakeholder influences can

become an important factor for the aims of this study.

Some authors have argued that CSR-oriented organisations can mitigate

negative brand evaluation in stakeholders’ attributions of crisis responsibility (Kim,

2013). Others have argued the opposite, that CSR could negatively influence crisis


response strategies in times of a crisis (Janssen et al., 2015). For example, crisis and

CSR literature has found that organisations with established CSR practices would be

expected to go above and beyond stakeholder expectations to rectify the situation

(Janssen et al., 2015, p. 187).

It is, therefore, in the interests of this research to adopt a dual focus approach for

crisis responsibility and CSR to support or contest prior findings. From the perspective

of a crisis spillover, however, organisations may assume responsibility for a crisis they

are not directly linked with, for example, if there is a diffusion of responsibility across

industry.

It should also be noted that large-scale organisations such as H&M may be

scrutinised due to their ability to influence industry trends in relation to CSR

(Arvidsson, 2010). This is due to large organisations being more socially visible;

however, this can also bring a greater organisational scrutiny as well as social and

political pressures by stakeholders (Arvidsson, 2010). Similarly, Zhou and Ki (2016)

suggested that smaller organisations can have more flexibility in their responses due

to their reduced public visibility. It is likely that patterns supporting or contesting this

argument may be found from the analysis of the data in the present study to explore

whether some organisations are more scrutinised than others, particularly large-scale

organisations.

Given that the key aspects of SCCT are crisis responsibility and organisational

reputation (Coombs, 2007b; Zhou & Ki, 2018a, 2018b), a link to attribution theory

was found by Kim (2013) in that CSR can have an influence on SCCT responses during

a crisis. Some authors have suggested that when organisations feel the need to conform

to social and economic norms in their environment, they are least likely to be actively

resistant (Clemens et al., 2008). In doing so, CSR could further bring heightened


positive attention from stakeholders when social expectations are met (Janssen et al.,

2015; Kim, 2014; Lee et al., 2018, 2018a, 2018b).

Organisations that have an established CSR agenda are generally expected to

respond in certain ways (Kim, 2014, 2017) and their existing CSR practices can

become a ‘cognitive blueprint’ of how stakeholders expect them to respond during the

crisis (Janssen et al., 2015, p. 187). NGOs have been found to be more likely to report

on a crisis related to organisations with a strong CSR record (Janssen et al., 2015), a

pattern that may emerge from the analysis of the data of this study.

If organisational responses to CSR demands are not congruent with stakeholder

expectations, particularly where the organisations have built up an image as socially

responsible, then CSR could become a liability (Zhou & Ki, 2018b). The post-crisis

attribution process may not, therefore, always be straightforward or linear and it may

not be realistic for all stakeholders to simply accept CSR-based responses without

further consideration of complex situational factors (Kim, 2017). However, when a

crisis occurs, CSR may support crisis recovery and the concept can, therefore, have

double effects (Zhou & Ki, 2018b).

The duration of CSR activities may also have an impact on the attribution

process of crisis responsibility. According to Zhou & Ki, (2018b), a long-term

engagement in CSR can benefit organisational crisis recovery as opposed to scepticism

associated with short-term, CSR-based crisis responses. Again, with CSR becoming a

standard activity for many organisations of today, the effective uses of the construct

within crisis settings have become more complex and require more evidence-based

research outcomes (Zhou & Ki, 2018a, 2018b).

There are also different types of CSR that can influence stakeholders’ blame

attribution processes (Janssen et al., 2015; Kim, 2013). Matten and Moon (2008)


identified two different types of CSR: implicit CSR represents collective CSR that

comes with a legal or mandatory component, for example; and explicit CSR represents

individual and voluntary organisational CSR activities. Engagement in one of these

CSR types does not exclude the other.

One pattern that was expected to emerge from the analysis of this study’s data

was if Connected and Unconnected Organisations strategically assume responsibility,

either CSR category to remain congruent with societal demands and, therefore,

maintain a positive brand attribution among stakeholders (Clemens et al., 2008;

Coombs, 2007b).

Matten and Moon’s (2008) implicit and explicit CSR framework was

specifically selected for the present study due to its focus on collective and individual

execution and was, thereby, deemed suitable to explore from the crisis spillover

perspective. According to Matten and Moon (2008), CSR manifests the “social

imperatives and the social consequences of business success” (p. 405). So, from a post-

crisis perspective it was assumed that the collective and individual execution of CSR

activities may impact on the blame attribution process among stakeholders, depending

on their social expectations and prior perceptions of individual organisations as well

as the industry as a whole.

So, by looking at implicit and explicit CSR, valuable insights can be gathered of

how relevant responses could serve as a symbolic or strategic resource (Kim, 2017)

during times of crisis, for example, equivalent to the ceremonial responses of

stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Symbolic CSR actions

can enable organisations to strategically tailor crisis responses to help stakeholders

perceive their genuine responsibility for a crisis (Kim, 2017), i.e. this could be utilized

as a strategy to secure organisational legitimacy (Kim, 2017). An example of CSR


being utilized as a symbolic resource would be for an organisation to assume

responsibility for a crisis that spills over to affect industry, not due to linkage with the

focal the crisis event but rather to show their intent on fixing an industry-wide problem.

Based on this rationale, implicit and explicit CSR types were incorporated into

this study and are explained further in the next section.

2.4.2 Implicit and explicit CSR

Implicit CSR refers to “values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and

customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues and that define

proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms”

(Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). In simple terms, this notion refers to value-based

corporate policies and practises (Thorne et al., 2017).

Whilst some implicit CSR activities may appear closely linked to explicit CSR

practises, implicit CSR is not undertaken as part of a calculated corporate strategy but

rather, reflects organisational CSR values (Thorne et al., 2017). For example,

organisations may not undertake implicit CSR as part of building a specific

organisational image. An example of implicit CSR in Australia would be workplace

health and safety which organisations are legally bound by for their employees and

stakeholders.

Explicit CSR refers to voluntary corporate strategies and policies that “assume

and articulate responsibility for some societal interests” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p.

409). Examples of explicit CSR are organisational contributions to disaster relief

within the community or enabling employees to have paid days off to volunteer.

Authors have suggested that explicit CSR are different from implicit CSR in that

the activities of explicit CSR are part of a deliberate and often calculated strategy


(Thorne et al., 2017). Thorne et al. (2017) found that organisations that undertook

voluntary CSR reporting, that is, explicit CSR, also often became a part of collective

CSR alliances, that is, implicit CSR.

From the above discussion, this study considered that implicit and explicit CSR

are not mutually exclusive, and organisations can simultaneously engage in both types

of CSR. However, there has been limited knowledge to back this assumption and this

study therefore aimed to examine relevant patterns through the analysed data.

Matten and Moon’s (2008) framework on implicit and explicit CSR has been

applied to other studies within the public relations and business management field

(Hiss, 2009; Morsing et al., 2008). The concepts of implicit and explicit CSR have

particularly been used to explore contextual differences in responsible corporate

behaviour, in particular in the European and American contexts (Hiss, 2009; Matten

& Moon, 2008; Morsing et al., 2008). These authors have argued that the American

business context has been dominated by an explicit CSR approach which is opposite

to the more common implicit CSR direction in the European region (Matten & Moon,

2008), which suggests trends of cultural inference.

Whilst the public relations discipline has made a range of valuable contributions

to scholarly discussions on the CSR topic, there has been consensus among authors

that more evidence-based crisis outcomes are needed to generate more robustness in

the crisis communication and CSR research field (Bartlett, 2011; Golob & Podnar,

2011).

As such, this study aimed to contribute towards the robustness of this field of

study through the industry-specific context of this study in addition to the currently

emerging knowledge of CSR outcomes within the crisis spillover context.


2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Crisis literature focusing on SCCT has traditionally had a short-term focus

(Coombs, 2007b, 2015c). Whilst Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) took a long-term

perspective within their study, the authors focused on collective organisations with

prior links to the Rana Plaza factory rather than looking at the effects of the crisis

spillover phenomenon. The timeline of active CSR activities may have an impact on

how stakeholder may attribute crisis responsibility. For example, crisis literature has

suggested that long-term threats may gain greater attention from stakeholders and

influence organisations to undertake a more victim-focused response by organisations

(Coombs, 2015c). As such, this research sought to take a multi-year focus to explore

a longer-term crisis and CSR responses of organisations beyond a collective cluster of

organisations, that is, the crisis spillover phenomenon.

In doing so, this study explored a dual focus of crisis responsibility by looking

at responsibility as a driver for crisis responses as well as a driver for social outcomes.

From the crisis spillover perspective, it is likely to be in the management’s best

interests to remain vigilant about current activities within their industry environment

(Desai, 2014, 2011) to maximise the effects of any strategic crisis response to

stakeholders. To achieve this, however, more theoretical knowledge on successful and

less successful outcomes is required for different crisis contexts.


Time Period 1 Time Period 2 Time Period 3

Figure 1.1. Conceptual map of key constructs and time periods.

Based on the conceptual summary in Figure 2.1, this research explored the crisis

spillover phenomenon through the following RQs:


spillover?

(2) What SCCT strategies do connected and Unconnected Organisations employ

in the short- and long-term?

(3) What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ


The gaps identified in the literature justified the aim of exploring short- and long-

term impacts of the Rana Plaza crisis spillover through a deductive approach. The

deductive approach was employed to test SCCT within the context of a crisis spillover

and to explore short- and long-term outcomes of CSR-based responses.

Crisis spillover to Unconnected Organisations from Connected Organisations

Single organisation undertaking: - SCCT/reputation - CSR

Multiple organisations undertaking: - SCCT/reputation - CSR

SCCT + CSR

Period where attribution of responsibility falls on organisations

Long-term crisis

responses


RQs 2 and 3 further provided an opportunity for this study to explore crisis

responses of individual organisations and thereafter zoom out to review broader trends

and triggers for each of the two sample groups.


Chapter 3: Method and Research Design

3.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter describes the design adopted by this research to examine the RQs.

It is structured to first discuss the methodology and the research design of this study.

This is followed by an overview of the applicable procedures, sample and timeline,

including a justification for their use. Next, the methods for organising and analysing

the data is outlined. The chapter concludes by discussing the criteria used to analyse

the research design and an overview of the ethical considerations.

3.1.1 Philosophical underpinnings

This research is situated within the realism paradigm with the rationale of

creating a theoretical and practical application of a contemporary phenomenon (Guba

& Lincoln, 1994). Drawing on the critical realism ontology, which assumes that

“reality is real but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible” (Guba &

Lincoln, 1994, p. 109), data collection from multiple sources aimed to enable the

creation of a widely critical, albeit never perfect, understanding of that reality.

The epistemological perspective of this study posits that of critical realism,

which essentially suggests that individuals try to find the truth, but we never know it

completely. However, the search for the truth continues because of its usefulness to

those researching in specific fields (Easton, 2010) and more broadly, its usefulness to

science. Easton (2010) has argued that the world, however, exists independently of our

knowledge of it for which science must continue to be critical of its objects. Thus,

critical realism posits that to explain and understand social phenomena, it remains


important to continue to enquire and evaluate them critically (Eason, 2010; Sayer,

1992). 3.1.2 Qualitative case study design

A case study design was adopted for this study to build “intensity and depth” in

the exploration of the interaction between the Rana Plaza case and its crisis context

(Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p. 19). The ability to engage in rich data that analyses

sub-units situated within the case study, both individually and more broadly, can create

a powerful method to describe the research phenomena being studied (Yin, 2009).

The case study design has been a widely employed research strategy (Marshall

& Rossman, 2016) in various fields, including CSR (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen,

2009; Choi, 2012; Fuoli, 2012), public relations (An & Cheng, 2010) and the crisis

communication field (Boutinot et al., 2015: Carvalho et al., 2015). Emerging literature

has also used the case study design to illustrate the larger phenomenon of the crisis

spillover (Comyn & Franklin-Johnson, 2016). For example, Comyn & Franklin-

Johnson (2016) studied the Rana Plaza crisis spillover from a one-year, post-crisis

perspective.

The qualitative design enabled this study to gather voluminous data from a

multitude of organisations for the evaluation of events that were bound by one crisis

event over a set period of time (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2009). This method was justified

through literature in that it “stresses the importance of context, setting, [organisational]

participant frames and reference” (Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p. 101). For the context

of this study, the participants are from hereafter on referred to as organisations.


3.1.3 Three principles of data collection

To maximise the benefits from the data collection, three key principles (Yin,

2009) were applied for:

(1) the creation of multiple collection sources to enhance research credibility

(2) the creation of a case study database for recording all evidence as well as

observational and methodological notes to build research dependability

(3) further enhancement of dependability by keeping a chain of evidence

throughout the research process (Yin, 2009).

3.1.4 Sample

Data was gathered from two groups of samples: Connected and Unconnected

Organisations. The Connected Organisations referred to those that were linked to prior

garment production at the Rana Plaza factory. Being the focal crisis organisations, the

objective here was to explore their more immediate and traditionally studied crisis

responses for later comparison with those implicated in the crisis spillover. In doing

so, data were gathered to help identify nuances to help explore each of the three RQs.

Unconnected Organisations referred to those that did not produce garments at

Rana Plaza but became implicated by holding similar corporate attributes to those of

the focal crisis organisations (Zavyalova et al., 2012); for example, they were fast

fashion retailers with garment production in Bangladesh.

Unconnected Organisations became ‘guilty by association’ (Zavyalova et al.,

2012) through the laws of attribution theory. The perceived organisational

responsibility contributed to stakeholders associating the crisis with the broader fast


fashion industry based on the similarities in corporate characters among organisations

and the influential, crisis-framing perception of guilt.

The research data were collected in 2017. The selection of the organisations was

therefore determined by reviewing fast fashion organisations that were connected and

unconnected with the Rana Plaza crisis through industry reports and news media.

Additional filters were, however, applied to the final selection of Unconnected

Organisations, and these measures are discussed next.

3.1.4.1 Selection criteria

The selection criteria for suitable organisations involved:

(a) Private and public entities3 listed on global stock markets, both with gross

annual sales figures greater than AUD$100 million. It was assumed that such sales

figures brought certain social and economic expectations among shareholders and

consumers, including profitability matters, business conduct, perceived company

image and social responsibility.

(b) Western organisations (e.g., Europe, the Americas and Australia) that offer

clothing as a part of their product range, such as H&M, Primark and Cotton On.

(c) Organisations that had garment production sourced from factories based in

Bangladesh, that is, the scope of factories in Bangladesh for this criterion extended

beyond Rana Plaza.

It was taken into consideration that some private entities may not have publicly

disclosed annual sales figures4. Therefore, the selection of private entities with

3Benetton, Bestseller, C&A, Cotton On, Fruit of the Loom, Helly Hansen, Kmart Australia, Lindex, Mango, Primark, and Target Australia. 4Cotton On, C&A


undisclosed sales figures came with an assumption of financial returns greater than

AUD$100 million due to their broader global market presence and international media

coverage.

In addition, given that the crisis spilled over on a global industry scale, the

research incorporated geographical frames for Unconnected Organisations to cover

organisations from Australia, USA and parts of the Nordic region, that is, Sweden,

Norway, Denmark and Finland. Justification for selecting these regions was

determined by:

(1) Market size: USA was identified as the world’s largest garment importer

(World Trade Organisation, 2017) and was likely to be impacted by the

industry-facing global crisis.

(2) CSR agenda: literature identified a strong CSR agenda in the Nordic

region (cf. Ihlen, 2011; Janssen et al., 2015; Morsing et al., 2008;

Pedersen & Gwozdz, 2014). In extending such knowledge, the case study

enabled an analysis of real-life crisis responses and trends in

organisational approaches to implicit and explicit CSR across

geographical regions of the sample Unconnected to the crisis (Matten &

Moon, 2008).

Based on the selection criteria and the screening process of suitable

organisations, the research established two sample groups consisting of 16 fast

fashion5 organisations. These are outlined in Figure 3.1.

5‘Fast fashion’ is a contemporary term referring to fashion clothing moving fast from the catwalk to reasonably priced organisations resulting in costs that are significantly lower than what a fashion house would sell the garments for.


Figure 2.1. Connected Organisations and the regions of Unconnected Organisations.

The characteristics held in common by the selected organisations were that they

all sold fashion garments as a part of their product range. Given that they all had

garment production in Bangladesh, they were all affected directly or indirectly by the

Rana Plaza crisis spillover.

This research selected three organisations from each of the geographical regions

as the Unconnected Organisations. An exception was made to include four countries

from the Nordic region, as the exclusion of Finland would have resulted in Scandinavia

rather than the Nordic region being analysed.

Connected organsationsOrganisations linked with prior garment production

at Rana Plaza.

1. Adler Modemärkte 2. Benetton 3. C&A4. Mango 5. Primark 6. Wal-Mart

Unconnected organsations

Organisations implicated through the effects of the

crisis spillover.

Australia1. Cotton On2. Kmart Australia3. Target Australia

Nordic Region1. Bestseller - Denmark2. H&M - Sweden3. Helly Hansen - Norway4. Lindex, (Stockmann Group) - Finland

USA1. Abercrombie & Fitch2. American Eagle Outfitters3. Fruit of the Loom


The Connected Organisations consisted of six organisations to capture a broader

set of data to identify possible trends and differences within the period. Geographical

frames were not applied to the Connected Organisations. Because the sample was

identified as focal crisis organisations due to their production linkage with Rana Plaza,

this study expected to find “traditional” crisis responses within this sample. For

example, single organisations responding to a crisis event, as opposed to Unconnected

Organisations that were implicated by the crisis spillover. The outcome of this method

was likely to provide a comparative overview of the response patterns between those

linked with the Rana Plaza crisis and those implicated through guilt by association.

3.1.5 Screening of organisational profiles

The first stage of the data collection screened organisational suitability against

the sample frame criteria. This step was completed by utilising the ‘Global Business

Browser’ database (formerly known as “OneSource”).

The “Global Business Browser” provided a way to extract global corporate

information, such as annual sales figures, or to confirm if individual organisations are

private companies, if they have a holding/parent company, and/or if they are listed as

a public company on a stock market.

Table 3.1 provides a summary of the sample frame criteria and the selected

organisations for this study. Holding companies are included in Table 3.1 as their

influence was sporadically identified in the data, in particular for Wesfarmers, ABF

and the Stockmann Group. It was important to note that whilst Target and Kmart were

essentially American organisations, the Australian chain of these stores were managed

by Wesfarmers Ltd.


Table 3.1

Overview of Sample Groups and Their Organisational Profiles6

3.2 DATA COLLECTION

This research adopted an embedded, single-case study design containing

multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009). The single-case study design was considered

appropriate given that this research involved a complex study of multiple organisations

from two different angles of the same crisis event. The outcomes of a single-case study

design assisted in capturing contextual conditions of a salient industrial accident (Yin,

2009) so as to assist other organisations impacted by similar situations in the future.

Additionally, the Rana Plaza case represented an extreme case and, therefore, was

identified as a rarity (Yin, 2009), and the multiple units of analysis within each of the

samples was gathered through various sources for data triangulation.

6Appendix C provides an overview of additional details for this table, such as the end of the fiscal year applicable to selected organisations.

Organisations Annual Sales Holding Company Private or Listed Entity

Region Prior business with Rana Plaza

Adler Modemärkte > AUD$100 million Steilmann Holding Ag Public Subsidiary Germany YesBenetton > AUD$100 million Edizione Srl Private Subsidiary Italy YesC&A > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Netherlands YesMango > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Spain YesPrimark > AUD$100 million Associated British Foods (ABF) Private Subsidiary UK/Ireland YesWal-Mart > AUD$100 million n/a Public Parent USA YesCotton On > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Australia NoKmart Australia > AUD$100 million Wesfarmers Ltd Private Subsidiary Australia NoTarget Australia > AUD$100 million Wesfarmers Ltd Private Subsidiary Australia NoBestseller > AUD$100 million n/a Private Subsidiary Denmark NoLindex > AUD$100 million Stockmann Group Private Subsidiary Finland NoHelly Hansen > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Norway NoH&M > AUD$100 million n/a Public Subsidiary Sweden NoAbercrombie & Fitch > AUD$100 million n/a Public Parent USA NoAmerican Eagle Outfitters > AUD$100 million n/a Public Parent USA NoFruit of the Loom > AUD$100 million Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Private Subsidiary USA No


A longitudinal timeline was employed over a four-year period to analyse three

different points in time, set out as follows:

Table 3.2

Focus of data collection over three periods of time

Time cluster Reference of dates Focus

Time Period 1 April to June 2013 Refers to primary crisis responses following the factory collapse.

The immediate crisis response may influence the crisis frame among stakeholders (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007b; Coombs et al., 2017).

Time Period 2 July 2013 to June 2014 Intermediate SCCT responses emerging from organisational commitment, or non-commitment to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety7 (hereafter referred to as the Bangladesh Accord) or the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety’8 (hereafter referred to as The Alliance). The latter was implemented later in July 2013.

Time Period 3 July 2014 to June 2017 Explores if organisations undertook short-term CSR or continued with long-term/ongoing CSR activities in response to the Rana Plaza crisis.

7The Bangladesh Accord is a legally binding, union-affiliated industry initiative that resulted from the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse. It served the purpose of improving workers’ safety across the ready-made-garment (RMG) factories in Bangladesh. This was initially a five-year initiative but was extended in June 2018 with 190 active signatories. 8The Alliance is legally arbitrated by its annual membership payment from its signatories. It ceased operations in December 2018 as per its five-year commitment after the Rana Plaza disaster.


3.2.1 Sampling of data

A purposive sampling strategy was undertaken for the broader data collection

for both sample groups through selective keyword searches of the Rana Plaza crisis.

In doing so, the study was able to capture data units addressing crisis-related responses

and actions applicable to the pre-determined organisations and in order to explore the

RQs appropriately.

Data consisted of secondary data of communications media sourced from two

trusted research databases, ‘ProQuest’ and ‘Factiva’. The search term ‘Rana Plaza’

was used in both databases, which yielded 13,238 results from ProQuest and 14,555

results from Factiva.

Given the large volume of findings, results were reduced through a number of

measures. The date range of 24 April 2013 to 30 June 2017 was applied for this study.

Organisational names were thereafter added together with the ‘Rana Plaza’ search

term, for example “H&M and (Rana Plaza)”, or “H&M or (Rana Plaza)”. To maximise

results pertinent to this study, some additional searches to specifically address the

sample organisations were undertaken involving “H&M and Bangladesh”, “H&M or

Bangladesh”, “H&M and 2013”, and “H&M or 2013”. The remainder of the data

sources consisted of publicly available information such as annual reports,

CSR/sustainability reports, blog posts, media statements, press releases, social media,

website content, and lastly, audio from video sources were transcribed for the analysis.

Based on the above data sources and methods, the aggregated data for analysis

was reduced to 518 data units, such as news articles or organisational blog posts

addressing the Rana Plaza crisis.


A growing body of crisis communication research has recognised social media

as “critical variables or contexts” (Coombs et al., 2017, p. 160). As such, crisis

responses released through organisational social media channels, such as Facebook

and Twitter, were collected through the social media listening software “Social Studio

by Radian 6” which requires the set-up of an online account with login. Once the online

account was created, individual topic profiles were set up for each organisational

participant to enable the software to search for statements containing the key word

‘Bangladesh’ released by organisations from 24 April 2013 to 30 June 2017. This

method yielded 144 applicable data units extracted from the ‘Social Studio’ database.

Again, the data units referred to individual data samples; however, in this case these

referred to social media-based crisis responses by organisations. These were in

addition to the 518 units of data previously discussed. All data units were streamlined

to PDF format and then imported to the qualitative software, NVivo. In addition to the

PDF format, crisis-related audio retrieved from video content was transcribed for

coding purposes during this process.

3.2.2 Data analysis

The data were analysed through a qualitative approach. Content analysis is a

suitable method because it enables the systematic evaluation of communications

content (Elo & Helvi, 2007; Krippendorff, 2013), such as in the form of documents,

oral communication and graphics.

While content analysis may be conducted through either or both an inductive or

deductive approach, both approaches possess three main phases of preparing,

organising and reporting on the data (Elo & Helvi, 2007). This research employed a

deductive method given its use of existing frameworks and models (Elo & Helvi, 2007;

Marshall & Rossman, 2016).


NVivo was utilised due to its ability to support the organisation and analysis of

large volumes of text-rich and multimedia-based data derived from multiple sources.

The rationale for using a computerised software tool instead of completing manual

coding derived from the ability for NVivo to provide a transparent and objective

method of demonstrating the coding decisions previously discussed. The software

further enhances efficiencies in comparing nodes, the exploration of trends and

differences through computerised reports (Creswell, 2003).

3.2.3 The content analysis method

The data reduction process consisted of several stages. First, the data were

organised into the three time periods. Second, the data were categorised and coded into

nodes in NVivo. These are noted in detail in Figure 3.2. The coding process was guided

by existing theoretical knowledge for the development of key concepts and categories

alongside emergent themes. This was achieved by drawing from the SCCT framework

(Coombs, 2007b), Matten and Moon’s (2008) conceptual framework for implicit and

explicit CSR, and stakeholder pressures identified in the data.

The findings of the data codes in Figure 3.2 were later grouped into one of the

three time periods considered by this study. During this process, all data pieces were

reviewed from two perspectives: 1) the lens of SCCT; and 2) the lens of CSR. It should

be noted that an organisational response could be both SCCT and CSR. Coding

decisions were guided by the following approaches:


= key category = sub-category = variables

Figure 3.2. Operationalisation of codes through NVivo. ‘Stakeholder pressures’ is represented by individuals or organisations with an interest in one or more crisis affiliated organisations and/or the fast fashion industry.

SCCT involved deductive coding drawing from Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT

that reflected SCCT strategies to deny, diminish, rebuild and bolster. The

SCCT codes were not mutually exclusive; organisations’ SCCT responses

were coded based on the SCCT type and also the order of use within each

time period. This resulted in the ability to present any evolution in each

CSR

durin

g tim

es o

f cris

is

SCCT (Coombs 2007b)

Denial

Bolstering

Diminish

Rebuild

Non SCCT response Crisis spillover

No Statement

Refusal to collective responses/rebuild

organisation-to organisation

pressures

Long-term strategy

CSR (Matten & Moon 2008)

Implicit

Explicit

Crisis Response Date

2013 April - June July - September October - Dec

2014

January - March April - June July - September October - Dec2015

2016

2017

Stakeholder pressures

Consumers, NGO's, news media etc.

Organisations

Connected Organisations

C&A Wal-Mart Benetton

Mango Primark Adler Modemärkte

Unconnected Organisations

Cotton On Target Australia Kmart Australia Abercrombie & Fitch Fruit of the Loom

H&M Lindex Helly Hansen Bestseller American Eagle Outfitters

Organisational Regions

Australia

Nordic Region

USA

Rana Plaza Crisis Linkage


organisation’s crisis response strategy. This order was reflected in the

tables within each time period.

1. CSR: Matten and Moon’s (2008) theory of implicit and explicit CSR

guided the analysis in exploring relevant CSR communication employed

by the organisations. Codes were, again, not mutually exclusive given that

the organisations could have undertaken both implicit and explicit CSR.

For example, organisational conformity to the Bangladesh Accord and The

Alliance were implicit responses as they were undertaken collectively by

the organisations. Once committed to the industry initiatives [to meet

stakeholder expectations] the organisations were required to abide by

relevant policies and guidelines in their practises. Explicit responses on the

other hand referred to individual and voluntary CSR communication

through actions or statements, such as CSR/sustainability reports or

separate foundations to empower vulnerable factory workers.

A sample of the coding process is displayed in Table 3.3. Stakeholder pressures

were also coded. Whenever a stakeholder (e.g., consumer or NGO) indicated a

pressure argument, for example, that an organisation should accept responsibility or

meet new industry standards, the stakeholder was coded under a specific node. These

nodes were translated into the number of mentions of stakeholders that pressured the

organisations and also formed part of the analysis around their influence on short- and

long-term organisational responses. Finally, the data analysis undertook a range of

progressive stages to generate reliable findings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016;

Krippendorf, 2003). This involved a thorough review and re-review of the data to

enable the emergence of patterns and findings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).


Table 1.3

Example of Operationalisation of Codes

Concept Code Example

SCCT Denial Mango, the Spanish organisation, said it did not attend [RP

victim compensation summit in Geneva] as it had not

formalised commercial relations with Rana Plaza. It has

stated it had ordered only test samples before the disaster

(Smith & Dowling, 2013, 13 Oct).

SCCT Diminish / Denial

“Walmart is the one company that is showing an astonishing

lack of responsibility, considering that so much of their

product was being made at the Tazreen factory”, said

Samantha Maher, a campaign coordinator for the British arm

of the Clean Clothes Campaign, a European anti-sweatshop

group. Walmart has also been asked to contribute to the

planned Rana Plaza fund because production documents

were found in the building rubble indicating that a Canadian

contractor was producing jeans for Walmart in 2012 at the

Ether Tex factory inside the building. Walmart said that

unauthorized contractors were producing garments without

the company's knowledge (Greenhouse 2013, 25 Nov).

Crisis

spillover

response and

CSR

Spillover H&M did not have clothes made at the site and was the first

company to sign a safety agreement for Bangladeshi factories

after the disaster (The Financial Express, 2013, Nov 27).

SCCT and

CSR

Rebuild Only Primark has donated the highest amount of US$ 1.0

million directly to the fund while another $9 million would

be paid directly to the workers of the New Wave Bottoms, a

factory of the Rana Plaza (The Financial Express, 2014, Apr

17).

After making sense of the data, trends and differences were interpreted through the

attachment of meaning, inferences, theoretical explanations and conclusions guided by


the RQs. Finally, a search began for alternative understandings of the findings to

minimise potential researcher bias. This included observational and methodological

notes to detect any early researcher mistakes or personal biases against actual

organisational behaviour (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). In this process, an emergent

node on crisis spillover was added to capture recurring organisational responses

applicable to the crisis spillover. This included the Unconnected Organisations

responses to the Rana Plaza crisis by, for example, commitment to the Bangladesh

Accord or The Alliance that were both established as a result of the factory collapse.

3.3 ENHANCEMENT OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The single-case study design required careful investigation to reduce the

prospects of any misrepresented results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1994). As such, this

section summarises the measures undertaken to enhance internal and external validity

in the form of credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability. Each of

these criteria represented strategies undertaken in the research process to enhance the

trustworthiness of this study.

3.3.1 Credibility

Credibility refers to the truth of the data representation and interpretation from

the participant’s perspective (Yin, 2009). This is an important aspect to case study

research that generates exploratory and descriptive findings to research phenomena

through its organisations (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). A number of steps were

addressed to mitigate researcher bias in the present study through “subjective

judgement” during the collection of the data (Yin, 2009, p. 41), as follows:

The data was collected from multiple sources to reach data saturation (Marshall

& Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2009)


Prolonged engagement with the data was undertaken for the completion of a

persistent observation, and to build scope and depth with the crisis spillover

phenomenon (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)

The collected data was reviewed and re-reviewed multiple times (Marshall &

Rossman 2016; Yin, 2009).

Credibility was further enhanced through the multiple units of analysis within

the single case study which represented media coverage of relevant organisations. The

findings were thereby able to provide a broader representation of the crisis spillover

phenomenon (Yin, 2009).

3.3.2 Dependability

Dependability refers to the degree of auditability and replicability should others

attempt to reconstruct the research with the same data within a similar setting (Lincoln

& Guba, 1985). This research employed a number of strategies to fulfil this criterion:

A case study database was implemented for the data collection and analysis

processes (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Yin 2009).

Data was explicitly sampled from publicly available sources, which enhanced

the retrievability of the content (Yin, 2009).

An audit trail of the data collection and analysis processes was maintained for

peer examination by an experienced research colleague to ensure that the same

conclusions were reached (Creswell 2003, Marshall & Rossman, 2016). A re-

evaluation of the coding was conducted where variances were detected.


Where the same conclusions were not reached, a re-review of the data analysis

was undertaken to eliminate possible bias or coding errors. Where changes

were required, the units of data were re-categorised.

A thorough presentation of the data analysis process was provided (Yin, 2009)

to enhance replicability.

In addition, content analysis is considered a reliable method for replicability

(Krippendorff, 2013). Provided that the formula for specified research techniques are

followed, researchers at a different point in time, and possibly under different

circumstances, should achieve equivalent results within the context of same

phenomenon (Krippendorff, 2013). 3.3.3 Confirmability

Confirmability refers to objectivity in the degree to which research findings may

be confirmed or validated by others (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Whilst this may be

a challenging criterion for the fulfilment of exploratory and descriptive outcomes

derived from qualitative research, this research addressed a number of steps to fulfil

this criterion. These referred to the persistent data observation through prolonged

engagement procedures (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and the reviewing and re-reviewing

of the sample (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Marshall & Rossman 2016).

Rich quotes referring to organisations were provided in the data to support the

establishment of emerging themes and conclusions derived from the data analysis (Yin

2009). The analysis also referred to theory and literature to support any claims. Lastly,

the research process and findings were audited by an independent peer examiner

experienced in qualitative methods (Creswell, 2003) for the fulfilment of this criterion.


3.3.4 Transferability

Transferability refers to the degree to which research findings can be generalised

to other contexts and settings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Yin 2009), that is, external

validity (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2009). The challenge with transferability is that it can

could be subject to perception to the counterpart making the generalisation (Creswell,

2003). Given the industry-specific settings of this study, such endeavours were likely

to be challenging; however, it could be possible that the overall findings of the present

study could be transferable to other crisis spillover settings.

3.4 ETHICS CONSIDERATIONS

3.4.1 QUT ethics clearance ID# 1700000515

The principles and practise for ethical management of the research data were

carefully considered to maintain a high degree of research validity, trustworthiness and

participant safety and welfare for content extracted from social media. As such, an

ethics application for negligible/low-risk research was sought and approved by the

QUT Office of Research Ethics and Integrity with clearance ID #1700000515. The

approval included the collection of social media-based data through the social media

listening software, ‘Social Studio by Radian6’, and the Facebook and Twitter accounts

of the organisations.

Individuals of the community were not approached for participation in this study.

Identifiers for the organisations (e.g., organisation or retail name) were disclosed in

the reporting of the data. Whilst this could cause discomfort to organisations, such

likelihood remained minimal given that the data has remained publicly available since

2013.


The collected data were stored electronically (Marshall & Rossman, 2016) by

password protection on an institutional drive. The research findings are presented

throughout the thesis with additional dissemination through publication and

conferences.

Chapter 4: Findings 71

Chapter 4: Findings

4.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter outlines the short- and long-term responses to a crisis event that

spill over from their focal organisations, for example, Connected Organisations, to

affect industry, for example, the Unconnected Organisations. SCCT and CSR comes

into focus as these are addressed by organisations in efforts to minimise reputational

damage among stakeholders in response to the crisis spillover.

To enable a longitudinal exploration, the data were divided into three time

periods:

(1) The immediate crisis response: 24 April 2013 to June 2013.

(2) The short-term crisis response: 2013 July to 2014 June.

(3) The long-term crisis response: 2014 July to 2017 June.

Each of these time periods were examined for the SCCT responses employed by

the organisations. This is followed by findings on attribution theory and SCCT through

post-crisis pressures facing the organisations, and how such pressures may have

shaped subsequent strategic short- and long-term CSR responses.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the similarities and differences

between the strategic responses of the organisations within each sample group, as well

as an overview of the geographical response patterns within Unconnected

Organisations.


4.2 TIME PERIOD 1: THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS RESPONSE

This time period focused on the time frame of 24 April 2013 to 30 June 2013

and represented the immediate crisis response phase for the organisations.

The Rana Plaza factory collapse happened at approximately 09:00am in the

morning of 24 April 2013 and became a catalyst for change within the fast fashion

industry. Following the collapse, stakeholders quickly gathered forces to demand

organisations with garment production in Bangladesh to take collective responsibility

to protect vulnerable factory workers in developing regions.

In unpacking the trends and response patterns for Time Period 1, the data first

analysed the SCCT, crisis spillover and CSR responses undertaken by organisations to

enable a thorough exploration of subsequent stakeholder pressures that emerged in

later time periods through media’s portrayal of the crisis.

4.2.1 Crisis response

The analysis first explored the immediate crisis responses following the factory

collapse. This involved deductive coding drawing from Coomb’s (2007b) SCCT

framework. This is set out in Table 4.1.

The numbers in Table 4.1 represents the order in which organisations undertook

their response strategies. All organisations arrived at a rebuild strategy within this time

period; however, the overall pattern leading to the rebuild response differed. It is

important to note here that rebuild strategies coincidently became equivalent to CSR

actions. For example, actions of appointing an NGO in Bangladesh after the factory

collapse to assist with victims and their families was a rebuild strategy but also

depicted explicit CSR on behalf of the organisation.


Table 2.1

Evolution of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 1

Response strategies

Organisation Bolstering Denial Diminish Rebuild No statement C

onne

cted

Adler n/a - linked to crisis in July 2013 (e.g., Time Period 2)

Benetton #2 #1 #3 #4

C&A #1 #2 #3 #4

Mango #3 #1 #2 #4

Primark #2 #1

Wal-Mart #3 #1 #2 #4

Unc

onne

cted

Abercrombie & Fitch #1 American Eagle Outfitters #1

Bestseller #1

Cotton On #2 #1

Fruit of the Loom #1 H&M #2 #1

Kmart Australia #2 #1

Helly Hansen #1

Lindex #1

Target Australia #2 #1 Total number of

responses 9 8 4 4 6

Note. #[number] = the order in which an organisation undertook its response strategies.

4.2.1.1 Connected Organisations

Only one organisation, Primark, offered an immediate rebuild strategy. The

broader pattern of connected organisation responses indicated that whilst they all

reached a rebuild strategy sooner or later, they initially attempted to remove or

diminish attributions of crisis responsibility by reminding stakeholders of their prior

activities or that contracts with the Rana Plaza factory were not viable at the time of

the collapse. The combination of denial and rebuild strategies were required to set the


record straight as the organisations with prior Rana Plaza linkage experienced severe

scrutiny and attributions of blame among stakeholders.

Wal-Mart initially issued a statement of denial which was followed by a

bolstering response to remind stakeholders of their ethical supply chain standards.

Wal-Mart sought to diminish their crisis responsibility by noting that the decision to

contract Rana Plaza was unauthorised.

Other statements were issued to diminish crisis responsibility as per the

following examples:

(1) the organisation had only ordered samples from a Rana Plaza based supplier, that

is, no actual sales orders had been placed for production. For example:

MANGO deeply regrets the tragedy that has occurred in Bangladesh and

would like to offer its heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims.

Furthermore, MANGO would like to clarify that the supplier Phantom was

not a supplier of the company, although they were planning to produce some

samples for various company lines, samples that still had not been

started. MANGO always conducts a social audit on all the suppliers it works

with before establishing any commercial relationship with them, in order to

verify the working conditions of its employees: the non-use of child labour,

the safety of the workplace, remuneration and hours, as indicated in the

company’s sustainability report:

http://www.mango.com/…/compa…/IN/empresa/rsc/memoria2011.pdf.

MANGO had not conducted a social audit because Phantom was not a

supplier of the company. Had the samples that Phantom was going to

produce for MANGO complied with the quality standards and the social


audit been positive, said supplier would have produced an order of 25,000

garments for the company. Even so, notwithstanding the social audit, it

would have been impossible to detect the structural defects of the collapsed

building, since MANGO would not have been able to ascertain that the

owners of said had building had built three storeys more than is permitted.

(@Mango (28 April 2013) [Twitter])

(2) Garment production at Rana Plaza was unauthorised (e.g., through sub-

contracting). For example:

Benetton Group strongly reiterates that none of the manufacturers housed in the

collapsed building is a supplier to any of our Group’s organisations. We have

since established that one of our suppliers had occasionally subcontracted orders

to one of these Dhaka‐based manufacturers. Prior to the accident, that

manufacturer had already been permanently removed from the list of potential

direct or indirect suppliers. In fact, it had come to light that it no longer met the

stringent standards that would have made it eligible to even potentially work for

us. (@Benetton (30 April 2013) [Twitter])

Benetton later updated their statement to clarify that an Indian supplier had sub-

contracted a part of their order to the Rana Plaza factory without prior approval. Whilst

it has been recommended that organisations continue to update stakeholders during a

severe crisis event (Coombs, 2015c), Benetton’s mistake was to firstly issue a firm

denial statement (2015c) and then to later retract the denial. As previously predicted

by literature, Benetton thereby increased their susceptibility for blame attributions

among stakeholders (Coombs, 2015c).


Primark’s response stood out in comparison to the other organisations in this

sample. They immediately accepted crisis responsibility with a rebuild strategy.

Although it was combined with bolstering, Primark spared no time in having impact

on the ground to assist victims and their families with food, supplies and short-term

funds.

An early media statement released by Primark signalled the development of

crisis spillover as they accepted immediate responsibility. In doing so, Primark spurred

attributions of crisis responsibility towards organisations not taking responsibility or

action. Primark stated:

Primark cannot speak for the other organisations involved – they will have to

make their own statement on the issue of compensation. However, the

company does of course stand by its earlier statement to compensate the

victims of this tragedy. A further comprehensive programme covering the

immediate and long-term needs of the survivors and the dependents of the

deceased is also being finalised. This programme will include medical and

occupational rehabilitation. This will be managed by international and local

NGOs. (Primark, 2013, May 10)

Primark’s statement signalled crisis spillover by indirectly placing organisation-

to-organisation pressures by indirectly shaming those not taking action. In doing so,

they started the process of ‘stealing thunder’ (Coombs, 2015c) by increasing blame

attributions towards other organisations. Competitors could essentially be triggered to

respond similarly to Primark for a positive organisation perception. Eventually,

however, all organisations arrived at a rebuild strategy, but with a combination of

diminish, denial or bolstering before or after the rebuild response.


4.2.1.2 Unconnected Organisations

The evidence presented in Table 4.1 above identifies consistent patterns among

organisations affected by the crisis through the spillover phenomenon within the

corporate environment. A majority of organisations initially detached themselves from

the crisis through bolstering strategies to remind stakeholders of their prior and

ongoing work in CSR. For example, Australian organisations, Cotton On, Target

Australia and Kmart Australia undertook bolstering strategies by emphasising their

factory audits in sourcing regions as well as CSR-focused corporate policies:

Cotton On Group risk and loss prevention manager Jacqueline Hennessy

yesterday said the company had comprehensive safety checks in place for its

Bangladesh factories, including some conducted by an independent authority.

Cotton On had built long-standing relationships in Bangladesh and regularly

took factory workers aside to ask how they felt about their work sites, she said.

While the company did not think its ethical program was perfect, it was

committed to improving working conditions in Bangladesh and had started

trying to do so long before public pressure came to bear, she said. “We're doing

the best we can in terms of flying the flag and doing the right thing around

ethical concerns” Ms Hennessy said (Squires, 2013, Jun 26).

Similarly, Kmart Australia released the following bolstering statement through

news media:

“The Bangladesh factory collapse truly is a tragedy and our thoughts are with

those involved. At Kmart, we work closely with our suppliers, including those

in Bangladesh, and their factory team members to ensure they have an

understanding of the importance of safety. More importantly we made a


decision some months back not to engage with any new suppliers who have

factories above marketplaces, such as the garment factory reported in

Bangladesh, or in shared premises due to the possibility of accidents occurring

and safety concerns.” (Cooper 2013)

It is worth noting that Wesfarmers is the Australian holding company of both

Target Australia and Kmart Australia, which means that both organisations are under

the same management however crisis responses may still vary somewhat.

Kmart Australia was the primary buyer from Bangladesh and they immediately

travelled to Bangladesh to inspect their suppliers’ compliance and building safety in

response to the Rana Plaza crisis. Kmart Australia also released a media statement

admitting to not having checked structural building inspections in their prior factory

audits:

To be quite honest, the thing that we weren't checking in our audits was

building safety. I mean, we were doing all the other safety checks in regards

to employment mainly. We refuse to do business with anybody that even

considers to try to have a sweatshop or underage employees. But the one thing

that we weren't doing were building checks and after this building had

collapsed, I mean it touched me as much as it did every other Australian that

has seen this terrible disaster. And, you know, I'm being honest, I [Kmart

CEO, Guy Russo], my team did not check buildings. (Ryan, 2013)

Kmart’s statement suggested that they assumed risk control as an outcome of the

Rana Plaza disaster, for example, the crisis influenced Kmart to start auditing their

factory buildings to reduce similar risks.


Whilst written statements were being issued in response to Rana Plaza, one

reporter noted that Australian organisations avoided answering crisis-related questions

on camera. This depicted a form of stakeholder pressure as answers were sought from

industry at the time. An example is depicted through this news media quote:

A string of Australian companies sells products that are made in Bangladesh:

Kmart, Target, BIG W and Cotton On are just a few. All say they insist on

strict guidelines on safety and worker's rights and conduct regular audits of

their Bangladeshi suppliers. But not a single one of these companies would

speak to us on camera to explain in detail just how these safe working

conditions are met. (Cooper, 2013)

In terms of responsibility, the news media statements described an industry-wide

issue with the potential to influence stakeholders to attribute guilt, which may have

ultimately contributed to the creation of a crisis spillover. The avoidance of

organisations that were narrated in the statement was likely to motivate stakeholders

to apply pressure to demand ethical supply chain practises by the fashion industry.

Moving on to the responses of other organisations in the sample, H&M, being

the single, largest apparel buyer in Bangladesh, engaged in bolstering strategies in

response to the significant industry pressures targeted at them. Such pressures were

targeted at H&M by stakeholders in the form of NGOs, which was predicted by the

literature discussed in Chapter 2. Other stakeholders who applied pressure were

industry watchdogs and consumers. Similar to other Unconnected Organisations, the

rationale for H&M’s bolstering responses was to remind stakeholders of their prior

CSR as the crisis spillover developed, and also to indirectly respond to stakeholder

pressures.


Below is an example of stakeholder pressures where H&M’s agreeance to

stakeholder pressures is hailed, whilst identifying that the pressures against the large-

scale organisation motivated peers to undertake similar strategies:

Consumer and labour groups hailed the move by Sweden-based H&M, which

is the largest purchaser of garments from Bangladesh, as an important step

toward improving factory safety in Bangladesh, saying it would increase

pressure on other western organisations and apparel organisations to do

likewise. Within hours of H&M's statement Monday, C&A of the

Netherlands and two British organisations, Primark and Tesco, also joined in.

(Greenhouse, 2013, May 14)

Whilst it may have been a coincidence that other organisations followed H&M’s

response through pressure emerging from news media reporting that demanded ethical

supply chain practises in developing regions, the response may have also signalled the

urgency for industry peers to remain competitive with the industry giant. Further data

to support this claim is outlined in Appendix D and refers to direct or indirect media

statements released directly by the Unconnected Organisations.

4.2.2 Description of stakeholder pressures

During the data analysis, inferences of stakeholder pressures targeting the fast

fashion industry started to take shape, which are depicted in Figure 4.1. Stakeholders,

such as Clean Clothes Campaign, unions, industry watchdogs, and consumers

influenced various degrees of conformity to pressures among organisations as they

demanded an increase in ethical supply chain practices in the fashion industry.


Figure 4.1. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources in Time Period 1, April-June 2014.

The coding references in Figure 4.1 refer to the number of times that references

to stakeholders appeared in the qualitative research data. Overall, the evidence

presented a period of intense industry scrutiny within Time Period 1. Figure 4.1 refers

to a total of 1,874 coding references to stakeholder pressures placed by stakeholders.

These refer to the number of times stakeholders appeared in the data through

stakeholders, news media, interviews and organisational communication. The top five

sources of pressures identified were (1) the Bangladesh Accord, (2) organisations

placing pressures on industry peers, (3) activist groups or other, (4) consumers, and

(5) garment unions and labour groups.

The demand of stakeholders was essentially for the fast fashion industry to

address the need for collective industry actions combined with independent

involvement of unions. A prime example of such an initiative became the development

of the Bangladesh Accord. This Accord was a five-year agreement that mandated

187130

0

461

332

79

161

8 31148

18 54 27 85 44 49 45 15 00

50100150200250300350400450500

Cod

ing

refe

renc

es

Sources of stakeholder pressures


legally binding compliance for the purpose of improved supply chain among its

signatories. This agreement became the first of its kind that mandated collaboration

with unions and labour groups for legitimate factory compliance. Whilst similar

industry initiatives had previously been considered unsuccessful, the Bangladesh

Accord took shape as an immediate outcome of the Rana Plaza disaster, emerging as

a catalyst for change within the fashion industry.

Organisations rejecting or remaining silent about their intentions to commit to

the Bangladesh Accord became heavily scrutinised and pressured by stakeholders. In

response to such pressures, Wal-Mart initiated the implementation of The Alliance as

a measure to improve safety and ethical standards across industry. They also indirectly

contributed towards the compensation plan for Rana Plaza victims through Building

resources across communities (BRAC), USA, which outlines a rebuild strategy

accordingly to Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT.

Stakeholders, such as news media and NGOs, continued to target large-scale

organisations resisting the Bangladesh Accord such as Wal-Mart. Such resistance was

further identified overall among organisations in the North American region due to

fears of legal accountability. Wal-Mart responded to pressures by proposing The

Alliance, a five-year industry initiative similar to the Bangladesh Accord, however,

with no legally or financially binding arbitration. Resistance to the Bangladesh Accord

was predominantly identified within the North American region with many

organisations following Wal-Mart’s lead by becoming members of The Alliance.

Investors later formed a part of the pressures facing the fast fashion industry,

particularly within the North American region, where a majority of the industry

resisted the Bangladesh Accord. For example, an extract from a news article published

in May, 2013 stated that:


A large coalition of religious groups and investors is pressing major North

American organisations to join a sweeping plan to improve safety in

Bangladesh apparel factories, calling on them to act together to force changes

in overseas workplaces. Also Thursday, a second group of investment and

pension funds controlling $1.35 trillion in assets, sent a letter to organisations,

calling on them to ensure compliance with safety standards in Bangladesh and

to disclose all of the factories they use -- a demand that most major

organisations have resisted. (Greenhouse, 2013, May 17)


In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, influential industry watchdogs (e.g.,

labour unions, NGOs activists and the ILO) began the development of the Bangladesh

Accord. This accord was coded as implicit CSR in the present study because of the

collective nature to the agreement as a result of societal expectations for industry-wide

improvements in developing regions. Implicit CSR is undertaken by organisations as

a result of societal expectations and regulations, as opposed to explicit CSR that is a

business-driven strategy (Carson et al., 2015; Matten & Moon, 2008; Thorne et al.,

2017). For example, whilst it was the choice of individual organisations to join the

Bangladesh Accord due to societal expectations, once they became signatories, the

organisations were obliged to adhere to its legal requirements. In other words, the

organisations were no longer creating safer factory environments for garment workers

as a voluntary act once they became signatories of the Bangladesh Accord; it became

an act of implicit CSR (Carson et al., 2015). Based on this, stakeholders began to

aggressively approach organisations to become signatories of the collective industry

agreement to create change. A deadline to join the Bangladesh Accord was set for 15

May 2013. Organisations had the option of committing to the agreement at a later


stage, however, with no right to retrospectively appeal prior decisions. Organisations

deciding to conform to the Bangladesh Accord started to shift towards implicit CSR

practices.


The analysis explored corporate CSR/sustainability reports published in early-

mid 2013, which thereby helped identify CSR practises at the time of the factory

collapse in April 2013. A predominant pattern of explicit CSR practices was identified

through individual corporate programs; for example, CSR was a non-collective

initiative. A shift in CSR practices thereby started to emerge across the industry in

response to the stakeholder pressures arising from the crisis. Pertinent trends and

patterns were captured from the research data and collated within Table 4.2. Some

organisations are listed as explicit/implicit, which means that they were in operational

transition from explicit CSR practises only to the undertaking of both explicit and

implicit CSR practises.

Table 4.2

Implicit/Explicit CSR in Time Period 1

Organisation Prevalent CSR strategy during Time Period 1

Data relating to CSR

Con

nect

ed

Adler Explicit Observed trends/patterns of industry actions: voluntary and non-legally binding activities observed in the data, such as community outreach programs, self-arranged factory audits through third-parties, code of conducts etc. Primark was the first and only organisation to immediately respond with an SCCT rebuild strategy which also happened to be CSR. This was achieved through immediate food and financial relief to victims and their families.

Benetton Explicit/Implicit C&A Explicit/Implicit Mango Explicit/Implicit Primark Explicit/Implicit

Wal-Mart Explicit


Unc

onne

cted

Abercrombie & Fitch Explicit Observed trends/patterns of industry

actions: norm across industry to engage in voluntary and non-legally binding activities through self-arranged factory audits through third parties, community outreach programs to empower garment workers, code of conducts etc. Similar to Connected Organisations, the level of individuality and the predominantly voluntary aspect represents a trend of explicit CSR.

American Eagle Outfitters Explicit

Bestseller Explicit/Implicit

Cotton On Explicit

Fruit of the Loom Explicit H&M Explicit/Implicit Kmart Australia Explicit

Helly Hansen Explicit

Lindex Explicit/Implicit

Target Australia Explicit

Wal-Mart initially withheld public responses in relation to the Bangladesh

Accord, and later declined to sign the Bangladesh Accord due to the cost and binding

arbitration associated with the agreement. A data extract from a newspaper in May,

2013 read:

Most U.S. companies, however, have balked at the language in the accord.

Some say it would expose them to excessive legal liability — particularly in

North America's litigious courts. Written by labor groups, the agreement

would require organisations who source clothing from Bangladesh to commit

to pay for inspections, building upgrades, and training — all enforced by

binding arbitration. (Plumer, 2013, May, 16)

This quote explores underlying factors in North American organisations’

resistance to sign the Bangladesh Accord.


The data were examined by geographical groupings for the Connected

Organisations to explore potential trends in post-crisis responses and CSR. As an

outcome of stakeholder pressures, an important change in CSR trends became

noticeable in the data for the North American region, an area that often adopted explicit

CSR such as voluntary corporate programs (Matten & Moon, 2008).


The European region was ahead of the sample group with their proactive CSR

agenda, partly through a push for continuously developing government policies and

the European Union. The Australian organisations started predominantly with explicit

practises as per the industry standards at the time of the crisis in 2013. Following the

industry-wide pressures that faced organisations, the sample quickly depicted a shift

towards collective implicit CSR practises that communicated a willingness to improve

industry standards towards more ethical supply chain practices.

H&M did not initially respond or agree to sign the agreement due to its legally

binding nature, which reflected a similar response by Wal-Mart. H&M were targeted

to sign the Bangladesh Accord and it was the first organisation to sign the agreement

in May, 2013, urging other organisations operating in Bangladesh to follow its lead.

H&M does not admit to having conformed to stakeholder pressures, suggesting that

the organisation sought to be portrayed with implicit CSR to genuinely create industry

change through collective actions. Other organisations to immediately follow H&M’s

strategy were Lindex, Helly Hansen, Bestseller, and Abercrombie & Fitch as the first

North American organisation to join. Kmart Australia and Target Australia (managed

by Wesfarmers) initially confirmed that they would not cease their business in

Bangladesh, and later committed to the Bangladesh Accord in mid-June 2013. These

organisations were closely followed by Cotton On. North American, Eagle Outfitters

and Fruit of the Loom, refrained from making a decision in relation to the Bangladesh

Accord within this Time Period 1.

4.2.4 Summary

As expected, Time Period 1 depicted crisis response strategies consisting of both

SCCT and CSR, and a combination of SCCT and CSR. An example of this was

Primark’s rebuild response through boots on the ground at the disaster site, including


the arrangement of food and monetary solutions to victims and their families through

local NGO’s. Other high level responses showed the following:

Responses that were SCCT, for example, without actions of CSR involved,

were of the bolstering type. This was to remind stakeholders about the prior

good that had been done by the organisations.

Responses that were purely CSR were depicted through organisations that

chose to not issue any statements about the crisis but instead undertook explicit

CSR by compensating victims through non-collective schemes.

The different organisational crisis response strategies showed different

responsibility attributions over time, culminating in the Connected

Organisations accepting responsibility. In doing so, these organisations

demonstrated a legitimate intention to improve less ethical industry practises

to protect vulnerable garment workers in developing regions. Essentially this

aligned with the social demands of stakeholders and linking this with CSR.

Connected and Unconnected Organisations typically arrived at a rebuild

strategy in different ways. For many Connected Organisations, this was after

trying different SCCT strategies.

Connected Organisations also used a wider variety of strategies (i.e., most used

four strategies, as opposed to Unconnected Organisations that used only two).

The latter sample, for the most part, did not initially make any statement, but

may have also used a bolstering or denial strategy.

Primark had active business with Rana Plaza but stood out through their

immediate admission of guilt followed by rebuild strategies.

Explicit CSR was the overall industry norm during Time Period 1.


Overall, the emergence of a crisis spillover was intensified occurred through

stakeholder pressures. Such pressures demanded fashion organisations undertake

collective action in response to Rana Plaza, and irrespective of prior business ties with

the collapsed garment factory.

4.3 TIME PERIOD 2: THE SHORT-TERM POST-CRISIS RESPONSE

This section presents the crisis response data and stakeholder pressures identified

for Time Period 2 between 1 July 2103 and June 2014.

Time Period 2 was a critical period for the post-crisis events with regards to the

industry implementations of the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance as well as The

Arrangement. The recurring theme in the data was the continuous stakeholder

pressures that demanded that organisations undertook collective actions to improve

supply chain practices, for example, through implicit CSR rather than individual

actions through explicit CSR. This was further signalled in the data through the two

different industry allies placing competitive pressures on one another to appear better

from a reputational perspective, for example, the Bangladesh Accord and The

Alliance.

The next sections outline relevant outcomes from the data further.


The analysis of Time Period 2 first investigated the crisis responses undertaken

by the organisations. The data was strongly dominated by the implementation of the

Bangladesh Accord and the effects of the crisis spillover phenomenon within this

context.


As expected, the data depicted more established SCCT responses by

organisations as additional crisis-related information had been identified at this point

in time. Table 4.3 provides a numerical order of how crisis responses were undertaken

by organisations. For example, Mango immediately released statements of denial,

followed by diminished responsibility as to why order forms from their company were

found at Rana Plaza and finally a rebuild strategy.

For Connected Organisations, one additional organisation, namely, Adler

Modemärkte, became linked with production at Rana Plaza in July 2013 in result of

continued investigations and exploration of the disaster site. As such, Adler

Modemärkte was not included in the data until Time Period 2 as this is when evidence

emerged of their linkage with the Rana Plaza factory.


Table 4.3

Overview of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 29

Organisation Bolst Dec. acc.

Alli mem. Den. Dimin. Reb. No

statem. Spillov. C

onne

cted

O

rgan

isat

ions

Adler #3 #2 #1 Benetton #1 #2 C&A #1 #2 Mango #1 #2 #3 Primark #1 Wal-Mart #3 #5 #2 #1 #4

Unc

onne

cted

Org

anis

atio

ns

Abercrombie & Fitch

#1

American Eagle Outfitters

#1

Bestseller #1 Cotton On #1 Fruit of the Loom

#2 #1

H&M #1 Kmart Australia

#1

Lindex #1 Helly Hansen

#1

Target Australia

#1

Total responses

0 2 2 2 4 6 1 10

Note. Bolst. = bolstering; Dec. acc. = declined accord; Alli. mem. = alliance member; Den. = denial; Dimin. = diminish; Reb. = rebuild; No statem.= no statement; Spillov. = spillover; #[number] = the order in which an organisation undertook its response strategies.

4.3.1.1 Connected organisations

Whilst Time Period 1 presented fewer organisational statements, for example,

the immediate post-crisis period, it was found that all organisations arrived at a rebuild

strategy with the Bangladesh Accord that was implemented at the end of Time Period

9 SCCT responses are ranked by the progressive order of different crisis responses aimed at stakeholders. For example, Benetton sought to diminish crisis responsibility due to a supplier sub-contracting parts of an order to the Rana Plaza factory. After explaining this to stakeholders, the organisation became a signatory of the Bangladesh Accord as a rebuild response to the crisis.


1. As a result, during Time Period 2, the agreement grew to become an established

force of the SCCT rebuild strategy as well as a form of implicit CSR.

Table 4.3 shows that Wal-Mart declined to commit to the Bangladesh Accord

due to its legally binding policies and regulations. Adler Modemärkte followed an

equivalent response for unknown reasons. Both organisations eventually undertook

rebuild strategies of a non-collective nature, that is, explicit CSR actions. Whilst Wal-

Mart announced their rebuild actions on their website, Adler Modemärkte remained

silent in the public sphere after they became linked to Rana Plaza in July 2013. This

means that there were no data available about communications statements released by

the organisation. The analysis, however, identified that they made a small donation to

a local charity in Bangladesh to assist the Rana Plaza victims. This information was

retrieved from the NGO, ‘Clean Clothes Campaign’, and not the organisation, as Adler

Modemärkte continued to distance itself from the crisis through a silent

communications approach. As such, the ‘no statement’ response continued to

complement SCCT within the crisis spillover context.

Despite facts and evidence linking organisations with prior garment production

at the Rana Plaza factory, such as order forms found in the factory rubble, the majority

of Connected Organisations continued to distance themselves from crisis

responsibility. From an SCCT perspective, the rebuild strategies undertaken by

Connected Organisations (excluding Primark) were likely to narrate that they went out

of their way to fix broader social issues, in order to be perceived positively by

stakeholders.

This showed that the organisations eventually combined their rebuild responses

from Time Period 1 with additional rebuild strategies in Time Period 2 to lessen their

blame attribution among stakeholders. For example, C&A committed to the


Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1 but extended their response in Time Period 2 by

also donating to the collective victim compensation scheme for Rana Plaza victims

and families. Organisations also extended their SCCT responses with diminish,

bolstering and denial strategies to reduce blame attributions. It was assumed that a sole

commitment to the Bangladesh Accord could otherwise risk being perceived as an

admission of guilt.

Wal-Mart stated that a staff member had incorrectly authorized production at the

Rana Plaza factory and the organisation was therefore unaware of their crisis linkage.

This was coded as a diminished crisis responsibility statement during the data analysis.


As SCCT focuses on single organisations responding to a crisis event, the crisis

spillover response is applied to Table 4.3 as a non-SCCT response for Unconnected

Organisations as they were considered guilty by association. In response to the

industry facing the Rana Plaza crisis, the Unconnected Organisations assumed

responsibility for a crisis they had no immediate linkage to by responding to various

stakeholder demands. For Time Period 2, this referred to collective agreements to

improve industry-wide supply chain practises and to collectively compensate Rana

Plaza victims and their families.

As previously discussed, some organisations became signatories of the

Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1, and this trend continued in Time Period 2.

Eventually, all the Unconnected Organisations became confirmed signatories.

There were few North American signatories of the Bangladesh Accord during

Time Period 2 due to the financial and legal arbitration of the agreements. Among the

early North American signatories were American Eagle Outfitters and Abercrombie

and Fitch. Fruit of the Loom was the last organisation in the sample to join the


Bangladesh Accord in December 2013. The organisation initially joined The Alliance

in September 2013 but extended their crisis spillover response with a concurrent

commitment to the Bangladesh Accord.

The data presented more established and intensified stakeholder pressures by

industry watchdogs and media that demanded organisations to commit to collective

industry reforms. Stakeholders perceived the Bangladesh Accord to be a ground-

breaking industry initiative due to its financially and legally binding and arbitrary

collaboration with union groups.

The Alliance, on the other hand, may have been perceived as a strategic tool and

a PR tactic by many stakeholders. An extract from the data states:

By contrast, the Alliance does not meet a high standard of transparency and

this has made it more difficult to objectively measure progress. While the

Alliance published corrective action plans (CAPs) for each factory following

initial inspections, it has, since those inspections were done, published no

detailed updates on factory-by-factory progress. Indeed, there is no way to

determine from the information the Alliance makes available whether there

has been progress. (International Labor Rights Forum, 2016)

Figure 4.2 identifies 2,189 coding references, and each refers to the number of

times that stakeholder pressures were identified in Time Period 2 in the data from news

articles, company websites and industry watchdogs through statements or quotes in

relation to Rana Plaza and the post-crisis scrutiny directed at industry.

The analysis identified Time Period 2 as a critical phase for the crisis spillover

development. This is because the crisis spillover was properly established during this


time period and scrutiny had provided a foundation to separate organisations that were

directly or indirectly linked to the Rana Plaza factory.

Figure 4.2. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 2, July 2013 – June 2014. Based on the above information, this research determined a crisis spillover response

by the sample of Unconnected Organisations apart from the sample of Connected

Organisations, and also identified an increase in coding frequencies.


Evidence from Time Period 2 showed that the steering committee of the

Bangladesh Accord, excluding its neutral chair (i.e., ILO), placed significant

stakeholder pressures on organisations to commit to the agreement. They held the

highest frequency of 302 coding references (see Figure 4.2).

The crisis spillover brought a sense of competitiveness among the organisations

through their self-portrayal of goodwill to stakeholders. Based on this, some

organisations directly or indirectly placed pressures on other organisations to appear

302

162 143

3

133

11

135

49 49 62

128173

268

7739

234

19 0

202

050

100150200250300350

Cod

ing

refe

renc

es

Sources of stakeholder pressures


in a better light and such patterns were identified from 268 coding references. This

included the prior statements released by H&M urging industry peers to follow their

crisis spillover response by committing to the Bangladesh Accord and to “do the right

thing”. This signals to stakeholders that those not following H&M’ response was

lagging with their willingness to undertake legitimate industry reforms.

The Rana Plaza Coordination Committee became the third strongest

environmental pressure on organisations. The objective of this committee was to

oversee a collective, industry-wide victim compensation scheme, namely, The

Arrangement. This compensation scheme became a tool for stakeholders to place

pressure on organisations with production in Bangladesh to take partial responsibility,

irrespective of their prior linkage with the Rana Plaza factory (Anonymous, 2015).

Whilst The Rana Plaza Coordination Committee was chaired by the neutral

International Labor Organisation, it was steered by other stakeholders, such as NGOs,

unions and labour groups, and the Bangladeshi government.

Pressures from consumers emerged through survey outcomes and statements

presented through the channels of news media, NGOs and activist organisations. Such

types of data supported claims of consumers being willing to pay slightly higher prices

for ethically made clothing, claims continuously contested by organisations such as

H&M and Wal-Mart.

Similar to Time Period 1, the analysis of the data for Time Period 2 continued to

identify consumers becoming actively involved in placing pressures on the fashion

industry. Such trends were intensified through the emergence of Fashion Revolution

which commemorated Rana Plaza victims by encouraging consumers to tag

organisations on social media to ask #whomademyclothes. The purpose of this was to

generate a social movement demanding improved supply chain practices, not only in


Bangladesh but on a global scale. This movement subsequently encouraged

organisations to publish photos of their factory workers with the responding hashtag,

#imadeyourclothes. Soon after, this movement developed the Fashion Revolution

Week which occurs annually to the memorial of the factory collapse and has provided

a dialogue for transparency between stakeholders, institutions and industry.


The Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance were critical, CSR-based industry

responses from the crisis spillover perspective of the Rana Plaza case. Despite the

Bangladesh Accord being perceived by stakeholders as more legitimate than The

Alliance, the data analysis suggested that both agreements held a common objective

to collectively improve building and safety standards in Bangladesh garment factories.

Table 4.4 provides an overview of how the organisations used implicit or explicit

CSR to respond to stakeholder pressures using an SCCT rebuild strategy. Explicit CSR

within this context refers to non-collective victim compensation such as through third-

party NGOs.

The Arrangement, which was the victim compensation scheme, became

pertinent in Time Period 2. Stakeholders demanded that any organisation with garment

production in Bangladesh should take partial responsibility by contributing to the

victim compensation scheme. Such actions would depict effects of the crisis spillover

phenomena for organisations with no prior affiliation with Rana Plaza, and a consistent

pattern of CSR actions for the recovery of legitimacy in both samples being studied.



The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) undertook extensive lobbying for

organisations to collectively conform to the Rana Plaza victims’ compensation plan,

particularly the Connected Organisations.

Table 4.4

Rebuild Strategies: Victim Compensation by Implicit or Explicit CSR10

Organisation

Contribution to Rana Plaza donors trust fund (RPDTF) or other victim compensation initiative

Implicit or explicit CSR

Con

nect

ed O

rgan

isat

ions

Adler USD$20,000 to an undisclosed Bangladeshi charity.

Explicit (e.g., individual)

Benetton USD$1,100,000 to RPDTF Implicit (e.g., collective)

C&A USD$1,000,000 to RPDTF (paid through the C&A Foundation).

Implicit (e.g., collective)

Mango Undisclosed amount to RPDTF Implicit (collective) through an explicit approach (individual)

Primark USD$7,300,000 - broken down by USD$1,000,000 to RPDTF and USD$6,300,000 via BRAC Bangladesh1.

Implicit (collective) and explicit (individual)

Wal-Mart USD$1,000,000 to RPDTF (paid via BRAC USA). Additional USD$1,750,000 earmarked for victim rehabilitation and future relief (as required) through BRAC US.

Implicit (collective) through an explicit approach (individual)

Unc

onne

cted

O

rgan

isat

ions

Abercrombie & Fitch

Nil Nil


Nil Nil

Bestseller Nil Nil Cotton On Nil Nil Fruit of the Loom

Nil Nil

10Collective/implicit payments to RPDTF by Bangladesh Accord signatories are made in addition to their mandatory expenses for factory improvements.


H&M USD$100,000 to RPDTF (paid via H&M Conscious Foundation).

Implicit (collective) through an explicit approach (individual)

Kmart Australia

Nil Nil

Helly Hansen

Nil Nil

Lindex Nil Nil Target Australia

Nil Nil

The progressive development to such efforts were continuously published on their

website as well as via global news and media channels.

Table 4.4 depicts organisational rebuild strategies through CSR; this was visible

in the evidence from the compensation payments to Rana Plaza victims. The process

to reach a conforming stage with the compensation demands varied for most

organisations and was, in many cases, drawn out. For example, some organisations

provided their compensation payments to third parties to remain detached from the

crisis responsibility, including possible legal repercussions where payments may have

been perceived as an acceptance of crisis responsibility.

It should be noted that the contribution by Wal-Mart shown in Table 4.4 above

was a unique response as the data suggested that similar payment amounts had not

been considered by Wal-Mart when linked to prior industrial accidents in Bangladesh.

In addition to Wal-Mart’s indirect contribution to the Rana Plaza victims, they also

earmarked an additional USD$1,750,000 for the NGO, BRAC USA. The purpose of

the earmarked funds was to continue to support BRAC USA’s work in Bangladesh

with counselling and rehabilitation for victims, as well as for a rapid response to any

future garment factory accidents. It was possible that Wal-Mart’s response was

influenced by accumulated pressures from prior accidents combined with the large

scale of industry scrutiny brought with the Rana Plaza collapse.


Benetton’s approach of appointing Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) to establish

their exact level of crisis liability, for example, by factoring in the square meters and

number of factory workers linked with their supplier, was perceived with mixed

responses by stakeholders. From a theoretical perspective, Benetton’s approach would

indicate a CSR approach that predominantly sought to meet societal expectations in an

attempt to address reputational damage and legitimacy (Carroll, 1979; Carroll &

Shabana, 2010; Janssen et al., 2015) following the negative outcomes to their early

crisis responses.

C&A launched the not-for-profit C&A Foundation in late 2013 following the

Rana Plaza collapse (C&A Foundation, 2017). Although C&A persisted on their

‘diminished’ SCCT response by stating that their contract with Rana Plaza was

outdated at the time of the collapse, Table 4.4 above shows that they have made one

of the larger contributions to The Arrangement through the C&A Foundation.

Primark’s response stood out again in comparison to the other Connected

Organisations, and Table 4.4 depicts a significant victim compensation approach. A

news media extract from October 2013 reads:

The firm [Primark] pledged to pay long-term compensation in the new year

to the 550 people in its supply chain who had worked there [Rana Plaza]. The

company [Primark] has also said it will guarantee a further three months’

wages to all 3300 workers or their dependants, having paid six months so far.

(Neville 2013, Oct 24)

Primark was, however, also heavily criticized by some industry stakeholders for

going ahead with their own compensation strategies in collaboration with local NGOs

such as BRAC. In lieu of Primark’s substantial compensation funds, The Arrangement

had to delay its payments to Rana Plaza victims and families as it had not managed to


raise the required minimum of USD$40 million through collective industry

contributions. Primark, however, contested the criticism by stating that vulnerable

crisis victims and families would have been unable to wait months for fashion

organisations to gather such collective funds.


H&M launched the not-for-profit H&M Foundation in the months following the

Rana Plaza collapse. Subsequent to the set-up of the foundation, H&M was the only

organisation among the Unconnected Organisations to contribute to the The

Arrangement. All the other organisations refrained from such victim compensation

strategies. The analysis interpreted H&M’s contribution to victim compensation

scheme as an additional strategic response to lead the way for others to follow within

the fashion industry.


Table 4.5 Prevalent Strategy and Visibility of CSR for Connected and Unconnected

Organisations in Time Period 2

Organisation Prevalent CSR

strategy for Time Period 2

Visibility of CSR

Con

nect

ed O

rgan

isat

ions

Adler Explicit Whilst explicit CSR continued

among all organisations (e.g., codes of conduct, non-collective compensation strategies for Rana Plaza victims, community outreach programs etc.), a slow shift towards collective CSR emerged through a commitment to the Bangladesh Accord or The Alliance.

Benetton Implicit C&A Implicit Mango Implicit Primark Implicit

Wal-Mart Explicit

Unc

onne

cted

Org

anis

atio

ns

Abercrombie & Fitch Implicit Whilst explicit CSR did not cease among organisations (visible through codes of conduct, community outreach programs etc.), a shift towards collective actions emerged in response to the changing institutional environment (Matten & Moon, 2008). Sample trends were captured in the data through a consistent social/financial commitment to the Bangladesh Accord and/or The Alliance among the sample.

American Eagle Outfitters Implicit

Bestseller Implicit

Cotton On Implicit

Fruit of the Loom Implicit H&M Implicit

Kmart Australia Implicit

Helly Hansen Implicit

Lindex Implicit

Target Australia Implicit

On the other hand, it should be noted that all of the Unconnected Organisations

became signatories of the Bangladesh Accord in response of the crisis spillover

phenomena. This entailed annual payments of up to USD$500,000 over a five-year

period towards the improvement of garment factories in Bangladesh.

In summary, Table 4.5 above depicts a shift in the reported CSR based industry

norms between Time Periods 1 and 2. Time Period 1 primarily indicated independent

and explicit CSR by the organisations. The severity of the scope and depth of the Rana

Plaza crisis showed patterns of collective and implicit CSR across the industry through

the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance and The Arrangement. The commitment to these

two collective industry agreements represents implicit CSR in Table 4.5.


The evidence further indicated that stakeholder pressures demanded collective

industry action and that organisations took crisis responsibility irrespective of their

prior linkage with the Rana Plaza factory. This was a contributing factor to the crisis

spilling over across the global fast fashion industry.

4.3.4 Summary

The Connected Organisations eventually all reached a rebuild response through

collective and thereby implicit CSR action. However, some organisations undertook

individual, for example, explicit CSR action, by compensating Rana Plaza victims

through third parties. This was to avoid victim compensations being perceived as the

acceptance of guilt among stakeholders and to alleviate the chance of direct payments

becoming the basis for prospective lawsuits by victims.

An example of an explicit CSR action was identified parallel to C&A’s

predominant implicit work with the Bangladesh Accord. The organisation set up the

C&A Foundation in the months following the factory collapse and thereby contributed

to the victim compensation scheme through their not-for-profit organisational channel

that technically operated separately from the organisation, C&A.

Primark’s initiated, immediate financial assistance and food relief program were

set up for not just their own garment workers in Rana Plaza, but also for the workers

of other organisations. The positive stakeholder responses that were generated by this

response placed pressures on other organisations to follow Primark’s example; for

example, by not taking action, they would allow Primark to publicly clean up the mess

of other organisations. Primark’s CSR responses were deemed as implicit given that

their actions were conducted in direct response to the crisis in their corporate

environment.


The Unconnected Organisations did not contribute funds to the victim

compensation scheme. This did not include H&M as it launched the H&M Foundation

shortly after the Rana Plaza collapse and donated a compensation amount through their

foundation channel. All organisations attributed some degree of responsibility by

becoming signatories of the legally binding Bangladesh Accord, and thereby

committed to contribute up to USD$500,000 per annum towards factory improvements

over a five-year period.

In summary, the data analysis identified the following key findings in Time

Period 2:

The crisis spillover became fully developed, and stakeholders pressured

the broader industry to improve ethical supply chain practises across the

board through media. As a result, the public perception of the crisis and

their attribution of crisis responsibility were steered towards the

organisations.

There was a shift towards implicit CSR practices through collective and

binding initiatives within the sample groups.

Crisis response strategies consisted of SCCT or CSR, but responses that

combined SCCT and CSR also emerged. An example of this was where

rebuild responses through commitment to the Bangladesh Accord were

also deemed implicit CSR. This was because the main purpose of the

Bangladesh Accord was for organisations to collectively make a social

impact through safety enhancements to garment factories.

The majority of Connected and Unconnected Organisations joined

collective initiatives, such as the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance.


This action was suggested to be a strategic move by organisations and

helped the crisis recovery process in the industry.

The subsequent section presents the findings based on the strategic, long-term

responses undertaken by the organisations. Consistent with the prior sections, the

findings for Time Period 3 also showed how possible shifts in stakeholder pressures

may have influenced the strategic actions of the organisations.

4.4 TIME PERIOD 3: LONG-TERM CRISIS RESPONSE

Data for Time Period 3 referred to the period of July 2014 to June 2017. A shift

in the stakeholder pressures facing the organisations was evident in this time period.

With the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance set to expire in 2018, media scrutiny

focused on the progress and outcomes of the organisations and their commitment to

the agreements.

As a long-term legacy of the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance, stakeholder

pressures shifted to demand improved supply chain practises with transparency across

the industry. This section discusses how such findings emerged in the data under a

similar structure to the previous time periods. An important trend to note here is that

many organisations moved away from SCCT responses and patterns of crisis spillover

responses continued to be evident.



With the exclusion of Adler Modemärkte, the Connected Organisations remained

actively involved with objectives mandated by the Bangladesh Accord and The

Alliance. Adler Modemärkte, instead, committed to a German government initiative

to improve supply chain practises in developing regions.


Figure 4.3. Patterns of crisis response strategies undertaken by Connected and Unconnected Organisations.

Figure 4.3 depicts an overview to SCCT trends in the overall data observed by

the level of responsibility undertaken by the Connected Organisations. Primark stood

out with their crisis response as the only organisation to immediately undertake a

rebuild strategy following the crisis whilst also reminding stakeholders of their prior

efforts to conduct business in safe factories.

The Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance were well underway in Time Period 3

and were, therefore, identified as long-term SCCT and crisis spillover responses.

Given that both initiatives primarily sought to make a social impact for garment

workers in Bangladesh, they were also identified as CSR. The focus of stakeholder

pressures, however, started to shift in Time Period 3 towards demands for transparent

supply chains, including the release of physical factory addresses.

Rebuild combined with

bolstering

Primark (UK/Ireland)

Rebuild combined with

diminishBenetton

(Italy), C&A (Netherlands),

Wal-Mart (USA)

Denial combined with

collective rebuild

Mango (Spain)

No official statements

releasedAdler

Modemärkte(Germany)

High Level of crisis responsibility accepted Low


As a part of the newer, long-term pressures, a group of influential industry

watchdogs joined forces to create industry change under the name, The Coalition.

Fashion organisations were approached to take a transparency pledge to disclose their

supplier information, including physical factory addresses within a given timeframe.

The evidence presented in Table 4.6 outlines the long-term crisis responses by

the organisations. The data essentially showed that the Connected Organisations

predominantly declined long-term crisis responses in response to stakeholders’ social

demands due to concerns of inviting competition from peers by releasing supplier

information. Data extracted from The Coalition’s report in April 2017 stated the

following in relation to Mango:

Mango, in response to outreach about the transparency pledge, offered an

alternative: disclosing only to members of the coalition that spearheaded the

Pledge, or to parties that register with the company. These proposals fall short

of the level of supply chain transparency needed in the industry. Private

disclosure of this type is not sustainable and does little to improve human

rights due diligence in global apparel supply chains. (The Coalition, 2017)

Whilst Benetton responded with a partial conformity to stakeholder pressures by

publishing some of its supplier names and physical addresses, C&A exclusively agreed

to take the full transparency pledge by publishing all of their supplier information on

their website in December 2016. In this respect, organisations in the Connected

Organisations appeared to continue to take measures for crisis detachment however

eventually all arrived at a rebuild strategy.


Table 4.6

Long-Term crisis responses through conformity to the supply chain transparency

pledge by Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 3

Organisation Commitment to supply chain transparency pledge

Crisis response

Con

nect

ed O

rgan

isat

ions

Adler Declined No

Statement/ Rebuild

Benetton Partial Rebuild/ Diminish

C&A Full Rebuild

Mango Declined Diminish

Primark Declined Diminish

Wal-Mart Declined Diminish

Unc

onne

cted

Org

anis

atio

ns Abercrombie & Fitch Partial Spillover


Declined Diminish/ Spillover

Bestseller Partial Spillover Cotton On Full Spillover Fruit of the Loom Partial Spillover H&M Full Spillover Kmart Australia Full Spillover Helly Hansen Partial Spillover Lindex Full Spillover Target Australia Full Spillover

Whilst SCCT theory traditionally posits short- to intermediate post-crisis

timeframes, it is argued here that the rebuild and diminish strategies continued for the

Connected Organisations in the years following the Rana Plaza collapse. A reasoning

for this is the scope and severity of the Rana Plaza crisis which required more than

short-term actions to mitigate stakeholder pressures.

Similar to Time Period 2, SCCT did not offer a spillover response as it focuses

on single organisations experiencing a crisis event. A spillover response was,

therefore, added to complement SCCT to fit the context of the crisis phenomenon

being explored. The crisis spillover response was applicable to organisations that

became implicated in the Rana Plaza crisis through guilt by association, for example,


the Unconnected Organisations. In response to the Rana Plaza crisis and their

implication in the event, these organisations assumed responsibility for the industry

crisis by responding to various stakeholder demands in the short- and long-term. For

Time Period 3, this referred to the demand for transparent supply chain practises.

4.4.1.2 Unconnected organisations

It should be noted here that Coombs (2007b) did not develop SCCT for

application in crisis spillover settings. This means that this study found an opportunity

to complement how organisations sustain SCCT strategies into the crisis spillover

phenomenon and the longer term.

The majority of Unconnected Organisations took the full or partial transparency

pledge which became a long-term spillover response as they were never linked with

prior business at the Rana Plaza factory. Had these organisations been a part of the

Connected Organisations, this would have rather been considered to be a long-term

rebuild response. This development indicated a shift in industry norms for fast fashion

organisations as a result of the Rana Plaza crisis spillover. The Unconnected

Organisations, yet again, accepted a degree of responsibility for a crisis that they were

linked with through guilt by association.

Similar to C&A’s response (i.e., Connected Organisations), H&M also took the

full transparency pledge in December 2016 and full supplier information with physical

addresses were available on their website. Both organisations implemented similar

CSR-based responses through the establishment of not-for-profit foundations in 2013.

The long-term data indicated the importance of large-scale organisations such as

H&M leading the way for industry peers by “doing the right thing”. If industry leaders

had embraced transparent supply chain practises, the impact would have been greater


as smaller organisations would have been encouraged to replicate H&M’s crisis

responses. A news media channel containing stakeholder pressure in April 2016 stated:

They [collective activist groups] argue that the Swedish firm [H&M] has a

duty to do more as a market leader and an early signatory to the accord. They

have influence in a number of different countries... with great power comes

great responsibility. (Hutchison, 2016, April 20)

It is also likely that organisations embraced the non-SCCT, long-term responses

to remain competitive and maintain stakeholder legitimacy as the industry

environment started shifting towards transparent and more ethical norms.


It has been established that the analysis of the data showed a shift in the demands

for stakeholder pressures for transparent supply chain practices. Multiple justifications

for such demands appeared in the data. Among those were ambiguity around

organisation-supplier factory relationships which were apparent in the immediate

aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse; for example, some organisations would not

disclose their supplier factories.

The analysis identified a total of 4,051 coding references for Time Period 3.

These referred to the number of times stakeholders appeared in the research data

through news media, interviews and organisational communication.

A shift in the stakeholder pressures became visible with an inference across four

of the top five stakeholder pressures appearing: (1) the Bangladesh Accord; (2) NGO

or charity initiative; (3) the Fashion Revolution; (4) activist group or other; and (5)

Oxfam.


Figure 4.4 provides an overview on the sources of pressures facing the fashion

industry during this period of time, for example, the number of times that the

Bangladesh Accord appeared in the data in Time Period 3. Figure 4.4 contains the most

coding frequencies for stakeholder pressures in comparison to Time Period 1 and Time

Period 2 because industry watchdogs and news media intensified pressures for

transparent organisational supply chain practises.

Figure 4.4. Reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 3, July 2014 - June 2017.

The frequency of coding references in Figure 4.4 means that the industry

pressures experienced by the organisations were far from eliminated and they had to

continue industry reforms to appear legitimate and avoid reputational threats.

Moreover, pressures included media and stakeholders who scrutinised the

performance of the organisations and their commitment to the Bangladesh Accord and

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The Alliance. This became a measure for stakeholders to ensure that the post-crisis

industry developments would not stagnate over the long-term.

An analysis of the data showed that the five-year duration of the Bangladesh

Accord brought expectations of signatories to be underway with improvements at their

Bangladesh factories. In Time Period 3, H&M continued to be the main target of

stakeholder pressures to ensure that they followed through with their commitments for

industry reforms. A large number of negative reports became associated with H&M

during this period as they were perceived to lag behind with their factory

improvements as per the requirements of the Bangladesh Accord. For example, the

evidence presented scrutiny of H&M’s legitimacy for lagging behind with the

implementation of their factory improvements.

An extract from the Clean Clothes Campaign (2015, p. 4) annual report stated:

As a witness signatory to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety,

Clean Clothes Campaign is keeping a close watch on organisations that

signed this binding agreement: making sure they keep their promises. Our

research in 2015 showed that Bangladesh factories supplying H&M were still

far from safe.

Due to H&M’s large organisational size and influence in the Bangladeshi

garment industry, the analysis of the data indicated that they became one of the key

targets of stakeholders, as was also depicted in Time Period 1. The organisation

continued to receive negative reports in news media in cases of perceived non-conduct

of the Bangladesh Accord.


4.4.3 Supply chain transparency

Stakeholder pressures demanding supply chain transparency emerged in Time

Period 3 and were aimed at all organisations to disclose their factory locations,

including physical addresses in the host country.

Figure 4.5 provides an overview on the level of pressures experienced by the

fashion industry in Time Period 3 between July and June 2017, which represents the

long-term timeline of this study. The main sources of pressure were news media,

statements by organisational peers, industry watchdogs and their annual industry

progress reports.

Figure 4.5 below shows that although that stakeholder pressures intensified in

Time Period 3. The scale and scope of the Rana Plaza crisis motivated stakeholders to

monitor the five-year commitment undertaken by organisations, and legitimate

outcomes were expected rather than short-term PR strategies.

Additional stakeholders also continued to emerge here, which is suggested to be

rare, three years after a crisis event. The Fashion Revolution initiative became an

influential post-crisis movement that emerged in the long-term data as they grew to be

active across 80 countries here. In addition to consumers asking #whomademyclothes

during Fashion Revolution Week in April each year, more global organisations started

to respond with the hashtag, #imadeyourclothes. The Fashion Revolution movement

also began publishing the Fashion Transparency Index as of 2016. The index reports

on 100 globally established fashion organisations that are surveyed on ethical supply

chain matters and operational transparency and are graded accordingly.

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Similarly, industry reports such as the Ethical Fashion Report and Behind the Barcode

has enabled consumers to make informed brand purchases in the long-term. As such

industry reports place pressure on organisations to be perceived positively by

stakeholders, the reports have been coded accordingly as a stakeholder pressure.

Moreover, on January 1st, 2016, the United Nations implemented the 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s), a pragmatic reform to achieve

social and economic equality on a global scale. Whilst the SDG’s are not legally

binding, each UN member country is expected to establish national frameworks and

measures for the collective achievement of the SDG’s.

Applicable to this study is SDG #12 which directs member states to achieve

sustainable consumption and production patterns. This was an interesting finding as

SDG’s were considered a governmental/political stakeholder pressures, however

relevant CSR had already started as a part of organisational long-term crisis responses.

Moreover, in December 2016, a policy instrument was introduced to align the

UN development system with the 2030 SDG’s, namely the Quadrennial

Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) 2017-2020. Whilst this study did not analyse

the QCPR, at the time of writing this thesis, the implementation of the UN’s SDG’s

was expected to have had a long-term impact on how the organisations within this

study mandated their CSR, given that they all originated from UN member states.


4.4.4.1 Connected organisations

Table 4.7 shows that all organisations undertook a combination of implicit and

explicit CSR. Implicit activities were determined by collective actions undertaken by

115

organisations with one or more industry peers, as opposed to explicit CSR, which was

deemed by individual organisational actions (Matten & Moon, 2008).

Table 4.7

Trends for implicit and explicit CSR by Connected and Unconnected Organisations

in Time Period 311

Organisation Prevalent CSR

strategy for Time Period 3

Visibility of CSR

Con

nect

ed O

rgan

isat

ions

Adler Explicit/Implicit Explicit CSR continued in the form of voluntary and non-legally binding activities, such as vendor codes of conduct, additional factory visits in addition to ongoing requirements for the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance. Many organisations resisted full or partial supply chain transparency. A shift towards legally binding supply chain requirements emerged.

Benetton Explicit/Implicit

C&A Explicit/Implicit

Mango Explicit/Implicit

Primark Explicit/Implicit

Wal-Mart

Explicit/Implicit

Unc

onne

cted

Org

anis

atio

ns Abercrombie & Fitch Explicit/Implicit In a similar manner to Connected

Organisations, explicit CSR continued in addition to ongoing requirements for the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance. Many organisations conformed to full or partial supply chain transparency. A shift towards legally binding supply chain requirements emerged through UN’s 2030 SDG’s and modern anti-slavery legislation.

American Eagle Outfitters Explicit/Implicit

Bestseller Explicit/Implicit

Cotton On Explicit/Implicit

Fruit of the Loom Explicit/Implicit

H&M Explicit/Implicit

Kmart Australia Explicit/Implicit

Helly Hansen Explicit/Implicit

Lindex Explicit/Implicit

Target Australia Explicit/Implicit

The newer pressures for transparent supply chain practises discussed in the

previous section influenced the type of activities undertaken here by the organisations.

Implicit CSR remained collective actions in response to the crisis in 2013 through the

legally binding Bangladesh Accord or The Accord.

16Collective transparency pledge/other obligatory schemes affecting industry = implicit CSR Internal policies, codes of conduct and vendor CoCs are explicit CSR (i.e., not collective actions but rather developed internally by the organisation).


Some organisations, such as Primark, were now also legally required to declare

their annual CSR activities due to reforms by national governments, for example, the

UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. This required all public and private UK corporations

with a consolidated global turnover of GBP36 million or more to communicate the

measures taken to prevent modern slavery abuses in their supply chain in their annual

reports.

In 2015 Adler Modemärkte maintained its silent communications approach;

however, as the only German organisation in the sample, they joined the German

Partnership for Sustainable Textiles. This initiative was set up by the German Federal

Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2014 as a response to the

Rana Plaza crisis and could be viewed as an implicit CSR response by the organisation.

Similar to the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance, the Partnership for Sustainable

Textiles sought to improve supply chain practices in developing regions of business in

collaboration with apparel organisations and industry bodies. At the conclusion of the

data collection for this dissertation, Adler Modemärkte had yet to publish a road map

for 2017 to disclose their individual action plans for supply chain improvements.

Given that it had been four years since the Rana Plaza factory collapse, at this point in

time, it was possible that Adler Modemärkte placed focus on other areas of priority for

PR purposes; however, no definitive statements were available from the organisation.

Wal-Mart expressed intentions of handing over the key responsibilities of The

Alliance to the Bangladesh government in 2018 when the official agreement expired.

As this study was conducted prior to 2018, the impacts of this could not be explored.

However, research data from 2013 suggested a conflict of interest by 60 % of 300

Bangladesh government members having direct or indirect ties to industry through

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ownership interests. Such risks to future CSR outcomes could be linked to a data unit

dated October 2013 which reads:

Our political leaders [in Bangladesh] don't talk in terms of what workers

deserve. They talk in terms of trying to appease international pressure. They

do this because they have to, because they are afraid of losing orders, not

because they think it's the proper thing to do. (Westhead 2013, Oct 13)

At the point of writing this thesis, this presented concerns for the long-term

pragmatic outcomes of The Alliance beyond its expiry in 2018.

In summary, beyond the work being undertaken through the Bangladesh Accord

and The Alliance, explicit CSR again weighed strongly among the Connected

Organisations. This was evident through consistent introductions of the vendor codes

of conduct, which specifically applied to the suppliers. Other types of explicit CSR

undertaken by organisations within the region involved community engagement with

a focus on the health and empowerment of workers.


Table 4.7 overall presents similar responses across the Unconnected

Organisations through stronger, combined implicit and explicit CSR strategies. The

predominant pattern was that obligatory implicit CSR responses were concurrently

combined with voluntary corporate programs, such as community outreach or internal

corporate policies pertinent to ethical supply chain practices, that is, explicit CSR

(Matten & Moon, 2008). Observations of the overall data suggested that the

Unconnected Organisations proactively and collectively undertook measures based on

the lessons learned from the Rana Plaza crisis. A data extract from CCC state:


Rana Plaza was described by everyone involved as a “wake-up call”.

Governments, employers, apparel organisations and civil society pledged

fundamental change to an industry grown out of control. Some innovative

programmes were developed to prevent new disasters and provide remedy to

those already affected. These victories now need to be defended and

developed, not eroded and reversed. However, the promises of fundamental

change have so far failed to come true: the systematic problems of cut-throat

competition, low pay, union repression, weak labour laws and legal impunity

remain. (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2015)

This quote depicts the long-term scrutiny that fashion organisations were faced

with as a long-term consequence of the Rana Plaza disaster.

Therefore, by conforming to stakeholder pressures through CSR, organisations

could continue to strategically maintain their social legitimacy when conducting

business in an environment reputed for its lack of compliance management. In fact,

this included American Eagle Outfitters who resisted the transparency pledge, but were

already obliged to follow the “California Transparency Supply Chains Act of 2010”.

As of 2015, organisations in the Nordic region started introducing corporate

policies and strategies aligned with the UN’s 2030 SDGs. Relevant data was identified

within annual reports and CSR/sustainability reports and referred to responsible

production goals as well as a contribution towards creating decent work and economic

growth in developing regions of business.

Bestseller were affected by the UK’s modern anti-slavery legislation due to a

UK-based subsidiary. A data extract showed that stakeholders could expect the

following statement within the organisation’s future annual reports:

119

BESTSELLER'S MODERN SLAVERY STATEMENT 2015/16 - This

statement is published in accordance with the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015.

It describes the steps taken by BESTSELLER A/S, which has a subsidiary in

the UK, within the financial year ending 31 July 2016 to prevent modern

slavery and human trafficking in our supply chain. (Bestseller, 2016)

This was to be followed by the organisation’s steps to ensure ethical and

sustainable supply chain practices.

Similar to the UK’s approach, Australia, as of 2018, was preparing to submit an

inquiry to parliament for a modern slavery act. As a long-term outcome of the Rana

Plaza crisis, this was likely to further impact on the organisations of Target Australia,

Kmart Australia and Cotton On Group to make stronger implicit CSR actions

involving supply chain practices. In addition, Target Australia and Kmart Australia

jointly implemented an Ethical Sourcing Guide (both operated under their holding

company, Wesfarmers). This sourcing guide applied to all of their suppliers and was

based on the UN’s “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.

In summary, the the analysis of the data suggested that industry was increasingly

affected by legislative requirements relating to CSR, for example, implicit CSR

through the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The organisations combined

compulsory social engagements with individual and voluntary efforts, for example,

explicit CSR through community empowerment programs or disaster relief. By

combining explicit and implicit CSR, organisations were able to maximise the

outcomes of their image and reputation by building legitimacy among stakeholders.


4.4.5 Summary

Whilst work with the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance continued to be

carried out, the trend among the Connected Organisations shifted from being

responsive to becoming resistant towards transparent supply chain management. Only

one participant, C&A, accepted a full transparency pledge and consistently responded

in a similar way to H&M throughout the three time periods.

The evidence ultimately identified that the Connected Organisations group

continued to distance themselves from crisis responsibility and were reluctant to

conform to the causes of short- and long-term stakeholder pressures. This was an

interesting development and from a practical perspective it was likely that these

organisations acted this way to take protect themselves from long-term legal

repercussions by victims and their families.

The Unconnected Organisations, on the other hand, continued to respond to the

crisis spillover phenomenon by conforming (Allan & Caillouet, 1994) to stakeholder

pressures through a full or partial pledge for supply chain transparency. This was

deemed as a collective CSR action to meet social expectations for this point in time,

that is, implicit CSR.

Whilst one organisation, American Eagle Outfitters (AEO), declined to take the

transparency pledge, they were bound by compliance with the “California

Transparency in Supply Chain Act 2010” through implicit CSR. The Act required

AEO to disclose efforts for responsible supply chain management and to eradicate

human exploitation for consumers to make an informed purchase decision. Disclosures

were released annually on their website or other channels of written statements such

as annual reports.

121

In summary, the data analysis of Time Period 3 found the following:

Industry adapted to implicit CSR practices for the long-term due to

emerging governmental requirements, for example, the UN’s Sustainable

Development Goals and modern anti-slavery legislation.

Stakeholder pressures demanded transparent supply chains practices.

Industry scrutiny continued to create more transparency in supply chain

practises through annual reports released by industry watchdogs.

The next section presents the findings of trends and patterns within the two

groups being studied, as well as across the regions from which the organisations

originated.

4.5 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE PATTERNS AND TRENDS

This section explores the objectives of Research Question 3, which asks:

What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ in

the short- and long-term?

To answer this research question, the analysis considered the trends and

variances in the crisis and CSR responses in both samples as well as the regional

CSR trends for the Unconnected Organisations.

4.5.1 Connected Organisations

The analysis identified inferences in the immediate crisis responses across the

sample. Whilst all organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild response within Time

Period 1, some organisations preferred to undertake individual crisis responses, for

example, explicitly rather than undertaking a collective industry approach, for


example, implicitly. By exploring individual organisations within each sample group,

broader industry-wide trends could be identified.

Adler Modemärkte persistently maintained a silent crisis response throughout

the study, with an undisclosed donation to a Bangladesh charity being the only

responsibility attributed to the crisis by this organisation. Others combined individual

rebuild strategies with collective industry responses, such as the Bangladesh Accord

or The Alliance.

Following the immediate crisis period, the data analysis identified that the

fashion industry shifted towards reformed collective industry practises that remained

unchanged throughout the study. This was evident through collective, implicit CSR,

such as the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance, and even the German Partnership for

Sustainable Textiles. From 2016, the demand of stakeholders was for organisations to

pledge transparent supply chain practises. Surprisingly, a majority of the Connected

Organisations, excluding C&A, declined to take the pledge despite prior conformity

to pressures identified in the previous years, as explored by this study.

Among the CSR activities that stood out from the norm was the set-up of the

C&A Foundation following the Rana Plaza collapse. Whilst this was an individual

approach, a similar response was set up by H&M first and then this was imitated by

C&A. In summary, this suggests peer-to-peer imitation, however, on an individual

organisational basis.

4.5.2 Unconnected Organisations: Geographical CSR trends

4.5.2.1 Nordic region

Organisations assumed collective responsibility by agreeance with the

Bangladesh Accord and/or The Accord. H&M stood out from the norm within the

123

Nordic region. This organisation was the single, largest garment producer in

Bangladesh and, therefore, became a primary target by stakeholders despite non-

affiliations with the Rana Plaza factory.

Ultimately, organisations within the Nordic region depicted a unified CSR

movement, for example, implicit CSR. This was approached through the UN’s

Sustainable Development Goals for the long-term to empower the local communities

within less developed regions where business was being conducted, as well as

improved ethical standards. Organisations communicated relevant CSR goals widely

through various channels like CSR/sustainability agendas, annual reports and

company websites.

4.5.2.2 North America

Prior research has suggested that organisations within the North American

region commonly addressed CSR responses of an explicit nature (Matten & Moon,

2008) prior to the Rana Plaza crisis. This means that organisations primarily engaged

in their own strategic and voluntary CSR programs, such as through community

outreach programs after hurricanes or internal company policies. This trend remained

in the immediate period following the factory collapse as many North American

organisations declined the Bangladesh Accord by mimicking Wal-Mart’s non-

conformity to stakeholder pressures. The rationale for declining the Bangladesh

Accord was indicated by concerns for its legally binding arbitration. There was also

concerns for prospective law suits by victims and their families by indirectly accepting

a level of responsibility through commitment to collective industry reforms.

The North American region eventually responded to stakeholder pressures by

shifting to more implicit CSR practices through the implementation of The Alliance.


Despite the lack of a legally binding arbitration and union collaboration, The Alliance

recognised that single organisations would not be able to improve industry practices

on their own, and that collaborative forces were necessary.

Analysis of the data for the long-term strategies indicated that there was a degree

of resistance in the North American region in the shift of industry norms towards

implicit CSR practices when compared to other regions; however, the market was

slowly transforming.

Although American Eagle Outfitters did not agree to the transparency pledge, it

was legally bound by the “California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010”,

which was of an implicit nature. American Eagle Outfitters was thereby strategically

aligned with the shifting industry norms for Unconnected Organisations.

4.5.2.3 Australia

Similar to other regions, Australia primarily undertook explicit CSR during

Time Period 1. Australian news media, NGOs, activists, and consumers were quick to

report on the Rana Plaza factory collapse, which likely prompted organisations to

respond tactically to minimise reputational damage.

Wesfarmers was the holding company of both Kmart Australia and Target

Australia, out of which Kmart Australia was the primary buyer in Bangladesh.

Following the Rana Plaza collapse, Kmart Australia immediately admitted that their

factory audits did not include structural building inspections, and thereby openly

brought awareness to an industry-wide issue at the time of the factory collapse. In

doing so, Kmart Australia accepted responsibility for the crisis spillover by

recognising their neglect of one of the broader underlying causes of the Rana Plaza

factory collapse that could apply collectively across the industry.

125

The shift towards implicit CSR in the Australian industry segment became

visible when Kmart Australia and Target Australia became the first organisations to

sign the Bangladesh Accord from the region in June 2013, again, closely followed by

Cotton On. The long-term analysis showed that all three Australian organisations now

led Australian fast fashion organisations by example through their ethical and

transparent supply chain practices. Such data emerged through industry reports, such

as Behind the Barcode which revealed a comparable scoring system of organisations

based on disclosure, or non-disclosure, of their ethical supply chain practises.

Target Australia and Kmart Australia further implemented a joint Ethical

Sourcing Guide which applied to all suppliers and was based on the UN’s Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. All three organisations achieved their top grades by

maintaining explicit CSR practices concurrent with implicit CSR through collective

industry initiatives, such as with the Bangladesh Accord and commitments to the

transparency pledge.

It should also be noted that whilst the pledge for supply chain transparency

became the objective of long-term pressures, the Australian region started releasing

physical factory addresses as early as in Time Period 2. The analysis of the data from

Australian news media outlets and NGOs indicated that Australia was increasingly

conscious of their ethical supply chain practices and how stakeholders perceived

relevant activities, as industry scrutiny had continued since Rana Plaza. The long-term

analysis showed that all three Australian organisations led by example with peers

within the region.

In addition, and similarly to what the UK had recently implemented, Australia

prepared to submit an inquiry to parliament for the implementation of a modern slavery


act. If successful, this would require organisations to declare ethical supply chain

practices in annual reports.

4.5.3 Summary

The section above discussed trends and variances in the crisis and CSR responses

between the two sample groups. It also compared patterns of geographical

characteristics between the organisations within Unconnected Organisations with

those linked with prior garment production at Rana Plaza.

In summary, the following key findings were identified within the data:

As the cause of stakeholder pressures shifted towards transparent supply chain

practices, the data showed patterns of resistance among the Connected

Organisations whilst Unconnected Organisations responded with agreement.

The Connected Organisations continued to distance themselves from the crisis

as opposed to those affected by the crisis spillover, and predominantly

conformed to pressures (Allen & Caillouet, 1994).

There was an industry shift towards obligatory and collective CSR of an

implicit nature, however, in combination with explicit CSR activities for

legitimacy.

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Chapter 5: Discussion

5.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter contains a discussion, interpretation and evaluation of the research

findings with reference to the key constructs and theories explored in the literature

review in Chapter 2, namely, attribution theory and Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT

framework, implicit and explicit CSR responses (Matten & Moon, 2008), and

stakeholder pressures.

In providing succinct outcomes of the different short- and long-term strategies

undertaken by the organisations and their meaning in terms of the existing literature,

key constructs and theories are explored through the three RQs of this study:


spillover?

(2) What SCCT strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations

employ in the short- and long-term?

(3) What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ


The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations, implications for

theory and practise, and finally, recommendations for future research applicable to the

nexus or CSR and the crisis spillover context.

5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1

How does attribution theory explain organisational responses to a crisis

spillover?



Rana Plaza presented a complex case from the perspective of attribution theory

and crisis responsibility. Whilst neither of the sample groups were directly responsible

for the crisis, the Connected Organisations were more closely affected by the crisis

than the Unconnected Organisations due to their prior business links with the Rana

Plaza factory.

SCCT prescribes a rebuild strategy for preventable accidents leading to human

injury or fatality, as these situations bring a strong attribution of responsibility

(Coombs, 2007b). The evidence showed that this was not the preferred initial method

for the majority of the Connected Organisations, perhaps due to their indirect link to

the cause of the crisis. The data showed initial SCCT strategies that denied or

diminished crisis responsibility. Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) examined this

similarly through an inductive content analysis and found that defensive strategies,

including denial and justification, attracted negative attention from stakeholders.

Organisations that undertake defensive strategies in a collective setting may seek to

take advantage of the situation by “getting lost in the crowd” among other

organisations that assume responsibility (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 177).

Chapter 2 identified apologies, the expression of remorse and sympathy or the

gesture of offering compensation to victims, as the most effective way to mitigate

negative attributions among stakeholders (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 177).

Primark on the other hand immediately employed a rebuild response which indicates

that organisations assume crisis responsibility, in this instance however, the response

acted in the organisation’s favour (Coombs 2007b, 2015c; Comyns & Franklin-

Johnson, 2016). Primark quickly released crisis-related information, which partly

assisted them in ‘stealing thunder’ (Coombs, 2015c) from peers and other media

129

channels. This was related to crisis spillover as Primark was able to frame their own

crisis response to stakeholders immediately after the factory collapse (Coombs 2007b,

2015c; Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016), and thereby influence crisis attributions

from information infomediaries (Zavyalova et al., 2012).

Whilst most Connected Organisations conformed to the Bangladesh Accord in

Time Period 2, this rebuild response complemented other SCCT strategies, such as

bolstering and diminish for organisations to distance themselves from crisis

responsibility. A different type of crisis detachment was, however, observed with

Adler Modemärkte. This organisation became linked to the Rana Plaza factory in July

2013 and from then on maintained a no-statement response.

It is possible that stakeholders struggled to attribute crisis responsibility to Adler

Modemärkte as the organisation was able to avoid the immediate reporting of the

factory collapse. The organisation’s linkage with Rana Plaza was not frequently

reported by both global news media or in their media in their home country of

Germany. As Adler Modemärkte was not a globally established organisation and had

little global media presence, it would have been challenging for stakeholders outside

Germany to attribute responsibility to them. From Adler Modemärkte’s perspective,

their continued silence helped to detach them from blame attribution with Rana Plaza.

Overall, the Connected Organisations contributed with various levels of victim

compensation strategies, as all organisations moved to a rebuild crisis response

(Coombs, 2007b). Some, however, compensated victims through third parties to avoid

payments being perceived or cognitively attributed with guilt among stakeholders

(Coombs, 2007b; Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1991), and thereby mitigate the risks

for possible legal repercussions. This was consistent with prior findings in the

literature, as organisations indirectly accepted responsibility through victim


compensation schemes, which in some instances, such as in the case for Wal-Mart,

could lead to class act law suits by victims.

The Connected Organisations continued long-term rebuild strategies through

CSR in Time Period 3, which were likely to encourage a positive perception of their

efforts among stakeholders, according to Zhou and Ki (2018b). Parallel with long-term

rebuild strategies, some Connected Organisations continued diminishing responses to

reiterate that factors causing Rana Plaza had been beyond their immediate control. The

purpose of such concurrent responses was to minimise blame attribution to their brand

names whilst responsibility was taken through rebuild responses to meet social

demands placed by stakeholders.

An example of this was C&A, which acknowledged prior business ties to Rana

Plaza but a diminish response to reduce responsibility was made stating that their

contract with the Rana Plaza factory had concluded well before the disaster. Whilst it

could normally be presumed that business contracts would have be active and in place

at the time of the crisis to enable the process of responsibility, this was not the case.

Poor record keeping management and, often, outdated websites of garment

manufacturers contributed to fashion organisations still being listed as business

partners at the time of the disaster.

However, journalist and stakeholders’ views of crisis responsibility (present in

media stories) were aimed at any organisation with prior business links with the unsafe

factory premises, as this was deemed unethical supply chain management.

This development is consistent with the literature in Chapter 2, for example the

organisations were still able to maintain a strong interplay by fulfilling the expectations

of their key stakeholders by undertaking the long-term rebuild strategies (Allen &

Caillouet 1994; Zhou & Ki, 2018a). For example, although C&A did not have an active

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contract with the Rana Plaza factory at the time of the building collapse, they assumed

responsibility through rebuild responses in combination with statements to diminish

responsibility.

5.2.2 Unconnected Organisations

Unconnected Organisations became implicated by “externally induced

disruptions” in their industry environment (Desai, 2011, p. 263) and their SCCT

responses were, therefore, different to those of Connected Organisations. An important

pattern was that responsibility bypassed the traditional owner of the crisis to

organisations with similar corporate characteristics within the industry. As such,

affected organisations were faced with different circumstances under the three goals

for public excuse-giving (Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Weiner, 1985, 1991).

The causal locus fell explicitly on external circumstances, that is, the Rana Plaza

factory owners, which was expected to reduce stakeholders’ attribution of blame

(Weiner, 1985, 1991). The factors of controllability and stability should have thereby

become redundant but were, instead, transferred from the Rana Plaza owners to the

Connected Organisations and then to the Unconnected Organisations (Weiner, 1985,

1991) through social stakeholder expectations for ethical supply chain practises.

One other threat facing the Unconnected Organisations was reputational damage

through guilt by association (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008) with the Connected

Organisations. Such cognitive attributions are particularly applicable to industry fields

with a prior history of disruptions (Desai, 2014) which had applied to the fashion

industry, for example, through prior sweatshop revelations and industrial accidents.

This may explain the initial crisis responses for the Unconnected Organisations in that

they either denied or remained silent in the immediate crisis aftermath.


Chapter 2, however, explained that organisations are more likely to undertake

accommodative strategies when the industry environment is more interconnected

(Clemens & Douglas, 2005). This can generally lead organisations to participate in

industry associations or other collective equivalent initiatives, which can work as an

effective tool to influence industry reforms (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Goodstein

1994). Based on this, H&M became susceptible to stakeholder pressures from the

Bangladesh Accord despite their non-linkage with the Rana Plaza factory.

Literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggested that this may happen to large-scale

organisations with a greater social presence to influence CSR trends (Arvidsson,

2010), which the analysis of the data supported. The findings thereby align with

Desai’s (2011) theory in that public relations responses provided from the

Unconnected Organisations sometimes carried a greater influence than that of the

Connected Organisations.

The Unconnected Organisations predominantly refrained from public statements

in Time Period 1. The sample strategically assumed responsibility through collective

CSR in Time Period 2, which presumably helped minimise anger among stakeholders

(Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Kim & Cameron, 2011). By meeting stakeholders’ post-

crisis expectations, for example, by collective measures to improve supply chain

practises through the Bangladesh Accord, the Unconnected Organisations created a

cognitive interruption in an attempt to diminish negative blame attributions.

This research has complemented Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT framework from the

crisis spillover perspective. The Unconnected Organisations became involved with the

crisis through the scrutiny of society’s “macrostructure” following a severe crisis event

(Allen & Caillouet, 1994, p. 46). By assuming responsibility through such responses,

the analysis of the data suggested that it was possible to collectively change or improve

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industry norms as a result of the crisis spillover (Desai, 2011; Yu et al., 2008). By

accepting collective responsibility for the Rana Plaza crisis, the Unconnected

Organisations used public relations as a tool to amplify a perceived positive social

impact through short- and long-term industry reforms (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b; Huang,

2008).

5.2.3 Summary

In answering RQ1 that examined how attribution theory explains organisational

responses to a crisis spillover, the following could be unpacked at a theoretical level:

The Connected Organisations undertook a diverse range of SCCT responses to

address key stakeholder groups, often those bearing the greatest threat (Allan

& Caillouet, 1994), rather than addressing all stakeholders simultaneously with

moderate outcomes (Allan & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 2007b).

Whilst all Connected Organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild strategy,

their communication was complemented with statements of denial, diminish

and/or bolstering. The purpose of this was to mitigate stakeholders’ cognitive

attribution of blame, given that this process is often driven by unexpectedness

and negativity, often resulting in anger and/or sympathy (Coombs 2007b;

Weiner, 1985). The literature has suggested that the initial distancing from the

crisis responsibility through diminish and/or denial strategies amplified

stakeholders’ feelings of anger towards organisations and sympathy for the

victims (Coombs, 2015c; Coombs & Holladay, 2014).

Primark was the only organisation to explicitly address a rebuild strategy with

full responsibility for the crisis; this included monetary compensation plans to

aid Rana Plaza victims and their families. Whilst Primark paid a higher cost


financially, by assuming responsibility they lessened stakeholders’ anger and

negativity towards them.

As the crisis spilled over to affect the industry, the Unconnected Organisations

undertook crisis spillover strategies to their advantage by assuming partial

crisis responsibility. This supports emerging theory as the acceptance of guilt

would traditionally, generally bring reputational damage to organisations. In

this instance, however, the admission of collective guilt was used as a cognitive

interruption of stakeholders’ blame attributions (Weiner, 1985), as they likely

would have had opposite expectations.

The next section explores RQ2 based on the results from the data analysis.


The following research question was explored:

What SCCT strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ in


To answer Research Question 2, short-term crisis responses were firstly explored

to determine broader findings in the data.


The analysis of the data showed that the organisations predominantly distanced

themselves from the crisis responsibility in the short-term due to the volatility brought

by the scale and scope of the crisis. Literature in Chapter 2 indicated that large-scale

organisations can be more susceptible to pressures due to the greater scope of their

public visibility (Arvidsson, 2010; Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Desai, 2014; Zhou &

Ki, 2018a), such as in the case of Wal-Mart. It could be assumed that non-conformity

to such pressures would bring reputational damage given that stakeholders often

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specifically target large-scale organisations to lead peers by example. In this case, Wal-

Mart did not respond to the stakeholder demands that pressured them to become a

signatory of the Bangladesh Accord.

One explanation could be a high degree of internal bureaucracy and rigidity for

larger organisations such as Wal-Mart (Clemens et al., 2008), but also an

organisational structure seeking to adopt aggressive and cost-efficient responses to

pressures (Clemens et al., 2008). In this case, that became The Alliance which Wal-

Mart initiated as a counter-option to the Bangladesh Accord. The analysis of the data

showed that the legitimacy of The Alliance was often questioned by stakeholders as it

was not congruent with the expectations of the stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b; Weiner,

1985; Zavyalova et al., 2012).

Questions pertained as to whether Wal-Mart used The Alliance as a non-legal

counter-agreement to strategically rebuild their post-crisis image and to deter negative

publicity through a ceremonial action (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Crisis spillover

literature has addressed similar behaviour as a “free riding problem” (Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 178). This means that organisations that contribute nothing

or less than others to fix industry problems, can benefit from collective efforts

(Comyns, & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).

Other organisations, excluding Adler Modemärkte, more readily conformed to

the Bangladesh Accord and thereby responded with an active strategy to mitigate

reputational damage arising from the circumstances of a crisis with a high probability

of blame attribution (Coombs, 1995, 2007b, 2015c; Coombs & Holladay, 2004;

Weiner et al., 1991, p. 5). Once H&M became a signatory of the Bangladesh Accord,

smaller industry peers followed a similar strategy. Literature in Chapter 2 supported

this by suggesting that smaller organisations are better equipped to respond with active


strategies for stakeholder pressures and innovative solutions due to less dependability

on bureaucracy (Clemens et al., 2008). Similarly, Zhou and Ki’s (2018a) study found

that smaller organisations can have more flexibility due to their reduced public

visibility, as opposed to the case for large-scale organisations, which helps explain the

flexibility of smaller organisations to assume responsibility during a crisis spillover.

Stakeholder pressures eventually started to shift to demand collective industry

compensation for the Rana Plaza victims and their families. A pattern that emerged

here for the Connected Organisations was that they responded by agreeing with

stakeholder pressures. Monetary contributions were, however, made independently or

through third parties and could be linked with strategies to maintain diminished crisis

responsibility. Their acceptance of stakeholder pressures may, however, be explained

by literature based on the high level of dependence between the fashion industry and

its stakeholders (Clemens & Douglas 2005; Ingram & Simons, 1995). For example,

when societal demands are congruent with organisational objectives, such as to

maintain a positive brand perception for long-term viability, rational agreement about

the actions to take may occur (Clemens et al., 2008; Coombs, 2007b).

Benetton’s behaviour stood out in that they employed the accountancy firm Price

Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) to undertake an independent assessment to scale their crisis

liability, including their commercial association and the square meters used inside the

factory. PwC calculated retributions of USD$550,000 for which Benetton doubled the

compensation amount to victims and their families. Whilst Benetton was already a

signatory of the Bangladesh Accord, their journey towards this subsequent

compensation rebuild response does not align with Coombs’ (2007b, 2015c) SCCT.

Moreover, whilst SCCT does not traditionally posit a long-term lens, it is argued

here that the Connected Organisations undertook rebuild responses parallel with SCCT

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strategies that denied, bolstered and/or diminished crisis responsibility in the short-

and long-term. The analysis of the data pertinent to stakeholders depicted emotions of

anger in response to the Connected Organisations’ reluctance to accept full

responsibility.

In Time Period 3, stakeholder pressures demanded transparent supply chain

practices and some Connected Organisations responded with resistance to conformity,

including Primark. Literature in Chapter 2 explained that when organisations feel the

need to conform to social and economic norms in their environment, they can be least

likely to make an active resistance (Clemens et al., 2008). Whilst the Connected

Organisations agreed with the need for industry reforms in the short-term, the long-

term pressures brought active resistance due to concerns about industry competition.

5.3.2 Unconnected Organisations

Similar to the Connected Organisation of Wal-Mart, H&M immediately became

susceptible to stakeholder pressures that demanded the two [large-scale] organisations

lead the way in industry reforms through the Bangladesh Accord. Literature in Chapter

2 acknowledged that the timing of the crisis response is imperative (Coombs, 2007b,

2015c; Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016), and H&M went with an accommodative

strategy as a first signatory of the Bangladesh Accord.

Whilst Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) looked at Connected Organisations,

they explained that organisations that respond with accommodative strategies in the

short-term put themselves in a vulnerable position reputationally and financially. For

the context of this study, this applied to the risks undertaken by H&M through their

accommodative spillover strategy. However, had they undertaken defensive strategies

instead, there is a probability that H&M could have experienced reputational damage


in the long-term (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016) with the rationale of not

fulfilling the social expectations held by stakeholders (Janssen et al., 2015).

Australian organisations, Target Australia, K-Mart Australia and Cotton On,

followed H&M’s lead by joining the Bangladesh Accord in June 2013. The subsequent

spillover response by K-Mart Australia and Target Australia stood out here as they

released the physical addresses of their suppliers on their websites. This was a

revolutionary development at the early stage of Time Period 2 given that demands for

transparent supply chains intensified in Time Period 3.

This early move by K-Mart Australian and Target Australia supports the

proposition made by Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) that organisations do not

share an equal burden during a crisis spillover. This means that some organisations,

such as K-Mart Australia and Target Australia, accepted the burden of responsibility

through accommodative strategies which could have caused reputational damage.

The evidence from the data analysis showed that all the Unconnected

Organisations eventually became signatories of the Bangladesh Accord, which

suggests that the crisis spillover influenced industry reforms. Whilst a difficult and

costly task to achieve, as suggested by crisis spillover literature (Desai, 2011; Yu et

al., 2008), it was likely that the scale and scope of the Rana Plaza crisis spillover

required pragmatic outcomes beyond statements of sympathy and/or bolstering from

the Unconnected Organisations. From a theoretical standpoint, the accommodative

responses from the Unconnected Organisations enabled them to build and rebuild their

“reservoir of goodwill” through CSR (Janssen et al., 2015, p. 184).

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5.3.3 Summary

Immediately after the Rana Plaza factory collapse, heavy scrutiny of the fast

fashion industry practises began. The analysis indicated that as similarities in the

corporate characteristics among Connected and Unconnected Organisations may have

influenced competitiveness in the post-crisis organisational responses. Findings

further suggested that large-scale organisations, such as H&M and Wal-Mart, became

more susceptible to stakeholder pressures to lead peers towards industry reforms

(Desai 2011; Yu et al. 2008).

In answering RQ2, which examined the extent to which organisations assumed

responsibility for an industry-focused crisis in their communication in the short and

long-term, the below findings were established.

5.3.3.1 Connected Organisations – short-term

The two groups in the sample predominantly distanced themselves from the

crisis to reduce stakeholders’ attributions to crisis responsibility. Whilst they all

eventually arrived at a rebuild response, the majority complemented the response with

diminish, denial and/or bolstering responses to influence stakeholders’ crisis

perceptions. These findings depict a traditional approach of organisations acting in

such a manner as to protect negative reputational outcomes and the risks of long-term

threats. This could be explained in terms of Coombs’ (2015c) view of a response

strategy to reduce offensiveness to stakeholders by acknowledging that they bear some

responsibility, however, with claims of having had little control over the factors

causing the crisis. This approach is to reduce attributions of responsibility (Coombs &

Holladay, 2002).


5.3.3.2 Connected Organisations – long-term

Similar to the short-term crisis responses, the Connected Organisations

continued to undertake rebuild responses that were complemented with diminish,

denial and/or bolstering responses. As the crisis had well and truly spilled over to affect

the industry in the long-term responses, literature may explain the efforts of the

Connected Organisations as ‘free riding’ with the responses of Unconnected

Organisations (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).

From a theoretical perspective, the long-term response of the Connected

Organisations again served strategies to reduce offensiveness among stakeholders.

This is an interesting development as Coombs (2015c) stated that in reality, this

strategy is rarely applied by organisations.

5.3.3.3 Unconnected Organisations – short term

The sample remained silent or undertook bolstering responses in the immediate

post-crisis phase during which linkages between organisations and the Rana Plaza

factory were determined by both stakeholders and industry. Some stepped forward to

release bolstering responses to remind stakeholders of existing measures and CSR

undertaken to keep factories and garment workers safe. The findings supported

existing literature in that large-scale organisations became susceptible to stakeholder

pressures to influence industry reforms of their peers. This was visible through H&M’s

commitment to the Bangladesh Accord in the short-term.

5.3.3.4 Unconnected Organisations – long-term

The full sample committed to industry reforms in the short- and long-term. In

doing so, the organisations could influence stakeholders to a positive attribution from

a micro perspective, whereby the conditions of the crisis spillover could influence

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broader industry perceptions from the macro level. A competitive interplay between

the Unconnected Organisations with Connected Organisations was also observed,

likely in efforts to be viewed as Good Samaritans, given that the scale and scope of

Rana Plaza required responses by actions and not only organisational statements.

The following section theoretically discusses organisational CSR in response to

stakeholder pressures, including trends and patterns within each of the two samples.


What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ in


The Rana Plaza crisis caused industry-wide reputational damage and loss of

organisational legitimacy for organisations; according to Janssen et al. (2015), this

could trigger all four roles played by CSR during a crisis by (1) increasing the level of

attention that stakeholders place on the crisis; (2) influencing the level of crisis blame

that stakeholders place on organisations, which highlights the importance of attribution

theory and SCCT within the crisis spillover context; (3) influencing stakeholder

expectations for the organisational crisis response; and (4) influencing the

organisations’ “insulation from the fallout of the crisis” (Janssen et al., 2015, p. 185).

As such, this part of the discussion of the findings addresses implicit and explicit

CSR from the perspective of RQ3, that is, what CSR strategies do Connected and

Unconnected Organisations employ in the short and long-term.

5.4.1 Connected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR

The analysis explored corporate CSR/sustainability reports published in early-

mid 2013, which thereby helped identify CSR practises at the time of the factory

collapse. The trend for the Connected Organisations was to engage in independent and


voluntary CSR, that is, explicit CSR. As the crisis started to spill over, implicit CSR

initiatives started to emerge based on stakeholder pressures. So, whilst the collective

industry approaches, such as the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance, and the collective

Rana Plaza victim compensation scheme were considered rebuild and spillover

responses in the short-term, there was also CSR undertaken by the organisations to

meet stakeholders’ social expectations (Janssen et al., 2015). The legal and financially

binding aspects to the Bangladesh Accord reduced the likelihood of CSR efforts being

perceived as “greenwash” or manipulative public relations efforts (Bartlett, 2011; Du

et al., 2010; Morsing et al., 2008).

Linked with the findings for RQ2, stakeholders’ attributions of crisis

responsibility were influenced by the scale and scope (Coombs, 2007b) of the Rana

Plaza case and required legitimate reforms for crisis recovery. Environmental

ambiguity was amplified in the short-term phase as resources to identify client

relationships between the Rana Plaza and global fast fashion organisations were

limited within complex layers of supply chain practises. For example, it was more

tolerable for key suppliers to authorise the sub-contracting of orders at the time to

manage competitive turn-around times and deadlines.

With the exclusion of some organisations, the Connected Organisations

predominantly responded with moderate conformity to stakeholder pressures to

commit to collective and implicit CSR activities in the short-term. The industry norm

at the time of the crisis was explicit CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008) through voluntary

programs that, for example, enabled education and training for vulnerable

communities or contributions towards disaster relief programs (Matten & Moon,

2008).

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Literature has assisted in examining the sample’s short-term response. Given

that implicit CSR that was related to supply chain practises fell outside the industry

norm at the time of the factory collapse, it was likely that organisations perceived a

low degree of common association. For example, there was an inconsistency between

implicit CSR strategies such as the Bangladesh Accord and industry norms at the time

(Du et al., 2010, Matten & Moon, 2008).

Among explicit CSR responses, Primark was criticized by industry watchdogs,

for example, stakeholders for proceeding with their own victim compensation schemes

collaboratively with BRAC Bangladesh, this is for example explicit CSR (Matten &

Moon, 2008). Primark later contested the criticism by stating that victims and families

would have been unable to wait months for fashion organisations to gather the

collective funds. Such patterns are explained in Chapter 2 as the ‘catch 22’ of CSR,

where organisations believe that they were damned if they did and damned if they did

not undertake relevant activities (Bartlett, 2011; Morsing et al., 2008, p. 97). On the

one hand, Primark attempted to act socially responsibly by immediately implementing

short- and long-term victim compensation schemes through explicit CSR. On the other

hand, the organisation was condemned for delaying implicit CSR efforts, which

seemed to have delayed collective victim compensation payments.

Other patterns in the data depicted organisations that indirectly contributed to

the collective victim compensation scheme, and to continue to “take actions to distance

themselves” from crisis responsibility (Yu, 2008, p. 463). As such, explicit CSR was

undertaken by a transfer of funds to a selected charity of NGO, and the latter party was

responsible for undertaking the implicit CSR by donating the funds to the collective

payment scheme.


The Connected Organisations eventually shifted towards implicit CSR through

collective industry engagement that was parallel with explicit CSR by individual

organisations. In doing so, the sample demonstrated a long-term commitment to

improving crisis-related, industry issues to reduce stakeholder scepticism (Zhou & Ki,

2018a). Literature suggested that successful CSR communication explores contextual

factors and societal expectations before utilising appropriate messages. Pertinent to

this, Wal-Mart expressed long-term intentions of handing over the key responsibilities

of The Alliance to the Bangladesh government upon its expiry in 2018. News media

reviewed as a part of the data analysis suggested a conflict of interest where 60% of

300 Bangladesh government members had direct or indirect ties to the industry through

ownership interests. Due to this, stakeholders expressed concerns about the

Bangladesh government holding a greater interest in generating profits from garment

orders than prioritising the protection of vulnerable garment workers.

Whilst this may again have been linked with the ‘catch 22’ of CSR (Morsing et

al., 2008), the legitimacy of The Alliance and Wal-Mart’s CSR in the Bangladesh

garment industry was consistently doubted among stakeholders and scholars (Comyns

& Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Zhou & Ki, 2018b). Despite the patterns of reluctance to

certain implicit CSR activities in the sample, long-term findings indicated emerging

government and legislative requirements to operate with ethical supply chain practices

in developing regions.

5.4.2 Unconnected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR

The findings suggested that high-profile industrial accidents, such as the Rana

Plaza case, can extend a reputational threat to organisations beyond those initially

viewed as guilty (Desai, 2011). This supports the literature discussed in Chapter 2 in

that stakeholder reactions to salient accidents can spill over through guilt by

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association (Desai, 2011; Yu et al., 2008). This may explain why the Unconnected

Organisations remained silent in the immediate crisis aftermath, for example, to avoid

the Rana Plaza-related media attention. When an organisation is caught in a crisis,

silence about CSR could be beneficial to avoid threats to the legitimacy of the CSR

activities (Coombs & Holladay, 2015; Shim & Yang, 2016). Silence on the CSR matter

is also a form of communication from organisations (Ihlen et al., 2011) and was,

therefore, considered for the context of this study.

CSR research discussed in Chapter 2 suggested that NGOs are more likely to

report on a crisis that is related to organisations with a strong CSR record (Janssen et

al., 2015). A prime example of this is H&M, which became heavily scrutinised in the

immediate post-crisis period. This was likely due to H&M being the largest garment

exporter in Bangladesh and to existing activities of explicit CSR in developing regions

(Janssen et al., 2015). The remainder of the sample undertook imitative responses to

H&M, with European organisations signing the joint Bangladesh Accord more readily

than the North Americans. An underlying factor for this could be that Europe

accounted for 60% of Bangladesh apparel exports (Plumer, 2013) at the time of the

Rana Plaza crisis. The Bangladesh Accord, therefore, became an important tool for

European organisations to enhance social fitness after the factory collapse. The CSR-

based responses of the Unconnected Organisations are suggested to be a “ceremonial

action” to deter negative attention in order to maintain legitimacy and positive

stakeholder relationships (Peter et al., 1997; Zavyalova et al., 2012). By

communicating implicit CSR to stakeholders, the sample made efforts to simplify the

causal attribution process by influencing the “perceptions about the appropriateness of

firm actions” (Zavyalova et al., 2012, p. 1083).


Collective industry responses following a disruptive event can be a costly and

challenging approach (Yu et al., 2008); this, however, became the industry trajectory

to meet stakeholders’ demands of improved supply chain standards. From a theoretical

perspective, an extreme crisis with a high fatality rate such as with the Rana Plaza

disaster extended the period of industry scrutiny and pressures (Coombs, 2007b,

2015c). The prevalence of mandatory policies and procedures were observed in the

data through corporate reports and organisational codes of conduct for suppliers, for

example, implicit CSR.

Similar to the long-term crisis responses of Connected Organisations, implicit

CSR communication became evident through emerging legislative requirements in

declaring ethical business practices (Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Matten & Moon, 2008).

In more recent developments, the implementation of the “UK Modern Slavery Act

2015” has been observed, which zoomed out from the Bangladeshi region to zoom in

on the improvement of ethical corporate practices in Western regions. It is expected

that the industry trajectory of implicit CSR practises will continue to be visible through

national government bodies as an outcome of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development

Goals (SDG’s), which are applicable to the organisations in both samples groups. This

particularly applied to SDG #12 which directs member states to achieve sustainable

consumption and production patterns. The implementation of the UN’s SDG’s is

expected to have a long-term impact in how the organisations mandate their CSR,

given that all organisations from both samples originated from UN member states.

5.4.3 Summary

The final section of this chapter discussed key findings pertinent to RQ3. By

referring to the literature in Chapter 2, the following were established:

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The scope and severity of the Rana Plaza crisis became a catalyst for

change in the fast fashion industry. Public relations could not be used for

organisational statements only, because the situation required actions in

the form of CSR for crisis recovery.

The industry-wide CSR trend at the time of the crisis was implicit CSR.

This trend started to shift towards implicit CSR through collective efforts

in the short-term. The long-term trend showed a clear representation of

implicit CSR combined with explicit CSR at the individual

organisational level (Matten & Moon, 2008).

The Connected Organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild strategy

through the Bangladesh Accord and/or The Alliance, which was also

considered implicit CSR. Literature could explain this as efforts to satisfy

select key stakeholders that posed the greatest reputational threat, such

as industry watchdogs, news media and NGOs (Bartlett, 2011; Dacin et

al., 2007; Desai, 2011; Suchman, 1995).

The Unconnected Organisations more readily assumed responsibility by

undertaking implicit CSR actions that addressed unsafe and unethical

environmental factors that enabled the Rana Plaza disaster to happen. In

doing so, organisations could strategically appear as Good Samaritans by

avoiding less favourable scapegoating strategies (Coombs, 2007b,

2015c) and engaging in damage control for a crisis with which they were

not immediately linked (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Desai, 2011; Yu, et al.,

2008).


Both sample groups carried a representation of a large-scale organisation

each with large market shares in the Bangladeshi garment export

industry, for example, Wal-Mart (Connected Organisation) and H&M

(Unconnected Organisation). Whilst both organisations were in different

sample groups within the context of this study, these large-scale

organisations became key targets of stakeholder pressures to influence

industry reforms (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Yu et al., 2008).

The results of this study supported the proposition by Comyns &

Franklin-Johnson (2016) that the burden of responsibility is not equally

shared among organisations affected by a crisis spillover in the short-

term. These authors suggested that organisations that accept

accommodative strategies, such as through CSR, bear the burden of

reputational threats. The findings of the present study indicated positive

stakeholder attributions towards accommodative CSR-strategies and

worked in the favour of the organisations rather than acting as a crisis-

intensifying factor. The long-term shifts in CSR practices for the fashion industry were rooted in

increasing legal requirements. Such developments are expected to continue to increase,

particularly through the impacts of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, and

leaves opportunities for additional work within this sphere.

5.5 LIMITATIONS

Whilst the aim of this research was to make a theoretical contribution to the

existing conversation on the crisis spillover phenomenon, the research field recognised

a number of limitations in this study which presents opportunities for future research.

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To date more, than five years has passed since the Rana Plaza factory collapse.

On the one hand, this facilitated the present study’s exploration of long-term crisis

spillover responses by organisations, but on the other hand, this may have presented

limitations for the collection of the qualitative data under some of the below possible

circumstances.

Accessibility concerns (Yin, 2009) may arise through content being deliberately

withheld by organisations; it is possible that some content was unavailable due to the

archiving of historical records. It is, however, also possible that some historical data

was made unavailable by organisations for privacy purposes.

Retrievability issues (Yin 2009) has been considered in that some content may

have been deliberately and retrospectively deleted by organisations for crisis

detachment. Such concerns could be applicable to the immediate crisis responses by

the Connected Organisations due to the high level of uncertainty that was pertinent to

the environment.

This research is further somewhat limited in its generalisability to crisis

spillovers within other industry settings (Desai, 2014). For example, crisis spillovers

affecting other industry setting could be influenced differently based on prior crisis

history linked with the relevant industry sector. A higher or lower fatality rate could

also determine the scope and duration to which the crisis spillover will carry, which

would impact how organisations are likely to respond to the crisis. These issues pose

challenges to the ability of replicating the methods and design of the present study to

the contextual conditions of other industries (Desai, 2014) and is therefore identified

as a limitation.

Specific characteristics pertinent to the sample frame further presents a

limitation as findings were representative of the organisations being examined as a part


of this study (Yin, 2009) This is identified as a limitation as specific characteristics to

organisations may have influenced how they have responded to the Rana Plaza crisis

and thereby the findings of this research.

Lastly, qualitative content analysis has proven to be extremely time consuming.

Whilst voluminous data was gathered for the purpose of this study, findings pose a

limitation in that they are restricted by the data that could be gathered for the analysis

based on the search parameters discussed in Chapter 3.

5.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

This study holds a range of implications for current discussions on the crisis

spillover phenomenon through the nexus of CSR and crisis communication. It has

contributed towards gaps in the literature by exploring a longitudinal timeline for a

crisis spillover that involved organisations that were directly and indirectly implicated

by an industry facing crisis. By exploring organisational CSR responses that were

motivated by stakeholder pressure, individual fast fashion organisations needed to

make a social impact to recover from reputational damage. Based on the literature

discussed in Chapter 2, the following theoretical implications could be established:

Connected Organisations: The scale, scope and evidence of prior business

links with the Rana Plaza factory motivated a high level of crisis attribution among

stakeholders, as suggested by Coombs (2007b, 2015c), but also a low level of

acceptance of responsibility. Whilst organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild

strategy, some faster than others, the broader sample remained cautious in fully

admitting responsibility to the public and may therefore have relied on other

organisations such as Primark to deflect responsibility. This pattern of assumed or

deflected responsibility supports Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) proposition of

151

‘free riders’ among the Connected Organisations that relied on other industry peers,

such as Primark and Unconnected Organisations, to recover from negative industry

scrutiny. The defensive strategies undertaken by such ‘free riders’ often led to led to

slower and sometimes poorer responses in the short- and long-term.

Unconnected Organisations: The crisis spillover provided an opportunity for

the Unconnected Organisations to acknowledge the lack of industry practices with the

opportunity to appear as Good Samaritans through their willingness to improve such

norms. The findings showed that large-scale organisations in particular were heavily

scrutinised by stakeholders and pressures for supply chain reform were used to

instigate competitive social efforts between industry peers. Organisations such as

H&M may therefore have been motivated to conform to stakeholder pressures for the

Bangladesh Accord to remain competitive in the outcome of the Rana Plaza crisis. As

a domino effect, H&M’s commitment to the Bangladesh Accord is likely to have

triggered similar behaviour among other Unconnected Organisations.

As a theoretical implication based on the behaviours of both sample groups, the

present study has found that responsibility was not shared equally among Connected

and Unconnected Organisations. However, given that anger and sympathy are the key

emotions of attribution theory (Coombs 2007b; Weiner 1985), Unconnected

Organisations were able to positively influence stakeholders blame attribution process

through strategies that sought to reduce anger. By acknowledging the need for industry

reforms that also supports a positive social impact, Unconnected Organisations

undertook accommodative responses through CSR and the Bangladesh Accord.

Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) also found that responsibility was not

equally shared among the organisations examined in their study, however further

suggested that organisations that accept accommodative strategies often bear the


burden of reputational threats. Whilst the present study supports Comyn & Franklin-

Johnson’s (2016) argument for the short-term, the findings of the present study suggest

that the opposite applied for the long-term perspective. As industry scrutiny has

continued for the long-term, annual reports by industry watchdogs and NGO’s

outlining organisational efforts to abolish unethical practises are being released.

Organisations that have not continued to undertake accommodative strategies

have become subject to a higher degree of scrutiny and pressures to engage in CSR for

pragmatic social impact. Overall, these patterns an environmental interconnectedness

as crisis responses may have induced competitiveness among organisations however

the collective acceptance of responsibility through SCCT and CSR essentially acted in

favour of the organisations rather than as a crisis-intensifying factor.

5.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

The multifaceted context of crisis communication and CSR practices means that

the findings of this study contribute with a number of practical implications for public

relations practitioners and scholars:

(1) Organisations faced with a crisis spillover event should exert caution with

denial strategies in both the short- and long-term. The study has supported

Coombs (2015c) argument in that once a denial is communicated to

stakeholders and is later revoked, reputational threats and scrutiny is likely

to intensify for the organisation.

(2) For crisis events of the fatal scale and scope of Rana Plaza, especially

with the high fatality rate considered, it is suggested for both Connected or

an Unconnected Organisations to assume collective industry responsibility

in both the short- and long-term. By communicating action as opposed to

only media statements, organisations face the opportunity to depict a

153

legitimate intention to eliminate factors causing the crisis in first place. In

other words, organisations may be better off by riding into the storm.

(3) Larger organisations, such as H&M, may need to be prepared for high-level

scrutiny as a crisis starts to spill over to affect industry; this is irrespective of

them being perceived as a Connected or an Unconnected Organisation. The

motivation among stakeholders is likely to be directed at large-scale

organisations to influence industry reforms to their industry peers.

(4) Conversely, smaller organisations may strategically monitor the outcome of

the responses undertaken by large-scale organisations. If they are perceived

as successful by stakeholders, they could follow the lead to remain

competitive.

(5) Geographical CSR trends and patterns were examined for Unconnected

Organisations and as an important practical implication, organisations

should not only exert awareness of existing practises within their immediate

region, but also strategies among international peers in the environment. By

developing an understanding of what may or not work for industry peers,

especially in a climate with increasing legal requirements for organisational

CSR requirements, organisations are able to respond to crisis spillover events

with a better understanding of the environmental expectations.

5.8 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The present study was limited to the fashion industry to fully understand the

strategic short- and long-term development of organisational responses. It is possible

for future studies to expand beyond these parameters and explore the contextual

conditions of other industries faced by a crisis spillover.


It would be valuable to expand on the present study through a quantitative

experimental study that explores the long-term industry shift towards implicit CSR.

Given that governmental legislation and expectations have had an impact on such

industry reforms, particularly through UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, to

explore relevant progress and outcomes from a geographical lens.

Moreover, as the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance expired in 2018,

opportunities have emerged to expand on the long-term focus of this study through the

exploration of industry responses from 2018 onwards. Questions could be asked of

whether five years has been sufficient time for the industry to recover reputational

damage through CSR, or whether the severity of the Rana Plaza crisis truly created a

wake-up call for industry, its stakeholders and consumers beyond 2018. This suggests

subsequent longitudinal research on the Rana Plaza case study and whether one crisis

spillover rolls over to the next and the attention of stakeholders and stakeholders.

Lastly, it remains important for crisis communications literature to continuously

explore how CSR engagement may influence crisis different outcomes. Crisis

communications remains an applied field that seeks solutions to evolving

environmental issues (Coombs, 2015c). This means that an approach that may have

been suitable two decades ago may no longer be suitable, as technology has drastically

changed how communication is used to reach stakeholders over this period. For

example, it could be valuable to expand of this study through the lens of Frandsen and

Johansen’s (2011) study by incorporating the background reputational

interdependence by applying this into the context of a crisis spillover situation.

Effectively, by continuously testing and examining key frameworks such as SCCT,

authors can review and improve relevant theories to suit evolving environments and

stakeholders’ social expectations.

155

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173

Appendices

Appendix A

Coombs’ (2007b) Original SCCT Primary and Secondary Crisis Response Strategies

Table A1

Coombs’ (2007b) Original SCCT Primary and Secondary Crisis Response Strategies

Primary crisis response strategies

Denial crisis response strategies o Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming

something is wrong with the organization. o Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis. o Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the

organization for the crisis.

Diminish crisis response strategies o Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying

intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.

o Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.

Rebuild crisis response strategies o Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. o Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility

for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness. Secondary crisis response strategies

Bolstering crisis response strategies o Reminder: Tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization. o Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of

past good works by the organization. o Victimage: Crisis managers remind stakeholders that the organization is a

victim of the crisis too.

Notes. Adapted from Coombs (2007b) SCCT framework.

174 Appendices

Appendix B

Coombs’ (2007b, p. 173) Original SCCT Crisis Response Strategy Guidelines

1. Informing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises have minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of similar crises and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.

2. Victimage can be used as part of the response for workplace violence, product tampering, natural disasters and rumours.

3. Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises) coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation.

4. Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), which have no history of similar crises, and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.

5. Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation.

6. Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with strong attributions of crisis responsibility (preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or prior relationship reputation.

7. The deny posture crisis response strategies should be used for rumour and challenge crises, when possible.

8. Maintain consistency in crisis response strategies. Mixing deny crisis response strategies with either diminish or rebuild strategies will erode the effectiveness of the overall response.

175

Appendix C

Organisational Profiles Pertinent to Sample Selection Criteria

Table C1

Organisational Profiles Pertinent to Sample Selection Criteria Organisations Accord

Signatory Alliance Member

Annual Sales

Fiscal Year Ending

Holding Company

Private or Listed Entity

Region

Abercrombie & Fitch

Yes No > 100 million

28 Jan 2017 Not Applicable

Public Parent USA

Adler Modemärkte AG

No No > 100 million

31 Dec 2016 Steilmann Holding Ag

Public Subsidiary

Linked to RP


Yes No > 100 million


Public Parent USA

Benetton Yes No > 100 million

31 Dec 2015 Edizione Srl

Private Subsidiary

Linked to RP

Bestseller Yes No > 100 million

31 July 2016 Not Applicable

Private Subsidiary

Nordic Region

C&A Yes No > 100 million

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Private Parent

Linked to RP

Cotton On Yes No > 100 million

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Private Parent

Australia

Fruit of the Loom Yes Yes > 100 million

28 Jan 2016 Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

Private Subsidiary

USA

H&M Yes No > 100 million

30 Nov 2016 Not Applicable

Public Subsidiary

Nordic Region

Helly Hansen Yes No > 100 million

31 Dec 2015 Not Applicable

Private Parent

Nordic Region

Kmart Australia Yes No > 100 million

30 June 2016 Wesfarmers Ltd

Private Subsidiary

Australia

Lindex Yes No > 100 million

31 Dec 2016 Stockmann Group

Private Subsidiary

Nordic Region

Mango Yes No > 100 million

31 Dec 2015 Not Applicable

Private Parent

Linked to RP

Primark Yes No > 100 million

17 Sep 2016 Associated British Foods (ABF)

Private Subsidiary

Linked to RP

Target Australia Yes No > 100 million

30 June 2016 Wesfarmers Ltd

Private Subsidiary

Australia

Walmart No Yes > 100 million


Public Parent Linked to RP

176 Appendices

Appendix D

Data Extracts of Organisational SCCT Responses in Time Period 1

Table D1


Date Brand or Retailer Quote

24 Apr 13 H&M The factory does not produce for H&M. Please read more about our work in Bangladesh [in response to consumer comment on Facebook] [Facebook - H&M 2013].

24 Apr 13 Benetton "In reference to the tragic news on the collapse of the building in Bangladesh, Benetton Group wants to clarify that none of the companies involved are suppliers to Benetton Group or any of its brands" [Twitter].

24 Apr 13 Wal-Mart "We are investigating across our global supply chain to see if a factory in this building was currently producing for Wal-Mart."

26 Apr 13 Primark "The company is shocked and deeply saddened by this appalling Incident at Savar, near Dhaka, and expresses Its condolences to all al those involved. Primark confirms that one of its suppliers occupied the second floor al the eight storey building, which housed several suppliers to the garment industry making clothing for a number of brands. Primark has been engaged for several years with NGOs and other retailers to review the Bangladeshi industry's approach to factory standards. Primark will push for this review to also include building integrity. Meanwhile, Primark's ethical trade team is at this moment working to collect information, assess which communities the workers come from, and to provide support where possible".

30 Apr 13 Cotton On "We are deeply saddened by the recent tragedy at a Bangladesh factory end our thoughts are with the families of the victims and those Involved. Whilst we have suppliers in Bangladesh, we can assure our customers that the Rana Plaza factory was not a Cotton On Group vendor. The safety end welfare of our suppliers is paramount and we have an ethical auditing team (based In China and Bangladesh) who regularly assess and audit our factories and their employees. We are proud of our Cotton On Group Vendor Code of Conduct. which underpins our fundamental trading principles. We evaluate and choose our external partners within these guidelines end have a zero‐tolerance stance on forced labour, child labour and bribery and corruption. For anyone wanting further information, please contact our customer service team on 1800 420 178 or email [email protected]"

30 Apr 13 Target Australia

“Target extends its deepest condolences to all of those affected by the tragedy in Bangladesh last week. A small number of the products Target offers are made by suppliers in Bangladesh however none of our suppliers operated from the building involved in last week's devastating factory collapse. Target is committed to operating in a manner that reflects our high ethical and moral values and we require our suppliers to do the same, which is why we have a Target Ethical Sourcing Code that sets out strong, minimum standards for our suppliers.

177

Appendix E

Impact of H&M’s commitment to The Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1

Table E1

Impact of H&M Signing the Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1 Date

Quote

May 13 “H&M's decision broke the dam. Following its lead, other major

European retailers, including Carrefour, Marks &Spencer and Inditex, parent of the huge Zara brand, said last week they would sign the accord, setting the stage for an industrywide collaboration to improve factory safety” (Alderman 2013, May 20).

May 13 "H&M's decision to sign the accord is crucial," said Scott Nova, executive director of the Worker Rights Consortium, a factory monitoring group based in Washington and backed by 175 American colleges and universities. "They are the single largest producer of apparel in Bangladesh, ahead even of Wal-Mart. This accord now has tremendous momentum" (Greenhouse & Yardley, 2013, May 15).

May 13 “If the organisers believe their online petitions had some impact, they are wrong, according to Anna Gedda, who heads H&M's programs to improve labour conditions. "Consumers and other groups were not the tipping point," she said. "The tipping point was that we reached an accord that we felt was really going to produce change" (Norman, 2013, June 8).

May 13 “But the Rana Plaza disaster, the deadliest in the garment industry's history, has created tremendous pressure for change. On Monday morning, the Swedish retail giant H&M and Inditex, owner of the popular Zara chain, endorsed the safety plan. Within hours, the large Dutch retailer C&A also joined the agreement, as did the lowcost British retailers Primark and Tesco. Benetton, the Italian clothing group, also agreed to sign, The Associated Press reported Tuesday” (Greenhouse & Yardley, 2013, May 15).

April 17 “ADVANCING THE BANGLADESH ACCORD - We were amongst the first companies to sign the Bangladesh Accord with the aim to help improve fire and building safety in the textile industry in Bangladesh. We are actively engaged with the Accord team, and have been on the steering committee since day one. We are also closely engaged with all of our suppliers? (H&M Sustainability Report, 2017).

178 Appendices

Appendix F

Data Extracts of SCCT Responses in Time Period 2

Table F1


Date Organisation Quote/Statement SCCT response

31 Jul 13 Adler

After being contacted by the CCC, Adler Modemarkte have offered a small charitable donation (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).

Rebuild

31 Jul 13 Mango

Mango refuse to take any responsibility for the Rana Plaza victims despite having placed a trial order with one of the factories. Similarly, LPP refuse to take responsibility for paying compensation (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).

Denial

31 Jul 13 Wal-Mart

Walmart (US) claims that they did not permit production at one of the factories housed in Rana Plaza, but do not deny evidence found on-site proving that one of their contractors had produced jeans in one of the factories less than one year before the collapse (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).

Diminish

13 Sep 13 Wal-Mart

Walmart did not attend the meeting [RP victim compensation summit in Geneva]. It has formed its own North American alliance for Bangladeshi worker safety, along with Sears, Hudson's Bay Co., The Gap, The Children's Place and J.C. Penney (Talaga, 2013, Sep 13).

Declined The Accord/Alliance member

24 Apr 14 C&A

C&A said it had given Pounds 410,000 to the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund (Dean & Muktadi, 2014).

Rebuild

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es a

nd d

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stem

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prov

emen

t by

colla

bora

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with

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er

stak

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ders

to im

prov

e co

nditi

ons f

or w

orke

rs a

cros

s the

indu

stry

(Wal

-Mar

t, 20

17).

Den

ial/L

ong-

term

rebu

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stra

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Documents

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DURING TIMES ...social impact in response to the crisis brought positive stakeholder attributions. However, organisations accepting accommodative strategies