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Property of the University of Notre Dame Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman, 2008. This work is the intellectual property of the author. Permission is granted for this material to be shared for non-commercial, educational purposes, provided that this copyright statement appears on the reproduced materials and notice is given that the copying is by permission of the author. To disseminate otherwise or to republish requires written permission from the author. 1

Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

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Page 1: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman, 2008. This work is the intellectual property of the author. Permission is granted for this material to be shared for non-commercial, educational purposes, provided that this copyright statement appears on the reproduced materials and notice is given that the copying is by permission of the author. To disseminate otherwise or to republish requires written permission from the author.

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Page 2: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

The Data Center Within A Data Center:

Building A Secure Environment For Compliance

EDUCAUSE Security ProfessionalsMay, 2008

Page 3: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Why Are We Here Today?

• Universities are dealing with increasing compliance burdens.– HIPAA, FERPA, GLBA, PCI DSS, FDA, and more

• Management is more open to solutions that spend up front money to control staff and infrastructure costs over time.– Simplification of compliance efforts is key.

• Current technology allows new approaches.– Virtualization and segmentation

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Page 4: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Agenda

• PCI DSS Background• Notre Dame’s Environment• Payment Card Environment Design• Networking Infrastructure• Deployment: Departments and Decentralized IT

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Page 5: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame5

Payment Card IndustryData Security Standard(PCI DSS)

Visa CardholderInformation Security Program (CISP)

PCI DSS History

Mastercard SiteData Protection Program (SDP)

Discover InformationSecurity ComplianceProgram (DISC)

American ExpressData Security Standard (DSS)

Page 6: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame6

Compliance Requirements: the Digital Dozen

Build and Maintain a Secure Network

Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder dataDo not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters

Protect Cardholder DataProtect stored cardholder dataEncrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks

Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program

Use and regularly update anti-virus softwareDevelop and maintain secure systems and applications

Implement Strong Access Control Measures

Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-knowAssign a unique ID to each person with computer accessRestrict physical access to cardholder data

Regularly Monitor and Test Networks

Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder dataRegularly test security systems and processes

Maintain an Information Security Policy Maintain a policy that addresses information security

Page 7: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame7

Who Must Comply?

• “Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security requirements apply to all Members, merchants, and service providers that store, process or transmit cardholder data.”

• “Additionally, these security requirements apply to all system components which is defined as any network component, server, or application included in, or connected to, the cardholder data environment.”

That Probably Means You

Page 8: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame8

Merchant Levels

Merchant Level Description

1 Any merchant who processes over 6,000,000 transactions annually.Any merchant designated Level 1 by Visa

2 Any merchant who processes between 1,000,000 and 6,000,000 transactions annually.

3 Any merchant who processes between 20,000 and 150,000 e-commerce transactions annually.

4 Anyone else

Page 9: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame9

Merchant Levels

• All merchants, regardless of level, must comply with all elements of the PCI DSS standard!

• Merchants at different levels have different validation requirements– Higher merchant levels cost significantly more to

meet validation requirements.

Page 10: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame10

Consequences• Reputational Risk

– What will the impact be on your institution’s brand?– Mandatory involvement of federal law enforcement in

investigation

• Financial Risk– Merchant banks may pass on substantial fines– Up to $500,000 per incident from Visa alone– Civil liability and cost of providing ID theft protection

Page 11: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame11

Consequences• Compliance Risk

– Exposure to Level 1 validation requirements

• Operational Risk– Visa-imposed operational restrictions– Potential loss of card processing privileges

Page 12: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Agenda

• PCI DSS Background• Notre Dame’s Environment• Payment Card Environment Design• Networking Infrastructure• Deployment: Departments and decentralized IT

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Page 13: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame13

Notre Dame’s Environment, Circa 2006

• Over 70 merchant accounts, 15 applications• No central oversight• One day all of that changed…

Page 14: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame14

• (Campus payment diagram)

Page 15: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame15

Notre Dame’s Approach• First, we conducted a risk assessment in

conjunction with a PCI consulting firm

• From that, launched a credit card security program– First Goal: Minimize on-campus card processing– Second Goal: Migrate existing systems to a dedicated,

isolated network

• Then we worked to reduce our footprint and then secure what was left

Page 16: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Reducing Our PCI Footprint

• Identify merchant accounts and payment locations.

• Assess which systems can be moved to 3rd party vendors.– Non-specialized systems are the low hanging fruit.

• Simplify environments where possible.

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Page 17: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Design Concept

• PCI compliance requirements apply by contagion: anything that touches it becomes infected.

• Separating using acceptable methods decreases your compliance footprint.

• VPN, firewalling, and dedicated infrastructure make control simpler.

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Page 18: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Agenda

• PCI DSS Background• Notre Dame’s Environment• Payment Card Environment Design• Networking Infrastructure• Deployment: Departments and decentralized IT

18

Page 19: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

The Datacenter Within A Datacenter

• Identify all services needed for the card processing systems:– Management systems– Infrastructure support– Compliance systems– Monitoring systems

• Scope and size systems• Set standards for those systems

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Page 20: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Design: ND’s PCI Architecture

• Architecture diagram not included for public release.

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Page 21: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

System and Security Components

• Secure Computing Firewall• Cisco VPN• Two factor Safeword authentication to

infrastructure (VPN)• Tripwire server integrity assurance• Juniper IDS• Qualys vulnerability scanners – inside, campus

perspective, and off-campus viewpoints.– PCI compliance module

Page 22: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

System and Security Components

• Infrastructure – NTP, AD, ePO AV, monitoring, IP KVM, central logging, update servers, etc.

• POS clients and servers– Device configuration standards

• WebInspect• HighTower SIM device for log and event

analysis and monitoring.

Page 23: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Firewall and IDS design

• Firewall isolates all PCI traffic• Single external physical interface• Single internal interface with multiple VLANs• Zones organized by function• Some special zones for campus systems• Remote Sites connected through VPN concentrator• Passive IDS (tried IPS) monitors all internal traffic

Page 24: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Sidewinder Firewall

• Application proxy firewall• Default deny inbound and outbound• Group based VPN, access restricted by job

function• Least privilege rule base • All access explicitly controlled

Page 25: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Key Internal Zones

Page 26: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Key Internal Zones

DMZ BURB (192.168.5.0/24)

POS BURB (192.168.3.0/24)

Application Servers

Public Web Servers

DNS

NETMGT BURB (192.168.6.0/24)

Network gear interfacesIDS/IPS Sensor -

Page 27: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Key Internal Zones

192.168.7.0/24 – Odyssey Private

192.168.58.240/29 – Odyssey Public

Backup BURB (192.168.8.0/24)

Odyssey Burbs

ScribeScanner BURB (192.168.15.0/29)

scanner

Page 28: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Isolating Systems

• Diagram not provided for public release.

Page 29: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Isolating SystemsInternet/Campus

`

VulnerabilityScanner

DatacenterFirewall

`

Odyssey

`

Central Backup

Private

Private

Public

PCI Firewall

PCI Interface

Datacenter

All system interfaces are on dedicated logical firewall

interfaces

Page 30: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Agenda

• PCI DSS Background• Notre Dame’s Environment• Payment Card Environment Design• Networking Infrastructure• Deployment: Departments and decentralized IT

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Page 31: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Network Design

From the PCI Standards Document:1.Encryption of data over open, public networks2.Follow change control procedures3.Review logs for all system components daily

Page 32: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Challenges

Encryption of data over open, public networks.• Required over ‘secure’ vlans?

Page 33: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Challenges

Follow change control procedures.– Initial design thoughts incorporated ‘secure’ vlans

that we present at each endpoint on campus.– This would have involved implementing change

control on more than 150 network devices, including access layer switches.

Review logs for all system components daily.– Workload for 150 devices would have been high

Page 34: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Devices requiring change control with ‘secure’ vlan

Page 35: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Our solution: Remote site VPNs

• Utilizes Cisco 3015 VPN concentrator with Cisco 851 VPN routers for endpoints.

• Extends the PCI network where we need it.• We provide user subnet space based on

customer need:– Stand-alone credit card terminals– POS devices– Single use computers

Page 36: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Additional Benefits of VPN

• The VPN tunnel provides a secure method of managing network devices.

• Provides a means of remote access for system administrators

• Fewer devices to manage.• Provides for easier additions to the PCI

network.

Page 37: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Agenda

• PCI DSS Background• Notre Dame’s Environment• Payment Card Environment Design• Networking Infrastructure• Deployment: Departments and decentralized IT

37

Page 38: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Deployment: Departments and Decentralized IT

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Page 39: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Two Types of Support• Central IT

– Fewer technical users.– Existing payment

solutions are often inherited.

– Responsibility for payment system is often not clearly defined.

• Departmental IT– Internal processes and

procedures.– Often very small staff,

broad responsibilities.– Payment solutions are

often provided by external vendors.

– Responsibility for payment system is often inherited.

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Page 40: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Existing systems• Food Services

– Many terminals– Other services blended

in: vending machines, food service displays, and campus “Domer Dollars”

– Many locations– Blend of commercial and

custom software– Departmental IT

• Theater Ticketing and Events– Single location– Mobile and static

workstations– Web driven– Single commercial

software package– Only standard

transactions– Central IT

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Page 41: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Deployment Steps

• Review existing architecture• Design solution• Build required resources• Test• Migrate into production

– Often in phases– Often unexpected hurdles due to legacy systems

and applications

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Page 42: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Challenges

• Process: creating a controlled system for adding new systems and handling changes.

• Lack of vendor documentation of protocols – many large high port groupings, reliance local broadcast for discovery, etc.

• Split system administration• DR for systems designed without DR

capabilities.

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Page 43: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Lessons Learned

• Review vendor documentation and current implementation.– Historic designs are often still in use.

• Dataflow diagrams are crucial.• Provide a fast troubleshooting process and a

defined support team. • Provide a single point of responsibility with

backup for migrations.

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Page 44: Copyright David Seidl, Bob Winding, Mike Chapple, Bob Richman

Property of the University of Notre Dame

Questions

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