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Coping with Uncertainty: European labour markets and the politics of social reform
Institutional change, transformation and development: the case of the
East German regions
Uwe BlienInstitut for Employment Research (IAB) &
University of Bamberg
London, 6th Nov. 20092
20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall: an assessment of the transformation process in Eastern Germany
- Transformation was reached in one pace with unification
- In no other country the transformation process was done in such a fast and drastic way as it was in Eastern Germany (“big bang strategy“)
- This lead to great economic problems (1991: rate of BSP change in Eastern Germany: -31.4)
- The consequences have been visible until today
London, 6th Nov. 20093
Steps of German unification
- During autumn 1989 repeated demonstrations and protests against the ruling SED party
- Increasing numbers of refugees left the GDR by neighbouring states (Chechoslovakia, Hungary)
- The power of the ruling group in the GDR was weakened step by step
- Opening of the Berlin Wall at 9 Nov. 1989 “by accident“
- Suggestion of introducing the D-Mark as currency in the GDR by Chancellor H. Kohl at 7 Feb 1990
London, 6th Nov. 20094
Steps of German unification (II)
- Economic and social union between West and East Germany at 1 July 1990
- Currency union at 2 July 1990 (exchange rate 1 to 1 for wages, 1 to 2 for bank accounts)
- Unification at 3 October 1990 by accession of the regions of the New Federal States to the Federal Republic of Germany
London, 6th Nov. 20095
Consequences of the currency union for the economy of the GDR
- The economy was nearly closed before and then – in one step – opened up to the economy in the West and to the world market
- Productivity in the East was only about 38.6 % of the West
- Production in the East was not profitable, it could only be sustained as far it was subsidized by the state.
- Unemployment increased in the following
London, 6th Nov. 20096
Reasons for the high speed of institutional change and of unification
- Fear that the “window of opportunity“ will be closed again soon
- in Western Germany: Fear that many people could leave the East and move to the West (and increase unemployment)
- Impatience about the outcomes of the whole process, especially in the East
- Breakdown of confidence in the representatives of the state in the East
- Dynamics of the political system (pressure of elections)
London, 6th Nov. 20097
Further reasons for realizing the currency union
- In the East the D-Mark was regarded not only as the symbol, but also as the reason of the Western living standard – not regarding all the conditions of economic life
- This was due to the “fetish character of money“ (Marx)
- Any experience with the mechanisms of a market economy was missing
- In the West the introduction was regarded as appropriate to make the unification process irreversible
London, 6th Nov. 20098
Euphoria about unification - neglect of any economic problems
- The unification will lead to “flourishing landscapes“ (H. Kohl)
- Problem of high wage increases was regarded in moral terms: Why should someone in the East earn less someone in the West? Is he or she not a German too?
- There was no resistance of firms and employers associations against wage increases, thus, wages doubled
- The conditions of a market economy were disregarded
- The consequence was a big economic crisis with alarming proportions
London, 6th Nov. 20099
Western Germanyproductivity
labour cost
labour cost
productivity
Eastern Germany
Productivity and Labour Cost
London, 6th Nov. 200910
Federal Republic of Germany
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
BSP growth rates
London, 6th Nov. 200911
Industry
construction
Quarterly growth rates
London, 6th Nov. 200912
Eastern Germany
Western Germany
Unit labour cost
London, 6th Nov. 200913
Properties of the crisis in East Germany
- Employment decreased from over 10 Mill. (1989) to just over 6 Mill. (1993)
- Unemployment increased to over 1.2 Mill.
- Many people were hidden unemployed in measures of labour market policy
- The firms in Eastern Germany were privatized by the „Treuhandanstalt“ (Trust Institution), which left a debt of over 200 000 Mill. €.
London, 6th Nov. 200914
Meanwhile, 20 years later the Eastern German regions are quite “normal“ German regions – however severe problems remain
- Institutions are the same as they are in the West
- Eastern wages stagnate of about 75 % of the wages in the West
- The unemployment rate is still about double the one of the West
- There are only faint signals of a convergence process
London, 6th Nov. 200915
Arbeitslosenquote nach Jahren
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Jahr
Alo
qu
ote
(%
)
Insgesamt
West
Ost
Yearly unemployment rates
London, 6th Nov. 200916
Unit Labour Costs
London, 6th Nov. 200917
Eastern Germany
Wages, productivity and unit labour costs
London, 6th Nov. 200918
Manufacturing in Eastern Germany
Wages, productivity and unit labour costs
London, 6th Nov. 200919
unter -5,0 -5,0 bis unter 5,0
5,0 bis unter 15,0 15,0 bis unter 25,0 25,0 und höher
Vorjahresveränderung in %:
Stralsund -7,0%
Eberswalde -9,2%
Bremerhaven -8,0%
Memmingen +70,3%Rottweil +63,5%
Villingen-Schwenningen +66,9%
Deutschland: +7,9%
Growth rate Unemployment rate
unter 3,0 3,0 bis unter 6,0 6,0 bis unter 9,0 9,0 bis unter 12,0 12,0 und höher
Arbeitslosenquote in %:
Deutschland: 8,1%
Freising 2,9%
Ingolstadt 3,0%
Donauwörth 3,1%
Sangerhausen 17,2%
Altenburg 15,6%
Neubrandenburg 15,6%
Regional Distribution and Change of Unemployment
London, 6th Nov. 200920
How can the remaining problems be explained?
- Informal institutions might be effective which slow down a covergence process
- The firms in the East are often only branch-plants; they lack development capacities
- Social networks to the markets are missing
The result is an economy with a low export rate (about 30 %, compared to over 40 % in Western Germany)
London, 6th Nov. 200921
Approaches of Krugman‘s new Economic Geography are suggested as explanation
- East Germany is the “periphery“ of the West
- Market potential is lower in the East: concentration of population is lower and the major agglomerations are in the West
- Today, the traffic network between both parts of the country is quite good
- Therefore, it might be profitable to produce (only) in the West
(Brakman, Garretsen 1993)
London, 6th Nov. 200922
An extension, introducing the labour market
- A reaction on the labour market problems in the East is out-migration (1.8 million people)
- it has a direct negative effect on unemploment
- it also reduces the market potential of the regions and has an indirect positive effect on unemploment
- The direction of the net effect is open
(Suedekum‘s 2005 extension of New Economic Geography by the Wage Curve)
London, 6th Nov. 200923
Conclusion
- The big bang transformation of Germany was unavoidable, due to reasons outside the economic sphere
- It did not facilitate a convergence process but led to stagnation
- The more recent developments of the East German regions show good values of some fundamental economic indicators, but no improvement in the labour market
- The latter might be changing due to recent events