Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion ... · surplus weapons. Jordi Molas-Gallart is a researcher at the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex,

Coping withCoping withCoping withCoping withCoping withSurplusSurplusSurplusSurplusSurplusWWWWWeapons:eapons:eapons:eapons:eapons:A PA PA PA PA Priority forriority forriority forriority forriority forConversionConversionConversionConversionConversionResearch andResearch andResearch andResearch andResearch andPPPPPolicyolicyolicyolicyolicy

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Brief 3Brief 3Brief 3Brief 3Brief 3

Maria Bowers is a researchassociate at the Stockholm Interna-tional Peace Research Institute(SIPRI).

Edward J. Laurance is Professor ofInternational Policy Studies andAssociate Director of the Programfor Nonproliferation Studies at theMonterey Institute of InternationalStudies (MIIS) in California.

Susanne Kopte is a researcherassociated with Greenpeace inGermany. In 1995, she is a visitingresearcher with the MontereyInstitute of International Studies,participating in BICC projects onsurplus weapons.

Jordi Molas-Gallart is a researcherat the Science Policy Research Unitat the University of Sussex, UK.

Otfried Nassauer is the Director ofBITS, the Berlin InformationCentre for Transatlantic Security.

Dr. Peter Wilke, a specialist on theconversion problems of Germanyand the former Soviet Union, since1995 he is a visiting researcher atthe Monterey Institute of Interna-tional Studies, participating in theBICC project on surplus weapons.

Dr. Herbert Wulf is the Directorof the Bonn International Centerfor Conversion (BICC). He haspreviously served as project leaderof the SIPRI research project onarms transfers and armsproduction and is a consultant tothe UN Center for DisarmamentAffairs.

Cover Illustration:Vladimír Rencín

About the AAbout the AAbout the AAbout the AAbout the AuthorsuthorsuthorsuthorsuthorsContentsContentsContentsContentsContents

ZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungZusammenfassungGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman Summary 44444

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Edward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andHerbert WHerbert WHerbert WHerbert WHerbert Wulfulfulfulfulf

Introduction:Introduction:Introduction:Introduction:Introduction:Coping with Surplus WeaponsSystems: A Priority for ConversionResearch and Policy 66666

Susanne KSusanne KSusanne KSusanne KSusanne Kopte und Popte und Popte und Popte und Popte und Peter Weter Weter Weter Weter WilkeilkeilkeilkeilkeResearching Surplus Weapons:Guidelines, Methods and Topics 1111111111

Maria BowersMaria BowersMaria BowersMaria BowersMaria BowersThe Disposal of SurplusChemical Weapons 1616161616

Jordi Molas-GallertJordi Molas-GallertJordi Molas-GallertJordi Molas-GallertJordi Molas-GallertDisposal of Surplus Missiles:Technical Difficulties andCommercial Interest 2323232323

Edward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceSurplus Light Weapons as aConversion Problem:Unique characteristics andsolutions 3131313131

Otfried NassauerOtfried NassauerOtfried NassauerOtfried NassauerOtfried NassauerSurplus—The NVA's Heritage 3737373737

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brief 3Coping withCoping withCoping withCoping withCoping withSurplus WSurplus WSurplus WSurplus WSurplus Weapons:eapons:eapons:eapons:eapons:A PA PA PA PA Priority forriority forriority forriority forriority forConversionConversionConversionConversionConversionResearch andResearch andResearch andResearch andResearch andPPPPPolicyolicyolicyolicyolicyEdited byEdited byEdited byEdited byEdited byEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andHerbert WHerbert WHerbert WHerbert WHerbert Wulfulfulfulfulf

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Aufgrund von Abrüstungsverträgenwie START und KSE, durch dieBeendigung von Kriegen undFriedensverträgen oder wegen derKürzungen in den Militärhaushaltenwerden viele Waffen aus demInventar der Armee ausgemustert.Einige Waffenkategorien (konventio-nelle Waffensysteme in Europa)werden in starkem Umfang redu-ziert, andere Kategorien (so dieChemiewaffen) werden komplettabgerüstet. Erst in den letzten Jahrenist die Frage "wohin mit den über-schüssigen Waffen?" zu einemernsten Problem und damit zu einerKonversionsaufgabe größerenUmfangs geworden.

Bislang ist das gesamte Ausmaß derbereits aufgehäuften Überschuß-bestände und die in den nächstenJahren möglicherweise zusätzlichauszumusternden Waffen nichtgenau bekannt. Die Regierungen derUSA, Westeuropas, Rußlands undanderer CIS-Länder verkaufen,verschenken oder leasen beträchtli-che Mengen konvenventionellerWaffensysteme. Vor allem imBereich der Kleinwaffen sind erhebli-che Bestände frei geworden, derenVerbleib oft ungewiß ist und diezum Teil in Kriegs- und Konflikt-regionen exportiert werden.

Die Regierungen verfügen über eineReihe von Möglichkeiten, dieÜberschußbestände abzubauen:einlagern, exportieren, verschrotten,verrosten lassen, für zivile Zweckeverwenden oder konvertieren usw.Die verschiedenen Strategien zurEntsorgung, Verschrottung oderVerwertung der Überschußbeständehaben unterschiedliche Konsequen-zen. Der Export der Waffen und

anderer militärischer Geräte istsicherlich die kostengünstigsteMöglichkeit eines Staates, sichüberschüssiger Waffen zu entledigen.Man spart nicht nur die ansonstenaufzubringenden Kosten für Ver-schrottung, sondern erzielt sorgarEinnahmen. Doch ist der politischePreis hoch, wenn der Abbau militä-rischer Potentiale in einer Regionmit dem Anheizen des Rüstungs-wettlaufs in anderen Regionenerkauft wird. Die Gefahren für denFrieden sind offensichtlich, wennkurzsichtig angelegte Politik, denbequemsten Weg zur "Entsorgung"der überschüssigen Waffen wählt.

Das BICC hat in Kooperation mitdem Monterey Institute forInsternational Studies einForschungsprojekt zu dieser Thema-tik initiiert und im November 1994ein Expertengespräch in New Yorkdurchgeführt. Die dort vorgestelltenPapiere sind in diesem brief veröf-fentlicht. Im ersten Kapitel wird dasKonzept zur empirischen Erfassungsowie der Gründe zur Entstehungvon der "überschüssigen Waffen-beständen" entfaltet. In weiterenKapiteln werden verschiedeneWaffenkategorien untersucht. Ineinem Beitrag über Chemiewaffen,die nach der verabschiedeten, abernoch nicht ratifizierten Chemie-waffenkonvention komplett zur

Zusammen-Zusammen-Zusammen-Zusammen-Zusammen-fassungfassungfassungfassungfassung

German SummaryGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman SummaryGerman Summary

Vernichtung in den nächsten Jahrenanstehen, werden die technischenMöglichkeiten und Schwierigkeitenauf dem Weg zur Verwirklichungder Chemiewaffenkonventionenbeschrieben. Rakten werden ineinem weiteren Kapitel als besonde-rer Fall besprochen, weil Raktensehr häufig sowohl militärisch alsauch zivil nutzbar sind und daher imFalle von Rüstungskontroll- undAbrüstungsverträgen der besonderenKontrolle bedürfen. Da die Raketenfür zivile Zwecke oft wirtschaftlichinteressant sind und sie militärischals moderene Waffensysteme gelten,fehlt häufig die Bereitschaft zurVerschrottung dieser Systeme. Einbesonderes Problem verursachen dieriesigen Überschußbestände leichterWaffen; es sind die Waffen, die amhäufigsten in Kriegen und Konflik-ten eingesetzt werden und derenVerbleib und Transfer schwer zukontrollieren ist. Durch das Endedes Kalten Krieges und die Beendi-gung einer Reihe von Kriegen inEntwicklungsländern (besonders inAfrika) sind große Bestände derKleinwaffen verfügbar geworden. Esbedarf koordinierter Maßnahmender internationalen Völkergemeinde(einschließlich "gun-buy-back"-Programmen), um diese Waffen-bestände zu kontrollieren. Schließ-lich wird in einer Fallstudie nachge-zeichnet, wie das Erbe der Waffender Nationalen Volksarmee derehemaligen DDR verwendet wur-den. Immerhin handelte es sich ummehr als 2300 Kampfpanzer, 390Kampfflugzeuge,69 Schiffe und riesige MengenMunition, Lastwagen usw. DieWaffen wurden teils verschrottet, eingroßer Teil wurde auch exportiert.

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During 1994, the Monterey Instituteof International Studies (MIIS) andthe Bonn International Center forConversion (BICC) focused some oftheir research on surplus weapons.BICC and MIIS have started a long-term research and policy analysisproject intended to contribute two-fold to addressing and hopefullysolving the problem of surplusweapons. The project will produce aglobal overview of existing andpotential future surplus weapons,which requires an intensive empir-ical research input. Further, it willcontribute to the design of newpolicies (including policy imple-mentation) primarily to avoid thetransfer of such weapons intoconflicts, but also to identify other(technical and political) means ofresponsibly reducing the surplus.

The papers in this volume werepresented at a workshop at the JoyceMertz-Gilmore Foundation inNovember 1994 in New York andare the result of that effort.1 Thesepapers have several purposes. First,they serve as an introduction to thesubject of surplus weapons as adimension of the overall conversioneffort in the post-Cold War period.Since this is a new topic for researchand policymaking, it is necessary to

develop and communicate to ageneral audience the magnitude ofthe problem and the dangers—bothpotential and real—to the economicwell-being and security of states andtheir citizens. Second, they serve as aset of guidelines for researchers whowill document the size and locationof surplus weapons stocks. Thepapers also present concepts andtheoretical constructs that may beutilized in order to describe andexplain the growth of surplusweapons and the negative economic,military, social and political conse-quences. Third, they initiate theprocess of selecting a research agendabased on specific weapons types,disarmament agreements, and specif-ic regions of the world where surplusweapons present a significantconversion challenge. Finally, andperhaps most importantly, thepapers introduce the subject to thepolicymaking community at thelocal, regional, national and inter-national levels. It is here that theresearch findings must be applied ifthe negative consequences of surplusweapons are to be ameliorated andeventually eliminated.

1 Grants from the Joyce Mertz-GilmoreFoundation and the Volkswagen Foundationmade this work possible.

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stockpiling of surplus weapons iswidely apparent, especially since theend of the East-West conflict and thedissolution of the Soviet Union.At the same time there are consid-erable surplus stocks of weapons inother regions of the world, such asCentral America, Africa, and Asia.

A cursory analysis of the existence ofsurplus stocks of weapons illustratesvarious causes that led to stock-piling: international disarmamentagreements, unilateral disarmament,the cessation of hostilities, financialconstraints on defense budgets, andthe modernization of armed forcesand replacement of its equipment.

Experiences in different regions haveproven how problematic themanagement of such surplusweapons can be: to mention onlythree recent examples, the CFEagreement led to cascading of surplusweapons into exports; the equip-ment of the former East Germanarmed forces (NVA) was partlydismantled but also exported in great

quantities; and the stockpiling ofequipment after the end of a long-lasting conflict between Ethiopia andEritrea has been stolen or illicitlytransferred into Sudan and Somalia.

The experiences of the past few yearsalso show that the whole range ofweapons (from sophisticated nuclearweapons and their delivery systemsto all types of conventionalweapons) are being made redundantand may thus become available tointerested parties.

Different methods of handling sur-plus weapons may be applied:

Mothballing of weapons is thesimplest method, although theseweapons are often kept withoutappropriate protection againsttheft. Furthermore, storedweapons may be employed again.The export of obsolete weapons isthe cheapest but most dangerousmethod of eliminating super-fluous weapons. Large quantitiesare still for sale today.Allowing the weapons to becomeobsolete over time is a practicalconsequence of technical andeconomic difficulties rather than achosen policy. It involves eco-logical hazards, and the tempt-ation to export these weapons foreconomic benefits remains.The destruction of weapons istechnically feasible, although notwithout costs and ecologicalhazards. Disabling weapons—asprovided for in treaties—is usuallypossible within a short span oftime and at limited costs. What iscostly, time consuming and tech-nically complex is the finaldisposal of weapons and theircomponents.Converting weapons or othermilitary equipment for civilianuse is the most constructiveapproach but is limited in scope.Reuse for civilian purposes ispossible only for a limited num-ber of military equipment cate-gories (such as radar, satellites,helicopters and trucks). Thelimitations are the result of

Introduction:Introduction:Introduction:Introduction:Introduction:Coping withCoping withCoping withCoping withCoping with

Surplus WSurplus WSurplus WSurplus WSurplus WeaponseaponseaponseaponseaponsSystems:Systems:Systems:Systems:Systems:

A PA PA PA PA Priority forriority forriority forriority forriority forConversionConversionConversionConversionConversion

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bybybybybyEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andEdward J. Laurance andHerbert WHerbert WHerbert WHerbert WHerbert Wulfulfulfulfulf

The program of the Bonn Inter-national Center for Conversion(BICC) tries to facilitate the processof conversion by focusing primarilyon six conversion areas: reallocationof the financial resources of themilitary sector to non-militarypurposes; reorientation of militaryresearch and development (R&D)for non-military purposes; down-sizing defense industrial over-capacities and reducing dependencieson arms production; demobilizationof armed forces; military base clo-sures; and surplus weapons systems.

These areas indicate that, inaddressing the issue of conversion, ahigh priority should be attached tothe problem of surplus weapons(weapons that are no longer con-sidered of importance in the armedforces of a nation). In contrast tosome of the other areas, only limitedresearch and political action has beendirected at solving the problemsassociated with surplus weapons.The existence and increasing

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specific and demanding militaryperformances of weapon systemsthat are too inefficient, hencecostly.In rare cases ‘demilitarized’weapons might even serve forother military purposes—forexample, as simulators, targets orexhibits.

As a general rule one may predictthat the two most desirable methods,namely conversion and scrapping ofweapons, will either be very limitedin scope or will require substantialamounts of investment, althoughreclamation of raw materials is feas-ible—as has been proven in the caseof munitions.

Since surplus weapons are a newphenomenon, not even the magni-tude of existing and potential futuresurplus is known for all categories ofweapons. In most cases, govern-ments confronted with the issuehave followed a muddling-throughpolicy in which all of the above-mentioned methods of managing thesurplus have been tried.

The dangers for peace, security andthe environment of such haphazardpolicies are obvious. Arms bazaars,smuggling and other illegal methodsof trade, dumping of surplusweapons, and environmental degrad-ation are all indicators of a growingproblem requiring the attention ofgovernments, NGOs, and researchinstitutions equipped with technicalexpertise.

Research DesignResearch DesignResearch DesignResearch DesignResearch Design

The first paper in this collection isan attempt to develop a compre-hensive list of the concepts andquestions which make up the largerresearch effort. In this piece, theauthors tackle the difficult questionof how to define a surplus, a remind-er that this problem is as political asany other on the conversion agenda—one must initially answer the age-old question of “how much isenough?” As they point out, to theextent that uncertainty and fears offuture threats still dominate nationalagendas, states will be reluctant topart with those weapons that an out-sider, operating under differentassumptions and perceptions, maydeem surplus.

An obvious first step in this projectis the gathering of empirical data.The authors have provided thenecessary list of indicators to gener-ate data on surplus weapons; whenaggregated, this list will form thebasic material for a surplus weaponsatlas. The research design also ad-dresses the critical question of caus-ality—why are surpluses created inthe first place? The ultimate goal ofthe project, the design and executionof policies to alleviate the problemscreated by surplus weapons, cannotbe achieved without addressing thecauses.

The guidelines of the authors arecomprehensive and designed to beapplicable to all types of weapons inall regions. While these guidelineshold for most major conventionalweapons—the biggest problem docu-mented to this point—it is clear thatcertain commodities create specialchallenges for conversion. With thatin mind, several of the followingpapers deal with specific types ofweapons.

IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction

The large inventories of equipmentthat U.S., European, and Russianforces no longer need, and cannotafford to maintain in inventory,have had a significant impact onthe current international defensemarket. Some of this equipment isfinding its way into internationalmarkets at bargain prices. Thisphenomenon began as a result ofthe Conventional Forces in Europe(CFE) agreement, which limitedmajor platforms for all countrieswest of the Urals. As a result, acascade of older equipment fromwealthier countries to poorercountries is underway. The end ofthe Cold War has accelerated thistrend.The U.S. and European countries,

for example, are donating orleasing capital ships to a number ofcountries. The Germans areputting inherited East Germanequipment on the market. Defenseindustries in arms supplierscountries are concerned that theavailability of such excessequipment displaces potentialorders for new equipment, or atleast depresses prices and decreasesthe bargaining leverage of sellers.Obviously, the U.S. would like tolimit the ability of agressivecountries to obtain weapons,particularly if U.S. forces mightone day have to deal with thosecountries. This is all the moreimportant in today's world, where

the U.S. will increasingly find itselfcalled upon to act as worldpoliceman, or at least referee. Butsuch a policy is easier to enunciatethan to carry out in practice.

Source: Strategic Assessment 1995,U.S. Security Challenges inTransition, Institute for NationalStrategic Studies, S. 142

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Central Estimates for Plutonium and HEU in UnsafeguardedCentral Estimates for Plutonium and HEU in UnsafeguardedCentral Estimates for Plutonium and HEU in UnsafeguardedCentral Estimates for Plutonium and HEU in UnsafeguardedCentral Estimates for Plutonium and HEU in UnsafeguardedInventories in TInventories in TInventories in TInventories in TInventories in Tons (1994)ons (1994)ons (1994)ons (1994)ons (1994)a)a)a)a)a)

Total weapon Weapon-grade Total HEU HEU ingrade plutonium plutonium in i n v e n t o r y a c t i v e

i n v e n t o r y operat ional weaponsweapons

Russia 125 50 1000 230United States 110 33 700 160France 6 2 15 7.5United Kingdom 2.6 0.8 13 3China 3 1.8 15 7Israel 0.35 0.3 — —India 0.36 0.3 — —Pakistan — — 0.2 ?

TOTAL 230 90 1940 410

a) Estimates of inventories were made in a number of cases. For details, see original source.

Source:Reprinted from Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, and Marvin Miller, “A Cutoff in the Production ofFissile Material,” International Security, Winter 1994/95 (Vol. 19, No. 3), p. 167

WWWWWeapons-Specificeapons-Specificeapons-Specificeapons-Specificeapons-SpecificConcerns and IssuesConcerns and IssuesConcerns and IssuesConcerns and IssuesConcerns and Issues

Although this collection of papersdoes not address nuclear weaponssurplus, it is a multi-dimensionalproblem which is of political con-cern at the highest level—e.g., thenuclear heritage of the former SovietUnion. Foremost is the issue of whatto do with surplus fissile material—plutonium and highly enriched ura-nium. According to a recent study,large amounts of surplus weapon-grade material are released during theprocess of eliminating the tens ofthousands of nuclear warheads.

The dangers and highly technicalsolutions to this problem make itone which requires special treat-ment. An additional unique featureof the surplus nuclear weapons issue

is the presence of a nuclear nonpro-liferation regime—a Nonprolifer-ation Treaty (NPT) and an inter-national organization dedicated topolicing fissile materials, the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). For example, it is illegal toexport nuclear weapons and thetransfer of fissile materials is tightlycontrolled at the international level.Unlike conventional weapons, thereis an international legal frameworkwithin which solutions may bedeveloped. Another issue unique tothese weapons—the surplus of nuc-lear scientists who, lacking otheralternatives, have the potential to selltheir ‘surplus’ services to the highest-bidding would-be nuclear state—must be addressed.

This collection addresses other cate-gories of weapons with specific char-acteristics. Thus, chemical weaponshave their own set of peculiaritiesthat shape policies designed to alle-viate the surplus. As with nuclearweapons, a nonproliferation regimeis emerging, based on the newlysigned Chemical Weapons Con-vention (CWC). Unlike nuclearweapons, all chemical weapons havebeen outlawed, which at least intheory makes the issue of surplussomewhat simpler. Exporting sur-plus is less of a concern, not onlybecause it is now illegal but also be-cause it is rather easy to producesuch weapons. Since under the CWCall existing chemical weapons are tobe destroyed, this will be the prin-cipal focus of research and policydevelopment.

Notes:

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Missiles have been singled out forspecial treatment for several reasons.First, in signing the 1987 agreementto establish the Missile TechnologyControl Regime, the major prod-ucers of missiles recognized thatalthough missiles are delivery sys-tems for nuclear weapons, they arenot covered under the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Second, theircharacteristics—e.g., high speed andno known defense—make them aparticularly destabilizing commod-ity, as was seen most recently in theGulf War. This quality makes thema highly sought commodity in theinternational arms market, thus gen-erating a disincentive to dismantle ordestroy them. Missiles also have apotentially dangerous capability tobe ‘mixed and matched’—creating adisincentive to destroy such weaponsif they can be dismantled and usedfor another purpose for which a

state does not have a surplus, bywhatever definition used. Finally,missiles are unique in that they canbe used as space launch vehicles(SLVs), a civilian purpose that hasgreat economic potential, at least inthe eyes of the states concerned.

Light weapons also have uniquefeatures that significantly affect thedevelopment of solutions. In onesense these weapons are the oppositeof nuclear weapons, in that a singleone cannot compare with a nuclearweapon in destructive power. Yet itis light weapons that throughout theCold War—and even more so today—were responsible for most of thekilling of both combatants and civil-ians. Due to a breakdown of exportcontrols in the former Soviet Unionand the concomitant continuedproduction of light weapons, the

international market has beenflooded with very cheap, hard-to-detect, and lethal light weapons. Theending of wars not associated withthe Cold War has also contributedsignificantly to this surplus, whichhas found its way into all of thebloody ethnic conflicts now raging.Because of the low cost, size, avail-ability, and lack of accountability ofthese weapons, solutions other thanthose used for larger weapons will benecessary. Some of these might in-clude increased publicity of negativeconsequences to develop normsagainst their use (e.g., the campaignto ban anti-personnel land mines),buy-back programs, transparencyregimes at the regional level, thedevelopment of consultative mech-anisms, and the further developmentof disarmament schemes as part ofUnited Nations peacekeepingoperations.

UK goes up for saleUK goes up for saleUK goes up for saleUK goes up for saleUK goes up for sale

The UK MoD's Defence SalesThe UK MoD's Defence SalesThe UK MoD's Defence SalesThe UK MoD's Defence SalesThe UK MoD's Defence SalesAgency is being viewedAgency is being viewedAgency is being viewedAgency is being viewedAgency is being viewedinternationally as a role forinternationally as a role forinternationally as a role forinternationally as a role forinternationally as a role forselling surplus militaryselling surplus militaryselling surplus militaryselling surplus militaryselling surplus militaryequipment.equipment.equipment.equipment.equipment.

The sale of surplus militaryequipment has become big buisnessfor the UK MoD's disposalsorganization, the Defence SalesAgency (DSA). With successes lastyear including the export of six

former Royal Navy Type 21 frigatesto Pakistan, four minesweepers toBangladesh and, in November, fourBroadsword class Type 22 Batch 1frigates and three River classminesweepers to Brazil, DSA salesare beginning to expand. Next onthe auctionblock are the RN's fourUpholder class SSKs with Canadatipped as the likely customer.According to DSAofficials, thesuccess of the UK's military disposalsales agency cn be gauged by theextent for foreign interest in theorganization. The former

Directorate of Sales (Disposals)recently hosted teams of interstedobservers from the USA, Belgium,Spain, Singapore, Czech Republikand Russia, all aiming to establish orimprove their own disposals salesorganizations along similar lines tothe MoD operation.

Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol.23, No. 5 (4.02.95)

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Conventional arms constitute themajority of surplus stocks in mostcountries. For example, experienceof the CFE arms reduction in Eur-ope and the results of unification inGermany provide an interestingempirical basis for the implement-ation of policies regarding surplusweapons. In the German case, theweaponry of a complete army (theformer East German NationaleVolksarmee, NVA) in 1990 becamesurplus, including more than 2,300battle tanks, 390 fighter aircraft and69 fighting ships. These conventionalweapons were partly scrapped, butalso exported—thus adding to theflow of internationally traded arms—

and partly integrated into the WestGerman armed forces. The last paperin this collection details what hashappened to the NVA material overthe last four years. It is a case studyencompassing all the above methodsfor handling surplus weapons thatmay be applied.

Belgium initiates 3-year sell-offBelgium initiates 3-year sell-offBelgium initiates 3-year sell-offBelgium initiates 3-year sell-offBelgium initiates 3-year sell-off

Belgium is to sell large quantities of armour and artillery over the next three years, officials in Brussels haveconfirmed. Reducing in size from a corps to a reinforced division, the Belgian Army is divesting itself of thefollowing equipment:

202 Leopard 1 MBTs (keeping 132);54 Gepard 35 mm selfpropelled anti-aircraft guns (keeping none);319 CVR(T) family SFVs (keeping 339)60 M109A2/A3 155mm howitzers (keeping 108);11 Alouette II liaison helicopters (keeping 33);10 Epervier reconnaissance drones (keeping 20);5 M48 bridgelaying tanks (keeping 9);12 Matenin mine laying systems (keeping 15);34 107 mm mortars (keeping 90;24 HAWK SAM launchers (retaining none).

These weapons will be sold in government-to-government contracts, while in some cases the originalmanufacturer may play an intermediary role. Proceeds will be used exclusively to pay for new defenceprocurements.

Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (28.01.95)

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bybybybybySusanne KSusanne KSusanne KSusanne KSusanne Kopteopteopteopteopteand Pand Pand Pand Pand Peter Weter Weter Weter Weter Wilkeilkeilkeilkeilke

Developing aDeveloping aDeveloping aDeveloping aDeveloping aframework forframework forframework forframework forframework forresearch on surplusresearch on surplusresearch on surplusresearch on surplusresearch on surplusweaponsweaponsweaponsweaponsweapons

The existence of surplus weapons,defined as those which are no longerneeded in the national context formaintaining or securing peace (stateof non-war), is widely accepted. Theend of the East-West conflict and thebreak-down of Soviet hegemony hasled to a systematic decline in defensebudgets and inventories of equip-ment, especially in Europe. At thesame time, there are considerablestocks of unnecessary weapons inother regions of the world, createdwith the cessation of fighting orabatement of wars not necessarilyassociated with the Cold War. InCentral America, Africa, Asia andthe Far East, the stock of weapons isoften higher than that needed fornational security, if one assumes theadequacy of a defensive doctrine.International disarmament agree-ments and economic realities haveincreasingly led to a reduction ofnational arsenals since 1990, withfurther reductions to follow over thenext ten years.

What are surplus weapons? How canthey be defined? The characteriz-ation of military capacities andweapon stocks as surplus presup-poses that there are normative

criteria for necessary stocks. Sincesecurity doctrines vary widely—between a conservative securitypolicy and a peace utopia—any defin-ition of stocks as surplus will alwaysbe controversial. Therefore anappropriate starting point is a discus-sion of possible criteria for definingsurplus weapons. This exercise can-not be avoided, since documentingexisting surplus stocks, their typesand their regional distribution, willbe a central task prior to analysis andpolicy implementation. This categor-ization is necessarily multi-dimensional, taking into account theorigin of the weapons involved,conflict categories, regional distrib-ution, weapon categories and disarm-ament effects.

Having described and documentedsurplus weapons, one must assess thepossible explanations for surplusstocks. The solutions put forth todeal with surplus weapons—the dis-armament steps inclusive of destroy-ing the weapons—will depend critic-ally on how they became surplus inthe first place. The surplus ofnuclear-armed intercontinentalweapons in the United States andRussia can hardly be compared witha possible surplus of small arms andlight infantry weapons after cease-fires and the resolution of conflictsin the Far East and Africa. Inessence, the approach can be des-cribed as a stock and flow analysis.The stock analysis concentrates onthe question of how much surplusexists, while the flow analysisreports the causes of and reasons for

the emergence of surplus weapons.The overall objective is to collectmaterial for a world-wide disarma-ment and conversion atlas, whichwill give an up-to-date overview ofsurplus weapon stocks and disarma-ment agreements, as well as an assess-ment of conversion which hasalready transpired.

The question of varying practicalapproaches to disarmament relatedto surpluses completes this analysis.The aim is to describe the surplus ofweapons in each particular case, inan international, national and region-al context, and then evaluate theeconomic costs and the technicalproblems, leading finally to policyrecommendations.

Definition of surplus:Definition of surplus:Definition of surplus:Definition of surplus:Definition of surplus:which criteria arewhich criteria arewhich criteria arewhich criteria arewhich criteria aremeaningful?meaningful?meaningful?meaningful?meaningful?

Without some semblance of aconsensus on what ‘surplus’ means,its elimination in a specific context isnot likely. For example, a definitionof surplus that includes onlyweapons systems eliminated due tointernational agreements is not ade-quate. Weapons must be discussed inthe context of military capacities,e.g., not only weapons stocks butalso arms production capacities. Thecriterion for defining a surplus mustbe laid down openly, and must diff-erentiate between surplus and neces-sary military capacities. The crite-rion for defining a surplus must belaid down openly, and must diff-erentiate between surplus and neces-sary military capacities.

When seeking a useful analyticaldefinition of military surplus, threegeneral levels should be distin-guished:

a surplus of military capacities—soldiers, weapon systems andmilitary facilities

a surplus of weapons and equip-ment

ResearchingResearchingResearchingResearchingResearchingSurplus WSurplus WSurplus WSurplus WSurplus Weapons:eapons:eapons:eapons:eapons:

Guidelines,Guidelines,Guidelines,Guidelines,Guidelines,MethodsMethodsMethodsMethodsMethods

andTandTandTandTandTopicsopicsopicsopicsopics

research designresearch designresearch designresearch designresearch design

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surplus (for example, they can beexported or new security doctrinescan emerge). This approach is also astarting point for an investigation ofregional distribution patterns ofsurplus.

The acceptance of official govern-mental statistics does not mean that acritical analysis cannot be carried outfor concrete cases, which mightshow at least the possibility of a diff-erent assessment regarding thechances for disarmament. One out-come of research in this area maywell be the development of a middleway between official statistics and atotally independent definition ofsurplus stocks.

How does a surplus ofHow does a surplus ofHow does a surplus ofHow does a surplus ofHow does a surplus ofmilitary capacitiesmilitary capacitiesmilitary capacitiesmilitary capacitiesmilitary capacitiesand weapons arise?and weapons arise?and weapons arise?and weapons arise?and weapons arise?

A first look at military surplus andweapon stocks generated by disarm-ament reveals different causes andstarting points for surplus weapons.An analysis of the reasons for sur-plus is therefore necessary. Basically,surplus results from the followingsituations: unilateral or international(at least bilateral) disarmamentinitiatives; the end of a war orlimited regional conflict; a modern-ization decision; and/or financialconstraints on defense budgets.

One hypothesis is that onlysurplus resulting from spectacularchanges (e.g., the end of an army—such as that of East Germany—resulting from the end of the ColdWar) can force actual conversionand disarmament strategies. Allcases below this level are dealt withby such cost-minimizing or profit-making strategies as mothballing orweapon exports, producing finan-cial as well as political profit. Thegeneration of surplus, of course,depends to a large extent on thevarious national laws and exportregulations as well as provisions indisarmament treaties requiringdestruction of weapons.

a surplus of industrial capacitiesfor weapon production

The initial decision must thereforedetermine which of these analyticallevels to apply when defining a sur-plus. In designing specific disarma-ment requirements, it seems mostuseful to use the wider definition,which takes into account overallmilitary capacities including:military-used infrastructure, soldiers,weapon systems, industrial capacitiesfor the production of weapons, andservicing and maintenance capacities.

The question remains: for the eval-uation of military capacities (and forparticular weapons), who defines—and by what criteria—which capac-ities (weapons) are surplus and nolonger needed? The answer to this“how much is enough?” questiondepends on complex evaluations ofsecurity policy and possible threats,which fluctuate over time. Objectiveevaluation criteria do not normallyexist. In military worst-case think-ing, absurd dangers are taken intoaccount. For example, the militaryarmaments competition in the East-West conflict created accepted scen-arios and possible courses of war thatencouraged the belief that, in termsof the military, one can never haveenough. This security logic led to awell-documented, excessive buildupof stocks in all categories ofweapons, a buildup that has nowcreated the need for sensible andpractical approaches to a build-down.

The spectrum of possible definitionsis set by two extremes:

On the one hand, the definitioncan be based strictly on disarma-ment agreements and nationalmilitary definitions. Surplus isthen that part of military capac-ities and weapons which, whencompared to the previous state(before the disarmament agree-

ment), is now too much. Even inthe course of this very restrictedsurplus term, a considerableworld-wide surplus of weapons,soldiers, military infrastructureand weapon production capacitiesdoes exist.

On the other hand, the surplusconcept could be considerablyexpanded and only recognizethose capacities which are legit-imate and seem to be necessaryfor a defensive security policy. Inthis case, the problems of eval-uation increase, and logically, sodo the stocks defined as surplus.

Because the above definitionaldilemma is political in nature withno obvious solution, practicalitydemands the use of a relativelyempirical concept of surplus, onerestricted to weapons and directmilitary capacities. This meanssoldiers and military infrastructurewill normally not be taken intoaccount. Industrial, research anddevelopment capacities will only beutilized to the extent they are neces-sary for the use of weapons or theunderstanding of the development ofsurplus.

The basic surplus concept used hereis mainly descriptive and distin-guishes between a stock and a flowanalysis. The stock analysis is neces-sarily normative and depends on thevaluation issues raised above. Itaccepts governments as the surplus-defining authority. The flow analysissupplements the stock analysis witha description of causes. This is neces-sary, both for understanding thedifferent phases (production ofweapons, being fit for duty, cause ofsurplus, use or reduction of surplus)and to show that weapons must notalways remain in the status of

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Case studies on disarmament andconversion comparing the phenom-enon of decommissioning old-fashioned systems (e.g., MIG fighteraircraft of the NVA) while simul-taneously modernizing (e.g., pur-chasing the Eurofighter 2000), illus-trate that disarmament is not a lineartrend of arms reduction.

Surplus weapons—Surplus weapons—Surplus weapons—Surplus weapons—Surplus weapons—how many andhow many andhow many andhow many andhow many andwhere?where?where?where?where?The stock analysisThe stock analysisThe stock analysisThe stock analysisThe stock analysis

The quantity and distribution ofsurplus weapons is the central pointof attention for disarmament andconversion policy. The stock anal-ysis includes all nations and producesprofile of existing weapon stocks.The overview lists weapon systemsand their regional distribution, andsets the research and policy agenda.Important are several factors:

criteria for registration andcounting

presentation methods (diagrams,graphs, etc.)

grade of differentiation (accordingto type of weapons)

surplus potential (possible‘disarmament reserves’)

weapon production capacities andthe resulting ‘oversupply’ ofweapons, research and develop-ment capacities.

The stock analysis should take intoaccount the number and quality ofweapons in the various categoriesremaining after the surplus isdeclared and determined. This meansproviding information on specificcategories: (1) military goods in thestock of the armed forces declared assurplus but still usable for military

purposes, presently stockpiled, in-tended for export, intended for civiluse (conversion), or intended forscrapping; (2) military goods in thestock of the armed forces no longermilitarily usable or forbidden bydisarmament agreements, intendedfor scrapping/destruction orintended for civil use; (3) weaponspartly destroyed in wars, mines leftbehind, and other ‘remnants ofwars;’ (4) weapons captured in warswhich will not be used in nationalarmed forces; (5) military goodsbeing stored or used illegally, andnot officially part of the stock of thearmed forces; and (6) newly pro-duced goods which have not beensold.

Regional distributionRegional distributionRegional distributionRegional distributionRegional distribution

A preliminary assessment of regionaldistribution patterns demonstratesthat high surpluses occur most fre-quently in the industrial countries.Further, the purely quantitativeweapon stocks of the former War-saw Pact states seem to be higherthan those of the West. Concur-rently, these Eastern states are under-going a crisis in economic trans-formation. As a result, they continueto produce armaments and increasethe level of surplus weapons; thearms production capacities appeartwice as heavy in Eastern Europeand the former Soviet Union than inWestern Europe. It should be notedthat such regional concentrations can

also be found in Western Europe andthe United States, which may lead tomajor problems as well.

In addition to these problems pro-duced by the East-West conflict,other regional surplus cases exist inthe Third World, and tendencies tocontinue arming exist in some partsof the world. A critical question isthe extent of the relationshipbetween the regional reduction ofsurplus (by export) and a resultingincrease of military capacities inother countries.

The stock analysis should focus onthe following regions:

the CIS—because of the STARTagreements, the chemical weaponsconvention, a strong stockpilingpolicy in the past and regionalchanges in stationing forces

the United States—because ofSTART, the chemical weaponsconvention and a rapid modern-ization policy

Europe—because of CFE

Germany—due to the unificationand the end of the NVA

regions of recent war and con-flict—Central America, SouthernAfrica (Angola, Mozambique),Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghani-stan, Cambodia, Vietnam, etc.

captured weapons, especially inIsrael and Vietnam (very old), theUnited States (smaller numbersfrom Iraq, Grenada, etc.),Southern Africa (Angola)

weapons produced for stock-piling, especially in Central andEastern Europe


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Suggestions for a flow analysis ofSuggestions for a flow analysis ofSuggestions for a flow analysis ofSuggestions for a flow analysis ofSuggestions for a flow analysis ofsurplus stockssurplus stockssurplus stockssurplus stockssurplus stocks

In addition to the purely quantita-tive documentation of surplusstocks, a flow analysis may be made—preferably in case studies—analyz-ing the origin of surplus. One ini-tially assumes that the acquisition ofweapons (by production or import)does not necessarily lead to a sur-plus, but to a use of these weapons asplanned (situation A).

By analyzing surplus in a flow anal-ysis, one may then distinguish sev-eral factors:

Causes of surplus (situation B):removal from service because ofwear and tear, but generallyusable; removal from service fortechnological reasons, i.e., becauseof modernization; removal fromservice due to changes of doctrine;removal from service because ofunilateral disarmament; reductionin inventory because of agree-ments; disposal of used weapons(very often in war regions)because the costs of continuing touse them are too high (i.e., mines,US weapons after the Gulf War);capturing of weapons during warswhich do not fit into domesticarmed forces; and/or excesscreated by over-purchasing andstockpiling of weapons.

Usage of surplus (situation C1):sending usable surplus to A asexports, thus starting the cycleagain; sending to surplus stocks atB; taking from surplus stocks bysending weapons back to A (inthe case of a crisis), B because ofage, or C; civil use; and/orscrapping or destroying them(situation C2).

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The stages of the flow analysis arealso suitable for a regional study.Referring again to the Figure, A (asproduction) normally and prefer-ably takes place in the industrialcountries; B (build-up of surplusstocks) initially occurs primarily inthe industrial countries, then—afterexport—in Third World countries;C occurs in the industrial coun-tries, mainly in the former SovietUnion, because there is minimaluse for the surplus, especially inthe Third World countries.

Exports of surplus weapons gener-ally occurs between the North andSouth, with areas of crisis and waras major customers.

From surplus toFrom surplus toFrom surplus toFrom surplus toFrom surplus todisarmament:disarmament:disarmament:disarmament:disarmament:what capacities arewhat capacities arewhat capacities arewhat capacities arewhat capacities arenecessary fornecessary fornecessary fornecessary fornecessary fordisarmament?disarmament?disarmament?disarmament?disarmament?What economic andWhat economic andWhat economic andWhat economic andWhat economic andtechnical problemstechnical problemstechnical problemstechnical problemstechnical problemsarise?arise?arise?arise?arise?

As can be seen by the variety of res-ponses to surplus weapons, it iscertainly possible that a surplus(military capacities) remains and isonly reduced to a small extent. Inwhat cases does surplus turn intodisarmament? In these cases, arethere similarities in the forms ofbehavior? If so, such an analysis hasdirect relevance in designing con-version strategies and policies.

After identifying and counting sur-plus stocks, one must ascertain thedisarmament capacities necessary forcoping with these problems. Whatstrategies exist for the stockpiling,destruction and conversion of

Viewing surplus as a flow variableinstead of simply a stock variable hasmany analytical advantages. Itbecomes obvious that surplus is atemporary phenomenon, dependingon such factors as a doctrine encour-aging stockpiling of old weapongoods (especially in the formerSoviet Army, but common to allarmed forces); agreements ondestruction/reduction over a periodof time; the financial background ofthe armed forces—the more moneyit possesses, the faster it will be mod-ernized and a surplus created, theeasier old equipment can be sold, andthe more money is available forcarrying out expensive destruction;and the state of the internationalweapons market in general (i.e.,demand for used weapons).

Second, it becomes apparent that thesame good (weapon) can go throughmore than one phase of surplus andnon-surplus. For example, throughexport the process becomes circularwhen a state acquires surplus equip-ment (A). However, surplus mayalso be created in the course ofchanging threat perceptions, whereweapons once declared surplus willbe used again. This was the philo-sophy behind the high weaponstocks of the Soviet Army. Goodswhich are ‘civilianized’ may theor-etically be used again for militarypurposes (for example, trucks in thesituation of a crisis).

Third, the relationship between newproduction and the removal ofweapons from service—for example,because of technical developments orexport interests—has become clear.In France, Mirage-3s are taken out ofstock and exported in favor ofRafales. In the United States, thesuggestion has been made to exportthe older F-16s in order to financenewer models.

weapons and armament capacities?The possibilities are strongly influ-enced by the available technical andeconomic means; an evaluation ofcases of surplus will enable the ela-boration of technical solutions andeconomic costs.

Research QuestionsResearch QuestionsResearch QuestionsResearch QuestionsResearch Questions

In conclusion, a set of key questionsemerge to guide research in the areaof surplus weapons.

What is defined as surplus?

What problems exist withnational (official) figures?

How many surplus stocks doexist?

Of what is the surplus composed?

Where does the surplus exist?

How does the surplus arise?

What factors determine disarma-ment and conversion options?

What strategies for handling sur-plus exist?

For what economic and technicalproblems (arising in the course ofsurplus) must solutions be found?

What is the legal framework con-cerning contracts and laws—bothinternational disarmament agree-ments and their provisions for thedestruction of weapons as well asnational export regulations?


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bybybybybyMaria BowersMaria BowersMaria BowersMaria BowersMaria Bowers


It is somewhat misleading to con-sider chemical weapons within thecontext of surplus weapons stocks inthe post-Cold War era. This is due tothe January 1993 signing of TheConvention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stockpilingand Use of Chemical Weapons and ontheir Destruction, commonly referredto as the Chemical Weapons Con-vention (CWC). Unlike the nuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),the CWC is non-discriminatory; allthe participants have the same rightsand obligations. The conclusion ofthe CWC was a true landmarkachievement in the field of disarma-ment, in that it bans not only theproduction, stockpiling, develop-ment and use of chemical weapons,but also the retention and transfer(sale) of chemical weapons. TheCWC also calls for the destructionof all chemical weapons owned orpossessed by states parties, andrequires the destruction of all oldand abandoned chemical weapons.

In essence, the CWC places all chem-ical weapons in the class of surplusweapons. Moreover, it prohibitscommonly used destruction tech-niques, namely dumping in anybody of water, land burial and open-pit burning. Former methods of dis-posing of surplus chemical weaponsstocks are thus no longer an optiontoday. The CWC mandates a dead-line for the destruction of all chem-ical weapons of no later than tenyears after the CWC enters intoforce. This deadline may be extendedby five years in special circum-stances, upon approval of the Conf-erence of States Parties to the CWC.

It is a challenge to discover methodsof disposal that are ecologically safeand acceptable to both governmentsand the local population wherechemical weapons are currentlystored. The difficult task often givesrise to controversy and heateddebates. The following discussionwill provide a brief overview of thetechnical, political, environmentaland economic problems nations facein the destruction of surplus chem-ical weapons stocks.

PPPPProperties ofroperties ofroperties ofroperties ofroperties ofChemical Agents andChemical Agents andChemical Agents andChemical Agents andChemical Agents andMunitionsMunitionsMunitionsMunitionsMunitions

In order to grasp the problems asso-ciated with the destruction ofchemical weapons, it is necessary torecognize that not all chemicalweapons or chemical weapons agents(the poisonous substance inside achemical weapon) are the same.These differences must be perceived,as different destruction techniquesare more or less suitable dependingupon the agent involved andwhether or not that agent is weapon-ized.

The Disposal ofThe Disposal ofThe Disposal ofThe Disposal ofThe Disposal ofSurplus ChemicalSurplus ChemicalSurplus ChemicalSurplus ChemicalSurplus Chemical

WWWWWeaponseaponseaponseaponseapons

The CWC defines ”Old ChemicalWeapons” as ”(a) Chemicalweapons which were producedbefore 1925; or (b) Chemicalweapons produced in the periodbetween 1925 and 1946 that havedeteriorated to such extent thatthey can no longer be used aschemical weapons.” The CWCdefines ”Abandoned ChemicalWeapons” as ”Chemical weapons,including old chemical weapons,abandoned by a State after 1January 1925 on the territory ofanother State without consent ofthe latter.”

The international organization thatwill oversee the implementation ofthe CWC is the Organisation for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) located in The Hague, theNetherlands. As of fall 1994, 158countries had signed the CWC and16 had ratified it. It will enter intoforce upon the 65th ratification, anevent which is likely to occur in thenot-so-distant future. Most majorstates are party to the agreement; thetwo countries with the largest stock-piles of chemical weapons today, theUnited States and Russia, are signa-tories. Nevertheless, there are anumber of countries that are notsignatories, some of which are likelypossessors of chemical weapons.Although several Arab states havestated that they refuse to sign theCWC until Israel signs the NPT,there remains a possibility that thesestates will eventually join the CWC.

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The CWC considers bulk agents—chemical agents that are notweaponized—as chemical weapons,which therefore must be destroyedin accordance with the CWC. Achemical agent is considered to be abulk agent when it is stored in atank, drum or other container that isnot suitable for battlefield employ-ment. In most cases, it is much easierto destroy a chemical agent when itis in bulk than when it is in a muni-tion. The destruction and disposal ofweaponized agents presents a varietyof problems. Chemical agents areconsidered to be weaponized whenthey are in a munition, whether it bea bomb, mortar round, artilleryshell, grenade, mine or any otherdispersal mechanism. The risksinvolved in destruction areheightened if the chemical is in amunition; a fused munition has anincreased possibility of explodingduring the destruction process orduring transport to a destructionsite.

There are literally thousands ofchemical substances that are poison-ous to humans. Over the lastcentury, however, only about 70different chemical agents have beenused in the manufacture of chemicalweapons (Compton, 1992). Only themost common agents will beaddressed in this study. There are anumber of ways to classify chemicalagents based on their specific prop-erties. When the average personthinks about chemical weapons, thefirst image that usually comes tomind is poison gas. Chemical war-fare agents, however, can be found ina variety of forms besides gas,including liquid, solid or aerosol(suspended particle).

Nerve agents are the most lethal ofthe chemical agents. Chemically,nerve agents belong to the groupof organo-phosphorus compounds,along with many modern pest-icides. Once a person comes incontact with a nerve agent—whether through inhalation,ingestion or contact with the skin—the toxic properties of the agentbegin to take effect.

Blister agents, or vesicants, are lesstoxic than nerve agents, but canbe deadly nonetheless. The mostcommon blister agents are mus-tard agents, first developed as achemical weapon in World War I.Blister agents react on humans bydestroying tissue, causing burnsand blisters when they come intocontact with the skin and damageto internal organs if inhaled oringested—sometimes resulting indeath.

Blood agents are lethal and blockthe flow of oxygen to the blood,causing oxygen starvation of bodytissues, termed anoxia. Cyanogenchloride and hydrogen cyanideare blood agents.

Choking agents attack the respira-tory system, and they can belethal. One of the most commonchoking agents is chlorine, whichwas the first chemical agent usedin World War I.

Harassing agents are usually notlethal unless inhaled in largequantities. Harassing agents canbe further broken down intotearing, sneezing or vomitingagents. Many of these agents weredeveloped in World War I and areobsolete today, while others (suchas CS, commonly called tear gas)are used by modern police forcesfor riot control.

Psychological agents impair ration-al thinking in humans. Largedoses can be lethal. LSD and BZare the most well known psych-ological agents.

Another method of chemical agentclassification is whether they arepersistent or non-persistent . Persist-ency is used to describe how long anarea remains contaminated at a levelof toxicity dangerous to humansafter a chemical agent has beenemployed. Thus, an agent is said tobe persistent if the area in which itwas used remains contaminated forabout a day or more. On the otherhand, a non-persistent or volatileagent disperses quickly, sometimesin a matter of minutes or hours.Lewisite, tearing agents, Sarin,Tabun and Soman are non-persistentagents. To make a non-persistentagent persistent, thickeners can beadded. As a result of the additionalchemical additive, it becomes morecomplicated to destroy the agent bycertain means.

A further definition helpful inunderstanding the properties ofchemical weapons is that of binaryweapons. Binary chemical weaponsare those in which two, separate,relatively non-toxic chemicals are

chemical weaponschemical weaponschemical weaponschemical weaponschemical weapons

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In 1991, for example, real estatedevelopers unearthed a number ofWorld War I chemical munitionsburied in Washington, DC. Themunitions were extremelycorroded—some were still fused andit was not clear what agents theycontained. Munitions of that ageand condition are very unstable, andgreat care had to be taken in theirremoval. There were no records ofwhat agents were in the munitions;indeed, there was no record of themunitions burial there. The area wasevacuated during the clean up and noone was injured, but the real estatevalue of the area understandablydropped. This single incident isillustrative of a number of incidentsthat have occurred in various coun-tries where chemical munitions havebeen disposed of by burial.

According to the CWC, chemicalmunitions that were buried before1 January 1977 do not have to bedestroyed, if they stay buried.Once the munitions are unearthed,be it intentionally or by accident,they are defined as chemicalweapons and must be destroyed.This precept of the CWC couldlead to costly results for a numberof countries, in that land burialwas a common method of disposalof chemical stockpiles that weredeployed on foreign territory. Ifthese buried munitions are un-earthed today, they will likelycome under the category ofabandoned chemical weapons andlegal and financial responsibilityfor their destruction will fall onthe abandoning state, if the aban-doning state can be established. Ifthe abandoning state cannot beidentified, the responsibility fordestruction must be assumed bythe State Party. In such cases, theState Party may request assistancefrom the OPCW.

located in the same munition. Uponfiring the munition, the seal separ-ating the two chemicals breaks,allowing the chemicals to mix inflight and creating a chemical agent.

FFFFFormer Methods oformer Methods oformer Methods oformer Methods oformer Methods ofDestructionDestructionDestructionDestructionDestruction

There have been methods of destroy-ing surplus chemical weapons foralmost as long as there have beenchemical weapons. Historically,chemical weapons fell into the cate-gory of surplus for a variety ofreasons. Many chemical weaponswere confiscated and destroyed atthe end of wars, most notably thosein the arsenals of Japan and Ger-many at the end of World War IIand those owned by Iraq at the endof the 1990 Gulf War. Chemicalweapons were also disposed of whentheir technology became obsolete,due to the development of newerand more toxic agents. Also, aschemical munitions are filled withchemicals that sometimes have acorrosive effect on the shell, usa-bility of chemical weapons maydecrease more rapidly than that ofconventional weapons. Leakingchemical munitions were also elim-inated, as they could not be usedwithout the threat of injury to one’sown forces.

Previously the most common dis-posal methods for chemical weaponswere land burial, sea dumping,detonation (firing or exploding themunitions) and open-pit burning.These methods may have beenthought to be quite clever at thetime (out of sight, out of mind), buttheir danger has since becomestarkly apparent.

Buried munitions also pose problemsenvironmentally. Once the muni-tions begin to corrode and leak, theagents can contaminate thesurrounding soil and even get intowater sources. The extent of contam-ination depends on the volatility ofthe agent, and while some agentsbreakdown and become non-toxicquickly, others remain in the soil forlonger periods of time. As a result ofheightened environmental awarenessin today’s world, buried munitionsare now often unearthed inten-tionally, in order to be disposed ofin an environmentally safe manner.

Sea dumping of chemical munitionsis another method of disposal thathas caused a number of problems.Every ocean, from the Indian to theArctic, has been a dumping groundfor thousands of tons of chemicalweapons. Major dumping oper-ations, many in very deep water,took place after World War II whenthe allies disposed of large quantitiesof Japanese and German chemicalweapons, as well as large surplusstocks of their own. Some argue thatthere is no danger when chemicalmunitions are dumped in very deepwater, and a number of studiesconducted corroborate this view.These deep water dumpings have,for the most part, not causedincident. Other dumping operations,however, occurred in relativelyshallow water in the Baltic Sea andoff the coast of Japan. In both ofthese regions, dumped chemicalweapons caused serious problems forthe fishing industry. Fishermen inthe Baltic and off the coast of Japanstill haul old chemical weapons up intheir nets, and are sometimesexposed to still-active agents. Certainareas have been marked off limits to

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fishing vessels for fear of futureincidents. In addition, sea-dumpedchemical munitions do not alwaysstay in the sea, and a number ofcountries—including France,Australia and Poland, to name afew—have had chemical munitionswash up on their beaches. Therehave also been unconfirmed reportsthat chunks of polymerized mustardhave washed up on beaches in theBaltic region.

Sea-dumped chemical munitionsreact differently in water dependingon the agent they contain. Themunition shell may break openduring the dumping operation ormay corrode over time, allowing theagent to leak out. Nerve agents andmany other agents hydrolyze, orbreak down and dissolve once theycome into contact with water, andare therefore rendered harmless in arelatively short amount of time.Mustard, however, is insoluble inwater. When mustard comes intocontact with water the surface oxi-dizes, forming a skin or protectiveshell around the agent, whichremains active inside. Most injuriesthat have occurred when fishermencome into contact with sea-dumpedchemical munitions have resultedfrom mustard.

Dumping has occurred not only inoceans, but also in lakes, ponds andrivers (such as the Mississippi River).This practice was less frequent thanocean dumping, but may be evenmore dangerous—these areas areoften closer to population centers,making contamination of the watersupply a real possibility.

The impact of sea-dumped chemicalmunitions on marine life is still amatter of debate. For the most partstudies have been inconclusive, butsome have determined that it is bestto leave most sea-dumped chemicalmunitions where they lie, ratherthan trying to recover them for re-disposal. Nevertheless, chemicalmunitions sea dumped in shallowwater will remain an environmentalproblem for some time to come.

Today, not only the CWC, but alsothe London Convention on seadumping prohibits this method ofdisposal. Thus, even if it can beproven that sea dumping in deepwater is a safe method of disposal, itis no longer an option due to thesetwo conventions.

Destruction by open-pit burning anddetonation have also had their shareof problems. In some historicalcases, when a large quantity of muni-tions was destroyed in one place, notall of the weapons detonated; addi-tionally, lax monitoring of the oper-ations allowed unexploded muni-tions to remain at the site.Furthermore, the toxic effluentsreleased into the atmosphere bythese methods of destruction exceedmost national limits imposed byenvironmental legislation. Thus,national environmental legislationoften prohibits these procedures.However, in other cases, detonationremains the only viable option fordestruction of certain chemicalmunitions. Some munitions deter-iorate to such a point that theycannot be moved without extremedanger of accidental detonation,making it wiser to destroy themunition in place. This was true ofIraq’s chemical weapons, and themethod of detonation termedinstantaneous thermodegredation—involving the generation of a full-airexplosion around the munition—wasused. Under this technique, muni-tions were placed upon a tray of fueloil and sharpel charges. The resultingfireball generated such an intenseheat that any contamination fromthe munition was vaporized. Onemay also use a large amount of highexplosives to achieve the same effect.

Destruction MethodsDestruction MethodsDestruction MethodsDestruction MethodsDestruction Methodsof Tof Tof Tof Tof Todayodayodayodayoday

There are two major confirmed tech-nologies for destroying chemicalweapons acceptable under the CWClimits today, incineration and chem-ical degradation. However, there aredozens of alternative technologies,and the number is growing.

There are many variants of theincineration process which haveproven to be environmentally andtechnologically sound. Germany hasbuilt an incineration facility near thecity of Munster, to destroy oldchemical weapons and contaminatedsoil left over from World War I andWorld War II chemical weaponstockpiles in the area. The successand safety rates of this facility arevery high. The United States has alsochosen incineration as its destructionmethod of choice, terming it ‘Base-line Incineration Technology.’Although the US incineration pro-cess is not identical to other incin-eration technologies—such as thoseused by Germany or Canada—it issimilar. For the purposes of thisstudy, the US Baseline method is themost worthy of further explanation,in that it is the proposed method ofdestruction for a very large numberof chemical weapons, namely theentire US chemical weapon arsenal.

Under the Baseline incinerationprocess, chemical weapons are firsttaken to the demilitarization facility,where the chemical agent is removedfrom the munitions or bulk con-tainers by automated equipment.This puts the workers at the demili-tarization plant at a very low risk ofcontamination. There are basicallyfour products that result from thedemilitarization process: chemicalagents; explosives and propellants;contaminated metal parts andcontainers (i.e. shells and drums);and dunnage (potentially contam-inated packaging materials). Thesefour products or ‘streams’ are thenfed into incinerators. The agent is


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initially collected in storage tanksand then fed into an incinerator thatburns the agent at 2700° F (1482°C).The effluents from this incineratorproceed to a second incinerator, orafterburner, which ensures thedestruction of any trace amounts ofthe agent that may remain from thefirst incineration process. Theeffluents from the afterburner passthrough a pollution abatement sys-tem which cools the flue gas, scrubsthe acid gases and removes any par-ticulate matter. The result is lesstoxic than effluents released from theaverage commercial chemical plantor found above an expressway in LosAngeles during rush hour. As for theother three ‘streams,’ a thick-walledrotary kiln is used to incinerate theexplosives, a roller hearth furnacefor the metal parts, and a stationaryfurnace for the dunnage. The result-ing solids pass through a pollutionabatement system and the nowrelatively harmless materials aredisposed of in an environmentallysafe manner.

Chemical degradation (or chemicalneutralization) technologies also takemany different forms. There are anumber of chemicals, namely alkalisand oxidants, which reduce andoften negate the toxicity of chemicalagents. One method is to feed thechemical agent into an aqueous solu-tion where the reactive chemicals aregiven time to neutralize the agent.Munition parts and containers canalso be immersed in the solution anddecontaminated. In many cases theresulting product of the chemicaldegradation process—hydrolysate—isrelatively non-toxic and may beeliminated by incineration, sea dis-posal or concentration into a solidform followed by deposit in landfills. Chemical degradation is oftenmore practical than other destruc-tion methods when agents are storedin bulk, as the process may bequicker than other methods. One

variant of chemical degradationtechnology consists of detonatingthe entire chemical munition in atank containing a solution, simul-taneously neutralizing the agent andparts. Other technologies allow forremoval of certain elements for re-use in industry.

There is a large group of otherdestruction technologies in variousstates of research and development.These technologies are only listedbriefly here, as some of themethods are highly technical and afull explanation would go beyondthe scope of this study (USNational Research Council, 1993;US Office of Technology Assess-ment, July 1992; Picardi, Johnstonand Stringer, 1991; Lohs, Lundinand Stock, 1990). Some methodsinvolve converting the chemicalagents into combustible gaseswhich are then burned and pro-cessed through a pollution abate-ment system. Three examples ofpotential methods of convertingthe agents into combustible gasesare a molten metal process, streamreforming gasification and a plasmaarc process. Other methods cur-rently under consideration proposeoxidation of neutralized or par-tially neutralized agents, includingbiological oxidation, electro-chemical oxidation, wet air oxi-dation and supercritical wateroxidation. Biological treatmentmethods are being studied carefullyas a way of decontaminating soilthat has been polluted by chemicalagents. A destruction methodwhich has been used with certain

less harmful agents entails mixingthe agent with concrete, therebyrendering it unusable. Some of themore interesting proposals for thedestruction of chemical agentsinclude using underground nuclearexplosions and air dropping muni-tions into active volcanoes.

The ChemicalThe ChemicalThe ChemicalThe ChemicalThe ChemicalWWWWWeapons Destructioneapons Destructioneapons Destructioneapons Destructioneapons DestructionChallengeChallengeChallengeChallengeChallenge

While the technologies for destroy-ing chemical weapons do exist, inpractice there are many factors thatmay come into conflict when thedestruction process is carried out.The issues that must be consideredinclude the high costs of destruction,safety, and environmental, legal andpolitical factors.

Certain methods of destructionobviously have a greater impact onthe environment than others. Pastdestruction practices have shown theproblems that can be encounteredwhen environmental concerns arenot addressed. Therefore destructionmethods must be thoroughly veri-fied before they are adopted. Never-theless, many chemical weaponsstockpiled today need to bedestroyed as quickly as possible asthey become increasingly unstablewith age. Although environmentalistgroups have legitimate concerns thatthe weapons be disposed of in anenvironmentally safe manner,weapons experts generally agree thatit is environmentally much moredangerous for the weapons to remainin storage for the additional yearsrequired to develop alternativemethods of destruction.

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Safety must also be carefullyconsidered in the destruction ofchemical weapons. This entailsprecautions and regulations thatprotect not only employees workingin the destruction facility, but alsothe civilian population surroundingthe facility. Highly sensitive mon-itoring equipment must be used inorder to ensure there is no leakage oftoxic agents.

The United States claims it has12,000 tons of chemical agents inmunitions and another 19,000 tonsin bulk storage. Russia, the sole in-heritor of the former Soviet Union’schemical weapon stockpile, officiallyreports its stockpile to be 40,000tons. These two countries are theonly signatories to the CWC thathave admitted to possessing chemicalweapons. In 1994, the UnitedNations Special Commission on Iraq(UNSCOM) declared that Iraqichemical weapons capabilities hadbeen destroyed, leaving Iraq with nosurplus (or any) chemical weaponsstocks. The destruction of Iraq’schemical weapons arsenal and pro-duction facilities was relatively rapid,and the process added to the know-ledge of how to manage the destruc-tion of captured chemical weaponsstocks in the future. Nonetheless, alarge number of old and abandonedchemical weapons exist in a numberof countries. The total amount ofchemical weapons and old and aban-doned chemical weapons that mustbe destroyed worldwide is daunting.

The United States currently operatestwo incineration destruction facil-ities. One is located at Tooele, Utah,with over 40 percent of the USchemical weapons stockpile. Thesecond facility is on Johnston Atoll,about 600 miles southwest ofHawaii. The United States plans tobuild destruction facilities at theseven other locations in the contin-ental United States where chemicalagents are presently stored. Thearrangement of US destruction andstorage facilities is due in part to the

actual danger of transporting thesemunitions, many of which have agedconsiderably, and in part to the statelegislation that often prevents transitacross state lines of such dangerousmaterials. The US stockpile chieflyconsists of munitions and bulk con-tainers with VX, Sarin or mustardagents. The original 1985 cost estim-ate for the destruction of the USchemical weapon stockpile was US$1.7 billion. Today, the estimatedcost of destruction is about US $9billion and growing.

This expense could expand consid-erably if the government is forced bypublic opinion and special interestgroups to study methods of destruc-tion other than incineration. This isa strong possibility—Greenpeacestrongly opposes incineration as ameans of disposal and has a veryvocal lobby presenting its case. Inaddition, many local activist groupsin the areas surrounding current USstorage facilities are opposed to theBaseline incineration method. Theamount of money that would haveto be allocated to the research andtesting of alternative methods isgreat, but many of these groupsbelieve that the additional costwould be offset by what they per-ceive as the reduced risks of rejectingthe incineration method.

Russia, on the other hand, has nolarge scale destruction facility inoperation. Russia does have a mobiledestruction facility called ‘Kuasi,’which was constructed to destroyleaking and defective munitions, butthis method is not feasible for thedestruction of large quantities ofchemical agents. Russia is still con-sidering a number of alternativemethods of destruction. The coun-try is showing great interest in thosedestruction technologies whichenable the retrieval of certain chem-icals in the agents, such as arsenicfrom Lewisite—an agent whichRussia possesses in large quantities.Arsenic is extremely expensive onthe world market (about $2000–3000per kilogram) and is used in themicrochip and semiconductor indus-

try. Understandably, the thought ofearning hard currency in this time ofeconomic crisis in Russia makes theextraction method extremelyattractive. Unfortunately, the pro-posed extraction method is slow,expensive and relatively inefficient indestroying the toxicity of the agents.In addition, the process producestoxic waste that is a disposal prob-lem in itself. Furthermore, it isquestionable if the large quantities ofarsenic produced would be sold.

Russia cannot destroy its stockpilewithin the time allotted by theCWC without outside assistance.The United States pledged US $55million in destruction assistance toRussia in 1993. Germany haspromised sizable monetary and tech-nical contributions to the Russianchemical weapons destruction effort,while other countries have alsopledged assistance. When one con-siders the cost of the US destructionprogram, however, these outsidecontributions fall short of the sumsneeded for Russia to destroy itschemical weapons arsenal.

Other countries have the costlyproblem of destroying old or aban-doned chemical munitions. Japanabandoned a large number of chem-ical weapons in China in the 1940sand now, according to the CWC,Japan must pay for the destructionand cleanup of these weapons. Manyother countries abandoned orimproperly disposed of chemicalweapons on former territories andcolonies. The bilateral negotiationsbetween the territorial state and theabandoning state in such cases are byno means an easy task, and includesuch issues as costs and whether ornot the munitions should bedestroyed in place or returned to thecountry from which they originated.


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One must also consider the threatof proliferation when it comes toreducing arsenals. In the case ofchemical weapons, the threat ofproliferation is much smaller thanthat of nuclear or conventionalweapons. This is true for severalreasons. First of all, many of thechemical weapons of today’sarsenals are aging and dangerous totransport. Second, it would becheaper in most cases for a countrydesiring chemical weapons to pro-duce them than to try to buy themon the illegal arms trade market.Third, the quantity of chemicalweapons needed to pose a signif-icant threat is large, especiallywhen compared to nuclearweapons. An illegal transfer of asignificant quantity of chemicalweapons would be very difficult tohide. Finally, a country would notwant to import chemical weaponsunless it had a sufficient chemicalprotection gear and training for itsown forces, a costly undertaking.Unfortunately, virtually everycountry has the technology toproduce some of the simple agentsused during World War I. In sum,if a country really wants a chemicalweapons arsenal, it would be easierto build one itself rather than toimport stocks.

Once the CWC enters into force, theOPCW will be responsible for theverification of destruction of chem-ical weapons stockpiles. Statesparties must declare their chemicalweapons storage and destructionfacilities. Inspection teams from theOPCW will continually monitorthese facilities until the weaponscontained therein have beendestroyed.

The destruction of chemical weaponstocks is neither an easy task nor anew issue. The long history ofdestruction—nearly 100 years, or aslong as chemical weapons haveexisted—has resulted in the highdegree of sophistication of manymodern destruction techniques.Nations have learned from their pastmistakes, sometimes painfully. Theyhave realized that safety and environ-mental concerns cannot be ignored.

The completion of destruction willbe a great achievement, the first rela-tively universal destruction of anentire category of weapons of massdestruction found in today’sarsenals. Unfortunately, the non-participation of some chemicalweapon possessor states in the CWCimplies the world may not be entire-ly free of chemical weapons. Onemay hope, however, that these coun-tries will eventually participate inthe CWC, bringing about the longsought-after world without chemicalweapons.

References References References References References

Compton, James A.F. 1992.Military Chemical and BiologicalAgents: Chemical and ToxicologicalProperties. West Bloomfield, NJ:Telford Press.

Lohs, Karlheinz, S.J. Lundin andThomas Stock. 1990. TheDestruction of Chemical Weaponsand Chemical Warfare Agents.Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI.

Picardi, Alfred, Paul Johnstonand Ruth Stringer. 1991. Alternati-ve Technologies for theDetoxification of ChemicalWeapons: An InformationDocument. Prepared forGreenpeace International, May

US National Research Council.1993. Alternative Technologies forthe Destruction of Chemical Agentsand Munitions. 10 June.

US Office of TechnologyAssessment. 1992. Disposal ofChemical Weapons: AlternativeTechnologies. July.

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Jordi Molas-GallartJordi Molas-GallartJordi Molas-GallartJordi Molas-GallartJordi Molas-Gallart


Missiles are one of the key defensesystems dominating the tactical andstrategic arena since World War II,and have therefore acquired greatpolitical and military significance.The capability of hitting militaryand civilian targets from long ‘stand-off’ distances makes them extremelyattractive delivery mechanisms forboth conventional and mass destruc-tion weapons. This is especially thecase for ballistic missiles, againstwhich no effective defenses have yetbeen developed. Even old, unsoph-isticated, inaccurate and relativelycheap systems can still seriouslythreaten large civilian targets whenarmed with nuclear or chemical war-heads.

At the cutting edge of ballisticmissiles technological development,the effects of the non-existence ofeffective countermeasures againstballistic missiles led to a peculiarkind of technological race: instead ofobserving the traditional measure-countermeasure dynamics amongcompeting military systems, ballisticmissiles in the opposing NATO andWarsaw Pact blocks became the tar-get of each other. Instead of develop-ing counter-measures against missile

attack, each side responded bythreatening the other side’s siloswith increasingly accurate missiles;the only defense possible becamemaking the launchers more difficultto strike (through silo hardening andmissile mobility measures) and theproliferation of missiles and missilelaunchers to multiply the targetsconfronting the enemy. This led toever-larger stocks of increasinglyaccurate nuclear missiles and harder-to-hit missile launchers (either insubmarines, hardened silos or mobilelaunchers).

Dismantling a portion of thesesystems under such arms reductionagreements as START and INF didhighlight some of the problems thedisposal of missiles may cause. Mostapparent were the logistic and tech-nical difficulties implicit in thenecessity of destroying such largestocks of weapons, as well as the en-suing economic costs. The problemsof disposal of surplus missiles are notlimited to the destruction of thelarge, sophisticated arsenals of thesuperpowers. Proliferation ofmedium-range missile systems,usually based on mature 1950s and1960s technologies, is increasinglybecoming a matter of internationalconcern. Whenever countries withmedium- and long-range missileprocurement decide (or are

compelled) to dismantle theirmissiles and missile production facil-ities, a series of similar problems willarise.

Nevertheless, the direct technicalproblems emerging through theprocess of dismantlement are not theonly dilemmas to be faced. Thispaper argues that there are twomajor reasons why supervision posespeculiar problems in the missilefield: (1) the ‘modularity’ of missilesystems means that subsystems andcomponents can often be appliedwith relative ease to other missilesfor which they were not initiallydesigned; and (2) many missile sub-systems, components, and even thewhole delivery system may havecivil applications. Two principalpractical consequences follow:

Special care must be taken to pre-vent diversion of components andsub-systems back into new missilesystems.

Countries may lay legitimateclaims to retain components, sub-systems, and production facilitiesfor civilian use.

This paper will focus on long-rangemissiles. The Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR) targetssystems with ranges over 300 kilo-meters, and it is these that are themain subject of today’s proliferationconcerns. Most systems over thisrange are ballistic missiles, butmodern long-range cruise missiles arealso capable of reaching targets atdistances beyond the MTCR limit.The problems posed by the disposalof smaller, shorter-range tacticalmissiles—often designed for useagainst single major weapons plat-forms (like anti-ship, surface-to-air,and air-to-air missiles)—will not bediscussed here in detail. Nonetheless,it should be noted that certain char-acteristics of ‘big’ missiles, includingtheir modularity, are shared by theirsmaller siblings. At the same time,there are no significant qualitativeleaps setting MTCR-controlledmissiles in a category apart from

Disposal ofDisposal ofDisposal ofDisposal ofDisposal ofSurplus Missiles:Surplus Missiles:Surplus Missiles:Surplus Missiles:Surplus Missiles:

TTTTTechnicalechnicalechnicalechnicalechnicalDifficulties andDifficulties andDifficulties andDifficulties andDifficulties and

CommercialCommercialCommercialCommercialCommercialInterestsInterestsInterestsInterestsInterests

bybybybyby

missilesmissilesmissilesmissilesmissiles

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‘weapons of mass destruction’ (ornuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons) and conventional arms isill suited for categorizing missile sys-tems. In addition to housing severaldual-use components, missiles arepeculiar in that their duality extendsto the major sub-systems (rocketstages) and eventually to the wholesystem. Compare this to main battletanks or fighter aircraft—they mayhave dual-use components, but theyare almost useless for civilian applic-ations.

The dual-use character of missilesystems has important implicationsfor their disposal. Because missilescan easily be turned into SpaceLaunch Vehicles (SLVs), countriesdismantling their missile forcesmay feel entitled to resist the des-truction of the delivery vehicle,arguing that it can be put to profit-able civilian uses. These issues havehistorically emerged in most of thelimited instances in which coun-tries have embarked upon theprocess of missile dismantlement.

Two examples will illustrate theproblems that must be faced. Thefirst is related to an alleged contra-vention of the START Treaty whenthe former Soviet Union launched atleast one SS-19 missile using encodedtelemetry, an operation explicitlyforbidden by the START Treaty.Responding to US questions on theincident, Russia claimed the launchaimed at testing space launch capa-bility. The second example refers tothe vociferous domestic oppositionthat accompanied the dismantlementof the never-completed ArgentineanCondor 2 missile program. In May1991 the Argentinean DefenseMinister stated his intention to“deactivate, dismantle, reconvertand/or render unusable” the Condor2 missile. Although he urged that thewhole project (personnel andmaterials) be transferred to the spaceresearch program (Milavnews, June1991, p.2), opposition politicianscriticized the Government’sdecision. Prominent among theirarguments was the contention that

other, shorter-range systems—the300 kilometer boundary is, from thetechnological point of view, an arbi-trary one. Components from con-ventional missiles that, thus far, havenot raised much of a proliferationconcern may be applied to morepowerful systems, or may help adeveloping industry constructlonger-range missiles. Similarly, it ispossible to improve or modify sys-tems so that their range and payloadgrow into the ‘proliferation concern’area. Therefore, although we willconcentrate on long-range missiles,our discussion will refer occasionallyto the implications for missile dis-posal of the technological contin-uum across different kinds ofmissiles.

Missile modularity:Missile modularity:Missile modularity:Missile modularity:Missile modularity:Implications forImplications forImplications forImplications forImplications formissile disposalmissile disposalmissile disposalmissile disposalmissile disposal

Interchangeable payloads: TheInterchangeable payloads: TheInterchangeable payloads: TheInterchangeable payloads: TheInterchangeable payloads: Themissile as a multiple-usemissile as a multiple-usemissile as a multiple-usemissile as a multiple-usemissile as a multiple-usesystemsystemsystemsystemsystem

It is common for authors and policy-makers dealing with proliferationproblems to bundle together long-range missiles with weapons of massdestruction. The MTCR arose fromthe concern raised by nuclear prolif-eration: denying the means of deliv-ering nuclear warheads at longdistances was seen as a further toolto control and reduce the dangersposed by nuclear proliferation. Yetthere is an obvious and importantdifference between missiles andnuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons—missiles are deliveryvehicles and are therefore able tocarry, with few modifications, avariety of payloads, including con-ventional warheads and weapons ofmass destruction as well as non-military payloads. A consequence ofthis flexibility is that missiles do notfit easily into weapon categories.Specifically, the distinction between

destroying the Condor missilewould obliterate Argentinean capa-bilities in the field of satellitelaunchers. US experts insisted thatthe Condor-2 could not be trans-formed into a SLV. Eventually, theCondor missiles were destroyed (inSpain) and the production andresearch facilities were apparentlydismantled.

Although Argentina ultimatelyyielded to US pressure, it is not aforegone conclusion that, in thefuture, countries that have embarkedon long-range ballistic missile devel-opment and production will agree tothe missiles’ destruction; rather, theymay try to follow the example of thebig superpowers. Both the UnitedStates and the countries of theformer Soviet Union (FSU) havecarefully studied the possibilities ofrecycling the missiles to be destroyedunder the START treaty, and haveused recycled missiles as boosters forspace-launch vehicles. The SovietUnion often utilized withdrawn SS-5and SS-6 missiles as space boosters.The US Department of Defense hasalso used converted ICBMs (Titan II)in this way, and routinely transfersmissile stages and components toSLVs. Thus, most of the soundingrockets used by NASA includecomponents from one or more sur-plus missiles and most rockets usedby the DoD to launch researchexperiments into space incorporatemotors from missiles.

At the same time, the STARTTreaty explicitly allows the use ofmissiles to deliver payloads into theupper atmosphere. Such a con-version of an ICBM into a SLV mustbe publicly announced, but this

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If verifying the final use of a missileis difficult, the problem of missileproduction facilities is eventhornier. A missile productionfacility also provides a techno-logical base for the production ofspace launch vehicles; therefore,missile plants cannot be consideredas specialized military productionfacilities. Under these circum-stances, any definition of weaponsurplus which includes arms pro-duction capacity becomes extreme-ly difficult—if not impossible—toimplement. Any country that hasinvested substantially in such facil-ities will be very reluctant todismantle them. The reputation ofthe aerospace sector as a high-technology field generating multi-ple spin-offs for the rest of theeconomy has often encouragedcountries to enter it. It is under-standable that countries consider-ing their entrance in the missile-space field now regard withskepticism US literature whichargues the development of spacelaunch capabilities does not makeany economic sense for newcomersto the field (Chow, 1993).

One must therefore expect thatdeveloping countries will try toretain their missile-capable researchand production facilities, even afterthey have withdrawn from missileproduction. Some authors haveargued in favor of a regime similar tothat of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) (Nolan, 1991). This regimewould promote and assist researchon launch and space technologiesamong member countries in ex-change for guarantees that these tech-nologies would not be diverted tomilitary use; to this end, a system ofsafeguards and intrusive inspectionswould have to be established.

obligation does not extend to thedetails of the procedure—althoughcertain controls and locationalconstraints apply. Such convertedmissiles are counted as ‘non-deployed missiles’ (NDMs). STARTdoes not establish any limits on thenumber of NDMs that may beretained by the signatories, with theexception of converted MX missiles.

The United States, with its sizablespace industry, views the potentialrecycling of large numbers of mis-siles with mixed feelings. As RalphM. Hall, chairman of the Sub-committee on Space of the USHouse of Representatives, put it:

"At first glance the removal of athousand or so strategic missiles fromour arsenal appears to be an oppor-tunity to, so-called, beat the swordsinto ploughshares by using these rocketsin our space program. A deeper look atthe issue shows that while these missilesmay turn out to be very useful, wemust also be very careful that use ofthese missiles by the US Government,or their release outside the Govern-ment as surplus assets, does not harmcommercial companies or discourageprivate investments in new launchvehicles" (US Congress, House,1992, p.1).

In the FSU, economic hardshipsseem to be making the recycling ofold missiles more of an attractiveproposition despite the already largeaerospace industrial base.

Mixed feelings are less likely incountries with less-developed aero-space production infrastructures.The dual-use nature of missile sys-tems is bound to fuel attempts bycountries with fledgling ballisticmissile forces pending withdrawal tokeep missiles as civilian systems.Nonproliferation policies will haveto deal with this potential strategywithin the framework of a missileconversion program, possiblythrough final-use verificationmeasures.

More implications of missileMore implications of missileMore implications of missileMore implications of missileMore implications of missilemodularity: Missiles as ‘mixmodularity: Missiles as ‘mixmodularity: Missiles as ‘mixmodularity: Missiles as ‘mixmodularity: Missiles as ‘mixand match’ systemsand match’ systemsand match’ systemsand match’ systemsand match’ systems

It is often possible to interchange thesub-systems of a missile with relativeease, without restructuring thewhole design of the missile. Themodularity of missiles extends farbeyond their capacity to accom-modate different kinds of payloads.Thus, it is possible to mix stagesfrom different missiles, creating newpower plants from the same com-mon rocket. For instance, the firststage of the Soviet SS-25 inter-continental missile is almost identicalto the first stage of the intermediaterange SS-20 missile. As the SS-25missile was not covered by the INFtreaty such similarity appeared tosome observers to be underminingthe validity of the whole treaty (USCongress, Senate, 1986, p. 112).Sharing common stage rockets is alsocustomary in smaller tacticalmissiles; for example, the French-designed Aster surface-to-air missilehas two variants (Aster15 andAster30) with different ranges (maxi-mums of 15 and 30 kilometers,respectively) and different boosters,but common second stages. Suchinterchangeability is even morecommon in other major subsystems,such as guidance sets. The seeker forthe short-range surface-to-air AS30missile was planned to equip theASMP-C long-range (400 kilometer)cruise missile, a French projectwhich is basically a conventionalversion of the nuclear-armed ASMP.In its anti-ship version, the ASMP-Cwould sport another final guidanceassembly, a radar seeker shared thistime with the MICA air-to-airmissile and the Kormoran anti-shipcruise missile. Materials like fuel arecommon to a wide range of missiles;thus, both the surface-to-air SA-2missile and the SCUDs use the sametype of fuel. This coincidence has ledto problems for UN inspectors inIraq, as Iraq claimed its continuedfuel production to be for SA-2missiles rather than the forbiddenSCUDs.


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Two principal sets of problemsresult. First, because isolated com-ponents can be matched to othermissiles, it becomes necessary toaccurately track the final destin-ation of the individual sub-systemsor parts from converted or disabledmissiles. Second, because a missile’smajor sub-systems can be rear-ranged in different ways, itbecomes very difficult to isolateclasses of missiles for the purposesof arms control, export controland arms reduction.

The importance of componentsThe importance of componentsThe importance of componentsThe importance of componentsThe importance of components

The interchangeability of missilesub-systems allows relatively easyupgrades through the addition ofsingle, new components into anexisting missile design or system. Ifcontrolled components then becomeavailable, potential proliferators mayincorporate such components intotheir systems to obtain performanceincreases or assemble additional sys-tems. It is even conceivable to builda whole missile by reassembling itscomponent parts. When a SS-20 (oneof the missiles to be destroyed underthe INF agreement) of mysteriousorigin appeared in 1993 in a militaryparade in the republic of Chechnya,one possible explanation proposedwas that the missile had beenreassembled from components byChechen missile technicians (MoscowNews, 17 September 1993, quoted inIMP database at MIIS).

Although this may appear far-fetched, it is nevertheless possible forcountries with a certain degree oftechnological capacity to rebuildmissiles from their component partsor by using ‘recycled’ components.This makes verification of missiledestruction difficult, and providesreluctant participants in missilereduction agreements a range ofopportunities to dodge their oblig-ations. It has been suggested that,after the Gulf War, the Iraqis dis-assembled a number of missiles andhid the main components in separatesites (Washington Times, 11 June

Not only is there a commonality ofsub-systems and components acrossmissile systems with very differentranges and technical characteristics,but there are also many componentswith dual military-civilian applic-ations. ‘Dual-use’ extends even tosome very specialized sub-systems;for instance, Inertial Guidance Sys-tems may be applied both to missilesand to civil aeronautic applications.In fact, there are cases of gyro tech-nologies developed initially forballistic missiles that have beenapplied to Inertial Navigation Sys-tems for transport aircraft (Hughesand Mecham, 1991).

Because of such modular design, newmissiles may be developed by‘mixing and matching’ different sub-systems, many of which are ex-tracted from earlier missiles. Indeed,it is difficult to find a single missilewhose major sub-systems have allbeen purposely developed and built.It is easier to modify a missile bychanging some of its major sub-systems and components than it is tointerchange major sub-systems inother complex weapons systems. Ina fighter aircraft or a main battletank, the substitution of a major sub-system usually requires major adjust-ments in the rest of the platform; theplatform is the result of a finelybalanced combination of sub-systemswhich may be upset if altered evenslightly. It is our hypothesis herethat, in contrast, missiles are moreadaptable—it is often possible tosubstitute a major sub-system with-out introducing significant changesin the rest of the weapon. If thishypothesis holds true, the mod-ularity and ‘mix and match’ char-acter of missile systems may beperceived as a peculiarity with imp-ortant implications for the disposaland conversion of missile systems.

1992, p. A7). A similar strategywould not be possible with a fighteraircraft.

Such a diversion or hiding ofcomponent parts during the processof disposal becomes more relevant inthe missile field than in otherweapons systems. This was illus-trated by the series of events follow-ing the decision to dismantle theArgentinean Condor II missile.Because components can be strippeddown and matched to other systems,the destination of some of theCondor’s most important com-ponents raised considerable concern(Wolfsthal, 1993). The missile wasshipped to Spain where it was dis-assembled, the missile body wascrushed and the propellant was sentto the United States for disposal.Special interest was raised by theCondor guidance sets allegedly lostin the process. Although Argentinaclaimed the missile lacked this essen-tial part, there have been persistentrumors in the press that the com-ponents either remained in Argen-tina or ended up in Spanish hands.This incident demonstrated both thedifficulty and the importance of con-trolling missile components in anymissile disposal process.

The obstacles involved in mon-itoring the final destination ofmissile components will increase incases where the number of missilesto be destroyed is high. Neverthe-less, even when dealing with a fewmissiles as in the Condor case, thedestination of some componentsmay be highly contentious—partic-ularly because of the dual(military-civilian) use of mostmissile components. A country canclaim a legitimate right to keepsome of the missile componentsand sub-systems for civilian use.Although such application mayinitially be verifiable, future uses ofthese components will be muchmore difficult to control.

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Defining missile classes:Defining missile classes:Defining missile classes:Defining missile classes:Defining missile classes:where are the limits?where are the limits?where are the limits?where are the limits?where are the limits?

Another consequence of modularityis the emergence of patterns ofgradual change in missile develop-ment and production: it is possibleto match existing designs with newlyacquired sub-systems, thus im-proving and/or modifying the initialperformance characteristics of thesystem. It then becomes difficult tostraight-jacket missiles into separategroups. A missile type can be trans-formed into a different use, as theSouth Koreans transformed theirUS-supplier Nike SAMs into surface-to-surface missiles. This capacity isnot limited to countries with a rela-tively strong industrial base; somehave claimed that Azerbaijan trans-formed SA-5 Gammon SAMs intoballistic surface-to-surface missile tobe used against Armenia (Beaver,1993). Other missile types continueto be adapted for applications diff-erent from those initially intended—the AMRAAM air-to-air missile isbeing converted into a SAM systemfor use by the Norwegian armedforces, and British Aerospace has justoffered a new air-to-surface anti-tankmissile derived from its ASRAAMair-to-air system.

This poses several complications fornon-proliferation policies and anyconcerted attempt to dismantlecertain categories of missile systems.Because different combinations ofpayload, motor stages, propellant,and guidance systems will result indifferent missile specifications, anyattempt at fencing off missile groupsis apt to be disputed. In addition, theprohibition of development and pro-duction of certain missile types islikely to have limited influence. Forexample, the INF Treaty prohibitsthe production or flight testing ofintermediate-range missiles, stages,or launchers of such missiles; fur-ther, it requires the elimination of all

support structures, including pro-duction and repair facilities. Yetbecause few, if any, facilities arelimited to the manufacture andsupport of such a particular class ofmissiles, the elimination of supportstructures will refer only to thosefacilities specifically planned to pro-vide direct support for deployedmissiles as is explained in article 11of the Memorandum of Understan-ding accompanying the INF Treaty.In other words, the INF Treaty doesnot affect production capabilities—the industrial infrastructure ofmissile production is unlikely to beaffected by such an agreement.

In short, the technologicalcontinuity linking different kinds ofmissiles makes it difficult if not im-possible to clearly ‘frame in’ missiletypes to be controlled or dismantled,and—even more important—pro-duction facilities will usually beexempted from any attempt at reg-ulating the deployment of certaincategories of missiles. This becomesmore relevant in the context of pro-posals to extend the INF Treaty to aworld-wide agreement. Such a meas-ure would provide a tool to controlmissile deployment, but it wouldnot be effective in the regulation ofmissile production facilities.Although such production facilitiesmay remain underemployed, mostcountries will strive to maintainthem—both as insurance againstfuture eventualities and as industrialcapacities that may be used in theproduction of unregulated missilesand for civilian applications. This isone of the reasons why the proposalof an international space agency(modeled on the IAEA) monitoringthe use of space technologies hasbeen advanced as a possible measure

to accompany an INF-like globalmissile treaty (Bailey, 1991). As aconsequence of technologicalcontinuity, surplus reduction meas-ures in one area of missile produc-tion affect the capabilities in theother missile fields; therefore acoherent and comprehensiveapproach to the study of missile sur-plus problems is required.

The Missile ‘system’The Missile ‘system’The Missile ‘system’The Missile ‘system’The Missile ‘system’

Thus far we have implicitly referredto missiles as powered, unmanned,guided projectiles, and have notconsidered the whole missile system,which includes launchers, radar, andtesting and support equipment.

The missile ‘system’ reproducesthe modular characteristics of themissile projectile. For instance, it isoften possible to launch differentkinds of missiles from the sameplatform, thus sharing surveillance,tracking and targeting systems.Launchers are often designed to beable to eject different kinds ofmissiles, and missiles can be adapt-ed to be launched from differentplatforms. As a consequence, anymissile that has reached somedegree of success will soon appearin several versions capable of beinglaunched from a variety of plat-forms. A platform able to launchmissiles may therefore increase itscapabilities just by improving themissiles it carries, and the perform-ance of old missiles may be en-hanced by better platform-basedsurveillance and guidance equip-ment. To sum up, the ‘mix andmatch’ process we have describedfor the missile extends to thewhole missile system, includingcommand and control systems,launchers and support equipment.


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All missile-related arms controlagreements deal with both missilesand their launchers and supportequipment. Although this situationis unavoidable, the variety of systemconfigurations (real and potential)creates serious headaches for armsnegotiators dealing with missileissues. Whenever a surplus of mis-siles exists, so likely will a surplus oflaunchers and support equipment.Because of system modularity, anymeasures aimed at identifying andreducing a missile surplus must affectthe complete missile systems, multi-plying the problems discussed above.First, countries may strive to retainlaunchers capable of launchingmissiles not affected by arms controlagreements, or may argue that asurplus in missiles is not translatedinto a similar surplus in launchers.Second, the process of disposal mustinclude both missiles and launchers,thus increasing the dismantlementtargets. In the limited missile dis-posal experience, launchers haveoften posed their own problems; forinstance, it was claimed that theIraqis were welding together pre-viously destroyed missile launchers.

This section has dealt with disposalproblems arising mainly from apeculiar structural characteristic ofmissile systems which we have des-cribed as modularity. Although allweapon systems will display certainmodular elements, missiles presentan extreme case of modular flex-ibility. Countries and organizationsdirectly involved in missile dis-mantlement must also address tech-nical difficulties that may emergeduring the process of disposal oncean agreement has been reached onthe reduction of missile surplus, andcertain operational procedures havebeen established.

Dismantling missiles:Dismantling missiles:Dismantling missiles:Dismantling missiles:Dismantling missiles:TTTTTechnical difficultiesechnical difficultiesechnical difficultiesechnical difficultiesechnical difficulties

A question of sheer numbersA question of sheer numbersA question of sheer numbersA question of sheer numbersA question of sheer numbers

Some missiles that have been or maybe the object of disposal have beenproduced and deployed in largenumbers. The missile as a guidedprojectile (rather that the whole sys-tem including launching facilities)has even equaled munitions at times:because they are dispensable, theyare often mass-manufactured andmany can be fired from a singlelauncher-system. Although this isespecially true for smaller tacticalmissiles, even large ballistic systemshave at times been produced anddeployed in large numbers. A notice-able example can be found in theproliferation of SCUD missiles—different sources estimate thatbetween 5,000 and 10,000 SCUDshave been produced, mainly in theformer Soviet Union but also insuch countries as Egypt, Iraq, NorthKorea and Iran. Although this is anextreme case, the sheer number ofmissiles produced and deployed maypresent too great a challenge to theorganizations that must dismantle arather complex and dangerous muni-tion. Furthermore, as demonstratedin the FSU, the contraction ordownright elimination of missileresearch and production facilitiesmay paradoxically reduce the coun-try’s capacity to dismantle theseweapons systems. The case ofmissiles shows how the goals ofweapons dismantlement and ofreduction of weapons productioncapabilities may conflict. Thesedifficulties are compounded by othertechnical problems that make dis-posal increasingly difficult if nottackled with some speed.

Decay: rockets do not age wellDecay: rockets do not age wellDecay: rockets do not age wellDecay: rockets do not age wellDecay: rockets do not age well

It is quite safe to leave a tank to rust.The elimination of a tank surplusdoes not have to be subjected toexcessive time pressures; if budgetaryor industrial constraints impose aslow pace of weapons destruction,the major problem will be themanagement of large stocks ofrusting tanks awaiting disposal. Inthe case of missiles the problem ismuch more involved. Insufficientmaintenance of both solid and liquidrockets and propellants may lead tonasty outcomes. Liquid propellantsare notoriously difficult to handle;they are usually stored close tolaunching sites to enable a rapidfilling of the missile tanks prior tolaunch. Proper (and expensive) main-tenance of the fuel tanks is requiredwhether or not the system is oper-ational. Thus, waiting for disposal isin itself costly. If proper mainten-ance procedures are not followed,such problems as rusting fuel tanks(liquid fuels are highly corrosive)and leaks may make the dismantle-ment process more hazardous as wellas expensive.

The principal problem for solidpropellants arises from the deterior-ation of the propellant grain. Tokeep the missile operational, it isnecessary to apply a schedule ofrocket maintenance procedures, andat certain intervals the whole rocketmotor must be recast. In the absenceof proper maintenance, not onlymay the engine become unreliableand eventually unusable (not muchof a problem if we are talking of‘withdrawn’ systems), but also itsdismantlement may become morehazardous. Although the propellantgrain may be recycled, extractionfrom the rocket is a dangerous oper-ation that requires specialized per-sonnel and facilities.

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Environmental issues andEnvironmental issues andEnvironmental issues andEnvironmental issues andEnvironmental issues andhandling difficultieshandling difficultieshandling difficultieshandling difficultieshandling difficulties

The environmental problems causedby missile disposal or recycling orig-inate for the most part in missilepropellants. In particular, someliquid propellants—the heptyl (usedin Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missiles),for example—are highly contaminantand notoriously difficult to handle.Even the gas released upon a missilelaunch is highly toxic, and the un-burned fuel contained in the spentfirst stage falling back to Earth couldcontaminate the area within a fivekilometer radius. Therefore,destroying missiles by launchingthem would cause serious contam-ination over large areas (FBIS, 1992).No safe method for heptyl destruc-tion has been developed—in theformer Soviet Union, the fuel(which with time becomes unusable)was drained for distillation and thenreused, but it remains unclear howheptyl fuel will be stored after dis-posal (FBIS, 1992). Solid propellantsare also dangerous to recycle (whichmay involve recasting) or dismantle.

Such technical difficulties imposestrict requirements on the facilitiesused for missile disposal. The tech-nical capabilities required for thedismantlement of rockets are verysimilar to those required for theirproduction. This leads to the afore-mentioned effect of reduction ofmissile production capacities simul-taneously reducing the potential forweapons disposal. At the same time,countries maintaining missiles butlacking an adequate industrial infra-structure for their disposal may haveto transfer them to other countriesto be dismantled. A governmentmay resist attempts to transfer ‘their’missiles abroad, however; an exam-ple is provided by the Ukrainiandemand to dismantle nuclear missiles(including warheads) on its ownterritory. Such a demand, labeled as

“impractical and unreasonable” byUS sources, was triggered byUkrainian misgivings about the finaldestination of the systems Ukrainewas transferring to Russia fordisposal (Washington Times, 11 June1992, p.A7).

TTTTTransport problemsransport problemsransport problemsransport problemsransport problems

Because rockets and propellants arevery dangerous to handle, missilesoften must be transported to specialfacilities for their dismantlement.Adequate precautions must be takenfor transport, as it was demonstratedby the transfer of the ArgentineanCondor 2 missiles to Spain fordismantlement. In February 1993, 14engines and 30 fuselages were trans-ported by land from their base andFalda del Carmen to the Navy’s portof Bahía San Blas, and from therewere shipped to Spain. The neces-sary precautions taken resulted in aslow travel speed. The paramountissue was avoiding frictional move-ment that could cause the engines’sealant to overheat (Olmo y Losada,1993).

Problems have also surfaced duringthe transport of liquid rocketengines. While transporting a liquidrocket to a base in Krasnoyarsk fordismantlement and recycling, atrain’s temperature control systemsfailed to operate. Although thisfailure could have caused the casingseals to break and the heptyl fuel toleak, Russian sources denied that aleak or a rumored explosion everoccurred. Be that as it may, bothcases illustrate the difficulties oftransporting both liquid and solidmissile rockets.

Conclusions:Conclusions:Conclusions:Conclusions:Conclusions:Questions forQuestions forQuestions forQuestions forQuestions forfurther researchfurther researchfurther researchfurther researchfurther research

This paper has distinguished twoprincipal groups of problemsassociated with missile disposal andrecycling: the organizationaldifficulties derived from the specialmodular and dual-use nature of mostmissile-related technologies, and thedirect technical problems that ariseduring the dismantlement process.While the former affect most missilesub-systems and components, thelatter concern primarily the rocketmotor and propellants. The tech-nical difficulties involved in theprocess of rocket dismantlement anddisposal have attracted the mostpress attention, but we have arguedhere that the nature of missile tech-nology presents a set of organiza-tional difficulties that must beaddressed.

It is important that any missiledisposal initiative heed the legitimateconcerns of industrializing countriesover their ability to develop capa-bilities in the aerospace sector. As aconsequence, further study of missilesurplus assessment and disposal mustbe accompanied by an understandingof the local conditions for the devel-opment of a domestic aerospaceindustry (specifically of space launchcapabilities) and must address thecontrol of dual-use, missile-relatedtechnologies.

This paper has also argued that thereis a technological continuity—andtherefore a certain technologicalcommonality—among differentkinds of missiles. Although subjectto different production dynamics,medium- and long-range ballisticmissiles and their smaller relativesshare some common technologies,components and general character-istics (especially their modularcharacter). Although most attention


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”Saddam Said to Play Hide-And-Seek with Scud Missiles.” [1992].Washington Times. 11 June, p.A7.

”Ukraine, Reversal on NukesPraised.” [1992]. Washington Times.15 April, p.A7.

US Congress. House. Committeeon Science, Space and Technology.1991. Impact of START Agreementsand Other Industry Incentives onCommercial Space Markets. 105thCongress, 31 July.

US Congress. Senate. Committeeon Armed Services. 1986. NATODefenses and the INF Treaty. Part 3.101st Congress, 2nd Session, 3, 14,16 February.

Wolfsthal, Jon B. 1993. ”ArgentinaShips Condor Missiles forDestruction, Joins MTCR.” ArmsControl Today. April, p.24.


Bailey, Kathleen C. 1991. ”CanMissile Proliferation Be Reversed?”Orbis. Winter, pp.5–14.

Beaver, Paul. 1993. ”Flash PointsUpdate.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. 6February, p.15.

Chow, Brian G. 1993. EmergingNational Space Launch Programs.Economics and Safeguards. RandCorporation, R-4179-USDP.

Hughes, David and MichaelMecham. 1991. ”Delco ResonatorGyro Key to New Inertial Sys-tems.” Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology. 30 September, p.48.

International Missile Proliferation(IMP). Database maintained by theMonterey Institute of InternationalStudies (MIIS).

Milavnews. 1991. June, p.2.

Miller, Roger, Mike Hobday,Thierry Leroux-Demers, andXavier Olleros. 1993. ”Innovationin Complex Systems Industries:The Case of Flight Simulation.”Unpublished Paper.

“Missile Fuel Leaks Will Spell‘Catastrophe.’” [1992]. FBIS.FBIS-SOV-92-059.

Nolan, Janne E. 1991. Trappings ofPower. Ballistic Missiles in the ThirdWorld. Washington, DC: TheBrookings Institution.

Olmo y Losada, J. 1993. ”Condor2 To Be Shipped to Spain forDismantling.” Proliferation Issues.15 January, p.13.

has thus far been directed towardsrelatively large ballistic missiles, theproliferation of smaller tacticalmissiles will have to be addressed. Assmall tactical missiles become moreattractive to both armies and para-military groups, their proliferationwill likely gain relevance as a polit-ical problem. Small, tactical missilescan pose substantial threats to allkinds of targets, from ‘soft’ objec-tives in terror campaigns to sophist-icated weapons platforms. Forinstance, there has already beensome concern over the implicationsof cruise missile proliferation and thechances that shorter-range anti-shipcruise missiles may soon becomevehicles for the long-range deliveryof mass-destruction weapons. Evensmaller systems, such as Stinger man-portable SAMs, have recently posedserious proliferation concerns. Asrevealed by the distribution ofStinger missiles among the Afghanforces, even unsophisticated armiescan use the new systems todevastating effect—a fact that willnot pass unnoticed elsewhere in theworld.

Once the genie is out of the bottle,little can be done to prevent thesystems’ spread to ‘undesirable’hands. In short, the study of strat-egies to deal with surplus weaponsmust be extended beyond thepresent concentration on larger,long-range, mostly ballistic systemsto small tactical missiles, and mustconsider the technological contin-uity among the different kinds ofmissiles.

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Edward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceEdward J. LauranceEdward J. Laurance22222

The rise of surplusThe rise of surplusThe rise of surplusThe rise of surplusThe rise of surpluslight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weapons

One of the newer commodities to bemade surplus is the category increas-ingly referred to as light weapons.By all accounts, the export of sur-plus light weapons—small arms, landmines, mortars, man-portablemissiles—has increased significantlyin the post-Cold War era (Karp,1993; Karp, 1994; The Economist,1994). The end of the Cold War hasunleashed ethnic conflicts long dor-mant and controlled by the logic ofthe Cold War and the concept ofclient states. Ironically, this growthin the export of surplus lightweapons, and the accompanying neg-ative consequences, is made increas-ingly visible due to the greater use ofUN peacekeeping and peacemakingoperations, which bring along withthem mass media coverage. It hasalways been the case that in armedconflict it is the light weapons whichdo most of the killing, and there canbe no question that an escalatingnumber of such weapons are gettinginto the hands of an increasing num-ber of soldiers, paramilitary forces,non-state actors and civiliansinvolved in ethnic conflicts whichwill not be resolved for a long timeto come.

While it is clear from all accountsthat there has been a reduction inarms trade in major conventionalweapons since the end of the ColdWar, there are some obvious reasonswhy there is an increase in the ex-port of light weapons. This is a sub-ject worthy of separate treatment,but a summary of key factors isimportant in developing appropriatemeasures for dealing with this typeof surplus commodity.

The disintegration of the formerSoviet Union (FSU) has resultedin the sudden availability ofmassive amounts of new and sur-plus light weapons. This is due tothe military nature of the formerSoviet industrial base, the collapseof export control systems in theFSU, and their need for hardcurrency. In 1991 and 1992 it isgenerally agreed that a brisk tradein light weapons existed in Russia,Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia andother countries where lightweapons manufacturing facilitieswere prominent, and was uncon-trolled by any central govern-ment. Exporters includedcommanders of army units andplant managers who were sud-denly faced with no money to paytheir troops or workers. Given amarket for these commodities andno governmental controls, theproliferation was significant andunreported.The FSU is not the only country

finding itself with surplus stocksof light weapons. Europe, Chinaand many developing countriesfind these weapons surplus, giventhe end of the Cold War. Theseweapons are usually not con-sidered as surplus needing to bescrapped. On the contrary, giventhe long life of some of these lightweapons, they are a heavily tradedcommodity. As many havepointed out, these weapons havenot been the subject of formalpost-Cold War concern (e.g.,CFE, the UN Register) and havefound their way into the hands oflegitimate and illegitimate armsdealers throughout the world. Acase which illustrates this reality isthe conflict in Rwanda (HumanRights Watch, 1994; Goose andSmyth, 1994).The breakup of Yugoslavia andethnic conflicts in the FSU areindicative of the loss of control bymajor powers over these conflicts.Despite the major powers increas-ingly turning to the UN as theirreplacement, the long-dormantUN is not yet equipped to con-trol either the outbreak, conductor termination of most of theseconflicts. The surplus of lightweapons, whose export was con-trolled by private parties, hadlittle difficulty finding its wayinto zones of ethnic and regionalconflict. These conflicts do notneed the high-technologyweapons so dominant in the ColdWar arms trade. While some ofthe more repugnant atrocitieswere committed by tanks and

Surplus LightSurplus LightSurplus LightSurplus LightSurplus LightWWWWWeapons as aeapons as aeapons as aeapons as aeapons as a

ConversionConversionConversionConversionConversionPPPPProblem: Uniqueroblem: Uniqueroblem: Uniqueroblem: Uniqueroblem: Unique

cccccharacteristicsharacteristicsharacteristicsharacteristicsharacteristicsand solutionsand solutionsand solutionsand solutionsand solutions

bybybybyby

2 This analysis is based on Edward J. Laurance, "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint," in Lethal Commerce, The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, ed. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), pp. 140-157.

light weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weapons

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heavy mortars, most werepromulgated using lighterweapons which went undetectedboth by governments and by thenews media covering these con-flicts.

Finally, the world economicsystem is transforming into onecharacterized by both morelegitimate free trade and thedevelopment of illicit networksthat foster the trade in lightweapons as well as in drugs andlaundered money.

The unique nature ofThe unique nature ofThe unique nature ofThe unique nature ofThe unique nature oflight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weapons

The growing quantity of the surplusand subsequent export of lightweapons, as indicated above, createssignificant challenges to the controlof its negative consequences. Equallyimportant in devising mechanisms todeal with surplus light weapons arequalitative factors, such as the char-acteristics of this trade and thenature of the commodities involved.First, light implies small and lessvisible, meaning that satellites areinadequate for detection and veri-fication. This also signifies that mon-itoring and control efforts bynational governmental officials, fromdesk officers down to customs offi-cials, is inherently more demanding,whether it is part of a conversioneffort or one involving export con-trols. This creates a situation where,even if states do begin to practicecooperative security in the post-ColdWar era, the implementation phaseof their arms control and conversionpolicies may be seriously hamperedby an inherent inability to verify thestocks or exports, even on the partof national governments. The chal-lenge for any multilateral controlschemes would be even greater.

Second, these weapons are not veryexpensive, especially given the trendsnoted above regarding their avail-ability. This means that many moretypes of participants can be and areactive in the trade. During the ColdWar, private arms dealers were allbut non-existent (Laurance, 1992).Based on the most cursory reading ofthe defense trade literature and onmedia coverage of conflicts in whichweapons are supposedly embargoed,that is clearly not the case now.Additionally, the low cost of theseweapons means that the currentmethods set up to track financialflows for illegal drug and gun dealsare proving inadequate. As a resultfinancial transactions are open to lessscrutiny by independent analysts andnon-governmental organizationssuch as SIPRI, which track andpublicize the arms trade. Such organ-izations are basically unable to per-form the valuable function of trans-parency when it comes to this classof weapons.

Consequences ofConsequences ofConsequences ofConsequences ofConsequences ofthe surplus andthe surplus andthe surplus andthe surplus andthe surplus andsubsequent export ofsubsequent export ofsubsequent export ofsubsequent export ofsubsequent export oflight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weaponslight weapons

It is now clear that private dealersabound and have a huge surplus tomarket. In such an environmentthere is little risk of political conse-quences for either the supplier(assuming it is a state) or a recipient.The embargo on the former Yugo-slavia is a case in point. True, thearms being imported into and usedin this region have a clear impact onthe conflict. There is periodic pres-sure on the combatants to moveweapons out of range of certain loca-tions. But since there are multiplesources of these imported weapons,to date the suppliers have escapedsuffering any negative consequences.The political consequences arediffused to a point where a focus onthe importing of these weapons hasdrawn minimal attention.

In the post-Iraq environment, wherewars are fought with mainly lightweapons, linkages between armsbuildups and military consequencesare much harder to depict. Theformer Yugoslavia again provides agood illustration. Small arms andmines are so plentiful that their con-trol would seem to have little effect.For larger weapons such as mortarsand tanks, actions by the UN peace-keeping forces to control their useindicates that a linkage does existbetween the arms themselves andmilitary consequences. However,when such weapons are indigenouslyproduced—as is the case with theBosnian Serbs—it is difficult todevelop any kind of control orrestraint instruments.

The case of light weapons revealsminimal economic consequences,due to low prices and greatavailability. Although the humancasualties in the conflict in theformer Yugoslavia are often cited—between 100,000 and 200,000—rarelydo we see an economic cost cited,especially one directly related to the

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It should also be noted that gun buy-back programs exist outside theUnited States, and these programsalso need to be evaluated. For exam-ple, many recent peacekeeping oper-ations have experimented with thisapproach. Nicaragua implementedsuch a program—although it has notbeen very successful—as have the USforces in Haiti. This approach hasgreat potential, especially in conjunc-tion with the promotion of normsagainst the possession and use of thisclass of weapons.

TTTTTransparencyransparencyransparencyransparencyransparency

The first step in making lightweapons transparent might beadding them, especially land mines,into the current United NationsRegister of Conventional Arms. TheEuropean Union has formally calledfor the integration of land mine datainto the Register, as has the UnderSecretary-General for HumanitarianAffairs of the United Nations.However, the 1994 group of expertstasked with the expansion of theRegister chose not to recommendsuch an inclusion.

"The Group recognized the terriblesuffering, injuries and deaths caused bythe misuse of anti-personnel mines, butfelt that the Register was not the appro-priate mechanism to deal with thisproblem. The Register is designed as aconfidence-building measure to contri-bute to the efforts aimed at preventingdestabilizing accumulations of majorconventional weapons beyond thequantity needed for legitimate self-defense. The Group’s view was that theissue of anti-personnel mines is largelyone of international legal regulation"(United Nation General Assembly,1994).

conduct of the war. This is due tothe fact that conducting such con-flicts with light weapons and little inthe way of sophisticated infra-structure is cheap, in direct contrastto the Gulf War, which was veryexpensive to conduct (about $100billion by some estimates). The armssuppliers to Iraq could relate theirbehavior directly to an economiccost, not to mention the significantlosses they incurred in arms trans-ferred to Iraq for which they did notreceive payment. Such economicconsequences create pressure forarms control, a pressure rarely therewhen wars are fought with lightweapons.

On the other hand, with the surge inlight weapons traffic and the increasein conflicts featuring clear abuses ofhuman rights, humanitarian conse-quences have gained more attention.The most notable case is that of anti-personnel land mines. The UnitedStates has placed a ban on the exportof these systems and has led the wayin the United Nations for an inter-national ban.

A first look at someA first look at someA first look at someA first look at someA first look at somesolutionssolutionssolutionssolutionssolutions

Creation of an InternationalCreation of an InternationalCreation of an InternationalCreation of an InternationalCreation of an InternationalNorm on NegativeNorm on NegativeNorm on NegativeNorm on NegativeNorm on NegativeConsequencesConsequencesConsequencesConsequencesConsequences

As can be seen in the long debate ongun control in the United States,nothing happens as long as the‘recipients’ can make the argumentthat possession of such weapons addsto stability and is defensive innature. I would submit that the legis-lation outlawing semi-automaticweapons in many states in theUnited States occurred only when amajority of the public concludedthat the guns themselves were amajor factor in the killings takingplace. In regard to the international

transfer of light weapons, this maybe difficult to achieve even at thenational level, although many stateshave well-established norms againstthe possession of and trade in thesetypes of weapons. But as notedabove, the surfeit of such weapons inthe aftermath of the Cold Warmakes the problem at a minimumregional in nature and more likelyinternational. The COCOM solu-tion, that of exporting expertise andassistance to states in developingexport control systems, seems muchmore daunting in the case of lightweapons.

The campaign led by human rightsand development NGOs to ban anti-personnel land mines serves as anexcellent example of what can bedone to establish such a norm(Human Rights Watch, 1993). In thisage of Internet and CNN, muchmore could be done to change worldopinion regarding the negative con-sequences of trade in light weapons.The key is to emphasize specificnegative consequences—in an age ofincreasingly brutal ethnic conflicts, ablanket ban on weapons perceived tobe needed by recipients for survivalis a non-starter.

Gun BuyGun BuyGun BuyGun BuyGun Buy-Back P-Back P-Back P-Back P-Back Programsrogramsrogramsrogramsrograms

With the growth of a norm againstthe unlimited possession of guns inthe United States, especially semi-automatic and automatic weapons, ithas been possible to begin experi-menting with so called gun ‘buy-back’ programs. The idea is to getcitizens to sell their guns to local orstate authorities, which then destroythem. As with any new approachsome programs have been successfuland others have failed. For example,some failures occurred (i.e., few gunswere turned in) because the govern-ment price was far below that of theblack market. Nevertheless, enoughof these programs have been con-ducted to make a program eval-uation imperative, in order to pro-duce policy-relevant theory whichmay further develop this solution.


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It is important to consider therationale for transparency in thesetypes of armaments. In the case ofthe seven categories currentlycovered by the Register—majorconventional arms—a consensusexisted that they are potentiallydestabilizing in a regional conflictcontext. A critical aspect is that theRegister focuses mainly on onetype of negative consequence oreffect of excessive arms accumu-lations—the outbreak of armedconflict across international bor-ders. The Register is in essence a‘Never another Iraq’ tool. It is alsoa confidence-building mechanism.The key to including any addi-tional systems to the UN Registerwill be to demonstrate that landmines or other types of lightweapons meet these criteria.

No other ‘light’ weapons were dis-cussed by the Group for inclusion inthe UN Register. This does notmean there are no cases where accu-mulations of light weapons can bedestabilizing. The Human RightsWatch study on Rwanda is an excel-lent example of just such a situation.Rather, the point is that the UNRegister is universal in scope and itwill be difficult to make the case thatlight weapons inter alia can bedestabilizing. It may be possible toinclude such weapons if the Registerevolves into regional variants.

A better approach to transparencywill be to utilize internationaltransparency instruments other thanthe UN Register. If the UN Registercontinues to develop, it will havepaved the way for such efforts. Inthe case of land mines, there exists anagreed-upon but moribundConvention on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of CertainConventional Weapons Which May BeDeemed to be Excessively Injurious orto Have Indiscriminate Effects.Protocol II deals directly with landmines and is currently being exam-ined by a UN group of experts forpossible revision and strengthening.The essence of this approach is to

"differences in security environmentsand concerns of states in variousregions . . . The Group noted the prob-lem of some types of conventionalweapons, including small arms, notcovered by the categories of the Regi-ster, is referred to by some states as oneof the reasons for the lack of particip-ation. The Group considered that sucha specific problem should primarily beaddressed among states in the regionsor subregions concerned" (UnitedNations General Assembly, 1994).

Whatever transparency approach isadopted, it will be much harder toput into practice than the currentUN Register, which has proventroublesome for many states. Agree-ing to register land mine and mortarproduction and exports will be amajor and arduous political feat.Implementation will be even moredifficult, especially given the well-documented lack of national controlover these light weapons.

Creating a register for certain lightweapons where a norm againsttheir production, use or transferhas been established (e.g., anti-personnel land mines) but cannotbe implemented may be worsethan no register at all. The politicalforces at work against transparencyare significant and they will seizeupon any such failures to invokethe “I told you so” theorem. Thisis one of the reasons that some ofthe states involved in the UNRegister exercise have moved soslowly, although others simplythink the idea of transparency andnational security don’t mix verywell.

take advantage of the breakthroughachieved by the Register and developa similar system for land mines andother light weapons. If it waspossible to concentrate on oneweapon system at a time—such asman-portable air defense missiles, inwhich emphasizing the terroristthreat eventually led to a normagainst their transfer—transparencymeasures would naturally follow.

A third approach to transparency isthat of regional registers. From thebeginning of the Register exercise inFebruary 1992 it was clear to themember states of the panel that areassuch as Africa would be marginal tothe effort, largely because of theweapons categories. Smaller andlighter weapons do matter. NGOsand academic analysts may play animportant role as these regionalregisters develop, since they areoften in a good position to observethe negative consequences. There isalready some movement in theregional register area. The OAS has aproposal on the table to set up aLatin American register, and the ideahas come up in ASEAN deliber-ations. The 1994 Group report onthe UN Register contains an entiresection entitled “Regional Aspects,”which concludes that participationvaried significantly by region due to:

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Increase the Role ofIncrease the Role ofIncrease the Role ofIncrease the Role ofIncrease the Role ofthe UN in micro-the UN in micro-the UN in micro-the UN in micro-the UN in micro-disarmamentdisarmamentdisarmamentdisarmamentdisarmament

While it is clear that the UnitedStates has backed off from its initialenthusiasm for using the UnitedNations to solve international secur-ity problems, it and the other majorpowers certainly have thecompetence to improve the UnitedNations’ capabilities in this area. Inthose cases where the UnitedNations has been involved, there hasbeen an increasing emphasis on therole of the guns themselves as a causeof the conflict and a major factor inits termination. In the war in ElSalvador, the conflict settlementincluded a disarmament componentwhich has helped considerably inpreventing a reoccurrence of thelevel of conflict which raged for adecade. In contrast, the war inAngola continued for a long time—despite UN involvement and cease-fires—because such a disarmamentcomponent has not been imple-mented. The UN Secretary-Generaland his Under Secretary-General forPolitical Affairs Marrack Gouldinghave increasingly tied the trans-parency of the UN Register to itsuse in preventive diplomacy. Iftransparency measures can bedeveloped for mines and other lightweapons, a more active UnitedNations may be more effective.Conversely, a more active UnitedNations will create a demand fortransparency, since it is unlikely thatany sort of UN intelligence agencywill be developed soon.

Develop ConsultativeDevelop ConsultativeDevelop ConsultativeDevelop ConsultativeDevelop ConsultativeMechanismsMechanismsMechanismsMechanismsMechanisms

As for light weapons, if a trans-parency mechanism can be devel-oped, it would provide the impetusfor states to air grievances whennegative consequences can be deter-mined. In this regard transparencymay go beyond registration ofweapons to include development ofan ‘incidents’ register, especiallywhen it comes to land mines.

Activists trying to shape nationaland international agendas need areadily available database toemploy when faced with theinevitable challenge: “guns don’tkill people, people kill people.” Ifthose favoring control of lightweapons cannot bring forth sup-porting examples—and lots ofthem—little can be accomplished.What is needed is not a database ofweapons exports and imports, as inthe case of the UN Register.Rather, the policymakers need tobe constantly shown, in case aftercase, how accumulations and mis-use of light weapons may haveserious negative consequences.

Using the DataUsing the DataUsing the DataUsing the DataUsing the DataThat Have Been MadeThat Have Been MadeThat Have Been MadeThat Have Been MadeThat Have Been MadeTTTTTransparentransparentransparentransparentransparent

PPPPPressure by NGOs on Nationalressure by NGOs on Nationalressure by NGOs on Nationalressure by NGOs on Nationalressure by NGOs on NationalGovernmentsGovernmentsGovernmentsGovernmentsGovernments

Now that the Gulf War has movedconventional weapons compara-tively to the forefront of the inter-national agenda, both national andinternational NGOs concerned withthe negative consequences of thearms trade are called upon to step uptheir pressure on national policy.Much of this pressure will be in theform of gathering and publicizingthe data on these negative conse-quences that have become moreavailable in the post-Cold War globalsystem. The land mine campaignserves as a good example—the infor-mation on casualties to innocentcivilians is simply not available togovernments. It comes as no surprisethat these NGOs have played amajor role in influencing policy notonly in the United States but also inthe United Nations. The issue ofhuman rights serves as a good anal-ogy. For valid reasons, most of thedata on human rights abuses wentunreported for many years. Statesguilty of such abuses had no interestin revealing such information.Therefore most of the action on theinternational human rights front wasdue to pressure from NGOs such asHuman Rights Watch and AmnestyInternational. In the case of lightweapons and their consequences,NGOs can increasingly focus on theweapons themselves. Continuedaccess by the media to the ongoingethnic conflicts will be critical to thiseffort.


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The United Nations’ Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, hascalled for control of light weaponsunder the term ‘micro-disarmament’(United Nations, 1995). In micro-disarmament the targets of thepolicies used are individuals andsmall groups, not states or well-organized sub-national militarygroups normally associated with thetraditional disarmament character-izing many UN operations. Dealingwith such situations requires anintegrated, multi-method strategyemploying a variety of policyapproaches which address not onlythe root economic and social causesof the violence, but also the weaponswhich raise the costs in economicand human terms.

Typically countries employ a rangeof techniques to control the negativeconsequences of excessive weaponsin the hands of their citizens. Thesefirst include improving the overallsecurity of the country throughstrengthening police forces, norm-ally a part of most traditional dis-armament to end civil wars. Im-proving security is the best approachsince it decreases the citizens’ need toillegally arm themselves. In manypost-Cold War cases, however, thesources of instability have causedcrime and violence to rise faster thanthe development of such securityforces. As a result, states have had tofocus on the weapons themselves, byenacting weapons registration laws,imposing penalties for the unauth-orized possession of weapons, and insome cases targeting individuals andgroups for forceful seizure of illegalweapons.


“The Covert Arms Trade.” [1994].The Economist. 12 February, p.21–23.

Karp, Aaron. 1993. “ArmingEthnic Conflict.” Arms ControlToday. 8–13 September.

Karp, Aaron. 1994. “The ArmsTrade Revolution: The MajorImpact of Small Arms.” TheWashington Quarterly. 17:4, pp.65–77.

Goose, Stephen D. and FrankSmyth. 1994. “Arming Genocidein Rwanda.” Foreign Affairs.

Human Rights Watch. 1994.Arming Rwanda: The Arms Tradeand Human Rights Abuses in theRwanda. January.

Human Rights Watch andPhysicians for Human Rights.1993. Land Mines: A Deadly Legacy.(Human Rights Watch andPhysicians for Human Rights).

Laurance, Edward J. 1992.“Political Implications of IllegalArms Exports from the UnitedStates.” Political Science Quarterly.Fall, p.503.

United Nations General Assembly.1994. Report on the ContinuingOperation of the United NationsRegister of Conventional Arms andits Further Development. Report ofthe Secretary General. August.

United Nations. 1995. Supplementto an Agenda for Peace. PositionPaper of the Secretary-General.January.

Although evidence is still beingaccumulated for the buy-backprograms utilized in Haiti by theUnited States under United Nationsauspices and in other internationalcases, such programs have been usedin US cities for many years. Facedwith social and economic situationsnot unlike those of developing coun-tries in post-civil war environments,gun buy-back programs have accel-.erated in popularity, and much hasbeen learned about how they workand why they fail.

37B·I·C·C

equipment under 44 last-minutecontracts with foreign governmentsand international arms traders forextremely low prices betweenAugust and October 1990, by argu-ing that many of these systems mightbe incorporated into the armedforces of the unified Germany.However, soon after reunificationincreasing amounts of former EastGerman weapon systems and mili-tary equipment came to be seen as a‘surplus’ no longer necessary for theBundeswehr.

Today the net results have becomevisible: except for a few weapon sys-tems which will be used for a shortperiod of time—24 modern Mig-29fighter aircraft and larger quantitiesof low-tech, general purpose equip-ment—all of the former NVA stock-piles became surplus.

This paper looks into several aspectsof the NVA case:

the availability and reliability ofdata about the NVA—i.e., the sizeof the heritage

the system of decision-makingconcerning the future of NVAequipment

the exports from surplus stocks

the German obligations under theCFE Treaty.

The paper presents an overview byconcentrating on the major cate-gories of weapons and militaryequipment. It looks at weapon sys-tems rather than military dual-useequipment, and on weaponsexported or scrapped rather thanthose destined for static displays atexhibitions.

bybybybybyOtfried NassauerOtfried NassauerOtfried NassauerOtfried NassauerOtfried Nassauer33333


The fall of the Berlin wall and thesucceeding German reunification leftthe Federal Republic of Germany’sBundeswehr with an additional,inherited army, the former EastGerman National Peoples Army(NVA). The personnel, infra-structure, weapons, ammunition andall other types of equipment of theformer East German armed forces—supplemented by weaponry former-ly owned by the East GermanIntelligence and internal SecurityServices (Stasi), the border troopsand other armed units—ended upunder Bundeswehr ownership,custody and responsibility. Later,the stocks of the East German armstrade company ‘IMES’ . Thus interalia more than 20,000 additional sub-machine guns came under Bundes-wehr custody about one year afterunification (Deutscher Bundestag,Document 12/1448, p.21).

The Bundeswehr halted attempts ofthe newly elected democratic Ger-man Democratic Republic (GDR)government to sell large quantities ofthese weapons, ammunition and

An ArmyAn ArmyAn ArmyAn ArmyAn ArmySurplus—TheSurplus—TheSurplus—TheSurplus—TheSurplus—The

NVNVNVNVNVAAAAA’s Heritage’s Heritage’s Heritage’s Heritage’s Heritage

3 This article reflects data as available in late1994, i.e., as of 31 December 1993. Theauthor is especially indebted to a number ofjounalists and research colleagues whoallowed him to analyse materials they usedfor their stories. Among them, colleagues ofDer Spiegel, Berliner Zeitung and SüddeutscheZeitung were especially helpful. Researchcolleagues Erich Schmidt-Eenboom andHans-Joachim Gießmann, who authored amajor book on the NVA in transition (Dasunliebsame Erbe, Baden-Baden, 1992), alsoprovided substantial assistance.

NVNVNVNVNVAAAAA

Defining the Size ofDefining the Size ofDefining the Size ofDefining the Size ofDefining the Size ofthe NVthe NVthe NVthe NVthe NVA HeritageA HeritageA HeritageA HeritageA Heritage

The answer to the fundamentalquestion of how much and whatexactly the Bundeswehr inheritedfrom the NVA is surprising:although both armed forces were‘German’ armies—thus reflecting aspecific understanding about thenecessity for bureaucratic correct-ness—there seem to be no reliable orconclusive books of record. It istherefore impossible to compile acomprehensive set of data on howmany of which systems and itemswere available on 3 October 1990,when the Bundeswehr officially tookcommand over the former NVA.Developing a clear understanding ofthe destiny of many of the inheritedweapons has also proven to be ex-tremely difficult.

While some of differences have beensufficiently explained in open orclosed sessions of parliament, it ishighly unlikely that this is true forall—the Bundeswehr has argued thatthis task would be too complicatedand time consuming. In principle,difficulties in keeping a clear recordfor transportable items may beimagined due to the circumstancesunder which bookkeepers had towork after reunification (i.e., lack ofexperienced and specialized per-sonnel, layoffs in personnel, sub-stantial relocations, exports, salesand constant changes); nevertheless,there are good reasons for a moreskeptical approach. Most of theexcuses for mistakes in accountingfor transportable goods are notreasonable for immobile items. TheGerman Ministry of Defense (MoD)provided parliament with varyingfigures regarding the total number ofinstallations it took over in theformer GDR—between May 1991and May 1994 inter alia the follow-ing figures were given officially:2,250, 3,320, 2,280, 2,235 and 2,288.Other aspects support a skepticalpoint of view; although the MoDproduces regular reports for parlia-ment on NVA military equipment,

38 B·I·C·C


“Going out of“Going out of“Going out of“Going out of“Going out ofbusiness sales” of thebusiness sales” of thebusiness sales” of thebusiness sales” of thebusiness sales” of theformer GDRformer GDRformer GDRformer GDRformer GDR

In several last-minute contracts,signed as late as 1–2 October1990, huge amounts of weaponsystems were sold by the GDRMinistry of Disarmament andDefense at very low prices.

Major contracts included:

MoD of Poland, DM 207.9million, to include 2700 FagottAT-missiles; 11 Mig-29s; 152mmammunition; air-to-air missiles,etc.

MoD of Hungary, approxi-mately DM 100 million, toinclude 200 T-72 MBTs for DM180,000 each; 130,000 AT minesfor DM 10 each; 50,000 AK-74submachine guns for DM 60each; and many other weapons aswell as spare parts

CIC International Ltd (USA),DM 275.5 million or US $349million, to include 3 shipsproject 151 for US $10 millionper copy; 12 ships project 205 for

US $100,000 per copy; Mig-21s andMig-23s; 58 BM-21 and 100 RM-70rocket launchers; 5,000 Sagger ATmissiles for US $800 each; 1,200T-55 for US $10,000 per copy; 200T-72 MBTs for US $200,000 each

Beij-MA Military District(Belgium), DM 62.5 million, toinclude inter alia 32 Mi-24 heli-copters for DM 300,000 per copy;100 T-72 tanks for DM 180,000 percopy; 9mm pistols for DM 10 percopy including ammunition; lightmachine guns for DM 75 per copy;RPG-18 light assault weapons forDM 85 each; 100,000 anti-personnel mines for DM 25 each

OEG SUMER Handels- undService Gesellschaft, differentcontracts regarding NBC equip-ment and decontaminationmaterials for export to SaudiArabia (export licensed by FRG)

Harlacher small arms andammunition for DM 317,746

Heckler & Koch ammunition forDM 144,700

ALTKAM (USSR), DM 498,420for vehicles

MAWIA GmbH, onedemilitarized ship, later illegallyexported to Guinea

Königsberg-Foundation, DM 1.5million for three L-410 transportaircraft

The two large contracts with armstraders included a paragraphallowing both sides to withdrawfrom their obligations if the neces-sary official licenses, allowances,etc. could not be gained; thus, it islikely no actual transfers have beenmade. Whether and to what extentthe contracts with Poland andHungary were fulfilled is notpublicly known.

Sources:Letter by which the Bundeswehr’sliaison group at the GDR Ministry ofDisarmament and Defense asked towithhold the systems listed in anAnnex from the GDR’s list ofweapons for sale: Bundesministeriumder Verteidigung/Ministerium fürAbrüstung und Verteidigung (DDR),6 September 1990; Vielain, 1991;Bauer, 1993, p. IV.2-1; author’sarchives .

it has not yet succeeded in producingthem in a standard format thatallows detailed comparison. Fromthe author’s point of view, an inten-tional lack of transparency exists.Even with extensive sources avail-able, therefore, there will be no clearand comprehensive set of data fromwhich to start, when investigatingthe fate of surplus weapons from theformer GDR stockpiles.

Indeed, the differences between theavailable data are large enough toencourage much speculation, includ-ing assumptions about stocks notjustified, illegally exported or used

for purposes of operational foreignpolicy.

This situation is due in part to a lackof political control over the armedforces during the unification process.The German Bundestag only latelydecided to execute tougher controlover the administration’s decisionsand behavior with respect to theformer NVA equipment. Othertopics were perceived as more im-portant by the newly elected parlia-mentarians during most of 1991.More detailed parliamentary controlwas executed only when in October1991 the Hamburg harbor policeseized a clandestine delivery of 14

military items to Israel, includingtwo complete Schilka ZSU 23/4 airdefense systems declared to be‘agricultural machines.’ In theaftermath of parliamentary invest-igations, many other exports cameto parliamentary attention (Deut-scher Bundestag, 2 December 1991).As a consequence the Ministry ofDefense was tasked in spring 1992 toregularly report on its activities withrespect to the former NVAequipment.

39B·I·C·C

The data published by the FRGgovernment and given to GermanParliament committees from bothsources differ widely. Detailedcomparisons between the figuresalso reveal differences between datapublished from the new Bundes-wehr system at different times.Astonishingly enough, the newBundeswehr accounting systemfigures have been corrected inmany cases and in that way camemuch closer to the original NVAfigures (see Annexes 1 and 2).

argued inter alia that the NVAnormally updated its listing everytwo years; the latest completedupdate occurred in 1987, and there-fore did not contain more recentchanges. The 1989 update wasallegedly canceled due to the polit-ical developments. Parts of theNVA list available to the authorand representing a 30 June 1990printout from the GDR MoDcomputer system, however, clearlyshow that an update includingmany 1989–1990 changes musthave been accomplished by theNVA. A comparison with the listreprinted by the German MoD in1992 reveals that the reprintedversion lists data of 1989 and 1990origin without attributing them toa post-1987 entry . Both listingsreflect the same totals for most orall systems listed in both. Themajor difference between the twosources is that the printout in theauthor’s archive lists the weaponsystems by age, thus establishingwhen they were added to the NVAinventory. Additions to inventoryup to 1990 are listed. Thus, theargument that no update was madesince 1987 cannot be accepted.

Bookkeeping Bookkeeping Bookkeeping Bookkeeping Bookkeeping

The GDR Ministry of Defenseand Disarmament maintained alist of weapon systems and majoritems held by the NVA. Aftertaking possession, the Bundes-wehr argued repeatedly that thislisting was by no means corrector complete since the NVA didnot keep reliable statistics on itsholdings. Surprisingly theBundeswehr never referred to anextensive database of the formerNVA, which was run at theGDR MoD and contained dataon the NVA military installa-tions and their local weapon andequipment stockpiles.

A new computerized accountingand management system for abroader range of items was estab-lished by the Bundeswehr, butno comprehensive comparison ofboth accounting systems hasbeen published. Nevertheless, inJanuary 1992 the Bundeswehr re-printed large parts of the formerNVA listing and preliminary fig-ures on the differences betweenthis list and the new accountingsystem. In trying to explain thesedifferences, the Bundeswehr

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Main Battle Tanks 2,342ACV/IFV 6,639Artillery 2,465Helicopters (attack) 87Fighter Aircraft (incl. L-39 trainer) 394Fighting Ships 69Vehicles (incl. trailers) 100,000Fire Arms ca 1,200,000Ammunition (metric tons) ca 300,000

Source: Deutscher Bundestag, 11 May 1992, pp. 5+. For details,see Annex 1.

Estimated Holdings of the NVEstimated Holdings of the NVEstimated Holdings of the NVEstimated Holdings of the NVEstimated Holdings of the NVAAAAA

Sources:Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungs-ausschuß, 19 December 1991, p.19;Wehrdienst 1303/1992, p.2; Deut-scher Bundestag, Document 12/2026; Deutscher Bundestag,Document 12/2026, Attachment 1;printout from the GDR’s MoDcomputer, 30 June 1990.

40 B·I·C·C


DecisionmakingDecisionmakingDecisionmakingDecisionmakingDecisionmakingSystem RegardingSystem RegardingSystem RegardingSystem RegardingSystem Regardingthe Future ofthe Future ofthe Future ofthe Future ofthe Future ofNVNVNVNVNVA WA WA WA WA Weapons andeapons andeapons andeapons andeapons andMaterialsMaterialsMaterialsMaterialsMaterials

During the early months afterreunification, the Bundeswehr laidprimary emphasis on ensuringcontrol over the NVA’s materialheritage. Thousands of majorweapons and thousands of tons ofequipment were relocated andbrought under a more centralized,easier-to-guard storage system.Thousands of military installations—often containing weapons, ammuni-tions or other dangerous goods—hadto be guarded, despite a serious lackof personnel.

Because of the amount of weaponsand items to be handled, the Bundes-wehr established a specific selectionsystem to make decisions about thefuture of these items. Three differentcategories of items were created:

Category 1: service with theBundeswehr for the foreseeablefuture

Category 2: further evaluation orcontinued interim service withthe Bundeswehr

Category 3: immediately in excess

A typical example of a category 1weapon is the modern Mig-29 fighteraircraft, which the Bundeswehr willuse beyond the year 2000. Otherexamples are two Tupolev aircraftconverted into the German ‘OpenSkies’ airplane. The Mi-24 attackhelicopters and Mi-8 transport heli-copters are good examples of cate-gory 2 material that was further usedor evaluated and is or will be retiredfrom service. The bulk of the majorweapon systems—e.g., all otherfighter and fighter bomber aircraft,98 percent of the main battle tanks,95 percent of the armored cavalry

vehicles and 95 percent of the artil-lery systems and mortars—weredecided to be in excess early in theprocess. About 80 percent of thenon-weapon systems and majortypes of equipment were similarlyresolved as early as 1991. Additionalweapons and materials from cate-gories 1 and 2 have since beenrecategorized to category 3. Amongthe weapons first considered for usewith the Bundeswehr were the D-30howitzers, the RM-70 missilelaunchers, the BTR-70 APCs andothers. They were recategorized, aswere 892 BMP-1, 2 SAM systemsSA-5, 163,039 AK 74 submachineguns, 24 Mi-24 helicopters and manyothers (Schulte, 1990, p. 873; Deut-scher Bundestag, 11 May 1992, p.5).Although recent official figures onwhich and how much of the formerNVA equipment is still in use areunavailable, it is no longer verymuch. In addition to those argu-ments used in public for phasing outmost NVA weapon systems (depen-dence on Russian spares, incompat-ibility with German technicalstandards, etc.) one argument mayhave also contributed to thesedecisions: the more weapons fromthe NVA the Bundeswehr continuedto operate, the more NVA specialistsit would have to continue toemploy.

Category 3 weapons and materialswere collected and stored in specialdepots. They have been used for onethe following purposes:

service with another GermanFederal Ministry, e.g. theMinistry of Interior

service with the new Länder orcommunity authorities tostrengthen the buildup of infra-structure

export sales from government togovernment

foreign military aid programs

technical intelligence exchangeprograms

humanitarian aid programs

takeover by the government-controlled company VEBEG forscrapping or selling after partial orcomplete demilitarization

takeover by the Bundeswehr fortechnical intelligence purposes

use by the Bundeswehr as livetargets on training sites

use as static displays in national aswell as foreign exhibitions(Wehrdienst, 15 November 1993,pp.2–3).

Special interest was immediatelygiven to those categories of weaponssubject to the CFE regulations(Hartmann, et al., 1992; Zellner,1994; Crawford, 1991; Institute forDefense and Disarmament Studies).The CFE Treaty, signed November1990 in Paris, continued to be applic-able in the new political situationwhen Germany accepted all limit-ations for the unified Germany thatwere originally intended for WestGermany. This decision made Ger-many the country with the secondlargest obligations for reductionsunder the treaty. Nevertheless, thetreaty allowed each signatory aperiod of time for corrections to itsoriginal notification figures. Itallowed the earmarking of TreatyLimited Equipment (TLEs) asintended for export according toArticle III regulations. Some types ofTLEs could also be recategorizedunder the treaty regulations bymaking specific changes to theirconstruction. As the CFE Treatyentered into force no earlier thanNovember 1992, there was sufficienttime to use those provisions thatallowed reductions to the costs asso-ciated with fulfilling the signatoriesobligations to scrap weapon systems.There was also sufficient time toexport treaty-limited weapons.Indeed, German government offi-cials informed members of parlia-ment that exports would become

41B·I·C·C

more difficult after ratification(Deutscher Bundestag, September1991, pp.12+). Comparing Ger-many’s 1990 assumptions about howmany TLEs it would have to scrapwith those given since shows thatGermany has taken advantage ofthese regulations—it will have todestroy much less weapons than ithad assumed in 1990.

Exports became a major means ofridding the Bundeswehr of theNVA’s heritage. A number of fac-tors contributed to this develop-ment. When the Bundeswehr tookcommand of the NVA, no special-ized dismantling facilities wereavailable to immediately begin todestroy NVA weapons, ammuni-tions and toxic materials in accord-ance with environmental regula-tions. Although many environ-mental laws were suspended in the

five new Länder for several years,only a few small or experimentalfacilities were available to imme-diately start the destruction of mili-tary equipment. During the timenecessary to build up specializedfacilities, only small amounts of themost dangerous types of ammuni-tions and weapons could bedestroyed, e.g., liquid fuel missiletypes. The bulk of all weapons andequipment had to be guarded andstored. For months this causedserious complications for theBundeswehr; they tried toimplement a centralized and cate-gorized storage system, but soon itwas argued that these tasks woulddivert the armed forces for yearsfrom their normal defense, trainingand military tasks. An informal

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consensus was reached—the soonerreductions of these surplus stockstook place, the lower the costs ofhandling the NVA’s heritage wouldbe. It was simply cheaper and fasterto transport a weapon to anothercountry that paid for the transferand maybe even for the weapon,than to first pay for storing it andthen for destroying it.

To help the Bundeswehr win timefor its military tasks, a newly estab-lished subsidiary of the government-owned company VEBEG, theMSDG (Material-Service-Depot-Gesellschaft), was assigned withguarding and operating those depotsin which material was awaitingdelivery for future in-country use,export or destruction.

German Exports of Major WGerman Exports of Major WGerman Exports of Major WGerman Exports of Major WGerman Exports of Major Weapon Systems 1992-93eapon Systems 1992-93eapon Systems 1992-93eapon Systems 1992-93eapon Systems 1992-93(according to origin)

Category 1992–93 FRG FRG GDR Percentage Type of GDRExports Systems surplus surplus GDR Weapon Systems

IncludedMBT 382 243 242 139 36.4 T-72, T-55

ACV/IFV 525 278 187 247 47.0 BMP-1, BTR-60/70, MT-LB,

PTS*

Artillery 459 — — 459 100.0 SPH 122 and152mm

AttackHelicopters 2 1 — 1 50.0 Mi-24

Combat Su-22,Mig-Aircraft 106 93 93 13 12.3 21/23

* This ACV/IFV was not identified clearly; although no equipment of West German origin is known to be designated PTS, it isaccounted for in the NVA share.

This table also makes clear that most of the exports from Bundeswehr stocks are surplus weapons. The tanks exported were Leopard 1s,the aircraft were Alpha Jets and F-4 Phantoms, and the 187 IFVs were M-113s.

Source: United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993.

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ExportsExportsExportsExportsExports

Exports from former NVA stockslargely contribute to Germany’srank as the second (or third) mostimportant supplier of major weaponsystems according to the 1992 and1993 UN Registers of ConventionalArms. Substantial numbers ofweapon systems as well as othermilitary items have been exported.

In general, the rules for handlingexcess Bundeswehr items had to beapplied for all surplus items of theformer NVA; no special regulationswere created with respect to Germanarms trade and export laws (Heyden,1990, p.62). Indeed, during a meetingof the German Federal SecurityCouncil on 27 February 1991, it wasdecided that all exports should behandled in accordance with normalWest German procedures as well asthe 1982 political guidelines for armsexports (Deutscher Bundestag, 2December 1991, p.26). The seizureof the covert delivery to Israel led on23 December 1991 to a policy withinthe MoD of tighter control of thepolitical leadership (Wehrdienst,1300/1992, p.II).

Nevertheless, the process ofpreparing for these deliveries hadstarted much earlier. Only two daysafter the March 1990 elections in theformer GDR—which brought aCDU-led Eastern German govern-ment into power—a meeting tookplace within the West GermanMinistry of Defense to discuss whenand with whom the inherited mili-tary equipment would be shared.

Many countries made requests forformer NVA equipment; some ofthem did so even before reunific-ation. In November 1991, a list waspublished naming a total of 44countries that had requested NVAweapons (not including requests forhumanitarian aid purposes). Among

them were NATO allies Belgium,Denmark, France, Greece, Turkey,the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates as well as Italy, Spain, Canadaand Holland. A wide range of non-NATO countries from Europe andother parts of the world was listed aswell: Finland, Austria, Switzerland,Sweden, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland,Romania, Hungary, the USSR,Egypt, Algeria, Botswana, Ecuador,Israel, India, Saudi Arabia, Peru,Tunisia, Singapore and many others(Bundesministerium der Verteidi-gung, Parlamentarischer Staatssekre-tär, 21 November 1991).

Exports to the GulfExports to the GulfExports to the GulfExports to the GulfExports to the GulfWWWWWar Alliesar Alliesar Alliesar Alliesar Allies

Preparations for the Gulf War partlycoincided with the process of Ger-man reunification. Since Iraqi forcesoperated mainly Soviet types of mili-tary equipment, the United States,the United Kingdom and—outside ofthe Gulf alliance—Israel approachedthe German government early on forvarious types of military equipmentwith which they might be confront-ed. Requests were mainly driven by‘technical intelligence’ needs, i.e.,testing and evaluation purposes.Therefore only small numbers ofindividual systems were necessary.

Germany, because of internal policyreasons and constitutional problems,could not contribute troops to thewar. It therefore decided to givefinancial support and to supply mili-

tary equipment in order to avoidincreasing political pressure from itsallies. This compensation strategyproved to be costly, totaling someDM 17–18 billion, or roughly US$10 billion at the time (Wehrdienst,1258/1991, p.1). NVA equipment, atcost estimated by the Germangovernment, made up a significantpart. This policy largely contributedto early and major exports of NVAweapons. The Commander of theBundeswehr Command East at thetime, Jörg Schönbohm, later wrote:“I have witnessed former NVAsoldiers to be laid off by 1st ofJanuary 1991, working over theChristmas Holidays of 1990, toensure that material for our alliesoperating in the Persian Gulf couldbe provided timely” (Schönbohm,1992, p.43).

While the United States received awide range of weapons for technicalevaluation and larger numbers ofdifferent trucks, logistics and medicalsupplies for operational purposes,France obtained mine clearance andmine laying equipment. Egyptsecured 30 NBC reconnaissancevehicles and a 250-ton spares packagein October 1992 (Deutscher Bundes-tag, Document 12/1999, p.15). Israelreceived NBC decontaminationequipment, firefighting equipmentand other dual-use supplies. Turkeywas the only country that showedinterest in obtaining substantialnumbers and a wider range of actualweapon systems. Supplies to Turkeyultimately led to the necessity ofsimilar deliveries to Greece, thuscreating a new military aid programfor both countries (see extra sectionbelow).

43B·I·C·C

Examples of NVExamples of NVExamples of NVExamples of NVExamples of NVA-Equipment Delivered to the GulfA-Equipment Delivered to the GulfA-Equipment Delivered to the GulfA-Equipment Delivered to the GulfA-Equipment Delivered to the Gulf-----WWWWWar Allies*ar Allies*ar Allies*ar Allies*ar Allies*

Type of Equipment Designation Number RecipientDelivered* Country

Engineering Equipment T 130 25 USATrucks Tatra 813 8x8 151 USATrucks Tatra 815 6x8 208 USATrucks Tatra 815 8x8 62 USATrucks (POL) Tatra 815 CAPL 16 104 USA

Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CA 18 17 USATrucks Tatra 815 VI 129 USATrailers for Tatra 815 VI —- 128 USATrucks (POL, 5,000 l) Ural 48 USATrucks Maintenance Ural 375C 48 USA

Heavy Load Trailers P 50 and P 80 189 USATrailer (Water) 220 USATrailer (POL) 294 USAMedical Cars LO 2002 A/C 47 USATrucks with Showers W50 LA/A/C 604 USA

Water Bottles 18,000 USAContainers (20 ft.) 724 USATents (8x15 m) 200 USANBC protection masks 100,000 USAMine Clearance Equip. KMT 5 10 FR

Mine Clearance Equip. KMT 6M 2 10 FRMine Laying Equip. MLG 60M 4 FRTrucks Tatra 815 6x6 40 CSFRHeavy Load Trailers P50/80 40 CSFRNBC equipment various IsraelSPW-40 NBC rec. veh. 30 EgyptSpares Package 250 tons spares 1 Egypt

* This table is deliberately incomplete, as it does not include exports covered in other sections. Excluded are deliveries to the UnitedStates for testing and evaluation as well as for training purposes; deliveries to Turkey; and deliveries for technical intelligence purposesto Israel. Israel also requested other NVA equipment but detailed and official figures are not publicly known.

Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 22 February 1991.

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Exports for TExports for TExports for TExports for TExports for TechnicalechnicalechnicalechnicalechnicalIntelligenceIntelligenceIntelligenceIntelligenceIntelligence

Former NVA weapons were given asloans or as gifts to foreign countriesfor technical intelligence, i.e., testingand evaluation purposes. These typesof exports were said to be limited tothe NATO countries and Israel.Other countries—”several Arabcountries”—may also have benefitedfrom such exports (DeutscherBundestag, 2 December 1991, p.5).While such deliveries were imple-mented on a regular basis accordingto agreed NATO guidelines with theUnited States, the United Kingdomand France, each delivery to Israelwas decided on a case-by-case basis(for details, see Annex 4).

The deliveries of former NVAequipment to the United States aresomewhat unique in this context.On the one hand, they covered abroader number of types of equip-ment than deliveries to any othercountry. In fact, the United States isthe only country that received largenumbers of complete major weaponsystems. On the other hand, theUnited States is the only countrythat received substantial numbers ofweapons from the former NVA fortraining purposes. The US militarymaintains complete ‘red flag’ units,equipped with Soviet/Russianweapons, in order to conduct itsmilitary training as realistically aspossible. The opportunity to equipthese units with more modern equip-ment from NVA stocks was notpassed up. It can not be clearly deter-mined in all cases whether deliveriesof NVA equipment to the UnitedStates served technical intelligence ortraining purposes.

According to official statements,Israel is the only country outside ofNATO participating in thisexchange; several clandestine oper-ations were set up by the West Ger-man Foreign Intelligence Service tosecretly transport NVA weapons toIsrael in cooperation with theMossad.

Israel (Deutscher Bundestag, 2December 1991; Deutscher Bundes-tag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 10December 1991; Kolbow/Stoltenberg, 1992) was one of thefirst countries to informally showinterest in NVA equipment. Basedon a 1967 general agreement andcase-by-case cooperation between thearmed forces of Israel, the GermanBundeswehr and the two countries’foreign intelligence services, thistype of cooperation already hadsome practice. Historically, the FRGhad benefited greatly from cooper-ation, since Israel had provided theFRG with some complete majorweapon systems captured during thewars in the Near East, including anAA-2 air-to-air missile and a BMP-2.The German side did not have muchhardware to give in return. Evenbefore the unification date, however,the Israeli military attaché in Bonnhad tabled preliminary requests forweapon systems of interest to theMossad and the Israeli armed forces.In mid-1991, the Israeli list contained274 positions, of which the Germangovernment had fulfilled some 68positions by December 1991 and waspreparing to fulfill an unknownnumber of additional ones (it hadalso turned down an unknown num-ber of wishes). The weapons seizedin Hamburg (14 positions) werefinally delivered in October 1992.Examples of deliveries to Israel canbe found in Annex 4.

While in public it was argued thatthese deliveries occurred as part ofthe German Gulf War effort and aspart of the normal, intra-alliancecooperation, one possible additionalmotive must be mentioned. WithGermany no longer a front-line stateand thus having significantly less-valuable COMINT, ELINT andother intelligence information toshare, transferring relatively mod-ern, Eastern-style weaponry andequipment from NVA stocks wasclearly a possibility for interimcompensation.

From what is known about exports,loans and deliveries for technicalintelligence purposes, a few con-clusions may be drawn.

Much of the equipment requestedand received by the United States,France, the United Kingdom andIsrael was identical. All countrieswere obviously looking for anumber of the same items, whichseem not to have been wellknown to the Western world.Ship-to-ship missiles of the P21and P22 ‘Styx’ types are goodexamples, as are modern air-to-airmissiles.

There was some reluctance in theFRG about giving Israel completeweapon systems or large numbersof the same item, while theUnited Kingdom and the UnitedStates obtained complete majorweapons if requested.

Israel and the United States bothwere obviously interested in land-mine technologies used by theNVA.

Only the United States lookedinto many major weapons sys-tems, such as different types ofaircraft (Su-22M4, Mig-23 andMig-29), different tanks or acomplete fighting ship, such as theTarantul class missile corvette.The United States also seems tobe the only country with theresources necessary to operatecomplete ‘red flag’ type militaryunits.

From what is known publicly,the recipient countries appear tohave had only limited interest inelectronic counter-measure(ECM) or electronic counter-counter-measure (ECCM) equip-ment from NVA stocks. This iseither due to the assumption thatthese items were not very capableor is an indication that relevantinformation has been withheldfrom the public for secrecyreasons.

45B·I·C·C

Since cooperation in technicalintelligence is normally subject tointense secrecy, the seizure of theHamburg weapons for Israel causedinvestigations that allowed a firstglimpse of German practices as wellas of some of its partners’ behaviorsin this field. To the author’s know-ledge, this case is unique. The sizeand the wide range of the deliveriesdiscussed during the investigationsclearly raise the question of whethermore transparency in this field couldmake a unique contribution to confi-dence building.

Arming Allies andArming Allies andArming Allies andArming Allies andArming Allies andFueling a RegionalFueling a RegionalFueling a RegionalFueling a RegionalFueling a RegionalConflictConflictConflictConflictConflict

Turkey and Greece are among thelargest recipients of former NVAweapon systems. As noted above,supplies to these two countriesoriginated from the Turkish requestsin the Gulf War context. Both coun-tries contracted for new, large, mili-tary aid packages (Materialhilfe III),consisting of a wide mixture of sur-plus NVA and Bundeswehr weaponsto be delivered until 1994/1995.Thus, these programs became ratherindependent from the Gulf War.

Greece received inter alia 21,675RPG-18, more than 7,000 guidedanti-tank missiles, 3 OSA air defensemissile systems (12 launchers with924 missiles), 306 ZSU23 air defenseguns, 501 BMP-1 armored personnelcarriers plus 158 RM-70 rocketlaunchers (including some 205,000rockets). At one point the country,pressed by its debts, had to delaydeliveries as it could no longer payfor the transport (Deutscher Bundes-tag, 21 January 1994, p.12).

Deliveries to Turkey are similarlyimpressive: 4,996 RPG-7 light assaultweapons were exported togetherwith 197,139 rounds of ammunition;303,934 Kalashnikov rifles with atleast 83 million rounds of ammuni-tion, more than 2,500 machine guns,and 300 BTR-60 armored personnelcarriers including large stocks of

ammunition were also delivered. Inaddition, both countries receivedother military equipment. Parts Iand II of Annex 3 show the majorexports from NVA stocks; in addi-tion, major deliveries from Bundes-wehr surplus stocks within the sameaid package are listed in parts III andIV of that annex.

Both countries are the major recip-ients of military aid within NATO.They are seen by their allies as im-portant factors of stability in theEastern Mediterranean and withrespect to the Muslim world—Volker Rühe, the German Ministerof Defense, has argued, ”since theend of the east-west confrontationTurkey and Greece are growing intothe role of stabilizing regionalpowers bordering crisis areas”(Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 7March 1994)—and they have receivedsubstantial amounts of surplusweapons for decades. German mili-tary aid programs for Turkey totaledDM 6.243 billion for the 1964–1994timeframe; German programs insupport of Greece totaled DM 2.572billion (Bundesministerium derVerteidigung, RüT II 1, 5 October1991; Wehrdienst, 13/1993, p.2).

While deliveries before the ratific-ation of the CFE Treaty were nor-mal military exports, later transfershad to be made under the treatyprovisions which allow ‘cascading.’Within this program, the moremodern armed forces with troopsdeployed at the former CentralFront—i.e., in Germany—are allow-ed to transfer substantial amounts ofdestined-to-be-destroyed equipmentto the countries at NATO’s flanks,thus modernizing the equipmentstandard of their allies within theagreed equipment limits for thesecountries. If these deliveries causethe recipient country to exceed theagreed holdings in a CFE category,the respective country is also obliged

to destroy older TLEs of the samecategory to meet its treaty commit-ments. Since not all these limits weremet prior to the cascading, thisprocess could lead to substantialincreases in national holdings insome cases.

Deliveries to both countries areaccompanied by the risk of fuelingan arms race among poor NATOallies, who have a wide range ofpotentially conflicting interests(Aegis, Cyprus, Balkans) and whosegovernments have regularly usedforeign policy disputes to overcomeinternal difficulties. Therefore themain suppliers, Germany and theUnited States, both apply a policy inwhich delivered equipment is care-fully divided between Greece andTurkey on a proportional basis.

The supply of huge amounts ofsmall weapons and ammunition toTurkey may well contribute toTurkey’s war in the Kurdishprovinces as well as to severe humanrights violations. While the Germangovernment argues that Turkeycommitted itself to not using theseweapons for purposes other thanNATO defense, the Turkish govern-ment has repeatedly pointed out thatfighting the Kurdish PKK guerrilla iswell within the common tasks of allNATO countries, since they agreedto cooperate in fighting terrorism.

Although the bilateral treatiesbetween Turkey and Germany onthe military aid programs clearlystate that Turkey is not authorizedto re-export weapons received fromGermany without Germany’swritten approval (Bundesministeri-um der Verteidigung, RüZII 2, 11November 1993; Bundesministeriumder Verteidigung/Ministerium fürNationale Verteidigung der Repu-blik Türkei, 1994, Art. 7, para. 2.), itis possible that Turkey suppliedIraqi Kurds with small arms fromformer NVA stockpiles.

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46 B·I·C·C


Conversations of the author withhumanitarian relief workers, whoworked in Iraqi Kurdistan for severalyears, led to the conclusion thatAK-47s in use with Kurdish militiasin Northern Iraq originate fromNVA stocks. NVA ammunition alsohas turned up with Northern IraqKurdish units. It cannot completelybe excluded that Turkey also useddeliveries from the former NVAstocks to covertly supply Azerbaijanin its conflicts with Armenia.

Exports to promoteExports to promoteExports to promoteExports to promoteExports to promoteexportsexportsexportsexportsexports

Several of the exports of NVAequipment were intertwined withprocurement programs of therecipient country from Germanarms industry. Sweden and Indo-nesia serve as examples.

In 1994, the German arms industrywon a major competition. Sweden,searching for its future main battletank, evaluated the newest versionsof the German Leopard 2, the USM1A2 Abrams, the French Leclercand the British Challenger tanks.After a lengthy process Swedenfinally contracted with Germanindustry for 120 new productiontanks for DM 1.2 billion (Wehrdienst4/1994, p.3), with a possible second

lot of 90 vehicles to follow. Thechoice was allegedly made on thebasis of the conditions Germany hadoffered. The Swedish arms industrywould participate in the tank pro-duction, and Germany would buyadditional equipment from Sweden.Finally—but never directly men-tioned—Sweden contracted for cheapsurplus weapons of German origin aswell. Sweden had already gained anadditional 160 ex-German Leopard 2tanks (out of 200) under a favorablecontract in 1994. Roughly 800 of theNVA’s MB-LT multi-purposearmored vehicles to the country foran extraordinarily low price; Swedenwill also receive spares from thecannibalization of 228 2S1 self-propelled howitzers (Björck, 1994,p.268; Bundesministerium derVerteidigung, 6 April 1994; Foss,1995, p.13).

Indonesia is another example—39former East German Navy vesselswere sold to Indonesia by January1993 in a deal very controversial forhuman rights reasons. The remark-ably low price of some US $13 mil-lion for all these ships was accomp-anied by a commitment to partialdemilitarization and refurbishmentin a German yard—at a cost of US$314 million—and the Germancompany Ferrostahl training 1660Indonesian naval soldiers. TheWorld Bank criticized the deal,noting that the total costs of theproject for Indonesia would be evenhigher, since remilitarization of theships at an Indonesian yard wouldcost another $339 million. TheIndonesian yard itself had to bemodernized for that purpose at theexpense of approximately US $119million and a new harbor had to bebuilt for US $179 million for oper-ating the ships (Deutscher Bundes-tag, Document 12/6512; Wehr-technik, June 1993; Ziller, 1994;Dudde, 1994; Der Spiegel, 27 Septem-ber 1993; Dauth, 1993; Dohnany,1993; Schmalz, 1992).

Despite the process of demilitariz-ation, on four ships the launchers formodern air-defense missiles were‘accidentally’ left aboard, and a 5,000ton spares and ammunition packageaccompanied the deal.The Indo-nesian government also decided toorder three new submarines fromthe German company, HowaldtDeutsche Werk AG, that normallycooperates with Ferrostahl whenselling submarines abroad.

Similarly, both Turkey and Greeceare long-established and well-knowncustomers of the FRG’s arms indus-tries, especially naval industries.

The massive exports from Germansurplus stocks are somewhat double-edged from a German arms industryperspective. While the Germangovernment on the one hand is acheap competitor for its own armsindustries, it also supports theexport sales of German industrieswith cheap, additional equipment.Sometimes this surplus equipmentneeds to be upgraded or brought upto the recipient country’s technol-ogy standards by German companiesbefore delivery (Heckmann, 1989,pp.49-50). From an industry pers-pective, deliveries of very modernequipment may also be perceived ascreating a need for next-generationweaponry by the German Bundes-wehr earlier than otherwise anticip-ated.

Examples of additional exports aregiven in combination with exportssupporting actual sales in Annex 5.

47B·I·C·C

Exports forExports forExports forExports forExports forHumanitarian AidHumanitarian AidHumanitarian AidHumanitarian AidHumanitarian Aid

Large parts of the dual-purposeequipment of the NVA have beenexported for civilian or human-itarian use. Trucks, maintenanceequipment, clothes, telecommun-ications or medical and NBC equip-ment, food and tents have beendelivered since 1990. A wide range ofcountries requested and receivedformer NVA equipment as human-itarian aid—most of the successorstates of the former Soviet Unionplus 34 other countries and hundredsof organizations from the privatesector were listed by the Germangovernment in answering parlia-mentary questions during 1991 and1992 (Bundesministerium derVerteidigung, ParlamentarischerStaatssekretär, 21 November 1991).In addition to the positive aspects, itmust be mentioned that in somecases humanitarian aid was delivered

together with the truckstransporting it, simply because thecosts of destruction for the trucksaccording to German laws would berelatively high.

CFE ObligationsCFE ObligationsCFE ObligationsCFE ObligationsCFE Obligations

Reductions in Treaty LimitedEquipment under the CFE cate-gories are occurring through bothexport and destruction. Thus, theunified Germany continues to fulfillits treaty obligations. By the end of1993 it was expected that allweapons to be dismantled could bescrapped before 16 November 1995,the deadline by which the CFE sig-natory countries are committed tocompleting their reductions.

CFE limits would have allowed theunified Germany to keep some addi-tional TLEs, since the stocks in theformer West Germany were belowthe upper limits allowed for aircraftand attack helicopters. Some last-minute exports and recategorizationscontributed to reduced needs forexpensive destruction as well. It isnot officially known whetherexports of former West GermanTLEs (e.g., Leopard tanks to

Turkey, Greece, Sweden, Denmarkand Norway; RF-4 aircraft to Greeceand Turkey; Alpha Jets to Portugal)have also been used to further reducethe number of weapon systems to bedestroyed. As no intention exists tooperate the additional weapon sys-tems allowed and therefore evenmore former West German weaponsystems are destined for surplus—ofsome 2054 Leopard 1, 2124 Leopard2 and 648 M48A2G tanks availableto the Bundeswehr in 1991, it willneed only 672 Leopard 1 and 1712Leopard 2 tanks for the new ArmyStructure Five (without war reservestocks) (Bundesrepublik Deutsch-land, 1994, Attachment 7)—the Ger-man government may store at leastsome valuable surplus NVA equip-ment for possible future export andhas primarily scrapped older NVAweapons in each category to meet itscommitments. Originally thedestruction of substantial numbersof modern GDR equipment hadbeen planned (Wehrdienst, 1322/1992, p.4).

Combat aircraft serve as a goodexample. Under CFE, Germany hadto scrap about 140 aircraft and con-tracted with a subsidiary of DASA,Elbe-Flugzeugwerke in Dresden.The destruction has since then beencompleted. All aircraft destroyedwere older Mig-21 models; not oneMig-23, Su-22 or even Mig-29 hasbeen scheduled for destruction. Atthe end of 1993, 24 Mig-29s werekept in service with the Bundeswehr,while more than 139 aircraft wereeither scheduled for export orawaiting a decision. These includedmost of the later-production Mig-21sas well as all available Mig-23s andSU-22 fighter bombers.

Spare parts deliveries (selection)Spare parts deliveries (selection)Spare parts deliveries (selection)Spare parts deliveries (selection)Spare parts deliveries (selection)

Source: Marinekommando Rostock, 1993, p.3.

* 38 spare tubes AK-230 (30mm naval air defense gun)* 51 tubes AK-725 (naval AD-gun)* 3 30mm AD-guns AK-230 A* 2 30mm AD-guns training* 2 30mm AD-guns AK-230 B* 7320 link for 30mm ammunition* 44 spare tubes AK-725* 34 spare tubes AK 230* 3 gun mounts for 30mm AK-230 A* 2 gun mounts for 30mm AK-230 B

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Some weapon systems may be usedas targets on Bundeswehr trainingranges. In some cases, this will affectsubstantial numbers; for example,104 T-72 MBTs, 86 PT-76s and 502S1 self-propelled howitzers wereallocated for use as live targets by theend of 1993 (Bundesministerium derVerteidigung, 6 April 1994, p.13).

AmmunitionAmmunitionAmmunitionAmmunitionAmmunition

Roughly 300,000 tons of ammuni-tion were inherited from the NVAby the Bundeswehr. While govern-ment and media reports concentrateon successful new technologies fordismantling ammunition, analysisshows that at least one-third andmaybe more than 40 percent of theformer NVA’s ammunition stockshave already been exported or aredesignated for export. The muni-tions available at the time of unif-ication were listed by the NVA asbelonging to the categories in thetable below.

The future of roughly 280,000 tonsof ammunition had to be decided.The larger portion of this ammuni-tion has been dismantled, while thesmaller part has been exported—as ageneral rule, exports took place incombination with deliveries of theweapons for which the ammunitionwas intended. Examples of suchdeliveries can be found throughoutthe tables and annexes of this paper.Not listed in these tables are theexports of ammunition (e.g.,torpedoes) to Sweden, where they

CFE, it is possible that a decision toretain some older Western equip-ment and instead destroy Easterntechnology weapons has been made.

Other Methods ofOther Methods ofOther Methods ofOther Methods ofOther Methods ofDemilitarizationDemilitarizationDemilitarizationDemilitarizationDemilitarization

Some TLEs from the former NVAhave been rendered useless in otherways. During the early months ofreunification, a number of majorweapon systems were converted intofirefighting equipment and otherheavy duty civil machinery in for-mer GDR armaments industry facil-ities for testing purposes. Severalaircraft, tanks and other types ofequipment have been demilitarizedfor static display in exhibitions inGermany and other countries(Wehrdienst 13/1993 p.3; Bundes-ministerium der Verteidigung, 6April 1994, p.13). This includesindividual sales to private collec-tions, as well.

The same procedure can be demon-strated in other areas. CFE oblig-ations are met by destroying theolder systems first: T-54s and T-55sinstead of T-72s; BTR-152s, BTR-40sand BTR-50s instead of BMP-1s orBMP-2s; 120mm mortars HM andHD-30 howitzers instead of themore capable HD-20, 2S3, RM-70 orBM-21 rocket launchers. It is not yetknown wether these more modernsystems will be dismantled later. TheNVA’s Mi-24 attack helicopters willalso not be scrapped but probablyexported, since there is no commit-ment to destroy them under CFElimits (Zellner, 1994; Bundesministe-rium der Verteidigung, 6 April 1994;Wehrdienst 3/1994, p.4).

One reason for the decision to scrapthe older technology systems mayhave been the lower expense;another reason surely was thatnewer technology weapons are easierto sell. Thus, only relatively smallnumbers of TLEs with higher mili-tary value may have to be destroyedduring the final stages of the destruc-tion period. Consequently thebudget proposal for 1995 contains areduced allocation of DM 219 mil-lion for CFE destructions (Deut-scher Bundestag, Document 13/50,Einzelplan 14, p.105; Wehrdienst 17/1994, p.1).

While it is not yet clear whetherinheriting the NVA has led to arestructuring of Germany’s plans toreduce its stockpiles according to

49B·I·C·C

CFE Related Destruction of WCFE Related Destruction of WCFE Related Destruction of WCFE Related Destruction of WCFE Related Destruction of Weapon Systems (1993)eapon Systems (1993)eapon Systems (1993)eapon Systems (1993)eapon Systems (1993)

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CFE Holdings Holdings Reduction CFE Limit Scrapped by RemarksCategory notified notified Commitment for FRG 31 December

1990 1992 calculated notified* 1993**

MBT 7,000 7,170 3,004 2,834 4,166 956 / 1,432 959 additional(2,834) MBTs

contracted

ACV/IFV 8,920 9,099 5,653 5,304 3,446 2,074/ 2,087 2014 additional(5,474) ACV/IFVs

contracted

Artillery 4,602 4,735 2,030 2,006 2,705 814 / 842 290 additional(1,897) contracted

Attack 258 256 — — 306 —Helicopter

Aircraft 1,018 1,040 140 140 900 140 / 140 140 Mig-21,(118) none

contracted

* Notified reduction commitments are given in two waysa) as reported by Hartmann (1994)b) as calculated by the author by comparing holdings in 1990 and FRG limits. The latter is shown in brackets.

** It is astonishing that two widely different sets of figures were given to Parliament in early 1994 about the numbers of weaponsdestroyed by the end of 1993: Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 6 April 1994 is in direct contradiction to DeutscherBundestag, 8 February 1994, p.3. The figure for tanks in that letter was corrected in April 1994. These data are different from those listedby Crawford, 1991. The official figures from the Bundeswehr with respect to CFE-related equipment to be destroyed have been reducedseveral times. See: Ulrich Weiser, Head of the German MoD’s Planning Staff, quoted in Defense News (25 March 1991, p.61), as sayingthat “4,500 main battle tanks, 6,000 armored vehicles, 50 armed helicopters and 150 combat aircraft will have to be destroyed.”Additional sources: Hartmann, et al., 1992, p.397;Frank, 1992, p.31, Hartmann, et al, 1994, p 598.

50 B·I·C·C


were destroyed at Swedish Ord-nance, since environmental regula-tions did not allow Germany to doso domestically within acceptablecosts (Wehrtechnik, 21 October1991, pp. 1–3).

By 31 December 1993 a total of60,500 tons had been exported, while109,100 tons had been destroyed. Anadditional 57,400 tons were awaitingexport, while 54,100 tons wereawaiting destruction. No explan-ation is given for the difference of300 tons from the estimated total(Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidi-gungsausschuß, 6 April 1994, pp. 11-12; Annex 5).

The ammunition disposal is expectedto be finished by the end of 1995.Since, for security reasons, theBundeswehr does not intend totransport other countries’ surplusammunitions to the new facilities forammunition disposal built in the fivenew Länder, it intends to help thecompanies who developed thesetechniques to aggressively markettheir unique capabilities in othercountries.

Costs and RevenuesCosts and RevenuesCosts and RevenuesCosts and RevenuesCosts and Revenues

The income from sales of weaponsfrom former NVA stocks are used tofinance the defense budget andespecially the dismantling process,which was expected to cost aboutDM 1.5 billion. According to 1994figures the Bundeswehr predicted theearnings from sales would totalroughly DM 1.5 billion by 1997. Asthe process of ridding the Bundes-wehr of NVA equipment is sched-uled to end in 1996, this is also theestimate for the overall total.

Ammunition Stocks of the NVAmmunition Stocks of the NVAmmunition Stocks of the NVAmmunition Stocks of the NVAmmunition Stocks of the NVAAAAA

Category of Ammunition Types Metric Tons

ArmySmall Arms Ammunition 92 58,600Artillery/Grenade Launchers 87 52,900Rocket Launchers 6 23,600AD-guns and SP-AD guns 17 21,800Tanks, AFV, IFV 63 66,000AT-Weapons 12 18,000Guided AT-Missiles 8 1,500Short Range AD-Missiles 4 500Hand Grenades 9 8,000Engineer Ammunition 66 16,000 850,000 AT-mines 500,000 Directional MinesAdditional munitions & parts 25 3,000

Air and Air Defense Forces1080 Air Defense Missiles 3 4,37817,564 Air-to-Air Missiles 10 2,429711 Air-to-Surface Missiles 7 406177,346 Air-to-Surface Rockets 8 1,656Bombs 15 1,290Ammunition for Aircraft Guns 5 886

Naval ForcesNaval Arty/Naval AD-guns 5 2,909Naval Mines 6 2,208Depth Bombs 2 1,785Large explosives/Torpedoes/Parts 5 685

Pyrotechnical AmmunitionSignals/Light 68 6,000Smoke/Fog 9 898

Total 295,430

Sources: Machon, 1991, p.38; Heckmann, 1990, p.76. While the Bundeswehr first usedfigures significantly lower than the NVA numbers (Preißler, 1991), it returned to theNVA estimates and continues to use them. In some cases, the Bundeswehr estimated theammunition heritage to be even larger, i.e., 350,000 tons. See: Erbe, 1991, p.413.

In addition to category 1 weapon systems, the Bundeswehr initially intended to use about30,000, then 16,400, metric tons of NVA ammunition. This figure was reduced toapproximately 14,000 tons. No lower figure has since been given publicly, although thenumber of NVA weapon systems in Bundeswehr use has been consistently reduced.

51B·I·C·C

The German MoD hopes to finishmanaging the NVA’s heritage by theend of 1996. In 1994, several initia-tives were begun to make this arealistic date. Whole storage sitescontaining old NVA equipmenthave been offered to civil industrieswilling to empty them and scrap therest of the equipment still available.Companies accepting these offerswill receive the infrastructure plusguards paid by the government forthe time in which they committhemselves to emptying a site.

From a Bundeswehr perspective,there is another good reason forspeeding up the process of managingthe NVA’s heritage. The Bundes-wehr already must prepare itself forthe next round of reductions ofweapons and equipment in service.In the post-Cold War era, its man-power has been reduced to 370,000soldiers; a reduction to 340,000 hasbeen decided and further cuts—possibly to less than 300,000 sol-diers—will have to be made duringthe next years if no significantincreases in the defense budget aredecided. Constant pressure exists onthe defense budget, leading to theinvestments share falling from aCold War third of the budget to afifth under current conditions. Withnew reductions, substantial numbersof weapon systems will again be-come available as surplus weapons.The reduced Bundeswehr will nolonger need them, and has neitherthe manpower to operate nor themoney to stockpile and maintainthem for long periods. They willtherefore fuel the surplus weaponsmarket.

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Year Income from Sales (in DM)

1990–1993 595,100,0001994 535,300,000*1995 278,300,000*1996 92,100,000*1997 16,000,000*

Total 1,516,800,000*

Estimated Earnings from Selling NVEstimated Earnings from Selling NVEstimated Earnings from Selling NVEstimated Earnings from Selling NVEstimated Earnings from Selling NVA Equip-A Equip-A Equip-A Equip-A Equip-mentmentmentmentment(Official estimate for 1990–1997)(Official estimate for 1990–1997)(Official estimate for 1990–1997)(Official estimate for 1990–1997)(Official estimate for 1990–1997)

* Estimate.

Sources: Wehrdienst 13/1994, p.4; Wehrdienst 17/1994, p. 1. At the end of 1993, DM903 million had been spent (DM 170 million for storage and safeguarding; DM 733million for destruction). In the budget for 1995, the estimated costs for destruction ofweapons have been reduced by DM 209 million to DM 178 million, because of reducedneeds to scrap weapons and equipment. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, FüS IV 2,1994, p.5. The figures given by the Bundeswehr for 1990 to 1993 sales are contradictory,since in another document (Wehrdienst, 13/1994, p.4) the total given was only DM 338million for the same period.

52 B·I·C·C



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Deutscher Bundestag. 1993.Document 12/6512. Bonn.28 December.

________. 1994. Antwort desBundesministeriums der Verteidi-gung auf die schriftliche Anfrage derAbg. Katrin Fuchs vom 21.1.1994.Bonn. 8 February, p.3.

________. 1991. Bericht derBundesregierung zur Überlassungvon Wehrmaterial aus Beständen derehemaligen NVA an Israel zurtechnischen Auswertung. Bonn.2 December.

________. Document 12/1448.Bonn.

________. Document 12/1820.Bonn. December 1991.

________. Document 12/1999.Bonn.

________. Document 12/2026.Bonn. 31 January 1992.

________. Document 13/50. Bonn.Attachment Einzelplan 14 (DefenseBudget).

________. 1994. Kurzprotokollder 24. Sitzung des UnterausschussesStreitkräfte in den neuen Bundeslän-dern. Bonn. 21 January.

________. 1991. Protokoll der 5.Sitzung des UnterausschussesStreitkräftefragen in den neuenBundesländern am 2.9.1991. Bonn.September.

________. 1994. Unterausschuß‘Streitkräftefragen in den neuenBundesländern,’ 7. Bericht an denVerteidigungsausschuß. Bonn. 2April.

________. 1992. Unterausschuß‘Streitkräftefragen in den neuenBundesländern,’ Sekretariat: Zahlen-angaben Bundeswehr in den neuenBundesländern. Bonn. 11 May.

Deutscher Bundestag. Verteidigungs-ausschuß. 1994. Bericht der Bundesre-gierung über den Fortgang derVerwertung von früherem NVA-Material. Bonn. 6 April.

________. 1991. Bericht zur Lage derBundeswehr in den neuen Bundeslän-dern. Bonn. 19 December.

________. 1991. Fragen und Antwor-ten zum Bericht zur Überlassung vonWehrmaterial aus Beständen derehemaligen NVA an Israel zum Zweckder technischen Auswertung vom2.12.1991. Bonn. 10 December.

53B·I·C·C

Deutscher Bundestag. Verteidigungs-ausschuß. Unterausschuß ‘Streitkräfte-fragen in den neuen Bundeländern,’Protokoll der 18. Sitzung. Bonn.

Dohnany, Johannes V. 1993. “Kor-vetten für Djakarta.” Die Woche. 18February.

Dudde, Lars-Martin. 1994. “VerirrteTorpedos.” Die Woche. 20 January.

Erbe, Jürgen. 1991. “Entsorgung vonWehrmaterial.” Soldat und Technik.June.

Feldmayer, Karl. 1992. “Kampf-schiffe für Indonesien.” FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung. 24 July.

Foss, Christopher. 1995. “Ex-German Leopards delivered toSweden.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. Vol.23, No. 1, p.13.

Frank, Hans. 1992. “Vernichtungvon Wehrmaterial nach den Bestim-mungen des KSE-Vertrages.” Jahr-buch für Wehrtechnik. Koblenz. Vol.21.

Gießmann, Hans Joachim. 1992. Dasunliebsame Erbe. Baden-Baden.

Goldbach, J. 1990. “Bericht überAbrüstung und Konversion amRunden Tisch Militärreform.”Forschung für den Frieden. January.

Hartmann, Rüdiger, et al. 1992.Kommentar zum Vertrag überkonventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa.Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik. March, SWP-S-375.

Hartmann, Rüdiger, et al. DerVertrag über konventionelle Streit-kräfte in Europa. Baden-Baden.

Heckmann, Erhart. 1990.“Munitionsentsorgung bei derNVA.” Wehrtechnik. October.

________. 1989. “NATO-Verteidigungshilfe—auch Hilfe fürdie deutsche Industrie.” Wehr-technik. May.

Heyden, Joachim. 1990. “Tech-nisch-Wirtschaftliche Aspekte derAusrüstung und Neuordnunggesamtdeutscher Streitkräfte.”Wehrtechnik. November, p.62.

Kolbow/Stoltenberg. 1992. Ques-tions asked by Walter Kolbow on23 January and answers providedby Secretary of DefenseStoltenberg on 10 February.

Machon, Christian. 1991. “Dieehemalige NVA und die Konver-sion- eine abschließende Zusam-menfassung.” Mediatus. SpecialEdition 1 (based on NVAdatabases).

Marinekommando Rostock.1993. Schreiben an die MSDG-Außenstelle Peenenünde. March.

Ministerium für NationaleVerteidigung (DDR)/MAV.1990. “Auskunftsangaben überdie Nationale Volksarmee, Stand1.1.1990.” Material für denRunden Tisch Militärreform beimVerteidigungsministerium derDDR. Berlin.

Mierzwa, Roland. 1993.“Rüstungshandel der Bundesrepu-blik nach dem zweiten Golf-krieg.” Probleme des Friedens.April, pp. 59-69.

Ministerium für Abrüstung undVerteidigung (DDR). 1990.Ausdruck aus der Datenbank desMinisteriums. Strausberg, 30 June.3 pages (author’s archive).

“NVA-Waffen zur UNO.” [1994].Der Spiegel. 29/1994.

Opall, Barbara. 1991. “German Aidto Israel Includes Two DolphinSubs.” Defense News. 25 February.

Preißler, Ingo. 1991. “StoltenbergsRechnekünstler rüsten ab.” BerlinerZeitung. 18 November.

Scheuer, Thomas. 1992. “Schalcksdubiosae Dreiecksbeziehungen.”Die Tageszeitung. 25 April.

Schibli, Peter. 1992. “Die Bundes-wehr wird zum Waffenhändler.”Baseler Zeitung. 29 July.

Schmalz, Peter. 1992. “Kriegsmari-ne im Schlußverkauf.” Die Welt.25 February.

Schönbohm, Jörg. 1992. “Deutschekommen zu Deutschen.” In DieterFarwick. Ein Staat—Eine Armee.Frankfurt/Bonn.

Schulte, Heinz. 1990. “NVAequipment to be scrapped.” Jane’sDefence Weekly. 3 November.

Thielbeer, S. 1992. “Deutsch-finnisches Waffengeschäft.”Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.13 June.

United Nations General Assembly.1992 . UN Register of ConventionalArms. Report of the Secretary-General. Reports from Germany.

Vielain, Heinz. 1991. “DubioseGeschäfte von Offizieren derNVA.” Welt am Sonntag. 27 July.

Wehrdienst. Vol. 1990-1994.

Zellner, Wolfgang. 1994. DieVerhandlungen über konventionelleStreitkräfte in Europa. Baden-Baden.

Ziller, Peter. 1994. “Bonn trägt beiRüstungsexport hohes Risiko.”Frankfurter Rundschau.16 February.

Computer printouts from theGerman MoD, dated 6 December1991: “Golfkrieg/Ausbildung” and“Technische Auswertung.”Archives of a journalist colleague.

NVNVNVNVNVAAAAA

54 B·I·C·C


Annex 1Annex 1Annex 1Annex 1Annex 1

Main Equipment of the NVMain Equipment of the NVMain Equipment of the NVMain Equipment of the NVMain Equipment of the NVA—WA—WA—WA—WA—West and East German Accountingest and East German Accountingest and East German Accountingest and East German Accountingest and East German AccountingDifferencesDifferencesDifferencesDifferencesDifferences

Type of Equipment GDR listing FRG listing Difference Remarks

TanksMBT T-72 549 551 + 2 FRG numbers vary*MBT T-55/T-55A 1,480 1,589 + 109 FRG numbers vary,

partially explainedMBT T-54 193 198 + 5 FRG numbers vary

Armored and Armed VehiclesAFV BMP-1 1,112 1,133 + 21 FRG numbers varyAFV BMP-2 24 24APC SPW 40P 299APC SPW 40P2 1,579 1,158 - 421 FRG numbers vary,

partially explainedAPC SPW 50 PK 199 154 - 45 partially explainedAPC SPW 60 PA/PB 1,468 1,455 - 11 FRG numbers varyAPC SPW 70 1,266 1,254 - 12APC SPW 152 W1/K 759 717 - 42 FRG numbers varyAFV PT 76 120 142 + 22 FRG numbers varyARV BRM1 K 15 10 - 5 FRG numbers varyArm. multi-purpose veh. MT-LB 529

Artillery SystemsCannon 85mm 225 180 - 45Cannon 100mm 267 255 - 12Cannon 130mm 175 137 - 38Howitzer 122mm M-30 407 405 - 2 FRG numbers varyHowitzer 122mm D-30 395 394 - 1 FRG numbers varyHowitzer cannon 152 mm D-20 137 137SPH SFL 2S1 122mm 374 372 - 2 FRG numbers varySPH SFL 2S3 152mm 96 95 - 1Rocket launcher RM-70 265 261 - 4 FRG numbers varyRocket launcher BM-21 58 59 + 1Missile launcher LUNA 48 69 + 21Missile launcher Totschka 8Missile launcher SS-23 —- —- four with 24 mslMsl transport vehicle Totschka 26Msl transport vehicle LUNA M 94Grenade launcher 82mm 491 479 - 12Grenade launcher 120mm/SANI 291 296 + 5 FRG numbers vary

55B·I·C·C

Air-Defense Systems

Launcher SM-65 Dwina 48eight complexesLauncher SM-90 Wolchow 17430 complexesLauncher 5P71/73 Newa 40ten complexesLauncher 5P72 S-200 24two complexesLauncher 5P85 S-300 12one complexLauncher ‘Krug’ 42Launcher ‘Kub’ 107Launcher ‘OSA-AK’ 41Msl transport vehicle ‘Krug’ 240Msl transport vehicle ‘Kub’ 219Msl transport vehicle ‘OSA-AK’ 42Portable SAM - Strela-2 1,896Portable SAM IGLA 75 75ZU 23 mm twin AD-gun 924ZSU 23/4 Schilka AD-gun 128 99 - 29

Anti-Tank Systems

AT missile launch vehicle 9P110 48AT missile launch vehicle 9P122 54 50 - 4AT missile launch vehicle 9 P133 156 169 + 13AT missile launch vehicle 9P148 52 48 - 4AT missile launcher for FAGOT 419 393 - 28AT missile launcher for METIS 31 20 - 11

Light Armssee Appendix 2

HelicoptersMi-24 attack helicopter 51 51Mi-8 TB armed helicopter 36 n.a.(see below)Mi-14 PL special helicopter 8 8(Haze)Mi-14 BT special helicopter 6 6(Haze)Mi-9 special helicopter 8 8Mi-2 transport helicopter 25 25Mi-8 transport helicopter 54 93 + 3 FRG counts

all Mi-8 here

AnnexAnnexAnnexAnnexAnnex

56 B·I·C·C


AircraftMig-21 251 251Mig-23 47 45 - 2 difference

explainedMig-29 24 24Mig-23 BN 18 18SU-22 54 54L-39 training aircraft 52 52AN-2 transport aircraft 18 n.a.AN-26 transport aircraft 12 12L-410 transport aircraft 12 12TU-134 transport aircraft 3 3TU-154 transport aircraft 2 2IL-62 transport aircraft 3 3Z-43 aircraft 12 n.a.

Naval Weapon SystemsKoni Class frigate (1159) 3 3OSA missile corvette (205) 12 12Tarantul missile corvette (1241) 5 5Balcom 10 missile boats (151) 1 3 + 2 difference

explainedKondor I minesweeper/ 1 + 1 differencepatrol boats explainedKondor II minesweeper (89.2) 20 20

* Indicates that at different times, different figures for the holdings of this item have been given by the Bundeswehr.

Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026, 1992, Annex 1; Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1820, 1991; Wehrdienst 41/1993, p.4; Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (der DDR), 1990 (author’s archive). Where no figure for the Bundeswehraccounting system is listed, the author could not find one.

‘Small Firearms’ are a good exampleof the confusion about data, whichconsists of two parts:

1. The Definition P1. The Definition P1. The Definition P1. The Definition P1. The Definition ProblemroblemroblemroblemroblemNVA and GDR figures calculatingsmall firearms probably include AK-47s, AK-74s, 9mm pistols, the sniperand automatic rifles plus the ma-chine guns, and thus roughly total1.2 million weapons at the beginningof 1990—i.e., at a time when the pro-cess of bringing stocks from outsidethe NVA into NVA custody wasongoing.

FRG and Bundeswehr figuresinclude in addition the AGS-17grenade launcher and the 40mmLAW RPG-7, but for unknownreasons list the sniper rifle only until

January 1992. Because the holdingsof these weapons were not verylarge, Bundeswehr totals also werearound 1.2 million.

West German Heckler & Koch sub-machine guns, machine guns andsniper rifles illegally exported to theGDR do not appear in either defin-ition. This also appears to be true fora small number of submachine guns,‘Skorpion,’ which were mentionedwhen taken into Bundeswehr stocks.

2. The Accounting P2. The Accounting P2. The Accounting P2. The Accounting P2. The Accounting ProblemroblemroblemroblemroblemNeither the NVA nor the Bundes-wehr figures used publicly may beviewed as reliable. The problem withthe NVA figures is related to their

obtainment during the ongoing pro-cess of bringing in stocks from otherarmed groupings in the GDR—totaling some 518,220 weaponsaccording to GDR definitions—which did not allow a complete fig-ure for small firearms to exist withinthe NVA before the Bundeswehrtakeover started. It may have been aslow as about 700,000 weapons, but itmay have been much higher, be-tween 1 and 1.2 million weapons.

The Bundeswehr/FRG figures mayalso be completely artificial, sincethe accounting was accomplishedduring the process of scrapping andexporting these weapons—this givesthe Bundeswehr complete freedomto list or not list weapons withoutsupervising control. To make the

57B·I·C·C

Annex 2Annex 2Annex 2Annex 2Annex 2Small Firearms in NVSmall Firearms in NVSmall Firearms in NVSmall Firearms in NVSmall Firearms in NVA StockpileA StockpileA StockpileA StockpileA Stockpile

Light Arms GDR FRG 1992 Difference FRG 1994 Remarks

Machine guns 42,526 40,991 - 1,535 55,575

Sniper rifles 1,749 1,509 - 240 n.a. listed by FRGonly in1992

Submachine gun 705,032 731,050 + 25,988 783,217 FRG numbers7.62mm AK-47 vary

Submachine gun 163,039 163,039 171,9255.45 mm AK-74

Pistol 9mm 267,125 270,681 + 3,556 266,537 diff. caused byFRG

Automatic rifle 3,518 3,862 + 344 4,279

Automatic grenade 184 173 - 11 651launcher AGS-17

Light assault 26,526 26,346 - 180 22,032weapons RPG 7

LAW RPG 18 n.a. n.a.

problem worse, even the Bundes-wehr figures given after the processof scrapping and exporting weaponswas completed are inconclusive, andcontradict other Bundeswehr reportsabout exports. Thus, the Bundes-wehr figures are likely not trust-worthy as well. According to thefinal figures published by theBundeswehr in 1994, the unifiedGermany had scrapped 891,217 smallfirearms, retained 4,784 and exportedanother 408,215 weapons of thiscategory (according to the FRGdefinitions). But after cross-checkingwith the individual exports reportedofficially beforehand, this figureproves to be too low:

a minimum of 303,934 AK-47s hasbeen exported to Turkey

a minimum of 4,996 RPG-7s hasbeen exported to Turkey

a minimum of 2,491 light machineguns has been exported to Turkey

100,000 AK-47s have beenexported to Finland.

This already adds up to more than411,000 small fire arms exported,excluding lower numbers that wereexported to many other countries aswell as additional substantial

exports—for example, another 2,500heavy machine guns for Turkeywere under consideration and wereat least partially delivered by the endof March 1994.

The minimum number of small fire-arms in NVA stockpiles was there-fore about 1.3 million; the highestpossible figure may have beenaround 1.7 million.

Sources: Goldbach, 1990, p.124f.;Ministerium für NationaleVerteidigung(DDR)/MAV, 1990;Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026, 1992; Bundesministerium derVerteidigung, RüZ II,2, 1994; Deut-scher Bundestag, Verteidigungs-ausschuß, 6 April 1994; Scheuer, 1992.


58 B·I·C·C


Annex 3Annex 3Annex 3Annex 3Annex 3NVNVNVNVNVA equipment delivered to Greece and TA equipment delivered to Greece and TA equipment delivered to Greece and TA equipment delivered to Greece and TA equipment delivered to Greece and TurkeyurkeyurkeyurkeyurkeyPPPPPart I: NVart I: NVart I: NVart I: NVart I: NVA Equipment Exported to TA Equipment Exported to TA Equipment Exported to TA Equipment Exported to TA Equipment Exported to Turkeyurkeyurkeyurkeyurkey

Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered*

Light MGs 2,500 2,491Ammunition for Light MG 132,000,000 ?Field hospital 3 3Light assault weapons RPG-7 12,000; later 5,000 4,996Ammunition for RPG 7 250,000 197,139

APC BTR/SPW-60 PB 300 300Ammunition 14.5mm for BTR-60 cannon 30,000,000 4,993,228Ammunition 7.62mm for BTR-60 MG 30,000,000 30,000,000Machine pistols Kalashnikov 256,125 303,934Ammunition for Kal. M-43 100,000,000 83,000,000

Heavy MGs 2,500 222Ammunition for Heavy MG 132,000,000 23,878,000Mine clearance equip. KMT-5 20 20RPG-18 100,000 one delivery canceledTrucks (ac fuel) Tatra 815 CA 15 50Trucks (ac fuel) Tatra 815 CA 16 100Decontamination equip. VariousTrucks (fire bdes) Tatra 38

Steel helmets 500,000 500,000Trucks Tatra 800 perhaps canceledTrucks (POL) Tatra 148 CA-17 30 perhaps canceledMissiles unnamed 100Bombs with fuz unnamed 100

Equipment, other various small incl. 5 SAMs, etc.Trucks POL Tatra 100Mine laying equip. (mech) 3 unknownTank transporter Ural 4320 C 90 unknownField hospitals 3 unknown

Bridging equipment 3 unknown

* Examples for deliveries listed for October 1990 until March, early April 1994

59B·I·C·C

PPPPPart II: NVart II: NVart II: NVart II: NVart II: NVA Equipment Exported to GreeceA Equipment Exported to GreeceA Equipment Exported to GreeceA Equipment Exported to GreeceA Equipment Exported to Greece


Search and Rescue Boat RSB 5 5River engineer boats BMK-103 M 4 4AD-gun 23mm ZU-23 316 306Ammunition 23mm 8,000,000 8,000,000Ammunition 23 mm 4,500,000 294,928

Self-propelled AD guns ZSU 23/4 120 unclear whethercanceled

or 72 deliveredACV BMP-1 500 501Ammunition 73mm three types 200,000 140,000Rocket launcher RM-70 150 158Ammunition 122mm for RM-70 200,000 205,000

Air defense msl systems OSA-AK 3 3 (with12 launchers)

AD-missiles 9 K-33 M2 408, later more 924and 3

LAW RPG-18 21,500 21,675AT-missiles 9 M-111 and 11,500 7,051

9 M-111MAmmunition 7.62mm M-39 and 40,000,000 5,473,712

M-43

Ammunition 7.62mm M-39 16,210,228 16,210,228Light trucks UAZ 469 B 2,000 292Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CA 20Trucks Ural D 375 1,000MT-LB unknown at least 1

Multi-purpose towing veh. ABPC 500 probably canceledBridging equipment Ribbon 8Electrical generators GAB-2, 200

GAD-40 etc.Field kitchens 650Camouflage nets different types 230,000 114,357

NBC-protection masks 260,000 260,000Trucks LO 2002 A 56 56Additional equipment different types small small

* Examples of deliveries listed for October 1990 until March/April 1994


60 B·I·C·C



Air defense guns 20mm twin gun 300 300Ammunition AD gun 20mm 1 DM-81 4,000 4,000Ammunition AD gun 20mm 4 DM-101 16,000 16,000Steel helmets 500,000 500,000 (NVA?)Main battle tanks Leopard 1 85 + 85 170

APC M-113 350 + 137 537Bridge-laying tanks M-48 10 + 10 20Engineer tanks M-48 A2G1 20 20ARV tanks M-88 20 20Ammunition 105mm DM-23 KE 100,000 100,000

Ammunition 105mm DM-456 HEAT 15,000 15,000Surface to Air Missiles Redeye 300 300Howitzers 203mm M110 131 131Ammunition 203mm HE 30,000 30,000Ammunition 203mm Bomblet 9,900 9,900

Ammunition 175mm DM-12 and DM-21 68,004 68,004AA-missiles Sidewinder AIM 9B 1,000 1,000Ammunition 40mm for L70 DM-28 138,000 138,000Ammunition 40mm for L70 DM-31 257,000 257,000AD guns L-70 260 260

RPV-systems CL-89 unspecified unspecifiedAircraft RF-4 46 46

Bundeswehr equipment delivered to Greece and TBundeswehr equipment delivered to Greece and TBundeswehr equipment delivered to Greece and TBundeswehr equipment delivered to Greece and TBundeswehr equipment delivered to Greece and Turkeyurkeyurkeyurkeyurkey

PPPPPart III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Tart III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Tart III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Tart III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Tart III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Turkeyurkeyurkeyurkeyurkey

* Examples for Deliveries listed for October 1990 until April 1994

61B·I·C·C

PPPPPart IVart IVart IVart IVart IV: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Greece: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Greece: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Greece: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Greece: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Greece


Support ship Class 701 1 1Landing boats Class 521 11 11Landing boats Class 520 2 2Harbor tug Class 723 5 5Torpedo recovery vessel Class 430 2 2 (plus 2

delivered earlier)

Tetis Class corvettes Class 420 5 5FPB Class 148 2 2Machine gun MG-3 75 75AD guns 20mm 20mm twin gun 546 546Ammunition 20mm DM-101 1,092,000 1,092,000

Ammunition 20mm DM-81 1,092,000 1,092,000Aircraft RF-4 E 20 (plus 7 20 (plus 7

in spares) in spares)Aircraft F-104 G 12 (plus 12 (plus

more earlier) more earlier)Naval mines DM-21/DM-39 n.a. 150Machine guns MG-3 and MG-3 A1 675 675

Howitzers M-110 (203mm) 88 72Main battle tanks Leopard 1 GR2 75 75ARV M-88 25 25Tank (bridging) 10 10APC M-113 200 200Camouflage nets different types 230,000 114,357

* Examples of deliveries listed for October 1990 until April 1994

Sources: Bundesministerium der Verteidung, 15 April 1994, Attachment (an older version of this computer printout from the MoD,dating from 2 December 1993, was used to check the reliability); Wehrdienst 1315/1992 pp. 2-4; Wehrdienst 28/1993, p.4; Wehrdienst13/1993, p.2; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 22 February 1991.


62 B·I·C·C


Type of Equipment Number Year Recipient RemarksDelivered

AT-missiles and launchers about 20 n.a. France different types,partly on vehicles,delivery intended

Small fire arms different typesSS-missile Frog-7 2 France intended for deliveryTelecommunications equip. various France probably deliveredIFF-Systems SRZO-2 3 1990 IsraelSSM P-15 1 1990 IsraelSSM P-21 1 1990 IsraelSSM P-22 1 1990 IsraelAir-to-air missiles 7 or 8 1990 Israel AA-8, AA-10a

and b, AA-11 and AA-7were available

Air-to-surface missiles 6 1990 Israel likely CH-25ML,MR; CH-29L,T

and CH-58Äwere available

Radar for Mig-29 1 1990 Israel returned in 1991SAM SA-5 Seeker 1 1990 Israel(warhead)SAM SA-13 3 1990 Israel likely to have included

launcher vehicleSpares T-72 tank 1990/1991 IsraelFROG-7 warheads n.a. 1990 Israel two types availableMine clearance Israel EMT-7 and KMT-6equip. most likely includedRange finders 3 IsraelLaser recon. 1 Israelsystem LPR-1Radar ‘Big Fred’ 1 1990 or 1991 IsraelAT-missiles 15 1991 Israel AT-3,-4 and 5 availableSA-16 Israel launcher and missilesAP- and AT-mines ca 100 1991 Israel

Spares Mig-23 1 1991 Israel included engine,ext. tanks

Torpedo SAET 40 2 1991 IsraelECM-Pod 1 1991 IsraelSA-6 reconnaissance 1 1991/1992 Israel intercepted in+ fire control HamburgSA-6 launch vehicle 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Long track radar P40 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)

adv. ECCM sys.AD-gun ZSU 23/4 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Schilka maintenance 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)vehicle


Examples of NVExamples of NVExamples of NVExamples of NVExamples of NVA Deliveries for TA Deliveries for TA Deliveries for TA Deliveries for TA Deliveries for Technical Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, Testing andesting andesting andesting andesting andEvaluation PurposesEvaluation PurposesEvaluation PurposesEvaluation PurposesEvaluation Purposes

63B·I·C·C

Truck KRAZ 214 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Truck KRAZ B-255 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg; msl trsp.

veh. P21 P22and missiles ?)

Truck Zil 157 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)msl trsp. veh. P15

Truck Zil 131 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)msl trsp. veh. P15

Truck GAZ 66 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Light truck UAZ 469 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Spares for BMP-2 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Spares for BMP-1 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Chaff and flares launcher 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg)Mine clearance equip. EMT-7 2 1990 UKAT-missiles 1991 UK AT-4 and AT-7Small arms 27 1991 UK different typesFighterbomber SU-22 M4 1 1991 UKSSM P21 with seeker warhead 1 1991 UKSSM P22 with seeker warhead 1 1991 UKMissile launcher RUBESH 1 1991 UKTorpedo SAET-40 2 1991 UKNaval mines 1991 UK different typesChaff and flare dispenser PK-16 1 1991 UKAD-gun AK-630 1 1991 UKSSM P-15 1 1991 UKFighter bomber Mig-23BN 1 1992 UKSSM P21/P22 1 1992 NL one eachTorpedo SAET-40 1 1992 NLFROG-7 SS-missile system 1 1992 USA launcher,

four msl, two warheads

Mine clearance equip. KMT-6 1 1991 USAMine clearance equip. EMT-7 2 1991 USAFunkstörgranate DZW 90 12 1991 USA different typesAP-mines PMP-2 192 1991 USAAT-mines TM-46 120 1991 USAAT-mines TM-62 M 128 1991 USAAT-mines TM-62 P3 112 1991 USASA-13 missile 6 1991 USASA-8 missile 12 1991 USABattlefield surv. radar 1RL232 1 1991 USAAcc. measurem. sys. AZK-5 1 1991 USAAAM AA-8 1 1990 USAAAM AA-10 1 1990 USA


64 B·I·C·C


Note: Most deliveries to Israel listed here are widely confirmed; additional Israeli requests have been approved since the end of 1991;probably additional deliveries not listed have been taking place. All deliveries to Israel are loans. Information on France is somewhatuncertain since parliament was informed only during preparations for delivery. UK information seems to be solid although more mayhave been supplied; US information is probably reliable.

Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, 2 December 1991; Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 10 December 1991; Kolbow/Stoltenberg,1992; Gießmann, 1992, pp. 235-237; notes by journalist colleagues cross-checked by interviews with members of parliament and theirresearchers. UK and US information is mainly based on two detailed computer printouts (archives of a journalist colleague), GermanMoD, 6 December 1991; also, United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993.

AAM AA-11 2 1990/1991 USAAAM AA-7 Guidance 1 1991 USAMig-29 fighter ac. 1 1991 USA returnedMig-29 engines 2 1991 USAMig-29 pilot helmet 1 1991 USASpares package for SU-22 1 1991 USASSM P21 with seeker warhead 1 1991 USASSM P22 with seeker warhead 1 1991 USASAM SA-5 missiles ? ? USA plannedASM CH-25 3 1990 USA three typesASM CH-29 2 1990 USA two typesASM CH-58 6 1991 USAASM CH-25 2 1991 USATarantul Class corvette 1 1991 USAMI-14 Haze helicopter 2 1991 USA Naval ASW versionNaval mines 11 1992 USA different typesAD-gun AK-630 1 1992 USATorpedo SAET 40 2 1992 USAChaff and flare dispenser PK-16 1 1992 USA

65B·I·C·C

Type of Equipment Number Year Remarks

T-72 MBT 59 1991T-72 MBT 27 1993T-55 MBT 11 1991BMP-1 AFV 19 1991BMP-2 AFV 15 1991BMP 2 1993MB-LT 14 1991MTP-LB 3 1991BTR-70 5 1991BTR-70 2 1993BTR-60 PB 3 1991BTR-50 PK 1 1991BTR-40 P2 2 1991BTR-40 with 9 P148 AT-system 5 1991122mm howitzer D-30 1 1991152mm howitzer D-20 2 1991SPH 2S1 5 1991SPH 2S1 6 1993SPH 2S3 5 1991SPH 2S3 4 1993RM-70 MRL 2 1991BM-21 MRL 4 1991AKLPz BRDM-1K 2 1991BM-24 2 1991100mm canon (AT) 7 1991Mig-23 ML/MLD aircraft 5 1991Mig 23 9 1993SU-22 M4 aircraft 2 1991Su-22 2 1993Mi-24 helicopters 2 1991Mi-24 1 1992SAM 9M33M3 72 1991SAM launcher 9A 338 12 1991120mm grenade launcher 1 1991Ammunitions small 1991 100mm, 125mm, 122mm,

various versionsTrucks 1991 variousGuided missiles 182 1992 various, not specified, NVA

possibly

Examples of Deliveries to the United States for TExamples of Deliveries to the United States for TExamples of Deliveries to the United States for TExamples of Deliveries to the United States for TExamples of Deliveries to the United States for Training Purposesraining Purposesraining Purposesraining Purposesraining Purposes

Note: Officially most of these deliveries have been categorized as being intended “for training purposes.” It may be assumed that theyhave served technical intelligence purposes as well. They represent NVA army equipment otherwise not listed in the technicalintelligence context. In addition, some items listed here have been exported in such small amounts that they may have been used fortechnical intelligence purposes but probably not for training purposes.

Sources: United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993; Wehrdienst 13/1993, p.4; Berliner Zeitung, 17 January 1992; computerprintout from the German MoD, “Ausbildung,” 6 December 1991 (archives of a jounalist colleage); Der Spiegel 47/991, p.26;Gießmann, 1992, p.236.


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Examples of Additional Exports from NVExamples of Additional Exports from NVExamples of Additional Exports from NVExamples of Additional Exports from NVExamples of Additional Exports from NVA StocksA StocksA StocksA StocksA Stocks

Type of Equipment Number Year Recipient Remarks

Spares from SPH 2S1 228 1994/5 SwedenMB-LT Armored 809 ? 1992-?? Sweden 5 in 1992,

Personnel Carrier 9 in 1993T-72 MBT 5 1992 SwedenBMP-1 5 1993 Sweden plannedA/S- missiles S5 8 1992 Sweden item not

clearly identifiedT-72 MBT 8 1992 CanadaT-72 MBT 1 1992 BelgiumT-55 MBT 1 1992 BelgiumBMP-1 1 1992 BelgiumBTR-70 1 1992 BelgiumSPH 122mm 2 1992 BelgiumMig-21 1 1992 BelgiumMig-23 1 1992 BelgiumParchim Class 16 1993/94 IndonesiaFROSCH I class 12 1993/94 Indonesialanding shipsFROSCH II class 2 1993/94 Indonesiasupply shipsKondor-II Class miners 9 1993/94 IndonesiaSpares and 5,000 1993-95 Indonesia only incompleteammunition (tons) details known,

fitting with shipsElectrical generators 75 1994/95 IndonesiaField kitchens 150 1994/95 IndonesiaKondor Class 1 1991/92 Guinea demilitarized; details

details dealKondor-II Class 4 1991/2 Uruguay without weapon

systemsTug (unspecified) 1 1991 UruguayPiast Class 1 1991 UruguayMI-24 attack helicopters 30-40 1995/6 Hungary plannedMedical equipment n.a. 1992 Hungaryfor 3 co.PTS 6 1993 HungaryBremse Class CPB 2 1992 Malta BGS stocks;

corruptioninvestigated

Kondor-I Class coastal 4 1992 Tunisia BGS stockspatrol boatBremse Class CPB 5 1992 Tunisia BGS stocksKondor-I Class CPB 2 1992 Malta BGS stocks;

corruptioninvestigated

SAB-12 Class CPB 5 1992 Cyprus BGS stocksBremse Class CPB 2 1992 Jordan BGS stocksOSA Class 6 1993 Estonia partially

demilitarized

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Kondor-I Class 2 1993 Estonia partiallydemilitarized*

OSA Class 3 1993 Lithuania partiallydemilitarized

Kondor-I Class 1 1993 Lithuania partiallydemilitarized

Kondor-II Class 2 1993 Latvia partiallydemilitarized

OSA Class 3 1993 Latvia partiallydemilitarized

OSA and Kondor 4 1993 Lithuania intendedTrucks 200 1992/3 EstoniaTrucks 200 1992/3 LatviaTrucks 200 1993 Lithuania possibly not

all deliveredL-410 transport 2 1992/3 EstoniaaircraftL-410 transport 2 1993 LatviaaircraftL-410 transport 2 1993 LithuaniaaircraftTrucks 9,000 1992 CIS i.e., Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakhstan

AK-47 Kalashnikovs 100,000 Finland

MBT T-72 100 1991/2 FinlandArtillery 447 1993 Finland incl. 218 HD-30

howitzers

BMP-1 110 1993 FinlandMB-LT 3 1992 FinlandAmmunition 46,000 + Finland tonsBTR -70 149 + 149 U N for UNPROFORAK-74 1 1991 NLAK-47 1 1991 NLAK-74 1 1991 Spain with 50 rounds

ammunitionAK-47 1 1991 Spain with 50 rounds

ammunitionKM-46 130mm 92 1994/5 GR/US/ not clear frommortar FI/SW source,possibly

Finland,plannedIljuschin -62 3 1993 Egypt private

businessman

Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1820, 1991; Deutscher Bundestag, 21 January 1994, p.12; Feldmayer, 1992; Schibli, 1992;Casdorf, 1992; Der Spiegel 29/1994, p.16; Gießmann, 1992, pp. 211-248; Mierzwa, 1993, pp. 59-69; Thielbeer, 1992.Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, Unterausschuß ‘Streitkräftefragen in den neuenBundesländern,’ Protokoll der 18. Sitzung. pp.8+.


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BICC series such as report, brief andpaper are published either in English(with a German summary) or inGerman (with an English summary).

brief 1:Ksenia Gonchar,Yevgeny Kuznetsov andAlexander Ozhegov,Conversion of the Post-Soviet DefenseIndustry: Implications for RussianEconomic Development,February 1995

brief 2:Anke Habich, Werner Voß undPeter Wilke, Abhängigkeit derWerften im Ostseeraum von derRüstungsproduktion (Dependence ofShipyards in the Baltic Sea Region onDefense Production), March 1995

brief 3:Edward J. Laurance andHerbert Wulf (eds.), Coping withSurplus Weapons Systems: A Priorityfor Conversion Research, May 1995

report 1:Edward J. Laurance andHerbert Wulf, with the assistance ofJoseph DiChiaro III, Conversion andthe Integration of Economic andSecurity Dimensions, January 1995

report 2:Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse undHans-Henning Schröder, Chancenund Probleme der Rüstungskonversionin der Gemeinschaft UnabhängigerStaaten: Konversionsprofile ausgewähl-ter Regionen - Nizhnij Novgorod,Republik Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg,Republik Belarus (Problems andProspects of Defense Conversion in theCommonwealth of Independent States:Conversion Profiles of SelectedRegions—Nizhnii Novgorod,Udmurtiya, Yekaterinburg, andBelarus), March 1995

report 3:Joseph DiChiaro III, Conversion ofthe Defense Industry in Russia andEastern Europe, Proceedings of theBICC/CISAC Workshop onConversion, 10-13 August 1994

paper 1:Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma andHerbert Wulf, Demilitarization andConversion, World Social Summit,Copenhagen, March1995

paper 2:Andreas Klemmer, United Nationspublications related to the subject ofConversion: An annotatedBibliography, April 1995

forthcoming:

brief 4:Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers(eds.), Demobilization in the Horn ofAfrica, workshop proceedings (co-publihed with IRG), June 1995

BICCBICCBICCBICCBICCpublicationspublicationspublicationspublicationspublications brief 5:

Mersie Ejigu, Transnational Develop-ment Associates, Study on the Size,Structure and Demobilization ofArmed Forces in Africa

report 4:Keith Cunningham and AndreasKlemmer, Restructuring the U.S.Military Bases in Germany: Scope,Impacts and Opportunities

report 5:Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma andHerbert Wulf (eds.), The BICC Panelon the World Social Summit

report 6:Petra Opitz, Die Konversion derrussischen Rüstungsindustrie- Krisen-management, Eine vergleichendeStudie der Regionen St. Petersburg undNovosibirsk (Conversion of theRussian Defense Industry - CrisisManagement- A comparative Study onthe Regions of St. Petersburg andNovosibirsk)

Documents

Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion ... · surplus weapons. Jordi Molas-Gallart is a researcher at the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex,