Coping with Crisis - ETH ZThe Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Middle East Peace Process The traditionally most significant challenge in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict and

The Middle East:Fragility and Crisis

International Peace Academy

Markus E. Bouillon February 2007

Coping with CrisisWorking Paper Series

About the AuthorMarkus E. Bouillon leads the International Peace Academy’s Middle East Program. Previously, he served as a political affairs officer and

special assistant in the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and supported IPA President Terje Rød-

Larsen in his capacity as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004). Dr.

Bouillon holds a doctorate in international relations from St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, and an MSc in the international politics of

Asia and Africa from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He is the author of The Peace Business:

Money and Power in the Palestine-Israel Conflict (London: IB Tauris, 2004) and co-editor of Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of Conflict

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

AcknowledgementsIPA owes a great debt of thanks to its many donors to Coping with Crisis. Their support for this Program reflects a widespread demand for

innovative thinking on practical solutions to international challenges. In particular, IPA is grateful to the Governments of Australia, Belgium,

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This Working Papers Series

would also not have been possible without the support of the Greentree Foundation, which generously allowed IPA the use of the Whitney

family’s Greentree Estate for a meeting of the authors of these papers at a crucial moment in their development in October 2006.

Cover Photo: A man walking outside the Sayyidna Al-Hussein Mosque in Cairo. ©James Cockayne.

The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author and not necessarily those of IPA. IPA welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs.

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Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen i

Introduction: A Crucial Region for the World 1

The ‘Old’ Center of Gravity: The Arab-IsraeliConflict and the Middle East Peace Process 1

A New Center of Gravity? Iran and theChallenge of Nuclear Proliferation 2

A Key Challenge for Peacebuilding:Iraq and the Risk of State Failure 4

Lebanon as a Battlefield? State-Building andReconstruction 5

Longer-Term Challenges: Demography,Education, and Employment 6

Crisis of Legitimacy: Political Reform,Democratization, Political Islam, and Terrorism 7

Problem and Solution: Economic Reform,Adjustment, and Resource Management 9

Absence of Regional Coping Mechanisms:Regional Actors in the Middle East 10

International Multilateralism as aNecessary Element of Crisis Management 11

Towards a Strategy for Coping with Crisis: A Regional Security Architecture 13

Further Reading 15

CONTENTS

Foreword

Terje Rød-LarsenPresident, International Peace Academy

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is pleased to introduce a new series of Working Papers within theprogram Coping with Crisis, Conflict, and Change:The United Nations and Evolving Capacities for Managing GlobalCrises, a four-year research and policy-facilitation program designed to generate fresh thinking about globalcrises and capacities for effective prevention and response.

In this series of Working Papers, IPA has asked leading experts to undertake a mapping exercise, presentingan assessment of critical challenges to human and international security. A first group of papers provides ahorizontal perspective, examining the intersection of multiple challenges in specific regions of the world.Asecond group takes a vertical approach, providing in-depth analysis of global challenges relating to organizedviolence, poverty, population trends, public health, and climate change, among other topics. The WorkingPapers have three main objectives: to advance the understanding of these critical challenges and theirinterlinkages; to assess capacities to cope with these challenges and to draw scenarios for plausible futuredevelopments; and to offer a baseline for longer-term research and policy development.

Out of these initial Working Papers, a grave picture already emerges.The Papers make clear that commonchallenges take different forms in different regions of the world. At the same time, they show that complexityand interconnectedness will be a crucial attribute of crises in the foreseeable future.

First, new challenges are emerging, such as climate change and demographic trends. At least two billionadditional inhabitants, and perhaps closer to three billion, will be added to the world over the next fivedecades, virtually all in the less developed regions, especially among the poorest countries in Africa and Asia.As a result of climate change, the magnitude and frequency of floods may increase in many regions; floodsin coastal Bangladesh and India, for example, are expected to affect several million people.The demand fornatural resources – notably water – will increase as a result of population growth and economic develop-ment; but some areas may have diminished access to clean water.

Second, some challenges are evolving in more dangerous global configurations such as transnationalorganized crime and terrorism. Illicit and violent organizations are gaining increasing control over territory,markets, and populations around the world. Non-state armed groups complicate peacemaking efforts due totheir continued access to global commodity and arms markets. Many countries, even if they are not directlyaffected, can suffer from the economic impact of a major terrorist attack. States with ineffective andcorrupted institutions may prove to be weak links in global arrangements to deal with threats ranging fromavian flu to transnational terrorism.

Finally, as these complex challenges emerge and evolve, ‘old’ problems still persist. While the number ofviolent conflicts waged around the world has recently declined, inequality – particularly between groupswithin the same country – is on the rise.When this intergroup inequality aligns with religious, ethnic, racialand language divides, the prospect of tension rises. Meanwhile, at the state level, the number of actual andaspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is their ability to acquire weapons through illicit global trade.

As the international institutions created in the aftermath of World War II enter their seventh decade, theircapacity to cope with this complex, rapidly evolving and interconnected security landscape is being sharplytested. The United Nations has made important progress in some of its core functions – ‘keeping the peace,’providing humanitarian relief, and helping advance human development and security. However, there are

The Middle East: Fragility and Crisis

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reasons to question whether the broad UN crisis management system for prevention and response is up tothe test.

Not only the UN, but also regional and state mechanisms are challenged by this complex landscape and thenature and scale of crises. In the Middle East, for example, interlinked conflicts are complicated bydemographic and socioeconomic trends and regional institutions capable of coping with crisis are lacking.In both Latin America and Africa, ‘old’ problems of domestic insecurity arising from weak institutions andundemocratic governance intersect with ‘new’ transnational challenges such as organized crime. Overall,there is reason for concern about net global capacities to cope with these challenges, generating a growingsense of global crisis.

Reading these Working Papers, the first step in a four-year research program, one is left with a sense ofurgency about the need for action and change: action where policies and mechanisms have already beenidentified; change where institutions are deemed inadequate and require innovation. The diversity ofchallenges suggests that solutions cannot rest in one actor or mechanism alone. For example, greater multilat-eral engagement can produce a regulatory framework to combat small arms proliferation and misuse, whileprivate actors, including both industry and local communities, will need to play indispensable roles in forgingglobal solutions to public health provision and food security. At the same time, the complexity andintertwined nature of the challenges require solutions at multiple levels. For example, governments will needto confront the realities that demographic change will impose on them in coming years, while internationalorganizations such as the UN have a key role to play in technical assistance and norm-setting in areas asdiverse as education, urban planning and environmental control.

That the world is changing is hardly news.What is new is a faster rate of change than ever before and anunprecedented interconnectedness between different domains of human activity – and the crises they canprecipitate. This series of Working Papers aims to contribute to understanding these complexities and theresponses that are needed from institutions and decision-makers to cope with these crises, challenges andchange.

Terje Rød-Larsen


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Introduction: A Crucial Region forthe WorldThe Middle East is perhaps the world’s most crucialregion: economically and strategically, the Middle Eastoccupies a top rank on the international agenda, withsignificance far beyond its geographical bounds.1

In the coming five to ten years, the highestnumber of key global security challenges is likely to beconcentrated in the Middle East, or be related to it.The 2006 crises in Lebanon and Gaza, involving awide range of regional actors including Syria and Iran,may have given only a taste of what is yet to come.They certainly manifested the reality of fragility thatcharacterizes the Middle East.They also point to thenecessity of approaching conflict(s) in the Middle Eastin a holistic manner, taking full account of theinterlinkages between the various epicenters ofinstability in the region. Such interlinkages illustratethe potential for either positive or negative dominoeffects: escalation and crisis in one arena tends toevoke a spillover effect elsewhere in the region and inthe relations of regional actors with the internationalcommunity, or individual international actors. Inaddition, longer-term trends that affect most or allMiddle Eastern societies in a cross-cutting way alsoneed to be taken into account, as they exacerbateinstability and underline the need to approach issuescomprehensively. As a consequence, crisis manage-ment vis-à-vis the Middle East requires not only in-depth understanding of individual crises, but also afundamental appreciation of the interlinkages andsymbolic and political connections between thevarious issues, as well as early preparation in anticipa-tion of longer-term developments.

This paper will present the different epicenters ofinstability and crisis in the region, and seek to engagein informed speculation on their evolution in thecoming five to ten years. It will then outline thelonger-term trends that affect, to one degree oranother, all Middle Eastern societies and that havetremendous potential to trigger new crises or exacer-bate existing ones. Based on this discussion, this paperwill then proceed to examine the various actorsengaged in the region, before sketching a number ofideas for an improved crisis management system forthe Middle East.

The ‘Old’ Center of Gravity:The Arab-Israeli Conflict and theMiddle East Peace ProcessThe traditionally most significant challenge in theMiddle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict and its core, thedispute between Israelis and Palestinians. It is a centerof gravity around which the region has revolved, andremains of vast political and symbolic significance.Both in its own right and due to its (positive ornegative) signaling effects, reinvigoration of the peaceprocess is a key challenge for regional and interna-tional policy-makers in the coming five to ten years.Success in this area will facilitate the capacity of theinternational community to deal with a variety ofother epicenters of instability; sustained failure toreinvigorate the process will cast a shadow over effortsto resolve other crises in the Middle East.

The key challenge ahead does not lie in how tosettle the conflict, but in how to move towards such asettlement.While a broad consensus now exists on thetwo-state solution and its general parameters,profound disagreement prevails regarding the processtowards realizing it. In Israel, a ‘third way’ perspectivehas recently evolved that reflects an ideationalevolution over the past decade and promotes unilateralsteps as the best path to pursue in order to enhancesecurity and contribute to ending Israel’s occupationof Palestinian land.This approach underpinned Israel’s2005 Gaza Disengagement, and has since beenembodied in the Israeli Kadima government of EhudOlmert. Among Palestinians, PLO Chairman andPresident of the Palestinian Authority (PA) MahmoudAbbas (Abu Mazen) remains committed to a negoti-ated permanent status and strongly rejects the resort toviolence. Hamas’s takeover of the PalestinianAuthority in early 2006, however, has deepened thechallenges confronting Palestinians; its reluctance todisavow violence, recognize Israel and thus commit tothe two-state solution, and to uphold previouslysigned agreements resulted in a near-boycott of thePA internationally. The core challenge ahead in theeffort to revive the peace process thus will be to dealwith Israeli unilateralist tendencies – or theimplementation of unilateral withdrawals – and withthe Palestinian extremists – either by inducing their

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1 Loosely defined as the area ranging from the North African Mediterranean to the Arab peninsula and the Gulf region, including, at the margins,Turkey and Iran and bordering on Russia, the Central Asian republics, and Afghanistan, as well as Sudan, Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

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moderation, or by weakening their hold on power.Three basic scenarios lie ahead. The first is a

continuation of the status quo. Continued Israelioccupation and intransigent positions on both sidesregarding negotiations will translate into continuedlow-intensity warfare, with occasional flare-ups.Under this scenario, a unilateral Israeli withdrawalfrom parts of the West Bank is likely to beimplemented at some stage in the coming years,resulting in a long-term interim status quo consideredmanageable from Israel’s perspective, but still entailinga continuation of violence and occupation, witheconomic and humanitarian crises in store for thePalestinian civilian population.2 This scenario wouldcontinuously strengthen Palestinian militants andreverberate regionally, contributing to the solidifica-tion of an axis of “rejectionist” actors including Iran,Syria, Hizbullah, and some Palestinian groups. A fullconfrontation might become difficult to avoid withina five to ten-year period.3

A second scenario would entail the immediateresumption of permanent status negotiations. Such ascenario is ultimately likely to result in crisis, asdomestic Palestinian rivalries would be exacerbated.Apossible failure of such talks would set off a majorcrisis of confidence among both Israelis andPalestinians, leading to a repetition of the eruption ofthe intifada in 2000, which followed the breakdown ofthe Camp David Talks in July that year. While aresumption of permanent status negotiations would bedesirable, their likely failure, given the vast differencesbetween the parties on the outstanding issues, mighthave disastrous consequences, as witnessed in theaftermath of Camp David.

Most promising, therefore, would be a combina-tion of existing elements in a gradual approach,underpinned by international support. In such a thirdscenario, negotiations would take place between Israeland the moderate Palestinian leadership (Abu Mazen),preferably with the support or tacit approval of Hamasand other radical factions, resulting in an Israeliwithdrawal from large parts of the West Bank and theestablishment (and international recognition) of aPalestinian state with provisional borders. Such a movewould be difficult for Hamas to reject and would thuslikely lead to its de facto recognition of Israel; alterna-tively, statehood would create a new domestic politicalprocess among Palestinians that would return a

reformed (and continuously reforming) secular-nationalist movement to power. In either case, thenecessary conditions for subsequent state-to-state talkswould be created. On that basis, eventual permanentstatus negotiations could then yield a settlement of theconflict between Israelis and Palestinians, which inturn would give impetus to the broader regional peaceprocess and enhance the probability of a settlement ofIsrael’s conflicts with Syria, Lebanon, and the widerArab world. However, realization of the first stepwithout subsequent permanent status talks wouldlikely result in crisis and deterioration.

A concerted effort is necessary over the comingfive to ten years in order to induce a gradual revival ofthe Middle East peace process. Continued stalemateand absence of a political process, or the (unrealistic)alternative of an over-ambitious early return topermanent status negotiations, are likely to spelldeterioration and crisis, with significant repercussionsthroughout the region. One important ramification ofdeterioration would be an even closer link betweenthe Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli arenas and Iran,with the latter increasingly directly squaring off withIsrael, which might fuel a much deeper confrontationregionally and globally, as foreshadowed in Israel’s2006 campaign against Hizbullah.

A New Center of Gravity?Iran and the Challenge of NuclearProliferationIran’s role in the region, which, according to someregional observers, is underpinned by the emergenceof a ‘Shi’a crescent,’ poses a second key challenge inthe coming period, especially given its evolvingnuclear program. Indeed, Iran is involved in all otherarenas of instability in the Middle East to a degree thatit is all but replacing the Arab-Israeli conflict as thenew center of gravity for conflict and instability in theregion and beyond. Many actors, in particular in theGulf and the wider Arab world, interpret Iran’s questfor nuclear capacity as motivated by regionalhegemonic aspirations. With the fall of SaddamHussein’s regime in Iraq and the removal of its mostpotent rival, Iran has emerged as the undisputedpowerhouse in the Gulf and has staked a claim forleadership in the wider Middle East. The Islamic

2 Although Israeli Prime Minister Olmert declared the end of his unilateral ‘convergence’ plan in the aftermath of the Lebanon war, if no other solutionis found, a managed unilateral withdrawal from some parts of the West Bank will quickly become a likely prospect in the coming years.

3 Such a prospect is exacerbated by the fact that the presidential term of Abu Mazen expires in 2009, with no successor in sight, unless popular Fatahleader Marwan Barghouti is released from prison.

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Republic is a key player in Iraq, where parts of theShi’a majority of the population is open to Iranianinfluence. Iran equally maintains close ties withHizbullah in Lebanon and with Syria, and has beenidentified by Israel as its most important adversary(albeit one that operates through proxy actors). Assuch, and given the generally difficult relations withIran, most actors in the region and in the internationalcommunity see Iran as the key challenge in theMiddle East at present.

Iran’s nuclear program raises serious questions andwill be a key challenge internationally. This crisis –and a possible confrontation related to it – will shapethe Middle East profoundly. It is also a multi-facetedchallenge: first, it underlines the long-standingquestion of how to interact with Iran both within theregion and internationally. Second, it is related to theties between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in the MiddleEast and beyond, a relationship that is undergoingprofound changes with a significant impact on theregion as a whole.4 Third, the Iranian nuclear programis of central importance because of its significance ina global context: the world’s response to Iran’s allegedweapons program will shape the global battle againstnuclear proliferation more than any other test case.Failure to address the situation might spell the end ofthe nuclear non-proliferation regime and trigger aglobal arms race.5

In the coming five to ten-year period, threepossible scenarios lie ahead, all resting on the realisticassumption that Iran will continue to pursue itscurrent nuclear program. In a first scenario, thecurrent de facto standoff would continue in themedium term, with the potential to lead either intothe second scenario of escalation, or to engagementand integration regionally and internationally, asoutlined in the third scenario. Under this firstscenario, divisions within the internationalcommunity – most notably between the US and EU-3 on the one hand, and Russia and China on theother, but also within the transatlantic alliance – willcontinue to create obstacles and result in complexdiplomatic processes stretching over significantperiods of time.At the same time, a unilateral US-ledintervention (similar to that in Iraq) cannot be ruledout in the remaining two years of the Bush

Administration’s term.The second scenario envisages escalation.

Sanctions would be followed by efforts by otherpowers to equal Iran’s program and by a deteriorationof conditions on other regional fronts. A confronta-tion might begin to take the shape of a conflictbetween Western and moderate Sunni Arab forces onthe one hand, and extremist Shi’a forces on the other.The conflict would have the potential to destabilizethe entire region and could deteriorate into a militarycampaign, likely led by the United States andsupported by a coalition of regional and extra-regional powers, against Iran. Israel could be drawninto the conflict at least indirectly, if not as part of amilitary confrontation. A military campaign wouldvery likely be difficult, with multiple battlefieldsthroughout the Middle East – essentially a ‘mega-confrontation’ embroiling the entire region, whichwould also see significantly increased terrorist activityagainst Western targets. If at all successful, a militarycampaign could result in the disintegration of theIslamic Republic; a more likely result would beprolonged war and crisis throughout the region, withsignificant impact on international relations and theglobal economy. Oil and gas markets would beaffected; and divisions in the international communityfurther deepened.

In a third scenario, Iran is engaged and, ultimately,integrated into the regional security architecture. Arelatively comprehensive process of engagement mightinvolve international and particularly US recognitionand acceptance of a limited, supervised nuclearprogram (with a limited uranium enrichment capacityon Iranian soil) for civilian purposes. Such amechanism would ideally be linked to a widerrevision of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,which would enhance its credibility and thus itschances for success. Incentives offered to Iran must beweighed in terms of their comparative value globallyand regionally. Given the risks associated with escala-tion, however, a diplomatic process that addresses bothIran’s long-standing isolation in the internationalcommunity (and other Iran-specific matters) and itsnuclear program within the broader context of arevised global nuclear non-proliferation regime mightbe the most preferable option.

4 For the first fifty years of the existence of the modern states, the Middle East was largely Sunni-dominated.The rise of the Shi’a majority in Iraqfollows the Islamic Revolution and may provide new impetus to the struggles of sizable Shi’a communities for political rights in Bahrain, Kuwait,Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon – which might easily pit those communities, under Iranian leadership, against an alliance of Western nations and pro-Western (but often authoritarian) Sunni Arab regimes (such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and many of the smaller Gulf emirates). One of the besttreatments of Sunni-Shi’a relations in the present era is found in Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (NewYork:W.W. Norton, 2005).

5 Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons might set off a regional arms race, which in turn might be followed by a wider international arms race.

quasi-independent entity, which would also integratethe oil-rich city and governorate of Kirkuk after areferendum in the course of 2007. Iraq’s Arabheartland would remain mired in civil war, whichwould further impede or delay the re-establishment ofcontrol by Iraqi central authorities. It would continueto represent a regional battlefield for various interests.Extremist and militant political Islamists would alsoseek to fill the vacuum. The Middle East as a wholewould remain unsettled, and relations between theWest and the wider Muslim world would continue tobe beset with difficulties, reflecting the perceivedconfrontation between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’emanating from Iraq (as well as Palestine andLebanon).6 Such deterioration, as the most realisticoutcome of a medium-term continuation of the statusquo,would also accelerate demands for a drawdown ofcoalition forces, which in turn would worsen thesecurity situation for Iraqis.

The second scenario would envisage deteriora-tion and a likely break-up of the Iraqi state.Constitutional revision is a key challenge in thecoming year and a necessary element for stabilization;failure to achieve (or agree on) a revision of theconstitution is likely to accelerate Iraq’s disintegration,triggering a Kurdish secession (that would also behelped by an intensification of the intra-Arab civilwar). A downward spiral into disintegration wouldalso be accelerated by an early withdrawal of coalitiontroops, as is increasingly a possibility for domesticpolitical reasons within member states of the coalition.Disintegration would result in increasing interventionby regional actors in the fragmenting Iraqi state.Kurdish independence would likely meet withreluctant acquiescence from Western powers (at best)and increase long-standing tensions with Turkey inparticular, but also with Iran and Syria.Turkey wouldseek to restrict – or influence in its own favor – a newKurdish entity. Iran would likely intervene on behalfof Iraqi Shi’as, establishing a de facto protectorate andlikely providing military assistance to secure anemerging Shi’istan, or, more realistically, contributingto the sectarian and ethnic combat activities accompa-nying the violent division of Iraq. The Arab Leagueand individual Arab players would provide similarassistance to the Sunni community, which would beconfronted with the reality of a Sunni entity charac-terized by a power vacuum, land-locked and without

In the coming five to ten years, much diplomaticeffort will have to be invested both into the nuclearnon-proliferation regime and the overall threat posedby a global proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-tion. Specifically in relation to Iran and its position inthe Middle East, a regional security architecture needsto be established that allows for a constructivedialogue between the states of the Arab Levant (as wellas Israel) and the Gulf on the one hand, and Iran andIraq on the other. In the long run, the positions,aspirations, and interests of those two regional powershave to be addressed.

A Key Challenge for Peacebuilding:Iraq and the Risk of State FailureIraq is connected closely with the Iranian epicenterbut poses the immediate (and separate) challenge ofstabilization and state-building. Since the US-ledinvasion of 2003, Iraq has become a battlefield forother disputes to be fought out in a power vacuum.For this reason, but also in its own right, the country’spolitical and economic reconstruction and re-integra-tion into the region and the international communityremains another key challenge. Iraq’s currentinstability and looming deterioration into a failed statemake a comprehensive state-building enterprise,undertaken domestically but with the assistance of theinternational community, an immediate necessity. Forthe time being, prospects for the future continue torange from complete state failure and disintegrationinto separate (yet warring) new entities to pacificationand the creation of a sustainable and strong Iraqi state.

Three possible scenarios lie ahead; continuation ofthe status quo, deterioration and break-up of theunified Iraqi state, and longer-term consolidation ofthe new Iraqi state. Under the first scenario, currentlevels of sectarian and ethnic violence wouldcontinue, with ongoing international efforts tocontain the violence, strengthen the Iraqi state andpursue a political process to underpin the state-building exercise. Such a scenario is unlikely to remaintenable in the medium or long-term and is likely tosee deterioration into an eventual disintegration of theIraqi state.A very loose Iraqi federation might also beconsolidated under this scenario (de jure, with thepotential of de facto disintegration), in whichKurdistan would strengthen its current status as a

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6 As Shada Islam argues in her paper in this series, this perceived confrontation has now become the key challenge to European societies from within:see Shada Islam,“Europe: Crises of Identity,” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York, February 2007.

major natural resources on its territory. Major popula-tion displacement would accompany the disintegra-tion, with significant violence and instability centeringon Baghdad. All three subsequently emerging entitieswould struggle economically, and significant instabilitywould continue to rage in the former Iraq for at leastanother decade, before new boundaries are consoli-dated and lasting structures established.

Given these stakes, a preferable option would bethe successful completion of the state-building projectin a third scenario, with emphasis in parallel on thedimensions of security, the political process, andeconomic reconstruction. The Iraqi constitution of2005 would be revised to offer Sunni Arabs a sufficientstake in the new political order, while safeguarding theimmediate interests of the Kurdish and Shi’acommunities. A federal but unified Iraqi state wouldbe built on concessions made by all parties and thenegotiation of an inclusive and enduring socialcontract among them. Kirkuk would be affordedspecial federal status, with significant involvement ofthe international community. The federal authoritieswould need to have greater control over Iraq’s naturalresources than currently envisaged in the constitution,as well as be given taxation powers. A fundamentalstepping stone would be an improvement in thesecurity situation, which will require not onlycontinued external help in support of the Iraqi state,but also that the proliferation of militias – and theirsubversion of state institutions – be addressed.Institution and capacity-building would also be keyelements. In the medium term, Iraqi forces would takeover the security sphere, thus allowing for a coalitiondrawdown, demands for which are likely to growirresistibly strong within all members of the coalitionin the coming two to three years.This scenario wouldpermit and indeed call for, an increased (political andcoordination) role of the United Nations and theinternational community beyond the US-led(military) coalition.

Concerted efforts will therefore be required fromthe international community in order to support thestate-building enterprise in Iraq. Failure to achieve thebest case scenario will lead to deterioration, with statefailure and violent disintegration a very probableresult.

Lebanon as a Battlefield?State-Building and ReconstructionSimilar prospects now confront Lebanon, where thestate-building exercise has faced obstruction and delay

since the end of the civil war in 1989. Much like Iraq,Lebanon remains a battlefield for other conflicts andconflicting parties from the surrounding region. Itspolitical and economic reconstruction is therefore notonly important in its own right; it is also a necessaryelement in a wider, regional strategy of stabilization.Lebanon’s neighbor, Syria, too, needs to be addressedand situated within the broader context of such astrategy, as it is both political battlefield and client;patron and conflict party. Key challenges related toLebanon thus exist on both the domestic and regionallevels. Ultimately, the goal is to establish a sovereignand politically independent state and to complete apolitical transformation begun, but not completed,following the end of the civil war.

In a first scenario, the uneasy interim status quoof the 1990s and early 2000s would be re-established.Lebanon would embrace its reconstruction gradually,but fail – or choose not – to address underlying issues.Lebanon’s precarious sectarian balance and theconstant risk of deterioration into civil strife do makea completion of the political transformation begun adecade ago difficult. The balance between pro andanti-Syrian political factions, continued yet covertSyrian influence and interference, Western supportbut ultimate helplessness, might all converge to re-create the Lebanese state of the 1990s. Hizbullahwould remain a significant political actor, with Syrianand Iranian support, and Lebanon would thus befaced with the latent risk of another Israeli interven-tion in the coming years.The expanded UN InterimForce in Lebanon (UNIFIL) would provide atemporary stabilizing impetus, but might also triggerdomestic and regional opposition from Sunni andShi’a militant groups (including Hizbullah). Lebanonwould be vulnerable to foreign interference and beused as a proxy battle arena for regional conflicts (theArab-Israeli and specifically, Israeli-Syrian dispute, thewider conflict between Israel and Iran, and/orbetween Sunnis and Shiites, between Arabs andPersians, moderate pro-Western Arabs and Islamistextremists).

As such, Lebanon would always remain at risk ofsliding into a second scenario, in which the securitysituation throughout Lebanon would remain difficult.Massive emigration and economic deteriorationwould result, which in turn would fuel insecurity andinstability and undermine the political state-buildingprocess. The Lebanese state would remain, despitesignificant international assistance, largely powerless.Israel would regularly interfere, at least along thesouthern border against Hizbullah guerrillas, with a

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full-fledged confrontation with Syria (if not Iran) acontinuous risk. Syria, in continued isolation from theinternational community, would remain immediatelyinvolved as a destabilizing actor and would besupported – if not increasingly replaced – by Iran.Lebanon would remain a proxy battlefield andconfront, within a few years, renewed state failure.Hizbullah and other militias might engage in directwarfare with UNIFIL forces as well as the Lebaneseauthorities, and would grow stronger politically evenif weakened militarily. Such a state of affairs would alsoimpede progress on the regional track of the peaceprocess, strengthening the hand of Palestinian extrem-ists in their respective arena, and tie down interna-tional actors, who might opt for disengagement fromLebanon, thus precipitating further deterioration.Both radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda andextremist Shiites, led by Iran, would be the long-termbeneficiaries.

Much as in the cases of the Israeli-Palestinianarena, Iran, and Iraq, a third potential scenario inLebanon involves a successful consolidation of thestate-building enterprise, with significant outsidecommitment and support over a sustained period oftime. UN forces would concentrate on stabilizationand on working with the Lebanese authorities toestablish the latter’s control and sovereignty. Such aprocess would necessarily see the disarming ofHizbullah, albeit in a form that would refrain fromhumiliating the group and instead focus on providingincentives for its complete transformation into apolitical faction, and its ‘Lebanonization.’ Hizbullahwould be integrated into the Lebanese army; in turn,the predominantly Shi’a areas of south Lebanon,southern Beirut and the Beqaa Valley would receivesignificantly increased assistance for reconstructionand socio-economic development, and the Shi’acommunity would overall be represented moreproportionally in Lebanese politics. Dialogue andconsensus among all Lebanese sects and parties wouldneed to be established on their shared future.Implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement wouldprovide the backdrop to the new Lebanese politicalorder, but would require re-negotiating in terms ofthe fundamental equation and distribution of powerbetween Lebanon’s communities, if not the institutionof a post-sectarian political order.7

A further necessary element under this scenariowould be a trilateral deal, brokered by the interna-

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tional community, over the Israeli-occupied Sheb’aFarms area, which would be handed over to Lebanon.Such a deal would require Syrian engagement in orderto conclude a bilateral Syrian-Lebanese borderagreement that would pave the way for an Israelihandover of the area to Lebanon. The best possibleincentive would be a re-opening of the regional trackof the Middle East peace process and negotiations overthe Syrian Golan Heights, enabled by significantprogress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. Short thereof,Syria’s reintegration into the region and into theinternational community, with re-engagement by theUnited States and economic benefits resulting fromthe finalization of its long-delayed associationagreement with the EU, might create sufficientincentives. Alternatively, Syria’s continued isolationmight permit such a deal if the Israeli-Palestinian trackadvances, while the international community success-fully engages – or isolates – Iran over its nuclearprogram. Syria remains the weakest link in theemerging ‘Shi’a crescent,’ and could be pursued byeither stick or carrot to cooperate, as long as itsalliance with Iran (in which it is client, rather thanequal partner) is broken, and it is deprived of otherproxy actors (to whom it is patron).At the same time,Syria is a key actor with regard to all four epicentersof crisis and instability in the region; its long-termisolation will not be conducive to achieving theoverall stabilization of the Middle East.

In the long term, Lebanon’s successful consolida-tion and reconstruction, economically and politically,will depend not just on the Lebanese arena, but onprogress in the wider Arab-Israeli arena and on theemergence (or proactive establishment) of a regionalsecurity architecture that allocates sufficient space toall relevant players. Failure and collapse might create abattlefield for regional and international conflicts inLebanon and exacerbate regional instability.

Longer-Term Challenges:Demography, Education, andEmploymentIn the coming period, beyond the immediate andspecific arenas of crisis, the Middle East will also likelyconfront a number of cross-regional challenges, whichare of a much longer-term nature but equally affectstability. One of the most important such challenges is

7 Taif actually envisaged an end of sectarianism, by and large, but endorsed a 50:50 division in politics between Christians and Muslims, which dispro-portionally favors all Christian communities and Sunni Muslims, and disadvantages Lebanon’s Shi’a.

posed by demographic trends, coupled with theireffects.8 The Middle East today has one of the largestproportions of youth (12-24 year olds), as well as thehighest levels of youth unemployment, in the world.9

Population growth is predicted to continue until2025, with the present total population of around 400million expected to swell to about 700 million.10 As aresult of these trends, Middle Eastern governments areunder much pressure to adjust to new social realities.High-quality education needs to be ensured;“knowledge societies” need to be built, with(unrestricted) creation and diffusion of knowledge asnecessary ingredients of economic and politicalprogress and thus, stability.11

Given demographic trends, governments are alsopressed hard to create adequate employment opportu-nities. Unemployment, in particular among thoseentering the labor market, is a key challenge, which, ifunanswered in the medium term, will have significantsocial, economic, and political implications.12

According to one assessment, the total labor force ofsome 104 million workers in 2000 will reach 185million in 2020, thus requiring the creation of a totalnumber of 80 million jobs in the coming fifteen years– as many as were created over the last five decades.Meeting such demands is virtually impossible, whichcreates wider social, economic, and political repercus-sions that both governments in the region and thosebeyond it have to prepare for in the coming period.

Two additional factors further exacerbate thechallenge of job creation. One is the fact that thecurrent crisis of unemployment and a swelling youthpopulation is compounded by a significant under-representation of women in Middle Eastern labormarkets.14 A second element exacerbating thechallenge of job creation is that conventional

responses to demands of employment are no longeraffordable, or politically feasible. Oversized govern-ment bureaucracies have long characterized MiddleEastern economies and underpinned politicalstructures and social contracts in the region, but havelost their economic viability. As such, rather thanproviding a vehicle for the continued absorption ofyoung jobseekers, the economically necessaryreduction of large government bureaucracies is likelyto intensify the demands for employment creation.Consequently, the demographic challenge translatesinto wider economic and political challenges, whichrequire answers in the coming years. Failure to addressthese might herald significant domestic instability thatwould not only be exploited by extremists, but wouldhave broader regional repercussions and thus affect thewider international community.

Crisis of Legitimacy: PoliticalReform, Democratization, PoliticalIslam, and TerrorismAgainst this background, political reform anddemocratization is a complementary long-termchallenge. If unaddressed, continued politicalexclusion of large segments of societies in the MiddleEast threatens domestic political stability within theregion and global co-existence more broadly, as anti-Western ideologies and vocabularies are oftenemployed in the domestic mobilization of dissent.15

The Middle Eastern model of political organiza-tion has come under increasing scrutiny in recentyears, as international actors have placed muchemphasis on the promotion of democracy. Early, if notpremature, elections have brought to the fore political

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8 For a broader overview of demographic trends and challenges, see Joseph Chamie’s paper in this series,“Population Trends: Humanity in Transition,”Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

9 Over the entire post-World War II period, the region’s average annual population growth rate of 3 percent exceeded all other regions except sub-Saharan Africa. In 2003, according to the World Bank, about 40 percent of the total population of the region were children under eighteen years ofage. See Tarik M.Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa,” Journal of Economic Research 18, no. 4(2004): 91-115.

10 Ellen Laipson,“The Middle East’s Demographic Transition:What Does It Mean?,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (Fall 2002), p. 177.11 Interestingly, access to school has by and large been ensured in recent years: between 1980 and 2000, the education attainment in the Middle East

increased more than 150 percent, more than in any other region in the world.What remains absent, however, is sufficient quality, which in turnwould translate into economic competitiveness and therefore adequate prospects for employment for the swelling youth populations across theregion. See Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform,” pp. 105-106.This issue has been recognized: having been identified as one of thethree key challenges facing the Arab world in the first Arab Human Development Report of 2002, the building of ‘knowledge societies’ was thecore theme of the second such report, released by UNDP in 2003.

12 At present, unemployment levels across the region average around 15 percent (and reach more than double that ratio among first-time jobseekers).Unemployment is highest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in Iraq, with significant numbers of jobseekers in Lebanon, Iran, and Jordan.

13 Laipson,“Demographic Transition,” p. 179.14 The region has made progress in closing the gender gap in education and has increased female workforce participation to about 35 percent in recent

years, but women remain disadvantaged. Such social and political inequality will have to be addressed if stability is to be maintained domesticallyand regionally.Yousef,“Development, Growth and Policy Reform,” p. 106.

15 A similar line of reasoning, albeit from a perspective emanating from the region, is pursued in the UNDP, The Arab Human Development Report 2004:Towards Freedom in the Arab World (NewYork: UNDP, 2005).

Islamists in a variety of arenas, and are likely tocontribute to a de-prioritization of internationaldemocracy promotion efforts in the coming years. Atthe same time, against the background of domesticpressures, the conventional model of political organi-zation in the Middle East will require significantadjustment. In most Middle Eastern polities, politicalopposition in the sense of organized and legitimatedissent (as is practiced in democratic systems) does notexist, or is weak. Political Islamist groupings have filledthis void. Political Islam must thus be understood as ahighly domestically motivated phenomenon,developed in opposition to the existing politicalstructures in each respective country, and utilizing ahighly appealing ideology and vocabulary borrowedfrom Islam. At the same time, political Islamistgroupings are also inherently transnational, thuswidening the domestic political space to encompassoutside players. In addition, while many politicalIslamist groupings appear to uphold democraticpractices, their commitment to democratic values interms of social tolerance and equality, peaceful co-existence with domestic dissent and regionalopponents, all remain in doubt.

A key dilemma related to the question ofdemocratization throughout the Middle East thereforeis whether the promotion of democracy (and ofelections as an early manifestation of democraticpractice) is conducive to stability domestically andregionally, or whether such efforts essentially furtherinstability. It is also unclear in which way politicalIslamists can and should be integrated into thepolitical process. At the same time, existing modes ofgovernance will not be feasible politically andeconomically for much longer, because increasingnumbers of young Middle Easterners demand greaterpolitical participation and/or because growingunemployment and insufficient resources dissolve thebasis of the existing social contracts in the region.As amiddle path, Middle Eastern governments need toengage in processes of gradual transition that areconducive both to stability and satisfy the demands of

their respective populations in the coming five to ten-year period, with the support (but without undue andcounter-productive pressure) of the internationalcommunity. Both the continuation of the status quo inmany Middle Eastern polities and radical changes arelikely to translate into instability, prompted either bywidespread dissatisfaction, protests and popularrebellion, or by the usurpation of power by actorswhose democratic credentials are in question, orwhose action agendas might directly exacerbateregional conflicts (such as the Arab-Israeli dispute), orcontribute to widening the mutually perceived gapbetween the ‘West’ and the ‘Muslim world.’16

Measures to democratize and enable greaterpolitical participation, combined with the broaderinstitution of the rule of law, albeit in a controlled andgradual process, are therefore important in the comingyears. Such efforts would contribute to the marginal-ization of extremists and strengthen the moderatesamong political Islamists. In turn, anti-Westernrhetoric and perceptions would be ameliorated, and arelationship perceived to be based on greater mutualrespect might emerge.Terrorists such as the al-Qaedanetwork would find it more difficult to recruitsupporters, who would instead gain a stake in thenewly inclusive political systems. In this sense, domesticactivities to democratize, with the support (but notpressure) of the international community would helpto address the fundamental misunderstanding that hascast a shadow on the relationship between the ‘West’and ‘Islam.’ Fear and prejudice have driven what hasbeen perceived as a clash of civilizations, and could beaddressed by policies linking conflict resolution (inparticular in the Arab-Israeli arena) with gradual yettangible progress in domestic political transitionstowards greater inclusiveness. As such, the pursuit ofbalanced policies vis-à-vis individual Middle Easternstates – with a focus on the promotion of democracy,in combination with comprehensive efforts to resolveconflicts in the region – would help to stabilize therespective polities domestically, and thus enhanceregional and global stability.

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16 Egypt and Saudi Arabia provide the cases where conditions are most pressing. Jordan, which has long pursued a domestic and foreign policy charac-terized by the desire to maintain stability above all else, and Syria, where regime disintegration and state failure is a realistic prospect in the contextof continued international isolation, are in a second tier of precarious polities. In Egypt, where President Mubarak is nearing the age of 80 andwhere no clear successor has been groomed or presented to date (and the most likely candidate, his son Gamal, appears to lack a sufficient hold onthe political elite), the Muslim Brotherhood remains by far the most popular political organization. In the event of President Mubarak’s death in thecoming years, Egypt could turn into an Islamic republic; a Muslim Brotherhood-led emerging democracy; or a repressive, likely military, dictator-ship. Either way, domestic instability would reverberate regionally and globally. Saudi Arabia, which has embarked on a very incremental process ofadjustment under King Abdullah and which has in recent years been able to fend off the underlying economic and employment concerns of agrowing youth population thanks to the high price of oil, could easily turn into a radical Islamist republic, or disintegrate, with civil war betweenthe majority of Sunnis and the Shiites of the Eastern provinces to follow.

Problem and Solution: EconomicReform, Adjustment, and ResourceManagementAn important additional measure is economic reformand structural adjustment. In the same way that thepolitical model prevailing in the Middle East is nolonger tenable, the economic structures underpinningit have also increasingly been drawn into doubt.Substantial job creation, combined with the parallelneed to service and eliminate considerable debtburdens, is required in many economies. Externalfinancial support will have to be reduced andcompensated for by domestic economic performancein the coming period.

Reforms in trade and in the large governmentbureaucracies are inevitable.At the same time, reformsin these fields are particularly difficult to implement,as they entail considerable social costs. An end toprotectionist policies would be particularly hurtful tothe majority of small-sized enterprises in the privatesector. Government bureaucracies are among the mostimportant employers in most of the countries in theregion.Addressing these issues, therefore, requires thatreforms are implemented in parallel with othermeasures that enable private sector growth, encouragethe development of ‘new’ sectors such as informationtechnology and new service industries. Implementedin their absence, austerity measures are bound tocreate resistance and generate mass protest. Much as inthe realm of political reform, economic adjustmentneeds to be gradual to extenuate the social (andresulting political) costs, avoiding instability in thecontext of change, while not impeding it.

Given these premises, economic reform, de-emphasizing state leadership in the economy, willactually require the state to take the lead in developingand encouraging new areas of growth and develop-ment, while divesting itself from the labor market and

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production.Wealth derived from oil and gas can playa useful role with respect to laying the foundations fora less state-driven economy. Even in the smaller oil-rich Gulf states and in Iran, unemployment has been agrowing concern in recent years. Consequently,natural resource-derived wealth needs to be investedinto an overhaul of ageing and insufficient infrastruc-ture and into economic diversification. In the longerterm, the direct or indirect dependency of manyMiddle Eastern economies on their natural resources(oil or gas, or both) will have to be reduced. Much alsoremains to be done to foster private sector growth.Most important is the reduction of red tape created bythe pervasive bureaucracies that often lack competen-cies and competence. This state of affairs throughoutthe region (in both oil and non-oil countries)illustrates the inherent interlinkages between politicaland economic reform, which need to be tackled inparallel in order to be successful.

One further element that needs to be addressed inthis context is the management of scarce waterresources. Domestically, the water dimension isinherently linked with wider political and economicreform, as highly subsidized water utilities are plaguedby problems of deteriorating infrastructure, poorservice quality and inadequate supply. In addition,more than 80 percent of the region’s water is used forirrigation, often of low value crops, which underlinesthe need for a wider economic shift away fromunsustainably expensive agriculture to trade andservices.Water scarcity and management problems arealso an important factor of concern to the widerinternational community, which might eventually beconfronted with migratory trends from the region. Inaddition, water is an important factor underlying orexacerbating conflict in the Middle East.20 As aconsequence, water issues must inherently beaddressed on a regional scale, and might indeed facili-tate functionalist foundations for wider ties.

17 Lebanon, for example, faces the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world (180 percent).18 For new firms, the costs of complying with regulations in the Middle East represent an average of 76 percent of per capita gross national income

(compared to 34 percent in Eastern Europe, 16 percent in East Asia, and 14 percent in Latin America).Yousef, “Development, Growth and PolicyReform,” p. 111.

19 The region is home to 4.5 percent of the world’s population, but receives only 2 percent of the world’s rainfall and possesses only 0.4 percent of theworld’s recoverable water sources.With the demographic projections for the coming fifteen years, Arab per capita water supplies are expected todecrease by half, if not more: Roger Harrison,“A Problem With Liquidity:The Challenges of Water in Saudi Arabia,” Washington Report for MiddleEast Affairs (July/August 2004), p. 44.

20 The water dimension reflects and impacts relations between Arab states and Turkey; between Israel and its Arab neighbors; between Iran and Iraq;and plays an important role in the relations between the sectarian and ethnic communities within Iraq.The water dimension in the Middle East istherefore inextricably connected with wider issues of conflict, which it reflects, impacts, and some analysts argue, drives.

Absence of Regional CopingMechanisms: Regional Actors inthe Middle EastRegional organization in the Middle East has beenremarkably weak. Thus, crisis management of thevarious challenges confronting the Middle East willhardly be sufficient on the regional level in thecoming five to ten years. In fact, the establishment ofeffective crisis coping mechanisms on the regionallevel is as much one of the challenges confronting theMiddle East in the coming years, as it is a necessaryresponse to the manifold crises in the region. At thesame time, given the high level of internationalinvolvement in the region, in particular that of theUnited States, the European Union and the UnitedNations, Middle East crisis management is by defini-tion a multilateral, international affair.

The three regional organizations that exist in theMiddle East, or encompass it, are the Arab League, theGulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization ofthe Islamic Conference (see the box below). Eachorganization groups together a number of regionalplayers (along with some from beyond the region) forspecific purposes, but there is no organizationencompassing all or the most significant regionalactors. As such, regional organizations in the MiddleEast have long been incapable of playing a decisiverole in crisis management and conflict resolution.TheArab League, reflecting Arab cultural unity, functionsas an arena to establish (or exhibit) consensus amongthe Arab states; actual conflict management anddispute resolution, however, have been handled byindividual actors outside the League. The GulfCooperation Council (GCC), officially a regionaleconomic organization, is primarily concerned withpublic security within its member states. It also acts asan arena to underline unity and political consensusamong the Gulf states, which generally seek to ensureregional stability and security through their bilateralties with the United States. The vastly diverseOrganization of the Islamic Conference is a largelycultural organization and plays no noteworthypolitical role, at least not in the Middle East.

Such absence of effective regional organizationand regional crisis coping mechanisms reflects the

manifold divisions and tensions characterizing theregion. While the Arab world shares a commoncultural and historical legacy, and remains committedto upholding that legacy, political divisions andrivalries have long been prevalent. Intra-Arab relationshave often been difficult over prolonged periods oftime, characterized by personal animosities andspecific, bilateral disputes. Pan-Arabism has all butdisappeared from the Arab world, except as a causethat requires substantial lip-service and ostensiblecommitment; its pan-Islamic variant never wielded asimilar attractiveness among the populations, althoughits political significance has risen with the emergenceof political Islam.

Beyond the prevalence of Arab disunity andbilateral relationships with the United States(primarily) as an alternative crisis coping mechanism,neither Israel, nor Iran, nor Turkey, is part of anyregional organization in the Middle East. WhileTurkey is often seen as a bridge between Europe andthe Middle East, and between Europe and CentralAsia, its engagement in the Middle East has beenlimited to bilateral engagements in a variety of arenas,most notably to safeguard immediate Turkish interests,but also thanks to the close strategic ties Turkey hasestablished with Israel and to its membership inNATO. Against this background,Turkey might have arole to play in conflict resolution and crisis copingmechanisms in the coming years.21 Iran’s exclusionfrom any regional organization (apart from the OIC)and from the overarching regional security architec-ture has been most problematic, and accompanies itsemergence as a possible new center of gravity for theconflicts in the Middle East. It is not just the relation-ship between the West and the Islamic Republic thatrequires definition, it is also the role and position ofIran within the wider Middle East – especially therelationship between ‘Persians’ on the one hand, andthe Arab world on the other – that needs to beclarified. Along with Iran, Israel has also beenexcluded from regional crisis coping mechanisms.Clarification of Israel’s role and position within theMiddle East is inextricably linked with a settlement ofthe Arab-Israeli conflict on the regional level, whichthus emerges clearly as a constitutive element in theconstruction of an enduring regional securityarchitecture.

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21 Turkey’s contribution of troops to a reconfigured UNIFIL in 2006 may well be a precursor to such a greater role.

International Multilateralism as aNecessary Element of CrisisManagementWhile regional crisis coping mechanisms remainunderdeveloped, the Middle East has always inherentlybeen a region of global interest, and of globalinterventionism.

By far the most significant actor in conflict resolu-tion throughout the region is the extra-regionalUnited States. US policy choices vis-à-vis individualactors or epicenters of crisis and instability are amongthe most decisive elements in managing crises in theMiddle East. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular,

there is no alternative broker of comparable weight tothe United States.The US has also consolidated closemilitary ties with all Arab Gulf states; warm relation-ships had long been established with Jordan and, in theaftermath of Nasserism and in the context of theCamp David peace accords, with Egypt. At the sametime, US engagement vis-à-vis the Middle East hasoften been viewed with suspicion by some fromwithin the region. In addition, with its engagement inIraq in particular, the United States has become lessoutside broker and intervener than actual regionalplayer in its own right. This, in turn, has made itsengagement much more complicated and problematicas regards conflict resolution, since the US is nowparty rather than outside mediator. Nevertheless, the

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The Arab League is the world’s oldest regional organization. Itstwenty-two members are located throughout the Levant, the Gulf,North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. It primarily serves thedemonstrative cause of Arab (cultural) unity and is dominated byEgypt. With its foundation spearheaded by Egypt and givenEgypt’s initial leadership role in pan-Arab efforts under PresidentGamal Abdel Nasser, the Arab League Secretariat has maintainedits headquarters in Cairo; almost all Secretaries-General havebeen Egyptians. The current Secretary-General, Amr Moussa,embodies the personalized nature of the political significance ofthe Arab League, which rests on his stature as a former EgyptianForeign Minister and confidant of President Mubarak. Its mostsignificant manifestations are the regular Arab summits, whichare important occasions to emphasize Arab unity, while actualcrisis management and conflict resolution remains a bilateral andmultilateral affair outside the confines of the organization. At thesame time, Arab Summit declarations do carry significant weightas expressions of consensus within the Arab world, and have inthe past put forward – or endorsed – significant initiatives, suchas the Arab Peace Initiative of then-Saudi Crown Prince (nowKing) Abdullah, endorsed in March 2002 at the Beirut ArabSummit, or, most recently, the Lebanese initiative to end theIsraeli campaign against Hizbullah. Yet the Arab League has beenused as an arena to establish (or exhibit) political consensusamong all Arab states only under the most extreme circum-stances of crisis; actual conflict management and dispute resolu-tion have been handled by individual actors in relationships andties beyond the League. In a reflection of the talk-shop nature ofthe Arab League, an increasing number of heads of states haverefrained even from participating in Arab Summits in recentyears.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981against the backdrop of the Iran-Iraq war, groups together the sixcountries of the Arab Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United ArabEmirates, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. Ostensibly founded as aregional economic organization and despite some progress inrecent years towards greater regional integration among itsmember states, the primary preoccupation of the GCC wasalways security and stability in the Gulf. The Council, which has a

small secretariat, primarily serves as a forum for consultation andconsensus-building among the Arab Gulf states, most notably atthe annual GCC summits and as an organization providing thebackdrop to close informal relations among the various regimesin the Gulf, who also collaborate very closely on internal publicsecurity. Given their similar domestic political and economicstructures, the high degree of cooperation is unsurprising; at thesame time, actual conflict resolution and crisis management ispursued by each of the Gulf states primarily through their bilateralties with the United States, and with Europe. Saudi Arabia’sintegration into the GCC has been interpreted both as incorpora-tion and containment of a sub-regional hegemon, and as amanifestation of its use of the GCC as an instrument to counterthe Egyptian-dominated Arab League; in truth, the GCC is a usefulvehicle for consultation and coordination on a sub-regional level,with very limited political influence. Tellingly, economic coopera-tion in the Arab Gulf has perhaps been more advanced in theOrganization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC), asub-organization of the OPEC cartel, though the GCC should notbe underestimated as a tool for consultation and consensus-building and as a reflection of the close ties among the smallerGulf emirates.

Considerably less significance should be ascribed to theOrganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), originally foundedupon a Saudi initiative to address Israel’s policies in the occupiedterritory and due to the ineffectiveness of the Arab League. Assuch, the OIC was almost explicitly designed to counter the ArabLeague. In recent years, however, the OIC has become a largelycultural organization representing the interests of Muslim statesin the world, which include Pakistan, Indonesia, as well as Russiaand all Middle Eastern countries. Given the vast diversity ofinterests and structures, the OIC does not play any significant rolein conflict management or resolution in the Middle East (althoughit does so elsewhere). Its primary focus is cultural and ‘inter-civilizational’ activities, with increasing emphasis also ondevelopment-related challenges confronting the Muslim world.An ambitious effort to resurrect the organization and provide itwith a renewed mandate under its latest Secretary-General hasnot yet seen significant results.

Regional Organizations in the Middle East

United States remains the key (external) party in theregion. It has also, over the past decade, been increas-ingly multilaterally oriented, despite perceptions tothe contrary: Its engagement in the Middle EastQuartet (where its political power is combined withthe European Union and its economic weight, theUnited Nations and its power of international legiti-macy, and Russia, a balancing actor and original co-sponsor of the Madrid peace process, which hasotherwise lost most of its influence in the region), inLebanon (where it acts in close coordination withFrance and the United Nations), vis-à-vis Iran (wherethe US has worked in tandem with the EU-3), andeven in Iraq (where it has worked closely with theUK) emphasize a growing multilateral component,perhaps as an element that offsets the perceived loss ofneutrality in the region and seeks to create renewedlegitimacy for a strong US role in the Middle East.

Such (selective) multilateralism, combining theUS’s overwhelming geo-strategic power with thegreater international legitimacy embodied in anyinternational alliance, and the economic strength ofEuropean players, is likely to remain a preferredinstrument in America’s toolbox in the coming years.It may also grow stronger as the US continues toconfront obstacles and crises throughout the region. Inmany instances, selective multilateral efforts havecombined extra-regional intervention with regionalactivity.Thus, the Lebanese state-building project hasbeen underpinned by a double entente of France andthe US globally, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia region-ally. The work of the Quartet has been furthered by,and has often depended on, the efforts of Saudi Arabia,Egypt and Jordan. In the Iranian epicenter, GCCefforts have tried to bridge gaps; in Iraq, the ArabLeague has been active in a similar vein.

The European Union, meanwhile, is an importantpartner in many of these endeavors. A key economicplayer throughout the region, it has solidified close tieswith the conclusion of EU Association Agreementswith a number of actors in particular around the(extended) Mediterranean. (Turkey, Israel, Egypt,Jordan, and the Palestinians are important partners inthis initiative.) Individual leading European nationshave been significant players in the past and remain soin the present, most notably the United Kingdom,France, and, to some extent, Germany, Italy, Spain, andNorway.The EU plays a central role when it comes to(financial) support for the state-building enterprisesnow underway in the region (such as in Lebanon andPalestine). At the same time, it cannot match thepolitical weight of the US, and has not been able to

translate economic power in the region into directpolitical influence due to vast internal divergenceswithin the EU.The unprecedented European lead ofUNIFIL from 2006 onwards, however, may herald agreater political role for the EU, but is likely to remainconstrained by the continuing differences of opinionwithin the twenty-seven member community.

The United Nations has also traditionally played acomplicated role in the region. Since its inception, theUN has been involved in the Middle East, where itvoted for the partition of Palestine, deployed its first-ever peacekeeping operation, maintained the largestnumber of peacekeeping operations until the prolifer-ation of such missions in the 1990s, still entertains thesingle largest UN operation (UNRWA, the agencysupporting Palestinian refugees) and is both key arenaand key player in all epicenters of instability and crisis.In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the UN has traditionallybeen involved, though more in the sense of an arenafor other actors, rather than as an actor in its ownright, even if the Quartet has provided the UN withinfluence on guiding political initiatives. At the sametime, its position has been difficult; often derided inIsrael as useless and biased, the organization hasundertaken great efforts to be seen as more balanced.In recent years, derision has come increasingly fromArabs, who perceive the UN to be a tool in the handsof occupiers, be it in Palestine, Lebanon, or Iraq.

Such perceptions curtail the UN’s role andinfluence, but also underline its inherent importance.It has suffered some of its most bitter defeats in theMiddle East, not least with the infamous Oil for FoodProgram in Iraq and the post-invasion bombing ofUN headquarters in Baghdad; but the UN has alsoachieved some significant accomplishments in theregion, in particular when it has been able to engagein support of existing peace and state-buildingprocesses, such as in the early years of the Oslo processin Palestine, or in Lebanon. It is also likely to play anincreased role in Iraq in the future.As a result, the UNwill continue to be limited in the scope of its activi-ties and is unlikely to lead conflict resolution or crisiscoping mechanisms, but to continue as a partner tocollective international efforts. As an arena providinglegitimacy to such efforts on the political level, theUN remains indispensable in all epicenters in theMiddle East. In this role, the UN may well see adeepened engagement in the coming period withregard to Iraq, precipitated by a possible coalitionpolicy shift, adding to its considerable contemporaryimmersion in Lebanon and the wider Arab-Israeliconflict, and its use as a political arena in relation to

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Iran’s nuclear program.As such, the UN will remain a key actor in the

coming years, when comprehensive efforts will needto be undertaken to manage the multiple crises in theMiddle East. Multi-level engagement and crisismanagement activity will reflect the variance of – andinterlinkages between – conflicts, where efforts on thedomestic, regional, and global levels will have to bepursued in parallel in order to allow for effective crisismanagement, building on existing models. Attemptsto resolve conflict or manage it on one level alone arebound to fail; domestic efforts will not succeedwithout a broader regionally comprehensiveapproach. Global efforts, meanwhile, are equallydoomed to failure if not underpinned and accompa-nied by internal domestic efforts and regional supportstructures.As such, for example, support for democra-tization will need to mean not change demanded orimposed from the outside, but built from the inside.External support will need to focus on state-buildingprojects that create strong institutions capable ofdelivering services and goods to all citizens, thus inturn forging states that are strong in the sense ofpopular legitimacy. Should any or all these efforts failto adequately address the challenges confronting theMiddle East in the coming five to ten years, however,the region will be certain to witness further deterio-ration – to the peril of all in the region and outside it.

Towards a Strategy for Coping withCrisis: A Regional SecurityArchitectureCrisis coping strategies in and vis-à-vis the MiddleEast in the coming period will need to reflect themultiplicity of conflict and the interrelatedness of thevarious challenges by engaging on multiple levels andinvolving multiple players. International conflictresolution efforts need to be led by the United States,despite the growing perception of its partisan rolewithin the region, with (for that very reason) theactive and legitimizing involvement of the UnitedNations as well as the economic underpinningsupport of Europe.The Middle East Quartet, thoughfar from successful in its efforts vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict until 2006, may provide a model forfurther development, in particular when combinedwith the wider efforts of a “Quartet+” mechanismlinking extra-regional actors with players from withinthe region. Such efforts will avoid the creation ofimpressions of global interventionism and of neo-

imperial undertakings.They will further the reach andlegitimacy of conflict resolution initiatives.

At the same time, such efforts will have to becarefully calibrated to respond to all crises in parallel,in a holistic and regionally comprehensive manner.Given the manifold interlinkages between the currentand emerging epicenters of instability and crisis in theMiddle East, ultimately only strategies that address allmajor challenges in parallel can yield success. Partial,inconsistent, and one-sided engagement will bydefinition remain unsuccessful and is likely to createadditional challenges for the future. Global, regional,and domestic efforts thus have to be designed toaddress all challenges in a comprehensive and consis-tent manner, placing the emphasis on stability andgradual transition towards new structures. A clearspace must be afforded to all relevant players andparties, with stable, sustainable, and lasting statestructures in the most vulnerable epicenters, and awider regional security architecture that addresses theconcerns and interests of all equitably.

In this context, the absence of a wider regionalsecurity coordination mechanism has long beenidentified as a key impediment to stability in theregion. Originally developed in the days of the Iran-Iraq war, proposals to create a structure of consultationand cooperation between Arab states, Israel, Iran, andIraq, modeled on the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe, retain their relevance andshould be taken into serious consideration as strategiesare devised with present-day and longer-termchallenges emanating from the Middle East. Given itssignaling effects and symbolic significance, progress inthe Middle East peace process towards a settlement ofthe wider Arab-Israeli conflict, eventually resulting ina just, lasting, and comprehensive regional peaceagreement, will be a cornerstone to attaining securityand stability throughout the region.At the same time,the state-building enterprises in Iraq, Lebanon, andPalestine, as well as incremental transitional processesof political reform and economic adjustmentthroughout the region, with significant and sustainedinternational support, will be equally importantmilestones on the way to securing lasting stabilitythroughout the Middle East. The engagement andultimate reintegration of Syria and Iran into the widerregional security architecture will be similarly signifi-cant, if not a precondition to achieve these goals.

Should these elements be realized throughconcerted, coordinated, and comprehensive effortsdomestically, regionally, and globally, then stability,prosperity, and enduring security will become a

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realistic prospect for the Middle East and the world.Failure to engage in a comprehensive strategy ofcoping with crisis, however, will threaten to set deteri-oration in motion throughout the region, which willaffect the wider world considerably. If the opportuni-ties emerging from a reality of fragility and crisis arebuilt on intelligently and effectively, a ‘new’ MiddleEast may yet see the light in the coming five to ten

years. Should the international communitymismanage individual processes, however, deteriora-tion throughout all epicenters and the entire region isa realistic prospect, with significant effects on interna-tional relations at large, as well as on the globaleconomy.

– January 2007

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Further Reading

International Crisis Group reports on the Middle East are among the best policy-oriented material produced ingeneral: www.crisisgroup.org. Among the best and most relevant reports are

International Crisis Group, Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the Abyss, Middle East Report No. 57,July 25, 2006.

______, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink, Middle East Report No. 54, June 13,2006.

______, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, Middle East Report No. 52, February 27, 2006.______, Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?, Middle East Report No. 51, February 23, 2006.

Other policy-oriented reports of sufficient quality are rare to find. There are many commentaries on acuteconditions, but few reports that more broadly outline particular crises from a perspective that remains relevant formore than a few weeks.Among the most interesting pieces are

Leverett, Flynt,“The Middle East:Thinking Big,” American Prospect, March 5, 2005.

Article promoting the establishment of coherent and institutionalized regional security architecture, by formerNSC director for the Middle East.

Lowe, Robert, and Claire Spencer, eds. Iran, its Neighbour and the Regional Crises. London: Chatham House,Middle East Programme Report,August 2006.

Recent report on Iran’s role in the various Middle Eastern crises and on perceptions among its neighbors, outlininginterests, positions and conflicts across the region.

Malley, Rob, and Hussein Agha,“Camp David:The Tragedy of Errors,” a series of articles/exchanges in theNew York Review of Books,August 9, 2001, September 20, 2001, June 13, 2002 and June 27, 2002.

Widely read exchange on the reasons for the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit.

Malone, David M., Ben Rowswell, and Markus E. Bouillon, eds. Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of Conflict.Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007.

Multiple-author volume on current drivers of conflict, obstacles in the stabilization and peace-building effort, andidentification of necessary elements for state-building in Iraq.

Tripp, Charles,“Regional Organizations in the Arab Middle East”. In Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell,eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995.

Most comprehensive and best overview of regional organizations in the Middle East.

World Bank, Better Governance for Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Enhancing Inclusiveness andAccountability.Washington, DC:World Bank, 2003.

World Bank study concluding that governance and political reform is a key ingredient if not precondition forsuccessful economic reform and adjustment.

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www.crisisgroup.org

The International Peace Academy is an independent, international institution dedicated to promotingthe prevention and settlement of armed conflicts between and within states through policy research anddevelopment.

Coping with Crisis is a multi-year research and policy-facilitation program on emerging human andinternational security challenges and institutional response capacities.

The Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series

The Middle East: Fragility and CrisisMarkus Bouillon

Africa: Confronting Complex ThreatsKwesi Aning

Asia: Towards Security CooperationMichael Vatikiotis

Central Asia and the Caucasus:A Vulnerable CrescentThomas de Waal and Anna Matveeva

Europe: Crises of IdentityShada Islam

Latin America and the Caribbean:Domestic and Transnational InsecurityArlene Tickner

Global Political Violence: Explaining thePost-Cold War DeclineAndrew Mack

New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection,Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone

Small Arms and Light Weapons: Towards GlobalPublic PolicyKeith Krause

Peacemaking and Mediation: Dynamics of aChanging FieldChester Crocker

Ending Wars and Building PeaceCharles Call and Elizabeth Cousens

Nuclear Weapons: The Politics of Non-proliferationChristine Wing

Transnational Organized Crime: MultilateralResponses to a Rising ThreatJames Cockayne

Global Public Health and Biosecurity: ManagingTwenty-First Century RisksMargaret Kruk

Population Trends: Humanity in TransitionJoseph Chamie

Energy Security: Investment or InsecurityFaith Birol

Food Security: Vulnerability Despite AbundanceMarc Cohen

Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration LinkNils Petter Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Ragnhild Nordås

Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality LinkRavi Kanbur

777 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017-3521 p 212 687-4300 f 212 983-8246 www.ipacademy.org

International Peace Academy

For more information about the series and electronic access to additional papers go towww.ipacademy.org/our-work/coping-with-crisis/working-papers.

www.ipacademy.org/our-work/coping-with-crisis/working-papers

Documents

Coping with Crisis - ETH ZThe Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Middle East Peace Process The traditionally most significant challenge in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict and