Coping With an Oiled Sea - Princeton

Coping With an Oiled Sea

March 1990

OTA-BP-O-63NTIS order #PB90-219973

Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Coping With An Oiled Sea: An Analysis ofOil Spill Response Technologies, OTA-BP-O-63 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, March 1990).

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

ii

ForewordIn the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in March, 1989, a myriad of

investigations were initiated to evaluate the causes of that accident and to propose reme-dies. The Office of Technology Assessment was asked to study the Nation’s oil spillclean-up capabilities and to assess the technologies for responding to such catastrophicspills in the future. The request for this study came from Senator Ted Stevens, a mem-ber of the Technology Assessment Board, and from Congressman Billy Tauzin, Chair-man of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee onMerchant Marine and Fisheries. This background paper presents the results of OTA’sanalysis. It discusses the current technologies and capabilities in the United States andabroad and evaluates the prospects for future improvements.

Cleaning up a discharge of millions of gallons of oil at sea under even moderate envi-ronmental conditions is an extraordinary problem. Current national capabilities to re-spond effectively to such an accident are marginal at best. OTA’s analysis shows thatimprovements could be made, and that those offering the greatest benefits would notrequire technological breakthroughs –just good engineering design and testing, skilledmaintenance and training, timely access to and availability of the most appropriate andsubstantial systems, and the means to make rapid, informed decisions. One mustunderstand, however, that even the best national response system will have inherentpractical limitations that will hinder spill response efforts for catastrophic events–sometimes to a major extent. For that reason it is important to pay at least equal atten-tion to preventive measures as to response systems. In this area, the proverbial ounce ofprevention is worth many, many pounds of cure.

Director

. . .111

OTA Oil Spill Study Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert W. Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Project Staff

Peter A. Johnson, Project DirectorWilliam E. Westermeyer, Co-Project Director

James E. Mielke, Specialist in Marine and Earth Sciences1

Contractors

Virgil F. Keith, ECO, Inc.Richard Willis, ECO, Inc.

Administrative Staff

Kathleen A. Beil, Administrative AssistantSally Van Aller, Secretary

I Congressional Research Service, Science Policy Division, Library of Congress.

iv

Contents

Chapter 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2. Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 3. Oil Spill Response Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......11

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....11

Mechanical Spill Response Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Dispersants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......19

Burning, Bioremediation, and Other Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......22

Quantity and Distribution of Response Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . .......24Chapter 4. U.S. Oil Spill Response Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....27

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......27

Technology: Which Cleanup Method? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......27

Decisionmaking: Democratic and Authoritarian Approaches . . . . .......28

Responsibility: The Polluter or the Government? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......28

Logistics: Essential to Quick Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......29

Beach Cleanup: How Much Emphasis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......30

Federal Regulations and Emergency Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......31

Equipment Testing: How Realistic? How Effective? . . . . . . . . . . . .......32

Personnel, Training, and Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...33

Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......34

Chapter 5. Selected European Oil Spill Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..39

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......39

French Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......39

Dutch Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......41

United Kingdom Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...43

Norwegian Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....44

General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......46

Appendix A. Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies . . . . . . .......51

Appendix B. Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . .......58

Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..68

Appendix D. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......70

Contents

FiguresFigure Page

3-1.3-2.3-3.3-4.A-1.A-2.A-3.A-4.A-5.A-6.A-7.A-8.A-9.A-10.A - n .

Table

2-10

3-1.4-1.4-2.5-1.A-1.B-1.

B-2.B-3.B-4.B-5.B-6.B-7.B-8.

B-9.

B-10.

Spread of an Exxon Valdez-Sized Oil Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....11Vessel-of-Opportunity Skimming System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......17West German THOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..18Schematic Drawing of the Navy’s Class V Oil Skimmer . . . . . . . . . .......18Components of a Boom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ....5IWeir Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......52Floating Suction Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Schematic Drawing of a Weir Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......53Vortex Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......53Disc Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......54Rope Mop Skimmer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....55Paddle Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56Sorbent Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56Sorbent Lifting Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56Submersion Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...57

TablesPage

Large Oil Spills: A List of 66 Spills Greater Than 2 Million Gallons,1967 to Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Equipment Required To Deploy Response Elements . . . . . . . . . . . .......20Suggestions Received by the Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....36Selection of Planned R&D Efforts by Federal Agencies and Industry . . . . .38Summary of Oil Spill Response Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......47Boom Classification According to Freeboard and Draft . . . . . . . . . .......52Major Types, Quantities, and Location of U.S. Navy SpillResponse Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......59Major National Strike Force Equipment of the U.S. Coast Guard .. .....59Major Sources of Skimmers in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......60Major Sources of Containment Boom in the United States . . . . . . .......61Major Sources of Offloading Pumps in the United States . . . . . . . .......62Major Sources of Dispersant Delivery Systems in the United States .....63Alyeska Response Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....64Equipment Based at the Oil Spill Response Center,Southampton, U.K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....64Petroleum Industry Response Organization Regional CenterCapital Equipment Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..66U.S. Oil Spill Co-Ops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..67

Chapter 1

Overview

The March 24, 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill inPrince William Sound, Alaska dramatically il-luminated the gap between the assumed andactual capability of industry and governmentto respond to catastrophic oil spills. Thereare many reasons why this gap wasn’t betterappreciated before March 24: elaborate oilspill contingency plans had been prepared andapproved; oil spill equipment had been devel-oped and stocked; major damaging spills hadoccurred infrequently, and almost never inthe United States; and a nebulous faith hadexisted that technology and American corpo-rate management and know-how could pre-vent and/or significantly mitigate the worstdisasters.

The Exxon Valdez accident shattered thiscomplacency. In the aftermath of the spill asmall army of people has been put to workaround the country studying how the UnitedStates can do a better job preventing spills andhow it can be better prepared to fight one thatdoes occur. In this background paper, OTA ex-amines the state-of-the-art of oil spill tech-nologies and response capabilities. On anencouraging note, it appears that improve-ments can be made in oil spill cleanup tech-nology and, perhaps even more, in the way weorganize ourselves to apply the most appro-priate technologies to fight oil spills. Suchimprovements should result in a reduced riskof significant damage from a major spill in thefuture.

However, the unfortunate reality is that,short of eliminating oil transportation at seaentirely, there is no perfect solution to off-shore oil spills. It is certain that oil spills willoccur again. If improvements in preventiontechnology are made, the frequency of majorspills may decrease, but improvements are

unlikely to eliminate oil spills entirely, and avery large spill under adverse conditionscould still overwhelm our capacity to respondeffectively. Even using the best technologyavailable and assuming a timely and coordi-nated response effort, it is not realistic to ex-pect that a significant amount of oil from amajor offshore spill could be recovered, ex-cept under the most ideal conditions. Histori-cally, it has been unusual for more than 10 to15 percent of oil to be recovered from a largespill, where attempts have been made to re-cover it. With improvements in technologyand response capability, it should become fea-sible to do much better, but it is unlikely thattechnical improvements will result in recov-ery of even half the oil from a typical largespill.

It is not feasible to be prepared for all con-tingencies: each oil spill is unique in terms oflocation, weather, oceanographic conditions,time of occurrence, characteristics of the oil,equipment available, and experience of re-sponse personnel. Accidents are unpredict-able. They may be caused by “acts of God” orhuman error, both of which are impossible tofully anticipate or control. The ideal condi-tions in which cleanup technology would bemost effective rarely occur in the real world.

The U.S. industry has concentrated its ef-forts in developing technology to fight the nu-merous small spills in harbors and protectedwaters. On the one hand, industry has over-sold its ability to fight major spills, and thegovernment has largely relied on private capa-bilities; on the other, the public’s expectationabout what can be accomplished once a majorspill has occurred has been too high. Preven-tion of major spills, although beyond thescope of this study, must be a high priority.2

I For the purP=9 of thi9 report the terms “catastrophic, “ “major)” and “large offshore” spills refer to discharges in excess of 1million gallons of oil that occur in open waters subject to rough seas, high currents, or other adverse environmental factors.

2For a de~]~ diws5ion of prevention Meawres, see U.S. Conwess, OffIce of T~hno]o~ Assessment, oil ~mn.SpOrtdkm byTankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measunx (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, July 1975).

1

—.————

2 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

It is important to put the environmentalimpacts of a major oil spill into perspective.Such a spill is indeed a catastrophe, but oilspills are not the worst type of pollution withwhich Federal and State authorities have todeal. In terms of threats to human health andpersistence in the environment, spills of haz-ardous chemicals or radioactive waste can befar larger problems, and accidents involvingdangerous materials can cause significant lossof life. Nevertheless, it is a serious problemwhen a large quantity of oil is spilled in acoastal or near-coastal area. The public is par-ticularly concerned about large spills in sensi-tive areas because the effects on the local eco-system are acute, often initially devastatingboth to biota and economic activities. Oil canbe toxic to organisms that come into contactwith it and can cause major problems withrecreational or other uses of coastal regions,

such as commercial fishing in Alaska. If largeamounts of oil reach the shore, the oil maypersist for long periods, even though naturaldegradation mechanisms do assist recovery.3

As bad as the Exxon Valdez accident was, itcould have been far worse: only about one-fifth of the crude oil the tanker was carryingwas released. Fortunately, the rest was off-loaded. The Amoco Cadiz did spill its entirecargo off the coast of France in 1978, a cargoroughly the same size as that carried by theExxon Valdez.4 Significantly, neither the oilindustry, the Federal Government, nor theState of Alaska were prepared to deal with aspill the size of the Exxon Valdez spill. It wasfortunate, in a sense, that the spiller in this in-cident was a major international oil companycapable of marshaling significant resources,rather than a small tanker company.

s~ 1974 the supe~ker Me~~ Spi]]ed some 16.2 million gallons of oil ~er grounding in the Strait of Magellan. Essentially, nocleanup occurred and at least half of the oil lost washed onto about 50 miles of shoreline. A study by the National Oceanic and Atmos-pheric Administration about 6 years aiter the spill concluded that much of the oil remained in sediments, along beaches, and inmarshes. In heavily oiled, sheltered areas, it seems likely that the oil will persist for more than 100 years.

4TheAmoco CacZiz spill released 66.4 million gallons of light crude oil off the Brittany coast in France. Prevailing winds kept the slicknear the coast for 1 month, eventually oilingabout 200 miles of coastline. In a 19S5 report, Oil in the Sea, the National Research Councilestimated that it would take decades before the environment recovered.

Chapter 2

Findings

The Exxon Valdez accident was the largestspill (about 10.8 million gallons or 35,000tons) in U.S. history. Not since the Santa Bar-bara oil spill 20 years earlier has as much pub-lic concern been voiced about the inability ofgovernment and industry to respond effec-tively to large oil spills. Although such spillshave occurred worldwide at the rate of 3 to 5per year since the Torrey Canyon accident offEngland in 1967, many of these (table 2-1)have escaped U.S. attention. This OTA studyis not directed at an evaluation of what wentwrong with the Exxon Valdez but is focused onthe response capabilities (or lack thereof) thatwere brought to bear in the Exxon Valdezspill, as well as in other large offshore spills.

Two factors are important to the questionof why public and private oil spill response ca-pabilities seem so limited today. First, verylarge accidents and catastrophic oil spills havenot occurred very often in U.S. waters. Thelast major tanker spill near the United Stateswas the Alvenus spill off the Gulf Coast in1984. It was about one-third the size of the Ex-xon Valdez spill, and, even though a large por-tion of the 2.7 million gallon spill was depos-ited on Texas beaches, the type of oil and thelocal conditions were such that beach cleanupwas reasonably effective. Second, many be-lieved that the responsible industry and gov-ernment agencies were prepared. The exhaus-tive contingency plans appeared to beevidence of the preparation and demonstra-tion of adequate capabilities.

In the light of actual events, the responsecapabilities of both government and privateentities proved inadequate for an Exxon Val-dez type of accident. It is also clear that thefew other large offshore spills that have oc-

%ob cmdt U.S. Coast Guad

The Exxon Valdez, flanked by two tugboats,in Prince William Sound.

curred in U.S. coastal waters in the past 10 to15 years have mostly escaped public atten-tion, largely because natural events dispersedor mitigated the impacts. One spill caughtfire, burning most of the oil; others happenedwhere favorable winds and currents carriedand dispersed most of the oil to the open seal

Many people have asked how can we be soill-prepared for massive oil spills in the mod-ern world of high technology. Perhaps theUnited States has not given attention to devel-oping appropriate technology in this arena;maybe we haven’t made needed investmentsin research; or maybe management of the re-sponse was just inept.

This OTA study addresses the question oftechnological promises and limitations. Thetechnology now available for oil spill cleanupin the United States and overseas has manylimitations affecting capabilities in real worldsituations. This has resulted in only verysmall percentages of actual cleanup for al-most all past major ocean spills. Some sourcesclaim that the most oil that can be recovered

I In the Bumah ~a~e accident off the Gulf Coast in 1979, the oil caught fire and resulted in most of the spill burning up. In theAr@Merchant spill off New England in 1976, the offshore winds carried almost all of the oil out to sea and it was dissipated in the openocean.


Table 2-1 -Large Oil Spills: A List of 66 Spills Greater Than 2 Million Gallons, 1967 to Present

Volume(millions

No. Date Spill Location of gallons) Ref(s)

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435383738394041424344454647484950

1979-198019831983197819791980-198119791967198019721981197619701977197919781975198519851978197119891974198319701978197819831985196819701974197319801989197819791971197219761977197219701969197719761976196919691977

lxtoc 1, Well BlowoutNowruz Oil Field, Well Blowout(s)Castillo de Beliver/Broke, FireAmoco Cadiz/GroundingAegean Captain/Atlantic EmpressD-103 Libya, Well BlowoutAtlantic EmpresslFireTorrey Canyon/GroundingIrenes Serenade/FireSea Star/Collision, FireKuwait Nat’l Petroleum TankUrquiola/GroundingOthello/CollisionHawaiian Patriot/FireIndependentsNo. 126 Well/PipeJakob MaerskBP Storage TankNova/CollisionBP, Shell Fuel Dept.WafraKharg 5, ExplosionMetula/GroundingAssimi/FirePolycommanderTohoku Storage Tanks, EarthquakeAndros PatriaPericles GCRanger, TX, Well BlowoutWorld Glory/Hull FailureEnnerdale/struck GraniteMizushima Refinery, Tank RuptureNapierJuan A. LavallejaExxon Valdez/GroundingTurkish Petroleum CorporationBurmah Agate/Collision, FireTexaco Oklahoma, 120 mi. offshoreTinderSt. PeterIrene’s ChallengeGolden DrakeChryssiPacocean/Broke in twoCaribbean SeaGrand Zenith/DisappearanceCretan starKeo/Hull failureStorage TankEkofisk Bravo, Well Blowout

MexicoPersian GulfSouth AfricaFranceOff TobagoLibyaBarbadosEnglandGreeceGulf of OmanKuwaitSpainSwedenN PacificTurkeyIranPortugalNigeriaIranZimbabweSouth AfricaMoroccoChileoff OmanSpainJapanSpainQatarTexasSouth AfricaSeychellesJapanSE PacificAlgeriaAlaskaTurkeyTexasNorth CarolinaMediterraneanSE PacificPacificNW AtlanticNW AtlanticNW PacificE PacificNW AtlanticIndian OceanMassachusettsNew JerseyNorth Sea

139-428*80-18550-80’67-7649*4241 .5*35.7-38.6*12.3-36.6*35.3*31.227-30.7’18.4 -30.730.4*28.92825*23.921.42019.6*191615.8*3-15.31514.6146.3-13.713.512.611.311*1110.810.71 .3-10 .7*9.2-10.710.410.410.49.59.59.29.28.98.98.88.44.6-8.2

abghababeabfhmablaablbcfambfabfbcfbfa

aa

gcfacaaabkbcfcfcdffaiaabccffffffffffbfbbf

a. A List of the 20..., 1989. f. Butler, 1978. j. Ganten, 1985. n. Tracey, 1988.b. Reuters, 1989. g. Woods and Hannah, 1981. k. Quina et al., 1987. 0. Ocean Industry, 1980.c. Van Gelder-Ottway..., 1976. h. Teal and Howarth, 1984. 1. Horn and Neil, 1981. p. NRC, 1975.d. A Basic Spill..., 1981. i. Caleb Brett, 1989 m. Bao-Kang, 1987. q. Journal of Commerce, 1/4/90.e. Lord et al., 1987.

Tinker spdls from the kan/lraq war were not goneralty available

● Fire burned part of spill

SOURCE: Exxon Corp and Of?lca of Technology Aasassment

Chapter 2–Findings .5

Table 2-1- Large Oil Spills: A List of 66 Spills Greater Than 2 Million Gallons, 1967 to Present (Continued)

Volume(millions

No. Date Spill Location of gallons) Ref(s)

51 1972 Giuseppi Guilietti NE Atlantic 8 f52 1977 Venpet and Venoil/Collision South Africa 7.4-8 ef53 1976 Argo Merchant/Grounding Massachusetts 7.7 bfh54 1967 Humble Oil Pipeline, Offshore Leak Louisiana 6 7 n55 1973 Jawacta Baltic Sea 6.1 c56 1967 R.C. Stoner Wake Island 6 c57 1970 Marlena Sicily 4.3 c58 1970 Pipeline Saudi Arabia 4.2 c59 1971 Oil Well Persian Gulf 4,2 c60 1980 Tanio/Broke amidships France 4.2 j61 1988 Ashland Storage Tank, Rupture Pennsylvania 3.8 b62 1969 Santa Barbara Channel, Well Blowout California 1.4-3,4 dfp63 1970 Arrow/Grounding Nova Scotia 1.5-3.1 ch64 1970 Storage Tank Pennsylvania 3 c65 1984 Alvenus/Grounding Louisiana 2.8 b66 1970 Offshore Platform, Well Blowout Louisiana 2.7 c

a. A List of the 20..., 1989. f. Butter, 1978.b. Reuters, 1989. g. Woods and Hannah, 1981c. Van Gelder-Ottway..., 1976. h. Teal and Howarth, 1984.d. A Basic Spill..., 1981. i. Caleb Brett, 1989e. Lord et al., 1987.

Tanker spills from the Iran/Iraq war were not generally available

● Fire burned part of spill

SOURCE: Exxon Corp and Office of Technology Assessment

after a major spill is 10 to 15 percent.2 OTAobtained data from several documented openocean large tanker spills that show the actualoil recovered at sea has been less than 10 per-cent of oil discharged –usually much less.Probably between 6 and 8 percent of the oilspilled by the Exxon Valdez was recovered atsea,3 although, as of this writing, Exxon is stillin the process of developing a recovery esti-mate. Under the best conditions, with the besttechnology, with technology that is immedi-ately available, and with the ablest organiza-tion, cleanup capabilities could be substan-tially improved. However, technical expertshave widely ranging views on the magnitudeof potential improvements, mainly because

j. Ganten, 1985. n. Tracey, 1988.k. Quina et al., 1987. 0. Ocean Industry, 1980.I. Horn and Neil, 1981. p. NRC, 1975.m. Bao-Kang, 1987. q. Journal of Commerce, 1/4/90.

the best conditions seldom occur in the realworld.4

Many claim that techniques other than me-chanical recovery could be used to mitigatethe effects of a large offshore oil spill withoutactually picking up the oil. These techniquesinclude use of dispersants and burning. In factthese other techniques have seldom been usedsuccessfully. In some cases public concernsabout side effects have prevented their use(these include possible toxic effects of dis-persed oil and air emissions from burning oil).In other cases, sea conditions or the conditionof the spilled oil have resulted in poor per-formance of these techniques.

ZU.S. ~ner~ Ac~unting o~ce, Ade~a~ of Preparation and Response to Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, October 1989.

ow~ter p~ker, ~aska Oi] Spi]] Commission, personal communication, Feb. 12, IW.4At OTA’S Oil Spill workshop in August 1989, several experts agreed that the high end of recovery capabilities for large ocean spills

might hypothetically reach more than 30 percent with the best technology.


The main question, therefore, is what im-provements could be expected if new tech-nologies or techniques were employed in thefuture. This OTA study has concluded thatimprovements could be made and that themost obvious improvements would not re-quire any technological breakthroughs-justgood engineering design and testing, goodmaintenance and training, timely access tothe most appropriate systems, and rapid, in-formed decisions. The improvements that canbe made, however, also have limitations, andthe inherent practical difficulties of recover-ing oil from the ocean will always hinder spillresponse efforts, sometimes to a major extent.

The key findings from this OTA evaluationare summarized below:

Mechanical containment and recovery isthe primary U.S. oil spill responsemethod. The technology currently avail-able for mechanical oil spill cleanup hasmany limitations, and only very smallpercentages of oil have been cleaned upfrom most major spills. While new de-signs have appeared over the years, thebasic technology has not changed in thepast decade.

Current mechanical containment and re-covery technology (especially that avail-able in the United States) is not usuallyeffective in waves greater than 6 feet,winds greater than 20 knots, and cur-rents greater than 1 knot (perpendicularto a boom). Wind and current conditionsin U.S. port areas, not to mention off-shore areas, often exceed these limits,leaving little margin for the effective useof existing mechanical equipment.

Improvements in mechanical recoverytechnologies that can be expected fromstepped-up research and developmentefforts are unlikely to result in dramatic

increases in total oil recovered from acatastrophic spill. In general, the im-provements that are likely to offergreater effectiveness for large offshorespills involve larger, more costly equip-ment, strategically located for quick re-sponse.

One prospect for reducing the high costof more effective containment and recov-ery equipment for large spills is to em-ploy dual purpose vessels. Army Corps ofEngineers’ dredges, for example, couldbe designed or retrofitted with oil spillrecovery equipment, and be on call tofight spills as needed. Commercialbarges, Coast Guard vessels, and othervessels of opportunity may also be em-ployed. Such an approach may also offerthe advantage of keeping more equip-ment in strategic locations.

Dispersants, like mechanical cleanupmethods, have their place as an oil spillcountermeasures tool. Greater use ofdispersants has been hampered in partby concerns about toxicity and in part byconcerns about effectiveness. Currentlyavailable dispersants are less toxic thanthe oil they dispersers but dispersed oilcan be toxic until it breaks down or is di-luted sufficiently, and it will impact agreater fraction of the water column (orthe sea bottom if used in shallow water)than undispersed oil. Dispersant usemay involve a trade-off between the envi-ronmental effects of a treated oil slickwith the shoreline impacts of an un-treated one.

The effectiveness of dispersants is per-haps of more concern than their toxicity.A number of experts disagree about theeffectiveness of dispersants, and there isas yet no reliable method to test effec-tiveness in field operations. Although

5Nation~ mse~ch Counci], Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), p. 3.

Chapter 2-–Findings ● 7

●

●

some currently available dispersantshave proved effective in ideal situations,ideal conditions rarely exist in the realworld. Research to improve dispersanteffectiveness is continuing and appearsto be producing some encouraging re-sults.

Abroad, some countries rely almost ex-clusively on mechanical cleanup meth-ods (e.g., Norway and the Netherlands),while others (e.g., the United Kingdom)rely almost exclusively on dispersants.Some countries have much larger me-chanical systems than those currentlyavailable in the United States (e.g., dualpurpose dredges in the Netherlands) andthus have much greater capacities forhigh volume recovery. Different policiesregarding the use of mechanical meth-ods are due largely to different physicalconditions in each country; differentdispersant policies relate to varying per-ceptions about their effectiveness andtoxicity.

In situ burning of spilled oil appears tohave merit in certain spill situations, es-pecially if the oil can be contained andthickened with the use of fireproofbooms. This technique is not currentlyan important oil spill countermeasurebut is being investigated further in theUnited States. Some experiments haveresulted in high burn percentages andthus high removal rates. Nevertheless,burning is probably also limited in its ap-plications. Igniting and keeping a slickburning may be a problem in some cir-cumstances; in others, burning mayjeopardize the stricken vessel and any oilremaining on board– oil which mightotherwise be off-loaded; and the resul-tant visible air pollution (which must,however, be balanced against the invis-ible air pollution caused by allowingevaporation of the toxic volatile compo-nents of the oil) may be unacceptable.

“ A

Despite the shortcomings of all existingcountermeasure approaches, each mayhave applications in certain situations.There is no one general solution to an oilspill. Many technologies may be very ef-fective in certain applications but com-pletely inappropriate in others. Regard-less of the technique(s) employed, theeffectiveness of the response will begreatly enhanced if there is a rapid re-sponse by a professional response teamthat understands which techniques arebest under which conditions. The speedof a response is critical and is dependenton rapid decisionmaking, logistics, andtraining.

—

Decisionmaking: If important deci-sions, such as how to deploy me-chanical equipment and whether touse dispersants, are not made withinthe first few hours after a major spill,the spill may be beyond effective con-trol. Rapid decisionmaking is diffi-cult in the United States, in partbecause oil companies have the re-sponsibility to clean up major spillsbut not the authority to use allmeans they deem appropriate. Rapiddecisionmaking could be enhanced ifthe government were responsible forcombating major vessel spills, as isthe case inmost European countries;if authority within the governmentwere more centralized; and if,through more thorough contingencyplanning, a greater number of deci-sions could be made without delay.

Logistics: Having the right equip-ment on scene when needed is essen-tial to a rapid response. Equipmentmay either be strategically located orrapidly moved to the spill site, but ineither case the recovery effort willonly be as good as the weakest link inthe system. Response system ele-ments such as adequate ships or


●

●

barges to accept recovered oil, tem-porary storage sites, and a means todispose the recovered oil are oftencrucial to a successful operation andare often ignored.

– Training: A career track for oil spillresponse professionals does not nowexist in the Federal Government.With the Coast Guard rotation sys-tem currently in effect, operationalexpertise is hard to come by, andeven if developed, maybe lost beforerequired. The establishment of atrained professional cadre to fight oilspills throughout the country (andperhaps abroad too) could make asignificant difference in the govern-ment’s ability to respond rapidly tospills. To be effective, professionaltraining must include the conduct ofperiodic exercises and contingencyplan testing.

The response to a major spill would bemore rapid and efficient if certain regula-tions could be waived or streamlined.Regulations that are appropriate undernormal operating procedures but whichmay cause unnecessary delay in emer-gency situations include: 1) Clean WaterAct restrictions that prohibit the decant-ing of oily water collected during cleanupoperations, and 2) Jones Act restrictionsthat restrict the use of available foreignvessels without a waiver.

The oil industry, through a new Petro-leum Industry Response Organization(PIRO), proposes to establish 5 or moreregional oil spill response centers andclaims it could endow each with the ca-pability to fight a 30,000-ton (about 9million gallons) spill. In January 1990the PIRO Steering Committee recom-mended adoption of this proposal with a5-year budget of almost $400 million andmembership by 20 oil companies. This isa worthwhile concept and could bring

●

●

about a major increase in U.S. capabili-ties when implemented. However, indus-try and the appropriate Federal agenciesmust work together to devise an effi-cient, integrated approach to fightingmajor oil spills. The benefits of the re-gional center approach could be en-hanced if the specific organization, func-tion, and outfitting of each center werejointly determined. Also, if the govern-ment continues to rely on private re-sources for spill response, it must care-fully monitor the availability andcapability of those resources.

Increased R&D on oil spill response tech-nologies will likely yield incrementalbenefits. Important problems can bebetter understood, but technologicalbreakthroughs that would result in ma-jor improvements in mechanical cleanupcapabilities are unlikely. The most im-portant problems have to do with 1) pro-viding technical backup for decisions onuse of techniques such as dispersantsand other chemicals, 2) developing tech-nical standards based on full-scale testsof capabilities of specific equipment, and3) sound engineering design and con-struction of substantial and reliable sys-tems in enough quantities to meet per-formance requirements for oil recoveryunder real world operating conditions.

One aspect of future technical improve-ments – that of pollution prevention –may provide significant benefits to theoverall oil spill problem. While manyhave advocated this as an area needingattention, it has not been included in thescope of this OTA study. A 1975 OTAstudy (ref. 2, chapter 1) addresses this is-sue and an on-going National Academyof Sciences/National Research Councilstudy is investigating the current situ-ation with regard to the double-bottom,double-hull issue.

Chapter 2–Findings . 9

● Given the difficulty of containing and has been effective except under idealcleaning up a catastrophic spill at sea, weather conditions. Efforts are probablymany have advocated more attention to needed, however, to improve capabilitiestechniques that would protect priority of protective systems and to assure thecoastal areas (e.g., booms). OTA has not availability of the best equipment.found evidence that shoreline protection

Chapter 3

Oil Spill Response Technologies

INTRODUCTION

The capability to respond effectively to amajor offshore oil spill is a combination ofthree principal factors:

1.

2.

3.

the physical conditions at the time of theaccident or spill;

the suitability, capacity, and availabilityof the technology deployed to fight thespill; and

the skills, training, readiness, and deci-sionmaking capabilities of the organiza-tions and people with responsibilities forcombating the spill.

This OTA study focuses on the second factorwhile recognizing the major influences of theother two and how they interact.

Adverse physical conditions that may bepresent at any spill site always contribute tothe difficulty of responding efficiently and ef-fectively. Some of the key conditions that af-fect a response effort include:

Spreading of Oil. Oil spilled on the waterspreads rapidly. The spreading rate dependson the type of oil, its volume, wind and seaconditions, and the amount of weatheringthat occurs. Figure 3-1 shows the effect ofspreading for calm water conditions and uni-form slick thickness–not necessarily realworld conditions. It can be seen that, for anExxon Valdez type of spill, the oil can spreadover 6 square miles (almost 4,000 acres) dur-ing the first 12 hours.1 The huge area encom-passed by a large spill means substantialamounts of equipment are needed to respond.Spreading also enhances evaporation and so-lution of the oil by creating a large active sur-face area. In addition, an oil slick tends to

Figure 3-1 -Spread of an Exxon Valdez-SizedOil Spill

12 hours 24 hours 2 days 3 days 4 days

Note: Assuming no wind or current

SOURCE: Engineering Computer Optecnomlcs, Inc (ECO)

fragment into a number of smaller patcheswith time, and thus, even larger total surfaceareas must be covered with any available re-covery equipment.

Composition of Oil. The viscosity of the oilcan be a critical factor in the response effort.In addition, oil spills in rough seas quickly be-come emulsions as they mix with water andform “chocolate mousse, ” a substance whichis very difficult to pump. High viscosity oilsare more difficult to recover mechanically anddisperse than low viscosity oils. Also, weather-ing processes such as evaporation, water take-up, oxidation, and biodegradation will in-crease the viscosity. Certain crude oils (suchas Alaskan crude) become very difficult topump when temperatures reach about O to 5degrees Celsius. In addition, the effectivenessof dispersants and the burning process de-creases as viscosity and emulsification in-crease. Also, the total volume of oil/wateremulsion (mousse) can reach several timesthe initial oil spill volume.

‘If all of the containment boom in the U.S. Navy inventory could be deployed to this type of spill site within the first 12 hours, itwould barely be enough to encircle such a spill. In fact, the U.S. Navy response was not even requested until more than 1 week aller theExxon Val& accident.

11

—.


Sea Conditions. Most existing mechanicalequipment becomes much less effective inwaves greater than 3 to 6 feet. In addition,small vessels cannot be used, and deploymentof gear in rough seas can be difficult. Currentscan cause oil to move in unpredictable direc-tions, and booms become ineffective whencurrent velocity exceeds about 1 knot perpen-dicular to the face of the boom.

Weather Conditions. Weather such assnow, fog, heavy rain, high winds, and lowtemperatures all adversely affect the deploy-ment and operation of equipment.

Location of Spill. If the spill is near theshoreline and the drift is toward shore, it willbe very difficult to prevent beach contamina-tion, no matter how ideal the conditions. Themore remote a spill, the more difficult it is toget equipment to the site quickly.

Logistics. It is critical to be able to moveequipment and personnel to the spill site asrapidly as possible. Also, all aspects of thetransportation network are important–barges and other support vessels are oftenoverlooked or not available.

Safety. Response to a large spill must in-clude consideration of fire and explosion po-tential of the slick under the right tempera-ture and atmospheric conditions. Theprotection of people aboard the vessel andthose working on clean-up operations is criti-cal. The safety of the stranded vessel itself isalso important, especially if part of the cargocan be recovered before it is all spilled.

The above factors affect the ability of anyresponse effort to mitigate the effects of alarge offshore spill. OTA has reviewed threemajor categories of existing technologies foroil spill response: mechanical recovery; dis-persants; and burning, bioremediation, andother techniques. In general, none of the cur-rently available technologies are adequate to

respond to and mitigate major offshore spillsof the Exxon Valdez type and size (over 10 mil-lion gallons).

In the United States, almost all of the exist-ing technology in the private sector has beendeveloped for use in harbors and other pro-tected waters. The Coast Guard and the Navyhave equipment in their inventory that wasdesigned for offshore areas in terms of deploy-ability and ruggedness, but it is limited tomoderate sea states, low currents, and moder-ate-size spills. No private U.S. oil spill coop-erative has the ability to deal with large, cata-strophic spills. The few large cooperatives inthe United States have equipment that ismore appropriate for platform spills. TheCoast Guard has only minimal equipment ofits own and depends, in large part, on privateindustry to supply systems to respond tospills. The Coast Guard has not developed anynew equipment in recent years, and the num-ber of strike teams has been reduced fromthree to two. The Navy’s spill response capa-bility is probably more substantial than thatof any other government agency, but itsequipment has been designed to be air-trans-portable and, thus, is limited in size and ca-pacity.

MECHANICAL SPILLRESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES

Mechanical recovery of spilled oilcan be ac-complished by a variety of techniques. A largenumber of different systems have been de-signed and built over the last 20 years. TheWorld Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products,for instance, includes hundreds of harbor,calm water, and offshore booms and skim-mers designed for a variety of spills and condi-tions, in addition to hundreds of sorbants thatsoak up oil.2 Oil spill containment and

2FMXM ~hu]ze (d.), world Catalog of Oil Spill Response Pm&cts (Bsltimore, ~: Port city press, 1*7), 470 PP.

Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies .1.3

cleanup technology has improved marginallyover the past two decades, but private andFederal research efforts in the United Statesdiminished greatly in the 1980s. Mechanicalspill response technologies can be divided intotwo major categories: containment boomsand oil recovery devices. Several containmentand cleanup devices are discussed below.More details are included in appendix A.

Booms

Booms range in vertical dimension fromunder 1 foot for protecting calm water areasto over 7 feet for offshore applications.Smaller booms are less expensive, lighter, andeasier to deploy. Large offshore booms re-quire larger boats, heavier equipment, andoften specialized equipment to deploy and re-cover. Most booms, including large offshorebooms as well as smaller booms, become inef-fective in currents over 1 knot and waveheights over 6 feet. Systems designed for moresevere conditions in the Norwegian sector ofthe North Sea are required by the Norwegiangovernment to be effective in waves up to 9feet and currents of 1.5 knots. However, inwave heights in the range of 6 to 9 feet, the ef-ficiency of the equipment decreases as oil es-capes the boom. In wave heights above 9 feet,oil is whipped into the water and splashedover the booms, and little recovery is possible.

One type of boom, designed for rapid de-ployment, is pumped full of air (in an upperflotation chamber) and water (in a lower bal-last chamber) as it is pulled off a reel. Thus,one trade-off is between rapid deployment us-ing continuous air inflation versus slower de-ployment but less reliance on continuouslyoperating inflation equipment. Booms thatcan be deployed from a reel and do not require

fhoib cmdi~ V7konm Intematimd, Lti.

A weir boom corralling an oil spill.

that sections be bolted together are generallyeasier to handle offshore. Future develop-ments are not likely to be in the direction ofgreater ability to operate in harsher sea condi-tions but more toward ease of operationwithin the limits now attained.

Booms ranging from 18 inches to 80 incheswere used at the Exxon Valdez spill in PrinceWilliam Sounds According to one spill re-sponse supervisor at the spill, the largestbooms were no better at containing oil thanbooms in the 32 to 42 inch range, but thelarger booms were useful to slow down thelarger boats that could not otherwise towslowly enough.4

3En@n&ring Computer Opt=nomics, Inc. (EC! O), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Tahnologies, ” contractor report PreP~ed forthe Ofllce of Technology Assessment, July 1989.

41bid.


Fhc@ edit Jlm Miako

Heavy-duty boom on reel at the Southampton,U.K. Oil Spill Service Centre.

Air bubble barriers are another type of con-tainment device. If air is pumped into a perfo-rated pipe below the water surface, the risingbubbles cause the surface water to flow awayfrom the pipe. Air barriers are more effectivein calm waters and when used at freed installa-tions. An air bubble barrier was employed inthe 1969 Santa Barbara spill with little suc-cess. This equipment requires large amountsof compressed air and presents logisticalproblems, which probably would make it un-suitable for remote areas.

A promising future addition to contain-ment technology may be the high pressurewater jet barrier. The water jet system is de-signed to herd oil, much like a barrier, but un-der a wide variety of operating conditions. Itcan be mounted on and used with oil recoverydevices.

Skimmers

Several basic types of skimmers are avail-able; some of the more common are suction

and weir skimmers and skimmers with a mov-ing surface such as a belt, oil-absorbent ropemop, or disks (see appendix A). Each has itsstrengths and weaknesses, and no single typeis best for all situations or types of oil. Eventhe most effective skimmers have rarely ac-counted for recovery of more than a few per-cent of oil from large spills.

Suction skimmers generally have a fairlyhigh oil recovery rate because of their highpumping capacity, but they do not discrimi-nate well between oil and water and thus havea low recovery efficiency.s They are simple tooperate but do not work well in choppy waves.Weir skimmers have the advantages of beingsimple and reliable, and they have a fairlyhigh recovery rate. However, most (especiallyrigid types) do not work well in waves. Con-ventional weir skimmers also have problemsin becoming clogged with debris. There are avariety of belt skimmers, some with belts ofabsorbent material, some without, and somethat can be used either way. Belt skimmerswith the belt inclined to the water and the up-per surface moving upward can generally han-dle debris very well. They also can be expectedto have a relatively high oil recovery rate andhigh efficiency. Disk skimmers rely on the ad-hesion of oil on rotating disks. Because of thelarge vertical dimensions of the disks, they arerelatively more effective in waves, and thelarger skimmers are effective in fairly high seastates. Disk skimmers have a high recovery ef-ficiency, which can be a considerable advan-tage if storage volume is limited. Among theirdisadvantages are their vulnerability to be-coming clogged with debris, their ineffective-ness with mousse, and their more compli-cated design (which makes them more likelyto break down). Rope mop skimmers have along loop of absorbent oleophilic (oil loving)material that floats on the surface of the water

The oil recovery rate, measured in gallons per minute, is the rate at which pure oil is recovered. Recovery efficiency is the percentoil in the recovered mixture. Robert Schulze (cd.), World Cakdog of Oil Spill Response Products (Baltimore, MD: Port City Press,1987), p. 213.

Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies ● 15

A disk skimmer deployed behind a boom. This model hasthe capacity to recover about 50 tons of oil per hour.

and is then pulled through a wringer to re-move oil. These skimmers have a high recov-ery efficiency, are easy to deploy off the side ofa vessel, and are relatively easy to maintain.

Evaluation of Capabilities

In wind and currents, a boom must be de-signed with proper ballast to remain verticaland to maintain an effective height in thewater. Other problems of containing oil in acurrent are related to the hydrodynamics ofoil in moving water. As an oil slick increases inthickness against the boom, the oil extendsdeeper into the water. Only about 10 percentrises above the waterline. In other words, anoil slick floats in much the same way as an ice-berg. As current velocity increases, more oil isdriven against the barrier. When a critical ve-locity for the depth of the barrier is exceeded,oil will migrate down the barrier and escapeunderneath. Another problem is entrainmentor dispersion of oil droplets in the water as itflows past oil held against a barrier. The rateat which droplets of oil enter the water and

flow beneath the barrier depends on the cur-rent speed (or the relative velocity betweenthe barrier and the water if the barrier is beingtowed) and properties of the oil itself. Bothentrainment and migration of the slick undera barrier become significant problems at cur-rent speeds in excess of 1 knot perpendicularto the boom face.6 Badly designed booms mayfail below this current speed. The difficultiesin handling barriers in open ocean waters arecompounded by the fact that ships towingbooms must navigate at very slow speedswhere it is difficult to maintain steeringcontrol.

Booms have probably reached their practi-cal limits in terms of the maximum wind andwave conditions in which they can be expectedto retain oil. Additional improvement willmost likely result from advances in ease of de-ployment and possible development of new,lighter weight, durable materials.

Skimmer performance varies widely de-pending on the viscosity of the oil being recov-ered. Most skimmers have a range of viscosi-ties in which they work best and can beroughly grouped according to the oil viscosityin which they are most effective. A generalizedgrouping of skimmer performance accordingto oil viscosity is shown below.

Light OilWeirSuctionSubmersion beltsSubmersion plane

Medium OilDiskRope mopSorbent beltSorbent lifting beltSorbent submersion beltBoom-skimmerVortex

(continued)

61 hot ew~s 1.2 miles per hour.

—


Photo credit: Jim Mhlke

A “Foxtail” rope mop skimmer deployed in aNorwegian test tank.

Heavy OilPaddle beltSorbent lifting belt disc (large offshore

types only)Rope mop (high viscosity, but not

Bunker-C)Weir with progressive cavity pump

In general, even the most rugged mechani-cal containment “and recovery equipment islimited in effectiveness to waves of less than 6feet, winds of less than 20 knots, and currentsless than 1 knot. Average wind and currentconditions in many U.S. port areas come closeto these limits leaving little margin for effec-tive use of mechanical equipment. Thus, itwould be normal to expect periods whenweather conditions would preclude operationof mechanical containment and recoveryequipment in any U.S. port area.

Even under ideal conditions, with equip-ment and trained personnel nearby and goodweather, it is not realistic to expect to recovermore than 30 percent of the oil from a majorspill. Probably less than half that amount ismore likely. The rapid spreading and frag-mentation of oil that occurs after a spill hasmade cleanup of large percentages of oilexceedingly difficult. Historically, recoveryfrom major spills has amounted to only a fewpercent, if there was any attempt at recoveryat all.

Mechanical Cleanup Enhancers

A number of products have been marketedto assist in the recovery of spilled oil. Onechemical that has undergone preliminarytesting and appears to offer some promise is anontoxic polymer, polyisobutylene, whichcomes in the form of a white powder and ren-ders oil visco-elastic. This change makes theoil adhere to recovery surfaces, therebygreatly increasing the effectiveness of oilskimmers, particularly rotating disk anddrum types. Rope mop type skimmers do notappear to be well suited to the use of thistreating agent because the increased visco-elasticity makes the squeezing of the ropemore difficult. This material has also beenshown to be effective at treatment ratios aslow as one part in 1,000.7 It does not appear toreduce spreading or increase thickness suffi-ciently to assist in situ burning. One potentialproblem may be applying and mixing it withoil in large, spread-out spills.

Other chemicals have been developed tobreak or prevent emulsions. These productshave the ability to convert the water-in-oilemulsion to two separate phases. The advan-tage of doing this is that the oil can then be

Werv F. Fingas, “Chemical Treatment of Oil Spills,” Alaska Arctic Offshore Oil Spill Response Technology Workshop Proceedings,U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 762, April 1989, p. 33.

Chapter 3– Oil Spill Response Technologies ● 17

recovered more efficiently or dispersed orburned more successfully. Most of these prod-ucts are hydrophilic (water-loving) surfac-tants. The problem with these surfactants isthat the surfactant is more soluble in waterthan in oil and will quickly leave the system ifthere is sufficient water. One product beingtested by Environment Canada is a demous-sifier – a mixture of long-chain polymers thatdoes not have the drawback mentioned above.Although not yet available, laboratory testsshow this material will prevent the formationof water-in-oil emulsions at treatment ratiosas low as 1:2,000. As with other treatingagents, application and mixing in large spillsmay be difficult. Like dispersants, mechanicalcleanup enhancers require certification beforethey can be considered for use.

Integrated Systems and Deployment

The difficulties encountered in spill re-sponses with respect to obtaining and deploy-ing boom and skimmer handling vessels andoil storage vessels have led to the proposition-ing of chemicals and equipment and develop-ment of integrated systems that are equippedto perform all the functions of the mechanicalrecovery process. Integrated systems fall intothree categories: vessel-of-opportunity sys-tems; single purpose, specially designed oilspill response vessels; and multiple purposevessels, of which one of the purposes is oil spillrecovery. These systems use conventionalskimmer techniques to recover the oil and aresubject to the efficiencies and shortcomings ofthose systems. However, they also have theadvantage of being independent of other sup-porting equipment in their recovery process,until their storage capacity is exceeded.

Vessel-of-opportunity skimming systems(VOSS) are systems designed to be deployedfrom any suitable vessel that maybe availablein the area. They incorporate portable skim-mers that are not integrated into a dedicatedvessel. The skimmer system is freed to theside of the vessel, and recovers oil while the

Figure 3-2-Vessel-of-Opportunity Skimming System

support vessel

Pumping subsystem Oil/waterseparator

SOURCE: Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc (EIX3)

vessel progresses through the slick (figure3-2). While these systems have the advantageof greater mobility, they are limited to thesuitability of vessels in the area.

Specially designed oil spill response ves-sels capable of operating in the open oceanhave been developed by European firms,mainly Dutch and German. These are largevessels, unlike some of the smaller skimmersdescribed previously. One of the more innova-tive is a tank vessel hinged at the stern thatoperates in a “V” configuration, using its splithulls to form a boom-like collecting system(figure 3-3). Two of these vessels are in use anda third has been ordered by Mexico. These sys-tems have the advantage of being completesystems with significant onboard oil/waterseparation capability and storage capacity.Disadvantages include their high cost and,since they are not air transportable, theirmore limited range of use.


Figure 34-Schematic

Variable speed positivedisplacement pump

Figure 3-3-Schematic Drawing of West GermanSplit Vessel THOR

SOURCE: MC Dredge lachnotogy Corp

Drawing of the Navy’s Class V Oil Skimmer

Hydraulic motor

Poweredsqueeze roller Powered main

a

SOURCE: U S Navy

—

Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies .19

Multiple-purpose vessels are an economicalapproach to large-scale, oil spill response sys-tems. The publicity surrounding the use ofthe Soviet dredge in the Exxon Valdez spill hasfocused attention on the use of dredges andother vessels as platforms for oil spill re-sponse systems. The Soviet dredge was de-signed from the beginning as a trailing hopperdredge with oil recovery capability. The firstreport of building a dredge with the dual roleof oil spill response was in 1977 with the de-sign of the Cosmos, a Dutch ship. The great ca-pacity of these vessels for storage of viscousmaterials and their pumping systems (includ-ing suction hoses up to 24 inches in diameter)make them ideal for recovering very viscousweathered oil. U.S. Army Corps of Engineersdredges were also used in the Alaskan oil spill,but without specific modification. Initial de-sign modifications would include spark sup-pressing electrical systems, oil/water separa-tion equipment, and ventilation systems fordealing with flammable volatiles. Unmodifieddredges would be limited to recovering weath-ered oil that presents no fire hazard. The ad-vantages of dual-purpose dredge vessels aretheir usefulness as a dredge during most oftheir lifetimes and their large capacity in theevent of a major spill. Both the U.S. CoastGuard and the Army Corps of Engineers arestudying the use of multi-purpose vessels. TheCoast Guard is studying the feasibility of giv-ing buoy tender vessels oil spill cleanup capa-bilities, and may add this capability to newbuoy tenders as they are built.

Recovery and containment systems cannotbe deployed at the site without the provisionof significant support resources. These sup-port resources include material handlingequipment such as forklifts and cranes, boomand skimmer handling vessels, storage ves-sels, surveillance airplanes, and trained per-sonnel. Table 3-1 shows the minimum equip-

ment required to deploy various responsecomponents.

DISPERSANTS

Perhaps the most controversial issue in thefield of oil spill response is the use of chemi-cals to disperse the oil. In general a dispersantis sprayed onto a slick to reduce the cohesive-ness of the slick so that the oil can be brokeninto small droplets by wind, wave, and currentaction. The oil droplets disperse into thewater column where they become diluted tolow concentrations and are subjected to natu-ral processes such as biodegradation.

Much of the controversy that has sur-rounded the use of dispersants has arisenfrom their impact on the environment. Whileearly dispersants were toxic, modern disper-sants are less toxic than the oil itself.8 Even so,the use of dispersants involves making an en-vironmental trade-off. In essence, this in-volves trading the potential short-term envi-ronmental effects of a treated slick against thepossible long-term shoreline impacts andother effects of an untreated one. The primaryimpact of a dispersed slick comes from the oildispersing into the upper water column.While it will rapidly become diluted, the in-itial concentrations may exceed the acute tox-icity threshold of organisms in the upper fewmeters of the water column. In certain sea-sons or sensitive areas, this maybe a trade-offthat authorities are unwilling to make.

In an untreated spill, evaporation may beresponsible for the loss of one-third or more ofthe oil in a period of a few hours or a day.While hydrocarbons dissolved in water alsoevaporate, many of the hydrocarbons that dis-solve (mainly aromatics) appear to producethe most immediate biological toxicity.9

8Nation~ ~semch Councl], Marine Boat-d, Using Oil Spiil Dispersants on the Sea (Washin@on, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).‘Ibid., p. 240.

. .


Table 3-1--Equipment Required To Deploy Response Elements

PersonnelSystem Staging area To site Onsite (per system)

CONTAINMENT SpaceForklift-4 tonCrane-4 tonMaintenance

facilitiesSpares

Vessel with minimum of8’ x 20’ clear deckspace for each 2000’of boom

A-frame/davit/handling equipment withminimum one ton capacity

Boats capable of tending boom— one if boom anchor used– two if no boom anchor used

2

2 per boat

4 to 6

7 to 8

RECOVERY

Skimmingbarrier

Vessel with minimum of8’ x 35’ clear deckspace per system


Two boats for maintaining barrieropening and shape and capable ofoperating at low speed-1 to 2 knots

Barge for receipt of recovered oilTug to tend barge or to shuttle barge to

onshore storage locationPlatform for prime power (may be barge)


Two boats for maintaining barrieropening and shape

Barge for receipt of recovered oilTug to tend barge or to shuttle barge

to onshore storage locationBoat with 10-ton crane at 35’ reachdeploy and recover

A-frame/davit handling equipmentminimum one ton capability fordeployment and recovery

Barge for receipt of recovered oilTug to tend barge or to shuttle

barge to onshore storage location

s p a c e

Forklift- I O tonCrane-10 tonMaintenance

facilitiesSpares

Self-propelledskimmer


Forklift-10 tonCrane-10 tonMaintenance

facilitiesSpares

3 to deploy2 to operate

Vessel-of-opportunityskimmer

SpaceForklift-10 tonCrane-10 tonMaintenance

facilitiesSpares


DISPERSANTAPPLICATION

Air deliverable Pumps totransfer frombarrels to tanktruck

Tank truckGround personnel

See onsite requirements Surveillance aircraft for spottingAircraft equipped to spray dispersant

2

vesse l SpaceForklift-8 tonCrane-8 tonMaintenance

facilitiesSpares

Vessel with 8’ x 24’ cleardeck space

Surveillance aircraft for spottingVessel capable of accepting

vessel system

2 to 3 todeploy

2 to operatedeliverable

TRANSFERPUMPS S p a c e Vessel with approximate

8’ x 24’ clear deckspace

Helicopter with l-tonlift capacity

Barge for receipt of off-loaded oilTug to tend barge or to shuttle

barge to onshore storage locationHoses and couplingsFenders

Forklift-2 tonMaintenance

facilitiesSpares

SOURCE: Engineering timputer Optecnomics, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies,” contractor repotl prepared for the Office of Technology Assess-ment, July 19SS

—— — .——-——

Chapter 3– Oil Spill Response Technologies .21

The immediate ecological impacts of dis-persed oil vary. In open waters, organisms onthe surface will be less affected by dispersedoil than by an oil slick, but organisms in thewater column will receive greater exposurefrom dispersed oil. In shallow areas, less wateris available to dilute the dispersed oil to lessthan lethal concentrations, so organisms willbe more severely impacted by dispersed oil.Consequently, dispersant use is generally lim-ited to deeper water. Although some immedi-ate biological effects of dispersed oil may begreater than for untreated oil, long-term ef-fects on most habitats, such as salt marshes,sea grasses, and mangroves, are less, and thesehabitats recover faster if oil is dispersed be-fore it reaches these areas.10 Thus, the pri-mary biological benefits of dispersant use areto reduce the hazard to birds (unless the dis-persant is sprayed directly on them) and toprevent oil from stranding on shorelines.Sometimes, it may be more the aestheticvalue that is protected, particularly ifstranded oil is removed from beaches androcky shorelines by high-pressure hot waterat the sacrifice of the local biological commu-nities.

Further advantages of using dispersants incombating a large oil spill are that they can berapidly deployed (by aircraft) over a largearea, may be used when sea conditions pre-clude mechanical response, and, if successful,can be a very cost-effective oil spill counter-measure. Dispersants can be applied by eitherfixed wing aircraft, helicopters, or systems in-stalled on a vessel. The most efficient systemfor large spills is the Airborne Dispersant De-livery System, a portable unit developed foruse on any available C-130. Dispersants aremost effective when they are applied early, be-cause the oil becomes less dispersible as itsviscosity increases. However, dispersants thatare effective on higher viscosity oils are beingdeveloped. The major consideration in apply-

Pbb CKWI1: J/m Mm/kc

Airborne Dispersant Delivery System, or ADDS pack, seenmounted on a flatbed for easy transport to a C-130 airplane.

ing the dispersant is to achieve a relatively

uniform application on the oil without unduewind drift loss. Most dispersants require anapplication of dispersant to oil in a ratio ofabout 1:10 to 1:20. As with mechanical equip-ment, prepositioning of dispersants is neces-sary to achieve an early and effective response.

In a major study published in 1989, the Na-tional Research Council generally approvedthe use of dispersants and recommended thatthey be considered as a potential first re-sponse option along With mechanical clean-up.11 Mechanical cleanup has the advantage ofremoving oil from the marine environment(although, thereby, creating a waste d i s p o s a lproblem onshore) but is generally limited byinability to cover a large slick area in a reason-able period of time. Dispersants are one of thefew countermeasures that can be applied to alarge area in a timely manner. One other ques-tion surrounding dispersants, however, is the

‘“Ibid., p. 4.‘ ‘Ibid.

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22 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

lack of hard data about their effectiveness inactual spill conditions. The National ResearchCouncil recommended further research inthis area. One difficulty, in particular, is in es-tablishing a methodology for determining dis-persant effectiveness at sea.

How well dispersants work depends on seaconditions and application techniques as wellas on the chemical nature of both the disper-sants and the oil. A certain amount of wave en-ergy is desirable to achieve mixing, whereas acalm sea reduces the immediate effectivenessof dispersants. Improvements have beenmade in application techniques, but they stillappear short of being routinely optimal. Fur-ther gains could be made from research in thisarea.

BURNING,BIOREMEDIATION, AND

OTHER TECHNIQUES

In Situ Burning

In situ burning is the process of burning anoil spill in place either with or without the useof fire containment boom. In order to igniteoil on water, the oil must be relatively fresh,and the slick must be at least 3 millimetersthick. To ensure thickness and to isolate oilfrom contact with a stricken vessel or otherobject, fireproof booms may be used. Sincethe more volatile components of spilled oilimmediately begin to evaporate, there is lesspotential for successful in situ burning as theslick ages. Some oil residue (about a 1 milli-meter thick layer) will remain in the water af-ter burning oil because the flame is alwaysquenched by heat losses to the water surfacewhen the oil layer gets thin. Such residue is it-self a problem to clean up, but burn efficien-

cies of over 90 percent can be obtained, par-ticularly if the oil is confined with booms orother means to keep the oil layer as thick aspossible. Since less evaporation takes place incold regions, in situ burning maybe more suc-cessful in these areas.

Several techniques have been devised for ig-niting oil spills. Devices used include floatingigniters that can be deployed by air and thehelitorch igniter, which is a tank system con-taining gelled gasoline suspended on cablesbelow a helicopter. One device under design isa laser ignition system using two coupled la-sers from a helicopter to heat and ignite oilspills.

Burning has been used in response to acci-dental oil spills with varying success. The useof burning to remove oil from the water pro-duces a trade-off that must be evaluated by lo-cal authorities. The trade-off is between re-moving oil from the water and releasing theproducts of combustion into the atmosphere.Measurements thus far indicate that combus-tion products released into the atmosphereare no more hazardous than those released byevaporating oil, and that the total environ-mental loading of toxic components remainsthe same or is reduced by the combustion ofcrude oil spills on water.12 Burning producesblack sooty smoke that is a highly visible pol-lutant and may raise concerns about humanhealth effects, whereas oil on the surface ofthe water, while also polluting in terms ofvolatiles entering the atmosphere, is usuallyperceived by the public to be less threateningto human health.

The aesthetic trade-off is not only one ofocean v. atmosphere, but also one of timeframe, the short-term impact of smoke andcombustion products versus the longer-termimpact of an oiled shoreline. The major incen-tive to burn the oil is not only to remove it

lpDa~d D4 Evms, “In$itu Burning of Oi] spi]]s,” Alaska Arctic Offshore Oi] Spi]] RespOnSe Technolo~ workshop Proc*inW,U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 762, April 1989, p. 53.

Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies 23

from the water but to reduce the probabilityof its becoming stranded on shore.

In some circumstances (e.g., if oil is not iso-lated from the vessel that spilled it) burningcould put a stricken vessel, its remainingcargo, and any personnel still on board at risk.The intentional sacrifice of a vessel and itscargo may ultimately cost less than the totalcost of a spill that could not be controlled, butthis is rarely obvious at the time a responsedecision must be made. The decision to delib-erately set fire to a vessel is one that most peo-ple would be very reluctant to make, espe-cially if considerable oil remains on board andif there appear to be other response options.In the case of the Exxon Valdez, much more oilremained on the ship than was spilled. Most ofthis oil was successfully offloaded, therebyaverting the greater tragedy that would haveoccurred if this oil also had spilled. Even so,Exxon’s total costs to fight this spill greatlyexceeded the value of the ship and its cargo.

Bioremediation

Bioremediation is the in situ use of mi-crobes to biodegrade and oxidize hydrocarbonmolecules. Biodegradants can be marine bac-teria naturally occurring in the spill area, non-indigenous naturally occurring bacteria, ge-netically engineered microbes, and nutrientsthat can be added to enhance biological oxida-tion. Tests of this technique on water haveshown little or no enhancement over the natu-rally occurring biodegradation.13 Use ofbioremediation on impacted shorelines, how-ever, has apparently been successful in somecases. Exxon, in conjunction with the Environ-mental Protection Agency (EPA), recentlyconducted a large-scale test of this technique

in cleaning up beaches soiled by the ExxonValdez spill. About 70 miles of shoreline werecoated with two kinds of nitrogen- and phos-phorus-bearing fertilizers to boost indigenousbacterial populations.14 Initial results are in-conclusive, but the data are still being evalu-ated. One difficulty is measuring the effective-ness of the technique.

Proponents of bioremediation say it is po-tentially the least damaging and least costly ofcleanup techniques, particularly for soiledbeaches. Its use on water, however, would ap-pear to be limited except perhaps as a followup to other actions. The major disadvantageof bioremediation is the long time frame in-volved. On beaches where it could take 5 to 7years for oil to breakdown under natural con-ditions, bioremediation with fertilizer couldreduce that to 2 to 5 years.15 Research needs tobe conducted on the effect on local habitatfrom increased microbial populations and nu-trient levels. Efforts to engineer new microor-ganisms or to identify and cultivate more effi-cient ones may be promising.

Miscellaneous Chemical Agents

Gelling Agents

Gelling agents change liquid oil into a solidto aid in recovery or are directed towardtanker accidents where pollution might beavoided or diminished by gelling the oil re-maining in the tanks. Gelling agents requiremixing with oil and allowing adequate timefor the gel to set. Some gels set in a matter ofminutes, whereas others, depending on envi-ronmental conditions, require about 8 hoursto form modest strength and several days toform substantial strength. Field tests haveshown that large amounts of gelling agent

13F~nws, op. cit., footnote 7! p- 30”14Mwk cra~ord, ~fE=on ~ts on Bu~ in ~as~ C]eanup,” Sc&nc+E, w ) ] . 245, Aug. 18, 1989, p. 704.1‘Ibid.

——


may be required, up to 40 per cent of the vol-ume of the oil itself.16 For these reasons gel-ling agents are not generally stocked for useby spill responders.

Herding Agents

Herding agents are designed to contract aspill and keep it from spreading. Herdingagents are limited in effectiveness and aremore successful in controlling small, thinslicks. Tests and actual use of these productsshowed that utility was limited to very calmwaters. Due to their limited application andoperating spectrum, there is little remaininguse of herding agents at this time.

Sinking Agents

Sinking agents, such as hydrophobic chalk,have been used to prevent oil from reachingshore. The French used about 3,000 tons ofpowdered chalk to sink an estimated 20,000tons of oil following the 1967 Torrey Canyonspill. Very little sunken oil came ashore. How-ever, Canadian tests of several sinking agentshave shown that none were effective in hold-ing oil after the initial sinking and that itslowly leached back to the surface over a fewdays.17 Because the sinking mass causes suffo-cation of bottom life and also exposes manybottom-dwelling organisms to oil, sinkingagents are generally forbidden by environ-mental regulatory agencies.

Combustion Promoters

Burning agents have been developed to as-sist in the combustion of oil, but these gener-ally have not functioned well in actual prac-tice. Burning agents are of two generic types,sorbents and pyrotechnical compositions.Sorbents function by collecting oil in thicker

masses to assist in burning, and pyrotechnicalcompositions keep the slick burning. Burningagents are of limited use because of the largeamount of material needed for a beneficial ef-fect and by the fact that in situ burning can beaccomplished without them.

QUANTITY ANDDISTRIBUTION OF

RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

Although oil spill response equipment iswidely distributed around the United States,the availability of equipment for respondingto major spills is limited. Principal stocks areheld by the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard,and industry cooperatives.

The Navy has two major equipment depots,one in Williamsburg, Virginia the other inStockton, California. A small amount ofequipment is located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.The primary mission of Navy resources is tofight spills from Navy ships and facilities;however, its equipment is considered a na-tional resource, and, as in the case of the Ex-xon Valdez spill (in which equipment fromboth major Navy depots was used), may becalled on in emergencies. The Navy has in-vested a total of approximately $30 million forits equipment. Since much of this equipmentwas purchased in the mid-1970s, its replace-ment value would be much greater than this(rough estimates are over $100 million). Navyequipment currently constitutes the largestequipment stock available in the UnitedStates applicable for fighting large, offshorespills. The principal Navy countermeasuresequipment are 24 Navy-modified belt skim-mers, each with a capacity of about 250 gal-lons per minute. These skimmers were used inthe Exxon Valdez spill, but were no match forthe huge volume of oil to be recovered. They

16Finws, op. cit., footnote 7! p- 29”“Ibid., p. 31.

Chapter 3– Oil Spill Response Technologies .25

PhoitJ cmdt U.S. Cosst Guad

U.S. Navy Marco Class V skimmer deployed inPrince William Sound.

are also not capable of effective recovery inrough seas (above sea state 3). The Navy hasno dispersant capability. A potential con-straint to efficient operations is that the Navymust depend on outside contractors for off-loading recovered oil, as it has no tank bargesof its own. Appendix B contains an inventoryof the Navy’s principal resources.

The U.S. Coast Guard also maintains twoimportant equipment stocks, one at its Atlan-tic Strike Team base in Mobile, Alabama, thesecond at its Pacific Strike Team base atHamilton Air Force Base, California. ThreeStrike Teams were maintained until 1987,when the Atlantic and Gulf Strike Teams wereconsolidated due to budget constraints. CoastGuard stocks include a number of OpenWater Oil Containment and Recovery Sys-tems, the principal elements of which areskimming barriers, pumps, and storage blad-ders (dracones). This equipment is not suffi-cient to combat a major spill. The CoastGuard relies on private contractors for addi-tional mechanical cleanup equipment. A sig-nificant amount of equipment at the twoCoast Guard Strike Team bases is devoted tothe important mission of off-loading (lighter-

PhoIu cmdt US. Coast Guwd

Dracone fuel bladder used for temporary storage ofrecovered oil.

ing) stricken vessels to minimize the loss ofoil. The Coast Guard has about 20 Air Deliver-able Anti-Pollution Transfer Systems for thispurpose. Appendix B contains a summary ofCoast Guard stock.

Much of the rest of the availabIe oil spill re-sponse equipment in the United States ismaintained by industry oil spill cooperatives.There are approximately 93 of these coopera-tives in the United States (see app. B), but vir-tually all are designed for fighting spills inprotected harbors, sheltered waters, and in-land areas.18 According to the American Pe-troleum Institute’s recent Task Force Reporton Oil Spills, “no U.S. cooperative has beendesigned to deal with a catastrophic spill. ”19

Moreover, little of the available industryequipment would be applicable for more rig-orous offshore conditions. Cooperative andother equipment that could be suitable off-shore is listed in appendix B, as is a listing ofthe Alyeska Cooperative’s recent acquisitions.

The largest oil spill cooperative in the worldis the Oil Spill Response Ltd. (OSR) base inSouthampton, England. The base is equipped

‘8American Petroleum Institute, “Task Force Report on Oil Spills,” June 14, 1989, p. 10.1‘Ibid.

——


with the capability to respond to large off-shore spills. (Because Exxon is a full memberof this cooperative, it was able to use 50 per-cent of the equipment on hand at the time tofight the Exxon Valdez spill. OSR base equip-ment was among the first out of state equip-ment to arrive in Prince William Sound.) Thebase has been stocked with the intent to beable to respond simultaneously to two10,000-ton spills (two 3-million gallonspills).20 Whether this capability could be metin practice is difficult to determine. In gen-eral, such estimates of response capacity typi-cally depend on the manufacturer’s estimates,and such information may be overstated andapplicable primarily to ideal conditions. OTAestimates that the capability of the South-ampton cooperative is roughly equivalent tothat of one of the U.S. Navy depots. OSR baseequipment is also listed in appendix B.

The industry has proposed to remedy thelack of equipment for fighting major spills byestablishing five regional oil spill responsecenters and equipping each with the capabil-ity to respond to a 30,000-ton spill. Each Pe-troleum Industry Response Organization(PIRO) center would contain lightering equip-ment, booms, skimmers, dispersant equip-ment, and other ancillary equipment, andwould be manned by oil spill professionals.The estimated capital cost for each centerwould be roughly $24 million in 1990 dollars.Although PIRO claims that this amount willenable its response centers to cope with

30,000-ton (9.2 million-gallon) spills, theseclaims have yet to be evaluated by an inde-pendent organization. It is thus not certainwhether response funding will be adequate.The Navy, for instance, estimates that each ofits 2 major depots have equipment whose re-placement value is about $50 million, and thisequipment provided only a limited capabilityto respond to the Exxon Valdez spill. Never-theless, it is difficult to evaluate response cen-ter capabilities by comparing equipment costsalone. Variables such as equipment mainte-nance, training, and logistics plans are alsovery important. Proposed regional centercapital equipment is presented in appendix B.

In sum, the only significant stock of oil spillresponse equipment that is readily available,tested, and maintained for fighting a large off-shore spill in the United States is that of theU.S. Navy. In Europe, the large industry coop-erative at Southampton has a significant ca-pability roughly equivalent to one of the twoNavy depots. Other industry capabilities inthe United States are either insignificant ornot readily available for offshore spills. TheAPI/PIRO proposal for establishing newequipment depots in the United States at stra-tegic locations will significantly improve in-dustry capabilities. However, it is still uncer-tain whether PIRO would be capable ofrecovering significant portions of a large off-shore spill. It also appears that the funds pro-posed to be allocated by PIRO may be inade-quate for the goal.

mA ~rop~ has ~n made t. expand the OSR base so that it will be capable ofhandlingtwo30,000-ton sPills. M.D. ~ng,~sis~tManager, Oil Spill Service Centre, personal communication, Jan. 22, 1990.

———— .

Chapter 4

U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Exxon Valdez spill, few saw U.S.oil spill policy as wanting. A seemingly sophis-ticated response system had been in place foralmost 20 years. Even though there had notbeen a spill in U.S. waters that aroused similarnational attention since the 1969 Santa Bar-bara well blowout, the system seemed to workwell. On previous pages we have addressedsome of the technology issues associated withresponding to spills. However, use of bettertechnology alone will not solve U.S. responseproblems. On the following pages we considerseveral aspects of U.S. oil spill response policy,identify some of the problem areas, and sug-gest some potential solutions. The section af-ter this investigates how several Europeancountries are organized to fight major spills.

TECHNOLOGY: WHICHCLEANUP METHOD?

Currently, the most likely oil spill counter-measures approach to be used in the UnitedStates for spills at sea is to rely on mechanicalcontainment and cleanup methods, i.e.,booms and skimmers. Even though availablebooms and skimmers are limited in capacityand capability, they can be deployed in almostany region without concern about additionalenvironmental damage. Such is not the casefor dispersants, however, where some limitson their use are usually considered. Moderndispersants are considered safe for many off-shore regions, but up to now they have beenseldom used. Questions about dispersant tox-icity largely have been laid to rest by new for-mulations, but they do not remove the oil it-self and thus many oppose their use. Inaddition, important questions about the effec-tiveness of dispersants have not been settled.Burning as a countermeasures approach has

been the subject of experiments, and some be-lieve it holds promise under certain favorableconditions.

There is no single or perfect solution to thegeneral problem of dealing with oil on thewater. As noted elsewhere in our report, eachof several available methods has strengthsand weaknesses. Each oil spill is unique, andthe approach that works well or at least rea-sonably well in one situation may work poorlyin another. Participants in OTA’s oil spillworkshop generally agreed that for the mosteffective response, all approaches must beavailable to those fighting the spill. This pro-vides the ability to use whatever technique(s)are most appropriate in each case. In particu-lar, better understanding of the conditionsand locations under which dispersant use andburning would be appropriate and/or prefer-able to mechanical equipment is needed.

Related to this, a systematic approach is es-sential. It makes little sense to have skimmersand booms available but inadequate space fortemporary storage of recovered oil or no planfor permanently disposing the oil. Hence,barges or other storage vessels, for example,are as important to the recovery system asskimmers. Similarly, it makes no sense tostock dispersants without an immediately

available delivery system. One cannot neglectany element of a comprehensive plan and ex-pect to mount effective oil spill countermea-sures. Undoubtedly, the performance of an in-dividual piece of equipment is less importantthan the overall performance of the system.Moreover, since all spills are different andsince resources are usually limited, an inte-grated system that works reasonably well forseveral different types of spills (e.g., for vis-cous oil and for low viscosity oil) and as thephysical properties of the spill change withtime is preferable to one that works well inone situation but poorly in another.

27


DECISIONMAKING:DEMOCRATIC ANDAUTHORITARIAN

APPROACHES

The current U.S. approach to fighting ma-jor oil spills, unlike the approach of someEuropean countries, is more democratic thanauthoritarian. Democratic decisionmaking,however, may not be as appropriate for mak-ing decisions in emergency situations wherespeed is essential.

Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard providesanon-scene coordinator (OSC) for most majorspill responses in coastal waters and along ad-jacent shorelines. The OSC’s initial responsi-bility is to determine whether the polluter cancope with the spill. If not, the OSC is empow-ered to take control of the spill response. Inpractice, however, his decisions are subject tothe oversight of numerous interested parties.For example, a Regional Response Team, con-sisting of regional representatives of variousFederal agencies, has considerable sway overthe OSC’s decisions. The OSC must also bemindful of legitimate State and local con-cerns. The interests of these groups maybe inconflict. It is thus difficult, if not impossible,for the OSC to act quickly. Unfortunately,large spills not rapidly contained will soon beout of control.

It maybe possible to devise a spill responsepolicy that would enable decisions to be madequickly and effectively. It would have to mini-mize unnecessary and counterproductive in-terference by others, but at the same timetake account of the legitimate concerns ofthose affected. In many European countries,it appears that the on-scene coordinator is ineffect an on-scene commander, that is, some-

one who has the unquestioned authority to actquickly. Greater authority for U.S. on-scenecoordinators could be coupled with a greatereffort by all involved to determine, before aspill, what decisions will be made if a particu-lar event occurs–what type response is ac-ceptable, what is not, and when and where aparticular response is acceptable. Agreementshould be reached before the event, for exam-ple, about the circumstances under which dis-persants may be used. Once the spill occurs,some decisions could be almost automatic.Planning of this nature should be addressedbefore spills in Regional Contingency Plansand in Federal Local Contingency Plans.

RESPONSIBILITY: THEPOLLUTER OR THE

GOVERNMENT?

The current practice in the United States isthat the polluter is responsible unless he can-not cope with the situation, at which point theFederal Government – the Coast Guard in thecase of offshore spills– will take charge.1 Al-though a rather detailed organization – in-cluding a National Response Team, RegionalResponse Teams, on-scene coordinators, anda National Strike Force– has been estab-lished to support the Coast Guard, there areseveral problems with this approach, as illus-trated by the Exxon Valdez spill. First, giventhe necessity of acting quickly, by the time theCoast Guard determines that the polluter isincapable of dealing with a spill, it may well betoo late for anyone to mount a successfulcountermeasures effort. Second, the CoastGuard does not now have the resources tomount an effective response to a catastrophicspill, especially one that has not been quicklycontained.

‘The National Response Team, “A Report on the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Response System, ’’Annual Report, March19s9, pp. &7.

Chapter 4– U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .29

Several critics of current U.S. response pol-icy2 have pointed out that although the pol-luter is initially responsible for the cleanup, helacks the authority to respond as he thinksappropriate. The oil industry, and in particu-lar, the new Petroleum Industry ResponseOrganization (PIRO), although willing to pro-vide equipment and personnel to respond to aspill, argue that large spills should automati-cally be managed by the Federal Govern-ment.3 Such an action would place both re-sponsibility and authority for cleaning up aspill in the same hands and, theoretically, en-able a clear and unambiguous commandstructure. Small spills which do not createspecial cleanup problems could still be han-dled with local spill resources.

As noted elsewhere in our report, virtuallyall European governments have assumed re-sponsibility for responding to major vesselspills. Although operators of fixed installa-tions, such as offshore platforms, are gener-ally still responsible for oil spill cleanup, gov-ernments have generally concluded that it isunreasonable to expect the same degree ofpreparedness for a vessel spill that might oc-cur anywhere at sea. The polluter, however, isstill liable to pay all reasonable costs of thespill.

In the United States, the Federal Govern-ment could adopt a similar approach of as-suming responsibility for large spills regard-less of the polluter’s capability. T h a tapproach would include a full evaluation ofcurrent Federal capabilities and abilities tomarshal public and private resources quickly.The Coast Guard, or whatever agency is as-signed responsibility for combating majorspills, would have to be given the appropriateresources to do the job.

LOGISTICS: ESSENTIAL TOQUICK RESPONSE

A rapid response is essential for effectivespill cleanup, so one must either have re-sponse equipment near a spill site or have thecapability to get to a spill quickly. In a countrythe size of the United States, it is impracticalto station equipment for fighting catastrophicspills every few miles along the coast. Clearly,it is also the case that the risk of oil spills ismuch greater in some areas than others—areas such as busy tanker lanes and ports.

An oil industry proposal indicates that it willestablish, through its new Petroleum Indus-try Response Organization, five major re-gional oil spill response depots and a numberof small “presaging” bases. The regional cen-ters would be located in the Northeast, mid-SouthAtlantic, Gulf Coast, Pacific Southwest,and Pacific Northwest.4 This is a more decen-tralized approach than the Navy’s strategy.The U.S. Navy, a large amount of whoseequipment was used to fight the Exxon Valdezspill, relies mainly on two equipment depots,one on the East Coast and one on the West. AllNavy equipment is designed (or modified) andpackaged so that it is capable of being truckedor airlifted anywhere in the United States.The U.S. Coast Guard currently has twoStrike Teams, one in Mobile, Alabama andone at Hamilton Air Force Base in California.At the present time, the Coast Guard is betterprepared to off-load stricken tankers than tofight major spills. It relies heavily on commer-cial contractors for spill responses.

Both centralized and decentralized logisticsstrategies may be effective. However, in either

2For ~mp]e, the ~~mation~ Tankers Owners Pollution Federation.%e American Petroleum Institute, “Task Force Report on Oil Spills,” June 14, 1989. p. iv.4SWnng commit- ~P~ ~d ~mmendations on the Imp]emen~tion of PIRO. J~. 5, 1990, p. 54

——


case it is still necessary to have the capabilityto get to the spill site quickly, and not justwith the appropriate skimmers and booms ordispersants, as the case may be, but also, asnecessary, with barges to hold recovered oil,and with the other necessary equipment thatwould constitute a complete response system.The whole system will be ineffective as long asany element is missing. For instance, whiledispersants and dispersant application sys-tems are available, the timely availability ofaircraft to apply dispersants has been a prob-lem. This problem has been addressed in sev-eral European countries by having contractaircraft on call for emergencies (the U.S. oilindustry would like to be able to use govern-ment-owned C-130s, e.g., National Guard air-craft, in the future.) Some European coun-tries also have initiated “sleeping contracts”with local vessel owners to ensure that barges,towboats, and other ancillary equipment areavailable in emergencies.

Much improvement is obviously needed inthe national capability to deliver responseequipment to the scene of a spill quickly.Some combination of government and privateresources will probably always be needed, andthus clear lines of authority and carefully co-

PhoRJ credit U.S. Coast GfJad

Using hot water to “clean” the beaches ofPrince William Sound

ordinated plans for deploying these resourcesare essential.

BEACH CLEANUP: HOWMUCH EMPHASIS?

In many cases, no matter how successfulthe response to a catastrophic oil spill at sea, asignificant fraction of the spilled oil is likely toreach shore. The public was appropriatelyoutraged when efforts to control the ExxonValdez spill failed and a significant amount ofoil from the spill contaminated hundreds ofmiles of Alaska’s coastline. Although hun-dreds of millions of dollars were spent “clean-ing” the shoreline, many scientists and oilspill professionals have concluded that, ex-cept for the benefit gained by appearing to bedoing something useful, the money spent waslargely wasted.

While considerable public pressure exists totake immediate action to restore pollutedshorelines to prespill conditions, this inher-ently costly, labor intensive undertaking hasseldom had more than modest success, par-ticularly on rocky shorelines. Moreover, insome instances, shoreline cleanup has re-sulted in more damage than good. Marshesand other wetlands are particularly vulner-able to mechanical cleanup methods, butcleanup of sandy and rocky beaches can alsocause additional damage. In some instances,the best course of action, although not a satis-fying one, is to do nothing and let the beachslowly recover naturally.

It maybe possible to give greater attentionto beach protection and beach cleanup, butthe inherent limitations of the availableequipment and methods should be made clearto all involved to eliminate false expectations.As noted elsewhere in our report, beach clean-ing activities in Europe are usually the re-sponsibility of local authorities. Local author-ities in France, for example, have strategicallyplaced stocks of everything from rakes andshovels and hot water pumps to booms. The

—

Chapter 4– U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .31

Norwegians have gone so far as to require a lo-cal response capability in each of the 52 areasthat comprise the coastal zone. Where not al-ready done, more attention to defensivebooming may require that local and Stateauthorities devise detailed plans and pur-chase equipment to protect the most sensitiveand vulnerable areas.

Bioremediation--the application of nutri-ents to speed the degradation of oil – is emerg-ing as one promising technique for futurebeach cleaning. Experiments are now beingconducted in Alaska, and the results of thesetests will be carefully evaluated over the nextyear. Nevertheless, effective application ofthis technique may also be quite limited. Re-search is being conducted on other chemicaltreatments as well.

FEDERAL REGULATIONSAND EMERGENCY

SITUATIONS

There may exist some situations wherewhat may be appropriate laws or regulationsfor normal situations unnecessarily hinder ef-fective cleanup operations during emergencysituations. Some OTA workshop participantsnoted, for instance, that the Federal CleanWater Act, in prohibiting oily discharges fromtankers5, makes no exception for the decant-ing of water collected with oil during skim-ming operations. Since a considerable amountof water may be collected with oil, the capac-ity of whatever storage vessel is used may berapidly reached, unless water that has been orcould be separated from the oil can be dis-charged. This may be accomplished with verylittle oil reentering the sea. If not done, oncestorage capacity is reached, skimming opera-tions must cease until oil and water can be off-

loaded. This may result in far less oil being re-covered, for example, as the skimmer sits idleand as the oil spreads further, weathers, andin general becomes more difficult to skim. Or-dinary discharge permits may be granted, butmay take up to 18 months to obtain. Thus, ageneral permit preapproving discharge of oilywater during oil spill emergencies may be use-ful to consider.

Second, several foreign vessels were used inrecovery operations during the Exxon Valdezspill. Such vessels may either be on the sceneand therefore handy for mounting portableskimmers or in themselves specialized oil spillvessels. However, under U.S. law, foreign ves-sels cannot automatically be used in emer-gency situations as “vessels of opportunity. ”The Jones Act prohibits foreign vessels fromengaging in coastwise trade, and this act hasbeen interpreted to apply to vessels thattransport recovered oil from an offshore siteto an off-loading terminal on shore.6 Waiversto this regulation may be obtained only if anational security concern can be demonstrated.The Exxon Valdez spill was considered to fallinto this category, and waivers were grantedby the U.S. Customs Service without unduedelay for about a dozen vessels to help incleanup operations. National security con-cerns may sometimes be difficult to justify,however, so a general waiver of Jones Act re-strictions may be appropriate for oil spillemergencies.

Third, U.S. customs regulations requirethat foreign equipment formally pass throughcustoms and that duty be paid. Since customsdelays are possible, some have suggested thatthese regulations could be a potential stum-bling block to efficient cleanup operations.This concern appears to have little merit, asthe Secretary of the Treasury has the author-ity to waive the regulation in connection with

5The ~t~h~n ~]e~~ ~rohibit~ dixhuws that “cause a fi]m or sheen u~n or discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoiningshorelines... ” 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Sees. 110.2, 110.3, and 110.4.

epaul He~]md, U.S. customs service, personal communication, NOV. 15, 1989


emergency situations.7 Waivers are usuallyobtained without undue delay.

Finally, the ultimate disposal of recoveredoil and oiled articles from the Exxon Valdezspill proved contentious. The industry wantedto incinerate, and, in some instances, openlyburn recovered material. It complained be-cause it could not get permits to do so quicklyenough. The State of Alaska hesitated in issu-ing permits because it wanted to be certainthat this method of disposal would not causean air quality problem. Permits took 2 to 3months to obtain. Decisionmaking about finaldisposal of recovered material may not be asurgent as many other decisions that must bemade, but when large amounts of oil and oilydebris are being recovered by numerous re-covery assets, temporary storage capacitymay be quickly overwhelmed. In the future itwould seem appropriate that contingencyplans include plans for waste disposal, specify-ing for instance, what kind of incinerators areto be used and where they are located.

EQUIPMENT TESTING: HOWREALISTIC? HOW

EFFECTIVE?

Equipment testing is an important elementof any research and development program.Equipment testing in large tanks, such as inthe now closed Oil and Hazardous MaterialsSimulated Environmental Test Tank (theOHMSETT facility), provides useful informa-tion – especially because variable factors suchas wave height can be controlled-but is nosubstitute for testing at sea under realisticconditions. Currently, very little performancedata exists on the open ocean, and few labora-tory effectiveness tests have been correlatedwith real field conditions. In particular, no

testing with oil has been conducted in recentyears in U.S. waters.

There are, necessarily, safety limits to howrealistic tests can be. Where safety is not a fac-tor, however, oil spill researchers would liketo be able to conduct occasional controlled off-shore oil spills for scientific and equipmenttesting purposes. Such test spills have beenconducted in Canada, Norway, the UnitedKingdom, and France, for instance, and haveprovided valuable data. While not strictly pro-hibited in U.S. waters, the “red tape” associ-ated with obtaining permission from the En-vironmental Protection Agency has effectivelyblocked intentional spills, according to someOTA workshop participants. One participantnoted that a minimum of 20,000 gallons (65tons) would be needed for a realistic test. Test-ing at sea, while clearly useful, is also expen-sive, perhaps costing up to $1 million everytime a test is conducted.

As an alternative or supplement to testingequipment offshore with intentionally spilledoil, some have suggested that U.S. Govern-ment personnel take advantage of so-called“spills of opportunity” for testing equipmentand/or for providing occasions for responsepersonnel to refine skills. The U.S. Govern-ment does have a formal program in place totake advantage of spills of opportunity toevaluate equipment, but spills of opportunitydo not usually represent ideal test situations.For one, the control over environmental vari-ables that is needed for scientific purposes isnot possible during these spills. In addition,researchers may be perceived as being in theway of the cleanup operation.

A related testing issue is the measurementof effectiveness. For some types of equipment,e.g., containment booms, a standard test pro-tocol has been developed to measure effective-ness.8 It is still very difficult, however, to

719 CFR 10.107.

8Ed ‘l’’ennygon, Mjner~g Management Service, OTA Workshop, Aug. 15, 1989.

Chapter 4– U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues ● 33

measure quantitatively the effectiveness ofskimmers and dispersants.9 Lack of an ade-quate measure of effectiveness has much to dowith the controversy over how effective dis-persants are (and in what situations).

PERSONNEL, TRAINING,AND DRILLS

The availability of skilled personnel forfighting oil spills is possibly more importantthan having the ideal type of equipment for aparticular spill. The objective of maintaininga work force of oil spill response experts hasbeen frustrated on several counts, however,not least of which is because major oil spillshave been rare events in the United States. Inall, there exist too little knowledge and experi-ence among those who may have some respon-sibility for fighting major spills.

The U.S. Coast Guard, which provides on-scene coordinators for spills and, if necessary,a strike team, does not have a career track foroil spill experts. Both the Captain of the Port,who would be designated on-scene coordina-tor in a spill, and strike team commandersrotate to other positions after 2 to 4 year as-signments. Although they receive simulationand classroom training, few are able to ac-quire experience fighting major spills.10 TheU.S. Navy has contract personnel dedicated tooil spill response. The Navy may be called toprovide equipment and help fight major U.S.oil spills (as in the case of the Exxon Valdezspill]; however, the primary responsibility ofits oil spill unit is to support Navy operationsworldwide. Would-be contractors find it diffi-cult to stay in business given the rarity of ma-jor spills. Those that do exist largely to sup-

port industry cooperatives, and neither thecooperatives nor the contractors have muchexperience dealing with catastrophic spills.11

To remedy this situation, several OTAworkshop participants suggested that theUnited States create a professional cadre, per-haps within the Coast Guard and/or withinthe private sector, whose entire career is dedi-cated to dealing with spills around the coun-try. Such a group could be available to re-spond to all major U.S. spills as well as toprovide advice and assistance for smallerspills. Rather than losing experience throughrotation and reassignment, a group of oil spillprofessionals would retain and build experi-ence. The skills and experience of such a groupmight be enhanced further by giving it the ca-pability to advise or participate in responsesto major spills elsewhere in the world, asneeded. Moreover, it may be prudent (al-though more expensive at the time) to over-respond to certain types of spills. If a spillturns out to be less severe than initiallythought, advantage may still be taken by us-ing the response as a training exercise. (Fundsspent when an overresponse proves not to bejustified may be more than offset on thoseoccasions when the initial response is justi-fied). Oil spill experts must maintain skillsthat may not be required for long intervals.Notably, the petroleum industry, through itsproposed Petroleum Industry Response Or-ganization, has proposed to man each of its re-gional response centers with “dedicated,trained personnel” and to stress training anddrilling of its personnel.12

Personnel training must include instruc-tion about the capabilities and limitations of arange of countermeasures techniques andequipment. Most of the equipment on the

9Mem Finws, OTA Workshop, Aug. 15) 1989.

JoMr. Jim O’Brien, OOPS, Inc., OTA workshop, Aug. 15, 1989.

I IThe ~erim Petro]eum Institute, “Task Force R.ePrt on Oi] Spi]]S,” June 14, 1989. p. 10.

121bid. p. iv.


market is operator sensitive; hence, the per-formance of a given piece of equipment is di-rectly related to the operator’s knowledge ofit. Also, contingency plans need occasionaltesting, preferably full scale testing of thecomplete containment, cleanup, and disposalsystem. With few major spills, complacencymay easily become a problem unless steps aretaken to counteract it. Contingency plan test-ing should involve State and local authoritieswho will have some responsibility in the eventof a spill, as well as oil spill professionals.

The National Forest Service has developedone system for responding to natural disastersthat may be worth emulating. Its IncidentCommand System for forest fire fighting isbased on a complete training program for in-dividuals within various separate organiza-tions who can be called on in the event of alarge fire. This system creates a managementstructure for responding to these rare events.This same approach could be applied to largeoil spills.

RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT

Organizations and Programs

Several agencies within the Federal Govern-ment are engaged in oil spill countermeasuresresearch and development. The three mostimportant are the Department of the Interior(DOI), the Department of Transportation(DOT), and the Environmental protectionAgency (EPA).

Within the DOI, oil spill research is con-ducted by the Technology, Assessment, andResearch Branch of the Minerals Manage-

ment Service (MMS). Among other things,MMS has plans to:

finalize offshore equipment test proce-dures,

continue field verification of in situ burn-ing,

continue refining airborne oil thicknesssensors,

conduct final testing of the high-speedwater jet barrier boom,

develop beach line cleanup techniquesthat are environmentally acceptable,

continue to conduct research to improvethe effectiveness of chemical treatmentagents,

continue developing a remote sensor fordetecting oil in broken ice and darkness,

finalize standard equipment and tech-nique test procedures, and

continue assessing the behavior of heavyoils.13

MMS would also like to reopen the Oil andHazardous Materials Simulated Environ-mental Test Tank– the OHMSETT facility,located in New Jersey. OHMSETT was for-merly operated as a cooperative interagencyprogram to evaluate oil spill response equip-ment and procedures, but closed when fund-ing dried up.

The Department of the Interior has in-creased funding for oil spill research in re-sponse to the Exxon Valdez spill. Notably, ithas entered into an agreement with theAmerican Petroleum Institute to jointly fundsome research and development. Each willcontribute $1 million per year for the next 3years. The projects listed above are among

131n@ra~ncy P]mningworkshop on oil spi]] Research and Development, Sep. 26-2’7, 1989, Groten, CT. workshop report prep~edby Decisions and Designs, Inc., Arlington, VA.

Chapter 4–U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .3.5

those being considered for funding. Some ofthe research may be done in cooperation withother agencies and with parallel Canadian ef-forts.

Oil spill research and development in theDepartment of Transportation is carried outby the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guardproposes to spend about $4.1 million in fiscalyear 1990 on oil spill response projects andabout $1.8 million on prevention projects. It isconsidering allocation of funds for the follow-ing oil spill response projects:

•

Ž

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

spill response information system devel-opment,

spill response training aids development,

surveillance systems development,

satellite imagery for spill tracking,

rapid deployment technology assess-ment,

tanker salvage and countermeasures de-velopment,

mechanical recovery systems develop-ment,

OHMSETT support,

Coast Guard countermeasures/equip-ment development,

chemical countermeasures technologyassessment,

in-situ burning development,

short term test and evaluation in Alaska,and

spill response personnel health andsafety.14

In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill,the Coast Guard R&D center in Groten, Con-necticut acted as a clearinghouse for propos-als and suggestions concerning cleanup. As ta-ble 4-1 indicates, 139 of these proposals wereconsidered to have immediate applicabilityfor combating the Exxon Valdez spill. Al-though a significant number of proposalswere rejected as not feasible, a still sizablenumber merit future investigation by govern-ment and industry researchers.

EPA plans to spend $1 million during 1990for oil spill research. This funding will belargely devoted to the continuation of theshoreline bioremediation program startedlast year in Alaska. EPA and Exxon havesigned a cooperative agreement to carry outthe research. Exxon has provided a total of $3million to date for this program. EPA is cur-rently developing a 5-year research plan,which will be implemented if Congress passesthe implementing legislation.

Several other agencies are also conductingimportant oil spill response research and de-velopment. The Army Corps of Engineersused two dredges to recover some of the oilspilled by the Exxon Valdez, and is now inves-tigating how to use its dredges more effec-tively. The National Institute of Standardsand Technology, in conjunction with MMSand the American Petroleum Institute, is con-ducting in situ burning research. And the Na-tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-tion is developing electronic communicationsfor response situations and studying the fateand behavior of oil.

The Exxon Valdez spill also galvanized oilindustry support for spill research and devel-opment. In April of 1989 the American Petro-leum Institute created an oil spill Task Forceto review industry operations in the areas of

l~u.s. coast Gumd ~re]iminW mmine en~ronmen~ prot~lon research ~d deve]oprnent p]an, fitiyear 1990. NOV. 18, 1989.(Draft).

—


Table 4-1 -Suggestions Received by theCoast Guard

category Number

Proposals for future government investigation:

BioremediationChemical (dispersant, degreaser)Physical (solidification, absorbent, etc.)Collection - vesselCollection - mechanicalSkimmer - boomsHull patchingOil movementWild-life cleanupIncinerationMiscellaneous

25% of database

Proposals forwarded to Exxon:

BioremediationChemical (dispersant, degreaser)

Total

Physical (solidification, absorbent, etc.)Collection - vesselCollection - mechanicalSkimmer - boomsHull patchingOil movementWild-life cleanupIncinerationMiscellaneous

22% of database Total

Other responses:

3414191717304354l 3

160

224361419—

——

539

139

● Previous research/application indicates methodnot feasible

● Letters of general concern

53% of database

SOURCE: United States Coast Guard, 1990

oil spill prevention and response. As a result ofthe Task Force’s deliberations, the industrycreated the Petroleum Industry Response Or-ganization (PIRO). In addition to establishingthe operational capability to respond to cata-

strophic oil spills, PIRO will design and man-age a research and development program. Theoil industry has pledged $30 million to $35million to PIRO during its first five years forthis purpose and expects to contribute $1 mil-lion to $4 million per year thereafter. Six ma-jor subject areas have been identified:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

preventing loss of oil from or away fromthe ship,

on-water oil recovery and treatment,

preventing and mitigating shoreline im-pact,

fate and effects of oil in the environment,

wildlife preservation, and

health and safety.15

Among those projects on which PIROwould expend the most funds during the in-itial 5 year period are bioremediation ofshorelines, development of chemical disper-sants and skimmers for on-water recovery andtreatment, and development of absorbentsand absorbents for shoreline use.16 In all,some 38 projects have been considered forfunding. PIRO recognizes a need to coordi-nate with government agencies to avoid dupli-cation of research.

Both Senate and House oil spill bills (S 686and HR 1465, respectively) pending as of thiswriting provide for the establishment andfunding of oil spill research and developmentprograms. Among the priority research iden-tified in the Senate bill are on-water oil recov-ery and treatment, prevention of loss awayfrom vessels, and prevention and mitigationof shoreline impacts. The House bill speci-fies – among other things– research, develop-ment, and demonstration of new or improvedsystems of mechanical, chemical, biological,

15PIRO 1rnp]ernen~t@ Inc., dral?, statement of PIRO’S proposed R&D program, o~. 10, 1989.‘EIbid.

Chapter 4- U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .37

and other methods (including the use of dis-persants, solvents, and bioremediation) forthe recovery, removal, and disposal of oil.Both bills establish coordinating committeesto oversee oil pollution research. The Housebill would establish a minimum of six regionalresearch centers at universities or other re-search institutions to address one or more ofthe research needs identified in the bill. TheSenate bill would establish a Prince WilliamSound Oil Spill Recovery Institute to identifyand develop the best technology for dealingwith spills in arctic and subarctic marine envi-ronments.

Discussion

OTA’s investigation of oil spill responsetechnologies indicates that the country’s abil-ity to recover oil from large spills is inade-quate. It can be improved, but a large technol-ogy research and development effort does notoffer the promise of major breakthroughs. Al-though most of the R&D projects proposed bygovernment and industry appear to be worth-while, OTA’s analysis shows that only modestand gradual improvements can be expectedfrom most mechanical response technologyR&D. And it is important to remember thattechnology is only one of many variables thatcan affect the recovery of oil from a spill. Thebenefits likely to result from improvements intechnology alone may not be noticed in theultimate amount of oil recovered from anymajor spill. An R&D program can be justified,however, on the basis of the need to maintainthe best capability possible and to understandthe most appropriate uses, capabilities, andlimitations of all the systems that may beavailable in the future.

Creation of a program to test oil spill equip-ment under realistic, at-sea conditions — occa-sionally using real oil —is particularly desir-able. OTA’s analysis indicates that muchequipment has mechanical deficiencies be-cause it has never been field-tested. Testing

has been conducted in the past at the nowclosed OHMSETT facility. Additional work ata reopened OHMSETT may be useful, but abigger payoff would result by testing responsetechnologies at sea. Although controlled spillshave been allowed in many European coun-tries (sometimes with U.S. observers present),it has been more than 10 years since an experi-mental offshore oil spill has been allowed inthe United States. In light of recent events, itwould be useful to allow occasional experi-mental spills to test equipment. WhateverU.S. testing is undertaken should be coordi-nated with similar efforts in other countries.

OTA’s investigations also show that coordi-nation of R&D efforts within the government,between the government and the private sec-tor, and among the many other interestsworldwide is essential to reaching desiredgoals with minimum waste of resources. Theseveral Federal agencies with R&D programshave different purposes and perspectives, butthere is considerable overlap as well. MMS,the Coast Guard, and EPA are all concernedwith acceptable standards and evaluation ofperformance of cleanup systems. They mustwork together to agree on final results, butone agency could take the lead in major pro-gram funding for best efficiency.

It is also vital that the Federal Governmentcoordinate its efforts with those of private in-dustry, especially if a substantial R&D pro-gram by PIRO gets underway as planned. Thisis important for several reasons. First, theindustry work may be directed at its own pri-orities; government priorities could be differ-ent and require additional work in areas notcovered by industry. Second, the governmentmust be completely knowledgeable about newtechnologies and techniques if it is to fulfill itsrole as principal coordinator and/or managerof future response efforts. Third, if the indus-try supports good, credible programs in cer-tain areas, it would be wasteful for the govern-ment to duplicate the effort.


An area in which greater collaboration be-tween the United States and other countrieson oil spill issues could lead to a sizable payoffis research and development. The UnitedStates and Canada have long cooperated on oilspill R&D, and this relationship appears tohave been profitable for both countries. How-ever, aside from the biennial Oil Spill Confer-ence meetings, at which research findings areoften presented by foreigners, no formalforum exists for the exchange of informationbetween the United States and other coun-tries. OTA has observed that there appears tobe a significant amount of overlap in the re-search of organizations like the French Centerfor Documentation, Research, and Experi-mentation on accidental pollution (CEDRE),the British Warren Springs Laboratory, andthe Dutch State Waterways Board with oilspill researchers in the U.S. government.Greater coordination and/or collaborationcould lead to less duplication, faster dissemi-nation of research results, faster progress onproblems of mutual concern, and a better useof limited R&D funds.

Table 4-2 displays a summary of R&D plansfor the organizations that OTA has contactedand that have current plans for oil spill R&Dexpenditures over the next few years. Theplanned programs of PIRO, the Coast Guard,MMS (in cooperation with API), and the EPAare displayed and broken down into severalresearch areas with notations of high, me-dium, low, or no priority under each. The totalplanned expenditures are about $10 million to$15 million per year in the near term. Abouttwo-thirds will be from industry and one-third from government. It can be seen thatthere are many areas of multiple interest thatcould lead to waste if not carefully coordi-nated. It can also be seen that some areas thatseem to offer promise of future improvementmay be neglected. For example, it appearsthat the engineering of complete systems forrapid deployment, recovery, handling, stor-age, and support for large operations— per-haps including vessels of opportunity– is onearea where additional progress is needed. No

group appears to be focusing on deploymentsystems as a whole (although PIRO has plansto do so). Another potential oversight is theneeded development of more reliable and rug-ged components in mechanical recoveryequipment to handle viscous oils, water emul-sions, debris, etc.

In general, however, R&D attention by theseveral groups that have planned programsappears to be focused on important problems.If these plans are carried out, if they are well-coordinated, and if developments become thebasis of a major expansion of equipment re-sources strategically deployed in high readi-ness condition — this would offer needed im-provements in national response capability.

Table 4-2-Selection of Planned R&D Efforts byFederal Agencies and Industry

Research coast MMSarea PIRO Guard (with API) EPASurveillance/data . . . . . . . . . . . . . - H H MDeploymentsystems . . . . . . . . . . – M L -Sourcecontainment . . . . . L H — —

Mechanicalrecovery . . . . . . . . . L H LDispersants . . . . . . . H L M MBioremediation . . . . H — — HBurning . . . . . . . . . M H H -—

Other/shorelineremediation ., ., . . . M — H MFate andeffects . . . . . . . . . H — HHealth andsafety ., . . . . . . . . . . L M —

Disposal . . . . . . . . . M — — —

Training/ Bio Testtesting ... , . . . . . . . – H M with Exxon

($3 million)ProposedBudgets$ million/yr . . . . . . . $7 $3-$4 $2 $1

NOTE: Hi = High PIRO = Petroleum Industry Response OrganizationM = Medium MMS = Minerals Management ServiceL = Low API = American Petroleum Instttute

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990

Chapter 5

Selected European Oil Spill Policies

INTRODUCTION

In order to investigate oil spill technologiesin use abroad and to learn how the UnitedStates might benefit from the oil spill experi-ences and policies of some other countries,OTA staff visited four countries bordering theNorth Sea in September, 1989: France, theNetherlands, the United Kingdom, and Nor-way. OTA’s trip was coordinated by the Inter-national Petroleum Industry EnvironmentalConservation Association and included visitsto a number of government and industry or-ganizations in these countries. The four coun-tries selected represent a wide range of tech-nologies and countermeasures policies. Beloware some of the highlights of our findings.

FRENCH OIL SPILL POLICY

The French seriously began to consider acomprehensive approach to fighting oil spillsin the aftermath of the Torrey Canyongrounding off England in 1967, but Frenchpolicy evolved significantly as a consequenceof France’s unfortunate experience with theAmoco Cadiz spill in 1978. This accident, inwhich approximately 223,000 tons (68 milliongallons) of oil were spilled along the Brittanycoast, was about 6.5 times as large as the Ex-xon Valdez spill, making it the fourth largestin history (table 5-l).

Notably, the French have assigned respon-sibility for fighting oil spills at sea to theFrench Navy, whose responsibilities are gen-erally the equivalent of those of both the U.S.Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Although em-phasis is placed on spill prevention, once aspill has occurred the French Navy has the

authority to use whatever means are deemedmost appropriate to fight the spill. Oil thathas reached the shoreline is the responsibilityof local authorities.

For fighting oil spills at sea, the offshorearea surrounding France has been dividedinto three maritime regions. Oil spill re-sponses within each region are directed by theresponsible Maritime Prefect, a senior Navyofficer who is also responsible for the defenseof the area.1 The Maritime Prefect’s first pri-ority is to prevent maritime accidents by en-forcing navigation regulations. Traffic separa-tion lanes have been established in someareas, and large, ocean-going tugs are used asboth “watch dogs” and rescue ships. In theevent of a spill, the Maritime Prefect func-tions as onscene commander rather than on-scene coordinator, and hence has considerablymore authority than his U.S. Coast Guardcounterpart. (If a similar arrangement were ineffect in the United States, at least 4 “mari-time prefects, ” possibly U.S. Coast Guard offi-cers, would be required, one each for the East,Gulf, West, and Alaskan coasts). Relatively

minor spills are handled with local equip-ment. If a spill occurs that is larger than localresources can handle, an offshore marine pol-lution plan, POLMAR MER, is invoked, andthe Maritime Prefect can then draw on theequipment and expertise of other regions,and, if necessary, of private stocks.

Local civil authorities are responsible forcontainment and cleanup when an oil spillreaches or threatens to reach land. Each ofFrance’s 26 coastal departments (states) pre-pares its own POLMAR TERRE responseplan, which the prefect (governor) of each de-partment can invoke in the event of a majorthreat. The plans identify priority areas to be

‘G. Marchand, G. Bergot, M. Melguen, and G. Peigne, “French Know-How in the Prevention and Fight Against Accidental Oil Spills, ”1987 Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, Apr. &9, 1987, Baltimore, MD, pp. 15-22.

39


protected and specify how booms will be in-stalled in these areas, what public and privateequipment is available, and where storagesites and treatment centers for recoveredproducts are located.2 Small spills are handledby commune officials (mainly by fire depart-ments) with local equipment stocks. TheArmy may be called for major spills and usedto clean beaches with material and equipmentfrom the POLMAR stocks. Having experi-enced major beach pollution and having rec-ognized that a significant proportion of anymajor spill may reach the coastline no matterwhat measures are taken, the French have putmuch effort into research and development ofbeach cleaning equipment and into planningand training for beach cleanup. OTA foundFrench beach cleaning technology and organi-

zation to be an impressive element of its oilspill cleanup plans. There is no comparableemphasis on defensive beach protectionmeasures in the United States.

Stocks of equipment for fighting offshorespills are maintained at POLMAR centers inBrest, Cherbourg, and Toulon, the headquar-ters of each of the three maritime regions, andalso in Le Havre, Lorient, Port de Bouc, andAjaccio. Purchase and maintenance of thisequipment is the responsibility of the FrenchMinistry of Defense. Booms for the protectionof sensitive nearshore and onshore areas arelocated in eight POLMAR centers around thecountry, so that no part of the coastline is fur-ther than 250 kilometers from a boom storagecenter. Equipment for land cleaning opera-

PhoEJ cnxfit Jim Mieh

French sand washing machine.

21bid.

Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies ● 41

tions (e.g., sand washing equipment and hotwater pumps) is stationed at two of theseeight centers.3 The Secretary of State for theSea is responsible for the purchase of equip-ment for onshore activities.

Unlike the three other countries OTA vis-ited, the French do not rely primarily on onecountermeasure technique. Both mechanicalequipment and dispersants are at their dis-posal, and the technique or techniques bestsuited to the circumstances will be employed.While recovery at sea is preferable, the Navymay use dispersants without conferring withothers if the spill is seaward of environmen-tally sensitive areas (as a rule of thumb, wherethe water depth is greater than 30 meters).

French mechanical cleanup equipment isnot radically different from that available inthe United States. Some French technology,including the Egmolap skimmers successfullyused in nearshore operations in Prince Wil-liam Sound, is available in the United States.Beach cleaning technology (e.g., sand wash-ers) is innovative and deserves some attentionfor use in the United States. Also, the Frenchhave been experimenting with biodegradationaccelerating agents. They supplied one of theproducts (Inipol eap 22) for bioremediationexperiments in Prince William Sound.

In the wake of the Amoco Cadiz oil spill theFrench government established CEDRE, theCenter for Documentation, Research, andExperimentation on accidental pollution.Among other things CEDRE advises authori-ties responsible for pollution control aboutstate-of-the-art techniques, assists and ad-vises authorities during crises, trains person-nel, conducts research to improve existingmethods, and tests equipment (including oc-casional testing in small, deliberate oil spillsat sea). The organization has a permanentstaff of 26 and a budget of 10 million francsper year. There is no equivalent U.S. organiza-tion, although counterparts of many of

Ptwfo credit Jim Midke

French Egmolap skimmers stockpiled at the POLMAR centerin Brest. Egmolap skimmers were used to recover oil

in nearshore areas of Prince William Sound.

CEDRE’s missions are spread around variousU.S. Executive Branch agencies. CEDRE is akey element in the French oil spill counter-measures approach. Its existence ensures thatat least some attention is devoted to oil spillissues in the sometimes long periods betweenmajor spills.

DUTCH OIL SPILL POLICY

The Dutch rely entirely on mechanical re-covery for fighting spills as they have no confi-dence in the effectiveness of chemical disper-sants. The most notable aspect of Dutchreliance on mechanical means is their use oflarge dual purpose vessels. Large skimmingvessels have advantages over small skimmersbecause they can simultaneously skim andstore much more oil than a small vessel andbecause they can operate in heavier seas. Nev-ertheless, large, dedicated spill vessels are ex-pensive to maintain and operate and slow torespond to distant spill sites. The Dutch arguethat a large vessel built purely for pollutioncontrol purposes would be idle for the greater

%entre POLMAR de Brest, “The Fight Against Oil Pollution on the Coastline: Missions and Methods of the POLMAR Centers,”May 1987.

——.


part of its life and is therefore economicallydifficult to justify.4 However, vessels that canbe put to use in periods between oil spills aremuch more attractive. Hopper dredges are es-pecially suitable for dual use purposes in theNetherlands: the country is small, has a sandycoastline, and has significant dredging needsin important ports and waterways. Thesedredges can be equipped with recovery equip-ment and can hold sizable amounts of recov-ered oil. Dredges normally operate in areaswhere the risk of oil spills is high– the ap-proach channels to ports. Moreover, it takesonly a few minutes for a hopper dredge to dis-charge its cargo and to be available for spillcleanup duties.

The Rijkswaterstaat, or State WaterwaysBoard, is responsible for vessel pollutioncountermeasures at sea, along the coast, andin the main navigable waterways in ports.5 Italso conducts oil spill research. As in France,although the government takes charge in theevent of vessel spills, the polluter is liable forall cleanup costs. Oil companies are expectedto fight platform spills. In the event of a largetanker spill, one or more dredges may becalled into cleanup action. Notably, dredgesare under contract to the government ratherthan owned by it. Where the flash point of thespilled oil is high enough, any dredge undercontract may be used. If the flash point is be-low 140°F, which is occasionally the case, adredge designed to tanker specifications (e.g.,the Cosmos) is used. When called, a dredgedrops its spoil, proceeds to its base, is fittedwith sweeping arms for oil containment andrecovery, and sails to the spill site to begin re-covery. The whole process generally takesabout four hours, although Dutch dredges areseldom further than 20 kilometers from theirbases.

The Dutch system is intended (perhaps op-timistically) to be able to cope with a 30,000cubic meter spill (about the size of the ExxonValdez spill) in 3 days. Assuming that about50 percent of a spill evaporates, mechanicalequipment must be able to recover 15,000 cu-bic meters. In all, 7 units, each unit containing200 meters of boom, 2 sweeping arms, a recov-ery vessel, and an assistant vessel, are avail-able to meet this goal.

Dual use dredges could prove useful in theUnited States. Although no single approach islikely to be the magic solution for all situ-ations, major port areas where dredges are op-erating would be primary candidates for suchsystems. As with other approaches, support-ing equipment and facilities must also beavailable. The usefulness of oil skimmingdredges in areas far from ports, for which sig-nificant time would be required to reach, isless obvious, although in some cases dredgesmay be able to steam to a spill site in time tomake a difference in the cleanup effort. TheDutch State Waterways Board suggested toOTA that 10 to 20 sets of sweeping arms, lo-cated at key ports around the United States,might be adequate coverage. Existing dredgeseither owned or chartered by the Army Corpsof Engineers could be converted to accept thesweeping arms. IHC estimates that costs toreconfigure dredges to accept sweeping armswould be about $400,000 per vessel, and thatthe equipment itself– which could be sharedamong several vessels–would cost about$600,000 per set. At present, the Army Corpsof Engineers has no responsibilities for oilspills, so a change in the basic U.S. approachwould be required.

d~c D~& T~hno]o~ Corp., “The IHC S]icktrai] and Its Possible Application in the U. S.A.,” Prepared for U.S. Army CorPs ofEngineers, Trailing Suction Hopper Workgroup Session, Atlantic City, NJ, June 14-15, 1989.

s~~comwative Study Ofpo]lution Contro] Po]iq and Contingency Plans in France and in the Wnn Aflreement Member countries)”paper presented at the Nineteenth Meeting of the Bonn Agreement Working Group on Operational, Technical, and Scientific Ques-tions Concerning Counter Pollution Activities, Renesse: May 3-6, 1989, p. 22.

Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies ● 43

UNITED KINGDOMOIL SPILL POLICY

Responsibility for responding to offshoretanker spills in the United Kingdom is ac-cepted by the central government. The gov-ernment provides the response equipment, di-rects the response operation, maintains andupdates the national contingency plan, and re-views developments in pollution controlequipments This authority has been dele-gated to the Marine Pollution Control Unit(MPCU) of the Department of Transport. TheMPCU is assisted by the Coastguard, whoseprimary role with respect to marine pollutionis to detect and report pollution incidents. Re-sponse to platform spills in the North Sea isthe responsibility of the operator. Responsepolicy for these spills is set by the Departmentof Energy, but the MPCU provides advice andmay help with the cleanup operations if theoperator’s resources prove inadequate. Pollu-tion that reaches shore is primarily the re-sponsibility of local authorities, but theMPCU advises and assists as required. In amajor coastal pollution incident (one beyondthe resources of a local authority) the MPCUwould set up a Joint Response Center andwould then coordinate and lead the onshoreresponse to ensure a fully integrated at-seaand on-shore cleanup operation.7 Stocks ofspecialized beach cleaning equipment are heldby the MPCU to supplement local resources.Cleanup costs are initially borne by theMPCU, but where the polluter can be identi-fied, he will be required to refund the costs ofthe measures.

It is the policy of the British government torely on dispersants as a first line of defense foroil spills; mechanical recovery plays a second-ary role. This policy is based on the govern-

ment’s lack of faith in the effectiveness of me-chanical equipment in weather conditions andsea states typical of the North Sea and otherwaters surrounding the United Kingdom andon the view that recent advances in disper-sants have improved their effectiveness andmade them much less toxic. According to theMPCU General Information Notes, “The onlyoperationally proven technique for combatingoil at sea in the conditions prevalent aroundthe coastline is spraying with dispersants.”8

Only dispersants which have passed appropri-ate tests may be used. Immediately after aspill occurs, a determination is made as towhether dispersant use would be safe and ef-fective. The MPCU consults with the Fisher-ies Department and the Nature ConservancyCouncil on the appropriateness of dispersantuse in sensitive areas and in water less than 1mile from shore or less than 20 meters indepth.

The MPCU currently has seven airplanesunder contract for applying dispersants. Tworemote sensing aircraft are available to directthe response effort. Aircraft and dispersantsare strategically positioned at airports aroundthe country. During daylight, aircraft must beready to fly within 30 minutes of notification;at night they must be ready within 2 hours.Hence, the MPCU is able to start spraying dis-persants very soon after a spill occurs, an im-portant advantage since effectiveness dependson early application, and in most cases oil canno longer be dispersed after about 48 hours.The Unit also has dispersant spraying equip-ment fitted to a number of commercial tugslocated at strategic positions around the U.K.coast; a small amount of mechanical recoveryequipment to deploy in chartered vessels; astock of cargo transfer equipment for lighter-

GW.H.H. McLeod, “Contro] Ofoi] Po]]ution Response Activities,” The Remote Sensing of Oil Slicks, A.E. KAX@ (cd. ) (London: JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd., 1989), p. 115.

~partment of Transport, “MPCU General Information Notes. ”

‘Ibid. p. 10.


ing operations; and stockpiles of beach clean-ing equipment.

During OTA’s visit, two tankers collided offthe Humber Estuary, resulting in an oil spillof 800 tons. The MPCU determined that theoil could be dispersed, and had the sprayingoperation under way within 3.5 hours. In theUnited States, both the decision to use disper-sants and the mobilization of airplanes andships may take much longer.

With available dispersant equipment, theMPCU maintains it can treat 5,000 tons of oilat sea in a 48-hour period. Planned upgradesin the aircraft fleet will increase this capabil-ity to 14,000 tons. The MPCU assumes that inmost coastal spills the greater part of the oilwill come ashore and estimates that with theassistance of MPCU beach cleaning equip-ment a local authority can clean up some6,000 tons of oiled material from beachesevery 7 to 10 days.

In the event of a very large spill, the MPCUmay ask for assistance from neighboringcountries. The United Kingdom and sevenother countries bordering the North Sea haveentered the Agreement for Co-operation inDealing with Pollution of the North Sea byOil, commonly called the Bonn Agreement, tofacilitate the sharing of equipment and the ex-change of information about oil spill counter-measures. The United Kingdom also has bi-lateral oil spill agreements with France (theManche Plan) and Norway (the Norbrit Plan).Although no formal agreement exists betweenindustry and the government, the MPCU mayalso ask for assistance from the oil industry’soil spill response base, located in South-ampton, England. The Southampton basecurrently maintains one of the largest stocksof oil spill equipment in the world, valued atabout 4 million pounds. Exxon is a payingmember of this cooperative, and was there-fore able to use about half of the South-ampton stock in the Exxon Valdez spill. TheSouthampton Base is a joint venture com-

pany. The full participants are Esso, BritishPetroleum, Shell, Texaco, and Mobil. Thesefull participants can call on a maximum of 50percent of the available equipment to respondto spill emergencies worldwide. Petro Canadais a lesser participant and, as such, may onlyuse equipment in proportion to its contribu-tion.

The MPCU also funds a research programto develop improved techniques for predict-ing the behavior of spilled oil, dealing with itat sea, and predicting its environmental im-pact. This program also covers hazardouschemicals.

NORWEGIANOIL SPILL POLICY

Oil pollution control policy in Norway is theresponsibility of the State Pollution ControlAuthority (SPCA) within the Ministry of theEnvironment. For major pollution, the SPCApresides over the Government Action ControlGroup, which also includes representativesfrom other government ministries, the oil in-dustry, and the scientific community. Respon-sibilities for actual cleanup are divided amongthe SPCA, local authorities, and the offshoreoil companies. In general, the polluter is re-sponsible for cleaning up oil spills, but if thepolluter is incapable of handling a spill or ifextra help is required, the SPCA may, at itsdiscretion, take over the operation.9 In thissense, Norwegian oil spill policy is similar tothat of the United States. In practice, the oiland gas industry has prepared specifically torespond to offshore platform spills, while theSPCA generally expects to respond to spillsfrom ships– an important difference betweenU.S. and Norwegian approaches.

The SPCA has decreed that oil pollutionwill be fought by mechanical means to the ex-tent possible. Dispersants are used only if me-chanical cleanup has proved ineffective and

YI’he Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority, “Oil Pollution Control: Emergency Services in Norway,” February 1983.

Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies . 45

Photo crwh Jim Mielke

Norwegian Transrec weir skimming system.

only with approval from the SPCA. The SPCArequires that the offshore oil and gas industrybe able to recover 8,000 tons of oil per day,that the equipment for doing so be able to op-erate in significant wave heights of up to 2 me-ters and in currents of up to 1.5 knots, andthat this equipment beat the spill site within48 hours of a spill. The SPCA has also im-posed requirements on refineries and largeterminals. These are required to be able tocope with 5,000-ton spills.

To meet offshore requirements, the elevenoil and gas companies that operate on theNorwegian continental shelf have organizedthe Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Op-erating Companies (NOFO). NOFO main-tains a total of 14 oil recovery and transfer(Transrec) systems and 8,750 meters of heavyduty boom at 5 strategic locations along theNorwegian coast. The Transrec systems havebeen designed for operation in rough NorthSea conditions and are among the largestskimming and transfer systems available any-where. These systems have been designed tobe mounted on the large industry work boats

that make regular shuttles between shorebases and offshore platforms, and, hence, arenever far from an equipment depot. Theseboats have a storage capacity of about 1,000tons.

Local authorities are responsible for fight-ing spills on and within 3 miles of the coast.Fifty-two municipal and intermunicipal con-tingency areas have been designated, andwithin each area an Oil Pollution ControlCommittee, with direct responsibility for thecleanup effort, has been established. Local re-sources are used for small spills. The costs ofmunicipal oil spill equipment are sharedequally between the central and local govern-ments.

Spills that are larger than can be handled lo-cally and/or beyond the capacity of the pol-luter to handle are in part or totally taken overby the SPCA. The SPCA has established 12equipment depots at strategic locations alongthe coast. Each depot is stocked with about $1million (U. S.) worth of equipment, includingheavy, medium-heavy, and light booms, onelarge and two smaller skimmers, and a supplyof beach cleaning equipment. In addition, theSPCA has contracted with a number of coastaltankers, tugs, and purse seine fishing vessels.These vessels are on call and maybe used in alarge spill. The purse seiners can be equippedwith skimmers and operate as both oil recov-ery vessels and oil storage vessels. In all, mu-nicipal, state, and private organizations haveestablished a total of 17 oil spill depots alongthe coast containing about 60 miles of lightand heavy booms and 300 skimmers. Numer-ous storage and boom towing vessels are oncall.

Norway has made a strong commitment tooil spill response training. The SPCA’s OilSpill Control Center in Horten offers a seriesof courses and exercises in oil spill control. Amost impressive aspect of this program is thewide range of personnel that participate: vir-tually all municipal, state, and private em-ployees involved in decisionmaking and/orcleanup operations in Norway receive train-


mm Credit Ml W@3smmn!ymf

Large offshore boom on reel, used by the Norwegian CleanSeas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO).

ing. The goals of this program are to train per-sonnel to know their responsibilities in anemergency spill situation and to give them theknowledge and experience needed to meetthese responsibilities. As one notable trainingdevice, the Center has developed an elaborate“tactical exercise.” In this exercise accidentsituations are simulated and trainees play theroles they would play in a real emergency situ-ation. Such roles may range from state or mu-nicipal decisionmaker to master of a vessel toa fisherman complaining of damaged gear. Inaddition to simulations, major seagoing exer-cises (which can include experimental, con-trolled oil spills) are conducted yearly. A con-sequence of the emphasis on training inNorway is that those with oil spill cleanup re-sponsibilities at all levels of government andindustry– an estimated 3,000 people—arewell informed about the decisionmaking proc-ess and about the types of things that can gowrong. Uncertainty about how to respond ap-pears to have been reduced to a minimum.

GENERAL COMMENTS

There exist almost as many approaches tofighting oil spills in Europe as there are Euro-pean countries (table 5-l). The degree of reli-ance on mechanical cleanup methods is onearea, for example, where the full range of pos-sible approaches are exhibited: some coun-tries rely exclusively on mechanical cleanupmethods, others on both mechanical methodsand dispersants, and still others almost solelyon dispersants. No European country, how-ever, relies on burning as an important part ofits spill response arsenal. Some other vari-ables include the type of mechanical equip-ment preferred, the government agency as-signed primary authority for oil spillresponse, the division of authority between lo-cal and statewide officials, the amount of oilfor which countermeasures must be preparedto deal, the role of private industry in cleanupefforts, and the preferred approach to train-ing, drills, and equipment testing.

These differences are based, in part, on cir-cumstances peculiar to each country, e.g., theuse of dual purpose dredges seems to makeparticularly good sense in the Netherlands,given the amount of local dredging activity, asdoes the use of large work boats for counter-measures platforms in Norway, given theirutility in rough seas and the fact that thesevessels regularly shuttle between the offshoreplatforms and shore bases. No doubt differentapproaches are also based on the different ex-periences of each country. In European coun-tries, as in the United States, progress ismade, much of the time, by the pressure ofevents, and revisions in contingency planshave been made in several countries in the af-termath of major pollution incidents.10 Im-portantly, some differences among countriesseem to be based on different perceptionsabout the effectiveness of a technique, aboutrisk, and/or about costs v. benefits, i.e., on

IoOp. cit., fOOtnOte 5, Pa& 39.

Table 5-1 -Summary of Oil Spill Response Arrangements

Central government Responsibility for clean-updepartments

Country primarily involved At sea On-shore Policy for clean-up at sea Clean-up resources

Belgium

Denmark

Ministry of DefenseMinistry of Interior

Navy Coastal munici-palities; CivilDefense Corps

Dispersants applied from vessels Limited mainly to dispersants andspraying equipment.

National Agencyfor EnvironmentalProtection

National Agency forEnvironmentalProtection; coastallocal authorities;Civil Defense Corps

Containment and recoveryalmost exclusivelyalthough provision for limiteduse of dispersants

Specialized vessels equipped withbooms and skimmers. Also equipmentand materials for shore clean-up indistrict stockpiles.

Ministry ofEnvironment

France Secretary of Statefor the SeaMinistry of DefenseMinistry of Interior

Ministry ofTransport

Maritime Prefect(Navy)

Coastal communes:Commissioner ofthe Department

Containment and recoverypreferred but dispersantsused in designated areas

Extensive stocks of specialized equipment and materials in regional stockpiles.Also strike teams and aircraft fordispersant spraying.

Specialized vessels, booms, skimmers,spraying equipment and dispersants.

FederalRepublic ofGermany

Federal Board ofWaterways andNavigation;coastal states

North SeaDirectorate ofState WaterwaysBoard

Coastal states Containment and recoverypreferred but dispersantsalso used in North Sea

Containment and recoveryexclusively

Specialized vessels, including combineddredgers/oil combating ships equippedwith oil recovery equipment. Othervessels for deploying booms. Otherequipment held by salvage and privatecontractors.

Extensive stocks of specialized equip-ment and trained response teams at 12regional centers.

Netherlands Ministry of Transportand Public Works

Coastal provincialand municipalstates

Norway Ministry ofEnvironment

State PollutionControlAuthority/MaritimeDirectorate

Coast GuardService

Coastal communityand intercommunityareas

Containment and recovery almostexclusively, but will considerdispersants if mechanical meansare ineffective

Municipal firebrigades; provincialauthorities

Containment and recoverypreferred although dispersantapplication permissible undercertain conditions

Large fleet of vessels equipped for anti-pollution work, Extensive stocks ofclean-up equipment in some 30 coastalsites.

7 dedicated spraying aircraft, vessel-mounted spray gear and extensivestocks of dispersant. Also containment

Sweden Ministry of Defense

UnitedKingdom

Department ofTransport

Marine PollutionControl Unit ofMaritimeDirectorate

Marine PollutionControl Unit ofMaritimeDirectorate; coastallocal authorities

Aerial application of dispersants;containment and recoverywhere applicable

and recovery equipment and equipmentfor shore clean-up in 3 regional stockpiles.

SOURCE: J N Archer and I C white, “Organlsatton to mmbat 011 SpIllS: The Case for Coordmatlon of Government Practice, ” International Tanker Owners Pollutlon Federation, p 5

—


many of the issues currently being debated inthe United States.

It is clear that no single countermeasurespractice will be applicable in all locales and forall types of oil spills. This is especially true inthe United States, a large country with thou-sands of miles of coastline. Yet some ap-proaches adopted in Europe deserve seriousconsideration for applicable parts of theUnited States. Among these:

equip existing dredges with oil recoverycapabilities (as in the Netherlands) in theU.S. port areas where dredges routinelyoperate,

expand the use of supply vessels as plat-forms for heavy duty skimmers (as inNorway) in such oil production areas asthe Gulf of Mexico and Southern Califor-nia,

preapprove dispersants for use in non-sensitive areas using on-call airplanes fordelivery systems (as in the U.K.),

expand training and contingency plan-ning exercises (as in Norway).

Despite differences, several generalizationsabout European oil spill response policiesmay be made. With respect to terminals, re-fineries, offshore platforms, and other fixedfacilities, the general rule is that the partycausing the pollution should clean it up. Op-erators of these facilities are expected to havecontingency plans and to provide equipmentand materials in the event of a spill.11 Directgovernment involvement in the response gen-erally only takes place if the polluter is unableto cope with the spill. Virtually without excep-tion, however, the central government–whether represented by the ministry of de-fense, environment, transportation, etc. in

any given country– is assigned responsibilityfor vessel spills.

Most countries accept that it would beunrealistic to expect the same level andpromptness of response if the pollutingsource was a vessel at sea, especially if theowner or operator had no presence in thecountry whose shores were threatened. Forthis reason, in northwest Europe the re-sponsibility for combating oil pollutionfrom tankers and other vessels is normallyaccepted by governments on the under-standing that the costs of any reasonablemeasures taken will be recoverable fromthe owner and his insurer.12

For these types of spills, unlike the currentsituation in the United States, both the re-sponsibility and the authority for cleanup arein the hands of the central government.

Also, there is a distinction in most Euro-pean countries between those responsible forcombating oil at sea and those responsible fordealing with it on the coast.13 On shore, re-sponsibility for implementing initial cleanupmeasures usually lies with local authorities,with the central government often providingadvice and coordination. As the actual or po-tential impact of a spill increases, central gov-ernments assume more responsibility, andare able to provide equipment, logistic sup-port, and technical and financial assistance.Coordination between local onshore responsi-bilities and central government offshore re-sponsibilities is usually the charge of a singlegovernment department or committee. Sev-eral European countries (e.g., France andNorway) appear to be far better equipped and/or organized than the United States to re-spond to spills that reach or threaten thecoast.

I IJ.N. ~cher ~d I.C. mite, “Or~izatiOn to combat oil spills: The Case for Coordination of Government practice, ” The Interna-tional Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd.

‘21bid. p. 3.

‘31bid. p. 4.

Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies .49

A wide variety of mechanical cleanup tech-nology is used in Europe. Some types ofbooms and skimmers in use or under develop-ment may offer some marginal advantages toequipment manufactured in the UnitedStates; however, OTA found no evidence thatEuropean technology was dramatically betterthan that available in the United States. Muchof this technology is, in fact, marketed in theUnited States, and those responsible for pur-chasing equipment are (or are becoming) fa-miliar with it. Some European equipment wasused in the Exxon Valdez oil spill. French Eg-molap skimmers used in beach cleaning werereportedly particularly successful.

OTA was impressed with the total amountof equipment available in Europe. In the eventof a major spill, countries have not only theirown local, regional, and national equipmentstocks on which to draw, but could also haveaccess to equipment from other nearby coun-tries and from the private sector. Several co-operative agreements exist. In addition to theBonn Agreement, already discussed, the Com-mission of European Communities (CEC) inBrussels has a task force that can provide ex-pertise to member countries that need advice.The CEC maintains a list of equipment

throughout Europe that potentially could beused in the event of a large spill. Also, a num-ber of bilateral agreements exist to facilitatecooperation regarding oil spills occurring onor near the offshore boundaries. (While help-ful, these bilateral agreements do not alwayswork to each country’s satisfaction, e.g., whenone country’s policy is to use dispersants andthe other’s is to rely on mechanical equip-ment).

All European countries OTA visited as-sured us that they were prepared for major oilspills. We suspect that had we toured U.S. fa-cilities before the Exxon Valdez accident, wewould have received similar assurances, soEuropean confidence is at least somewhatquestionable. On the whole, however, Euro-pean countries are better organized than theUnited States, have more resources on whichto draw, and conduct more frequent trainingexercises. In part this is due to activity under-taken in response to unfortunate experienceswith their own major oil spills. As some Euro-peans readily admitted, no country, no matterhow well organized and equipped, would havebeen able to cope satisfactorily with a spill thesize of the Exxon Valdez spill — particularly insuch a remote location.

Appendix AMechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies

Containment Booms

Oil spill containment barriers or booms are float-ing devices generally resembling short curtains thatrestrict an oil slick from spreading beyond the bar-rier. Several designs have been produced for condi-tions ranging from protected waters to open ocean.Some barriers are designed to be towed, while oth-ers remain stationary. Barriers designed for pro-tected waters would be less effective in strong cur-rents or heavy waves but generally are more easilydeployed than offshore booms. Oil spill contain-ment booms generally have five operating compo-nents as shown in figure A-1.

Float

The float is the buoyancy member that keeps theboom riding on the surface of the water. Heavierbooms or booms used in rough seas need morebuoyancy and therefore have a larger volume offloat materials. Floats may be rigid or flexible andshould be relatively smooth so that they don’t trap

Figure A-1 -Components of a Boom

Ballast weight/fttotal boom weight/ft

SOURCE: World Catalog of 011 Spill Response Products

debris or produce vortices that may cause the loss ofoil under the boom.

Freeboard

The freeboard is the vertical height of the boomabove the water. The freeboard prevents oil fromwashing over the top of the boom, but if it is toohigh, the boom may be pushed over in high winds.The boom must be flexible enough to rise and fallwith the waves so that the freeboard is not lost witheach passing wave.

skirt

The skirt is the continuous portion of the boombelow the floats. The skirt helps to contain the oil.While a deeper skirt is more effective in containingoil, increasing skirt depth increases the current loadon the tension members of the boom.

Tension Member

Tension members consist of any elements such ascables, chains, lines, or boom fabric that carry thehorizontal tension loads on the boom.

Ballast

Weight is applied to the bottom of the skirt to im-prove boom performance. Ballast is generally achain (which also serves as a tension member) or aseries of weights along the entire length of theboom.

There are two basic types of booms in general usetoday: fence booms and curtain booms. Fencebooms have a rigid or semirigid material as a con-tainment screen for oil floating on the water. Cur-tain booms have a flexible skirt held down by bal-last weights or a tension chain or cable. Their majordifference is the way in which they respond towaves, current, and wind. If current and wind roll afence boom away from the vertical, there is a loss offreeboard and draft. A curtain boom has a flexibleskirt that is free to move independently of the free-board and flotation, thus movement of the skirtaway from vertical does not necessarily mean loss of

51


freeboard. Other booms, not necessarily of differ-ent types, are designed for special purposes. Theseinclude fireproof booms, ice booms designed forspills in ice-filled water, and sorbant booms used tocontain and absorb small amounts of oil in rela-tively calm waters.

Booms are classified according to their physicalcharacteristics, which include freeboard, draft, re-serve buoyancy to weight ratio, total tensilestrength, skirt fabric tensile strength, and skirt fab-ric tear strength. Although all of these characteris-tics are important, only the freeboard and draft willbe mentioned hereto convey an idea of the overallsize of booms that are used for various applications(table A-l).

In the above classification, based on that used inthe World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products,calm water is defined to have a significant waveheight of less than 1 foot, harbors less than 3 feet,and offshore less than 6 feet. The significant waveheight is the maximum wave height for whichbooms in that category are likely to be effective.The table shows that booms recommended for har-bors and offshore are quite large. A boom recom-mended for harbors would have a vertical dimen-sion (freeboard plus draft) of 22 to 42 inches and aboom recommended for offshore use would have avertical dimension of more than 42 inches.

These classifications should be used with someflexibility. For example, offshore booms typicallyhave long skirts. However, in offshore areas of fastcurrents a shorter skirt may be more effective. Inthis case, a boom classified as a harbor boom maybemore suitable than an offshore boom.

Table A-1 - Boom Classification According toFreeboard and Draft

Freeboard DraftService (inches) (inches)

Calm water 4-1o 6-12

Harbor 10-18 12-24

Offshore >18 >24

SOURCE: Office of Technology Aaaessment, 1990

Mechanical Recovery Devices

Several devices have been developed to collect oilfrom surface waters. Since the efficiency of an oil re-covery device is improved by increasing the thick-ness or depth of an oil slick, these devices are fre-quently used in combination with containmentbarriers. Oil spill recovery skimmers are generallyseparated into categories according to the way inwhich they pick up oil. Fourteen categories and sub-categories can be identified. These are defined asfollows:

Weir – A skimmer that has an interior basinwith a slightly submerged lip over which the oilfloats and is collected by gravity (figure A-2). Theweir is generally a floating skimming head usedwith a pump to continuously empty the collectingbasin. These skimmers work best if the edge of theweir is right at the oil/water interface, but in prac-tice, this adjustment is difficult to achieve andmaintain. Weir skimmers have the advantages ofbeing simple, reliable, and commonly available. Inthick layers of oil (25 mm or more), weir skimmershave high recovery rates with a recovery efficiencyof around 50 per cent. In thinner slicks (1 to 8 mm),the recovery efficiency drops to 10 per cent. Con-ventional floating weir skimmers have problems inbecoming clogged with debris and do not work wellin waves. Archimedes screw devices have been in-corporated in some weir skimmers to grind up de-bris.

suction – A suction skimmer is a simple suctionhead acting somewhat like a weir used on a floatinghose from a vacuum truck or portable suction pump(figure A-3). Pump suction draws the oil to the

Figure A-2 - Weir Skimmer

Oilk

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products.

Appendix A-Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies ● 53

skimmer head. This also is the same principle usedwhen a suction hopper dredge is converted to oilspill recovery. The advantages of suction skimmersare that they are simple to operate, shallow draft,and can be used nearly everywhere, even underpiers. They are likely to have a fairly high pumpingrate but with a low recovery efficiency, particularlyin a thin slick. They are not effective, however, ifthere is any appreciable water movement such aschoppy waves.

Boom Skimmer – A boom skimmer is a recoverysystem with one or more skimmers mounted in theface of a spill containment boom, regardless of theskimmer type, although the recovery device is gen-erally a weir (figure A-4). Weirs installed on boomsthat can follow the wave surface reasonably well arekept near the surface of the water and thereforeable to maintain a high rate of recovery. In general,boom skimmers have a high rate of recovery and aredesigned for dealing with large spills at sea. Sincethe weir is employed in the collection pocket of theboom, recovery efficiency is increased. Boom skim-mers are large pieces of equipment with manyworking parts needing maintenance. They are ad-versely affected by the same debris problems asother weirs.

Vortex – A vortex skimmer draws oil and waterinto a collection chamber and separates it by cen-trifugal force (figure A-5). This centrifugal actiondischarges the water out of the bottom and concen-trates the oil so that it can be pumped off through ahose to storage. This principle is sometimes com-bined with a weir serving as the collection chamber.Vortex skimmers can achieve a reasonable recoveryrate in medium to heavy oils, but generally have afairly low efficiency.

Moving Surface – Moving surface skimmers uti-lize a moving material that absorbs or causes oil toadhere to it in preference to water. The oilcoatedmaterial then passes over a scraper, squeezer, orother device to remove and recover the oil in asump. There are several varieties of moving surfaceskimmers including, disk/drum, brush, rope mop,and belt types as follows:

Disk/Drum– Any disk or drum devices that relyon the adhesion of oil to a solid surface (figure A-6).Disk type devices have a series of vertical disks thatare rotated through the oil surface. Drum skimmershave a horizontal drum that rotates through theslick. Many small disk skimmers have the disadvan-

tages of being expensive, complicated, more likelyto break down, and vulnerable to becoming clogged

Figure A-3– Floating Suction Skimmer

T Suction hose

SOURCE: World Catalog of 011 Spill Response Products

Figure A-4-Schematic Drawing of a Weir Skimmer

Air tube ——1

Vane pump \Oil discharge tube

SOURCE: Vikoma International

Figure A-5-Vortex

SOURCE: World Catalog of 011 Spill Rasponse Products

out


Figure A-6- Disc Skimmer

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products

with debris. On the other hand, they have high re-covery efficiency which can be a considerable ad-vantage if storage volume is limited. Large diskskimmers are likely to be more durable and somedisk skimmers have vanes or screens to keep out de-bris. Because of the vertical dimensions of the disk,disk skimmers are effective in waves. Some largefloating disk skimmers are effective in fairly highsea states.

Brush – Skimmer with a horizontal brush thatrotates through the oil and past a scraper which re-moves the oil into a sump. This skimmer is designedfor recovering highly viscous oil and oil on ice.

Rope Mop – Rope mop skimmers employ along,continuous loop of absorbent oleophilic (oil loving)material that floats on the surface of the water andis then led through a combination scraper-wringerthat removes the oil along with some water (figureA-7). Rope mops can be deployed from shore andthe rope guided around a pulley that has been se-cured offshore or can be operated from boats. Ropemop skimmers generally have a high recovery effi-ciency and are most effective in medium viscosityoils. Rope mops can operate in shallow water, waterfilled with debris, water mixed with ice, and underice. They are relatively easy to maintain.

Belt – Belt skimmers are identical in that theyall employ a moving belt which mayor may not be ofabsorbent material. Six types of belt skimmers canbe identified.

1. Paddle Belts – Paddles are attached to the beltto lift oil out of the water (figure A-8). A typical pad-dle belt skimmer pulls oil up a ramp using four ormore paddles. Paddle belt skimmers have a high re-covery rate and operate best in medium to high vis-cosity oils, but are likely to have problems in shortperiod waves.1 They also handle debris very well.

2. Sorbent Belts – A sorbent belt skimmer is onethat has a continuous, flat belt that moves horizon-tally over the water in the well of the collection ves-sel (figure A-9). High recovery rates can be expectedand debris handling is excellent. This skimmer wasdeveloped for the U.S. Coast Guard as a zero rela-tive velocity skimmer with the belt moving as fast asthe vessel is traveling forward (or current movingaft). Apparently, while technically feasible, it hasnot been very practical operationally and has neverbeen commercially produced. Perhaps further de-velopment could prove useful.

3. Sorbent Lifting Belts – A sorbent belt skim-mer that has a belt inclined to the water’s surfaceand lifts the oil out of the water (figure A-10). Sor-bent lifting belts are made of porous oleophilic ma-terial that allows water to pass through. The beltpasses through a set of rollers where the oil isscraped and wrung out of the belt. Sorbent liftingbelt skimmers are often mounted on fairly largevessels and are intended for use in harbors and off-shore. They can be expected to have a high recoveryrate and high efficiency.

4. Brush Lifting Belts – These skimmers have achain of brushes that lift the oil from the water.Cleaning devices remove oil from the brushes at thetop of the ramp. These would be particularly usefulin large spills of highly viscous oil.

5. Submersion Belts – The operating principle ofsubmersion belt skimmers is the opposite of liftingbelt skimmers (figure A-n). Instead of carrying theoil up out of the water, the submersion belt movesalong a plane forcing the oil under water. The oilthen surfaces in a collection sump. Submersion beltskimmers work best in low viscosity oils and thinslicks, in contrast to most other skimmers that re-quire thick accumulations of oil for most effectiveoperation.

‘World Catalog, p. 226.

—. .


Figure A-8-Paddle Belt Skimmer

Paddles h

Figure A-9- Sorbent Belt Skimmer

Transferpump

Twin I


SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Responaa Products

Figure A-10--Sorbent Lifting Belt Skimmer

Direction forskimming

t 1

SOURCE: Wortd Catalog of Oil Spill Response Prcducts

Appendix A-Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies ● 57

Figure A-n –Submersion Belt Skimmer

I Collected floatage II # I


Appendix BQuantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment

The following tables provide information on thetree, quantity, and location of major oil spill re-sponse equipment within the continental UnitedStates. The first two tables identify U.S. Navy andU.S. Coast Guard equipment. The following four ta-bles list skimmers, booms, dispersant delivery sys-tems, and off-loading pumps that could be applica-ble for offshore spills. Except for the Navyequipment maintained at Williamsburg, Virginiaand Stockton, California and the Coast Guardequipment in Mobile, Alabama and Hamilton AirForce Base, California, this equipment is held by in-dustry oil spill cooperatives. The 93 cooperativesare listed in the next table, and, following this, thenew equipment acquisitions of the Alyeska coopera-

tive following the Exxon Valdez spill are identified.Next, we list the equipment based at the Oil SpillService Centre in Southampton England, abouthalf of which was used in the Exxon Valdez spill. Fi-nally, the equipment proposed to be purchased foreach regional oil spill response center to be estab-lished by the Petroleum Industry Response Organi-zation is presented. A caveat: response capabilitydepends on much more than the type of equipmenton hand, including such variables as maintenance,training, and logistics, so conclusions about thecapabilities of the organizations presented herebased solely on examining equipment are likely tobe inaccurate.

—

Appendix B–Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment .59

Table B-1 -Major Types, Quantities, and Locationof U.S. Navy Spill Response Equipment

Table B-2– Major National Strike ForceEquipment of the U.S. Coast Guard

Quantities/locationPearl

Williamsburg, Stockton, Harbor,Equipment description Virginia California Hawaii

Spilled oil recovery equipment:Skimmer vessel system

(36’ aluminum hull) . . . . . .Skimming system

(sorbent belt voss) . . . . . . .Skimming system

(screw pump voss) . . . . . . .Skimmer, sorbentrope mop (36”) . . . . . . . . . .

Boom vans(42” x 1980’ boom) . . . . . .

Boom mooring systemBoom handling boat(24’ 260 hp) . . . . . . . . . . .

Boom tending boats(19’ x 23’ inflatable) . . . . . .

Boom tending boats(18’ rigid hull) . . . . . . . . . . .

136,000 gal oils t o r a g e b l a d d e r .

26,000 gal oilstorage bladder . . . . . . . . .

Pumping equipment:Pump, 6“ submersibleFloating hose (6” x 100’)Hot tap system . .,Boarding kit. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Firefighting system ., ., . .Ancillary equipment:Command trailer

(40’ communicationsand command center)

Command van(20’ communicationsand command center)

Fender system(8’ x 12’ foam) . . . . . . .

Fender system(14’ x 60’ Ip air) . .

Fender system(10’ x 50’ Ip air) . . . . . . . .

Shop vans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rigging vans . . . . . . . . . . . . .Personnel bunk van . . . . . . . 2 0Beach transfer system(4-wheel drive veh.) . . 1

Communication system(SAT phone, land) . . . . . . . 1 0

Communication system(SAT phone, ship) . . . . . . . . 1

Oil/water separator(parallel plate100 gal/rein) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Cleaning system van . . . . . . 1

Atlantic Pacificteam team

Spilled oil recovery equipment:

Open Water Oil Containment andRecovery Systems:

Skimming barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Fast surface delivery systems . . . . . . . . 11Pumping subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Dracone barges (various sizes) . . . . . . 8Expandi harbor boom (1,600 feet) 1

Pumping equipment:

Air Deliverable Anti-PollutionTransfer Systems (ADAPTS):

Prime movers . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . 7Submersible pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Hydraulic hose (5,000 feet) . . . . . . 1Discharge hose (4,000 feet) . . ., 1Fuel bladders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?

Viscous oil pumping systemsPrime movers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Submersible pumps . . . . . . . . . . ., ?

Chemical transfer systems . . . . . . . . . . . 2Nonsubmersible pumps . . . . . . . . . . 9

Ancillary equipment:

Command Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Tractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Boats (various small boats) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10All purpose vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Trailers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Radios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 42Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Monitoring equipment . . . . . . . ?T e s t i n g e q u i p m e n t . . . . , . . ?

19111740

1315

118

187

16

2265

1236

7Y‘f

SOURCE: U S Coast Guard, 1989

SOURCE: U S Navy, 1989

Table B-3--Major Sources of Skimmers in the United States

Storage Performance c

7 sea state Expected d

Region Location service type No.a Type a 2 3 Viscosity Debris availabilityEast cost Davisville, RI B N 1,700 1,000 G G-F F G F BWeir

Sorbent liftingbelt

WeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirWeirSorbent lifting belt

WeirWeirWeirWeir

120120

1,000

G F G AWilliamsburg, VA

Davisville, RIDavisville, RIMobile, ALVenice, LAVenice, LAVenice, LAIntercostal, IACameron, IACameron, LAHouma, IAGrand Isle, IAGeand isle, LARockport, TXGalveston, TXStockton, Ca

Port San Luis, CAPort San Luis, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CA

GFGGGG

GG

FFFFFFFFFFF

G-F FF P

GG

Gulf coast

west coast

GG

GG

GG

GGG

GGG

GGG

GGF

FFG A

ccccAccccc

GFGFFF

Hdamilton AFB, CA WeirConcord, CA WeirSan Pedro, CA WeirSan Pedro, CA WeirSan Pedro, CA WeirSeattle, WA Submersion

beltValdez Weir

GG

120

G cc

AlaskaGG

Valdez WeirDutch Hahrbor WeirDutch Harbor WeirDeadhorse Weir

YNNY

BGGGDutch Harbor Weir G Voo . . 120N o B/C

a B = Barrier SkimmerSC = Seif-pmpeliadhsif-contahwd skimmerVOO = Skimmer system operatad from a “Vessel of Opportunity”

b Y = %if-~O@SdN = Requires external

rfmwwceoftheeystem aaawhoie, including barriers. support, arc Where poaawible, information on the performance characteristics (P = poor, F = farr, and G = good) of the equipment m

:j!&!:g$:!Ij!j?:;&:mzkions decated 2 sea state perforrnacne, and (3) composrhon of the oil encountered In addition, a sense of the ready availability of the resources IS provided as not all assets can be Utilized m a

1S4662, “Oil Poilutbn Response Planning Guide for Extreme Weatherm

.,

A = Readiiyavailabia in moat cases.‘isW%!wg, VA and Stockton, CA

ent is mainly government resources of the U.S @asf Guard and the U S Navy Coaat Guard equiopment is baaed at Mobiie, ALand Hamitton Air Force Base, CA Navyequipment is primarily based at Willi

B = Equipmentwhkh maykeavailabiedependingon apecificequipment needs andcircustances existing atthetimeof need These aaaetsare mainly held by cooperativesfor the convenience of its membership withinadefhed area dtheras amatterofoperating or economic necesa ity. in the case of the former (such as offshore lease equipments), warvere from govemrnentaientitres may have to reobtained, oragraement maybe required among the members 10 cease or reduce operations

C = Resources that maybe made avaiiabie but only within a specified area Equipment that is permanently Inatalied on a vessel would, for instance, only be available within that vessel’s areai limitation

SOURCE: Engineering Cornpuater Optecnomics, inc (ECO), “Anatyais of Oii SpIii Reaponse Technoiogksa,- contractor reporl prepared for the Office of Technology Asaessmnt, July 19S9

Table 54- Major Sources of Containment Boom in the United States

Total Free Unlit Tensile Sea statelength board Draft weight strength performance a

Expected c

Region Location (feet) (inches) (inches) (per 100’) (Ibs) 1 2 3 Maximum availability

East coast Davisville, RIDavisville, RIDavisville, RIWilliamsburg, VA

Gulf coast Mobile, ALMobile, ALGrand Isle, LAVenice, LAVenice, LAIntracoastal, TXGalveston, IXRockport, TX

West coast Concord, CAConcord, CASan Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CAStockton, CAHamilton AFB, CASeattle, WASeattle, WA

Alaska ValdezValdezValdezDeadhorseDeadhorseDeadhorse

Dutch HarborAnchorage

2327

cB/CB/C

B/CB/C

a Rating indicat~ ~tlmated performance of the s~tem ss a whole, including barriers, support, etc Where possible, information on the performance characteristics (P = poor, F = fair, and G = good) of the equlPment Is givenIn terms of ( 1 ) gallons affected, (2) sea state performance, and (3) mmposrtlon of the 011 encountered In addmon, a sense of the ready avmlatxhty of the resources IS provrded as not all assets can be uhhzed m a direct mannerSOURCE: COMDTINST M164662, “OIl Pollutlon Resopnse Planning Guide for Extreme Weather”

bMeasured m feetc AvsulabllKy IS mdlcaled as follows:

A=

B.

c=SOURCE:

Readdy available m most cases This equipment is mamfy government resources of the U S Coast Guard and the U S Navy Coast Guard equipment IS based at Mobile, AL and HamlRon Air Force Base, CANavy equipment is primarily based at Wilhemsburg, VA and Stockton, CAEquipment which may be available depending on specfic equipment needs and cwcumstances exlstmg at the time of need These assets are mamly held by cooperatives for the convenience of its member-ship wrfhm a defined area either as a matter of operating or ecorromlc necesslfy In the case of the former (Such as offshore lease requirements), warvers from governmental entttms may have to beobtained, or agreement may be reqwred among the members to cease or reduce operationsResources tfrat maybe made avatlable but onfy wrthin a specrfied area Equipment that IS permarrentty installed on a vessel would, for instance, only be avarlable within that vessel’s areal hrnltatlonEngmeermg Computer Optecnomics, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies, - contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, July 19S9

Table B-5-Major Sources of Offloading Pumps in the United States

Performance characteristics

Units capacityViscosity Debris tolerance

Emulsify ExpectedRegion Type city (gal/min) Light Heavy Silt Gravel Seaweed liquids availability b

East coast Destroil Williamsburg, VA 2 310 G P G G F G AThune-Eureka Williamsburg, VA 10 2000 F G G G P P AViscous Oil Elizabeth City, NC 1 2 0 0 0 F G G G P P A

Gulf coast Adapts Mobile, AL 12 1000 P G G G P P AViscous Oil Mobile, AL 1 2 0 0 0 F G G G P P A

west coast Adapts Hamilton AFB, CA 12 1000 P G G G P P AViscous Oil Hamilton AFB, CA 2 2 0 0 0 F G G G P P AThune-Eureka Stockton, CA 11 2000 F G G G P P ADestroil Stockton, CA 2 310 G P G G F G AAdapts Concord, CA 1 1000 P G G G P P BAdapts Concord, CA 1 1000 P G G G P P B

Alaska Destroil Anchorage, AK 1 310 G P G G F G Bstops Valdez, AK 2 1000 G G G G P P B

Other Thune-Eureka Detroit, Ml 5 2 0 0 0 F G G G P P AAdapts Detroit, Ml 2 1000 P G G G P P A

a P = pcor, F = tier, G = good

bAvailability is indicated as follows:

A =

B =

SOURCE:

Readily available in moat cases This equipment is mainly government resources of the U S Coast Guard and the U S Navy Coast Guard equipment is baaed at Mobile, AL and Harmlton Air Force Base, CANavy equipment is primarily based at Williamsburg, VA and Stockton, CA.

Equipment which may be available depending on specific equipment needs and circumstances exmtmg at the time of need These assets are mainly held by cooperatives for the convemence of its member-ship within a defined area erther as a matter of operating or economjc names ity In the case of the former (Such as offshore lease requuements), waivers from governmental entities may have to beobtained, or agreement may be required among the members to cease or reduce operations

Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technoi~y Aeeasement, July 19S9.


Table B-6- Major Sources of Dispersant Delivery Systems in the United States

Oil treatment a Storagerate comparison capacity Expected

Location Platform (gal/rein) (gallons) availability

East Coast Davisville, RI

Gulf Coast Grand Isle, LAHouma, IARockport, TXGalveston, TX

Chandler, ARChandler, ARMesa, AR

West Coast San Pedro, CASan Pedro, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CASanta Barbara, CA

Alaska Anchorage, AKAnchorage, AK

Boat

BoatBoatBoatBoat

DC-4ADDS/C-130DC-4

BoatBoat c

Boat c

Boat c

Boat

BoatHelicopter

500500500

Less than 8000Less than 8000Less than 8000

4a4a4a4848

5001600

5 0 0

500

500

25002500

DrumsDrumsDrumsDrumsDrums

DrumsDrums

B

BBBB

BAB

BcccB

BB

a ~URcE: COMDTINST Ml ~ 2, C,OII ~llution Response plannlng Guide for Extreme Weather,”’ Rating mdlcates estimated Performance of the system as a whole, includ-

ing barriem, support, etc

b Av~lablli~ is mdcatecf ss follows:

A = Readily avatlable m most cases This equipment is mainly government resources of the U S Coast Guard and the U S Navy Coast Guard equipment IS based atMobile, AL and Hamilton Air Force Base, CA Navy equipment is prlmarlly based at Wllllamsburg, VA and Stockton, CA

B = Equipment which maybe available depending on specific equipment needs and circumstances exlstmg at the time of need These assets are mainly held bycooperatives for the convenience of Its membership wrthln a defined area edher as a matter of opera!lng or economic necessity In the case of the former (Suchas offshore lease requirements), waivers from governmental enttttes may have to be obtained, or agreement may be required among the members to cease or

reduce operations

C = Resources that may be made available but only within a specified area Equipment that IS permanently installed on a vessel would, for Instance, only be avail-able wtthm that vessel’s areal limitation

c Installed on response vessel

SOURCE: Engmeenng Computer Optecnomlcs, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assess-ment, July 1989


Table B-7- Alyeska Response Equipment

Since the Exxon Valdez spill incident, Alyeska has substantiality increased the amount of spill response equipment that it has on hand torespond to any future spills. The equipment obtained is listed below.

3 ERVs Escort Response Vessels – ERVs are 210- 1(Ship Escort) foot converted ocean going, ice (Knowles Head)

strengthened tugs. These vessels havetwin variable pitch propellers and bowthrusters for increased maneuverability.Each ERV is equipped with:● 2 Vikoma Seaskimmer 50’s 2

(nameplate 385 bbl/hr each) (Valdez)● 1,600 ft. RoBoom Ocean 2000 on deck reels● 3,000 ft. Expandi 4300 Boom

(self inflating)● 4,000 bbl recovered oil storage capacity.

Weir Boom Response Vessel – equippedwith:● 2 Framo Transec boom/skimmer systems 2

(initially 1 Vikoma weir boom skimming (Valdez)system - nameplate 4200 bbl/hr)

● 20-foot work boat.

Dynamic Skimming System - A 180,000 bbl

equipped with:● 2 Marflex Sweep Arms (nameplate

2100 bbl/hr).

Lightening Vessel – A 140,000 bbl integratedtug/barge equipped with:. Fenders● 3 Framo salvage pumps● Ancillary salvage equipment (hoses, etc.)● Moorings.

Storage Barges – (73,000 bbl and 63,000bbl). Each equipped with an assortment of:● Spill containment booms including

Vikoma HI 950 Boom, Scot Boom, ArcticHarbor Boom (total approximately16,000 ft.)

● Supersucker pump/skimming systems● Absorbent materials.

Ship Assist Tugs – Two tugs available forpollution response duties.\ r

Other Resources Available for Spill Response● 62,000 gallons of dispersant● 2 aerial dispersant applicators

(ADDS PACKS)● Dispersant application systems mounted

on escort vessels● Fire boon, igniters, and other burning

● A portable communications module● Reconnaissance aircraft

SOURCE: Aiyeska 1990

Table B-8-Equipment Based at the Oil Spill Response Center, Southampton, U.K.

SOURCE: Oil Spill Responae Cantre, Southampton, Unltad Kngdom, 1969


Table B-8- Equipment Based at the Oil Spill Response Center, Southampton, U.K. (Continued)

Item Quantity Item Quantity

2.

3.

4.

5.

Skimmers (continued)

Egmolap, heavy oil belt skimmer 1Clam Shell Skimmer 3Heavy Fuel Oil Skimmers, toothed disk

skimmers 2Heavy Oil Skimmers (medium) 2Heavy Oil Skimmer (small) 1

HIAB Jib with power pack 4Vacuum Box for use with BP Vacuum Head 3

Dunlop Dracone 1D5, capacity 100 tons 1Dunlop Dracone 1E, capacity 30 tons 1Leigh Flexible Pillow Tanks, capacity 25 tons 10Leigh Flexible Pillow Tanks, capacity 12 tons 10Fastank Storage Unit with liners, capacity 7 tons 17Hoyle P/U Storage Tank, capacity 25 tonsSkimmex Storage Tank, capacity 6 to 7 tonsSkimmex Storage Tank, capacity 2.5 tonsVikoma Pillow Tank, capacity 30,000 litersAvon Storage Tank, capacity 25,000 liters

Thune Eureka CCN 100 PumpSpate Pump 3B 5Putzmeister Concrete Pump, screw and ram

pumpDesmi/Destroil Screw PumpGodiva Fire Pump 1

WSL Offshore Spray UnitBiggs Wall Wide Spray UnitRototech TC3 Spray ModuleWSL Inshore Spray UnitSeaguard Pack Super Dispersant Spray UnitBackpack sprayers– Falcon 2 gallons

Falcon 3 gallonsGell set unitBeach Pump AR-30 2Beach Pump AR-15 2Additional hose – 70m on reel

50m on reelPillow Tanks, capacity 300 gallonsAerial Dispersant Delivery System

21121

2

14

1112711751

11631

6.

7.

8.

9.

Sailor VHF Radio Type RT 144,61 channels 3Motorola VHF Radio Type HT 200, 6 channels 6Motorola VHF Radio Type MX 300S, 24 channels 6Stomo VHF Radio Type 500, 3 channels 2Aquastar Radio Telephone Type WP/1, 24

channels 1Lafayette VHF Scanning Monitor, 7 channels 3Telescopic Masts, 9m 3

Floodlights 2Zodiac 16 ft. inflatable boat 1Avon 12 ft. inflatable boat 1Alvis Stalwart Amphibious Vehicle 1High pressure hot water cleaners 5Hipower multipurpose power packs 7Bauer Compressor Type 1C40 1Rollalong Mobile Command Center 1Mini Power Pack, diesel power pack on wheels 5

45 ft. work boat 1Fast personnel carrier 128m training/operation vessel 1Air transportable work boat 1

Vikoma Emergency Air Blower for boominflation 5

Small air blowers 13Vulcanisers for on-sits boom repair 5Boom cleaner, Ro-Clean system 1Mooring buoys, anchors, chainsRotary hand pump for filling knapsack

dispersant sprayers 2Hand pump for liquid transfer 1Atlas Copco Air Compressor 1Welding units 3Road trailers 3Fork lift trucks 3Ford tractor 1Foam generator 1Video camera/recorder 1Camera and accessories 1Absorbants, booms, pillows, pads, etc.

SOURCE: Oil Spill Response Centre, Southampton, United Kingdom, 1989


Table B-9-Petroleum Industry Response Organization: Proposed Capital Equipmentfor Each of Five Regional Centers

Currentnumber Current

Item estimated $ estimate

Lightening:Pumps 4 $851,524Fenders 8 $240,000Dracones 8 $1,000,000

Containment boom (ft):OffshoreMediumLightweightSkimming barrier

Skimmers:Skimming barrierOther skimmersPower packs

Dispersant equipment:Adds packHelicopter systemDispersant chemical

Other:vesselsOffice equipment & computersBird cleaningProtective boom (lightweight boom)Temporary oil storage (Dracones)Forklifts, compressors, etc.Trailers/cargo containersMaintenance shop equipmentVehicles, 4-wheel driveTractors for trailersPre-stages bargesOther equipmentSpare parts

30,00030,00010,0004,000

4140

14

50,000

$1,891,524

$3,974,580$1,917,900

$5,892,480

Major equipment subtotal

$1,870,000$2,770,382

(Included in skimmer cost)

$4,840,382

$500,000$121,080$800,000

$1,221,080$13,845,448

$4,000,000$130,000 ab

$20,000 a

$587,300$1,750,000

$500,000 a

$380,000$25,000 a

$120,000 a

$540,0001,750,000$200,000$800,000

Other subtotal

$10,582,300$10,582,300

Equipment total for one regional center: $24,207,746

Equipment total for five regional centers: $121,038,731

Headquarters office equipment and computers: $130,000

Total capital equipment $121,188,731

a Indicates data not available to allow reprojection of costsb Pll estimate for non-mainframe computers = $2.0 million/regional center

SOURCE: Petroleum Industry Response Organization (PIRO), 1990.


Table B-10– U.S. Oil Spill Co-Ops

Alaska Clean SeasAnchorage, AL

Altoona Area IndustryAssociation

Altoona, PA

Arco-Total CooperativeTraverse City, Ml

Atlanta Area Terminals OilDoraville, GA

Bi-State Metropolitan OilBettendorf, IA

Boston Harbor Oil SpillCooperative

East Boston, MA

Bridgeport Harbor PollutionAbatement Committee

Bridgeport, CT

Buffalo River & Harbor OilSpill Cooperative

Buffalo, NY

Burlington Harbor PollutionAbatement Committee

Montpelier, VT

Central New York Oil SpillCooperative

Rochester, NY

Central New York Oil SpillContainment

Rochester, NY

Charleston Industry LiquidSpillage ControlCommittee, Inc

North Charleston, SC

Clean Atlantic AssociatesNew Orleans, LA

Clean BayConcord, CA

Clean Caribbean CooperativeEast Boston, MA

Clean Channel AssociationMont Belvieu, TX

Clean Coastal WatersLong Beach, CA

Clean Gulf AssociatesNew Orleans, LA

Clean Harbors CooperativePerth Amboy, NJ

Clean Islands CouncilHonolulu, HI

Clean Land & Harbor, IncWilmington, NC

Clean Rivers AssociationConvent, IA

Clean Rivers CooperativePortland, OR

Clean Rivers/Coos Baycooperative

Coos Bay, OR

Clean Islands CouncilHonolulu, HI

Clean SeasCarpinteria, CA

Clean Sound CooperativeSeattle, WA

Continental Shelf AssociatesJupiter, FL

Connecticut River PollutionControl Committee

Hartford, CT

Cook Inlet ResponseOrganization

Nikiski, AK

Corpus Christi Area OilSpill control Association

Corpus Christi, TX

Delaware Bay & RiverCooperate

Lewes, DE

Delaware River Co-OperativePhiladelphia PA

Detroit Area IndustrialMutual Aid

Detroit, Ml

Evansville Mutual AssistanceAssociation

Evansville, IN

Fairfax City PetroleumTerminals Air & WaterConservation & SafetyOrganization

Fairfax, VA

Four Corners Area Oil ControlCoordination Committee

Cortez, CO

Greater Caribbean Energy andEnvironmental Foundation

Miami, FL

Greater Cincinnati HazardousMaterial Control Committee

Cincinnati, OH

Green Bay Oil Men’s CleanWaters Control Board

Green Bay, WI

Humboldt Bay Oil SpillCooperative

Eureka CA

Jacksonville SpillageControl, Inc

Jacksonville, FL

Marine Industry GroupGretna LA

Massachusetts Petroleum CouncilBoston, MA

Memphis Area PetroleumAssistance Association

Memphis, TN

Metro-Milwaukee PetroleumOperations Group

Middletown-Portland CooperativePortland, CT

Miss-Ota-Croix Oil ControlCoordination Committee

St Paul, MN

Montana-Wyoming Oil ControlCoordination Committee

Laurel, MT

Muskegon Tri-Cities MutualAssistance Association

North Muskegon, Ml

Mutual Assistance Pact-WichitaTulsa, OK

Nashville Mutual AssistanceAssociation

Nashville, TN

National Fire ProtectionAssociation

Quincy, MA

Neches River Oil Controlcommittee

Beaumont, TX

New Haven Harbor PetroleumCooperative

New Haven, CT

Norwalk Abatement CommitteeNorwalk, CT

Oil City Petroleum Co-opCommittee

Oceanside, NY

Pensacola SpillageControl, Inc

Pensacola, FL

Peoria-Tazewell ConservationCommittee

Pekin, IL

Petroleum Committee ofSioux Falls for EnvironmentalProtection

Yankton, SD

Plattsburg-Lake Champlain OilSpill Control Committee

Plattsburgh, NY

Port of Miami SpillageCleanup Committee

Miami, FL

Port Manatee EnvironmentalProtection Association

Palmetto, FL

Port of Palm Beach EnvironmentalProtection Committee

Riviera Beach, FL

Port Canaveral/Brevard CountySpillage Cleanup Committee, Inc

Cape Canaveral, FL

Port Everglades SpillageCommittee

Ft. Lauderdale, FL

Portsmouth Harbor Oil SpillCommittee

Concord, NH

Pt. Everglades Spillage CleanupFt Lauderdale, FL

Roanoke Valley Mutual AidAssociation

Roanoke, VA

Savannah River Oil ControlCoordinating committee

Savannah, GA

Southeast Wyoming Oil SpillCooperative

Casper, WY

Stamford West Branch HarborAssociation

Stamford, CT

Tampa Port Committee forSpillage Control, Inc

Tampa FL

Texas City Harbor Oil SpillageContingency Program

Texas City, TX

Thames River petroleumCooperative

Norwich, CT

The Port of Mobile Oil Spillcooperative

Mobile, AL

Toledo Harbor Spill ControlCommittee

Toledo, OH

Tri-City IndustrialAnti-Pollution Committee

Braintree, MA

Tri-State Pollution Preventionand Cleanup Committee

Charleston, WV

Tulsa Area Oil Control CommitteeTulsa OK

Ulster/Greene Counties HarborPollution Control Cooperative

Port Ewen, NY

Utica-Rome Oil Pollution ControlCommittee

Marcy, NY

Vicksburg Association for CleanPort & River

Vicksburg, MS

Will-Grundy IndustrialConservation Committee

Lockport, IL

Milwaukee, WI

SOURCE: Robert .%hulze, op clt, footnote 5

Appendix CAcknowledgments

We are grateful to the many individuals and or-ganizations in the United States and abroad whoshared their special knowledge, expertise, and in-formation with us in the preparation of this study.We are especially indebted to those who partici-pated in our oil spill countermeasures workshopand to those who critiqued our first draft.

Special thanks go to John S. Lemlin of the Inter-national Petroleum Industry Environmental Con-servation Organization in London, who organized acomprehensive series of meetings for us with gov-ernment and industry organizations responsible forcombating oil spills in Europe, and to our gracioushosts in the United Kingdom, France, the Nether-lands, and Norway.

Participants, OTA Workshop on OilSpill Countermeasures Technology,

August 15, 1989

David EvansNational Institute of Standards and

Technology

Mervin FingasEnvironment Canada

Jack R. GouldAmerican Petroleum Institute

Gerald GreenerU.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Stuart A. HornMobil Oil Corp.

Don KashUniversity of Oklahoma “

Virgil KeithEngineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc.

James T. LeighDelaware Bay & River Cooperative

Jack MortensonClean Bay, Concord, California

Jim O’BrienOOPS, Inc.

M. Ruud OuwerkerkIHC Dredge Technology Corp.

John TealWoods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Peter A. TebeauU.S. Coast Guard Research and Development

Center

Ed TennysonMinerals Management Service

William WalkerNaval Sea Systems Command

Richard WillisEngineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc.

Donald B. WoodExxon Production Research Co.

Other Contributors

Winy AndersonState Pollution Control Authority (Norway)

James CaldwellRBI, Inc.

Wayne BeckerU.S. Coast Guard

Ken BlowerBritish Petroleum International, Ltd.

(London, U. K.)

Simon BommeljeTexaco Petroleum (Netherlands)

Charles BookmanNational Research Council

Larry CokerExxon Chemical Co.

John D. CostelloPIRO Implementation, Inc.

David CreoleU.S. Coast Guard

Brian DicksITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Dennis DooleyAlaska Oil Spill Commission

68

Appendix C–Acknowledgments .69

Mike EmgeU.S. Coast Guard

Tony GreenwoodEsso U.K. (London, U. K.)

John GregoryMinerals Management Service

Amy R. HammerExxon Corp.

Biff HoltU.S. Coast Guard

Steve HobkinsonVikoma International, Ltd. (Cowes, U. K.)

Kurt JakobsonU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Donald S. JensenU.S. Coast Guard Research and Development

Center

Jan LaneU.S. Department of Energy

Capt. R.M. LarrabeeU.S. Coast Guard

Martin LeeCongressional Research Service

John S. LemlinInternational Petroleum Industry

Environmental Conservation Association(London, U. K.)

Doug LentschU.S. Coast Guard

D.W. LerchMARCO Pollution Control

M.D. LongOil Spill Service Centre (Southampton, U. K.)

Ottar LongvaState Pollution Control Authority (Norway)

Ron MaccaroniU.S. General Accounting Office

Hamish McLeodDepartment of Transport (London, U. K.)

Jim MakrisU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Marthe MelguenCEDRE (France)

T.H. MollerITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Alan MolyneuxTexaco (Belgium)

Hugh ParkerITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Walter ParkerAlaska Oil Spill Commission

Georges PeigneCEDRE (France)

Tormod PettersonEsso Norge as. (Norway)

Brent PyburnBP International Ltd. (Southampton, U. K.)

Keith C. ReynoldsVikoma International Ltd. (Cowes, U. K.)

Nabil SaadExxon Chemical Co.

Daniel F. SheehanU.S. Coast Guard

Lisa SpeerNatural Resources Defense Council

Robert SteeleExxon Production Research Co.

Widar SkoglyNorsk Oljevernforening For Operatorselskap

(Norway)

Joseph StahovecNaval Sea Systems Command

Jan ThormanMinerals Management Service

Bernard TramierElf Aquitaine (France)

Marjorie WalshExxon Chemical Co.

Robert WilliamsNovatec, Inc.

Ian C. WhiteITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Appendix DAcronyms

API

CEC

CEDRE

DOT

DOI

EPA

MPCU

MMSNOFO

American Petroleum Institute

Commission of EuropeanCommunities

Center for Documentation,Research, and Experimentation onAccidental Pollution (France)

Department of Transportation

Department of the Interior

Environmental Protection Agency

Marine Pollution Control Unit(United Kingdom)

Minerals Management Service

Norwegian Clean Seas Associationfor Operating Companies(Norway)

OHMSETT Oil and Hazardous MaterialsSimulated Environmental TestTank

OSR Oil Spill Response Ltd.(Southampton, U. K.)

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

PIRO Petroleum Industry ResponseOrganization

USCG United States Coast Guard

SPCA State Pollution Control Authority(Norway)

VOSS Vessel-of-Opportunity SkimmingSystems

70