Copeland, D. - The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism, A Review Essay

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Review: The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review EssayAuthor(s): Dale C. CopelandSource: International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 187-212Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626757.

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2/27

The

Constructivist

Dale C.

Copeland

Challenge

to

Structural

Realism

A Review Essay

Alexander Wendt,Social Theory f nternational

Politics, ambridge: Cambridge University

Press,

1999F

Press,

999

For

more than a de-

cade realism, y most ccounts hedominant aradigmninternationalela-

tions theory,has been under assault

by the emergingparadigm

of

constructivism.ne groupof realists-the tructural

or neo-/systemic)

eal-

istswho draw nspirationrom enneth

Waltz's eminal heoryf nternational

Politics'-hasbeen a

particulararget

or

onstructivistrrows. uch realists

contend hat

narchy

nd thedistributionfrelative

ower

drive

most f

what

goes

on n

world

olitics.

onstructivistsounter hat tructuralealismmisses

what s often more

determinantactor,

amely,

he

ntersubjectively

hared

ideas that

hape

behavior

yconstitutinghe dentitiesnd nterestsf ctors.

Through

series f

nfluentialrticles, lexanderWendt as provided ne

of

the

most

ophisticated

nd

hard-hitting

onstructivist

ritiques

f tructural

realism.2 Social

Theory f

nternational olitics

provides the first ook-length

statementfhis

unique

brand

f

onstructivism.3

endt

oesbeyond

he

more

Dale C.

Copeland

s Associate

rofessor

n the

Departmentf

Government

nd

Foreign ffairs, niversity

ofVirginia.

e

is

the uthor

f

The

Origins

of

Major

War

Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell

Universityress, 000).

For theirvaluable

comments

n earlier

drafts f

this

essay,

thank

pencer Bakich,

Eric

Cox, John

Duffield,Kelly Erickson,MarkHaas, Jeffreyegro,Len Schoppa, and Dennis Smith. Portionsof

this

essay

were

drawn

from

Integrating

ealism

and

Constructivism, aper presented

t

the an-

nual

meeting

of

the American Political Science

Association, Boston, Massachusetts,September

1998. For

nsightful

omments n that

paper,

thankMichael

Barnett,

Miriam Fendius

Elman,

ain

Johnston,

ndrew

Kydd,

Randall

Schweller,Jennifer

terling-Folker,

nd Alexander Wendt.

1. KennethN. Waltz, Theory f nternationalolitics New York: Random House, 1979).

2. See, inter lia, AlexanderWendt, The Agent-Structureroblem n International elationsThe-

ory, nternational rganization, ol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, Anarchy s

What States Make of t: The Social Construction f Power Politics, nternationalrganization, ol.

46, No.

2

(Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; Wendt, Collective dentity ormation nd the nternational

State, American olitical cienceReviezv, ol. 88, No.

2

(June 994), pp. 384-396; and Wendt, Con-

structing nternational olitics, nternationalecurity, ol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.

3. AlexanderWendt, ocialTheory f nternationalolitics Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,

1999).References o Wendt'sbook are given in thetext, nclosed in parentheses.

Internationalecurity,ol.25,No.

2

(Fall2000), p. 187-212

?

2000by thePresidentnd Fellows fHarvard ollege nd theMassachusettsnstitutefTechnology.

187


3/27

Internationalecurity

5:2

| 188

moderate constructivist oint that hared ideas must be considered

alongside

material orces n any empirical nalysis. nstead he seeks to challenge

the core

neorealistpremise that anarchy forces tates nto recurrent ecurity ompeti-

tions.

According

to

Wendt, whether a system

s

conflictual

r peaceful is a

function ot of anarchy nd power but of the shared culture reated through

discursive ocial

practices.Anarchy

has no determinant

logic,

only different

cultural nstantiations. ecause each actor'sconception fself its nterestsnd

identity)

s

a

product

of

the others'

diplomatic gestures,

tates can reshape

structure

y process; through

new

gestures, hey

an

reconstitute

nterests nd

identities toward more other-regardingnd peaceful

means

and

ends. If

Wendt

s

correct,

nd

anarchy

s

what

states

make of

it,

then realism has

been dealt a crushingblow: Statesare notcondemned by their narchic itua-

tion toworry onstantly bout relativepower and to fall nto tragicconflicts.

They can act

to

alter

the

ntersubjective

ulture

hat onstitutes

he system, o-

lidifying ver time the non-egoisticmind-setsneeded for

ong-term eace.

NotwithstandingWendt's mportant ontributions o international elations

theory, is critique

of

structural ealismhas

inherent

laws.

Most important,t

does not

adequately address

a critical

spect of

the

realist

worldview: the

prob-

lem of

uncertainty. or structural ealists,

t is states' uncertaintybout the

present nd especially the future ntentions f others hatmakes

the evels and

trends in relative

power

such

fundamental

causal

variables.

Contraryto

Wendt's claim thatrealismmust

smuggle

n

states

with

differently

onstituted

interests o

explain why systems

ometimesfall

nto

conflict,

eorealists

rgue

that

uncertainty

bout

the

other's

present

interests-whether the other is

drivenby security r nonsecuritymotives-can be enough to lead security-

seeking

states

to

fight.

his

problem

s exacerbated

by

the incentives hat ac-

tors have to deceive one

another,

n issue Wendt

does not address.

Yeteven when statesare fairly ure that the other s also a security eeker,

they

know that

t

might hange

its

spots

later

on.

States

must therefore

orry

about

any

decline

n their

power,

est the other

urn

ggressive

fter

chieving

superiority.

Wendt's

building

of a

systemic

constructivist

heory-and

his

bracketing

f unit-level

rocesses-thus presents

him with an

ironic

dilemma.

It is the

verymutability

f

polities

as

emphasized by

domestic-level

onstruc-

tivists-that statesmay changebecause of domesticprocesses ndependentof

internationalnteraction-thatmakes

prudent

eaders

so

concerned bout the

future.

f

diplomacy

can have

only

a

limited ffect

n

another's character

r re-

gime type,

then

leaders must calculate the

other's

potential

to attack later

should it

acquire

motivesfor

xpansion.

n

such an environment f

future n-


4/27

The Constructivisthallenge o Structural ealism 189

certainty,evels and trends n relativepower will thus act as a key constraint

on state behavior.

The problem of uncertainty omplicatesWendt's efforts o show that anar-

chy has no particular ogic,but only threedifferentdeational nstantiationsn

history-as Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian cultures, epending on the level

of

actor

compliance to certainbehavioral norms. By differentiatinghese cul-

tures in terms of the degree of cooperative behavior exhibited by states,

Wendt's

analysis

reinforces he

very

dilemma

underpinning

he

realist rgu-

ment. f the other s acting cooperatively, ow is one to know whetherthis

reflects ts peaceful character, r is just a facade masking aggressive desires?

Wendt's discussion of the

different egrees

of

internalization

f the three ul-

tures nly exacerbates he problem.What drivesbehavior at the ower evels of

internalization

s

preciselywhat

s

not shared between actors-their private

n-

centives to

comply

for short-term

elfish reasons. This suggests

that

the

neorealist nd neoliberal paradigms,both of which emphasize the role of un-

certaintywhen internalization s low or nonexistent, emain strong ompeti-

tors to

constructivism

n

explaining changing evels of cooperation through

history.

nd

because Wendt provides little mpirical evidence to support his

view in

relationto

these

competitors,

he

debate

over

which paradigm pos-

sesses greater xplanatorypower

is

still

an

open

one.

The first ectionof this ssay outlines he essential lements f Wendt's rgu-

ment

against the backdrop of the general constructivist osition.

The

second

considers ome

of

the book's contributions ersus existing

heorieswithin he

liberal, onstructivist,

nd

realistparadigms. The

third

ffers

n extended cri-

tique ofWendt'sargument gainststructural ealism.

Overview: onstructivism

nd Wendt's

rgument

Three

elementsmake constructivism distinct orm

f

international

elations

theorizing.First,global politics s said to be guided by the intersubjectively

shared

ideas, norms,

nd

values

held

by

actors. Constructivists ocus

on the

intersubjective

imension of

knowledge,

because

they

wish

to

emphasize

the

social

aspect

of

human existence-the

role of

shared

ideas as an ideational

structure onstraining nd shaping behavior.4This allows constructivists o

4.

See Audie

Klotz

and

Cecilia

Lynch, Conflicted Constructivism?

Positivist Leanings vs.

Interpretivist eanings, paper presented t the annual meeting f

the nternational tudies Asso-

ciation,Minneapolis,Minnesota,March 1998,pp. 4-5; Jeffreyheckel,

The Constructivist

urn

n


5/27

Internationalecurity 5:2 | 190

pose

this structure s

a causal force

separate

fromthe material structure

f

neorealism.

Second, the ideational structure as a

constitutive nd not just regulative

effect n actors.

That s, the structureeads

actors o redefine heir nterests nd

identities n the

process of interacting

theybecome socialized by process).

Thus unlike rationalist

heories uch as neorealism and

neoliberalism,which

hold interest nd identities onstant norderto isolate respectively) he causal

roles

of power and international

nstitutions, onstructivism onsiders how

ideational

structures

hape

the

very way

actors define

themselves-who

they

are,

their

goals, and the roles

they

believe

they

hould

play.5

Third, deational structures nd actors

agents ) co-constitutend co-deter-

mine

each other.Structures onstitute

ctors

in

terms of their nterests nd

identities, ut structures

re also produced,reproduced, nd altered

by the dis-

cursive

practices

f

agents.

This element

llows constructivistso

challenge

the

determinacy

f neorealism. tructures re not

reified

bjects

that ctorscan do

nothing bout,but to which theymustrespond.Ratherstructures xistonly

through

he

reciprocal nteraction f actors. This

means thatagents, through

acts of social

will,

can

change

structures.

hey

can

thereby

mancipate

them-

selves from

dysfunctional

ituations that are in turn

replicating

onflictual

practices.6

International elations Theory, Vol.

50, No.

2

(January 998), pp.

324-348; Wendt, Anarchy s

What

States Make of It ; Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle

Ground: Constructivismn World

Politics, European ournalf nternational

elations,

ol.

3,

No. 3

(September

997),pp. 319-363; and

Martha

Finnemore,

National nterestsn

nternational

ociety Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell

University ress,

1996), chap. 1.

5. See

Nicholas G. Onuf, World f Our

Making Columbia: University

f

South Carolina Press,

1989),chap.

1; Audie Klotz, Norms

Reconstitutingnterests: lobalRacial Equality and U.S. Sanc-

tions

against

South

Africa, nternational

rganization,

ol.

49,

No. 3

(Summer 1995), pp. 451-478;

Klotz and

Lynch, Conflicted Constructivism? . 7; Andreas

Hasenclever,

Peter

Mayer, and

VolkerRittberger,heories f

nternationalegimes Cambridge:Cambridge University ress, 1997),

pp.

158-167; PeterJ.Katzenstein, Introduction: lternative

erspectives n National Security, n

Katzenstein, d.,

TheCultutref

National

ecurity:

orms nd

dentity

n World olitics

New

York:Co-

lumbia

UniversityPress, 1996), pp.

1-32; Ronald

L.

Jepperson,Alexander Wendt, and

Peter

J.

Katzenstein, Norms, Identity, nd Culture n National Security, n

ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander

Wendt and

Raymond Duvall,

Institutions nd International

rder,

n Ernst-Otto

zempiel

and

James

N.

Rosenau, eds., GlobalChanges nd Theoretical

hallenges

Lexington,

Mass.:

Lexington

Books,

1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore,National nterestsn International

ociety, hap. 1; JohnGerard

Ruggie, Constructinghe WorldPolity London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky,

American dentity nd Neutral Rights

from ndependence to the War of1812, nternationalrga-

nization, ol.

51,

No.

2

(Spring1997),pp. 207-243; and the special issue of

Security

tudies n the or-

igins

of national

nterests, ol. 8,Nos. 2-3

(Winter-Spring 999). For a broader discussion of the

rationalist-constructivistebate and for

further eferences,ee the

special issue of nternationalr-

ganization,

ol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn1998).

6. See

Ted Hopf, The Promise of

Constructivismn International elationsTheory, nternational

Security,

ol.

23,

No. 1

(Summer 1998),pp. 172-173; Wendt,

Anarchy

s What States Make of

t ;


6/27

TheConstructivisthallenge o Structural ealism

I

191

For

constructivists,herefore,

t

is critical o recognize that n actor's reality

at

any point

n time s

historically

onstructed nd

contingent.

t

is

the

product

of human

activity-historical

ocial

practices-and

thus

can,

at least

in

theory,

be

transcendedby instantiating ew social practices.This process of cultural

change may be slow;

after

ll, agents are sometimes going up against thou-

sands

of

years

of

socialization. But

even

the most embedded structures an be

alteredby acts ofwill (and the requisitesocial mobilization).The neorealist

presumption hat there re universal aws of international olitics that work

across

space

and

time,

driven

by the given reality f structure,must therefore

be discarded

or

at least

highlyqualified.7

Social

Theory f

nternational olitics

moves beyond this core constructivist

framework.For

Wendt,

constructivism n its

different trands

is simulta-

neously

too extreme nd too limited n its

attack

on

neorealism.

t

is too

ex-

treme

when it

claims that it is ideas all the way down, namely,that all

aspects

of

human

reality

re

shaped by socializationthroughdiscursiveprac-

tices.8Materialforcesdo exist nd mayhave independent ausal effects n ac-

tor

behavior.Moreover, he state s a real, self-organized ctor thathas certain

basic interests

rior o its nteraction

ith

other tates.Yetaccording oWendt,

constructivism s too limited when it

simply

tests ideas as causal factors

against

realistvariables like

power

and

interest,

ithout

xploring

he

degree

to which these

apparent

material variables are

really

constituted

by

ideational

processes.

f

much of

what

scholars take to be material auses is

ac-

Wendt, Collective IdentityFormation nd the International tate ; Adler, Seizing the Middle

Ground, pp. 338-340; BradleyS. Klein, Strategic tudies

nd

World rder Cambridge: Cambridge

University ress, 1994), chaps. 1-2; ChristianReus-Smit, The Constitutional tructure f nterna-

tional Society nd the Nature of Fundamental nstitutions, nternationalrganization, ol. 51, No.

4

(Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore,

National

nterests

n

Internationalociety, hap. 1.

7.

See Peter L. Berger nd Thomas Luchmann, The Social ConstructionfReality New York: An-

chor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, The Povertyof Neorealism, in Robert 0. Keohane, ed.,

Neorealismnd ts Critics New York:Columbia University ress, 1986),pp. 255-300; Wendt, Anar-

chy s What StatesMake of t, p. 410; JamesDer Derian, Introduction: ritical nvestigations, n

Der Derian, ed., nternationalheoryNew York:New YorkUniversity ress, 1995),pp. 4-9; Rodney

Bruce Hall, Moral Authority s a Power Resource, nternationalrganization,ol.51,No. 4 (Au-

tumn

1997),pp. 591-622;

and

Rey

Koslowski

and Friedrich

.

Kratochwil, Understanding hange

in International olitics: The Soviet Empire'sDemise and the nternational ystem, nternational

Organization, ol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.

8. In

earlier work, Wendt himself omes close to this more extreme onstructivistine. Wendt,

Anarchy s What States Make of It, p. 401; and Wendt, Constructing nternational olitics,

p.

73. On the

idea that material tructures ain theirmeaning only throughdiscursive practices,

see Bukovansky, American dentity, . 218; Finnemore,National nterestsn Internationalociety,

pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, What's at Stake n the Agent-Structureebate? Internationalrga-

nization, ol. 43, No.

3

(Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461.


7/27


tually heproduct

of

historical ocial practices, henrealism xplainsfar ess

in

international elations han

s commonly

ssumed.

Social

Theory f nternationalolitics s a complex work of both social philoso-

phy and social science,one that ustifiesmultiplereadings to absorb ts subtle-

ties.9 ts core argument,however,can be summarized as follows. The book's

targetsWaltzian neorealism.The overarching oal is todo for onstructivism

what Waltzdid forrealism,namely, hebuilding ofa parsimonious systemic

theory hat reveals the overarching onstraining nd shaping forceof struc-

ture-this time from an ideational

perspective. (Thus

the title's twist on

Waltz's masterwork- Social

Theory

of International

olitics. )

As

with

neorealism,Wendt's argument s founded on the notion that tates

are

the

primary

ctors

in

world

politics.

States are

self-organized

nits con-

structed from

within

by

the discursive

practices

of individuals

and

social

groups. As units that exist n the collectiveknowledge of many individuals,

they re

not

dependent

on the

thoughts

f

any one person. Moreover, s

self-

organized entities, ach possesses a corporate dentity s a sovereign actor,

an

identity

ot

tied

to

interaction

with

other tates.10 ven more controversial

for xtreme

onstructivists,

endt

lso

suggests

that tates

possess

certain

s-

sential needs that arise from

their nature as self-organizedpolitical

units:

needs for

physical survival, autonomy, conomic well-being, nd collective

self-esteem-namely,

he

group's

need

to feelgood about itself see chap. 5, es-

pecially pp. 207-209, 224-226, 235-236).

Wendt

argues

that t

s

only

with this

starting oint-the

state as a

pre-so-

cial actor

with

certainbasic

needs-that

we can see the

mpact

of nteraction

at thesystem evelon the nterests nd identities fstates. fstatesweresolely

a

product

of

nteraction,

herewould be

no

independent hings pon

which

n-

teraction ould

have its effect.

Moreover,

he state

could

never

act as a free-

willed

agent employing

rational deliberation o

change

its

situation;

t

would

be littlemore than a cultural

automaton

pp. 198, 74, 125-130, 179-182, 244).

Wendt

also

contends, ontrary

o more extreme

onstructivists,

hat the

state,

at least

nitially,

as a

tendency

o

be

egoistic

n its relations

with

others.Wendt

acknowledges

thatmembers f

groups,

s social

identity heory

as

shown,

al-

9. For a recent

discussion of the more philosophical aspects ofthe book, see the essays by Robert

0.

Keohane, StephenD. Krasner,Roxanne Lynn Doty,

Hayward R. Alker, nd Steve Smith, nd

Wendt's reply, n Review f nternationaltudies,Vol. 26, No. 1

(January 000), pp. 123-180.

10. Going beyond his previous work, nd borrowing rom

James

D.

Fearon, Wendt also includes

another

orm

f

dentity

hat

s intrinsic

o

the state-its type

dentity

s a

particular

orm fsov-

ereign ctor e.g., being

a democracy, fascist tate, tc.). See Fearon, What s Identity As We

Now

Use

the

Word)? unpublished manuscript,University f

Chicago,

1997.


8/27


most always show favoritism oward each otherwhen dealingwith members

of

the

out-group.This means that

n

the nitial tages of

a

state-to-state

nterac-

tion,egoistic self-help ehavior is likely

to

be exhibited pp.

306,322-323).11

Wendt's

apparent concessions to the neorealistparadigm,

however,do not

mean thategoistic orientationswill always be dominant, thatstates cannot

learn to be more other-regardingnd cooperative. Drawing from symbolic

interactionism, endt rgues that nteractionwithother tatescan lead actors

to significant edefinitions f self.

n

the process of nteracting,

wo states,des-

ignated

as

Ego

and

Alter, ake

on

certain oles

and cast the

other

n

corre-

sponding

counter-roles.

uch role-taking

nd

alter-casting,

ependingon the

type

of

behavior

exhibited

egoistic

vs.

other-regarding, ilitaristic

s. cooper-

ative),

can lead to one of two results:

reproduction

f

initially goistic

con-

ceptions

of

self and

other,

or

a transformation f the shared ideational

structure o one

that

s

more collective nd other-regardingpp. 327-336).

The

critical

point

for

Wendt is that a structurehas no

realityapart

from its

instantiation n process. Structure, e stresses, exists,has effects,nd evolves

only

because

f gents

nd

their ractices p. 185, emphasis

in original; ee also

p. 313). Hence,

if

egoistic and militaristic onceptions of self

and other con-

tinue,

t is

only because

of

the nteractive ractices hat sustainthose concep-

tions.

Likewise, discursive practices are the source of any

transformation

n

interests

nd

identities.By castingthe other

n

a nonegoistic

ight, nd acting

toward t from n

other-regardingtandpoint, ctors can begin

to build collec-

tive

dentities hat nclude the other s

part

of the definition f

self

chap. 7,

es-

pecially pp. 336-342, 368-369).

The book begins ts sustainedcritiqueof neorealism n chapter3. Wendtar-

gues thatbehindWaltz's explicitmodel of nternational olitics, mphasizing

anarchy

nd the

distribution

f

material

apabilities

s

primary

ausal

factors,

lies an

implicit

model

focusing

on

the distribution f interests cross states.

That

is,

neorealism cannot

explain

variations

n

international

utcomes with-

out

implicitly nvoking

different

ypes

of states-some

of which

seek

only

to

maintainwhat

they

have

(status quo states)

and some that eek to

change

the

system hrough

orce

revisionist tates).Systems onsisting

f

only

status

quo

states constitute one

kind

of

anarchy,

while

systems

with revisionist tates

constitute nother.Foreshadowinghis laterdiscussion,Wendtsuggests that

status

quo

states

should

be

relatively eaceful anarchies

of

a

Lockean or

per-

haps

Kantian

kind),

while revisionist

tates

will be

conflictual,

with

states

al-

11.

On

social identity heory, ee JonathanMercer, Anarchy nd

Identity, nternationalrganiza-

tion,Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 229-252.


9/27


5:2 | 194

ways

on

the

edge

of elimination anarchy

with a

Hobbesian

culture).This

argument

mplies

thatanarchy, s

a mere absence

of

central uthority,

as no

one

logic. Rather

the

way

a particular narchy

and distribution

f power

plays

itself ut

will

depend

critically n

the distribution f nterestsn the sys-

tem- what states

want

p.

106, emphasis

in

original).12

Waltz's

neorealism s therefore

nderspecified:

A

hidden

variable,

the

distri-

bution of nterests statusquo vs. revisionist),s doing most of theexplaining.

Anymaterial

tructure,

n

fact,

will have no effect xcept nsofar s

it nteracts

withthe deational structure hat

s the distribution

f

nterests.

oncrete nter-

ests,

moreover,

re not simplygiven by

the system.Socialized

beliefs about

what

kinds of

objectives

re worthpursuing

or avoiding will shape each

state's

actual interests.

o while individuals and

states

may

have certain

basic needs

(such

as needs for urvival,

steem, nd autonomy),

how theseneeds are mani-

fest n

particular

ctors

will be a product

of social

discursivepractices

pp.

113-

135).

Building on thisfoundation,n chapter6 Wendt ays out what he calls the

three culturesof anarchy

that have characterized

t various times the past

two thousand

years

of nternational elations.

n

each

culture,

tates

play

cer-

tain

types

of

roles

vis-a-vis

each

other,complete

with

specific

behavioral

norms. n a Hobbesian

culture,

which

according

o Wendt

dominated

world af-

fairs

until the seventeenth

entury,

tates cast

each

other

n the role of

en-

emy :

The other

s

a threatening

dversary

that

will

observe

no limits

on the

use of violence.

Violence must therefore

e

employed

as

a basic

tool for sur-

vival.

In

a Lockean

culture,

which has

characterized

he

modern

state

system

since theTreaty fWestphalia n 1648, tatesview each other s rivals thatmay

use violence

to advance their nterests,

ut

that

are

required

to refrain

rom

eliminating

ach other.

n

a

Kantian

culture,

which has

emergedonly

recently

in relationsbetween

democracies,

tates

play

the role

of

friends,

hat

s,

states

do not use force o settle

disputes

and work

as a team

againstsecurity

hreats

(pp. 258, 260-262,

279-280,

298-299).

The behavioral

normsfor ach

culture re known

by

the actors

and are

thus

shared

to at least a minimal

degree (a

minimal

requirement

or a

culture).

These

norms,

however,

an be internalized

o threedegrees.

n

the

first

egree,

12. Wendt's

rgumenthere extendsearlier

work byRandall L. Schweller,

AndrewMoravcsik,

nd

Arthur

A. Stein.See Schweller, Neorealism's

Status

Quo Bias: WhatSecurityDilemma?

Security

Studies,

ol. 5, No.

3

(Spring

1996),pp. 90-121; Moravcsik,

TakingPreferences eriously:

A Liberal

Theory

f nternational olitics, nternationalrganization,

ol. 51,

No. 4 (Autumn 1997),pp.

513-

555;and Stein,Why

NationsCooperate: ircumstance

nd Choice n nternational

elations

Ithaca,

N.Y.:

CornellUniversity

ress, 1990).


10/27

The

Constructivisthallenge o Structural ealism 195

consistentwithneorealism, ompliance to the norm s solely a function f

coer-

cion: The actor complies because of the threat f punishment ounded on the

relative superiority f the other actors. In the second degree, closer to the

neoliberal view, actors conform o the norm not because they see it as legiti-

mate, but merelybecause they think t is in their elf-interest. cceptance at

both the first nd second degrees is therefore urely nstrumental,nd when

thecosts and benefits f complying hange, behavior should also change. At

the third

evel, consistent

with

constructivistogic, stateshave internalized he

behavioral norms

s legitimate, s part

of who

they re. They dentify

ith the

other's

expectations, ncorporating

he other within

their cognitive

bound-

aries.Onlyat this eveldoes thenormreally construct tatesby shapingtheir

core

interests

nd identities s

actors chap. 6, passim, especially p. 250).

Given that

there are three formsof culture,depending on the norms fol-

lowed by the actors, and three degrees of internalization f these norms,

Wendt

portrays

nternational

ystems

as

being

in

any

one of nine

possible

modes at any particular ime.On thehorizontal xis, moving from eft oright,

is

the

degree

of

cooperation representedby the Hobbesian, Lockean, and

Kantian culturesrespectively. n the vertical xis, from ottom o top, are the

three

degrees

of

internalization see Figure 4, p. 254). This three-by-three

grid offers ome advantages. It allows us to see conflictual obbesian systems

as

a

product

of shared nternalized deas at the third

degree a

social construc-

tion) and

not

ust as

a

product of materialforces the realistview). Moreover,

high degrees of cooperation a Kantian culture)can be a product

of

pure self-

interested ompliance resulting rom he threat f punishment first egree) or

thesimple benefits f cooperation second degree). Conflict oes notconfirm

realism, ustas cooperationdoes notconfirmiberalism r constructivism.

t all

depends

on the

degree

of

nternalization-why

he actors cted

in a

conflictual

or

cooperative fashion, why they

treated

each other as

enemies, rivals,

or

friends.

Wendt's

key assertion s that the culture

n

which states

find

themselves

t

any point

n

time

depends

on the

discursive

ocial

practices

hat

reproduce

or

transform ach actor's view

of

self and other.

Anarchy

s what states

make of

it. A

Hobbesian

system

will

be

sustained

only

f

actors continueto act toward

each other n

egoistic,militaristic ays.

Such a culture s not the nevitable

re-

sult

of

anarchy

and the material distribution f

power,

as neorealistswould

have it.

Rather, ecause egoistic, iolentmind-sets re maintainedonlyby ego-

istic and

violent

processes,

a

cultureof

realpolitik

an become a

self-fulfilling

prophecy.

f

actors

gesturedifferently,howing

that

they

re

casting

the other

in a

less

self-centered

anner,

hen

over time Hobbesian

culture

an move

to


11/27

Internationalecurity5:2 | 196

a Lockean and

possibly Kantian form.We must

never forget,Wendt reminds

us, that cultures

are not reifiedgivens, but products of historical ocial pro-

cesses.

Today's

common

sense about

international elations-that

t

s a

self-

help

world

of egoistic tates-is itself

product

of historically ontingentdeas

and not a

true

reflection

f

the intrinsic atureof states pp. 296-297). By en-

gaging

in

new

practices,

tates can

instantiate

ew

ideational structures

hat

help actorstranscendcollective-action roblems and historicalmistrust. he

constructivist ove

ofregarding goismas

always

an

ongoing product of

the

social process

helps us

see

that self-interests not some eternalgiven driving

actor

behavior,

but an

ongoing product

of the

system.

As Wendt

asserts,

If

self-interests not sustained

by practice,

t will

die out (p. 369).

Wendt's onstructivist

hallenge

The nexttwo

subsections onsider ome of the mplications f Social Theory or

thethreemost mportant pproaches in international elations heory: iberal-

ism,

constructivism,nd structural ealism. My focus s on thestrengthsnd

weaknesses of the

argument gainst structural ealism,giventhistheory's

m-

portance

as the

primary

nd

constant

arget

f Wendt's

analysis.

CONTRIBUTIONS

OF

WENDT

S

ARGUMENT

The contributions f

Social Theory o modern liberalism are

significant.

he

book cuts against

the grain of recent iberal and

neoliberal developmentsby

drawing nspiration rom

raditional idealist

arguments

f

the

interwar

e-

riod. Wendt offers socially scientific nderpinning or he dealist claim that

diplomacycan

fundamentally hange

the

way

states think bout themselves

and others.Recent

iberaltheory ocuses

on

the

mpact

of

domestic-level

orces

in

the

formation

f state

preferences.13

eoliberal institutionalism

dopts

real-

ist

assumptions about rational actors

with

exogenous

preferences

o consider

how

institutions urther

ooperationby solving

problems

of nformational

n-

certainty.14gainst

iberalism,

Wendt

poses

the causal and constitutive ole of

systemic

deational structure

n

the

preferences

f

states, ndependent

of

do-

13. See Moravcsik's summary, Taking

Preferences eriously.

14. Robert0. Keohane, After

Hegemony: ooperation nd Discord n the WorldPoliticalEconomy

(Princeton,

N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1984); Stephen D.

Krasner, d., International egines

(Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell University ress,1983); Hasenclever,Mayer, nd

Rittberger,

heories

f

nter-

national

Regimes; nd VolkerRittberger,d., Regime heory nd

International elations Oxford:Ox-

ford

University ress, 1993).


12/27

The Constructivisthallenge o

Structural ealism 197

mestic-levelprocesses.15

Against neoliberal institutionalism,Wendt's work

challenges the assumption ofexogenous preferences articularly he

assump-

tion of egoistic, bsolute

gains-maximizing tates. f egoism is sustained

only

by process,as Wendt claims, thennew, more other-regardingractices an

re-

shape the shared ideational

environment,moving states to levels of

coopera-

tion not explained by

neoliberalism.

The book also pushes theconstructivistaradigm to a new level ofsophisti-

cation. Strong constructivists ill

be frustrated y Wendt's acceptance that

states and individuals have basic needs that re independentof social

interac-

tion,by his assertion hat hese

actorsare predisposed by natureto be

egoistic

(at

least

initially), nd by his view

that

tates are

indeed actors

with

corporate

identities hat exist prior to interaction. et Wendt shows convincingly

hat

without hese baselines, social processes at the nternationalevel would have

nothing o act upon. The extreme

onstructivistosition-that it s ideas all the

way down-leaves thetheorist

with all structure nd no agents. ndeed,

if

ac-

torswere to be wholly constituted y structure, hen the constructivistro-

gram would fall apart. Agents would be purely puppets of the ideational

environment

n

which

they

find

hemselves-in George

Herbert

Mead's

terms,

each

would exist simply as a

socially

conditioned

Me,

without the free-

willed

I

capable

of

resisting

he socialization

process.16

n

such

a

situation,

there s no

possibility

or

ransformation

f the structure

hrough

he actions of

agents.

The

system

would

continually eproduce tself,

nd

change

across time

resulting romdiscursive practiceswould be impossible-except through x-

ogenous

material

hocks outside of

the

model.17

Wendt'scritique f neorealismoffers hreemain contributions.irst, e goes

beyond

liberal and

constructivist heoristswho

treat

power

and interests s

factors

overed

by realism,

nd who

then eek

simply

o show that

ideas mat-

ter as a

separate

causal

force.Such theorists, y

not

asking

whether

power

and

interests re constituted

y

social

interaction, ive away

too much to real-

ism; they

are

reduced to

performingmop-up operations

for

phenomena

not

explained by

realist variables.Wendt hows that o the extent hat

ostensibly

material

variables

such

as power

and interest re

actually shaped by

social

15. In doing so, Wendt s also challengingdomestic-level onstructivists.

16. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, nd Society Chicago: University f Chicago Press,

1934),

chap. 3. On Mead's significantnfluence n Wendt's thinking, ee Social Thieoryf nternationaloli-

tics,pp. 327-336, 170-171, 264-265; and Wendt, Anarchy s What States Make of It.

17. On the conditionsfor hange in collective deas, see Jeffrey . Legro, The Transformationf

Policy Ideas,

American

ournal f

Political

cience,

Vol.

44,

No. 3

(July 000), pp. 419-432.


13/27


practices, hey

hould

more properly

e

considered deational

variables consis-

tentwith a constructivist iew of world politics.

Second,

Wendt

helps improve all systemic heorizing-whether neorealist,

neoliberal, or constructivist-byproviding the most rigorous philosophical

justification etproduced for reating he state s an actor.Most systemic heo-

ristsview the state-as-actor ssertion s a reasonable assumption forthe pur-

poses of theorybuilding,and go no further. his leaves them vulnerable to

unit-level heoristswho counter hatonly ndividuals and social groups exist,

and thattherefore rocesses withinthe state must be the theoretical ocus.

Wendt demonstrates hat the state

is a real

self-organizing ntity hat,being

held in the collective memories of many individuals, is dependentfor exis-

tence on no particular ctor just as other ocial groups are, for

that

matter).

Third, nd most mportant, ith his claim that anarchy s what statesmake

of

t,

Wendt

offers

he boldest

critique

f realism n the field.

Against

the real-

ist assertion

hat

narchyforces tates to worry onstantly

bout survival and

therefore bout relativepower, Wendt seeks to show that spirals ofhostility,

arms

racing,

nd war

are not nevitable

n

an anarchic

ystem.

f

states

fall

nto

such conflicts,

t s a

result f their wn social practices,which reproduce gois-

tic

and

militaristicmind-sets.Anarchydoes notcompelthem

to be conflictual.

It is an emptyvessel with no inherent ogic (p. 249). To explain behavior and

outcomes,

this vessel must be filled

with

varying

nterests

nd identities-

status

quo

or

revisionist

tateswhose characteristicsre at

least

in

part

a func-

tion of nternationalnteraction. uch an

analysis helps

to

overcome the

pessi-

misminherent

n

manyrealist rguments.18

f

states can

transcend heir

past

18. The primary arget ere s Waltz,Theory f

nternational

olitics, ut also implicitly

ffensive e-

alists such as JohnJ.Mearsheimer, The False Promise of nternational nstitutions, nternational

Security, ol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 994/95),pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, Beyond Victory:

ffensive

Real-

ism and the Expansion of War Aims, Security tudies,Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49.

Scholars n the defensiverealistcamp of structural ealism are typically

ess

pessimistic, ecause

theybelieve that ertain orms f soft-line iplomacy can mitigate, lthough

not

eliminate,

he

se-

curity ilemma. See especiallyCharles L. Glaser, Realists s Optimists: ooperation as Self-Help,

Internationalecurity, ol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 994/95),pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones,Realism and

America's Rise:

A

Review Essay, nternationalecurity, ol. 23, No.

2

(Fall 1998),pp. 157-182; Rob-

ertJervis, Realism,Neoliberalism, nd Cooperation: Understanding he Debate,

International

e-

curity, ol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins fAlliances Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell

University ress, 1987); and StephenVan Evera,

Causes

of

War:

The

Structure

f

Power

and theRoots fWar Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1999). On the debatebetweenoffensive

and defensive

ealists,

which

Wendtdoes not discuss,

see

Sean M. Lynn-Jones

nd Steven E.

Miller,

Preface, n Michael E. Brown,Lynn-Jones,nd Miller, ds., PerilsofAnarchy: ontemporaryeal-

ism nd InternationalecurityCambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel,

Restating he RealistCase: An Introduction, ecurity tudies, ol. 5, No.

3

(Spring 1996), pp.

xiv-

xx; and Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, nd Cooperation, pp. 48-50.


14/27

TheConstructivisthallenge o Structural ealism

I

199

realpolitikmind-sets by instantiating ew, more other-regarding ractices,

then

hope

forthe

future

an

be restored.

WEAKNESSES

OF

WENDT

S

ARGUMENT AGAINST STRUCTURAL REALISM

Wendt's

critique

of structural

realist theory suffers from problems of

misspecification nd

incompleteness.Although t is

true

that tates trainedto

think ggressively re more ikelyto be aggressive,Wendt's point thatrealism

cannot

explain behavior

and

outcomes without mplicitly elying n a hidden

variable-the distribution f nterests-goes toofar. t is based on a misunder-

standing

of how structural ealist

arguments re

set

up to

make

predictions.

Structuralrealists are not nafve.

Like

all

theorists-whether

liberal,

con-

structivist,

r classical

realist-they recognize

that states

may

exist

that,

be-

cause

of

domestic- r individual-level

athologies,

have interests

xtending

ar

beyond mere

security.

uch

states tend to destabilize a

system,

because

they

are

constantlyeekingopportunities oexpand through orce.Yet structural e-

alistsbuild their heories rom hestarting ssumptionthat ll states n thesys-

tem

are

presently nly security eekers,

hat

hey

have no

nonsecurity

motives

forwar.

The reason for

beginningwith

this

assumption

s

straightforward.

t is

easy

to show that tateswith

pathological

unit-level haracteristicsre often

ggres-

sive.

But if realists

can

explain why systemsmay

move from

ooperation

to

conflict, epending

on the material

conditions,

ven

when all states are secu-

rity eekers,

hen

the

paradigm

offers

powerfulbaseline

for

heory evelop-

ment.By

withstanding

he

hardestpossible

deductive

test,

realism shows the

tragedyofworld politics-that good statesmay do bad things, ven against

other

good

states. The initial

assumption

of a

system

of

security

eekers

can

thenbe relaxed to demonstrate ow

systems

will

be even more conflictual

nce

states with unit-level

pathologies

are introduced.

To show how

purely ecurity-seeking

tatescan still

conflict,

tructural

eal-

ists

point

to

prudent

eaders'

uncertainty

bout two

temporal

dimensions-

first,

he

present

ntentions f the

other,

nd

second,

and even more

critical,

he

future ntentions f

the other.19

oth of

these dimensions

re at the heartof the

realist

understanding

of the

security

dilemma.

In a

two-actor

security

di-

19. For ease of exposition,below I use the terms intentions nd motives largely synony-

mously.Although ntentions s the more commonlyused term,motives more

accurately aptures

what s at stake,namely,whether tatesdiffern their ore reasons for cting

ither for ecurity r

nonsecurity bjectives. See Charles L. Glaser, Political Consequences of MilitaryStrategy: x-

panding

and

Refining

he

Spiral and DeterrenceModels, World olitics, ol.

44, No. 2

(July

992),

pp. 497-538.


15/27

International

ecurity 5:2 | 200

lemma,

statesA and B

are both

seekingonly their

wn survival.

But giventhe

difficultyfseeing the

other'smotives the

problemof other

minds ), stateA

worries hat

B

currently arbors

nonsecuritymotivesfor

war.

Hence,

if

B

takes

stepsonlyfor ts own

security,hese steps

may

be

misinterpretedy

A

as

prep-

arationsfor ggression.

tate A's

counterefforts,

n

turn,

will

likely

be

misinter-

preted

by

B as

moves to

aggression,

sparking a spiral of

mistrust and

hostility.20

Even

more intractable or

systemicrealists s

the

problem

of future

nten-

tions. Even when

states

A

and B

are both

fairly

ertain hatthe

other s

pres-

ently

security eeker,

hey

have reason to

worry

hatthe other

might hange

its

spotssome years ateras a

result

of a

change of

eadership, revolution, r

simplya

change of heart

resulting rom n

increase

in its

power.21 he fear

here is

not

that

the

present

distribution

f interests

ontains states with n-

nately

aggressive

intentions, ut that the

future

system

will

contain

such

states.

In short, ystemicrealistsunderstandthat nherentlyggressive statesare

possible.

But

they

do not

requirethe

system

n

the

present

moment o

contain

such states for

t

to still

fall

nto conflict.

ontrary

o Wendt's

claim,therefore,

anarchy

nd

distributions

fpower can have

effects hatdo not

depend

on as-

sumptions bout the

real,current istribution

f

nterestseven

if

the

possibil-

ity

of evil states

down the

road is

important).Realism

only

needs states

to be

uncertain bout the

present

nd

future nterests

f the

other,

nd in

anarchies

of

great

powers,

such

uncertaintymay

oftenbe

profound.

The

question

of

uncertainty

s

critical o

understanding

he

differences e-

tween structuralrealism and constructivism,nd where Wendt's analysis

misses

the

mark.

Consider

first

ncertainty egarding

he other's

present

n-

tentions.

Wendt

s

aware that

hiskind of

uncertaintyhallenges

his

point

that

20. See, inter lia,

RobertJervis,

Cooperation

under theSecurity

ilemma, World

olitics, ol.30,

No.

2

(January

978),pp. 167-214; and

Charles

L.

Glaser, The

Security ilemma

Revisited,

World

Politics,

Vol. 50, No. 1

(October 1997),pp. 171-201.

As AndrewKydd

notes,

uncertainty

ver

the

other'smotives s an

essential

component f anystructural

ealist

rgument rawn from he secu-

rity

ilemma.Kydd, Sheep

in Sheep's Clothing:

Why

Security-Seekers o Not

FightEachOther,

Securitytudies,Vol.

7,

No. 1

(Autumn

1997), pp.

125-126.

21. Robert Jervis,

erceptionnd

Misperceptionn

International

olitics Princeton,N.J.:

Princeton

University ress,1976), p. 62; RobertJervis nd RobertJ.Art, The Meaning ofAnarchy, n Art

and

Jervis, ds.,

International

olitics:

Enduring

Concepts

nd

Contemporaryssues

(Boston:Little,

Brown,

1985),p. 3; and

Mearsheimer,False

Promiseof nternational

nstitutions, . 10.Defensive

realists end

to put

more

emphasis on

uncertaintybout

present ntentions,

hereas offensive eal-

istsstress he

problemof

futurententions nd

theconsequent need

to increasepower as

a

hedge

against future

hreats.Compare

especially defensive

realists such

as Glaser,

Realists

as

Opti-

mists, nd

Walt,Origins f

Alliances, o offensive

ealists

uch as Mearsheimer,

False Promiseof

International

nstitutions.


16/27


the current istribution f nterests rives the way anarchyplays itself ut. He

counters that, at least in the modern environment, he problem of other

minds is not much of a problem. States today can indeed learn a great deal

about

what the

other

s

doing and thinking. hat knowledge may not be 100

percent ertain, Wendt argues, but no knowledge is that p. 281, emphasis

in

original). To assume a worst-case cenario and to treat he otheras hostile

may be more dangerous than adopting a conciliatory olicy, ecause it creates

a

self-fulfillingrophecy

of mutual mistrust

pp. 281, 107-109, 360).

This

counterargument as serious flaws.

n

essence,

t

s an efforto assume

away theproblem-that therereally s no problem of otherminds-and it is

weak on three grounds. First,Wendt's view that states typicallyknow a lot

about the other's motives s an unsupported empirical statement ased only

on a

reading

of the

contemporary ituation.Even

if

t were truefor he major-

ity of states today-and it certainly oes not capture the realitybetween the

states that

count, such as the United States and China-his point cannot

be

retrofittednto the previous fivecenturies hatconstitute he focus of Wendt's

analysis.

n

sum,

if

uncertainty bout present ntentionswas rampantduring

these

five

hundredyears,

t

along

with

hifts

n

relativepower) may explain

a

great deal about changes in conflict nd cooperation over time.

Second,

Wendt's view is

inconsistent

with

his recognition

hat states often

do have difficultyearningabout the other.The very problem Ego and Alter

have in first

ommunicating

s that

behavior does

not

speak

for tself.

t

must

be

interpreted,nd many interpretationsre possible (p. 330).

This

point

s

reinforced

y

Wendt's

epistemologicalpoint

of

departure:

hat

the ideas held

by actors re unobservable chap. 2). Because leaderscannotobservedirectly

what the other s

thinking, hey

re

resigned

to

making

nferences

rom ts be-

havior. Yet

in

security affairs,

s Wendt

acknowledges,

mistakes in infer-

ences-assuming

the

other

is

peaceful

when

in

fact

it

has malevolent

intentions-could prove fatal p. 360).

Wendt

accepts

that the

problem facing

rational states

is

making

sure

that

they perceive other actors,

and other actors'

perception

of

them, correctly

(p. 334, emphasis

in

original).

Yet the book

provides

no mechanism

through

which

Ego

and

Alter

an

increase heir onfidence

n the correctness

f their s-

timatesof theother's type. Simply describinghow Ego and Altershape each

other's sense

of

self and other

s not

enough.22

Rational choice

models, using

22. Consider Wendt's statement hat Ego's ideas about Alter, ight r zorong,re not merely

pas-

sive perceptions f something hatexists ndependentof Ego, but actively nd on-goingly onsti-

tutiveof Alter's role vis-a-visEgo (p. 335, emphasis added). His subsequent discussion offers o

insights ntohow Ego would be able to earn that ts deas about Alterwere ndeed right r wrong.


17/27


assumptions

consistentwith structural

ealism,do much better

here. n

games

ofincomplete nformation, here states are unsure about the other'stype, c-

tions

by security-seeking

ctors that

would be too costlyfor greedy

actors to

adopt

can

help

states reduce their

uncertainty

bout

present ntentions,

hus

moderating he security ilemma.23Wendtcannot simply rgue thatover time

states an learna

greatdeal about other tates.

t

is what s not shared, t least

inthearea of ntentions,hat emains hecore stumbling lock to cooperation.

Third,Wendt's position that the problem of other minds is not much of a

problem gnores a fundamental ssue in all social relations, ut especially

in

thosebetween states,namely, he problemof deception. n making stimates f

the other's present ype, tates have reason to be suspicious of its diplomatic

gestures-the

other

may

be

trying o deceive

them.

Wendt's analysis

s

rooted

in the

theory

f

symbolic nteractionism,ut he does not discuss one critical s-

pect

of that radition:

he dea of impressionmanagement. Actors

n

their e-

lations

exploit

the

problem of otherminds fortheirown ends. On the public

stage, theypresent mages and play roles thatoftenhave little o do withtheir

true beliefsand interests ackstage.24

In

laying

out his

dramaturgical iew of Ego and Alter co-constitutingach

other's interests nd

identities,

Wendt assumes that both

Ego

and Alter are

making genuine

efforts o

express

their rue

views

and to cast the other n

roles thattheybelieve

in.

Butdeceptive actorswill stage-manage he situation

to create

mpressions

hat erve theirnarrow

ends,

and other

ctors, specially

in

world

politics,

will understandthis.25

hus

a

prudent ecurity-seeking go

will have

difficultyistinguishing

etween two scenarios:

whether t and Alter

do indeed share a view of each other s peaceful,or whetherAlter s just pre-

tending

o be

peaceful

n

order o make

Ego

think hat

hey

hare a certain on-

23. See JamesD.

Fearon, Rationalist xplanationsforWar, nternationalrganization, ol. 49, No.

3 (Summer 1995), pp.

379-414; Glaser, Realists as Optimists ;

Andrew

Kydd,

Game

Theory

nd

the Spiral Model, World

olitics, ol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp.

371-400; Kydd, Sheep

in

Sheep's

Clothing, pp. 139-147;and Dale C. Copeland, Trade Expectations

nd

the Outbreak of

Peace:

Detente 1970-74 and

the End of the Cold War 1985-91, Securitytudies, ol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn

1999-Winter

000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory,Wendt's book considers

only games

ofcomplete

nformation,n which actors are certain bout the other'spreferences nd type pp.

106-107, 148, 159-160,167, 183, 315).

24. See especially

Erving Goffman,The Presentationf Self n

Everyday ife Garden City,N.Y.:

Doubleday, 1959), chap.

6.

25. These actions arewhat game theoristswould call effortst

strategicmisrepresentation. n

the

nstrumentalmanipulation f normsfor elf-interested

easons, ee Paul Kowert nd Jeffrey .

Legro, Norms, dentity, nd Their Limits:A Theoretical

Reprise, n Katzenstein,Culture fNa-

tional

ecurity, p. 492-493.


18/27


ceptionof theworld, when in fact they do

not.26Wendt's analysis offers o

basis for saying when peaceful gesturesshould be taken at face value, and

when

they hould be discounted as deceptions.27When we

consider

the

mpli-

cations

of

a Hitlerite tatedeceiving others o achievea positionof militaryu-

periority,

e understand

why great powers

in

historyhave tended to adopt

postures

of

prudent mistrust.

The problemof future ntentions-whichWendt'sbook does not discuss-is

even

more intractable. he problem is rooted in the

possibility

of domestic

changes

in

the other that occur despite effortso maintaincooperativerela-

tions.

Wendt

bracketsoffdomestic processes to focus on the effect f interac-

tion between states. This approach fails to

consider

the

implication

f liberal

and

domestic-constructivistrguments n the conclusionsof Wendt's ystemic

constructivism.tates

do not form conception f themselves

nly through

n-

teraction

with

other states. Socialization

processes internal to

a

state

can

change

the state's

identity

nd

interests ndependentlyof such interaction.

Wendtcapturesthispoint nhis discussion ofthefourforms f dentity: cor-

porate, type, role,

and collective. The first wo

develop throughpro-

cesses within he

state,reflecting

he

self-organizingspect

of the

unit,

nd do

notrequiretherecognition f other tates for heir

meaning.28

ole

and

collec-

tive

dentities,

n

the otherhand, are constituted nly through nteraction

e-

tween states.29

These

distinctions ave profound mplications or he

potential mpact

of

se-

curitydilemmas

in

Wendt's framework. f the nature of the other's domestic

regime

an

change independently f nternationalnteraction,

heneven

when

Ego is confident hatAlter s currently security eeker, t mustworry hatAl-

ter

might

become

athologically

hostile ateron. This

worry

will

be

particularly

26. This problem s especially pernicious n Wendt'sLockean and Kantianworlds,where statesdo

seem to be followingnormsof self-restraint.ut even in a Hobbesian world, t s highly ikely hat

Ego may believe thatAlter s an enemy even when Alter does not accept this assessment. t is

not enough forWendt o say that heyboth ntersubjectivelyhare the view that he other s an en-

emy (pp. 260-263). In fact, n a spiraling ecurity ilemma, there re two separate beliefsthat do

not overlap: Ego thinksAlter s an aggressive enemy,when Alter knows that t is not; and

Alter

likewise thinks go is an aggressiveenemy,when Ego knows that

t

s

not.

Again,

t s what

is not

shared-the uncertaintyn the system-that is problematic.27. Costly signalinggames in rationalchoice game theory gain provide a mechanismby which

states can evaluate valid versus potentially eceptive gestures.

28. See Wendt,Social Theory f nternationalolitics, p. 224-233; and Wendt, Collective dentity

Formation.

29. For Wendt'searlier wofolddistinction etween corporate nd role dentities, ee Wendt, Col-

lective dentity ormation.


19/27


intense fEgo facesan exogenous decline in relativepower thatwould leave

Alterpreponderant ater, hould it acquire nonsecuritymotives

forwar.30

This discussion reveals a deep irony n the constructivist ake on interna-

tional relations. t is constructivism's eryemphasis on the mutability f nter-

ests and identities,when takendown tothe domestic evel,thatreinforces hy

anarchyforces tates to be on guard. States know thatdiplomacyalone will

rarely e enough to ensure the ong-term eaceful natureof theother consider

the difficultieshat

Washington aces today

in

stabilizing

Russia's democratic

institutions). his problem s heightenedby a factofwhich Wendt s aware:

thatdomestic

processes

are

typically

armore dense than nternational nes

(pp. 2, 13,21,27-28, 107-108). Wendtbelieves that hisfactmakes his argument

for

a

systemic

onstructivism hard case.

But he

overlooks

the more

pro-

found

point:

thatthe

independence

of domestic

processes

undermines

his

ef-

fort o show

thatmaterial

tructures o

not

constrain

nd

shape

state

behavior

except by way

of

deas rising hrough nternationalnteraction.

f statesknow

thatthe natureof theother s mostly function f ts own domesticprocesses,

then

they

must

pay great

ttention o their

resent

nd futurematerial

apabil-

ity,

n orderto

guard against

a

situation

n

which the

otherbecomes

aggressive

later on.31Thus domestic-level onstructivism einforces he value of a sys-

temic

realistview of world

politics,

t

least

as

a baseline starting oint

for

he-

ory building.

Reinforcing

he dilemma of

changing

future ntentions s the criticaldiffer-

ence between

a

systemic

realist

conception

of structure

nd

Wendt's notion.

Wendt stresses

repeatedly

that structure s

always

a

function f

interaction:

that tructurexists,has effects,nd evolves onlybecause ofagentsand their

practices.

Structures

annot be considered

given

realities

ndependent

of

pro-

cess.

This is the

mistake of actors

reifying

tructures

nd then

forgetting

hat

they rehistorically ontingent,hat hey re sustained or transformednly by

human

activity pp. 150, 185-186,313, 340, 364, 368).

In

previous work,

Wendt

takes Waltz

to task for his statement hat international

tructures,

ike eco-

nomic

markets,

are formed

by the coaction

of theirunits.

If

this

s

so,

and

30. See Dale C. Copeland, TheOrigins fMajor War Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 2000),

chaps. 1-2; Van Evera, Causes of War,

hap. 5; and Jack . Levy, Declining Power and the Preven-

tiveMotive forWar, World olitics,

Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.

31. This

problem

s

reinforced y the fact hat ntentions an change overnight as

a

resultof a

coup orrevolution, or xample),

whereas significant hanges n relativepower take

many years

to

effect.

llowing oneself o fall

behind n power,hoping that he otherwill always stay peaceful, s

thus

fraughtwith risks.


20/27


structures re not

exogenously given

but

are generated and sustained by

coaction,

henactors

can set

about

changingthe structures hatreinforce om-

petitive

nd violent

behavior.32

The

problem here is thatWaltz's economic analogy does not really capture

what

systemic

realists mean

by structure. or

such

realists, tructure

s a

function f the

potential

or

coaction among units.

n

anarchy, tates have to

worrymore about what the other might do tomorrowor in ten years than

about what t s

presently oing

or has done in the

past.

The

economic

markets

of Waltz's

analogy,

t

s

true,

re not

generated

untilthere s

buying

and

selling

activity.

his is

simplybecause markets re designed to improvetheutility f

individual

actors versus

the

noncooperative outcome,

and no

improvement

can

be

made unless

there

s

exchange that s, interaction).

tructures n

inter-

national

politicsare different. he actors are not trying o increasetheirutility

per se,

but to

avoid harm.Hence

present

nd

past

interactions not

the

core s-

sue;

the

potential

of others to do harm in

the

future s. This

means, among

otherthings, hatactors in anarchymustworryabout exogenous decline in

theirmaterialbasis

for urvival,

nd

the probability

hat

the other

will be

ag-

gressive

after

uch decline.33

The distinction

etween

Wendt's

focus on structure

s

the coaction

interac-

tion)

of

units,

nd a

realist

focus on

structure s

the

potentialfor coaction,

s

neither emantic

nor trivial.

t

reflects fundamentally ifferentonception

f

the

role of

time

n

international

olitics.For Wendt

nd other

onstructivists,

t

is the

past

that

matters-how interactions nd

gestures

n

the historical

rocess

have socialized

actors toward certain

conceptions

of self and

other.

Realists

certainly o not dismiss theways thatpast interactionhape current eliefs.34

Most

fundamentally, owever,

realism s a

forward-looking heory.

tates are

rational maximizers

of their ecurity

ver

the

foreseeablefuture.Hence

they

remain

constantlyvigilant

for

any changes

in their external situation

that

mightdamage their hances

for

urvival ater.Reduce

to

fivewords, then,

he

32. Wendt, Anarchy s What StatesMake of t, pp. 401-402,406-407,410; and Waltz,Theory f n-

ternationalolitics, . 91.

33. Note that ctorshere are not automatically ssuming worst case, namely, hatpolicies must

reflect he mere possibility hatthe othermight ater aggress. Rather ecuritymaximizers, f they

are rational,

will

always calculate according o theprobabilities

f

certain ndesirable hings omingto pass. Givenuncertainty,owever, stimates f these probabilitieswilloften e high.Cf. Stephen

G. Brooks, Dueling Realisms, nternational rganization, ol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-

477.

For

a model of rationaldecisionmaking hatdevelops this defensiverealistnotion, ee Cope-

land, Origins fMajor War, hap. 2.

34. As noted, realists mploy costly ignaling models to show how actors can rationally pdate

their stimatesof the

other's character nd motives,based on

its

past behavior.


21/27

International

ecurity 5:2 |

206

divide between

constructivismnd

systemic ealism s all

about

past socializa-

tion versus

future

ncertainty.35

Thisanalysis has

a straightforward

mplication:There s no

need for ny in-

teraction

n

the present

or

past for a constraining

tructure o exist. Power

structures-the

relative distribution

f material

resources-are not

generated

by social

practices even

if

practices can sometimes

change the

distribution

overtime).Structuresxistbythe merepresenceof theother, nd itspotential

to do harm in the

future-its potential

to coact by invading,

f you will.

Hence,

in

anarchy,

ven

when a statehas no relations

with

the

other,

ven

if

he

otherdoes not

know thatthe state

exists,

he state s

forced

by

the situation o

contemplate uture

cenarios

n

which the other ould

do it harm.

When scouts

returned o ancient

Assyria with the first

eports n theEgyptian

mpire and

its

phenomenal

resources,Assyrian eaders would have

been

imprudent ot to

have at least

consideredthe

possibility f an

Egyptian nvasion. No

interaction

was

required

for

Egypt's relativepower to have a

constraining

ffect n As-

syria'sbehavior.36

The pernicious

ssue ofuncertainty

elps us evaluate

the value of Wendt's

discussion of the three

cultures of

anarchy

nd their

hree

degrees of inter-

nalization.

Wendt uses his

three-by-three

rid

in

chapter

6-Hobbesian,

Lockean,

and Kantian

cultureson the horizontal

axis,

and

first,econd, and

third

degrees

of

internalization n the vertical-as a

visual

tool to show that

interaction an socialize states

away

from conflictual

o more

cooperative

forms f behavior.

States

n

each of the nine

boxes,

he

argues,

share at least a

basic notion of what the

behavioral norms are

in

the

system.

n

termsof the

questionofpresent nd future ntentions, owever, here re two problems.

First,Wendtassumes that state

knows not

only

which

of the nine boxes

it

is

in,

but which

box the

other

s

in. If

Ego,

for

xample,

knows that t is in the

top right

ox,

where t

follows and has

deeply

internalized he Kantian norm

of not

using

violence to settle

disputes,

t

may

stillbe

uncertain bout Alter's

35. This does notmean that

constructivism oes not deal with the problem of

uncertainty. ut it

does so by looking

at how socialized notionsof selfand other

shape actors'views of the future

possibilities.

he

causal story emainsone of

historical

iscursive

practicesmoldingcurrentmind-

sets; actorssee the

future nly through he

strongfilter fpast socialization. See

Emanuel Adler

and Michael Barnett, ds., Security ommunitiesCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1998),

chaps. 1, 2, 13. The realistview of the

future ocuses on thethings hatmight ccur

ndependent f

an actor's

past interaction ith the other. o while

realists

ccept

that

historicalnteraction an re-

duce

uncertaintybout the other's

character nd motives,

they argue thatprudent actors can

never

ignore themany exogenous

determinants f the other's future ehavior.

The security

di-

lemma can be moderated,but never

eliminated.

36. Note

that his s not even

a

first

ontact, ecause Egypt does not

yet know

of Assyria's

exis-

tence. Cf. Wendt, Anarchy s What

States Make of It, pp. 403-407.


22/27

The Constructivisthallenge o

Structural ealism 207

true disposition. f Alter s following henorm n termsof its behavior,does

thisreflectts strong nternalized elief n

the norm third egree),or ust

ts n-

duced compliance because of fear of

punishment r loss of benefits hould

it

defect first r second degrees)? For Ego,

this question s critical, ecause

if Al-

ter

s only conforming o the norm forfear of punishment r expectationof

benefits, go has everyreason to fear hat

Alter's behavior

will

not be so coop-

erativeshould the materialconditions hatshape costs and benefits hange.37

Yet Wendt does not explain how states are supposed to know whether the

otherhas deeply internalized norm or not.Thuswe are still n thedark as to

how

state uncertainty bout present nd future

ntentions

s to be overcome.

This

problem s compounded by thefact

that the

threecultures, s

Wendt

lays themout, are distinguished rom ach other n terms f behavioral norms.

Which culture a

system

s in at

any point

in

time,as

Wendt's

discussion

re-

veals, is known only by the degree towhich statesfollow, n terms f their x-

ternal

behavior,the norms Wendtspecifies: n a Hobbesian

culture,

whether

theyobserve no limits n theirviolence; nLockean, whether heyuse violence

but refrain rom

killingone another;

nd in

Kantian,whether heydo

not use

violence to settledisputes (p. 258; see also

pp. 260-261, 268, 279-280, 283-284,

298-299). Thus inhis three-by-threerid

Figure 4, p. 254), the horizontal xis,

which

details

the

three

cultures,

s defined

by

the

degree

of

cooperation,

with

Hobbesian cultures howing

the most

conflictual ehavior

and Kantian

the most

cooperative.

Wendt

thus uses

behavioral/outcome

measures to clas-

sify

he

changes

n the

world

system

ver time.

n the

seventeenth

entury,

he

system

moved

from

Hobbesian to a Lockean

culture,

e

argues,

because even

though many states were being eliminatedpriorto thattime,fewwere after

(pp. 279, 284, 323).

Yet when the

system

xperiences arge-scalewarfare,

Wendt

sees this ither s an

indication

f

a Hobbesian

culture r a

sign

that he

system

is

shifting

ack into

one (pp. 259-260, 270,

279, 314).

That Wendtuses

behavior

to define ulture

s also shown by the fact hat tates could be

in

a

Kantian cul-

ture

even

if

theyare only at the first nd second

degrees

of internalization-

that

s,

even if

hey omply

with

thebehavioral norm

not to use violence

to

set-

tle a

dispute only because of fear

of

punishmentand narrow

self-interest

(pp. 303-306).

37. See Wendt, ocialTheory f nternationalolitics, p. 303-305,wherehe notes thatKantian coop-

erative behavior at the first nd second degrees is purely nstrumental. tates are treating ach

other s friends nly n form, ot n substance: For egoistic tates friendshipmightbe nothing

more than a hat they ry n each morning or heir wn reasons,one that heywill take off s soon

as the costs

outweigh the benefits, ut untilthathappens they

will

be friends

n

fact ven

if

not n

principle p. 305).


23/27


5:2 | 208

If behavioral compliance defines the cultureone is in, leaders are thrown

rightback into the problem of other minds that

underpins the securitydi-

lemma. They are forced o relyon inferences,n the form f probabilistic sti-

mates,of the other's truemotives nd strategic bjectivesbased on the other's

behavior. But inferences re a weak substitutefor direct knowledge. The

chances

for

misinterpretation

ithin

narchic ystems-perceiving

the other's

actions as reflecting ostile motives, ven ifthey re not ntended thatway-

remain high.

Wendt's

practice

of

measuring

culture

by

the level of

cooperative

behavior

exhibitedby states also poses a methodologicalproblem. n essence, Wendt

collapses the thinghe wants to explain-why the systemhas apparentlybe-

come

more

cooperative

over time-into the causal factor

e

wants

to

triumph,

namely, he nstantiation f new ideas about self nd other hrough nteraction.

This

makes

it

hard to know

what would

falsify

is argument.Whenever be-

havior turns conflictual,Wendt can argue that

the culture has become

Hobbesian; whenever the behavior becomes more cooperative, he system s

moving toward a Lockean or a Kantian culture.

The

deeper problem

here is Wendt's

willingness

to call any system

wher

Documents

Copeland, D. - The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism, A Review Essay