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by Erin Boehmer, Intern, Commons Lab, Science and Technology Innovation Program, July 22, 2011. Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs), are global networks composed oftechnical professionals and volunteers with expertise in social media, geographic information systems (GIS), database management, and/or online campaigns. These communities are quickly redefining disaster preparedness, response, and relief, but face organizational, technical, social, and political challenges (detailed in this paper). For example, many V&TCs’ have distributed internal structures that support open source software development and prevent against slow moving bureaucracy. This design challenges the status quo of humanitarian aid organizations and government agencies and makes interactions amongst parties challenging as V&TCs work to gain trust and acceptance and adhere to established protocols and procedures.The coordination of future endeavors among V&TCs would assist in addressing suchissues. It is unclear, however, what coordinated step would most effectively mitigate or eliminate the effects of current challenges within the disaster response community. In this analysis, I propose four alternative strategies. The first calls for the discussion and establishment of protocols to which relevant V&TCs must adhere. The second establishes a coordination board, composed of leaders in modern disaster relief, to develop standard systems that V&TCs are encouraged to implement. The third develops V&TCs’ presence in academia. The final option suggests that V&TCs continue developing separately and informally interact when necessary. After rating the alternatives based on efficacy, cost, time, and political feasibility, I conclude that establishing protocols and standards specific to the different types of V&TCs, developing a standard plug-in for after-action data collection, and branding the term “V&TC,” will best bolster V&TCs efforts to enhance data collection and communication during disastersand crises.
Citation preview
Intern Report:
Coordinating Efforts by Volunteer and Technical Communities for Disaster
Preparedness, Response, and Relief
Erin Boehmer, Research Assistant
Commons Lab of the Science and Technology Innovation Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
July 22, 2011
On my honor as a University student, on this assignment I have neither given nor received
unauthorized aid as defined by the Honor Guidelines for papers in Science, Technology and
Society courses.
Erin Boehmer
i
Executive Summary
Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs), are global networks composed of
technical professionals and volunteers with expertise in social media, geographic information
systems (GIS), database management, and/or online campaigns. These communities are quickly
redefining disaster preparedness, response, and relief, but face organizational, technical, social,
and political challenges (detailed in this paper). For example, many V&TCs’ have distributed
internal structures that support open source software development and prevent against slow-
moving bureaucracy. This design challenges the status quo of humanitarian aid organizations and
government agencies and makes interactions amongst parties challenging as V&TCs work to
gain trust and acceptance and adhere to established protocols and procedures.
The coordination of future endeavors among V&TCs would assist in addressing such
issues. It is unclear, however, what coordinated step would most effectively mitigate or eliminate
the effects of current challenges within the disaster response community. In this analysis, I
propose four alternative strategies. The first calls for the discussion and establishment of
protocols to which relevant V&TCs must adhere. The second establishes a coordination board,
composed of leaders in modern disaster relief, to develop standard systems that V&TCs are
encouraged to implement. The third develops V&TCs’ presence in academia. The final option
suggests that V&TCs continue developing separately and informally interact when necessary.
After rating the alternatives based on efficacy, cost, time, and political feasibility, I
conclude that establishing protocols and standards specific to the different types of V&TCs,
developing a standard plug-in for after-action data collection, and branding the term “V&TC,”
will best bolster V&TCs efforts to enhance data collection and communication during disasters
and crises.
ii
Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
List of Figures iii
Acknowledgements iv
Introduction 1
Current Issues within the V&TC Community 5
Strategizing Future Relationships Among V&TCs 11
Proposed Alternatives 11
Establish a Set of Protocols and Standards 11
Establish a V&TC Coordination Board 13
Develop a Presence in Academia 14
Continue Developing Separately with Informal Interactions 15
Criteria for Evaluation 15
Analysis of Alternatives 16
Recommendations and Conclusion 23
Appendix A: V&TC Profiles 26
Geeks Without Bounds 26
Standby Task Force (Crisis Mappers) 29
CrisisCommons 35
Works Cited 39
iii
List of Figures
Table 1: Ability of Alternatives to Address V&TCs' Challenges ................................................. 19
Table 2: Evaluation Matrix ........................................................................................................... 19
Figure 1: Ushahidi-Haiti map. ........................................................................................................ 3
Figure 2: Internal structure of GWOB.. ........................................................................................ 20
Figure 3: Internal structure of the Standby Task Force. ............................................................... 20
Figure 4: SBTF Workflow. ........................................................................................................... 20
Figure 5: SBTF Webinar Interface ............................................................................................... 20
Figure 6: CrisisCommons Structure. ............................................................................................ 20
iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all those with the Science and Technology Innovation Program at
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for exposing me to the excitement and
challenges inherent within emerging technology policy. I would specifically like to express my
gratitude to Lea Shanley and David Rejeski for their dedication and mentorship during my time
at the Center.
I would also like to thank the Policy Internship Program at the University of Virginia,
specifically Michael Rodemeyer and Jim Turner, for providing me with the opportunity to
explore the world of technology policy in Washington, DC.
Thank you to all of those within the Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs) and
related organizations for giving me your time and explaining the intricacies of V&TCs’
structures and interactions, specifically Andrew Turner (CrisisCommons), Kirk Morris (Standby
Task Force), Willow Brugh (Geeks Without Bounds), Mark Prutsalis (Sahana Software
Foundation), Nigel McNie (Programming Volunteer for CrisisMappers, CrisisCommons, and
SBTF), John Crowley (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative), and Stuart Gill and Will Pate (Global
Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery). Without your contributions, this endeavor would
not have been possible.
I would also like to acknowledge those who reviewed earlier versions of this report and
offered their valuable edits and insight, including Joe Filvarof, Robbin Boehmer, Lea Shanley,
Kirk Morris, Patrick Meier, Nigel McNie, and Mark Prutsalis.
1
Introduction
In the past, officials and volunteers responding to disasters reported a sense of chaos and
desperation resulting from devastated communications infrastructures on the ground. A 2006
committee commissioned by the Executive Office of the President to report on lessons learned
from the federal response to Hurricane Katrina describes the scene:
On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting from the field was extremely difficult to
obtain because of the widespread destruction of communications infrastructure….
[L]ocal, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend on a variety of conflicting
reports from a combination of media, government and private sources, many of which
continued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information throughout the day, further
clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New Orleans…. The New Orleans
Mayor’s Office operated out of a Hyatt Hotel for several days after Hurricane Katrina’s
landfall, unable to establish reliable communications with anyone outside the hotel for
nearly forty-eight hours. This meant that the Mayor was neither able to effectively
command the local efforts, nor was he able to guide the State and Federal support for two
days following the storm…. Louisiana State Senator Robert Barham, chairman of the
State Senate's homeland security committee, summed up the situation in Louisiana by
stating, “People could not communicate. It got to the point that people were literally
writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles and dropping them from helicopters to
other people on the ground. (Executive Office of the President, 2006, pp. 42-43)
2
Since Hurricane Katrina, the world has seen cellphones transform from simple voice devices to
digital devices as people send text messages, browse and post content online, and explore the
functionalities of applications. The norm for most people is no longer a landline home phone, but
rather personal, high-bandwidth cell phones running on a 3G or 4G network. Therefore, in
response to communication failures during crises and the new standards of communication
technologies, the disaster relief community has seen the rise of Volunteer and Technical
Communities (V&TCs)1. V&TCs are networks of “technical professionals with deep expertise in
social media, geographic information systems (GIS), database management, [and] online
campaigns [who apply] their skills to some of the hardest elements of the disaster risk
management process” (GFDRR Labs, 2010). These volunteers are able to harness the growing
power of applications like Twitter and Facebook, devices such as Androids and iPads, skills like
database design and computer hacking, and methodologies such as Scrum development or
Extreme Programming (XP) in order to improve on ground communication and organization
practices.
During the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, V&TCs worked with a noticeable presence. Remotely
located technical volunteers developed Mission 4636, which established a free phone number
(4636) in order to “allow people on the ground to text their requests for medical care, food,
1 The term “V&TC” is used in this paper as the official terminology for a network of volunteer and professional
technical workers. Both “VTC” and “V&TC” are commonly used to describe the organizations (due to the different brandings in the “Volunteer and Technical Communities: Open Development” report and the “Disaster 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies” report). To some, the title “Volunteer Technology Community” only credits volunteer positions, disregarding the dedicated workers within the field who are paid (M. Prutsalis, personal communication, July 17, 2011). Therefore, only the term “V&TC” should be used in the future in order to credit all those who give their time within the community and to avoiding wasting valuable volunteer time on a relatively unproductive debate. In order for the nascent network to establish a professional reputation, the community must agree on how to officially refer to itself.
3
water, security and shelter from any Digicel / Comcel-Voila device and receive aid” (Mission
4636, n.d.). This service garnered about 80,000 messages, predominantly in Haitian Kreyol,
which workers and volunteers translated, geolocated, and categorized via online crowdsourcing
platforms which “sorted the information by need and priority, and distributed it to various
emergency responders and aid organizations…. [T]he service scaled up about one week after the
earthquake to include [responses such as] serious injuries, requests for fresh drinking water,
security, unaccompanied children and clusters of requests for food, and even childbirths”
(Mission 4636, n.d.). Often these technologists mapped the Mission 4636 messages and other
crowdsourced data using open source platforms such as Ushahidi or OpenStreetMap (see the
Ushahidi-Haiti map below in Figure 1).
Figure 1: Ushahidi-Haiti map. Red circles show the number of reports within that area. When clicked, a user may choose to view the contents of the reports. On the right side panel, users may choose to display only certain categories of messages and requests (taken from http://haiti.ushahidi.com).
4
Others created applications such as the We Have, We Need application, which could be accessed
via smart phone or computer. The application worked as a sort of Craigslist, pairing victims in
need of resources and aid organizations navigating to where help was most needed. The
application helped officials by routing information out of the disaster, where communication
systems were devastated, into information systems in Washington, DC or New Zealand where
volunteers could quickly, calmly, and intelligently coordinate response efforts (HaitiVoiceNeeds,
2010). V&TCs also were able to “provide reachback support to the United Nations (UN), the
European Union, United States and across the globe, making their supercomputers and large
storage arrays available for processing imagery, managing translation workflows, and serving
large data sets” (GFDRR Labs, 2010).
The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011) also recognized V&TCs as a powerful tool for
community empowerment: “When crisis responders ask for (or themselves build) new features,
they are also asking the community to change the range of possible behaviors that users perform
in the software which is roughly analogous to asking for a change to law of policy in a real-world
town or city” (p. 40). In this way, the applications and tools that V&TCs develop may play a
growing role in disaster preparedness and planning, as crowdsourced data can be gathered from
local residents to inform authorities of failing infrastructure or, in reverse, preparedness lessons
can be disseminated to at risk communities.
Many of the prevalent V&TCs today have brought forth beneficial changes within the realm of
disaster response; their formulation, however, has led to a new set of challenges and complexities
within and among the V&TCs, humanitarian relief organizations, and Federal and State and local
governments.
5
Current Issues within the V&TC Community
Volunteers and professionals working in the nascent field of volunteer-based technology
development for disaster preparedness, response, and relief have expressed various problems that
V&TCs must address in order to improve their effectiveness. While some of these issues deal
with the organizational and technical aspects of software development, others are social and
political in nature and surface when the groups interact.
Disaster-affected communities are often a diverse group of people as crises affect individuals
differing in age, culture, and economic background. Therefore, one of the most fundamental
considerations when building applications and technologies for modern disaster relief is to
understand the needs of people of different backgrounds in divergent contexts – especially if
developers intend to deploy the project during more than one event. Yet the challenge of creating
a universal design is inherent in consumer technology and has been described as the need to
balance “ideals and the pragmatics of incorporating those ideals within a context of multiple
voices, cultural differences, material constraints, localized needs, and – as ironic as it may sound
– other ideals.” (Coleman, 2004).
Strategic design, however, has proven to be especially challenging for V&TC developers due to
the unpredictable nature of disasters and the limited availability of volunteers involved in
V&TCs. Many organizations have only a few regularly active members during static times, but
witness an influx of interest when a disaster strikes (A. Turner, personal communication, June 8,
2011). A lack of activity during times of non-disaster leads to a lack of planning and preventative
measures and results in volunteers having to “catch-up” to the influx of pleas from victims after a
crisis takes place (M. Prutsalis, personal communication, July 18, 2011). Some organizations,
6
such as Random Hacks of Kindness, the Standby Task Force, and Geeks Without Bounds, have
notably risen to the challenge of inspiring volunteerism and development during static times by
engaging in tasks such as creating custom Ushahidi instances ready for deployment and hosting
mobile disaster app “hackathons” (see Appendix A). Yet there still exists a need to devise a
robust post-crisis system to regularly and methodically collect user feedback and to gather
statistical and qualitative data regarding the technologies. One reason for the lack of post-crisis
analysis of projects’ effectiveness and usability is that volunteers feel “burnt-out, [feel] no
responsibility, [are] not receiving pay, and [do not want to] deal with paperwork” (N. McNie,
personal communication, June 3, 2011).
Some V&TCs have devised ways to collect feedback on applications and response systems, but
focus mainly on feedback from volunteers rather than victims. Feedback, in these circumstances,
is often collected through Skype chats and forums after the disaster has taken place. Nigel
McNie, a volunteer during the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand, emphasizes the
importance of collecting information from crisis victims by interviewing people face-to-face
(personal communication, August 23, 2011). Personal surveying would mitigate the possibility
of data suffering from "user bias." If information is only collected digitally or through secondary
sources (such as the volunteers who interacted with victims), the feedback will fail to incorporate
the opinions of people who looked at an app and “got confused/frustrated [and left the app]
without giving any feedback” (Nigel McNie, personal communication, August 23, 2011).
Collecting information on the ground also would allow V&TCs to “gauge how far knowledge of
the map percolated throughout the community…. [If information is collected through other
means, it is likely that] only people who have heard of the [apps] will be giving feedback” (Nigel
7
McNie, personal communication, August 23, 2011). Despite the potential for personal surveying
on the ground to reveal critical information about how an application was used, few V&TCs
have established protocols for promptly interviewing victims and collecting information on
applications after a disaster.
Another issue for V&TCs with dwindling volunteer bases during static times is raising
awareness of their group’s existence within the general public. Even within the disaster response
and relief community “some field staff members [during the earthquake in Haiti] were [only]
tangentially aware of the resources that were available, [and] were too busy to take advantage of
the resources or to consider the changes to workflows and methods that these new information
resources would entail” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). While some groups, such as
Ushahidi (a non-profit organization that develops free and open source software for information
collection, visualization and interactive mapping) have enjoyed publicity in widely viewed
sources such as The Washington Post and The New York Times (Turner, 2009) (Giridharadas,
2010), others have yet to gain recognition beyond their direct circles despite significant
contributions to the field. Some V&TCs find, however, that they gain significant recognition
from government, humanitarian organizations, and IT companies during disasters when
authorities in the disaster afflicted regions turn to crowdsourcing technologies to mitigate the
effects of the crises and stimulate communication (McManus, 2011).
Including more volunteers in the V&TCs’ operations highlights the importance of cultivating
trust with partnering organizations and with victims and volunteers working on the ground. As
John Hagel III of McKinsey & Co. and John Seely Brown of the University of Southern
8
California (2006) explain, “knowledge does not ‘flow’ – it tends to be, in fact, very ‘sticky’….
Unlike information which can be more readily codified and disseminated, knowledge tends to
reside in individuals and it is very context specific. For this reason, knowledge sharing typically
requires trust-based relationships and a sharing of practice” (p. 11). A feasible way to increase
trust among V&TCs, established disaster aid organizations, and victims is to work in
coordination with established humanitarian communities and governments; yet “many of the
technologists that are building new platforms for imagery, mapping, and information sharing
have [or are perceived as having] limited field experience and [supposedly] an engineer’s
approach of ‘just do it’” (GFDRR Labs, 2010). This stereotype of the V&TC “hacker”
community clashes with national and international systems established within the context of
government to government or government to international institution interactions (GFDRR Labs,
2010). This issue, however, is less about the engineering/hacker mentality among V&TC
members (as many of the members also have experience in humanitarian aid), and more
addressing the often inaccurate perception of what type of person a V&TC represents.
Governments and formal organizations in the past have also struggled in partnering with certain
V&TCs (especially if the V&TC requires funding) due to a loosely defined internal structure or
lack of an officially established organization. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and
Recovery Labs (GFDRR Labs) at the World Bank describes the difficulty of funding open
development groups with loosely defined structures, as GFDRR Labs can only provide projects
with resources through a formal, internationally competitive process (S. Gill, personal
communication, July 20, 2011). In short, there is “no easy way to push money to [those]
9
organizations that do not formally exist [on paper]” (S. Gill, personal communication, July 20,
2011).
Another issue to consider is the increased potential for security threats and liability issues if a
given V&TC does not plan for the distant future. The V&TC movement is largely based on open
source software and cloud-computing, which aim to “harness the power of distributed peer
review and transparency of process” (Open Source Initiative, n.d.). The open source nature of
this data means that, if a V&TC does not prioritize security and data verification, the projects and
data could be accessible to terrorists, corrupt leaders seeking to shut-down or punish activists,
and individuals lacking the knowledge and skill necessary to organize disaster relief efforts (K.
Morris, personal communication, June 3, 2011). Data, such as volunteered geographic
information (VGI), generates specific concerns regarding abuse as it is “user-generated content,
with very little moderation or control by the site’s owners and very little restriction on the nature
of content. In some cases users [can] even edit the content created by others” (Goodchild, 2007).
However, many groups have demonstrated strategies that can be used to reduce the possibility of
encountering unforeseen vulnerabilities and security threats (Chameles, 2011), such as through
the development of a new Ushahidi instance that specifically addresses vulnerabilities or by
gathering all volunteers after a crisis to discuss lessons learned (K. Morris, personal
communication, August 21, 2011). Furthermore, a recent report conducted by Yahoo researchers
shows that, during the earthquake in Chile, 95.5% of tweets related to confirmed-truths validate
the information. Yet in the case of a false-rumor, 50% of related tweets will deny that
information (much of the remaining population will tweet related questions)(Mendoza, Poblete,
10
Castillo, 2011). This study demonstrates the often undermined power of a community to correct
itself.
Sharing data amongst V&TCs and other open source initiatives has raised the possibility of
licensing issues. For example, an application may scrape data from multiple websites and display
the data within the context of its own site. If the sources all have licenses for redistribution or
commercial purposes, the user must ensure that he abides by the rules of each license or face
legal penalties. This could be seen with Google’s missing persons data2, which could include
user-specified dates for when their data should be destroyed. Developers could pull data into
their applications using the Person Finder API, but could easily violate the contract if they did
not remove the data from their application by the specified date (M. Prutsalis, personal
communication, July 18, 2011).
Some groups within the V&TC community have also experienced internal challenges. One
instance of this was described in the 2011 Disaster Relief 2.0 report, “Communities that need
each other’s strengths are being forced to compete for money in the donor pool, and some are
finding the need to compete in areas of overlap or are being asked to tackle issues where other
V&TCs are already working” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 51). Individuals within
the community have also begun to differentiate between paid versus unpaid workers, praising
volunteers for their altruistic efforts, implicitly suggesting that paid volunteers are less selfless
and less valuable within the community. These relationships are at times detrimental to the
2 Visit http://code.google.com/p/googlepersonfinder for more information about Google’s missing persons data or
http://code.google.com/p/googlepersonfinder/wiki/DataAPI for the application’s API.
11
overall effort and must be controlled in order to sustain a benevolent partnership amongst and
within divergent entities.
Strategizing Future Relationships Among V&TCs
John Hagel III and John Seely Brown (2006) accurately describe the V&TC movement:
Individuals and organizations come together and collaborate in evolving networks of
creation…. They play off each other, appropriating each other’s work, learning from it,
building on top of it, and then watching and learning from what others do with their own
creations. They often work in parallel and then fight and learn from each other when the
time comes to try to integrate their work into a broader offering.” (p. 10)
This has led some leaders within humanitarian organizations and V&TCs to suggest coordinating
efforts among the many different groups in order to mitigate the current problems within the
field (Crowley, 2011)(Verity, 2011). Others, however, see competition as a positive force and are
comfortable with the present situation. Therefore, the remainder of this paper will seek to answer
the question: what coordinated step should Volunteer and Technical Communities take in order
to reduce the effects of or eliminate the issues currently experienced during technical disaster
preparedness, response, and relief?
Proposed Alternatives
Alternative 1: Establish a Set of Protocols and Standards
Many V&TCs were founded within the last few years and are relatively new entities in the world
of international humanitarian response, although they represent a set of skills much needed in
disaster relief (refer to Appendix A). In order to partner with and gain the respect of governments
12
and established humanitarian organizations, V&TCs at the 2010 International Crisis Mappers
conference discussed “an ‘API for the UN’… with the core notion being that the UN should
partner with the V&TCs to establish a common set of protocols to connect their people,
workflows, and data flows.” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p.44). The discussion
should be mediated by a neutral party. The discussion should include pertinent groups such as
the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) at the World Bank and the
Red Cross as well as all known V&TCs.
Among the goals of such an effort will be to establish standard accountability controls to ensure
compliance with a large range of international agreements and internal processes and policies
(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 41). Such protocols will also establish a means to deal
with the accidental release of data that would put vulnerable populations at risk as well as
protocols to address licensing discrepancies and to establish a baseline of trust among
organizations. Some V&TCs do have methods for dealing with these issues, especially those that
work in human rights (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 41).
As David Aylward explains in the Disaster Relief 2.0 report, the end product of this effort will be
agreed upon V&TC architectures, standards, and protocols:
It [should be] possible to say to organizations when they arrive, ‘you are not playing
unless you are playing according to this architecture, standards, and protocols. Use any
software you want, as long as it conforms to these standards.’ The UN could use its bully
pulpit role to enforce that. Otherwise you get the same wonderful people who do the best
13
they can with the electronic equivalent of duct tape. It’s absurd to keep doing it over and
over.’ (as cited in Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 42)
Alternative 2: Establish a V&TC Coordination Board
John Hagel and John Seely Brown (2006) describe a “global practice network” which connects
participants with similar sensibilities and practices through a centralized “practice orchestrator”
who defines a system for participation within the network and for integrated activity (p. 9). The
practice orchestrators can successfully play a less active role in terms of recruitment and
management of specific creation initiatives because participants share similar mentalities and
practices (Hagel & Brown, 2006, p. 8).
Therefore, this alternative suggests V&TCs should focus their efforts on forming a global
practice network in the form of a “coordination board” rather than developing standardized
systems and protocols without the establishment of a higher level entity. This board would be
nominated by members of V&TCs based on skill, reputation, and ability to lead and would
consist of unbiased individuals (who are not associated with any particular V&TC). Assembling
members who have a deep and diverse knowledge of the crisis community, but are not
volunteering all of their time to V&TCs, will assist in ensuring that the board members have time
to convene when necessary. The individual members would not be paid and would only convene
when a defined proportion of V&TCs within the community solicits their attention.
The board would be approached with problem statements by the V&TCs and their humanitarian
or government partners and would work, with feedback from the V&TC community, to define
systematic workflows that V&TCs could then be encouraged to adopt. An example of one of the
14
board’s primary foci will be to implement strategies to support risk reduction and prevention
among V&TCs during static periods as a more effective way to save lives when crises do strike
(GFDRR Labs, 2010). The board would leave the establishment of specific protocols and
standards to individual V&TCs.
Alternative 3: Develop a Presence in Academia
The V&TC effort is in need of a neutral venue where problems faced both by the international
humanitarian relief communities and the V&TCs can be discussed by individuals with different
belief structures without fear of harsh confrontation (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p.
55). Schools and academia are recognized by those involved in development work as a means to
bypass the complications that arise through politics (Boehmer, Smith, Schoppa, 2010) and
students have historically made major contributions to V&TC efforts (such as those at Tufts’
Fletcher School who ran Ushahidi-Haiti). By involving academia more prominently in the
V&TCs’ development and deployment efforts, a iterative process of design, development,
evaluation of successes and failures, and redesign may be supported.
Furthermore, academia will both serve as a form of advertisement and a means to provide
V&TCs with a dedicated source of trusted labor. Students will be mentored by experienced
faculty within related departments and will work together on teams. Students from many
different academic, ethnic, economic, and racial backgrounds should also be encouraged in this
endeavor in order to continue and further V&TCs’ diverse support. This will be achieved in part
by emphasizing the international aspects of projects (which will attract students who speak other
languages or have experience living in other countries). This will also be achieved by forming
partnerships not only with universities in the United States, but also in at-risk locations such as
15
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. This model has already been adopted by the crisis mapping
NGO, Ushahidi, through their Universities for Ushahidi program (see http://u4u.ushahidi.com/
for more information) (Himelfarb, 2011). This example will serve as a preliminary case study on
which other V&TCs can develop their future academic partnerships.
Alternative 4: Continue Developing Separately with Informal Interactions
The possibility remains that V&TCs may not need to embark on a coordinated effort to reform
their developing disaster response and relief strategies. Some experts argue that the ability “to
provide reliable… information depends upon motivated citizens, the accessibility and usability of
data collection tools and techniques, and the infrastructures used to store, validate, and share
contributed data” (Elwood, 2008). Appendix A demonstrates how each V&TC is designing an
internal system that best suits its needs given its specific mission and is forming a “competitive
architecture that can accelerate capability building” (Hagel & Brown, 2006, p. 13), within the
V&TC community as a whole. While some endeavors will experience success, others will fail in
their attempts due to the natural competition among competitors engaged in similar pursuits. This
form of “natural selection” among V&TCs will eliminate the need to establish protocols, invest
in academia, or devise a coordination board as systems ill-designed to handle liability, trust, and
other issues will become obsolete.
Criteria
The four stated alternatives will be evaluated based on the follow set of criteria: efficacy, cost,
time, and political feasibility.
Efficacy refers to the ability of each alternative to bring about significant and desired change
within V&TCs, among multiple V&TCs, and within the disaster response community as a whole.
16
Cost refers to the monetary cost of the endeavor, which is a necessary consideration given the
non-profit or completely volunteer status of the organizations. The time required to complete the
task demands attention given the limited time that volunteers are able to dedicate. Political
feasibility will assess the likelihood that V&TCs and humanitarian organizations adopt the
alternative given the potential existing positions and tensions within the community. This
criterion will also take into account the possibility of local, federal, and state governments to
support the action and involving the outcomes of the endeavor in relief efforts.
Analysis
The four alternatives are compared in Table 1 below by their ability to address the problem
statements discussed earlier in this paper. This highlights the potential successes and
inadequacies of each of the four alternatives.
17
Alternative 1:
Establish a Set of
Protocols and
Standards
Alternative 2: Establish a V&TC
Coordination
Board
Alternative 3: Develop a
Presence in
Academia
Alternative 4: Continue
Developing
Separately with
Informal
Interactions
Address different
communities and
contexts
No
This would still be
the responsibility of
V&TC project teams
Maybe
Would have the
potential to promote
best workflows for
incorporating a
large, diverse user
base or for preparing
puppet scripts and
then customizing for
deployment
Yes
Will include
participants from a
range of
backgrounds and will
promote disaster
preparedness in
many regions
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Attract
volunteers
during static
periods
Maybe
Protocols will lead
to a higher level of
professionalism,
which may lead to
publicity, which
would attract static
period volunteerism
Maybe
May devise
successful systems
that cause V&TCs to
gain recognition
from potential
volunteers
Yes
Student and
professors will work
during static times
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Gather after-
action data
Yes
Protocols will
require V&TCs to
collect after-action
data
Yes
Will devise a post-
crisis data collection
workflow
Yes
A system for post-
disaster data
collection can be
devised or students
can be enlisted to
collect data on the
ground
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Raise awareness
of
V&TCs/projects
Yes
Protocols will help
to professionalize
V&TCs, which will
better allow them to
interact with groups
such as UN OCHA
or the Red Cross.
This will lead to
better publicity.
Maybe
If devised systems
are adopted, may
lead to greater
success and
therefore publicity.
Yes
Would become a
campaign across
many universities
Maybe
V&TCs will
experience varying
levels of publicity
based on their
marketing and
success
Cultivate trust of
volunteers and
V&TCs
Yes
At least to some
extent, protocols
ensure a level of
V&TC
responsibility
Maybe
If V&TCs adopt the
workflows and they
are successful, may
lead to more trust
No
May lead to a lack of
trust by
victims/organizations
on a design level, but
students may be
trusted more easily
on an ethical level
Maybe
V&TCs may begin
to gain trust
naturally as the
groups mature
V&TCs need to:
18
Improve
coordination
with established
organizations
Yes
Can create protocols
such as the
requirements to
become an official
V&TC. This may
later be used to
apply for funding.
Maybe
If V&TCs adopt the
standardized
systems, other
organizations will be
familiar with certain
aspects of all
V&TCs before
beginning a project
No
Does not address this
issue
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Address the
possibility of
liability issues
Yes
Specific protocols
should be
established for each
generalized category
of V&TC (exp.
hackathon-based,
crowdsourced map-
based)
No
Liability strategies
will be determined
by individual
V&TCs.
No
Does not address this
issue, although
universities may be
used as a forum for
discussion
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Address the
possibility of
security threats
Yes
Specific protocols
should be
established for each
generalized category
of V&TC
Maybe
The Board will not
address how groups
should handle
security breaches,
but may recommend
systems that protect
against security
threats (exp. web
scripts that filter out
bad data such as
spam or verification
teams)
No
Does not address this
issue, although
universities may be
used as a forum for
discussion
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Address the
possibility of
licensing issues
Yes
For example, a
protocol may require
data providers to
clearly show users
when the data must
be deleted
No
This will be handled
by individual
V&TCs
No
Does not address this
issue, although
universities may be
used as a forum for
discussion
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Reduce the
instances of
project overlap
Maybe
Could simulate
better coordination
and communication
among V&TCs
No
Because the board
can only suggest
workflows, unlikely
that it will
significantly impact
possible project
overlap
No
It is more likely that
spreading V&TCs
efforts among many
different universities
will increase project
overlap (this may be
helpful though -
projects can be
designed specifically
for an area and
population)
Maybe
Certain V&TCs may
establish a
reputation for
specific tasks as they
mature, thereby
reducing overlap
19
Table 1: Ability of Alternatives to Address V&TCs' Challenges.
The results from Table 1 indicate the first alternative’s success in addressing a majority of the
problems many V&TCs are facing, especially relative to the other three alternatives’ outcomes.
Using the information from Table 1, each of the four alternatives is evaluated by the proposed
criteria. The results of this comparison are shown in Table 2 and explained below.
Table 2: Evaluation Matrix. The proposed alternatives are evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3. A score of 3, in this analysis,
represents an effective, inexpensive, and politically feasible option with minimal time requirements. The rationale for
these ratings is described below.
Create a sense of
equity between
volunteers and
professionals
Yes
Standardize use of
“V&TC” to include
both volunteers and
professionals
No
Will not be able to
have much impact
on intra-V&TC
relationships
No
Does not address this
issue
Maybe
V&TCs may devise
their own strategies
for this
Efficacy Cost Time
Political
Feasibility Total Score
Alternative 1:
Establish a Set of
Protocols and
Standards
3 2 2 3 10
Alternative 2: Establish a V&TC
Coordination
Board
2 3 1 1 7
Alternative 3: Develop a
Presence in
Academia
2 1 1 3 7
Alternative 4: Continue
Developing
Separately with
Informal
Interactions
1 3 3 2 9
20
Alternative 1 would be extremely effective due to the large span of protocols that could be
implemented. Although this alternative does not immediately address the lack of volunteers
during static periods, protocols could be established to demand the collection of after-action data.
By establishing protocols, the V&TCs would be more easily able to collaborate with existing
humanitarian organizations and governments and therefore would gain recognition and trust
from disaster-stricken communities. Similarly, determining how similar organizations should
deal with difficult issues such as liability, licensing, and security (such as through the use of a
disclaimer notice or a data filtering script) would set a standard on which V&TCs could
collaborate and build. Clear, official protocols would also aid with intra-V&TC problems
through mandates such as making the term “V&TC” official rather than “VTC,” as V&TC
highlights the participation of both volunteers and professionals in the movement. Furthermore,
the protocols would be made publicly available in keeping with the open source nature of
V&TCs. Though the protocols may require more than a year to discuss and establish throughout
the network of V&TCs it would be politically feasible as few groups are opposed to the
establishment of protocols within the network (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 44).
The primary costs of the endeavor would be paying for travel and the coordination of meetings,
but that cost may be covered by a significant grant or several individual grants to V&TCs. If the
UN becomes involved in the endeavor, it may also shoulder certain aspects of the financial
burden.
The second alternative has the capacity to produce similar results to the first alternative, as the
board would be able to establish some standards with the added ability to develop standardized
systems (ie, designs for disaster preparedness programs) that V&TCs would be encouraged to
21
implement. These systems would provide a baseline from which V&TCs would build. However,
there are several concerns that must be considered. The first is the political feasibility of this
alternative given the many different personalities and opinions involved in the V&TC
movement. It is likely that the groups may have a difficult time selecting individuals to serve of
the board without contentious, which could lead to a complex set of political boundaries among
V&TCs. This would restrict collaboration amongst the groups, damage the open source nature of
the groups, and possibly lead to the board’s rejection within certain crowds. In order to ensure
that this does not occur, a significant amount of time must be allotted for discussion and debate
among relevant organizations, from FEMA to the Red Cross to CrisisCommons. The fact that
membership on the board is an honorary, versus professional, position increases the likelihood
that those involved would not be able to prioritize their positions when in conflict with their
professional schedules. This would delay efforts and render the board less effective, as
organizations often need to quickly decide on internal structures and policies – especially during
a crisis. The board’s determinations would therefore be recommended rather than mandatory and
would mainly be adopted during static periods. The alternative would also be critiqued by
V&TCs who would view the board as an added layer of bureaucracy in a system that is
intentionally designed to function from a grassroots level.
Investing in an advertising campaign within academia and coordinating the development of
student groups and research projects in support of V&TCs would engage a reliable and large
group of diverse volunteers before, during, and after a crisis. The diversity of the group, in terms
of academic, economic, and cultural backgrounds, would help to facilitate discussions of how to
best design projects for similarly diverse user populations. V&TCs will establish a level of trust
22
with student groups as they work with the groups to discuss problems and possible project
designs. The involvement of student groups, however, could lead to a weakened trust of V&TCs’
application designs by major organizations, as it is unclear what skill level a given student
represents. Allotting tasks to students may save organizations valuable time, yet it will also
demand time and patience as V&TC mentors answer questions and review students’ efforts (M.
Prutsalis, personal communication, July 17, 2011). Although the advertising campaign within
universities may be costly if groups decide to invest in marking strategies such as online
advertisements or publicity events at Universities, the option is one of the most politically
feasible. It only requires a loose coordination among V&TCs in order to increase the efficacy of
the effort, and would be welcomed by students and universities seeking to get involved in the
nascent and exciting field. Furthermore, academia provides a “safe space where those with
different belief structures around [their] work can safely raise issues and explore alternative
mindsets…. [The academic forum is] open to everyone from donors and beneficiaries to
technologists at operational organizations and the agencies that contract with them” (Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 55). This politically neutral forum would also make feasible
future, potentially contentious, discussions and changes within the community.
The final alternative, which suggests no changes to the current system, would produce no
additional costs or volunteered time. It is also likely that, even if V&TCs do not take action to
coordinate their efforts more closely, innovation within organizations will solve some of the
problems that the community currently faces, such as developing a plug-in to be used in all
platforms for after-action data collection. Yet, the current networks are advised against
continuing without further coordination of interactions. V&TCs were formed in times of rapid
23
change such as during the Indian Ocean Earthquake (Sahana Software Foundation) or post-
election violence in Kenya (Ushahidi). While this caused V&TCs to adopt a “bootstrapping
mindset” and potentially act as catalysts to re-shape and re-focus institutions, “knowledge
sharing and shared understanding become even more effective when participants come together
on a regular basis to undertake new collaborative creation efforts” (Hagel & Brown, 2006, p. 11).
Therefore, separate development might be possible, but it is not recommended.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Leaders from within humanitarian organizations, governmental agencies, and V&TCs agree that
coordinating efforts among the many different players is critical to resolving problems
surrounding current disaster relief efforts (Crowley, 2011). The quantitative results from the
evaluation matrix and supporting rationale show that the best coordination alternative to pursue
(among those proposed) is Alternative 1: Establishing a Set of Protocols and Standards. This
will help organizations to systematically deal with difficult issues such as liability and licensing,
while leaving strategic operations (such as recruiting and retaining volunteers during static
periods) to the individuals groups. This will allow natural competition among organizations to
ensue, while establishing a standard level of trust to allow the routine incorporation of V&TC
efforts within the larger framework of governmental and humanitarian relief.
Volunteer and Technical Communities should begin establishing protocols and developing
internal systems by studying reports from the open source, education, healthcare, and other
relevant communities (S. Gill, personal communication, July 20, 2011). Through this lateral
learning, the leaders of technology-driven crisis response will understand what processes and
methodologies succeeded and failed in the field and why. Stuart Gill, leader of the new GFDRR
24
Labs initiative at the World Bank, explains that people are benefitting from well-designed
systems that Volunteer and Technical Communities have never heard about because of the small
scale of the successful ventures; yet “I know for a fact it would be of value to these communities
to understand [how and] why the systems are successful” (personal communication, July 20,
2011).
Additionally, it is critical that groups work to collect data on projects that have been deployed so
as to understand the successes and failures of the applications. Nigel McNie (2011), a
programmer for CrisisCommons, Crisis Mappers, and the SBTF, says it is crucial that “V&TCs
make a point of returning to the location post-crisis and asking the community questions like,
‘Did you see the map?’, ‘Was it useful?’, ‘Was it easy to use?’, ‘Were your needs met?’, and
‘What could we do to improve the service?’” This should be done by sending volunteers back to
the location after the disaster has hit to gather first-hand data on how the applications were used.
It would also be beneficial for V&TCs to use a plug-in that can be deployed through applications
on any platform. The plug-in will ask questions such as “Was this app useful? How?” and will
only record personal information if the user gives permission. This will provide V&TCs with a
standardized means to collect data on the effectiveness of their projects. This information should
then be filtered into an open source repository where V&TCs can observe what applications exist
and how they can be improved based upon user feedback.
By discussing and establishing protocols and standards, conducting post-crisis surveys with
application users, and developing a standard plug-in for after-action data collection, the newly
established “creation net” of groups like Geeks Without Bounds, the Standby Task Force, and
25
CrisisCommons will revolutionize data collection and communication during disasters and
crises.
26
Appendix A: V&TC Profiles
Geeks Without Bounds (GWOB)
Style: Hackathons
I. Stated Mission
Geeks Without Bounds was founded in 2010 as a “not-for-profit alliance of hackers, coders
and geeks united by the common goal of assisting communities in distress. [GWOB
members] actively organize and help promote coding/hacking events to facilitate the
building of tools and systems meant to alleviate many of the technical problems
encountered during emergency and disaster situations” (GWOB, n.d.).
II. Current Organizational Structure
Geeks Without Bounds centers around the concept of a “hackathon,” an event where
software developers and technical experts gather to program and create applications with
little restrictive overhead. During GWOB’s weekend hackathons, which occur throughout
the year, humanitarian response officials (sometimes from the government) approach the
group with problem definitions which technical volunteers work to address during the
hackathon by building applications and other tools (W. Brugh, personal communication,
July 6, 2011). The volunteers are sometimes rewarded with prizes, introducing a level of
competition and therefore motivation.
GWOB was founded less than a year ago, and therefore is still working to define an internal
structure (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011). At this point, however, the
group functions under a two tiered management structure, as shown in Figure 1 below. On
the top most level are the group coordinators – currently a small team of three individuals
with significant coding and software development experience. The two founders, Johnny
Diggz and Willow Brugh, are working to hire a Project Coordinator as a fourth core team
member. The core management team aims to effectively coordinate among the many
different projects that form during Geeks Without Bounds’s hackathons.
a. Project Management
The group currently uses Atrium, a task management system offered through
School Factory, Inc., to organize projects (see
http://atrium.schoolfactory.org/gwoborg/). The service allows members to list
tasks to be completed and then maintain an open dashboard where the current
state of the task is updated and discussed. The Atrium site also includes tabs that
display tweets from members’ Twitter accounts, a calendar with upcoming events,
a list of members who have registered within the service, and a GWOB blog. The
projects are encouraged to be open source, yet teams are ultimately the owners of
their developments and sometimes form businesses around their technologies. For
this reason, documentation is often disparate (a reason why the group has begun
using Atrium). GWOB does offer hosting
27
services to developers, but many also choose to host their own applications (W.
Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).
Program Director Willow Brugh is responsible for tracking projects based on
contacts made during GWOB hackathons. She ensures that projects volunteers
continue to make progress after leaving the hackathon, have the structure and
resources they need to continue, have opportunities to publicize their work, and
that they are able to pass their projects to other volunteers if necessary (W. Brugh,
personal communication, July 6, 2011). She also encourages project volunteers to
bring their work to future hackathons to continue working on them.
Eventually, GWOB aims to establish an online “tool box” where GWOB
coordinators, who are aware of where different tools related to V&TC efforts are
located, publish that knowledge to the internet and encourage individuals to keep
current tools updated and to build ones where none exist (W. Brugh, personal
communication, July 6, 2011).
Figure 2: Internal structure of GWOB. While the core management team is a completely represented by the top tier, the number of projects (point of contact(s) or POC(s) and volunteers) is greater than what is pictured and expanding with each GWOB sponsored hackathon. The green coloring of the Project POC(s) and Project Volunteers indicates that some projects branch off from the GWOB structure and form their own, independent businesses (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).
28
b. Volunteer Management
Currently, if volunteers “don’t already have some self-drive, [GWOB] doesn’t
work well” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011). This stems from
the group’s basis within the hacker community, which typically “expect[s]
volunteers to just catch on” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011), in
this case, to the organizational and technical aspects of the V&TC effort. GWOB
recognizes the importance of designing a framework within which novice
volunteers can adapt and grow. The current leadership expects the future Project
Coordinator (in conjunction with the Program Director and volunteers) to develop
this aspect of the GWOB infrastructure. Coordination with other V&TCs is also
expected to be helpful as it clarifies where to “send people with certain skill sets
[in order to put them to] fuller use and [make them] feel better about their
experience” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).
GWOB aims to stay in contact with project teams both to ensure that the team has
the necessary resources and continues to make progress. This process also helps
to establish trust between the coordinators and volunteers. By understanding the
different personalities and skill levels within the groups, the team as a whole
benefits. As Willow Brugh explains, “I see that there are two kinds of
trustworthiness: one where you always tell the truth, and the other where you can
keep a secret. Both are necessary in different contexts” (personal communication,
July 6, 2011).
III. Project Deployment
When disasters strike, GWOB examines which projects are fully developed and available
for use. If the application is relevant, the GWOB coordinators call the individual project
directors and ask to use the tool. Once GWOB has the group’s permission, it then asks the
developers to teach others how to use and support the tool.
Geeks Without Bounds has not specified how they would deal with liability issues resulting
from a user being harmed through the use of a GWOB developed application. The
possibility of this occurring is seen as negligible because when people working within the
context of a disaster are given tools, “they will know what is appropriate, because they're in
it” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011). As Program Director Willow Brugh
states, “I'm willing to take the liability of potentially harming someone if it also potentially
saves a lot of people. So, I guess the answer [to ‘how will GWOB deal with liability
issues?’] is ‘we'll figure that out if it ever happens’” (personal communication, July 6,
2011).
GWOBs primary strategy is, therefore, proactive. GWOB asks hackers to attempt to break
the apps that are built and to manipulate the tool for misuse and corruption (an idea familiar
to military and hacker communities, but new to humanitarians) (W. Brugh, personal
communication, July 6, 2011). This allows GWOB to understand not only how to prevent
these situations from occurring, but also how to damage the people trying to use it for evil
in the process (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).
29
Standby Task Force (SBTF)
Style: Volunteer Network
I. Stated Mission
The Standby Task Force was created in response to the need for crisis responders to have “a
trained and professionalized volunteer force [that could] be on standby and activated within
hours” (Meier, 2010).The SBTF is therefore different from many V&TCs as its primary
focus is not to conceive and develop ideas for disaster technologies, but rather to “provide
humanitarian organizations [working in crisis affected communities] with real-time Crisis
Mapping support” (Standby Task Force, n.d.). In order to achieve this end, the group’s core
team works to increase the ability and skills of SBTF volunteers and the sustainability of the
effort through a continuous dialogue and coordination with other tech and crisis mapping
endeavors (Standby Task Force, n.d.). The core management of the Standby Task Force
aims to eventually become “superfluous [in order to] fulfill the goal of the SBTF: creat[e] a
space of empowerment where people learn how to work together and can do it independent
of the core team” (Ayala, 2011). The team has made significant progress towards this end, as
evidenced by the creation of the Sudan and Mumbai crisis maps by volunteers’ of their own
volition (Kirk Morris, personal communication, August 21, 2011).
II. Current Organizational Structure
The SBTF was launched in 2010 at the International Conference on Crisis Mapping (ICCM
2010) after being proposed by Patrick Meier, Director of Crisis Mapping at Ushahidi and
co-founder of the International Network of Crisis Mappers (Meier, 2010). The Force, which
is not an organization, works to streamline the informal distributed network of volunteers
through an interface for crisis mapping based on lessons learned during prior disasters, such
as Haiti, Chile and Pakistan (Standby Task Force, n.d.). While the SBTF was originally
divided into three teams, the SBTF currently consists of ten teams: the Geo-Location Team,
Humanitarian Team, Report Team, Media Monitoring Team, SMS Team, Task Team, Tech
Team, Translation Team, Verification Team, and Analysis Team. Each of the ten teams is
managed by several team coordinators who also act as the point of contact for the team.
30
Figure 3: Internal structure of the Standby Task Force. Each team is a self-sustaining entity with volunteers selected by the Volunteer Coordinators. All teams work together during a crisis, performing well-defined tasks (Standby Task Force, n.d.).
31
Like many V&TCs, the SBTF is open source endeavor. It uses open source platforms such as
Ushahidi, OpenStreetMap, and Frontline SMS, and sends electronic invitations to join the SBTF
to any individual wishing to become a part of the effort (K. Morris, personal communication,
August 21, 2011). This invitation contains instructions for filling out a member profile, joining a
team, and signing up to the SBTF Google Group (K. Morris, personal communication, August
21, 2011). This process ensures a higher level of trust between volunteers as they work together
during static times and also among the highly organized and structured organizations like the
United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Meier, 2010).
a. Project Management
The Task Force is able to prepare for disasters by maintaining a customized
instance of a Ushahidi map during static periods (K. Morris, personal
communication, June 3, 2011). The SBTF also customizes the Ushahidi platform
based on the lessons learned from previous deployments and puppet scripts are
written, debugged, and then hosted on the popular, online, open source code
repository, Github, in order to quickly deploy Ushahidi instances during crises (K.
Morris, personal communication, June 3, 2011). This ensures that, when a disaster
occurs, most structural work has already been completed.
The SBTF will not deploy any volunteer teams until a relevant authority solicits
their help (such as UN OCHA during the political crisis in Libya)( K. Morris,
personal communication, June 3, 2011). This allows the partner to make requests
so that data is tailored to the specific needs of the community (K. Morris, personal
communication, August 21, 2011), while it also legitimizes the Task Force’s work
and supports a high level of trust. When the SBTF does become involved, they
use GitHub in order to support code sharing amongst the many different SBTF
members and their partners (K. Morris, personal communication, June 3, 2011).
b. Volunteer Management
The SBTF uses a customized group website in order to organize and coordinate
amongst the ten different project groups. Each team creates a workflow for new
volunteers in order to quickly establish an understanding of their responsibilities
within the context of the group. An example of a workflow representing the
organization of the Task Force can be seen in Figure 3 below.
32
The teams provide a variety of training materials to new members, often in the
form of PowerPoint slides. However, training is also available through online
webinars hosted via the AnyMeeting web conferencing service. The webinars
allow a more senior member of the team to educate a large number of people on
topics such as how to use OpenStreetMap or the ethical protocols of disaster
mapping (Morris, 2011).
III. Project Deployment
Once an authority requests the SBTF’s aid, the teams deploy a Ushahidi instance and begin
monitoring and mapping media in the form of YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, SMS
messages, blog posts, live UStream channels, etc. The issue of whether or not a piece of data
is a rumor or true has arisen during several occasions. However, the Verification Team (one
of the ten subdivisions of the SBTF) has been successful using forensic evidence from the
message or video in order to determine its validity (K. Morris, personal communication,
June 3, 2011). However, the group is also able to rely on the senders’ histories and the
reactions of neighboring individuals on the ground in order to determine the validity of the
data. A recent study by a research team at Yahoo showed that 95% of tweets related to
confirmed reports validated that information while a miniscule 0.03% of tweets denied the
validity of these true cases (see Table 3 below). Yet, when false information is tweeted, the
results show that the percentage of tweets denying the information increases to about 50%
(Mendoza, Poblete, Castillo, 2011). This conclusion suggests that data verification may be
possible through the aggregate analysis of tweets (Meier, 2011).
Figure 4: SBTF Workflow. (Standby Task Force, n.d.b).
33
Table 3: Classification results for cases studied of confirmed truths and false rumors. (Mendoza, Poblete, Castillo, 2011).
The Standby Task Force also utilizes the concept of a “handle” in order to map data. This
means that, instead of asking individuals to tweet information whenever they deem
necessary, the SBTF asks groups to periodically report information to be mapped – this
enables a higher level of trust for both the volunteers and the community (Morris, 2011).
During the course of the project, the group rotates among volunteers to prevent against
physical, mental, and emotional fatigue (Morris, 2011). This is made possible by the fact
that there are about 600 volunteers for the SBTF who reside in about sixty countries
(Morris, 2011). Projects also aim to return control of the project to local authorities after the
course of about ten days (Morris, 2011).
34
Figure 5: SBTF Webinar Interface. This online conferencing service was used to train volunteers from across the globe on the SBTF's geolocation tools. A PowerPoint presentation appeared on the “Screen Share” tab later in the session (Morris, 2011).
35
CrisisCommons
Style: Bar Camp
I. Stated Mission
CrisisCommons is currently working to become a primary resource in linking the disparate
elements of a disconnected bureaucracy of crisis response organizations (CROs), V&TCs,
and interested individuals (A. Turner, personal communication, June 8, 2011).
CrisisCommons is a grassroots movement that “provides tools to supports aid workers on the
ground, hosts CrisisCamps where tools are produced , and maintains and supports a network
of volunteers to provide tools and respond to crises” (Lurie, 2010). During CrisisCamps a
global network of volunteers, developers, and professionals collaborate to build open source
tools to support aid workers (CrisisCommons, n.d.).
More specifically, CrisisCommons seeks to:
1. Empower Communities – Encouraging CrisisCamps
2. Become a Partnership Broker – proactively engaging crisis actors to facilitate technology
challenges during crisis; citizen advocate
3. Share Technology Tools – Building the “Sourceforge” of Crisis Response OSS
4. Innovate Crisis Tools of Tomorrow - Hackathon
5. Create Cross Response Collaboration – International aid & domestic response (closing
the gap)
6. Respond to Crises – Development of the CrisisCommons Action Team (both virtual and
physical)
7. Cultivate World Sensors – Empowering independent reporting & aggregation during
crisis
8. Build Global Citizen Action - Empowering digital literacy to save lives
9. Advocate for Access – Empowering global access to and freedom of expression
(CrisisCommons Charter, n.d.)
II. Current Organizational Structure
The idea of a “CrisisCamp” was founded in March 2009 as a barcamp event intended to
“connect crisis management and global development practitioners to the technology
volunteer community” (CrisisCommons, n.d.). During the crisis in Haiti, CrisisCamp events
became an official movement; CrisisCommons has since worked with “over 3,000 people …
worldwide in over 30 cities across 10 countries including France, United Kingdom, Canada,
New Zealand, Chile and Colombia” (CrisisCommons, n.d.).
CrisisCommons is working to define their governance structure. Presently however, a core
management team oversees the marketing, technical development, and general coordination
of CrisisCommons. Each CrisisCamp is its own entity and often has a group leader who is
the point of contact (POC) for the project (although volunteers’s and POCs’ contact
information is not routinely collected)(CrisisCommons, 2010, pp. 7-9). Some CrisisCamps,
36
such as CrisisCampLdn, have clearly defined structures and protocols for organizing
volunteers during crises and have begun to branch off from CrisisCommons in an effort to
clearly define their mission and structure (London Governance Discussion, n.d.). Others are
more ad hoc and depend on the CrisisCommons core team for governance and coordination
with other CrisisCamp teams.
a. Project Management
CrisisCommons is primarily organized through the use of a wiki and blog where
members post ideas regarding individual applications, governance structures, after-
action reports, and general information useful to the CrisisCommons community and
other V&TCs. While the organization hosts these pages internally, it also offers ad
hoc hosting services to developers working through individual CrisisCamps during
disasters (A. Turner, personal communication, June 8, 2011). This causes an
increased demand for server space and bandwidth during disasters and a lapse during
static periods. In order to address this issue and to offer effective support services,
CrisisCommons plans to coordinate their efforts through Oregon State University
OpenSource Lab (OSL) (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011). OSL’s responsibilities will
include providing core services for running CrisisCommons during static times (ie,
supporting the wiki); defining the environment, process, criteria, and lifecycle for
supporting new development; and defining the environment, process, criteria, and
lifecycle for launching and supporting new sites (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011).
CrisisCommons is also reorganizing their use of collaboration tools (ie, Skype),
content management tools, and project management tools (ie, Basecamp)
(Infrastructure/Plan, 2011). One of the primary concerns with the use of
Figure 6: CrisisCommons Structure. A core team within CrisisCommons oversees the efforts of individual CrisisCamps (these individuals are not all listed in this figure). While most of the Camps are self-driven, some specific Camps, such as CrisisCampLdn, are gaining independence as they work to define their own structures and protocols. The loose connections between independent CrisisCamps and CrisisCommons are highlighted by the broken lines on the left of the figure and the green color of the boxes.
37
organizational and collaborative tools is the monthly or yearly expenses associated
with the services.
The CrisisCommons Infrastructure Working Group (CCIWG) has been tasked with
developing a code-of-conduct, developing a 6 month CCIWG plan, updating the CCIWG 2-
year roadmap that exists, “gardening” the wiki, collecting and filing “documents,” collecting
and filing “files,” improving rapid-fire/on-demand workflow management for disaster tasks,
and developing podcasts for new members to the CCIWG.
b. Volunteer Management
CrisisCommons is unique within the V&TC network as it has managed to attract
people with backgrounds in technology as well as individuals with nontechnical
expertise, such as marketing (M. Prutsalis, personal communication, July 17, 2011).
This unique feature is expressed on the CrisisCommons homepage: “CrisisCampers
are not only technical folks like coders, programmers, geospatial and visualization
ninjas but we are also filled to the brim with super creative and smart folks who can
lead teams, manage projects, share information, search the internet, translate
languages, know usability, can write a research paper and can help us edit wikis”
(CrisisCommons, n.d.).
In order to better coordinate the efforts of volunteers, the CrisisCommons
Infrastructure Working Group (CCIWG) is searching for people willing to volunteer
their time on an ongoing basis in exchange for an opportunity to use their technology
specific skills, work on problems important to the CrisisCommons community, and
provide input to the future direction of the CCIWG (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011). The
CCIWG also aims to create both an Opportunity Model and Operational Model that
volunteers can use to find incomplete projects requiring attention and understand
procedural standards for developing projects (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011).
CrisisCommons is also planning to “go on tour” during September 2011 (National
Preparedness Month ) by “literally driving around the country in a tour bus… in order
to raise awareness, educate and connect people about how technology – especially the
Internet – can enhance disaster preparedness and response” (CrisisCommons, n.d.).
The tour bus will drive from the USA’s east coast to the west coast, inviting
individuals from local communities to ride on the bus for any given distance, hacking
with members or CrisisCommons and CrisisCamps along the way (CrisisCommons,
n.d.). The goals of this journey are to “support and train local emergency managers,
public health officials, and community organizers…. host an open data scavenger
hunt…. learn from the crisis experts…. learn from the tech community…. and raise
$1M of volunteer time” (CrisisCommons, n.d.).
III. Project Deployment When a disaster hits, individual CrisisCamps (such as CrisisCampNZ or CrisisCampLdn) form or
reconvene, thereby joining the efforts of volunteers not necessarily near the location of the disaster.
While the camps work to solve the technical problems that are brought to their attention,
CrisisCommons provides a forum where they can post and discuss critical data, such as existing
projects, contact information, application code, training materials, or relevant hashtags.
38
After the disaster, the Commons is also used to post after-action reports, or reflections from team
members on what strategies were successful and which strategies are in need of revision.
CrisisCommons is one of the few V&TCs that has prioritized the collection of reflection material on
past deployments.
39
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