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People v. Cabrera FACTS: Dec 13, 1920: Policemen of Manila arrested a woman (allegedly without any cause and was
also thereafter abused) who was known to be a wife of a Constabulary soldier stationed at Santa Lucia Barracks.
This was considered as an outrage by the Constabulary soldiers which started the hostility between the Police and the Soldiers
Dec 14, 1920: During the sunset, Artemio Mojica had an encounter with Macasinag of the Constabulary who was subsequently killed.
Being aware of the state of excitement among the soldiers about the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in the Barracks.
Dec 15, 1920: Nicolas Torio was easily persuaded by corporal Ingles to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company by letting Francisco Garcia saw out the window bars of the quarters.
Upon escaping the quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.
Thereafter, these events transpired: o One platoon fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an
American policeman named Driskill was stationed. The firing lead to the Driskill’s death along with Jacumim who was her friend.
o The Constabulary squad fired a volley into the civilian car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian passengers,
o Captain William E. Wichman and patrolman Sapala was also killed during the firing at Calle Real
o The Soldiers who were situated in the courtyard of San Agustin Church also killed patrolmen Trogue and Sison.
Dec 16, 1920: An investigation ensued by Coloner Sweet, which resulted with around seventy soldiers who confessed. They were charged with crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder and serious physical injuries.
ISSUES: WON the Admissions found in Exhibit C-76 (confessions) were done with fraud and deceit- Nope WON there was conspiracy between the accused- Yup WON they could be convicted or Treason and Sedition Law- Yup HELD: 1. It is alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions because:
a. They were under the impression that those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao
i. What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records. The source of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the confession is not established.
b. It was “for the good of the service” in response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers
c. They didn’t understand what they were doing, for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog,
i. With military orders given in English and living in the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. In open court, sixty- nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their own men.
2. The argument is then advanced that the appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so-called psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and of their uniform.
a. Under section 5 of Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. b. It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act,
each is responsible for all the acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceed with his part unaided.
c. Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences therefor.
3. Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government.
a. The defendants argue that in a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary
i. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
US v. Tolentino
SUMMARY: Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon an information charging him with the crime of "uttering seditious words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
FACTS:
Tolentino wrote a drama and the announcement with other members of a theatrical company, of which he was director. The government found him to have uttered and published seditious words and speeches against the government; hence, guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon →at Bukas'
ISSUE:
WON his work was inciting sedition and violated Act No. 292
HELD: YES. The court said,
“→ Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.”
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are define in that section, viz:→ (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its→ presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
According to petitioner,
accused to commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear from the evidence of→ record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary and artistic production wherein the
legendary history of these Islands and their future, as imagined by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
Court answered: IT IS NOOOOOOOOT.
The public presentation of the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than two years→ after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a wide-spread and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required the use of the armed forces of the Government for their suppression. (There was still this “junta” from Hongkong who acted “with confederates in the Philippines”, and “was still able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which it hoped to fan into open revolt and rebellion at the first favorable opportunity.”)
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such→ conditions could not and in fact were not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application, nor should they blind this court to the true purpose and intent of the author and director of the play.
Espuelas v People Facts Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken making it to appear as if he had hanged himself from a rope suspended from the limb of a tree. He then sent copies of the photograph to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation throughout the Philippines along with a suicide letter written by a fictitious suicide named Alberto Reveniera. The suicide letter consisted of grievances to the Roxas administration, citing it as the cause for his suicide. Espuelas admitted that he had written the note and that the photo was his and caused its publication in the newspapers. Issue WON Espuelas was guilty of seditious libel, violating Article 142 of the RPC. Held Yes he is guilty. The Court held that the letter was a scurrilous (low, vulgar, mean, foul) libel against the government. The court was convinced that the letter reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government. Writings of such nature are criminal because it is conducive to the destruction of the very government itself. The court quoted Paterson as saying that sedition is a limit to free speech but within the limit is sufficient space for giving out valid criticisms of the judgment and conduct of authority. They admitted that punishment of seditious utterances may become a weapon of intolerance but they assured that as long as there were sufficient safeguards such as the requiring of intent on the part of the defendant, then it is largely a question of policy. The court held that the letter, lacking specificity of any actual deed or lack thereof of the government, it is nothing more than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. The article is wet with violence and hate, from the alleged suicide of the writer to the burning of the pictures of Roxas by future generations.
The argument that it only attacks the “Roxas people”, by calling them Hitlers and Mussolinis and not the government as a whole is untenable as well. The people referred to here are the President, the Cabinet and legislators.
The letter is deemed to be bent on sowing the seeds of sedition and strife. By using the expression Juez de Cuchillo or Law of the Knife, the idea that the appellant wanted to convey was that the only means of freeing the Philippines from the current government was the use of violence. Dissenting opinion by J. Tuason J. Tuason cited the case of US vs Dorr, where it was found that Dorr’s article, although ‘it may have had the effect of exciting among certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures.”, it had nothing which could be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection, or in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.” J. Tuason argues that the letter is misunderstood. The author was desperate enough to kill himself because many men were following the practices despots and fascists like Hitler and Mussolini. He pretended to have killed himself because he was impotent to remedy the deplorable
state of affairs of his country. Far from asking the overthrow of the government, the letter evinced intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions. In the letter, it did not mean that because he could not kill Roxas, he was asking other people to do it. The letter was addressed to his wife and children who were both imaginary. The meaning of the sentence is ambiguous and the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt. In prosecutions of sedition, utmost caution should be observed lest freedom of expression be impaired. The solution of clashes which frequently occur between liberty or free speech and prosecution for sedition, the criterion, it is submitted should be the presence or absence of real, not imaginary danger of the utterance materializing or inciting others to disloyalty to the Government and its laws. According to Justice Holmes, there is no inciting to sedition unless “the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”
Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (March 24, 1972)
FACTS:
-‐ Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista Sr., as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Art 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of congress, “arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.”
-‐ For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two information against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
ISSUE:
-‐ WON Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD:
-‐ There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
-‐ There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of
an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.
Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
Additional Notes from the net:
-‐ They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-‐settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.
People v. Feloteo1 [295 SCRA 607 September 17, 1998 – Puno, J.]
Facts: Sonny Sotto, along with two friends, were walking along the highway on the way home to Sitio Nagbaril. Feloteo appeared on the opposite side of the road, armed with an armalite rifle. Without uttering a word, Feloteo shot Sotto to the chest, causing his death. The bullet came from SPO2 Roman Adion’s M-‐16 armalite rifle. Feloteo was convicted of murder, aggravated by treachery, and sentenced to serve reclusion perpetua.
Issue: WON TC was correct in appreciating treachery and WON reclusion perpetua is the proper
penalty imposed Held: 1.) Treachery is appreciated in this case. The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if
the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself. Applying the rule to the facts, even if Feloteo contends that he shot Sotto in the front and he jokingly warned that he will be shot, Sotto did not have sufficient time to defend himself.
2.) * Appellant was convicted of Murder (Art 248) and illegal possession of firearms (Sec 1 of PD 1866). Sec 1 of PD 1866 provides that: “if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the death penalty shall be imposed.”2 However, RA 8294 amended PD 1866 and it now provides that: “if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.” RA 8294 amended PD 1866. In proposing to amend PD 1866, the Senate was faced with the option to follow the ruling of People v. Barros, treating the illegal possession of firearms as an aggravating circumstance or to follow the ruling of People v. Evangelista, that it is possible to file two separate information – one for murder and the other for the illegal possession of firearms. The Senate went with the first option. This means that if murder or homicide was committed, the separate penalty for illegal possession shall no longer be meted out since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The court also made reference to the use of an unlicensed firearm as a qualifying circumstance in the case of People v. Quijada: unless a law provides for it, the use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be treated as an aggravating circumstance since it does not fall under Art 14 of the RPC.3 The use of a firearm illegally possessed in the commission of murder cannot be treated as a separate offense. It is now an aggravating circumstance. This did not affect the imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
1 Easy way to remember the case? Nabaril si Sotto sa Sitio Nagbaril. 2 RA 9346 suspends the death penalty. 3 Now the gap is filled by RA 8294.
People v. Narvasa (1998)
RA 8294 “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”
Facts:
Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and Mateo Narvasa were charged with homicide, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with unlicensed high powered guns, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot SPO3 PRIMO CAMBA, who was acting on report that there were missing carabaos, pigs and goats, caused his instantaneous death.
Issue:
WON RA 8294 which took effect during the pendency of the case have retroactive effect
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The court said: “Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder; appellants should perforce be culpable for two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court. “Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense.” Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable only for homicide and penalized with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, RA 8294 should be given retroactive effect.
Obiter: On the issue regarding proof that firearm was unlicensed: “As we have
previously held, the testimony of, or a certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused-‐appellant was not a licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession.” The prosecution submitted a certification showing that Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were not licensed firearm holders, a fact that was attested to by SPO4 Roberto Manuel, a member of the PNP.
People v. Quijada [259 SCRA 225 July 24, 1996 – Davide, Jr., J]
Facts: RTC charged Quijada of two offenses – one for murder under Art 248 and another for illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866. During a benefit dance, Quijada and the victim, Diosdado Iroy, had a fist fight because Quijada was constantly annoying Iroy’s sister, Rosita. Two nights after, another benefit dance was held at the same place. After the event, Rosita saw Quijada approach Diosdado Iroy from behind and shot Diosdado’s head. Quijada was caught by the police and was positively identified by Rosita as Diosdado’s killer. The firearm was not licensed. Quijada was not licensed to hold firearms, as well.
Main issue: WON the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearms should be treated as two
separate offenses Held: Yes (explained in sub-‐issues)
Would the ruling constitute double jeopardy? o Double jeopardy is done in two ways: a person is punished twice for the same
offense; or a person is punished by the same act covered by both a law and an ordinance (the conviction/acquittal of one should be a bar against the other).
o In justifying murder and illegal possession of firearms not falling under the jeopardy rule, it relied on the Additional-‐Element Test: to determine if there are two separate offenses or only one, the court must examine if each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
Elements of aggravated illegal possession of firearms: (1) a person has possession of an unlicensed firearm and/or has no license to use a firearm (2) the said person uses it to commit murder or homicide.
Elements of murder: (1) a person was killed, (2) the accused killed him, (3) the accused was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances in Art 248 and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Does the rule of complex crime (Art 48) apply to absorb one offense with the other? o Even if murder qualifies the offense of illegal possession of firearms, it does not
follow that homicide is absorbed in the offense. The court wants to avoid the absurdity of a more serious crime defined and penalized by the RPC will be absorbed by a statutory offense, one of which is malum prohibitum.
Elements under Art 48: they must consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies OR it must involve an offense being a necessary means to commit the other.
o The court also interpreted PD 1866 as having the intention not to punish murder and illegal possession of firearms through examining intention of the decree. Marcos enacted PD 1866 condemned not only the nature of the act but also for a larger policy consideration of reducing the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed firearms. If intent were required, the policy and purpose would be difficult to achieve.
In reference to PD 1866 Sec 1, the court further ruled that there is a difference between:
• As a result of – that murder or homicide was not the original purpose • With the use of – killing, requiring a mens rea, is the primary purpose
o Finally, the court interpreted that PD1866 cannot be an aggravating circumstance because of the simple reason that it is not one of the grounds presented in Art 14.
PEOPLE V. BELTRAN Direct Assault This case is an example of the second form of assault with the following requirements:
a. Offender makes an attack, employs force, makes a serious intimidation or makes a serious resistance
b. Person assaulted is a person of authority c. At the time of the assault, the person in authority ir his agent is engaged in the
actual performance of his official duties, or that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.
d. Offender knows that he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties
e. There is no public uprising FACTS: In January 11, 1972, while Ernesto Alvarado was driving Calixto Urbi home, Delfino Beltran shouted “Oki ni Inayo” (vulva of your mother) and reported the incident to the newly elected Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico. They decided to act on the report and went to the Puzon Compound and ask for the surrender of Beltran and his companions. Upon their arrival, they were met with simultaneous discharge of gunfire from the appellants. This resulted to the death of Vicente Quirolgico, and several physical injuries of Mayor Quirolgico, and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino. The defense of one of the appellants was that they fired in retaliation because the group of the police fired at them for half an hour. Delfino Beltran used self-‐defense, and the other accused testified that they had no part in the incident. ISSUE: WON there was direct assault? HELD: Yes, they were convicted of attempted murder with direct assault on Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Rolando Tolentino, and murder of Vicente Quirolgico with aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. RATIO: At the time of the incident, Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority, and Pat. Tolentino is a policeman who was wearing his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community. The Court gave credence to the testimony of Carmelita Collado, a resident of Puzon Compound who witnessed the incident. Mayor Quirolgico, Pat. Tolentino, and Chief of Police Collado also verified the identity of their assailants. Physical evidence proved that the appellants traded shots with the group of the mayor.
People v. Dollantes Facts: The accused were charged with “Assault Upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder.” During a social gathering at the local dance hall, the barangay captain was giving a speech when the accused interrupted him by going to the middle of the dance floor and insulting him. When the barangay captain approached him to ask that he cease disturbing the events, the accused and his cohorts ganged up on the captain and stabbed him with bolos and hunting nights. The autopsy report showed the barangay captain died as a result of multiple stab wounds. Both the prosecution and the defense presented witnesses for their respective sides. The RTC found the accused guilty of assault resulting in murder. Issue: Which set of witnesses ought the SC give credibility to: prosecution or defense? Prosecution eye-‐witnesses positively identified the accused. When they were cross-‐examined, the lower court found their testimonies to be credible.
-‐ One witness was 6 meters away when the incident happened and claimed the accused brandished a knife and asked, “who is brave here?”
-‐ Another witness corroborated the testimony by claiming he had tried to assist the barangay captain but one of the co-‐accused stopped him and told him not to interfere.
-‐ The victim’s wife testified that one of the accused had wanted to be barangay captain, while the other had a misunderstanding with the barangay captain concerning a theft case.
-‐ The witnesses were categorical and straightforward in specifying the stabbing, the types of weapons used, and there was no mistaking identification of the accused given the crime scene was well-‐lit with petromax lamps.
Defense claims only Hamlet Dollantes had stabbed the victim, and that prosecution’s witnesses had inconsistent testimonies.
-‐ Claim: That the witness could not have seen the accused stab the captain since the witness ran away
o Prosecution: that witness didn’t run away — he ran to report the incident to the police
-‐ Claim: The witnesses failed to report stoning that had occurred that night
o Prosecution: immaterial, since stoning was not the means of killing the victim
-‐ Claim: there is inconsistency in one prosecution witness claiming the wife was stoned while the other witness claimed it was the store that was stoned
o Prosecution: the testimonies are not inconsistent as one does not preclude the other
Held:
1. Minor variations in witness testimonies show sincerity, and not deficient credibility.
2. The claim that only Hamlet Dolantes was at the crime scene was refuted by the following:
a. The wife of one of the accused (Lauro) turned over hunting knives used by the accused
b. The theory that only Hamlet was present is inconsistent with the number and location of the victim’s stab wounds
c. The alibi of the witness does not stand 3. Self-‐defense does not lie:
a. The victim was not armed. b. Even if the victim had “boxed [the accused] and would not release his
hand,” stabbing is still a disproportionate retaliation and does not constitute valid self-‐defense.
c. Conspiracy was proven by the co-‐accused who had not participated in the actual stabbing as kicking and dancing around the dead body, as well as statements of “do not intervene,” and “do not interfere you’re not party to this, we already got what we came for;” furthermore, one of the accused was telling people not to listen to the victim’s speech since he would “not stay long as barangay captain”
4. Treachery was present: a. The accused took turns stabbing the victim, who was caught by
surprise with no chance to defend himself. Doctrine: The barangay captain was killed while in the performance of his duties. A barangay captain’s duty is to enforce laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in enforcement thereof he incurs the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is MURDER with ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN AUTHORITY.
Alberto v De la Cruz (June 30, 1980)
J. Concepcion
FACTS: Eligio Orbito, provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner.
He petitioned to include Jose Esmeralda (assistant provincial warden) and Armando Cledera (governor)
as co-defendants in his case. According to Eligio, Cledera wrote a note asking Esmeralda to send five
men to work in the construction of a fence at his house leased by the province and used as a guest
house. Esmeralda said he couldn’t remember who gave him the note and that he wasn’t sure about the
genuineness of the signature therein. Respondent Judge ordered the Fiscals office to cause further
investigation in order to know whether Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have any
participation in the circumstances of Pablo Denaque’s escape from judicial custody. Upon
reinvestigation, Fiscal weren’t able to establish a prima facie case against Cledera and Esmeralda as
neither Eligio nor the alleged note did not appear during the said reinvestigation. Hence, the Fiscal
refused to charge Cledera and Esmeralda. Respondent Judge however, upon motion for reconsideration
filed by Eligio, he granted that the information be amended to include Cledera and Esmeralda as
defendants under the provisions of A156 in relation to 223 and 224 of Penal Code.
ISSUES: 1. WON the Fiscal should be compelled to include Cledera and Esmeralda as defendants using
A156 in relation to 223 and 224 of the Penal Code
2. WON respondent Judge was right in granting the amended information
HELD:
1. No! It is a rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations
thereof. It would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case
when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to
secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be
to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.
2. No! The respondent Judge in his order to the Fiscal that he couldn’t decide WON to include Cledera
and Esmeralda w/o further investigation. The reinvestigation however failed to adduce additional
facts to constitute a prima facie case against the two. Also, Cledera and Esmeralda can’t be charged
using A1561 as they are public officers not contemplated in the said article. They also can’t be
1 Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its
minimum Period shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
charged using A2232 as there was sure no connivance in the escape of Pablo Denaque from the
custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda
asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the
names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita
who picked the men to compose the work party. Connivance is an essential element in the
commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. They also can’t be charged
under A224 as the article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has
escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non-
performance of duty. The person who has custody is the one liable under this provision.
2 ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his
custody or charge
G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Montemayor, J.
FACTS
Abilong was sentenced with destierro, forbidding him from entering within 100km
from Manila, for attempted robbery. He was then charged with evasion of service
after going beyond the limits and committing vagrancy.
He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional with accessory penalties and costs, hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON destierro is covered under the RPC provision on evasion of sentence given that
it is not imprisonment
HELD & RD
YES. Court held that the Spanish text of the law is controlling, where sufriendo
privacion de libertad means “deprivation of liberty” and it is clear that a person
under the sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of liberty.
CFI judgment affirmed with costs against appellant.
Dissent by J. Perfecto
The English text clearly provides that appellant should be acquitted. Fugandose (by
escaping) should have been considered with Privacion de libertad. Escape
presupposes imprisonment. There is no sense in escaping from destrierro because
there is no enclosure. The conviction should have been for contempt of court, which
is punishable by up to 6 months imprisonment.
Wilfredo S. Torres (petitioner) v Neptali A. Gonzales, Chairman, Board of Pardons and Parole, and Director, Bureau of Prisons (respondents) G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987 J. Feliciano Facts: Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime of two counts of estafa and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day, with the maximum sentence expiring on Nov.2, 2000. On April 18,1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." He accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner after discovering that Torres has been charged with 20 counts of estafa (in 1982) and has been convicted of sedition but was pending appeal before the appellate court. NBI records also showed that a long list of charges had been brought against Torres during the last 20 years for a wide assortment of crimes (estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or interfering with police functions), some of which have already been dismissed. On Sept.8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner and the Minister of Justice then issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugns the validity of the arrest and recommitment order, claiming that he did not violate the conditions of his parole as there was no final conviction and that he was denied due process when he was not given the chance to explain and be heard via trial. Issue: WoN conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence Ruling: Petition dismissed Ratio: No. Citing the cases Tesoro v Director of Prisons, Sales v Director of Prisons and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the Court gave the following rules and doctrine: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act (Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code); or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon (under Art.159 RPC). Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice (no violation of due process). What is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law but rather the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. In this case, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Dissenting opinion of J.Cruz As many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction, without which Torres cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon. An allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the judge. He also regards Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code as an encroachment on judicial functions; in so far as it allows the President to determine his judgment whether or not a crime has been committed. He calls for the reversal of the Espuelas doctrine and the release of Torres from imprisonment. *Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the Governor-General (or head Executive): to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.
PP v. DIOSO and ABARCA G.R. No. L‐38346‐47 October 23, 1964 Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense – Penalty. — Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency. Facts: Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca were members of the Batang Mindanao (BM) gang in the New Bilibid Prison. Dioso was serving his sentence for robbery, and Abarca for homicide. As vengeance for the slaying of fellow gang member Balerio, they planned and succeeded in murdering Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez, members of the rival “Happy Go Lucky” gang. On Sept. 12, 1972, 6:15 am, Abarca, accompanied by Dioso, pretended to be sick and was admitted to the prison hospital where the victims were. While the victims were taking breakfast, Abarca stabbed Gomez and Dioso stabbed Reyno. Voluntarily surrendering and admitting the murder, both pleaded guilty before the trial court, which sentenced them to death. They seek the commutation of the death sentence given the mitigating circumstances. Issue: WON the mitigating circumstances will suffice for the commutation of the sentence Held: NO. Aside from the fact that the killing was accompanied by alevosia, the Court finds both appellants as quasi‐recidivists. They committed the crime of murder while serving sentence for a prior offense (homicide for Abarca, robbery for Dioso). For their quasi‐recidivism, the maximum penalty is indeed to be imposed for the new felony – that is, death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. BUT, for the lack of requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute their sentence to reclusion perpetua and P30,000 for indemnity.
PEOPLE V. GALANO (1958)
Topic: Forgery
Ponente: De Leon, J.
Facts:
Jan. 17, 1956, around 10:30 pm, the attention of Patrolman Restituto Villanueva was aroused by a crowd chasing a man in Echague Street, near Quezon
bridge, Manila.
When Villanueva caught up w/ the crowd, the man being chased turned out to be Benjamin Galano Y Carpio. Galano’s lips were bleeding.
Lilia Cruz, a balut vendor, informed Villanueva that Galano bought 4 eggs from her and paid her a false pre-war one-peso bill of the Treasury Certificate
series.
Galano and Cruz were brought to the police station. Cruz told Torres (investigating officer), that upon receiving the one-peso bill from Galano, she
discovered the word “Victory” at the back thereof was written in ink. She called Galano but the latter ran away.
Torres said that Galano admitted that he wrote the word “Victory” in ink and paid Cruz with it. He also made a statement in his own handwriting.
TC convicted Galano with violation of Art 166.
Issue: WON the forgery committed falls within Article 166 of the RPC?
Held: NO. Art 169 par 1 is the one applicable
(but the dispositive portion said they “affirm” trial court’s decision except the modification of a lighter penalty)
Ratio:
The one-peso bill is a genuine pre-war treasury certificate “payable to the bearer in demand” which has been, however, withdrawn from circulation. It is
however, redeemable at its face value presented to the Central Bank, pursuant to RA 17 and 199.
Defendant says: the one-peso bill he gave was different from the one in evidence; he only made the written statement because Torres was shouting at
him and he was afraid, and that the facts do not constitute the crime defined in Art. 166.
SC: The act of appellant running away when Cruz called his attention is an indication of his guilt. There is also no showing why the officers should falsely
implicate Galano. The use of a loud voice is insufficient to constitute intimidation.
The act was done for no other purpose than to give to it the appearance of a true legal tender of the current Victory series to the end it may not be
refused for purposes of Sec 1612 of the Revised Administrative Code even after June 30, 1948, despite the provisions of RA 199. The forgery is akin to, if
not worse than, affixing a seal to a genuine signature on a document which is invalid w/o a seal.
The forgery here committed comes under the 1st par of Art. 169. SC believes that this provision does not only contemplate situations where a spurious,
false or fake document or instrument is given the appearance of a true and genuine document, but also to situations involving originally true and genuine
documents which have been withdrawn or demonetized, or have outlived their usefulness.
The penalty prescribed is too harsh compared to the amount (P1.00). A copy of the decision is furnished to the president for executive clemency.
Castro, J., concurring & dissenting:
Concur w/ the findings of fact but disagrees that the defendant is guilty of forgery under Art 166
Art 166 must be read and applied in connection w/ Art 169 RPC because the latter provision defines the nature and extent of forgery.
Believes that the provision only embraces situations where a spurious, false, false or fake document mentioned therein should be a true and genuine
treasury or bank note or instrument.
Writing “Victory” in ink does not fall within the purview of par. 1 of Art. 169, because the note in the case is genuine.
Essential element in forgery of currency is therefore the destruction of, or the attempt to destroy, the public credit, regardless of the resulting injury to
private interests.
Majority opinion confuses forgery w/ falsification.
Definition of forgery applies to obligations and securities mentioned in arts 166, 167, and 168 while the definition of falsification applies to documents
mentioned in arts 171, 172, 173, 174 and 175
Applicable article is Art. 318, estafa
Cabigas v People (1987) - Accused is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of Land Bank Makati Branch - Securities which are in form of treasuries and bills are deposited with the said Section - Mar 29 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited with them, Cabigas and his assistant discovered the loss of 6 treasury bills with a value of P3M. Reyness, Cabigas' assistant, crossed out the last two digits 82 and added 76 for the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19 treasury notes. - Cabigas reported the incident to Pigram, the branch manager. Folloeing day, Cabigas prepared his report (DR SDUC) wherein he indicated 1533 pieces of treasury bills instead of 159, to count the missing six bills. (Now totaling P607,095,000) - Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered Pigram, was the one who negotiated the said treasury bills with Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that the 5 missing bills were negotiated by Pigram with Home Savings Bank to secure a loan. - After investigation by NBI, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Report and the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Issue: Was Cabigas guilty of falsification by violating Art 171 of the RPC? Held: It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under Par no 4 (making untruthful statements in a narration of facts) the ff. elements must concur a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a 3rd person - Correction of the figure made by Cabigas from 1539 to 1533 was to conform with the actual number of treasury under custody--> It was speaking of the truty - He placed an asterisk and wrote "Adjustment on erroneous entry dated 3/09/82 so as not to hide that they were discrepancies - Evidence also discloses that upon discovery of the loss, petitioner imeediately reported the matter to his immediate supervisor and to Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive on the part of Cabigas - Also, the DRSDUC is a form purely devised and adopted by him-> form was never required nor introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank hence he wasn't under legal obligation to disclose the DR SDUC or SDR. *DR SDUC- Daily Report Securities/Deposits Under Custody SDR- Securities Delivery Report
Syquian vs. People March 13, 1989 Facts: Manuel Syquian, mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, was charged with the crime of falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4 of the RPC (making untruthful statements in a narrative of fact). The criminal charges brought upon him draw strength from the fact that he appointed Jesusa Carreon to a position that did not exist (as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary) and certifying that funds existed for the salary Ms. Carreon. Upon demanding what she thought was the rightful salary to her non-‐existent job, the falsification that Syquian had engaged in became obvious. Faced with the mentioned criminal charges Sqyuian presented the following assertions as his defense:
1. There was no criminal intent on his part 2. No evidence that he took advantage of his public office 3. He made a conclusion of law and not a narration of fact 4. He was deprived of his due process
The Trial Court found him guilty of the crimes charged against him; the Court of Appeals concurred with the lower court’s ruling. Issues: WON Syquian is guily of falsification of public documents Held: YES. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact has the following elements/requisites:
• That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of fact
• That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him
• That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false **The Court held that all were present in the case at bar The Court held that the defense of the petitioner that he issued a conclusion of law and not a narration of facts was untenable. A conclusion of law is a proposition arrived at from the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded. Clearly, determining whether or not there were funds to spare for Ms. Carreon’s “position” did not depend on applying the law; he simply had to examine his budget for the fiscal year. Seeing as such information was readily available to the petitioner, it is deemed that he knowingly made false certification when he claimed that “funds for the position are available.” (the fact that his municipality failed to enact a new budget for the current year meant that they had to use their budget from the previous fiscal year. As such, it is even more obvious that there could be no funds for a position that was only recently created)
With regard to the second element, the Court held it was present because an officer of the law, he was obliged to be truthful in all his transactions. Further, the Court held that contrary to the petitioner’s claims, wrongful intent is immaterial when what is falsified is a public document. Therefore, it does not matter whether or not he had wrongful intentions when he falsified the said document. He may also not invoke the defense of good faith because such was not sufficiently established in his favor. Thus, he is criminally liable for his acts. Lastly, the Court held that he was not denied due process merely because there was a pending petition for change of venue. He was allowed ample opportunity to plead his case and present evidence. The fact that he failed to do so is not the Court’s fault. In fact, his own counsel resigned owing to the fact that the petitioner had already left the country before trial could even begin.
Luague v Court of Appeals (1982)
FACTS: After Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in Samar, died, his wife Pilar Luague encashed his salary warrants, but because she signed the name of her husband as payee on three treasury warrants for purpose of endorsement, she was charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. She contends, however, that she acted on good faith and had no criminal intent when she cashed the paychecks. She said that a day before her husband died at the hospital, he instructed her to get the checks from the District Supervisor, which she then used to pay for: the money they owed at the drugstore; the construction materials they bought for the tomb of the deceased; and the materials used for the coffin, which they purchased on credit. ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty HELD: No, petitioner acted in good faith and is acquitted. The Court of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law when they convicted the petitioner of falsification of commercial documents just because she signed her husband’s name in indorsing the treasury warrants. The CA failed to take into account that:
1. She signed her husband’s name because they were delivered to her by the District Supervisor long after her husband’s death;
2. She used the proceeds to pay for the expenses of her husband’s illness and burial; 3. She believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband’s
vacation and sick leave credits – the value of which exceeded the value of the checks. Because of (3), the government didn’t sustain financial loss due to encashment of the checks. The court said that the absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent. The prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and the Court of Appeals should’ve been more compassionate. The accused is a poor widow who was in a state of bewilderment due to the recent death of her husband when she cashed the paychecks, not to mention that she was also in dire in dire need of money to settle their expenses. “A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order under the circumstances.”
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY,
defendants and appellants.
G.R. No. 31012. September 10, 1932. J. Vickers.
Facts: Romualdez was charged with the crime of falsification of public documents, with Mabunay as an accomplice.
It was alleged that she altered the bar exam grades of Mabunay:
from 58 % to 64% in Remedial Law; from 63% to 73% in Civil Law, thereby increasing his overall grade from 72.8% to
75%.
Romualdez was the secretary of Justice Romualdez (her uncle), who was appointed as the chairman of the
examination committee for admission to the bar in 1926. Romualdez was assigned as a corrector, alongside other
attorneys. The anomaly was discovered through two lists produced by the attorney-correctors, where one list states
the original grade of Mabunay, and the other having erasures, indicating the new grade. The exam papers of
Mabunay show that the original grades were totally blacked out, and the new grades were written just beside
the initials of the correctors, not indicating that Romualdez corrected the grade since she did not write her
own initials, nor did she consult the original correctors, nor report to the Justice about it. Only Mabunay’s
paper was altered by Romualdez.
Romualdez states, as corroborated by Justice Romualdez, that she was given authority to revise the compositions
already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given to them, PROVIDED that the new revision
was done in order to do justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were known. It was
said that the bar exam committee proposed that even those who had obtained a general average of 70% but below
75% should be admitted, but the SC rejected the proposal.
Mabunay allegedly withdrew P600 from his account, and five days later, Romualdez deposited P510 in her account.
Issues: WON there is falsification of a public/official document.
WON Mabunay is an accomplice.
Ruling: YES. The court cannot believe that such unlimited discretion was granted to her by the Justice, and even if
she was given that authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof. When she altered the
grades, she already knew that it was Mabunay’s exam. Also, the exams are considered as public/official documents,
since the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. Romualdez’ acts are covered by
pars. 2, 3, and 6 in Art. 300 (now 171) of the PC:
2. by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. by attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
6. by make an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
NO. Mabunay is guilty as a coprincipal and conspirator.
Dissent (Street, Villamor, Villareal)
The court failed to consider the fact that Samson, Romualdez’ cosupervisor of the correctors, changes the grades of other exams in precisely
the same way Romualdez did. Also, if authority was in fact given to her, there is no falsification case against her, because her acts would
only constitute to abuse of authority. There is no difference with the authority given her to read and grade papers and the authority to
revise grades. Does the court mean to suggest that the assigning of an untrue grade in bad faith by any reader authorized to grade exam
papers constitute a falsification of a public document? Also, no item of proof connecting Mabunay to Romualdez. Cases cited as authority by
majority opinion does not apply to this case, because the falsification done in those cases were by an unauthorized person.
