Control + 1 – Block Headingsopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/Final_Ir… · Web viewIndex. Index 1. 1AC 2. Inherency 24. Withdrawal/SOFA k/2 stability 42

Iraq Withdrawal Policy Aff DDW ‘101

Index

Index........................................................................................................................................................................11AC..........................................................................................................................................................................2Inherency...............................................................................................................................................................24Withdrawal/SOFA k/2 stability.............................................................................................................................42Iran Talks Stopped Now........................................................................................................................................48Iraq k/2 US-Iran Relations.....................................................................................................................................49Iran diplomacy k/2 Iraq Stability...........................................................................................................................57Iran Diplomacy k/2 Prev Miscalc..........................................................................................................................60Iran Diplomacy k/2 ME Stability..........................................................................................................................61Iran nuclearization ev............................................................................................................................................63Withdrawal Iraqi Balancing Against Iran.........................................................................................................65Iran strikes ev.........................................................................................................................................................66AT: Iranian Agression...........................................................................................................................................67Withdrawal k/........................................................................................................................................................68AT: Withdrawal Instability...............................................................................................................................75Heg Low Now........................................................................................................................................................76Heg Sustainable.....................................................................................................................................................77AT: Obama Hates Heg...........................................................................................................................................78Econ Links (Oil)....................................................................................................................................................79Iraq K/2 Econ.........................................................................................................................................................80Military Overstretch Links....................................................................................................................................81Soft Power Links...................................................................................................................................................83Soft Power Impacts................................................................................................................................................84Soft Power Real.....................................................................................................................................................85Heg Impacts...........................................................................................................................................................86AT: Loss of Credibility Decreases Heg.................................................................................................................89AT: Withdrawal Increases Terrorist Recruitment.................................................................................................90Recruitment/Readiness Key to Heg.......................................................................................................................91Iraq Decreases Hegemony.....................................................................................................................................92Russia Add-On.......................................................................................................................................................94Other Russia Cards................................................................................................................................................95Syria Add-On.........................................................................................................................................................96Iraq K/2 US-Syria Relns........................................................................................................................................97Solves credibility...................................................................................................................................................99Plan popular.........................................................................................................................................................100Neg Stuff – Withdrawal On track........................................................................................................................110Neg Stuff – Withdrawal bad................................................................................................................................112

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PMNirali, Lisa, Cory, Greg, Drew, Jack, Robert, Noah, Jesse, Julia, Kade 1


1AC

Contention one is the Status Quo:

The Security Agreement set a 2011 withdrawal date but it won’t be followed—it’s nonbinding and contingent on ground conditions(William Rivers Pitt, New York Times Writer, Truthout, 5/14/10, “Out of Iraq: Don’t Hold Your Breath”, http://www.truth-out.org/out-iraq-dont-hold-your-breath59458)

President Obama will not get the United States out of Iraq in his first term. If he wins a second term, it is highly unlikely he will get us out of Iraq before he finally leaves office. Print that out and tack it to your wall. Six years from now, it will still be hanging there, yellow and curled, but entirely correct. We're not going anywhere. Yeah, yeah, I know, the word from the White House ever since Obama first began to campaign has been that we'll be out of Iraq by 2011. That was the promise, oft-repeated, and I'm here to tell you that it's a load of bull. Iraq is the 51st state, now and forever, so praise the Lord and pass the taxpayer-funded ammunition, amen. The reasons for this grim truth are myriad, and most recently have to do with another frenzy of violence and bloodshed in that ravaged, raped nation. A parliamentary election on March 7 failed to deliver majority control to either of the two major faction s - one controlled by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, the other by current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki - and the resulting power struggle has spilled into the streets. Again. On Monday, more than 100 people were killed and 300 injured after a series of bombings and assassinations rippled across Iraq. In total, it appears there were more than 60 attacks; Baghdad, Mosul, Hilla, and other cities were rent by explosions and gunfire which, according to the power players, had a decidedly political edge. Matters have gotten so dangerous there that Allawi was compelled to lash out at his own government (such as it is) for sitting on their hands while people are getting killed: Allawi says he is under constant threat and that the government is doing little to help protect him. "We live every single day under a threat that we are going to be assassinated," he says. "I ask for support from the government, as an ex-Prime Minister ... Nobody cares a damn." Asked to specify what kind of support he has asked for, Allawi says, "Cars, communication gear, these bomb-detection, anti-detonator things ... These cost a lot of money. It's not free of charge. We need the government to protect us as they protect others. But this is not happening. I have to go to personal friends to donate a car, an armored car. It's ridiculous." Allawi is particularly furious that the impasse has allowed other rivals to whittle away at contested seats with a campaign of "de-Baathification" - that is, purging politicians with ties to Saddam Hussein's ousted Baath Party. "This smearing campaign was something unbelievable: the Baath Party is coming back to power, Saddam Hussein is coming out of his grave and things of this nonsense," he says. (Allawi's party crosses sectarian lines, while al-Maliki's is predominantly Shi'ite.) The violence didn't end on Monday. On Tuesday, two bombs went off in Mosul, one targeting the Iraqi police force and the other targeting an Iraqi military patrol. A suicide car bomb went off at a police checkpoint in Falluja, and hundreds of students tried to storm a local Parliament building in the Kurdish region of Iraq after the abduction and killing of a Kurdish journalist. This would all be disgusting by itself, but is made more so by the fact that these events have become so morbidly predictable. Advocates of the war, along with a herd of "professional" pundits, would argue that things are far better in Iraq than they used to be. Those unfortunate souls who have spent the first half of this week sweeping guts and eyeballs off the sidewalks, however, would probably beg to differ. Which brings us to why we're not leaving. According to The Associated Press: U.S. commanders, worried about increased violence in the wake of Iraq's inconclusive elections, are now reconsidering the pace of a major troop pullout this summer, U.S. officials said Tuesday. The withdrawal of the first major wave of troops is expected to be delayed by about a month , the officials said. Waiting much longer could endanger President Barack Obama's goal of reducing the force level from 92,000 to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31. More than two months after parliamentary elections, the Iraqis have still not formed a new government, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried out attacks like Monday's bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people - the country's bloodiest day of 2010. The threat has prompted military officials to look at keeping as many troops on the ground for as long as possible without missing the Aug. 31 deadline. A security agreement between the two nations requires American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011 . In Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which Mr. Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq's security deteriorates . Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Mr. Obama's top campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be



1AC

politically risky back home - but so could anarchy and a bloodbath following a hasty retreat. Two senior administration officials said the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back - if only to ensure that enough security forces are in place to prevent or respond to militant attacks . Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the administration's internal discussions. Already, the violence, fueled by Iraq's political instability, will likely postpone the start of what the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, has called the withdrawal "waterfall" - sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period. Read between the lines of that carefully-worded report, and the reality of the situation becomes all too clear. We made such an incredible mess in Iraq that continued violence is a brass-bound guarantee. Every act of violence gives more fuel to those who argue for staying . It's a perfect circle , and it is not going to stop. George W. Bush and his men got us into Iraq with the absolute intention of staying there forever. We've built a bunch of massive bases for exactly that purpose. Most people consider the Bush administration to be an abject failure, but in this they succeeded beyond even the wildest expectations. The companies that continue to rake in cash from our expenditures in that war are going to be building golden statues of Bush for a long time to come. Whether President Obama is a prisoner of this situation, or is actively continuing the policy, is entirely irrelevant at this point. He may hate this war, or he may love it, but at the end of the day, he will continue in the manner of his predecessor. We're there, and unless this country erupts in a frenzy of furious protest and civil disobedience, we're staying. Even that may not make the nut, but it would be awfully nice to see this country shake itself out of its stupor and do what needs to be done.



1AC

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should withdraw all troops from Iraq by 2011 as specified by the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.



1AC

Contention two is Iraq Stability.

Status quo violence is up because of US presenceLieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00_gard-johns_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

Charge #1: There could be a civil war. Only the presence of U.S. forces is keeping some stability in Iraq and precluding a religious war and increased civilian casualties.Response: There already is a civil war, even if the Administration doesn't use that term. It is beside the point that one side doesn't wear uniforms, a common occurrence in today’s warfare. With conservative estimates of 12,000 - 25,000 civilian deaths and many more thousands wounded since the fall of Baghdad, the high level of civil violence is indisputable.While U.S. troops do provide security in certain locations like the Green Zone , the reality is that daily life in Baghdad is still miserable, journalists can’t leave their hotels, congressional visitors can’t drive from the airport in to Baghdad , and suicide bombers continue to kill on a daily basis . The presence of U.S. forces, the collateral damage they cause and the casualties they inflict on Iraqi civilians are major incentives for the recruitment of insurgents. The visible presence of our troops may actually be more of a cause of civil conflict than a solution to it.



1AC

Withdrawal causes political alignment, ending sectarian violence and increasing stability(Zaid Ad Ali, attorney at New York Bar, 1/19/07, openDemocracy, “The United States in Iraq: The Complete Case For Withdrawal”, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/withdrawal_4264.jsp)

The explosion at Mustansiriyah University that killed more than seventy people on 16 January 2007 sent a clear message: no one is safe in today's Iraq. The Iraqi government has reacted to the atrocity in a typically lethargic and dishonest manner, offering empty promises of swift justice and increased security. Meanwhile, very few observers remain hopeful that the escalation that the George W Bush administration announced on 10 January - involving the deployment of around 21,500 additional United States troops in Iraq - will improve the desperate current situation. It is time for policymakers in the US to face up to the fact that the US occupation will never be able to achieve victory in Iraq, no matter how that goal is defined and what pattern of behaviour it entails. This article argues that there is a clear and ineluctable causal link between the mere presence of the occupation authorities and the failure to reestablish law and order in the country . The only viable course of action is therefore that the US army should withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible . The article ends by offering some suggestions as to what measures can be taken to ensure that the country's post-occupation phase will be as peaceful and successful as possible. A failure of reconstruction The prerequisite to recommending a specific course of action is to offer an honest diagnosis of what has happened in Iraq since March-April 2003. Fortunately, most commentators now agree that the US occupation of Iraq, after apparent military success in the war that preceded it, got off to a very bad start. By virtue of a series of misguided administrative decisions - including the dissolution of the Iraqi army and blanket de-Ba'athification - the occupation authorities managed to destroy the Iraqi state in one fell swoop. One of the consequences of these blunders is that the US created enough space for armed groups of all kinds to mushroom across Iraq within a short period. But this is only one part of the story. The combined effect of the US's policies in 2003 was the dismantling of the entire Iraqi state. The effect of everything that has happened since then, however, is even more disturbing. Despite all the efforts that have been made and all the monies that have been squandered, the US has clearly failed in the most important task that it had set itself: to put the pieces back together and rebuild a functioning state in Iraq. Baghdad is now but a shadow of its former self, resembling Mogadishu more than anything else. In many areas of the country, the state is completely absent. Where the state does make its presence felt, the services that it provides have continued to deteriorate since 2003 - as if there is a cancer eating away at the heart of the state itself. The Bush administration often cites the December 2005 parliamentary elections and the drafting of the new constitution as positive developments, but they at best represent a distraction. A combination of reasons is often cited - sabotage, insurgency, corruption - to explain the failure to reconstruct the state, but the cause is more fundamental: it can be found in the nature of the occupation itself. Whenever a society is occupied, the way in which it will interact with the occupying forces will be determined by a number of different factors. For example, it should be obvious that no occupation comes into existence in a historical vacuum. Indeed, the factual context in which an occupation comes into existence will have a major effect on the way the occupied society will react. In that sense, the fact that the US occupation of Japan took place after one of the most violent wars in human history and after the use of overwhelming force against the occupied country was one of the major reasons why there was no post-war Japanese resistance to speak of (see John Dower, "A warning from history", Boston Review, February/March 2003). By contrast, the circumstances leading up to the American occupation of Vietnam led the people of that country to assume that the US was intending to replace France as a colonial power. In that context, it is surprising how little attention observers, commentators and policymakers alike have paid to the incredibly sordid history of involvement in Iraq prior to its occupation of that country. The US has been involved in internal Iraqi affairs in different ways for at least half a century, and the more involved it has become the more disastrous the results for ordinary Iraqis. The details are often difficult to face up to, considering that we are talking about what should be the world's most important exporter of democracy and prosperity. From the start however, the US policy in relation to Iraq has been characterized by blind self-interest, inhumanity and racism. A sordid history Although it first became involved in Iraqi affairs through covert operations in the late 1950s, the US made its interests in the country abundantly clear during the Iraq-Iran war, when it offered billions of dollars in agricultural credits to the Iraqi regime, which was then able to divert monies to fund its costly war effort (1980-88) against Iran. The US also provided Iraqi generals with military support during the war. On a number of occasions it supplied them with advance warning of Iranian troop movements in order to facilitate the Iraqi war effort. This was done despite the fact that the Reagan administration was already aware at that point that the Iraqis



1AC were preparing to use chemical weapons on the battlefield, which is somewhat problematic considering the US's insistence that the rules of war should be respected at all times. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US seized on the opportunity to launch a full-scale war against the Iraqi people. Hussein was given five months to withdraw, and during that time, thirty countries, led by the US, massed their armies along the Saudi-Iraqi border and in the Gulf. In one of the negotiation sessions, James A Baker made the notorious announcement to Tariq Aziz that Iraq was going to be "bombed in the stone age". That is exactly what happened. In violation of just about every rule of war imaginable, the US and its allies destroyed every piece of infrastructure, every industrial plant, and every governmental institution within their reach, whether civilian or not. Within a few weeks, the Iraqi economy was utterly devastated - the US managed to knock Iraq, which had previously been considered a middle-income economy, back into third-world status. To make matters worse, and in complete contempt for the people that it supposedly cared so much for, the US military for the first time used depleted uranium (DU), a type of nuclear waste, in its munitions. DU is one of the heaviest substances known to man, and it was used in order to increase the efficiency of anti-tank shells. Southern Iraq was the main battlefield during the course of the war and it bore witness to a number of massacres: thousands of Iraqi tanks were laid to waste with DU munitions, even as they withdrew from Kuwait. The effect is that a vast swathe of southern Iraq has been transformed into a toxic wasteland. Its land and water will be contaminated for many thousands of years. In the meantime, cancer rates and the number of malformed births amongst the already poor and downtrodden indigenous people of that area have skyrocketed. Prior to 2003, US officials dismissed the appeals by local Iraqi doctors as Ba'athist propaganda; the fact that these same doctors have continued their campaign against DU in the post-Ba'athist era has apparently left officials in the US unimpressed (see Zaid Al-Ali, "Iraq: the lost generation", 7 November 2004). The next chapter of US-Iraqi relations proved even more deadly for the Iraqi people. After the initial invasion of Kuwait took place in August 1990, the United Nations Security Council imposed the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever devised on Iraq in order to coerce it to withdraw from the country. The rules of the sanctions regime were simple: Iraq could not import or export anything for whatever reason. The effect on Iraq's economy - which was heavily dependent on food imports and on revenues generated by its oil industry - was devastating. After the war, the sanctions were maintained in order to encourage the Iraqi state to destroy its arsenal of non-conventional weapons. Iraq did this within months and - contrary to allegations by US officials - Iraq's non-conventional weapons programmes were never reconstructed. Nevertheless, the US decided that the sanctions should be maintained at all costs, regardless of the price that the Iraqi people would have to pay. It therefore blocked all efforts by the international community to have the sanctions lifted. It was clear from the start of the sanctions regime that it was utterly inhuman and could not continue without causing the death of hundreds of thousands of poor Iraqis. But that is precisely what happened: after the 1991 war, poverty rates continued to increase at incredible rates, and an increasing number of Iraqis were dying from preventable diseases because of a lack of access to basic medicines. After a significant amount of pressure, the US acquiesced in the creation of the oil-for-food programme. This mechanism was in theory designed to alleviate the suffering of poor Iraqis, but in fact just prolonged their misery. It allowed the Iraqi government to sell a limited amount of oil in order to purchase basic necessities for its population. These limits were set according to what was calculated to be the minimum amount that each Iraqi required to survive. After it was discovered that Iraqis were still starving despite the program, the limit on the sale of oil was doubled. Then it was found that this still meant that UN sniffer-dogs were better fed than the average Iraqi, and the limit was lifted altogether. But the decision came years too late for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who perished as a result of the hardships imposed on them. Each time, the US was the one to set the limits of the programme. The latest chapter in the story of US-Iraqi relations started in 2003, when the US launched its unprovoked and unjustified attack on Iraq. It is now commonly accepted that the occupation that followed has served to bring yet new miseries to the most vulnerable Iraqis. A state of corruption Most people living in the west tend to forget this history as they were never directly affected by it. Iraqis however are acutely aware of the way that they have been violently oppressed with the connivance, complicity, or direct exercise of power by successive US administrations. In light of this knowledge, and given the context that Iraqis are living through, it is worth considering what type of person would accept to collaborate with the occupation forces in Iraq. It was clear from the start, and the way the situation has played out in practice has proven beyond any shred of a doubt, that the Iraqi government is populated by officials who are morally corrup t . It is commonly accepted that what was left of Iraq in 2003 has now fallen apart, but insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that one of the main culprits behind this state of affairs is the Iraqi government itself. Most analysts, most notably the Iraq Study Group, have accepted the superficial narrative according to which the Iraqi government is a "government of national unity" that is "broadly representative of the Iraqi people". Others have realised that the government has failed to satisfy its obligations to reestablish the rule of law, but have instinctively attributed this failure to a lack of initiative on the part of senior Iraqi officials. It should be obvious from the way the Iraqi state has evolved in the past three years that this narrative is completely mistaken. If Iraq has become the most corrupt country in the middle east it is not because the government is not capable of dealing with the issue - it is because the senior government officials are actually amongst the most corrupt people in the country. If violence is increasing, it is not because the government is unable to combat it, but because it is in fact involved in promoting it. If Iraq is not rife with sectarianism, it is not because Iraqis are inherently that way - far from it. It is because it was the only system on offer by a political class that depends on sectarianism to be relevant. If the reconciliation process is failing, it is not because Iraqis are



1AC

barbarians, as western commentary often suggests or implies - it is because senior politicians prefer to eliminate their opponents than to compromise. If public services are continuing to deteriorate, it is not because the government doesn't have sufficient expertise to repair them - it is because senior officials are not affected in any way, and so they don't care. And if 3,000 Iraqis continue to leave the country every day, the government fails to act not because it is incapable, but because they are disinterested - their families already live comfortably abroad anyway. What is to be done? There is clearly only one option available: the Iraqi government must go. But the solution cannot merely be to replace it with a different group of individuals, whether through elections or through an appointment process similar to what took place in 2004. It is not a coincidence that the Iraqi government has evolved in the way that it has - it was unavoidable given the presence of the US occupation . And as long as the occupation remains in place, any individual Iraqi that will accept to work in government will much more likely than not be of the same stock as the individuals currently in power. The presence of the US army in Iraq has a deeply corrosive influence on Iraqi society , and this is what policy makers in the US should come to terms with. In order for Iraq to function, the US military should withdraw from the country as soon as possible. There are many Iraqis who are competent, honest, and non-sectarian and who would be willing to rebuild their country, so long as the circumstances are correct. What this means in practice is that t he US army must leave in order to create enough s pace for these people to contribute . Hussein al-Muayed, Jawad al-Khalissi, Abdul Hussein Sha'ban and many others have been waiting in the wings for the past four years and will continue to boycott the political process so long as the occupation remains in place. They are all household names in Iraq, respected for their integrity, their intelligence, and their non-sectarian credentials, but they remain largely unknown in the west precisely because they refuse to collaborate with the occupation. Some would no doubt argue that a withdrawal of US troops in Iraq would merely lead to an increase in violence. I would suggest that the alternative - staying the current course and maintaining the presence of US forces in Iraq - is much more likely to lead to more violence. A withdrawal will force a realignment of political forces in Baghdad. The government would probably collapse - not an unattractive proposition - and because truly competent and honest political forces would accept to participate in the post-occupation phase, there is a strong likelihood that the political wrangling that would ensue would lead to a more effective and non-sectarian government. In any event, if the US does decide to withdraw, it could do so and still play a constructive role by implementing certain measures that would reduce the potential for violence. It could start by offering to take all collaborators with them as they withdraw from Iraq, in the way that President Ford did when US forces withdrew from Vietnam. In that case, 150,000 Vietnamese were resettled in the US. In Iraq, the numbers would necessarily be far lower considering that the apparatus established in Baghdad is nowhere near the size of what it was in Saigon. This initiative could be financed merely by redirecting a small fraction of what it is costing the United States to maintain the occupation in place. Today, there are no good solutions to the catastrophe that the US has created in Iraq. There are only those options that we know will lead to a further escalation of the conflict, and those that have a chance of leading to a positive conclusion. At this stage, it is certain that the deployment of additional US troops to Iraq will merely lead to more death and suffering. On the other hand, a unilateral and immediate withdrawal of US troops offers the possibility and some hope that an effective and non-sectarian system of government may emerge in the aftermath . After all, and in the final analysis, what the Iraqi people need now is not more armies, more war, and more violence. What they need is to recover their independence and to be given the space to govern themselves, by themselves. What they want and what they need is to be free once and for all.



1AC

Iraq instability causes global nuclear warCorsi, Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard & Staff Reporter for World Net Daily, 1-8-7 (Jerome, "War with Iran is Imminent, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53669)

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq , Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria . The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war , with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.



1AC

Can’t renege – would cause instability and helps al-QaedaRaed Jarrar, political analyst, and Erik Leaver, research fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, Counterpunch 3/3 ’10, “Sliding Backwards on Iraq” http://www.counterpunch.org/jarrar03032010.html

But reneging on withdrawal would have the gravest consequences in Iraq. The Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan. The mantra was "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." But such plans for "condition-based" withdrawal create the very deteriorating conditions that lead to an extension of the military occupation.Unfortunately, there is considerable support both inside and outside Iraq for the continuation of U.S. occupation. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United S t ates by keeping it engaged in a conflict that takes an enormous toll on human lives, money, and global reputation . And Iran and other regional players fear the reemergence of a strong, independent, and united Iraq.



1AC

Contention three is Iran.

This is the most important issue – Iraq is key to engage IranKugelman 06 Michael Kugelman Vali R. Nasr, Professor of Middle East and South Asia Politics, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate SchoolThe Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University and Master’s Degree Student, The Fletcher School, Tufts Universityhttp://farescenter.tufts.edu/publications/papers/2006Paper1-EngagingDialogue.pdf

Dr. Nasr spoke of the prospects and challenges for U.S. dialogue with Iran, positing that better U.S.-Iranian relations may be predicated on a better American understanding of conditions on the ground in Iran. While American contexts for possible dialogue with Iran involve the War on Terror, the war in Iraq, Iranian nuclear technology, and domestic forces in Iran pushing for political change, Iran’s proposed focal points for dialogue revolve around the long- term implications of the American presence in the region . Stability and prosperity are larger concerns in Iran than questions of freedom, particularly as American actions have disrupted the past regional balance of power: Pakistani and Iranian gains in Afghanistan have been reversed, as has Iranian “expansionism” in parts of Iraq. Additionally, the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have drastically altered state structures. Yet none of these developments, Dr. Nasr argued, are reflected in current U.S. policy-making or featured in American attempts at dialogue. The American footprint, he continued, has profound consequences for Iran, particularly as the Iranian “zone of influence” crosses Iranian national boundaries and extends from Najaf, Iraq, to Herat, Afghanistan.



1AC

Diplomacy with Iran prevents miscalculation that could escalate to preemptive strikesSENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR (R-IN); May 18, 2006, CAPITOL HILL HEARING, Federal News Service, l/n

The witnesses generally shared the view that no diplomatic options, including direct talks, should be taken off the table. Direct talks may in some circumstances be useful in demonstrating to our allies our commitment to diplomacy , dispelling anti-American rumors among the Iranian people, preventing Iranian misinterpretation of our goals, or reducing the risk of accidental escalation . Our policies and our communications must be clear, precise and confident, without becoming inflexible.I noted a comment by Dr. Henry Kissinger in an op-ed on Iran that appeared in Tuesday's Washington Post. Dr. Kissinger wrote, I quote: "The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War, i.e. no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialog within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union the evil empire," end of quote from Dr. Kissinger. Now, Dr. Kissinger's analogy, as well as the testimony we heard yesterday, reinforced the point that Iran poses a sophisticated policy challenge that will require the nuanced use of a range of diplomatic and economic tools.

Strikes draw in the entire Middle East and Central AsiaMichel Chossudovsky, (Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Consultant to many international institutions such as UNDP and the WHO; and researcher at the Center for Research on Globalization), 5-1-5, Centre for Research on Globalisation, www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO505A.html

The World is at an important crossroads.The Bush Administration has embarked upon a military adventure which threatens the future of humanity.Iran is the next military target. The planned military operation, which is by no means limited to punitive strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, is part of a project of World domination, a military roadmap, launched at the end of the Cold War.Military action against Iran would directly involve Israel 's participation, which in turn is likely to trigger a broader war through out the Middle East , not to mention an implosion in the Palestinian occupied territories. Turkey is closely associated with the proposed aerial attacks. Israel is a nuclear power with a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. (See text box below). The use of nuclear weapons by Israel or the US cannot be excluded , particularly in view of the fact that tactical nuclear weapons have now been reclassified as a variant of the conventional bunker buster bombs and are authorized by the US Senate for use in conventional war theaters. ("they are harmless to civilians because the explosion is underground")In this regard, Israel and the US rather than Iran constitute a nuclear threat.The planned attack on Iran must be understood in relation to the existing active war theaters in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine.

The conflict could easily spread from the Middle East to the Caspian sea basin. It could also involve the participation of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where US troops are stationed.An attack on Iran would have a direct impact on the resistance movement inside Iraq. It would also put pressure on America's overstretched military capabilities and resources in both the Iraqi and Afghan war theaters. (The 150,000 US troops in Iraq are already fully engaged and could not be redeployed in the case of a war with Iran.)In other words, the shaky geopolitics of the Central Asia- Middle East region, the three existing war theaters in which America is currently, involved, the direct participation of Israel and Turkey, the structure of US sponsored military alliances, etc. raises the specter of a broader conflict.

Moreover, US military action on Iran not only threatens Russian and Chinese interests, which have geopolitical interests in the Caspian sea basin and which have bilateral agreements with Iran. It also backlashes on European oil interests in Iran and is likely to produce major divisions between Western allies , between the US and its European partners as well as within the European Union.


http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO505A.html


1AC

Middle East War Goes Global - Results in Extinction in a Week DEBKAfile, Israeli military intelligence review, winner of Forbes’ Best of the Web Award, 12-23-‘2 [“Pandemic Potential in Mid East Bio Warfare” http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=227]

The danger of biological warfare turning into a pandemic is of particular concern in the Middle East, given the medical, social and economic conditions prevailing in the region, according to the experts consulted by DEBKAfile. These conditions appear to have persuaded the Iraqi ruler that he holds an unanswerable deterrent. The rush of activity around Israel’s defenses – the dispatch of US anti-missile, anti-air batteries and an exercise for integrating US and Israeli systems - arises from the conviction that Israel is one of Iraq’s targets of choice and the Washington’s undertaking to protect the country against Iraqi retaliation for a US assault on Baghdad. The pandemic factor in bio warfare has unfolded quietly but with devastating consequences since Saddam fourteen years ago launched one of the largest biological and chemical attacks on a civilian population in history. To punish Iraqi ethnic Kurds for supporting Iran in the brutal 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, he dropped poisonous substances on the Kurdish town of Halabjah, killing an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 Iraqi Kurds. The population of that once vibrant market town on the Iranian border was halved outright, but there were also dire genetic consequences. Christine Gosden, head of Medical Genetics at Liverpool University in northwest England, says that to this day, Halabjah’s inhabitants are prone to cancer, respiratory disorders, skin rashes and birth defects, such as Down syndrome, as well as infertility and mental health problems. Cleft palates and spina bifida appear in three times more people than in nearby Suleimaniyeh. Iraq’s genocidal bio-war agents, such as rotavirus, which only kills infants and children, still cause deaths today. And today, the threat of Iraq again resorting to bio-engineered weapons raises an even broader pandemic peril. For instance, if Iraq were to retaliate against Israel for an American offensive by disseminating smallpox, or a similar bio-warfare agent, an epidemic might ensue, but Israel’s medical services are capable of containing it. However, a comparable standard of medicine i s totally lacking in surrounding countries. Such a bio-weapon, especially if Saddam were to use two or more, could spread around th e Middle East and the world in the space of one week. The hazard would be as great if Baghdad were to employ biological agents against US troops. These regional conditions would blow a contagion to pandemic proportions: 1. The lack of adequate medical treatment facilities in most Middle East countries. 2. The movement of oil from and through the Middle East out to Western countries. 3. Poor sanitary conditions in most regional countries. 4. A water shortage after five years of drought, which even an abundantly rainy winter in 2002-2003 would not suffice to alleviate. 5. The 2-4 million visitors each year making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. One possible scenario would have West Bank Palestinians fleeing from contamination by an Iraqi biological attack aimed at Israel, but spreading to their centers. These refugees would carry the infection to surrounding countries like Jordan, Syria, Egypt, or even Iran. All the vehicles heading out of the region would carry the contamination with them. Smuggled goods across the borders would have the same effect. DEBKAfile’s military source report that in late November, Jordan deployed military units along its frontier with Israel and the West Bank to forestall any such an exodus and asked Israel to cooperate by lining up troops on its side of the Jordan river frontier. Our sources say the prime minister’s office delayed its reply to the plea from Amman. The royal palace appealed to Washington to intercede with Ariel Sharon – so far without effect. A source familiar with the exchanges between the three capitals summed up the present state of play: “Why must we rush to solve a non-existent problem at this moment? Jordan has effectively cut down the incoming Palestinian traffic to 100 a day. We don’t need to look as though we are working with the Jordanians to seal off the border. After war breaks out and should we find ourselves facing biological or chemical attack, we’ll confront that problem, like the hundreds of others that will no doubt arise. DEBKAfile’s political sources comment: On the one hand, the flight en masse of refugees from Palestinian controlled areas is a delicate political issue; on the other, migration pressures could swing out of the control of any authority, whether American, Israel or Jordanian. US war planners in Washington are taking into account potential war-inducted major population shifts in the Middle East of minorities in flight from war zones or those taking the opportunity to seek greener pastures, whether for a better deal as minority groups or a better life in general. Seen in those terms, the Palestinian potential for migration is not among the largest. In terms of the hazards of transmitting bio-engineered disease worldwide, a far greater danger is seen in Washington as posed by the annual pilgrimage to the Saudi holy cities of Mecca and Medina by some four million Muslims from 70 countries. Many travel by air, journeying from South America to North America, Britain, France, Germany, the FarFar EastEast and all corners of the globe. Even if a state of war reduces the Hajj by fifty percent, millions will still flock to the Saudi cities in 2003, providing Saddam Hussein and fanatical terrorist groups like al Qaeda with an ideal breeding ground for turning outbreaks of smallpox or anthrax into a world pandemi c . Most intelligence analysts agree today that neither Saddam nor al Qaeda will scruple to transform this holy event into a doomsday weapon .


http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=227


1AC

Talks with Iran are key to solve their nuclearizationClifford Kupchan and Ray Takeyh, (Director at Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm; senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), May 23, 2006, The Boston Globe, www.cfr.org/publication/10750/us_could_benefit_from_a_giveandtake_strategy_with_iran.html

In the end, as distasteful as it maybe, Washington has no option but to engage in a direct give and take with the Iran ian regime. A generous American offer of economic concessions and security dialogue may just tip the scales in favor of pragmatists inclined to arrest Iran's drive toward nuclear arms . Should this approach fail, the United States can return to its allies and coalitions of the willing with a credible claim that it has exhausted all diplomatic options and it is time for a viable, multilateral policy of pressure .

Iranian nuclearization causes nuclear warJoseph Cirincione (Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress), April 4, 2006, Interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10331/

They want to deter a United States or possibly Israeli attack, and they want the prestige that such a weapon would give them for their regional ambitions.

And it's exactly for those reasons that other countries in the region would react. Saudi Arabia could not tolerate the political, military, and diplomatic power that a nuclear weapon would give Iran . And that's the great danger-that other countries in the region would start exploring their nuclear options.There are already stories that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with the Pakistanis on nuclear research. We don't know if this is true, but we do know that the Saudis bankrolled the Pakistani nuclear program. My great fear is that the Saudis might take a nuclear shortcut, and invite Pakistan to station some of its nuclear weapons on Saudi territory . This, in fact, would actually be legal under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Saudi Arabia is a member of, just the way the United States stations nuclear weapons in Europe. Egypt might also react. They used to have a nuclear program in the 1960s; they might decide that they have to beat the Iranian challenge in their own way. So might Turkey.In fact, if there's a unified government of Iraq within five years, Iraq -long-term foe of Iran-might consider that it needs to balance Iranian power. So that's really the great threat, is that you would go from a Middle East with one nuclear weapons state, Israel, to one with three, four, or five nuclear weapons states with the remaining political, economic, and ethnic conflicts unresolved. That's a recipe for nuclear war.

Talks solve terrorismTahereh Ebrahimi-far, (Professor of International Relations at the Islamic Azad University, in Tehran), 2005, Journal of the European Society for Iranian Studies, 39-52.

Terrorism Considering the mounting terrorist provocations ascribed to fundamentalist groups in Central Asia and Southern Caucasus, particularly in the

Middle East region and in Afghanistan and Iraq, the necessity for the realization of security cooperation between the US and Iran is indisputable. Iran and the US can embark on creating anti-terrorist bases near the border of Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq. Of further possible cooperation, one can cite the exchange of information on the situation of terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US and Iran can be active in hold ing security meetings in order to bring viewpoints closer on the nature and concept of terrorism and combat it with the participation of other sub-system security environments. On the other hand, Iran can help the US, by receiv ing US logistic support , in the combat against terrorist groups located in the west of Afghanistan and northern Iraq which share common borders with Iran.


http://www.cfr.org/publication/10331/

http://www.cfr.org/publication/10750/us_could_benefit_from_a_giveandtake_strategy_with_iran.html


1AC

Terrorism causes extinctionYonah Alexander, Director, Terrorism Studies Program, 1999. Abstract. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses. www.isrp.com.au/isrpcom/journal/pa_abstracts/abstract__alexander.htm

Terrorism-the calculated employment of the threat of violence by individuals, subnational groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the violation of law, intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area larger than the victims attacked or threatened-is as old as

civilization itself. Yet unlike their historical counterparts, present day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats. The internationalization and brutalization of modern terrorism make it clear that we have entered into an "Age of Terrorism" with all of its serious implications to

national, regional and global security concerns. This alarming and dangerous trend increases the potential for "Super Terrorism"-biological, chemical or nuclear violence-as well as the advent of information warfare and cyber terrorism. Perhaps the most significant dangers are those relating to: the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and perhaps even the survival of civilization itself.

Engaging Iran is critical to ensuring Iraq stabilityGawdat Bahgat (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania), Parameters, Summer 2007, pp. 5-18, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07summer/bahgat.htm

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security adviser, urges the United States to engage in bilateral talks with Iran on mutually contentious security and economic issues.42 The bipartisan Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, advocates that, "Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq." The group recommends that the U nited States " engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues."43

The SOFA’s guarantee of withdrawal assuages fears of permanent US presence, securing Iranian cooperationDaniel Serwer, VP of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, and Sam Parker, Iraq Program Officer in the Center for Post-Conflict, Peace, and Stability Operations, USIP Peace Brief Dec ‘8, “Iraq in the Obama Administration” http://www.usip.org/resources/iraq-in-the-obama-administration

That said, Iran can also be helpful , provided the right incentives. It intervened to help end fighting between Sadrists and ISF in early 2008, once it was clear that its "special groups" within the Sadrist movement were losing the battle. Tehran appears, for the moment, to have reined in violence by special groups, although training activities are continuing. The U.S. and Iran share to some degree an interest in a stable Iraq governed by a popularly elected parliament and prime minister, but the U.S. wants a strong Iraq while Iran wants a weak one. In general, the incentive structure facing neighboring regimes is changing. For much of the Iraq war, several of Iraq's neighbors either actively undermined U.S. efforts in Iraq or merely declined to play a positive role out of fear of a long-term U.S. presence and of further efforts at regime change throughout the region. Now that it is apparent that these developments are not likely, supporting stability in Iraq has become a more prominent concern.The SOFA's formal commitment to U.S. withdrawal and a new U.S. president who has been critical of Bush Administration policies in the Middle East present an opportunity for the U.S. to capitalize on this change in incentive structure and secure more robust regional cooperation in Iraq. Iraq is and will inevitably continue to be the scene of competition between the Arab regimes and Iran, and the potential for Turkish incursion in northern Iraq is a perennial concern. Despite the competing and conflicting interests in the region, there is also a mutual interest in stability and in keeping Iraq's problems contained.


http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07summer/bahgat.htm

http://www.isrp.com.au/isrpcom/journal/pa_abstracts/abstract__alexander.htm


1AC

Contention four is Overstretch.

Iraq has overstretched the military—destroying recruitment, retention, and qualityLieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00_gard-johns_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

The U.S. military will be stretched to the breaking point: In January 2004, Lieutenant General John Riggs said : " I have been in the Army 39 years, and I’ve never seen it as stretched in that 39 years as I have today;" and it is more stretched now. Despite increased incentives and lowered standards, the Army is unable to meet its recruitment goals . If the U.S. maintains troops in Iraq indefinitely at or near current levels, the ability of our armed forces to protect our national security interests in the rest of the world, including in Afghanistan where the Taliban has mounted a reinvigorated insurgency, will continue to decline.It is evident that many junior and mid-grade officers , discouraged by the prospect of repeated tours in Iraq, are resigning their commissions after fulfilling their mandatory service obligations, rather than opting for careers in the military. The difficulties faced by the armed forces today will lead to a deterioration of the quality of the Army from which it will take many years to recover.

And, repeated tours of duty have damaged equipment and moraleSaunders 07( Phillip C., Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, The United States and East Asia after Iraq, https://secure.www.cfr.org/content/meetings/Iraq-Impact/49-1_09_Saunders.pdf)

Washington’s commitments in Iraq may have a longer-term impact on US global military capabilities , which would indirectly affect the US ability to fulfill its security commitments in Asia. Iraq deployments have placed the great est strain s on the army and the marines. Many ground units have completed multiple tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan. The resulting stress on troops and families is having some negative effects on recruitment and retention, although the services have continued to hit their recruitment quotas. Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker has called for an expansion of the size of the army, warning that the Iraq War will break the army unless the active duty force is expanded or the National Guard and reserves are remobilised.15 Over the long run, increased losses of experienced mid-level officers and non- commissioned officers could have a negative impact on US military capabilities . However, repeated tours in Iraq and Afghanistan are also providing extensive combat experience throughout the force, which may help offset the loss of some experienced personnel.16 The extended Iraq deployment is taking a toll on equipment as well as troops. Equipment used in Iraq faces intensified maintenance requirements due to prolonged use in desert conditions; a higher-than-expected operational tempo also means that equipment will need to be replaced sooner than expected. The cost of equipment replacement and a potential expansion in the size of the army will place additional demands on future US military budgets and may limit the



1AC

Overstretch collapses the economyFakiolas and Fakiolas 07 (Efstathios T and Tassos, PhD from the Department of War Studies, PhD from IMEMO, Mediterranean Quarterly Pax Americana or Multilateralism? Reflecting on the United States’ Grand Strategic Vision of Hegemony in the Wake of the 11 September Attacks, http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/4/53)

On the other hand, an important question arises as to what the concept of hegemony means. Conventional wisdom understands it as an enduring pattern of dominance that a great power imposes over others by building a hierarchical world order in its own right. The principal intellectual tradition developed is the hegemonic stability theory. 17 This assumes that hegemony points to situations in which one state has considerably more economic power than the others. The inequality of this type of power is so great that it allows this state to achieve territorial expansion, establish free trade, and rule the international system politically, thereby making a hegemonic world order possible and stable. However, territorial and military overstretch, coupled with diplomatic over commitments , inevitably result in the economic decline of the hegemon, which in turn lays the ground for its power to wane and the world order to degenerate.

Independently, current Iraq spending is unsustainableRussel Feingold, US senator from Wisconsin, Counterpunch May 2, ‘6, Remarks on the Senate Floor, “Our Presence is Destabilizing Iraq” http://www.counterpunch.org/feingold05022006.html

More important, though, is the fact that our current Iraq policy is making the United States weaker, not stronger. We need to redeploy U.S. forces from Iraq because, as a result of our current costly and burdensome presence in Iraq, we are unable to direct our resources worldwide to defeat the wide and growing network of terrorist organizations that seek to harm Americans.This Administration has compounded its misguided decision to wage war in Iraq by refusing to recognize the consequences of its actions--the tremendous cost to our brave troops and their loved ones, the drain on our financial resources, and the burden on our nation's national security resources and infrastructure, which are unable to focus on new and emerging threats to our country. I don't have to point very far to show how imbalanced and burdensome our policies in Iraq are. While we have spent , according to the Congressional Research Service, upwards of $6 billion dollars per week during Operation Iraqi Freedom , and $1.3 billion per week during Operation Enduring Freedom, we are spending a little more than $2 million annually--not weekly -- in Somalia, a known haven for terrorists and criminals and a true threat to our national security. This supplemental appropriation, if passed, will increase the cost of this war to $320 billion and rising. Mr. President, this is simply unsustainable, and because the President has failed to provide us with any semblance of a vision for when our troops will be redeployed, we can expect more of the same for years to come. That is, unless the Congress finally requires the Administration to develop an Iraq strategy that includes a flexible timeline for redeploying our troops by the end of 2006.


http://www.counterpunch.org/feingold05022006.html

http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/4/53


1AC

Economic collapse causes nuclear warMead, 9 – Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter Russell, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/09, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

The damage to China's position is more subtle. The crisis has not--yet--led to the nightmare scenario that China-watchers fear: a recession or slowdown producing the kind of social unrest that could challenge the government. That may still come to pass--the recent economic news from China has been consistently worse than most experts predicted--but, even if the worst case is avoided, the financial crisis has nevertheless had significant effects. For

one thing, it has reminded China that its growth remains dependent on the health of the U.S . economy. (continued…)A deceleration in China's long-term growth rate would postpone indefinitely the date when China could emerge as a peer competitor to the United States.

The present global distribution of power could be changing slowly, if at all. The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. ( Think of Weimar Germany , when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United S t ates and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil

seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the

economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years . For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that t he U nited States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. (continued………)This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises

actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars . Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression , what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight .


http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2

http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2


1AC

This is key—Iraq is the core distraction from domestic econ issuesTellis 08 (Ashely J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States, The National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/sa08_Intro.pdf)

If the issue of maintaining productivity growth constitutes the transforming element in the economic realm, bringing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to a happy conclusion could be conceived as its political counterpart. Success here would liberate the U.S. economy to focus on resolving those more pressing domestic problems that inhibit the growth of U.S. strength. Expanding investments in national infrastructure, defeating poverty, restoring fiscal d iscipline, and expanding the range of opportunity for the U.S. citizenry would be among the problems that could be addressed more easily if a satisfactory conclusion to these twin conflicts could be realized. This will be, however, among the most difficult, yet urgent, challenges facing Bush’s successor. If current trends continue, it appears as if the United States will steadily reduce its involvement in Iraq irrespective of whether Senator John McCain or Senator Barack Obama becomes the next president. A number of factors—the steep and rising costs of the war, the public exhaustion with its course, the undermining of all the original rationales for the conflict, and the steadily increasing human toll in combat operations—seem to be coagulating to compel a substantial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in the not too distant future . The recent improvements in the security situation in that country, coupled with the election of an indigenous government that now seeks for its own domestic reasons to minimize the U.S. presence, will increase the pressure for reduced U.S. involvement, especially given the financial relief that such withdrawal seems to promise (even if it is ultimately belied).



1AC

Even if withdrawal is a setback, continued occupation is too expensive and our overstretch benefits Al QaedaTed Galen Carpenter, VP for defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO institute, Council on Foreign Relations Feb 28, ‘8, “When Should the US Withdraw from Iraq?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/15586/when_should_the_us_withdraw_from_iraq.html

A long-term occupation would be an extremely costly proposition, both in lives and dollars. The mission currently costs more than $10 billion per month. Even if the level of violence remains relatively low, and Washington ultimately achieves its long-delayed objective of reducing troop levels below 100,000 (neither of which is certain), the monthly cost would still run $7 billion to $8 billion. And that is merely the direct financial drain. It does not take into account such indirect costs as the care of thousands of additional wounded veterans over the coming decades—an obligation that will add tens of billions more to the tab. A long-term mission in Iraq is a multi-trillion-dollar commitment.The hawks argue that we have no choice, though, because a withdrawal would, according to James Phillips, be a “disaster.” He worries especially that al-Qaeda would acquire a sanctuary and that Iran would be strengthened. The first concern is greatly overblown. Al-Qaeda [AQI] is universally hated by Shiites and Kurds, and it has clearly worn out its welcome even with its former Sunni allies. A University of Maryland poll reveals that an overwhelming majority of Iraqi Sunnis dislike al-Qaeda (PDF). Who would provide a sanctuary?Fears about Iran’s enhanced influence have some validity, but that train left the station a long time ago. When the United States overthrew the Baathist regime that made Iraq into the principal strategic counterweight to Iran, it guaranteed that Tehran ’s position would be strengthen ed. A Shiite-led government in Baghdad may not be an Iranian vassal, but it will have close ties to Iran. And no extended U.S. occupation (short of making Iraq a outright U.S. puppet) can prevent that outcome.Leaving Iraq will not be without adverse consequences to the United States, but for a superpower, it will be a setback, not a disaster. Conversely, trying to stay in Iraq means having U.S. troops attempt to referee the still simmering Sunni-Shiite internecine struggle—a conflict that could fully re-ignite at any time. Trying to remain in Iraq also plays into the hands of al-Qaeda, which has already benefitted enormously from a U.S. military occupation that has antagonized the overwhelming majority of people in the Muslim world. The Iraq mission was always the foreign policy equivalent of purchasing stock in Enron or Worldcom. It is long past time to acknowledge error and terminate our losses.



1AC

Contention five is Soft Power.

Iraq killed US credibility and international imageLieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00_gard-johns_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

Charge # 3: If the U.S. "cuts and runs," we will lose prestige and credibility across the globe.Response: Accusations that arguments for policy change constitute a “cut and run” surrender is an emotional ploy that obfuscates the issue. It is precisely the U.S. intervention in Iraq that has squandered the positive image of , and world sympathy that was felt for, the U.S. immediately after 9/11. According to authoritative polling, after two years of an aggressive U.S. campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East, the Iraq war has made millions suspicious of U.S. intentions ; and the polls reveal that most now believe the war has made the world more, not less, dangerous.Not only do most Europeans view us in a negative light, but our image in the Muslim world is even worse: only about one fifth of Turks, Pakistanis or Jordanians -- to name three U.S. allies -- view us positively . It is true that American military power is respected and prestigious because it is the strongest in the world; but being regarded as a stubborn bully focused exclusively on our own interests as seen by the Administration does not give our nation the kind of image or credibility we desire and need. It is significant that polls show 80% of Iraqis want the American military to depar t. At a recent conference, Iraqi leaders called for the departure of American troops and even suggested that insurgents are justified in killing coalition troops.The war against extremists cannot be won primarily through the use of force—it is foremost a war of ideas. We are losing that war and our Iraqi policy is one of the contributors to that condition.The U.S. cannot rebuild its credibility by extending the occupation, but rather by reforming the botched reconstruction program to restore a consistent supply of water, electricity and gasoline to Iraq’s civilian population, and by talking with all parties in the country and region to help rebuild its political structure.

Perception of aggressive US military intent has killed leadership legitimacy and hegemonyHinnebusch 07 (Raymond, Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 209–228, Fall 2007, Middle East Critique, The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a782790793&fulltext=713240928)

But heg emony also depends on legitimacy —many states accept it as long as the hegemon defends a world order that benefits more actors than itself . For John Ikenberry,16 the hegemon’s overwhelming power is actually unthreatening since the US is content to be an ‘off-shore balancer’ and eschews territorial aggrandizement; because, being democratic, its policy is predictable and self-restraining, not arbitrary; and because its power is exercised through multinational institutions where it is constrained by mutually agreed rules. The Iraq war , however, suggests that the US role in the world has taken a turn away from benign hegemony as predictability, self- restraint, and multilateralism no longer hold and , in the Middle East at least, the US has become a partisan player, not a balancer. Iraq may mark a watershed, as the squandering of soft power and substitution of force for consent undermines the legitimacy of US leadership.


http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a782790793&fulltext=713240928



1AC

Heg is key to prevent multiple scenarios for nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the U nited S tates exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states , and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of a nother hostile global rival, enabling the U nited States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.



1AC

And, credibility’s key to successful democratizationNossel 04 (Suzanne, Chief of Operations for Human Rights Watch, Foreign Affairs, Smart Power, http:// www.jstor.org/stable/20202345)

By undermining alliances, international institutions, and U.S. credibility , the Bush administration has triggered a cycle that is depleting U.S. power . Spurning global cooperation has encouraged distrust of U.S. motives, hampering U.S. effectiveness in Iraq and fanning hostility. The pernicious result is that liberation and freedom , the most contagious ideas in history, are becoming associated , at least in the Middle East, with a violent and unwanted occupation . A new liberal internationalist agenda must turn this vicious cycle into a virtuous one, in which U.S. power generates confidence in U.S. leadership, enhancing U.S. power all the more.

Democracy prevents multiple scenarios for extinction, nuclear war, and environmental degradationDiamond 95 (Larry, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html)

Nuclear, chemical and bio logical weapons continue to prolif erate . The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another . They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not

ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass d estruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more

stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens , who organize to protest the destruction of their environments . They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because,

within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.


http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202345

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202345


Inherency

**Delay will happen – uncertainty from Iraqi electionDale McFeatters, editorial writer for the Scripps Howard News Service, “Leaving Iraq is Not As Simple as it Sounds” in the Korea Times opinion section 6/16 ’10, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/137_67724.html

More than three months after the elections, Iraq still does not have a government and it may be weeks, even months, before it gets one. This could greatly complicate U.S. plans for withdrawal ― all combat troops out by Aug. 31, except for 50,000 to remain as trainers of the Iraqi security forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations as needed. Those remaining troops are to be gone by the end of 2011.But absent a government, the U.S. military might be Iraq's only guarantee against anarchy and a resumption of sectarian fighting.The problem is that the March 7 elections did not produce a clear winner, only a narrow plurality. The Iraqiya party of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi won 91 seats in the 325-seat parliament. The State of Law party of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki won 89 seats.Allawi believes he should be given time to build a majority coalition. The two major Kurdish parties, with 43 seats, say they would be amenable to joining that coalition contingent on written guarantees about such issues as the division of oil revenues.But Iran brokered a coalition of the two major Shiite parties. This new National Alliance has 159 seats, enough for al-Maliki and other Shiite leaders to claim the right to form the government. The question of whether a bloc created after the election can pre-empt the party with the most votes is before the Iraqi courts.The danger in all this is that the Sunnis, who largely backed Allawi, will once again be shut out of power and once again take to the streets, in the worst case just as the U.S. military is packing up to leave.In a column for the Washington Post, Allawi argued for the U.S. to remain ``actively engaged" in Iraq. ``While I have long supported the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Iraq cannot be allowed to revert to an unstable state of sectarian strife, dominated by regional influences," he wrote.

Election issues ensure combat-capable troops despite drawdown. Prefer our evidence—it cites Biden. The International Herald Tribune, 3/5 ’10, “U.S. worries Iraq election could alter troop pullout; Re-emerging violence is a bigger concern than who wins Sunday vote” by Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, l/n

But administration officials also acknowledged that the bigger worry for the United States was not who would win the elections, but the possibility that the elections - and their almost certainly messy aftermath - could ignite violence that would, at the least, complicate the planned withdrawal.In part for that reason, ''we're not leaving behind cooks and quartermasters,'' Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. said Wednesday by telephone. The bulk of the remaining U.S. troops, he said, ''will still be guys who can shoot straight and go get bad guys.''Gen. Ray Odierno, the top American military commander in Iraq, has drawn up a contingency plan that would keep a combat brigade in northern Iraq beyond the Sept. 1 deadline, should conditions warrant, administration officials said. Kirkuk and the restive Kurdish area in the north are still major concerns for U.S. military planners.Beyond that, military and administration officials say they are prepared to use the remaining U.S. noncombat troops for combat missions, if things heat up.


http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/137_67724.html


Inherency

***Won’t withdraw troops—ambiguous rhetoric is a political tactic, not a real promise of drawdownAP 5/11 ’10, “APNewsBreak: US reviewing Iraq troop pullout pace” by Lara Jakes, l/n

In Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq's security deteriorates. Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Obama's top campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be politically risky back home but so could anarchy and a bloodbath following a hasty retreat. Two senior administration officials said the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back if only to ensure enough security forces are in place to prevent or respond to militant attacks. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the administration's internal discussions.Already, the violence, fueled by Iraq's political instability, will likely postpone the start of what the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, has called the withdrawal "waterfall" sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period.In a January interview with the AP, Odierno said he hoped to start withdrawing as many as a monthly average of 12,500 troops, starting in May, to meet the August deadline. He has long said he would not start the withdrawal until two months after Iraq's March 7 elections to ensure stability.But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior Pentagon official said that the "waterfall" is now expected to begin in June at the earliest. All cited ongoing concerns about whether the political impasse would lead to violence , and spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the process more candidly."From a military perspective, the best way for us to maintain security is to hold as many forces on the ground until we need to redeploy them," said one of the senior officials in Baghdad. The official said it would be wise for Odierno to wait as long as he can, given the unsettled political conditions in Iraq.



Inherency

According to Maliki’s advisor, forces will not withdraw because US will stay on powerful bases in Iraq (Malid Wahik, advisor to PM Miliki tells Voice of Iraq, 6/23/10, Voice of Iraq, “US Forces Reportedly Tighten Control of Iraqi Units”, http://www.lexisnexis.com)

A high-ranking Iraqi security source said that the US forces tightened their control of a number of military and security units of the Iraqi Defence and Interior Ministries that are deployed in and outside of Baghdad. However, the media adviser to the outgoing Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki dismissed this information as "inaccurate." The high-ranking Iraqi security source told Al-Sharq al-Awsat two days ago: "On the pretext of the need for coordination with the Iraqi forces of the Defence Ministry and with some security forces belonging to the Interior Ministry, the US forces tightened their control of these forces that are active in and around the Iraqi capital for fear of these Iraqi forces being used by any political party to control the situation in Baghdad." The source explained: "This move by the US forces was made by appointing senior US forces officers as advisers to Iraqi division and brigade commanders. The source continued: "In his speeches after the announcement of the election results, Al-Maliki said several times that he is the commander in chief of the armed forces. This suggests that he threatens the other political groups to use his powers as commander in chief of the armed forces against other groups that do not enjoy military support." The security source did not hide his concerns that "Al-Maliki might use the army in his favour if his complete loss is confirmed and if he is forced to leave his post as prime minister." The source said: "The attempted assassination of former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who is leader of the Iraqi List, involves the fact that Allawi's rival, Al-Maliki, enjoys a military government power." The source added: "This is especially true in light of the fact that the outgoing prime minister considers Allawi one of his staunchest opponents and believes that Allawi is his rival who stands a good chance to form a government and remove Al-Maliki from power. The first decision in his plan was to prevent Allawi from using the Al-Muthanna Airbase in Baghdad for travel." The Iraqi security source said: "The US forces deal firmly with this issue. Therefore, they imposed their control on the Iraqi forces that might be used in any security operation in implementation of orders from Al-Maliki. " The source noted: "The US forces are at ease because they control the Iraqi airspace and because US military aircraft can control any unusual action on the ground." However, Ali al-Musawi, media adviser to Al-Maliki, denied this information. Speaking to Al-Sharq al-Awsat by telephone from Baghdad yesterday, he said: "None of these reports is true. All Iraqi forces are under the orders of Al-Maliki in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces." He added: "The Iraqi forces began to depend on themselves and they do not need the US forces, even though the agreement on the US forces withdrawal calls for providing assistance to the Iraqi forces, should our forces need such assistance through coordination between them in accordance with the Iraqi Government's recommendations." Commenting on the information that the security source mentioned, Al-Musawi said: "This information is inaccurate, and there is no concern over any problems." He added: "The US forces will withdraw from Iraqi territories in accordance with previously prepared timetables." He emphasized: "The US forces will withdraw without delay." However, the high-ranking security source said: "To our knowledge, the US forces will not withdraw on the announced dates. The US forces insist on remaining in the Balad (formerly Al-Bakr) Base near Samarra because it is the largest Iraqi military base and is situated in the middle of Iraq."



Inherency

Iraq violence set to delay US troop withdrawal because Iraq needs troops to secure the country(Martin Chulov, staff writer, The Guardian, 5/12/10, “Iraq: U.S Troop Withdrawal Delay”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay)

The White House is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country . General Ray Odierno, the US commander, had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki. American officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Late tonight seven people were killed and 22 wounded when a car bomb planted outside a cafe exploded in Baghdad's Sadr City, a Shia area, police and a source at the Iraqi interior ministry said. The latest bomb highlights how sectarian tensions are rising, as al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. The violence is seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe. Odierno has kept a low profile since announcing the deaths of al-Qaida's two leaders in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, who were killed in a combined Iraqi-US raid on 18 April. The operation was hailed then as a near fatal blow against al-Qaida, but violence has intensified ever since. All US combat forces are due to leave Iraq by 31 August, a date the Obama administration is keen to observe as the president sends greater reinforcements to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan – a campaign he has set apart from the Iraq war, by describing it as "just". Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the deadline. But they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict. "The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challenge. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." Zebari said Iraq's neighbours were taking full advantage of the political stalemate. He also hinted that they may be directly backing the violence. "They too have been emboldened, because we haven't been able to establish a viable unified government that others can respect," he said. "In one way or another, Iran, Turkey and Syria are interfering in the formation of this government. "There is a lingering fear [among some neighbouring states] that Iraq should not reach a level of stability. The competition over the future of Iraq is being played out mostly between Turkey and Iran. They both believe they have a vested interest here." The withdrawal order is eagerly awaited by the 92,000 US troops still in Iraq – they mostly remain confined to their bases. This month Odierno was supposed to have ordered the pullout of 12,500, a figure that was meant to escalate every week between now and 31 August, when only 50,000 US troops are set to remain – all of them non-combat forces. US patrols are now seldom seen on the streets of Baghdad, where the terms of a security agreement between Baghdad and Washington are being followed strictly: this relegates them to secondary partners and means US troops cannot leave their bases without Iraqi permission. US commanders have grown accustomed to being masters of the land no longer, but they have recently grown increasingly concerned about what they will leave behind. Zebari said: "The mother of all mistakes that they made was changing their mission from liberation to occupation and then legalising that through a security council resolution." Earlier this week, Allawi warned that the departing US troops had an obligation enshrined in the security agreement and at the United Nations security council to safeguard Iraq's democratic process. He warned of catastrophic consequences if the occupation ended with Iraq still politically unstable.



Inherency

Withdrawal will fail because US claims need to provide help to Iraq(Mike Schwartz, insurgency sociologist, The Huffington Post, 3/15/10, “Will the U.S military leave by 2011”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-schwartz/will-the-us-military-leav_b_498579.html)

I was asked recently by a friend what I thought would happen when the deadline for troop withdrawal from Iraq (December 2011) arrived. Here is my response, for what it is worth: Like so many others who have been following the recent developments in Iraq, I do not have a settled opinion on what will happen to the US military presence there between now and the end of 2011, when the Status of Forces Agreement calls for the withdrawal of all troops (not just "combat" troops). For me, the (so far) definitive statement on this question by Obama was his 2006 election campaign statement at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, where he firmly asserted the need to maintain a (approximately 50,000 strong) US "strike force" in or near Iraq to guarantee US interests in the Middle East, to allow Washington to move quickly against jihadists in the region, and to make clear to "our enemies" that the US will not be "driven from the region." (I am attaching that document, which I still think is the most explicit expression of his thinking on this issue.) In that statement he said that this force could be stationed in Iraq, perhaps in Kurdistan , or in a nearby country (despite the absence of nearby candidates). Since taking office he has neither reiterated nor repudiated this policy, but his actions have made it very clear that he is unwilling to sacrifice the 50k strike force, even while he has also said he would abide by the SOFA and remove all troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. In the meantime, Gates and various generals have released hedging statements or trial balloons (see the recent Tom Dispatch article by Engelhardt) say that the 2011 deadline might be impractical and that various types of forces might stay longer, either to provide air power, to continue training the Iraq military, or to protect Iraq from invasion. Any or all of these could translate into the maintenance of the 50k strike force as well as the five (previously labeled as) "enduring bases." Moreover, while there has been considerable coverage of the vast project undertaken by the U.S. military to remove the billions of equipment from Iraq, I have seen no reports of any dismantling of the five "enduring bases" and, as Engelhardt reports, continued effort to expand the already record-breaking Embassy to accommodate additional hundreds of administrators above the original 1000 projected US officials there.



Inherency

US will not withdraw because it has no interest in losing power over oil lands or global business(Tom Engelhardt, co-founded American Empire Project, Middle East Online, 4/26/10, “Why We Won’t Leave Afghanistan or Iraq”, http://aljazeera.com/news/articles/39/Why-we-wont-leave-Afghanistan-or-Iraq.html)

All evidence indicates that Washington doesn’t want to withdraw -- not really, not from either region. It has no interest in divesting itself of the global control-and-influence business, or of the military-power racket. That’s hardly surprising since we’re talking about a great imperial power and control (or at least imagined control) over the planet’s strategic oil lands. And then there’s another factor to consider: habit. Over the decades, Washington has gotten used to staying. The U.S. has long been big on arriving, but not much for departure. After all, 65 years later, striking numbers of American forces are still garrisoning the two major defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan. We still have about three dozen military bases on the modest-sized Japanese island of Okinawa, and are at this very moment fighting tooth and nail, diplomatically speaking, not to be forced to abandon one of them. The Korean War was suspended in an armistice 57 years ago and, again, striking numbers of American troops still garrison South Korea. Similarly, to skip a few decades, after the Serbian air campaign of the late 1990s, the U.S. built-up the enormous Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo with its seven-mile perimeter, and we’re still there. After Gulf War I, the US either built or built up military bases and other facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, as well as the British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. And it’s never stopped building up its facilities throughout the Gulf region. In this sense, leaving Iraq, to the extent we do, is not quite as significant a matter as sometimes imagined, strategically speaking. It’s not as if the US military were taking off for Dubuque. A history of American withdrawal would prove a brief book indeed. Other than Vietnam, the U.S. military withdrew from the Philippines under the pressure of “people power” (and a local volcano) in the early 1990s, and from Saudi Arabia, in part under the pressure of Osama bin Laden. In both countries, however, it has retained or regained a foothold in recent years. President Ronald Reagan pulled American troops out of Lebanon after a devastating 1983 suicide truck bombing of a Marines barracks there, and the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, functionally expelled the U.S. from Manta Air Base in 2008 when he refused to renew its lease. ("We'll renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami -- an Ecuadorian base," he said slyly.) And there were a few places like the island of Grenada, invaded in 1983, that

simply mattered too little to Washington to stay. Unfortunately, whatever the administration, the urge to stay has seemed a constant. It’s evidently written into Washington’s DNA and embedded deep in domestic politics where sure-to-come "cut and run" charges and blame for "losing" Iraq or Afghanistan would cow any administration. Not surprisingly, when you look behind the main news stories in both Iraq and Afghanistan, you can see signs of the urge to stay everywhere. In Iraq, while President Obama has committed himself to the withdrawal of American troops by the end of 2011, plenty of wiggle room remains. Already, the New York Times reports, General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in that country, is lobbying Washington to establish “an Office of Military Cooperation within the American Embassy in Baghdad to sustain the relationship after... Dec. 31, 2011.” (“We have to stay committed to this past 2011,” Odierno is quoted as saying. “I believe the administration knows that. I believe that they have to do that in order to see this through to the end. It’s important to recognize that just because US soldiers leave, Iraq is not finished.”) If you want a true gauge of American withdrawal, keep your eye on the mega-bases the Pentagon has built in Iraq since 2003, especially gigantic Balad Air Base (since the Iraqis will not, by the end of 2011, have a real air force of their own), and perhaps Camp Victory, the vast, ill-named U.S. base and command center abutting Baghdad International Airport on the outskirts of the capital. Keep an eye as well on the 104-acre US embassy built along the Tigris River in downtown Baghdad. At present, it’s the largest “embassy” on the planet and represents something new in “diplomacy,” being essentially a military-base-cum-command-and-control-center for the region. It is clearly going nowhere, withdrawal or not. In fact, recent reports indicate that in the near future “embassy” personnel, including police trainers, military officials connected to that Office of Coordination, spies, U.S. advisors attached to various Iraqi ministries, and the like, may be more than doubled from the present staggering staff level of 1,400 to 3,000 or above. (The embassy, by the way, has requested $1,875 billion for its operations in fiscal year 2011, and that was assuming a staffing level of only 1,400.) Realistically, as long as such an embassy remains at Ground Zero Iraq, we will not have withdrawn from that country. Similarly, we have a giant U.S. embassy in Kabul (being expanded) and another mega-embassy being built in the Pakistani capital Islamabad. These are not, rest assured, signs of departure.



Inherency

US officials not pressured to follow timetable for departure from Iraq(Lara Jakes, Anne Gearan, staff writer, AP National Security Writer, 5/11/10, “US Reviewing Iraq Troop Pullout Pace”, http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/11/us-reconsidering-pace-of-iraq-troop-withdrawal/)

American commanders, worried about increased violence in the wake of Iraq’s inconclusive elections, are now reconsidering the pace of a major troop pullout this summer, U.S. officials said Tuesday. The withdrawal of the first major wave of troops is expected to be delayed by about a month, the officials said. Waiting much longer could endanger President Barack Obama’s goal of reducing the force level from 92,000 to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31. More than two months after parliamentary elections, the Iraqis have still not formed a new government, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried out attacks like Monday’s bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people — the country’s bloodiest day of 2010. The threat has prompted military officials to look at keeping as many troops on the ground, for as long as possible, without missing the Aug. 31 deadline. A security agreement between the two nations requires American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. In Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq’s security deteriorates. Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Obama’s top campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be politically risky back home — but so could anarchy and a bloodbath following a hasty retreat. Two senior administration officials said the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back — if only to ensure enough security forces are in place to prevent or respond to militant attacks. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the administration’s internal discussions. Already, the violence, fueled by Iraq’s political instability, will likely postpone the start of what the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, has called the withdrawal “waterfall” — sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period. In a January interview with the AP, Odierno said he hoped to start withdrawing as many as a monthly average of 12,500 troops, starting in May, to meet the August deadline. He has long said he would not start the withdrawal until two months after Iraq’s March 7 elections to ensure stability. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior Pentagon official said that the “waterfall” is now expected to begin in June at the earliest. All cited ongoing concerns about whether the political impasse would lead to violence, and spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the process more candidly. “From a military perspective, the best way for us to maintain security is to hold as many forces on the ground until we need to redeploy them,” said one of the senior officials in Baghdad. The official said it would be wise for Odierno to wait as long as he can, given the unsettled political conditions in Iraq. At the Pentagon, “there’s been a renewed focus on Iraq lately,” said the senior military official there. He said all options were being considered, including later delays, adding that “we need to get out in an appropriate way … not completely tied to a timeline.” Maj. Gen. Stephen Lanza, the top U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said Tuesday that troops “are on track” to draw down by the president’s Aug. 31 deadline, but he would not discuss whether the pace was being slowed. Although “there is still work to be done here,” Lanza noted that overall violence across Iraq is lower than it has been in years. “There are still terrorists who wish to disrupt Iraq’s forward progress and Monday’s attacks are an example of that,” Lanza said. Shortly before the election, there were 96,000 U.S. troops in the country. About 4,000 troops were sent home in April — including military dentists, postal workers, truck drivers and other support personnel. As of last week, there were about 92,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, meaning an average of 10,500 a month would have to be pulled out. Odierno can wait only so long to start the “waterfall.” Keeping tens of thousands of soldiers in Iraq until the last minute will create a logistical nightmare with a limited number of planes, trucks and ships available to get troops and equipment out.



Inherency

Despite Obama’s rhetoric, troops may remain in Iraq after 2011 because of loopholes in SOFA(Jeremy Scahill, journalist/author, The Huffington Post, 3/15/10, “Obama’s Iraq: Troops Out By 2011? Not So Fast”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-scahill/obamas-iraq-all-troops-ou_b_170765.html)

Some anti-war analysts find hope in President Barack Obama's address at Camp Lejuene in North Carolina on Friday, in which he appeared to spell out a clear date for withdrawal from Iraq. "I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011," Obama said in a speech that quickly generated headlines announcing that an end to the occupation is on the horizon. As far as rhetoric goes, Obama's statement seems very clear. But in reality, it is far more complicated. Obama's plan, as his advisors have often said, is subject to "conditions on the ground," meaning it can be altered at any point between now and 2011 . Underscoring this point, a spokesperson for New York Rep. John McHugh, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, said on Friday that Obama "assured [McHugh] he will revisit the tempo of the withdrawal, or he will revisit the withdrawal plan if the situation on the ground dictates it. ... The president assured him that there was a Plan B." Despite Obama's declarations Friday and the celebrations they have sparked on the liberal blogosphere, the Pentagon certainly seems to believe its forces may well be in Iraq after 2011 . NBC's Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszeswki reported on Friday that "military commanders, despite this Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be out by the end of 2011, are already making plans for a significant number of American troops to remain in Iraq beyond that 2011 deadline, assuming that Status of Forces Agreement agreement would be renegotiated. And one senior military commander told us that he expects large numbers of American troops to be in Iraq for the next 15 to 20 years ." Some have suggested that such statements from the military are insubordination and contrary to Obama's orders, but they could also reflect discussions between the White House and the Pentagon to which the public is not privy. Then there's the monstrous U.S. embassy unveiled last month in Baghdad, the largest of any nation anywhere in the history of the planet and itself resembling a military base. Maintaining this fortified city will require a sizable armed U.S. presence in Baghdad and will regularly place U.S. diplomats in armed convoys that put Iraqi civilian lives in jeopardy. Whether this job is performed by State Department Diplomatic Security or mercenaries from the company formerly known as Blackwater (or else a corporation more acceptable to the Obama administration), the U.S. will have a substantial paramilitary force regularly escorting U.S. VIPs around Iraq -- a proven recipe for civilian deaths and injuries. Obama's speech on Friday did not even address the question of military contractors -- a crucial omission given that their presence rivals that of U.S. troops by a ratio of over 1-to-1. Finally, the Status of Forces Agreement, which supposedly lays out a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, contains a gaping loophole that leaves open the possibility of a continuation of the occupation and a sustained presence of U.S. forces well beyond 2011, "upon request by the government of Iraq." Article 27 of the SOFA allows the U.S. to undertake military action, "or any other measure," inside Iraq's borders "In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq." Could this mean an election where the wrong candidate or party wins? What is the definition of a threat? The Democrats' Response Earlier in the week, when details of Obama's official Iraq plan began to emerge, expressions of surprise poured from the offices of the congressional Democratic leadership over his intention to keep a force of 35,000 to 50,000 troops in the country beyond 2010. "When they talk about 50,000, that's a little higher number than I anticipated," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., was "particularly upset" according to the New York Times and did not understand "the justification." Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., exclaimed, "Fifty thousand is more than I would have thought."


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-scahill/obamas-iraq-all-troops-ou_b_170765.html


Inherency

General Odierno admits troop presence highly probably after 2011(Michael Hastings, The Hastings Report, 3/9/10, “Top US General In Iraq: Possible 2000-3000 Troops After 2011”, http://trueslant.com/michaelhastings/2010/03/09/top-u-s-general-in-iraq-possible-2000-3000-troops-in-iraq-after-2011/)

I got the opportunity to ask General Ray Ordierno a question at a press conference yesterday at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Mainly: How many Americans will be left in Iraq after the Americans leave Iraq? (Call it the ‘Obama Withdrawal Paradox.’) This is a topic I’ve been reporting on, and a subject Tom Ricks recently brought up on his blog, as well as in the pages of the NYT. I haven’t done the transcription yet–I am that lazy–but here’s a very rough paraphrased dialogue of what the exchange sounded like: Me: Hi, um, General, uh, what kind of U.S. military presence will there be in Iraq after 2011? General O: None, unless the Iraqis ask us, and then that would have to be negotiated with the Iraqi government. The most interesting part was in the follow-up. He said there was an actual possibility of a “major” troop presence in Iraq after 2011. (Contingent on the Iraqis asking the Americans, as mentioned above.) Then I asked him to define “major”–did he mean 30,000 to 50,000 troops? General Ordierno said, no, he would define “major” as 2,000-3000 troops. I was surprised by this answer–the 30,000 to 50,000 range is one I’ve heard batted around in discussion with military and foreign policy types, and if I were to have to make a guess, I would say that might be the size of our presence there for years to come. Or at least 15,000! But General Oridierno suggested my thinking might be way off, and another military official who I spoke to after the press conference told me that my thinking was, in fact, way off. Are we buying it? More reporting needed, to be sure. That being said, I spoke to Iraq’s Interior Minister on Sunday about the future U.S. troop presence. He said he was open to the idea, and the kind of things he said were needed would seem to require more than 2,000 to 3,000 troops. Also, Ayad Jamal Aldin, an Iraqi Shiite parliamentarian, made the point that Iraq won’t be able to defend itself against Iran by the end of 2011–an argument sure to get traction in foreign policy circles with an ideological bent that almost rhymes with “beingwrong.” Ayad said he thinks there should be more than just a token force of Americans here.

The U.S. will maintain a small force of helicopters and PMCs after 2011Richard Lardner (Writer for the AP, 6/16/10 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/16/state-department-creating-mini-army-in-iraq/?page=1)

The State Department is quietly forming a small army to protect diplomatic personnel in Iraq after U.S.military forces leave the country at the end of 2011, taking its firepower with them. Department officials are askingthe Pentagon to provide heavy military gear, including Black Hawk helicopters, and say they also willneed substantial support from private contractors. The shopping list demonstrates the department's reluctanceto count on Iraq's army and police forces for security, despite the billions of dollars the U.S. invested to equip and trainthem. And it shows that President Obama is having a hard time keeping his pledge to reduce U.S. reliance on contractors, apractice that flourished under the Bush administration.

Withdrawal will be delayed to help train the Iraqi Air ForceMichael Gisick (Journalist based in Beirut, covered Iraq war, “US base projects continue in Iraq despite plans to leave”, 6/1/10, http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-base-projects-continue-in-iraq-despite-plans-to-leave-1.105237)

Many observers both inside and outside the military believe the nascent condition of the Iraqi Air Force,which remains years away from being able to defend the country’s skies, could lead the Iraqi government torequest that a U.S. training force remain in the country beyond 2011 — most likely at Balad, currently hometo more than 20,000 U.S. troops.



Inherency

Combat troops will stay, will be relabeled as “military advisers”Jeremy Hammond (Editor of Foreign Policy Journal, 2/25/10 http://www.infowars.com/the-rationale-for-keeping-u-s-forces-in-iraq)

With the deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq at the end of next year creeping nearer, theU.S. has to find some way to convince the Iraqi government to allow a continued military presence,which is the likely outcome despite the U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement containing the deadline.One means by which this will be accomplished, relabeling “combat forces” something else, perhapsremaining as “military advisers” or something to that effect, has already been discussed. Thomas E. Ricksoutlines another rationale for maintaining a military occupation of Iraq in the New York Times, offering up a variation on atheme that has been familiar throughout the war that is likely to become a mainstay in the political discourse.

Obama has tried to be obtain a permanent presence in IraqEric Margolis (Contributing editor for the Toronto Sun on the Middle East, 1/26/10 http://www.sun2surf.com/article.cfm?id=42779)

Obama’s disappointing, lacklustre first year record is mirrored in his foreign policies. The leader who wasto bring change has continued or expanded many of the most pernicious policies of the Bush years. TheMiddle East continues to be America’s most trying foreign problem. What we call terrorism comes in goodpart from the Muslim world’s fury over the endless agony of Palestine. Osama bin Laden warned, “There will be no peacein America until there is peace in Palestine.” Obama’s vow to halt Israeli annexation of the West Bank and engineera fair Arab-Israeli peace turned into a humiliating fiasco. Obama’s demand that Israel cease building settlements wasrejected with contempt by Israel’s hardline leadership. Hillary Clinton even stabbed her boss Obama in the back by laudingIsrael’s “restrained’ settlement policies, a clear sign of her political ambitions if Obama falters. Dismaying his liberalsupporters, Europe and the Muslim world, “peace president” Obama is expanding the pointless war in Afghanistan, entrenching a permanent US presence in Iraq, and intensifying US military operations in Somalia, Yemen, North and West Africa.

Obama intends to keep troops in Iraq to ensure a leader who obeys himMichael Schwartz (Sociologist specializing in insurgency, 3/15/10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-schwartz/will-the-us-military-leav_b_498579.html)

Another sign that the Obama administration intends to maintain a significant military presence in Iraqafter 2011 is the continued insistence that Iraqi "democracy" must be guaranteed. In "Washington speak,"this means that the government of Iraq must be an ally of the United States, a condition that has been iteratedand reiterated by all factions (GOP and Democrat) in Washington, since the original invasion. Given the increasingunwillingness of the Maliki administration to follow US dictates (for example, on oil contracts, on relationswith Iran, and on relations with Anbar and other Sunni provinces), the removal of troops would allow Maliki evenmore leeway to pursue policies unacceptable to Washington. Thus, even if Maliki succeeds himself inthe Premiership, the US may need troops to keep the pressure on him. If he does not succeed himself, thenthe likely alternate choices are far more explicit in their antagonism to integration of Iraq into the USsphere of interest. (Even Iyad Allawi -- the leader of the major contender for a parliamentary plurality -- who was oncea US client premier, has voiced stronger and stronger opposition to tight relations with the US.). The Obama administrationwould then be left with the unacceptable prospect that withdrawal would result in Iraq adopting a posture not unlike Iran'swith regard to US presence and influence in the Middle East.



Inherency

The military wants troops in Kirkuk, which could delay withdrawal for another five to ten yearsRanj Alaaldin(Middle East political and security analyst, 2/26/10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/26/iraq-us-troops-standby)

Yesterday came the first signs of the inevitable in Iraq: a prolonged presence of US troops beyond thestatus of forces agreement deadline of 2011. President Obama has promised to get all combat troops (ie mostof those still in the country) out of Iraq by August this year. But Thomas Ricks of Foreign Policy magazinehas revealed that the top US military commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, has asked Obama to keepa combat force in the north for longer than that. Odierno's request suggests that a somewhat flexibleapproach will be taken towards the remaining 40,000 to 50,000 troops. The general has asked for acombat brigade to remain in Kirkuk, the ethnically mixed, oil-rich and volatile disputed territory. Butthe problem of Kirkuk will not be resolved by the end of 2011 and it may never be peacefully resolved atall (see the Falklands, the other oil-rich disputed territory that has had historic battles fought over it, where disputes existover the rights to its oil and also where the UN, as with Kirkuk, has been called to look into). If Obama does indeedgive his approval then it is likely to be a reflection of the US troop presence in Iraq over the next five,possibly 10, years. Yet, we may well be seeing the South Korea-style permanent military presence taking root here,both as a counter-measure against the impenetrable Iranian influence in the country as well as a measure to keep the peace;since Kirkuk could decide whether Iraq collapses or survives, a prolonged military presence in Iraqfocused around the province, as well as other northern areas like Mosul and Diyala – where joint US-Kurd-Arab military patrols have been initiated – can be justified



Inherency

After Odierno’s statement, US withdrawal from Iraq is questionable at best(Raed Jarrar, Erik Leaver, 3/3/10, “Sliding Backwards on Iraq”, Middle East at Peace Action & Institute for Policy Studies, http://www.counterpunch.org/jarrar03032010.html)

Last week, President Obama's out-of-control military brass once again leaked a statement contrary to the president's position. This time the statement came from Army Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, who officially requested to keep a combat brigade in the northern part of the country beyond the August 2010 deadline. Floating this idea just two weeks before the Iraqi national elections is dangerous for Iraqi democracy, for U.S. soldiers on the ground, and for the future of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Pentagon Scramble Quickly responding to his soldiers marching out of step, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that there would have to be a "pretty significant" deterioration in the security situation in Iraq before he would consider delaying the planned withdrawal. But much of the damage was already done. Those supporting an extension immediately created an echo chamber in the media. Thomas Ricks, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, published an op-ed in The New York Times and another in Foreign Policy urging Obama to delay the withdrawals of combat troops scheduled this year, and cancel final troop withdrawals scheduled for the end of 2011. Ricks, who reported the leak by Odierno, is publicly betting that in four years the United States will have nearly 30,000 troops still on the ground . That's no way to make policy in Iraq. Rick's Foreign Policy piece went as far as claiming that Odierno "got a polite nod from the president when the issue was raised during his recent meetings in Washington." Obama has consistently said he would comply with the August 31 deadline to remove combat forces from Iraq. He repeated this dozens of times on the campaign trail, stated it clearly at Camp Lejeune last year, and also repeated this policy in his Cairo speech. Vice President Biden affirmed this policy numerous times, saying in February, "You're going to see 90,000 American troops come marching home by the end of the summer." And just last week, the White House reaffirmed its intention to call an end to operation Iraqi Freedom by August 31. Congress confirmed the president's policy by including clear language recognizing and supporting the deadlines for the withdrawal of combat forces in both the FY10 defense appropriations and defense authorization bills. Last month 28 members of Congress, including the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sent a letter to Obama commending him on his plan to withdraw combat forces by August 31, regardless of the situation on the ground. Outrage in Iraq Flying in the face of these consistent messages of assurance by the White House and Congress, Odierno's statement has harmed the president's credibility in Iraq and caused the first major storm of criticism inside the country since Obama's election in 2008. The Iraqi media has been overwhelmed with political statements, analysis, and press releases condemning the possible prolongation of the U.S. occupation. In one statement, MP Omar Al-Jubouri, a Sunni from the National Iraqi Coalition, rejected the attempts to change the withdrawal plans, telling the Nina News Agency that while he "acknowledges the troubled administrative and security situation," he still "holds the U.S. forces responsible" for the deterioration. In another statement, covered by Al-Sabaah newspaper, MP Jamal Jaafar, a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, argued that prolonging the U.S. presence "will cause more tension" among Iraqis. Jaafar also stated that the United States must "get an approval from the Iraqi government" if it was planning to leave even "one single soldier in Iraq beyond the withdrawal deadline included in the bilateral security agreement." MP Abdul-Karim As-Sameraie, chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, criticized the attempt to change the withdrawal plans and asked again for a public referendum on the bilateral security agreement. Such a measure could result in the cancellation of the agreement, potentially leading to an earlier U.S. withdrawal or having troops operate in Iraq without international legal safeguards. Consequences of Waffling An Obama flip-flop on the timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops would have serious consequences in the United States and Iraq. The U.S. global image will be tarnished, Obama's credibility will be called into question, and the administration will likely lose what little global political capital it gained in the last year. But reneging on withdrawal would have the gravest consequences in Iraq. The Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan. The mantra was "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." But such plans for "condition-based" withdrawal create the very deteriorating conditions that lead to

an extension of the military occupation. Unfortunately, there is considerable support both inside and outside Iraq for the continuation of U.S. occupation. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United States by keeping it engaged in a conflict that takes an enormous toll on human lives, money, and global reputation. And Iran and other regional players fear the reemergence of a strong, independent, and united Iraq.



Inherency

In order to maintain control over power in Iraq, US troops will not withdraw(Peter Symonds, staff writer, 6/9/10, WSWS International Committee of the Fourth International, “US consolidates occupation in Iraq”, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jun2010/pers-j09.shtml)

As the Obama administration escalates its war in Afghanistan, Iraq is cautiously being declared a success. The top American commander in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno, declared last Friday that the country had held “a legitimate and credible election”, its security forces had improved and plans were “on track” for the withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq by September 1. Speaking at the West Point military academy late last month, President Obama was even more upbeat, declaring that as US troops depart, “a strong American civilian presence will help Iraqis forge political and economic progress” towards establishing “a democratic Iraq that is sovereign and stable and self-reliant”. The reality is entirely different. Even after the September deadline, the US military will maintain a huge military presence of 50,000 troops, ostensibly in “non-combat” and “training” roles, to prop up a puppet regime in Baghdad, which, three months after the national election, is yet to be formed. While the character of the American occupation of Iraq is changing, its underlying purpose—to maintain the country firmly under US domination—remains the same. In his comments last Friday, General Odierno declared that the “drawdown” was ahead of schedule—600,000 containers of gear and 18,000 vehicles moved out; and the number of bases down from 500 last year to 126 and set to decline to 94 by September 1. What is actually underway, however, is not a withdrawal, but a vast consolidation in preparation for the long-term occupation of the country by US forces. The Stars and Stripes newspaper noted in an article on June 1 that the ratification of the US-Iraq security agreement in November 2008 governing the drawdown was followed by a massive expansion of base construction work. “In all, the military finished $496 million in base construction projects during 2009, the highest annual figure since the war began and nearly a quarter of the $2.1 billion spent on American bases in Iraq since 2004. An additional $323 million worth of projects are set to be completed this year.” While the number of US bases may be declining, the Pentagon is establishing what are known as “enduring presence posts”—including four major bases: Joint Base Balad in the north, Camp Adder in southern Iraq, Al-Asad Air Base in the west and the Victory Base Complex around Baghdad International Airport. These are sprawling fortified facilities—Balad alone currently houses more than 20,000 troops. In addition to the 50,000 troops that will remain, there will be up to 65,000 contractors after September 1. Under the 2008 agreement, the US military handed over internal security functions to Iraqi forces last year, but, under the guise of “training” and “support”, retains tighter supervision of the army and police. Moreover the Iraqi government can always “request” US troop assistance in mounting operations. As Odierno explained in a letter to US personnel on June 1, even after all US combat troops leave, “we will continue to conduct partnered counter-terrorism operations and provide combat enablers to help the Iraqi Security Forces maintain pressure on the extremist networks.” The 2008 agreement sets December 31, 2011 as the deadline for all US troops to quit Iraq, but the construction of huge new US bases indicates a long-term US military presence under a Strategic Framework Agreement that is yet to be negotiated. As Stars and Stripes pointed out, “the nascent condition of the Iraqi Air Force… could lead the Iraqi government to request that a US training force remain in the country beyond 2011, most likely at Balad.” Accompanying the troop drawdown is a buildup of civilian operations centred on the US embassy in Baghdad. The new embassy, situated in the fortified Green Zone, is the largest and most expensive in the world. Opened in January 2009, the complex includes 21 buildings, occupies 0.4 square kilometres and houses 1,000 regular employees as well as up to 3,000 additional staff. The embassy’s No 2 diplomat Cameron Munter told the Washington Post last month: “Our commitment will not be on the scale of numbers and money that the military has. But it will be extraordinarily substantial.” The Post also touched on certain sensitive projects that would not be handed over to embassy staff, including “the collection of intelligence, initiatives to counter what the military calls ‘malign Iranian influence’, and the integration of tens of thousands of former insurgents the military turned into Sunni paramilitary groups.” In other words, the US military will remain actively involved in monitoring and manipulating the sectarian divisions that Washington has exploited since the 2003 invasion to assert its control. The “ending” of the insurgency, trumpeted by the Pentagon and White House, has involved the ruthless



Inherency

[continues]suppression of opposition to the US occupation, resulting in the deaths of more than a million Iraqis, another two million driven into exile, and tens of thousands detained and tortured. Iraqi “democracy” rests on a police state apparatus developed and honed by the US military. The “legitimate and credible” election in March was only open to those parties and politicians that accepted the occupation. Seven years of war has had a devastating impact on the Iraqi people. Unemployment and underemployment remain high. According to last month’s Brookings Iraq Index, as of last year, only 20 percent of the population had access to proper sanitation, 45 percent to clean water, 50 percent to more than 12 hours a day of electricity, 50 percent to adequate housing and 30 percent to health services. A 2007 World Bank survey found that 23 percent of people were living in poverty on less than $US2.20 a day. The criminal US invasion of Iraq was not aimed at helping the Iraqi people. Rather, its purpose was to subjugate the country in order to establish control over its vast energy reserves and to transform it into a base for wider American strategic objectives in the Middle East and Central Asia. Having bloodily suppressed resistance in Iraq, the Obama administration is pulling its troops out in order to expand its neo-colonial war in Afghanistan and for new military aggression in other parts of the globe. Being left behind is an extensive American civilian and military apparatus that will continue to control the levers of power in Baghdad, bully the Iraqi government into line on matters concerning US interests, keep a watchful eye on the country’s festering sectarian tensions and leave the door open to a rapid return of US troops.



Inherency

Obama allows for Brigade Combat Troops to remain in Iraq after the withdrawal deadline of 2011(Gareth Porter, investigative historian of US national security policy, 3/27/09, Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/03/despite-obama’s-vow-combat-brigades-will-stay-in-iraq/)

Despite President Barack Obama’s statement at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina Feb. 27 that he had “chosen a timeline that will remove our combat brigades over the next 18 months,” a number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which have been the basic U.S. Army combat unit in Iraq for six years, will remain in Iraq after that date under a new non-combat label. A spokesman for Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates, Lt. Col. Patrick S. Ryder, told IPS Tuesday that “several advisory and assistance brigades” would be part of a U.S. command in Iraq that will be “re-designated” as a “transition force headquarters” after August 2010. But the “advisory and assistance brigades” to remain in Iraq after that date will in fact be the same as BCTs, except for the addition of a few dozen officers who would carry out the advice and assistance missions, according to military officials involved in the planning process. Gates has hinted that the withdrawal of combat brigades will be accomplished through an administrative sleight of hand rather than by actually withdrawing all the combat brigade teams. Appearing on Meet the Press Mar. 1, Gates said the “transition force” would have “a very different kind of mission”, and that the units remaining in Iraq “will be characterised differently.” “They

will be called advisory and assistance brigades,” said Gates. “They won’t be called combat brigades.” Obama’s decision to go along with the military proposal for a “transition force” of 35,000 to 50,000 troops thus represents a complete abandonment of his own original policy of combat troop withdrawal and an acceptance of what the military wanted all along — the continued presence of several combat brigades in Iraq well beyond mid-2010. National Security Council officials declined to comment on the question of whether combat brigades were actually going to be left in Iraq beyond August 2020 under the policy announced by Obama Feb. 27. The term that has been used internally within the Army to designate the units that will form a large part of the “transition force” is not “Advisory and Assistance Brigades” but “Brigades Enhanced for Stability Operations” (BESO). Lt. Col. Gary Tallman, a spokesman for the Joint Staff, confirmed Monday that BESO will be the Army unit deployed to Iraq for the purpose of the transition force. Tallman said the decision-making process now underway involving CENTCOM and the Army is to determine “the exact composition of the BESO.” But the U.S. Army has already been developing the outlines of the BESO for the past few months. The only change to the existing BCT structure that is being planned is the addition of advisory and assistance skills rather than any reduction in its combat power . The BCT is organised around two or three battalions of motorized infantry but also includes all the support elements, including its own artillery support, needed to sustain the full spectrum of military operations. Those are permanent features of all variants of the BCT, which will not be altered in the new version to be deployed under a “transition force,” according to specialists on the BCT. They say the only issue on which the Army is still engaged in discussions with field commanders is what standard augmentation a BCT will need for its new mission. Maj. Larry Burns of the Army Combined Arms Centre at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, told IPS that Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey directed the Combined Arms Centre, which specialises in Army mission and doctrine, to work on giving the BCTs the capability to carry out a training and advisory assistance mission. The essence of the BESO variant of the BCTs, according to Burns, is that the Military Transition Teams working directly with Iraqi military units will no longer operate independently but will be integrated into the BCTs. That development would continue a trend already begun in Iraq in which the BCTs have gradually acquired operational control over the previously independent Military Transition Teams, according to Maj. Robert Thornton of the Joint Centre for International and Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth. Gen. Martin Dempsey, the commander of Army Training and Doctrine Command, has issued Planning Guidance calling for further refinement of the BESO. After further work on the additional personnel requirements, Casey was briefed on the proposed enhancement of the BCT for the second time in a month at a conference of four-star generals on Feb. 18, according to Burns. Other names for the new variant that were used in recent months but eventually dropped made it explicitly clear that it is simply a slightly augmented BCT. Those names, according to Burns, included “Brigade Combat Team-Security Force Assistance” and “Brigade Combat Team for Stability Operations.”

The plan to deploy several augmented BCTs represents the culmination of the strategy of “relabeling” or “remissioning” of BCTs in Iraq that was developed by U.S. military leaders in the wake of the surge of candidate Barack Obama to near-certain victory in the presidential election last year. Late last year, Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM chief, and Gen. Ray Odierno, the top commander in Iraq, were unhappy with Obama’s pledge to withdraw all U.S. combat brigades within 16 months. But military planners quickly hit on the relabeling scheme as a way of avoiding the complete withdrawal of BCTs in an Obama administration. The New York Times revealed Dec. 4 that Pentagon planners were talking about “relabeling” of U.S. combat units as “training and support” units in a Dec. 4 story but provided no details. Pentagon planners were projecting that as many as 70,000 U.S. troops would be maintained in Iraq “for a substantial time even beyond 2011.” That report suggested that the strategy



Inherency

[continues]

envisioned keeping the bulk of the existing BCTs in Iraq as under a new label indicating an advisory and support mission. Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen discussed a plan to re-designate U.S. combat troops as support troops at a meeting with Obama in Chicago on Dec. 15, according a report in the Times three days later. Gates and Mullen reportedly speculated at the meeting on whether Iraqis would permit such “re-labeled” combat forces to remain in Iraqi cities and towns after next June, despite the fact that the U.S.-Iraq withdrawal agreement signed in November

2008 called for all U.S. combat forces to be withdrawn from populated areas by the end of June 2010. That report suggests that Obama was well aware that giving the Petraeus and Odierno a free hand to determine the composition of a “transition force” of 35,000 to 50,000 troops meant that most combat brigades would remain in Iraq rather than being withdrawn, as he ostensibly promised the U.S. public on Feb. 27

Obama not committed to withdrawing troops on timeRon Jacobs in 09 (Ron Jacobs is the author of The Way The Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground. His most recent novel Short Order Frame Up is published by Mainstay Press. January 26th, 2009 Dissident voice http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/01/obama-bowing-to-the-masters-of-war/)

The American people did not elect the Pentagon. They elected Barack Obama based a good deal on his promise to get US troops out of Iraq sooner rather than later. Since he was elected, Mr. Obama has hedged on this promise. Since he was inaugurated, the Pentagon and its civilian boss Robert Gates have hedged even more. Now, they insist, US troops should remain until the Iraqis hold a national election that is as of today not even scheduled. Then, even after that election is held, the departure of some US troops should depend on the outcome of the election. In other words, the Pentagon and Defense Department are telling Mr. Obama that no US troops should leave Iraq unless the election results meet the expectations of Washington.This is exactly why Robert Gates should be removed from his position. Just like the American voters did not elect any of the generals pushing for a continued occupation of Iraq, neither did they elect Mr. Gates. His continued presence in the halls of official Washington is an ugly reminder of the destructive, disastrous and disavowed policies of the Bush and Cheney regime now in exile. It is bad enough that even if Barack Obama overrides the Pentagon and Mr. Gates and sticks to his sixteen month withdrawal plan there will still be around fifty thousand US troops in Iraq. This is because Obama’s call to bring all troops home from Iraq that began his campaign somehow morphed into a call to bring home only those troops determined to be “combat troops.” This categorization involves a constantly changing number of troops and is a definition that seems to fluctuate at the whim of Generals Petraeus and Odierno.No matter what, it is not what millions of US voters voted for on November 4, 2008. It is also why those millions have no reason to give Mr. Obama an inch of slack on this issue. If he won’t stand up to those men and women that insist on carrying out the policies of his predecessor, then Mr. Obama deserves to hear that from those voters. Democracy in the United States didn’t end with Obama’s inauguration. Indeed, the time to exercise one’s voice

and raise it in opposition to the actions and policies of the elected government is when it actually starts to govern. Unless the Obama administration is held to the fire on its promise to end the Iraq war and occupation within 16 months, it is unlikely that it will end then. Furthermore, the likelihood of all troops being out of Iraq by 2011 as promised in the Status of Forces Agreement signed in 2008 diminishes, also. After all, what motive would there be to end the occupation in 2011 if there is no demand from the American people that the Obama administration stick to its promises regarding Iraq?Many US voters across the spectrum believe that Mr. Obama deserves a little time to establish himself as president. Give him a few months, they say. While this is a worthy and magnanimous gesture, it does not apply to the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these operations have not achieved their stated goals and the continued killing of local citizens by US and their client forces will not achieve those goals in the future. To pretend

otherwise is pure folly and defies the basic facts of the past eight years . A good part of the reason the violence in Iraq has died down lies with the expectation that US forces will be leaving soon. There are other reasons, including the security clampdown across the country and the sheer fact of a population exhausted from conflict, but a substantial reason for the lull in violence is the hope that with the US leaving there will come a new Iraqi sovereignty and some kind of genuine peace. This hope can die very quickly if the resistance forces inside Iraq come to believe that the US intends to stay.


http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/01/obama-bowing-to-the-masters-of-war/

http://www.amazon.com/Short-Order-Frame-Ron-Jacobs/dp/0977459098


Inherency

US could circumvent Status of Force Agreement due to loopholesAFP in 08 (Professional association of individuals responsible for generating philanthropic support for a wide variety of nonprofit, charitable organizations. Nov 26, 2008, Google.com, http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=AFP&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8)

Key sections of a legal accord to allow US troops to remain in Iraq for another three years may be lost in translation, US officials said, hours before Iraqi MPs voted Wednesday on whether to endorse it. The parts of the status of forces agreement (SOFA) in question concern Iraqi legal jurisdiction over United States soldiers who commit crimes off base and off duty, the requirement for US troops to obtain Iraqi permission for all military operations and a ban on the US staging attacks on other countries from Iraq. Status of forces agreement, ready to be voted on in the 275-member Iraqi parliament Wednesday, took a year of painstaking negotiations to get to this stage. Once approved, it will be the legal framework to replace the UN mandate on the United States military presence in Iraq that runs out on December 31. But three officials in Washington said the administration of US President George W. Bush has withheld the official English translation of the agreement to suppress a public dispute with the Iraqis until after the parliamentary vote. The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the official English language text of the agreement was designated as “sensitive but unclassified.” “There are a number of areas in here where they have agreement on the same wording but different understandings about what the words mean,” said one US official. The White House National Security Council said it had held up the translation’s release until the Iraqi parliament votes. “We plan to release it soon,” said spokesman Gordon Johndroe. “We are waiting for the Iraqi political process to move further down the road.” In the event the SOFA is approved, the US could simply circumvent parts of the agreement, said officials. The pact was approved by the Iraqi government on November 16, but has not yet been ratified by the parliament.

Troop Withdrawal deadline to be raised againMATT NEGRIN & KENDRA MARR are Matt Negrin is an assistant editor for POLITICO and Kendra Marr is a reporter for POLITICO. June 23rd, 2010 http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0610/quick_hearings_predicted_de7cbd39-bff7-42bf-867d-3b0bd30ea04c.html

Top members of the Senate Armed Services Committee predicted Wednesday that Gen. David Petraeus would be confirmed quickly so he can begin work as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. Some senators, however, will renew their concerns about the administration’s commitment to a July 2011 withdrawal date , Sen. John McCain said. Any withdrawal should be “conditions based,” he said at a news conference with Sens. Lindsey Graham and Joe Lieberman. “The hearing for General Petraeus’s confirmation will probably be the fastest in the history of the Armed Services Committee,” McCain said. “I’ve talked to Senator Levin, and it will be done very soon.” Sen. Carl Levin, the chairman of the committee, said in a statement that he expects to begin the hearing "no later than next Tuesday.”Graham called Petraeus “our best hope” in winning the war in Afghanistan, and he said the change in leadership is an opportunity to remove the aides who disparaged White House officials in the Rolling Stone profile of Gen. Stanley McChrystal that led to the general’s resignation on Wednesday.


http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0610/quick_hearings_predicted_de7cbd39-bff7-42bf-867d-3b0bd30ea04c.html

http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0610/quick_hearings_predicted_de7cbd39-bff7-42bf-867d-3b0bd30ea04c.html

http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=AFP&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8

http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=AFP&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8


Inherency

Iraqi deadline a question mark Justin Elliot is a reporter-blogger at TPMmuckraker. Previously, he served for over a year as the News Editor for TPM, May 14, 2010< http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/justin-elliott.php>

In order for President Obama to meet his pledge to get Iraq troop levels down to 50,000 by August, the military will have to exit the country at a rate of about 14,000 troops per month -- a difficult but doable task, military observers tell TPMmuckraker.The number of U.S. troops in Iraq currently stands at 94,100, according to the Pentagon. Unless Obama changes his policy, the military must get at least 44,000 troops out of Iraq by August. The Pentagon said recently that it expects to get down to 91,000 by the end of May, at which point an accelerated pullout will begin. (See chart below.) While the AP this week quoted two "senior administration officials" saying that "the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back," military observers interviewed by TPMmuckraker say the accelerated pullout is possible if the will exists. "If we are to meet the president's objective, the logisticians will throw more resources at it," says Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton (Ret.), who trained Iraqi troops in the early years of the war and is now a senior adviser at the National Security Network. "We do want to pull all their unit equipment out with them. That's not trivial. But major stuff like vehicles that are a bit of a challenge -- it wouldn't surprise me if we would keep some or move those out a little more slowly." Peter Juul, a military affairs researcher at the Center for American Progress, says, "They may be cutting it close in terms of a cut-off point where meeting the deadline becomes unfeasible from a technical perspective, but I haven't seen anything to make me think that they would be missing the deadline." In his February 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Obama pledged that the "combat mission" in Iraq would end by August 31, 2010. The United States would keep 35,000 to 50,000 troops for what he described as a training and advisory mission. He said all U.S. troops would be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. During the campaign, Obama promised "to end the war safely and responsibly within 16 months." If the administration had followed through, the war would have been over by this month.


http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/promise/126/begin-removing-combat-brigades-from-iraq/

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-of-president-barack-obama-responsibly-ending-the-war-in-Iraq/

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2010/05/us_reviewing_iraq_troop_pullout_pace.php

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2010/05/pace_of_us_drawdown_from_iraq_on_schedule_pentagon.php

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/justin-elliott.php


Withdrawal/SOFA k/2 stability

Withdrawal ensures a peaceful political process because natives will take responsibility to protect Iraq(Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, 2/27/09, Center For American Progress, “The Promised Withdrawal From Iraq”, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/promised_withdrawal.html)

President Obama today made a critical change in our nation’s foreign policy in Iraq, reaffirming his full commitment to the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by the Bush administration late last year. Obama’s announced he will remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by August 31, 2010 and honor the 2011 SOFA deadline for a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces. This shows he remains committed to the promise he made to the American people during his campaign—that he would finally act to end this needless, mindless, senseless war. During his campaign, Obama promised to remove U.S. combat troops within 16 months, leaving behind a residual force with limited responsibilities. His announcement today largely fulfills these pledges. While the 19-month deadline is an extension of his earlier estimate, it still offers a strong commitment to remove U.S. forces from the country. His plan will benefit both the United States and Iraq, moving both nations toward a new era of responsible engagement in the Middle East . By setting a deadline for withdrawing combat forces, Obama has sent an unmistakable message that the United States fully supports a sovereign Iraq and is serious about upholding the principles set out in the SOFA. That agreement promised that U.S. troops would leave Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and vacate the country by the end of 2011. Obama’s plan would see all combat troops out of Iraq well before this deadline, leaving only a residual transition force in place until the agreement runs out. By strengthening our commitment to leave, and setting an earlier deadline for the end of combat operations, Obama has also taken an essential step in building trust with the Iraqi government and people. Even after the signing of the SOFA, some Iraqis publicly doubted whether the United States would leave the country. Obama’s announcement today is a definitive sign that he does not intend to keep forces in Iraq indefinitely, and will work toward fully turning over our responsibilities to the Iraqi government and security forces. This plan will also create momentum for Iraqi political progress. The set deadline will put Iraqi leaders and sectarian actors on notice that they must pursue meaningful reconciliation. Last month’s provincial elections were carried out without major incident, yet signals from members of the Sunni Awakening—the tribal groups whose support and manpower were a key cause of the drop in violence over the last few years—that they might resort to violence if they determined that election fraud had taken place, indicate that Iraqis still have work to do in this area. Obama’s announcement means that the Iraqis must take on the burden of ensuring the continuation of a peaceful political process. Obama’s announcement is the start of a meaningful shift in the American role in Iraq. The president was careful to note that a U.S. military withdrawal will enable a more comprehensive U.S. engagement in the region. As combat troops leave, we will increasingly transfer to a tripartite support mission: pursuing the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq, train the Iraqi security forces to carry out missions, and protecting American personnel who remain in the country. This modified mission, along with the redeployment of combat troops, will reduce the stress on our already overburdened servicemen and women, paving the way for a full withdrawal at the end of 2011. The clock is already ticking—the end of August 2010 is just 18 months away. The majority of Americans (69 percent in a recent CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll) support removing most American forces from Iraq. Fortunately, this country, and our service men and women overseas, finally have a president who is committed to the same ends.



Withdrawal/SOFA k/2 Stability

A withdrawal will not threaten Iraqi stability because it forces Iraqis to solve their own problems(Stephen Biddle, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth Pollack, Council of Foreign Relations, Brookings Institute, June 08, Foreign Affairs, “How To Leave A Stable Iraq”, p. 46)

But starting in 2010, if current trends continue, the United States may be able to start cutting back its troop presence substantially, possibly even halving the total U.S. commitment by sometime in 2011, without running excessive risks with the stability of Iraq and the Wider Persian Gulf region. Some argue that to do this, the United States must Withdraw, or threaten to Withdraw, its troops. They believe this would force Iraqi leaders to put their differences aside and reach a grand compromise on reconciliation, because lraqis would need to solve their own problems,either without a U.S. military crutch or in order to preserve a U.S. presence as a reward for reconciliation. There is some merit to this logic. It is true that the presence ofU.S. forces reduces the stakes for Iraqi politicians, since it limits violence. And if lraq faced chaos other- Wise, a threat of withdrawal would certainly be Worth trying. But withdrawal is a risky gambit. And progress is now being made without it: violence is down dramatically, and political change, although slow, is under way. Threatening withdrawal might speed this progress. Reconciliation will require all the major Iraqi factions to accept painful compromises simultaneously. If any major party holds out and decides to fight rather than accept risky sacrifices for the larger good, then its rivals will find it very hard to hold their own followers to the terms of a cease-fire-likely plunging Iraq back into open warfare. If reconciliation can be done slowly via small steps, then each stage of compromise is likely to be tolerable, with the risk of one holdout party exploiting the others kept to a manageable level. In contrast, if reconciliation must be done quickly, with a grand bargain rapidly negotiated in the face of an imminent U.S. withdrawal, the necessary compromises will be great-making them extremely risky for all parties. ln a factionalized, poorly institutionalized, immature political system such as lraq’s, many parties would doubt their rivals’ motives and could refuse to make such large and risky compromises. \




A withdrawal of troops ensures stability by forcing Iraqis to take steps to end national violence(Bill Richardson, staff writer, The Washington Post, 9/8/07, “Why We Should Exit Iraq Now”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090702063.html)

Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and John Edwards have suggested that there is little difference among us on Iraq. This is not true: I am the only leading Democratic candidate committed to getting all our troops out and doing so quickly. In the most recent debate, I asked the other candidates how many troops they would leave in Iraq and for what purposes. I got no answers. The American people need answers. If we elect a president who thinks that troops should stay in Iraq for years, they will stay for years -- a tragic mistake. Clinton, Obama and Edwards reflect the inside-the-Beltway thinking that a complete withdrawal of all American forces somehow would be "irresponsible." On the contrary, the facts suggest that a rapid, complete withdrawal -- not a drawn-out, Vietnam-like process -- would be the most responsible and effective course of action. Those who think we need to keep troops in Iraq misunderstand the Middle East. I have met and negotiated successfully with many regional leaders, including Saddam Hussein. I am convinced that only a complete withdrawal can sufficiently shift the politics of Iraq and its neighbors to break the deadlock that has been killing so many people for so long. Our troops have done everything they were asked to do with courage and professionalism, but they cannot win someone else's civil war. So long as American troops are in Iraq, reconciliation among Iraqi factions is postponed. Leaving forces there enables the Iraqis to delay taking the necessary steps to end the violence. And it prevents us from using diplomacy to bring in other nations to help stabilize and rebuild the country. The presence of American forces in Iraq weakens us in the war against al-Qaeda. It endows the anti-American propaganda of those who portray us as occupiers plundering Iraq's oil and repressing Muslims. The day we leave, this myth collapses, and the Iraqis will drive foreign jihadists out of their country. Our departure would also enable us to focus on defeating the terrorists who attacked us on Sept. 11, those headquartered along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border -- not in Iraq. Logistically, it would be possible to withdraw in six to eight months. We moved as many as 240,000 troops into and out of Iraq through Kuwait in as little as a three-month period during major troop rotations. After the Persian Gulf War, we redeployed nearly a half-million troops in a few months. We could redeploy even faster if we negotiated with the Turks to open a route out through Turkey. As our withdrawal begins, we will gain diplomatic leverage. Iraqis will start seeing us as brokers, not occupiers. Iraq's neighbors will face the reality that if they don't help with stabilization, they will face the consequences of Iraq's collapse -- including even greater refugee flows over their borders and possible war. The United States can facilitate Iraqi reconciliation and regional cooperation by holding a conference similar to that which brought peace to Bosnia. We will need regional security negotiations among all of Iraq's neighbors and discussions of donations from wealthy nations -- including oil-rich Muslim countries -- to help rebuild Iraq. None of this can happen until we remove the biggest obstacle to diplomacy: the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. My plan is realistic because: ? It is less risky. Leaving forces behind leaves them vulnerable. Would we need another surge to protect them?




Withdrawal leads to Iraq stability because politicians will focus on survival rather than foreign demands(Mark Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Washington University, Nov. 08, Foreign Affairs, “Why Only US Withdrawal Can Spur Iraqi Cooperation”, p.152,153)

Today, a credible commitment to a more rapid withdrawal, which the authors view as a potential disaster, is more likely to facilitate Iraqi political accommodation than to endanger it. There are no guarantees, of course. Iraq is currently a house of cards, with a plethora of unresolved issues of contention threatening to undermine stability at any moment. But a carefully managed, responsible drawdown of U.S. forces is more likely to produce meaningful political accommodation than is an endless store of strategic patience. Rather than moving the Iraqis toward compromise, Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack’s approach would create a multitude of perverse incentives for Iraqi politicians to produce just enough progress to keep U.S. forces engaged but never enough to allow them to leave. Political progress would continue to dance just out of reach, with its failures always offering a reason for the United States to delay the drawdown of its military forces. It is not simply that the United States cannot militarily or financially sustain the commitments required to achieve a perfect solution; it is that the U.S. military presence actively impedes the essential political accommodations needed to create a stable, broadly representative Iraqi political order. A U.S. commitment to draw down U.S. troops over a defined period, as the Iraqi political leadership itself now demands, would give Iraqi politicians a self-interest in political accommodation- accommodation reached not to meet foreign demands but to ensure their own survival. A clear and credible public declaration of the United States’ intention to withdraw would shift the incentives of all the major political actors. And a responsible exit strategy would then offer plenty of opportunity to shape the transition and guard against the likely dangers. In contrast, a policy built on U.S. troops staying in Iraq, whether to enforce local cease-fires, maintain pressure for political accommodation, or moderate the fears of Iraqi politicians, is a problem masquerading as a solution.




Current Withdrawal table stabilizing IraqGeneral Ray Odierno 6/4 (Commander of American forces in Iraq, Department of Defense press briefing, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-briefings/pentagon-dod-news-briefing-with-gen-ray-odierno-june-4)

In terms of security, actually security continues to move forward at a very good pace. I judge security on a couple of things: the feel that I get as I go around, but also on the statistics that we look at. I look at number of incidents; casualties -- civilian, Iraqi security forces, U.S. I look at high-profile attacks. All of those statistics for the first five months of 2010 are the lowest we've had on record.Although there has been some violence, there have been some bad days in Iraq, every statistic continues to go in the right direction. That's especially important to us now as the Iraqi security forces have continued to take more and more responsibility and are in fact in the lead now across the country, in Iraq, for security. And they have been now for the last couple months. In addition to that, over the last 90 days or so, we've either picked up or killed 34 out of the top 42 al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. They're clearly now attempting to reorganize themselves. They're struggling a little bit. They've broken -- they've lost connection with AQSL [al Qaeda Senior Leadership] in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They will attempt to regenerate themselves. They're finding it more difficult. And these operations -- going after the top al Qaeda in Iraq leaders has been a truly partnered effort between the Iraqi security forces and U.S. forces as we move forward. They've continued to develop their ability to collect intelligence and then action that intelligence. And they're getting better at that every day. The most -- the other important point I'd like to talk about, that I've been very impressed with, has been the Iraqi military leaders. During this time of vulnerability, as we are getting ready to seat the government, the Iraqi security forces have performed extremely well. The leaders have stayed neutral. They have shown their professionalism in enforcing the constitution, not showing favoritism toward certain parties. They’ve continued to execute their operations across the country, from Mosul to Basra, from Diyala province out to the Syrian border. And I think it has proven a lot to us that they are getting more and more ready to take over full control of security. Today, in Iraq, we're at 88,000 boots on the ground. We are on track to be at 50,000 by the first of September. We are on our plan.




Pullout prevents Iraqi violence because US presence intensifies the threat of a civil war and is morally derelict. (Norman Soloman, commondreams, 3/05, “Why Iraq Withdrawal Makes Sense”, http://www.commondreams.org)

President Bush just told reporters that he has no intention of setting any timetable for withdrawal. "Our troops will come home when Iraq is capable of defending herself," he said. Powerful pundits keep telling us that a swift pullout of U.S. troops would be irresponsible. And plenty of people have bought into that idea -- including quite a few progressives. Such acceptance is part of what Martin Luther King Jr. called "the madness of militarism." Sometimes, an unspoken assumption among progressive activists is that the occupation of Iraq must be tolerated for tactical reasons -- while other issues, notably domestic ones, are more winnable on Capitol Hill. But this acceptance means going along with many of the devastating effects of a militarized society: from ravaged budgets for social programs to more authoritarian attitudes and violence in communities across the country. "The bombs in Vietnam," King said in 1967, "explode at home; they destroy the hopes and possibilities for a decent America." He rejected the insistent claims that it would be more prudent to avoid clear opposition to the war in order to concentrate on domestic issues. "I speak for those whose land is being laid waste, whose homes are being destroyed, whose culture is being subverted," he said. "I speak for the poor in America who are paying the double price of smashed hopes at home and death and corruption in Vietnam." As spring 2005 begins, many who like to praise Martin Luther King are going out of their way to evade the fundamental destructiveness of this war. Of course, throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, a prevailing argument was that removing

U.S. troops would be a betrayal of U.S. responsibility to the people of South Vietnam. Today, likewise, opposition to a swift U.S. pullout from Iraq is often based on the idea that the American military must stay because of a responsibility to the people of Iraq. But most Iraqis want the U.S. military out of their country -- pronto. As Newsweek reported in its Jan. 31 edition: "Now every major poll shows an ever-larger majority of Iraqis want the Americans to leave." Yet we hear that U.S. troops must stay for the good of the Iraqi people -- even though most of those people clearly want U.S. troops to leave. (Are we supposed to believe that Americans know better than Iraqis whether American troops should stay in Iraq?) To paper over such illogic, a media-stoked myth tells us that getting out of Iraq is a notion remaining outside the boundaries of what the U.S. public could take seriously. Most politicians and pundits insist that it's off the table. But polls are

telling a different story. "According to a recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll taken after the Iraq elections, 59 percent of the public believes the United States should pull its troops out of Iraq in the next year," Amy Quinn of the Institute for Policy Studies wrote in early March. "Yet the ranks of those actively demanding that the president produce an exit strategy from Iraq are slim." In mid-March, an ABC News/Washington Post poll found that a large proportion of the U.S. population has a negative view of the war. For instance, the poll asked: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting or not?" Only 45 percent said "worth fighting," while 53 percent said "not worth fighting." Such nationwide poll numbers hardly indicate a country where few people are interested in proposals for extricating U.S. troops from Iraq. But the point is not only that political space exists in the United States for a grassroots

movement to effectively organize for a swift pullout. It's also the best alternative for Iraq. Consider the perspective of David Enders, a brave American journalist who has been in Iraq most of the time since the invasion. While writing for such outlets as MotherJones.com, the Nation magazine and the British daily Independent, he actually covers Iraqi society firsthand rather than staying behind American lines. Days ago, responding to my questions via email from Iraq, Enders provided some of the reasons for his assessment that American troops should leave rather than stay. For instance: "It is the will of the Iraqi people." Enders cites a recent survey by Iraqi pollster Saadun Al-Dulaimie, who found that 85 percent of Iraqi people want U.S. troops out of their country as soon as possible. "The U.S. does not provide security for the average Iraqi, and it never has." "The U.S. has not prevented a civil war from taking place. If anything, it has exacerbated it." "It is not morally derelict to pull out; it's morally derelict to stay. Returning real control and sovereignty to Iraqis is the most effective way to prevent the country from breaking apart. U.S. troops complain Iraqis don't want to stand up and fight for themselves, and a big part of the reason is the occupiers' presence." Meanwhile, Enders voices enthusiasm for the resolution sponsored by more than two dozen members of the House of Representatives "expressing the sense of Congress that the President should develop and implement a plan to begin the immediate withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq" (House Concurrent Resolution 35). This spring, as U.S. activists work to build a strong movement against the war, the need to pressure Congress is clear. What's less apparent is the need to also push -- and, if necessary, confront -- hesitant progressive organizations that are taking the easy way out by refusing to challenge the ongoing war. Fortunately, some national organizations are providing forthright leadership to pursue the goal of getting U.S. troops out of Iraq. Those groups -- including United for Peace & Justice, Progressive Democrats of America, Military Families Speak Out, TrueMajority, Iraq Veterans Against the War, Code Pink, Campus Antiwar Network, Veterans for Peace, Iraq Pledge of Resistance, American Friends Service Committee, Democracy Rising and U.S. Labor Against the War, to name just a dozen -- inspire as they organize. Only clear opposition to the war can change the terms of the national debate. Taking the paths of least resistance won't get us very far.



Iran Talks Stopped Now

US and Iran ready to engage in talks pending on US withdrawalReuters 09 Thomson Reuters is the world's largest international multimedia news agency, providing investing news, world news, business news, technology news, headline news, small business news, news alerts, personal finance, stock market, and mutual funds information available on Reuters.com, video, mobile, and interactive television platforms. Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests. “Obama says ready to talk to Iran” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE50Q23220090127

"It is important for us to be willing to talk to Iran, to express very clearly where our differences are, but (also) where there are potential avenues for progress," Obama said. "If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us." Iran said it awaited changes in U.S. policies toward it. "We are waiting for the new American administration to carry out practical changes," government spokesman Gholamhossein Elham said according to the ISNA news agency. "America should accept that it is a government, not an empire." In an echo of Obama's comments, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signaled on Tuesday the administration's readiness to talk to Iran, saying Tehran had a "clear opportunity" to show the world it is willing to engage.



Iraq k/2 US-Iran Relations

Since US and Iran agree withdrawal from Iraq is the better option, pulling out furthers US Iran relations(George Friedman, 3/1/2010, staff writer, Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Thinking about the Unthinkable: A US Iranian Deal”, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100301_thinking_about_unthinkable_usiranian_deal)

The Fundamental U.S.-Iranian Issue Iraq, not nuclear weapons, is the fundamental issue between Iran and the United States. Iran wants to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq so Iran can assume its place as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. The United States wants to withdraw from Iraq because it faces challenges in Afghanistan — where it will also need Iranian cooperation — and elsewhere. Committing forces to Iraq for an extended period of time while fighting in Afghanistan leaves the United States exposed globally. Events involving China or Russia — such as the 2008 war in Georgia — would see the United States without a counter. The alternative would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan or a massive increase in U.S. armed forces. The former is not going to happen any time soon, and the latter is an economic impossibility. Therefore, the United States must find a way to counterbalance Iran without an open-ended deployment in Iraq and without expecting the re-emergence of Iraqi power, because Iran is not going to allow the latter to happen. The nuclear issue is simply an element of this broader geopolitical problem, as it adds another element to the Iranian tool kit. It is not a stand-alone issue. The United States has an interesting strategy in redefining problems that involves creating extraordinarily alliances with mortal ideological and geopolitical enemies to achieve strategic U.S. goals. First consider Franklin Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalinist Russia to block Nazi Germany. He pursued this alliance despite massive political outrage not only from isolationists but also from institutions like the Roman Catholic Church that regarded the Soviets as the epitome of evil. Now consider Richard Nixon’s decision to align with China at a time when the Chinese were supplying weapons to North Vietnam that were killing American troops. Moreover, Mao — who had said he did not fear nuclear war as China could absorb a few hundred million deaths — was considered, with reason, quite mad. Nevertheless, Nixon, as anti-Communist and anti-Chinese a figure as existed in American politics, understood that an alliance (and despite the lack of a formal treaty, alliance it was) with China was essential to counterbalance the Soviet Union at a time when American power was still being sapped in Vietnam. Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous. It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different. U.S. vs. Iranian Interests Consider the American interest. First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage. Now consider the Iranian interest. First, it must guarantee regime survival. It sees the United States as dangerous and unpredictable. In less than 10 years, it has found itself with American troops on both its eastern and western borders. Second, it must guarantee that Iraq will never again be a threat to Iran. Third, it must increase its authority within the Muslim world against Sunni Muslims, whom it regards as rivals and sometimes as threats. Now consider the overlaps. The United States is in a war against some (not all) Sunnis. These are Iran’s enemies, too. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. In point of fact, the United States does not want this either. The United States does not want any interruption of oil flow through Hormuz. Iran much prefers profiting from those flows to interrupting them. Finally, the Iranians understand that it is the United States alone that is Iran’s existential threat. If Iran can solve the American problem its regime survival is assured. The United States understands, or should, that resurrecting the Iraqi counterweight to




[continues]Iran is not an option: It is either U.S. forces in Iraq or accepting Iran’s unconstrained role. Therefore, as an exercise in geopolitical theory, consider the following. Washington’s current options are unacceptable. By redefining the issue in terms of dealing with the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there are three areas of mutual interest. First, both powers have serious quarrels with Sunni Islam. Second, both powers want to see a reduction in U.S. forces in the region. Third, both countries have an interest in assuring the flow of oil, one to use the oil, the other to profit from it to increase its regional power. The strategic problem is, of course, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese model is worth considering here. China issued bellicose rhetoric before and after Nixon’s and Kissinger’s visits. But whatever it did internally, it was not a major risk-taker in its foreign policy. China’s relationship with the United States was of critical importance to China. Beijing fully understood the value of this relationship, and while it might continue to rail about imperialism, it was exceedingly careful not to undermine this core interest. The major risk of the third strategy is that Iran will overstep its bounds and seek to occupy the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Certainly, this would be tempting, but it would bring a rapid American intervention. The United States would not block indirect Iranian influence, however, from financial participation in regional projects to more significant roles for the Shia in Arabian states. Washington’s limits for Iranian power are readily defined and enforced when exceeded. The great losers in the third strategy, of course, would be the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. But Iraq aside, they are incapable of defending themselves, and the United States has no long-term interest in their economic and political relations. So long as the oil flows, and no single power directly controls the entire region, the United States does not have a stake in this issue. Israel would also be enraged. It sees ongoing American-Iranian hostility as a given. And it wants the United States to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But eliminating this threat is not an option given the risks, so the choice is a nuclear Iran outside some structured relationship with the United States or within it. The choice that Israel might want, a U.S.-Iranian conflict, is unlikely. Israel can no more drive American strategy than can Saudi Arabia. From the American standpoint, an understanding with Iran would have the advantage of solving an increasingly knotty problem. In the long run, it would also have the advantage of being a self-containing relationship. Turkey is much more powerful than Iran and is emerging from its century-long shell. Its relations with the United States are delicate. The United States would infuriate the Turks by doing this deal, forcing them to become more active faster. They would thus emerge in Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran. But Turkey’s anger at the United States would serve U.S. interests. The Iranian position in Iraq would be temporary, and the United States would not have to break its word as Turkey eventually would eliminate Iranian influence in Iraq. Ultimately, the greatest shock of such a maneuver on both sides would be political. The U.S.-Soviet agreement shocked Americans deeply, the Soviets less so because Stalin’s pact with Hitler had already stunned them. The Nixon-Mao entente shocked all sides. It was utterly unthinkable at the time, but once people on both sides thought about it, it was manageable. Such a maneuver would be particularly difficult for U.S. President Barack Obama, as it would be widely interpreted as another example of weakness rather than as a ruthless and cunning move. A military strike would enhance his political standing, while an apparently cynical deal would undermine it. Ahmadinejad could sell such a deal domestically much more easily. In any event, the choices now are a nuclear Iran, extended airstrikes with all their attendant consequences, or something else. This is what somethingelse might look like and how it would fit in with American strategic tradition.




Removing US Troop Presence and Bases in Iraq is Vital to Jumpstart US-Iran Relations

Kayhan Barzegar, Prof. of International Relations @ Islamic Azad University, ‘8 [Middle East Policy, Winter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post Invasion Iraq, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Barzegar_Middle_East_Policy_Winter_2008.pdf]

The most significant factors concerning Iran’s new security challenge are the U.S. military presence next to Iran’s national borders and U.S. aims and strategies. Although Iran was greatly relieved to see the Taliban and Saddam regimes removed from power,31 there was none54 theless a sense that a new and possibly greater security threat had replaced them: U.S. administration officials and military forces, determined to implement the Bush administration’s preemptive doctrine vis-àvis Iran. The new circumstances saw the United States position itself as a “balancer,” reflecting the high likelihood of an indefinite U.S. military presence on Iran’s immediate borders.32 Since 9/11, the Bush administration’s regional policy has focused on isolating Iran in its geopolitical sphere, building unfriendly regional alliances against it and pursuing a policy of “regime change.”33 This has forced Iran to confront the United States in the region. New Political-Security Arrangements The political-security system in the Persian Gulf was designed chiefly for traditional threats, based on conditions in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.34 Policies such as “balance of power” and “dual containment” were based only on the demands and interests of transregional players. In other words, third-party interests have been the main components of such a security system.35 Traditionally, stability was defined as the creation of a balance between Iran and Iraq. This line of thinking was based on an evaluation of the two sides’ various economic, cultural, military and ideological strengths. Supported by U.S. regional policies, one of the main justifications advanced by the shah’s regime for Iran’s growing military expenditures was the fact that they were necessary to stave off the threat posed by the Baath regime.36 Saddam Hussein, likewise, naming himself the guardian of the Arab world’s eastern gate, justified his growing military costs to be necessary for blocking Iranian influence in the region. This ultimately led to an intense arms race and distrust between Iran and Iraq, culminating in a full-fledged war. With the new developments, such an arrangement that multiplies the causes of tension and mistrust among the regional states and is based on mutual misperceptions about the roles, positions and aims of the other countries is not in conformity with regional realities. In addition, as demonstrated during the crises of the last few years, namely the first and second Persian Gulf wars, it lacks efficacy. 37 For the same reason, the current conditions and realities of the region demand new regional security arrangements. Instead of focusing on differences, any new security arrangement must primarily be based on a new definition of the nature of the threat and a precise understanding of the aims of all players, identifying and working on common security concerns and interests. The birth of a new Iraq demands a revision of the current regional political-security architecture, especially in the Persian Gulf. Most of Iran’s foreign-currency earnings derive from the export of energy through the Persian Gulf.38 Meanwhile, the region is also Iran’s main route of international trade and communication and the starting point for Iran’s international relations. The establishment of a new Iraq with a different power dynamic, featuring empowered Shia factions, has presented new possibilities for Iranian foreign policy in the region. Another aim of Iran’s policy towards Iraq is to create economic-cultural and political opportunities. Iraq’s trade was traditionally oriented to the Arab world through Jordan in the west and Turkey and the Soviet bloc countries in the north. In the new circumstances, a reorientation to Iran and the east as well, owing to Iraq’s long borders with Iran and cultural-societal commonalities, could play a major role for increasing economic and cultural-political exchanges. More diverse exchanges with the neighboring countries will further mutual interactions, leading to an appropriate level of political-security relations. Today, Iran, on account of its great economic potential, is in the best position to fill the demands of regional markets, creating economic opportunities for Iranian trading companies and young industries. The transit of energy sources; the geopolitics of pipelines and other sources of energy transference; and fulfilling the economic demands of regional markets in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and the Persian Gulf are all significant parts of Iran’s regional presence. Greater economic activity requires applying pragmatic foreign policy to the establishment of close politicalstrategic relations with neighboring governments. Iran-U.S. Conflict in Post-Invasion Iraq The Bush administration’s attempt to establish a new political-security order in the region by installing like-minded elites in Iraq or transforming Iraq into a potential model of democracy for Iran is perceived as contrary to Iran’s national interests because it allows for further U.S. penetration and influence in the region. Not only do these policies endanger Iran’s national security; they further demonize Iran in its own neighborhood, especially in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, actions that Washington considers to be security enhancing are simultaneously regarded by Tehran as fostering insecurity. The current U.S. military presence and its long-term goals



of establishing military bases in Iraq, on the one hand, and the legitimate security concerns that have emerged from the changing nature of the regional political security system, on the other, have compelled Iran to reject cooperation with the United States to secure the region.




US Long Term Presence in Iraq is the Critical Impediment to US-Iran Relations Kayhan Barzegar, Prof. of International Relations @ Islamic Azad University, ‘8 [Middle East Policy, Winter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post Invasion Iraq, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Barzegar_Middle_East_Policy_Winter_2008.pdf]

What are the roots and aims of Iran’s foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq? Many scholars attribute Iran’s policies to a desire to achieve national and regional interests, perceiving this policy to be mainly offensive and ideological.1 I argue instead that the roots and aims of Iran’s foreign policy are defensiv e , mainly pragmatic, and based on state-oriented and strategic issues. As to Iran-U.S. relations in the new Iraq, the main controversy involves different perceptions of the security challenges; actions that Washington considers to be necessary for protecting the U.S. interests in post-invasion Iraq are regarded by Tehran as undermining Iran’s security and national interests. The new political-security developments in post-invasion Iraq have led Iran to seek a friendly, stable, secure and prosperous neighbor. However, the Bush administration’s regional policy — largely focused on defining Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, building regional alliances against Iran, and establishing long- term military bases next to Iran’s borders — has compelled Iran to oppose it. I argue that historical views and stateoriented and strategic issues all have significant effects on Iran’s foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq. I then explain that the nature of cultural and political-security characteristics of Iran’s sources of power as well as the demands of the factors and principles involved in Iran-Iraq relations will inevitably force Iran to be pragmatic in its policy toward the new Iraq; ideology is only one source of Iran’s power. Lastly, I argue that Iran’s foreign policy is based on achieving strategic aims. It is the result of a combination of considerations aimed at producing both security and opportunities. The birth of a new Iraq demands a revision of the current regional political-security architecture, mainly based on “balance of power.” By shifting Iraq to a friendly state, Iran desires to discard the traditional designation of Iraq as Iran’s counterbalance in the Persian Gulf and to turn the new relations into a “balance of interests.” The main conflict in Iranian-U.S. relations in post-invasion Iraq is based on redefining Iraq’s political-security structure. Understanding the roots of Iran’s foreign policy has important implications for the United States and regional countries that are currently concerned about Iran’s role and aims in Iraq.

US Troop Presence Is the Most Important Issue for Iranian Iraq Policy

Kayhan Barzegar, Prof. of International Relations @ Islamic Azad University, ‘8 [Middle East Policy, Winter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post Invasion Iraq, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Barzegar_Middle_East_Policy_Winter_2008.pdf]

These elites believe that post-invasion Iraq presents a combination of challenges and opportunities. Iran’s Iraq policy is formulated in Iran’s National Security Council, where all governmental bodies have representatives and seek to balance one another. Undoubtedly, the Iranian government would like to see a secure, stable, balanced and united Iraq. Spreading insecurity in Iraq, as Iranian officials have always asserted, would mean insecurity for Iran.15 On the Iranian side, there is great motivation to help secure Iraq, while at the same time addressing Iran’s security concerns and strategic interests. These concerns are mainly focused on the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and their long-term strategy of establishing military bases . There are also security concerns regarding the opposition groups inside Iraq that are operating against Iran.16 This issue has been one of the main concerns of the Iranian government in any political security agreement with the Iraqi government.




US withdrawal improves leverage for US Iranian DialogueWehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A. Guffey Prepared for the United States Air Force The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract “THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf

Most Israelis expected some sort of U.S. engagement and dialogue with Iran in the Obama administration. An Israeli official believes that the U.S. drawdown will allow a serious U.S. attempt at engagement with Iran, or at least improve U.S. leverage in such a dialogue.77 But Israelis, regardless of their political perspective, do not want to see talks with Iran drag out in a way that would allow the nuclear issue to remain unresolved.

Withdrawal resets US-Iran relationsMoubayed 09 Sami Moubayed staff writer for Asia Times Feb 3, 2009 “Ahmadinejad rides the American tide” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KB03Ak04.html

They include American support for a 1953 coup that toppled a democratically elected Iranian government, during the years of president Dwight Eisenhower. They also include American backing for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq wars, under Ronald Reagan, and support for the creation of Israel in 1948, under Harry Truman. He accused the US of preventing Iran from achieving any kind of scientific progress, and injecting the country with “poverty, ignorance, and illiteracy”. For a new page, he noted, American must withdraw from Iraq (which Obama has promised to do) and apologize for all wrongs committed against Tehran since 1979. After all the fire, Ahmadinejad said one useful thing: that he was willing to look forward, no longer back, if there was a “fundamental change” in US foreign policy.

Iraq is a prerequisite to engaging Iran on nuclear issuesFrank G. Wisner (Senate Foreign relations Committee, “The United States & Iran: Time for Diplomacy” 3/3/09, http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate090303Wisner.pdf)

A diplomatic engagement with Iran will fail if we attempt to “cherry pick” the issues. The problems we an Iran face are numerous and they are interconnected. The Iranian side attaches special importance to national security and national honor. We and Iran cannot address Iraq without considering the Gulf; it is not possible to deal with the nuclear question without coming to grips with Iran’s conception of its security environment. In addition, the past quarter century is littered with cases of single issue engagements with Iran. Each time we and Iran have tried to close on one problem, we have found that its resolution led to a dead end and did not contribute to the resolution of other issues. The reason is simple – we and Iran have not agreed on a political context.

Similarly in Iraq and Afghanistan, we need to advance Iran’s interest in stability along its borders . Iran wants the al‐Maliki regime in Iraq to succeed but it recognizes the need for reconciliation among Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups. In Afghanistan, a return of the Taliban to Kabul is inimical to Iranian interests, a disposition we can harness to our advantage. In fact, Tehran today is sending signals it wishes to discuss Afghanistan. For openers, we must make it clear the United States seeks no permanent base for its forces in either country.




US-Iranian Relations will improve due to US withdrawal from Iraq, US military presence threatens Iranian security. Barzegar 08-(Kayhan, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, December 8 2008, Belfer Center,, "Iran and Obama: The Grand Bargain on Roles" http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18720/iran_and_obama.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1111%2Fkayhan_barzegar%3Fpage%3D3)

Yet, as occasionally expressed by U.S. officials, Iran's increased regional role contradicts U.S. strategic goals, the interests of Arab allies, and most importantly, the security of Israel. To diminish Iran's role, the Bush administration utilized all means, such as installing like-minded elites in Iraq or through transforming Iraq into a potential model for Iran, in order to form a new kind "balance of power" between the two countries, creating an unfriendly coalition with the region's Sunni regimes against Iran, and, finally, opposing systematically Iran's nuclear program. These policies are all perceived as being contrary to Iran's national security and interests. As a result, Iran and the U.S. are now two "strategic adversaries", which are trying to balance against each other. Today, actions that Washington considers to be security-enhancing are regarded by Tehran as bringing insecurity for Iran. Iran's opposition to the Iraq-U.S. Political-Security Agreement is in this context, whereas any U.S. penetration in Iraq would increase the role of the U.S. across from Iran's western boundaries and likewise diminish Iran's strategic role in its own backyard. For this reason, Iran has persistently asked for U.S. troop withdrawal. Such a characterization of Iran-U.S. relations is somehow new and apart from past bitter history. A real change by Obama's administration, as expressed by Iranian officials like Speaker of the Majlis Ali Larijani, should be fundamental and based on redefining Iran's role in U.S. regional policies. The nature of power and politics has changed and become more interdependent in the region. Today, the political-security issues in the Levant are linked with power-sharing conflicts in the Persian Gulf. Iran has the key role in the both regions. President Obama's policy in the region should be based on changing the traditional policy of "balance of power", which is itself a source of tension and war in Iran's relations with neighboring states. The Iran-Iraq War was the result of an arms race which had begun due to this policy. Such a policy is neither efficient nor will it be accepted by Iran. The region can not be secured at the expense of Iran's insecurity. Instead, the U.S. president should change this policy to "balance of interests" in which all actors' interests, regional or trans-regional, are secured. He should also change the existing perception in America that a powerful Iran will endanger U.S. regional interests. The "grand bargain" between Iran and President Obama should therefore be based on accepting Iran's role. Unlike the existing view in America, Iran's main point of bargaining is not to obtain "security assurances" from the U.S., rather it is to gain an appropriate regional role commensurate with its sources of power. If the Obama administration is willing to do so, Iran should be interested in settling the Levant issues in exchange for accommodating Iran's role and key interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq. Iran should also realize that its role and influence in the region are unlikely to be indefinite It is a momentous opportunity for Iran therefore to settle its strategic issues with the United States in the course of region's transformation to a new-political security order..

Iran wants the US out of Iraq, feel it contributes to regional instabilityAljazeera 10 Aljazeera is a leading Arabic news paper “Iran demands US troop withdrawal” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/04/201041854124873989.html

The Iranian president has called on the US to withdraw its troops from the Gulf region and Afghanistan. "The region has no need for alien troops and they should return home and let the regional states take care of their own affairs," Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in a speech marking the country's annual Army Day on Sunday. "They must leave the region and this is not a request but an order, and the will of the regional nations," he said. He said the deployment of US and Nato troops in Iraq and Afghanistan under the pretext of


http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18720/iran_and_obama.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1111%2Fkayhan_barzegar%3Fpage%3D3

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18720/iran_and_obama.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1111%2Fkayhan_barzegar%3Fpage%3D3

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/1111/kayhan_barzegar.html?back_url=%2Fpublication%2F18720%2Firan_and_obama.html%3Fbreadcrumb%3D%252Fexperts%252F1111%252Fkayhan_barzegar%253Fpage%253D3&back_text=Back%20to%20publication


fighting terrorism had not only failed, but also increased insecurity in both countries.



Iran diplomacy k/2 Iraq Stability

US-Iran Co-operation Necessary to Prevent Iraqi Civil War

Courtney Rusin, @ The United States Institute for Peace, ‘5 [September, A Critical Triangle: Iraq, Iran and the United States, www.usip.org/resources/critical-triangle-iraq-iran-and-united-states]

An atmosphere of growing militarization and anti-Americanism in Tehran spells trouble for Washington because the deteriorating situation in Iraq has undermined the Bush administration’s leverage in dealing with Iran on the nuclear issues and on the question of Iraq itself. This development has unfolded in tandem with rising prospects for full-fledged civil war in Iraq, a development that raises the prospects for a direct (or indirect) US-Iranian confrontation in the region. The single most important factor that might work against such a confrontation is the shared interest that both Iran and the U.S. have in preventing a civil war and the ensuing dismemberment of Iraq that would surely follow such a war. Indeed as Pollack pointed out, it is precisely this common interest, combined with the benefits that Tehran has reaped from the emergence of a Shiite government in Baghdad that has thus far encouraged Tehran to play a relatively positive role in the struggle to create a sustainable political order in Iraq.

Iraq Civil War Escalates - Brings in All Regional Powers


The dynamics leading to a civil war in Iraq may then include not only inter -sectarian conflict among Kurd, Sunni, Shia but also intra-sectarian conflict within the Shia. If civil war emerges, all of Iraq’s neighbors , with Iran leading the way, will have an interest in moving and influencing the outcome. Iraq’s neighbors who fear Shia dominance—the Saudis, Syrians, Jordanians, and Turks—will look after their own proxies. Pollack asserted that “Iran’s decision about civil war in Iraq could be the single most important decision in post-Saddam Iraqi history. If the Iranians decide to move, it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy—they will kick off the civil war that they are trying to win because the moment they move, the Sunnis have to move, the Kurds have to move and all of Iraq’s neighbors also have to move immediately .”

INCENTIVIZING IRAN TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IS KEY TO THEIR STABILITYZbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, (Co-Chair of the Independent Iran Task Force and served as National Security Adviser to President Carter from 1977 to 1981; is Co-Chair of the Task Force and President of Texas A&M University, awarded multiple distinguished medals for work in intelligence), 2004, "Iran: Time for a New Approach," Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 1-79.

U.S. concerns have long focused on Iran's activities and intentions toward its neighbors. Over the past decade, Iran's foreign policy has gradually acceded to the exigencies of national interest, except in certain crucial areas where ideology remains paramount. As a result, Tehran has reestablished largely constructive relations with its neighbors and has expanded international trade links. The changing regional context has produced new pressures and uncertainties for Iran. The Task Force concluded that, although Iran's leadership is pursuing multiple avenues of influence and is exploiting Iraqi instability for its own political gain, Iran nevertheless could play a potentially significant role in promoting a stable, pluralistic government in Baghdad. It might be induced to be a constructive actor toward both Iraq and Afghanistan, but it retains the capacity to create significant difficulties for these regimes if it is alienated from the new post-conflict governments in those two countries.



Iran Diplomacy k/2 Iraq Stability

ENGAGING IRAN IS VITAL TO STABILIZE IRAQMahmood Monshipouri, (professor of political science at Quinnipiac College), October 2004, The Muslim World, Volume 94 Issue 4 Page 565-586.

Reformist factions in the Islamic Republic have repeatedly said that Iran can have a moderating influence over Iraq's Shi'ites. It is also important not to exaggerate Iranian influence on Iraq's Shi'ites. Iranian clergy maintain some degree - even minimal - religious influence over the Shi'ites there.91 The biggest Iraqi Shi'ite opposition group, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) was led by Ayatollah Muammad Baqer al-Hakim, who returned from 23 years in exile in Iran to Iraq and had 7,000 Badr Brigades fighters.92 Subsequently slain in a massive bomb blast in a mosque in Najaf, Ayatollah Hakim himself repeatedly spoke against the presence of foreign forces in Iraq, arguing that Iraqis must be able to install the government they desire.93Although the participation of this Council is crucial to the formation of an interim administration in post-war Iraq, Iran's Islamic government, according to some leading clerics such as Sheikh Karbalai, is not supported by all Iraqi Shi'ites as the right model: "unlike Iranians, Iraqis are a religious and ethnic mix."94 It may be the case that the average Iraqi cleric is not fully cognizant of the Iranian people's increasing distaste for the Islamic Republic. Regardless, it is crucial that the United States have Iran's cooperation in the nation-building and reconstruction of Iraq.

SHOULD ENGAGE IRAN ON IRAQ- BEST STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONSRobert E. Hunter, (Senior adviser at the Rand Corp. and former U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998), April 19, 2007, UPI, http://www.rand.org/commentary/041907UPI.html

U.S. and Iranian diplomats would help both their nations if they use these talks to go off in a corner by themselves and discuss the full range of their differences, disagreements and potential conflicts. The first issue is Iraq. Iran has gained significantly from America's problems there. Saddam Hussein, its bitter enemy, is gone, as is Iranian Enemy No. 2, the Taliban, in Afghanistan - and both courtesy of U.S. military power. But if the Iranians are thinking clearly, they will understand that a political and military vacuum in Iraq, following a disorderly withdrawal of American forces, could not be entirely to their liking. At a major conference in Bahrain in January, the Iranian foreign minister said that if the United States left Iraq, Iran would be willing to ease its passage, a statement that could easily be dismissed as not wanting to step on its own victory. But the minister added another point: The United States should not be in any hurry to leave. This recalls St. Augustine's remark: "Oh Lord, make me chaste - but not yet." All this makes Iraq a good issue to head the agenda of U.S.-Iranian bilateral negotiations. The next point should be Afghanistan. In 2001 Iran was instrumental in the U.S. and coalition defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaida, Iran's own mortal enemies, and America acknowledged as much. Now, Iran has even approached the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to ask for help in stabilizing its eastern frontier against the drug dealers pouring in from Afghanistan and killing Iranian police. NATO has so far refused, at America's request.


http://www.rand.org/commentary/041907UPI.html


Iran Diplomacy k/2 Iraq Stability

ENGAGING IRAN IS KEY TO STABILITY IN IRAQMahmood Monshipouri, (professor of political science at Quinnipiac College), October 2004, The Muslim World, Volume 94 Issue 4 Page 565-586.

The United States has found it difficult to operate in the postwar power vacuum of Iraq without the cooperation of the Shia community. If there is one area in which the Shia community is seemingly unified, it is in its opposition to the American presence in Iraq.80 Further, any U.S. plan to create an alternative Shi'ite leadership to Ayatollah Hakim's is likely to face major opposition.81 It is in this context that the U.S. foreign policy in post-war Iraq must find a way to come to grips with whatever influence Iran wields in this situation.82 Achieving stability in Iraq, former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has noted, will require the support and engagement of neighboring countries, even those with which the United States has an adversarial relationship.83 A six-plus-two agreement, some observers have suggested, might be a good idea for the U.S. military to supervise peacekeeping operations in Iraq for some time to come and for the United Nations to supervise the rabid, Byzantine domestic politics of the country.84

ENGAGING IRAN IS KEY TO STABILITY IN IRAQMahmood Monshipouri, (professor of political science at Quinnipiac College), October 2004, The Muslim World, Volume 94 Issue 4 Page 565-586.

The United States has found it difficult to operate in the postwar power vacuum of Iraq without the cooperation of the Shia community. If there is one area in which the Shia community is seemingly unified, it is in its opposition to the American presence in Iraq.80 Further, any U.S. plan to create an alternative Shi'ite leadership to Ayatollah Hakim's is likely to face major opposition.81 It is in this context that the U.S. foreign policy in post-war Iraq must find a way to come to grips with whatever influence Iran wields in this situation.82 Achieving stability in Iraq, former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has noted, will require the support and engagement of neighboring countries, even those with which the United States has an adversarial relationship.83 A six-plus-two agreement, some observers have suggested, might be a good idea for the U.S. military to supervise peacekeeping operations in Iraq for some time to come and for the United Nations to supervise the rabid, Byzantine domestic politics of the country.84



Iran Diplomacy k/2 Prev Miscalc

IRANIAN DIALOGUE KEY TO AVOID MISCALCULATIONS AND WARAnthony H. Cordesman, (Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS), May 24, 2007, Iran, "Soft Power," and Haleh Esfandiari, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,957/

There is always going to be a good case for dialogue with Iran, for the same reasons the US always talked to the USSR during the worst days of the Cold War, and should never have failed to recognize and talk to China. It is even more important to talk to hostile states than friends. The risks of misunderstandings are much greater, even limited progress in improving relations can help prevent wars, and present problems can lead to better relations in the future.

ENGAGING KEY TO SOLVE MISCALCPuneet Talwar, (International Affairs Fellow at CFR Served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1999 to 2001 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff), Jul/Aug2001, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, Issue 4, ebsco

Although both countries could survive without improving their relations -- indeed, they have managed to do so for more than two decades --neither should miss the opportunity to bolster regional and global security. Negotiations between the two sides might be difficult, but the absence of direct dialogue is worse, since it leads each side to badly misjudge the other's intentions and to misread the other's signals.


http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,957/


Iran Diplomacy k/2 ME Stability

IMPROVING US-IRAN RELATIONS IS KEY TO STABILIZE THE MIDDLE EASTTahereh Ebrahimi-far, (Professor of International Relations at the Islamic Azad University, in Tehran), 2005, Journal of the European Society for Iranian Studies, 39-52.

None of the major problems in the region today can be solved by one power alone. A stable Middle East depends on the United States and Iran working together in the region. They certainly have common interests in regional security and the secure flow of oil and hence are bound to cooperate in the Middle East. Unfortunately, however, these shared interests are not perceived as vital ones by either side; nor do they see eye-to-eye on the key issues. This does not mean that the US-Iranian relationship has no future. While there are reasons to doubt an improvement in Iran-US relations, there are substantial reasons to hope that recent developments in the Middle East will lead to an improvement in the Iran US relations.

MIDDLE EAST WAR WILL PRODUCE GLOBAL NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION.Steinbach, 2002. http://wagingpeace.org/articles /0203/0331steinbachisraeli.htm

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "S hould war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."

US-Iranian dialogue is the only internal into ME peaceCarpenter and Malou 08 Ted Galen Carpenter and Malou Innocent (Ted Galen Carpenter is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington DC, and is the author of seven books on international affairs. He is a member of the editorial boards of the National Interest, Mediterranean Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Studies. Malou Innocent is a Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute. She received her BA in Mass Communications and Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and her MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago. “The Iraq War and Iranian Power” Winter 2007–08 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/carpenter_innocent_the_iraq_war_and_iranian_power.pdf)

Successful US–Iranian dialogue could be a springboard to a wider regional conference, including Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council states. As Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution put it, ’no neighboring state is likely to significantly alter strategy unless they all do’.46 A comprehensive and mutually agreed-upon framework would be the first step for establishing a durable and sustainable regional peace.


http://wagingpeace.org/articles%20/0203/0331steinbachisraeli.htm


Iran Diplomacy k/2 ME Stability

US Iranian dialogue opens up US influence in ME, and solves misunderstandingJerrold D. Green, Frederic Wehrey, and Charles Wolf, Jr. 09 Prepared for the Smith Richardson Foundation conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.5755&rep=rep1&type=pdf

There is value in negotiating with Iran, even if the likelihood for a breakthrough is distant. First, negotiations broaden U.S. contacts inside the regime and produce more information about its processes , both of which might generate unexpected openings for influence later. Second, negotiations reduce misunderstandings that can escalate into conflict. Third, negotiations can help de-mystify the Islamic Republic, reducing the U.S. tendency to treat it as an exceptional and abnormal actor in the international system.



Iran nuclearization ev

Iran Nuclear Question Directly Linked to Us Policy in Iraq


There is a close if not decisive link between Tehran’s approach to the nuclear question and Washington’s evolving position in Iraq. Indeed, as Kemp points out, since the invasion in 2003, Iran’s willingness to cooperate on the nuclear debate has been directly related to the success of the U.S. military campaign in Iraq. A stable Iraq and a fall in oil prices would encourage Iran’s leaders to cooperate with the U.S. and Europe. But if the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate and oil remains in short supply, Iran will be less inclined to compromise.

TALKS WITH IRAN ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ARE KEY TO AVOID WARRobert E. Hunter, (Senior adviser at the Rand Corp. and former U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998), April 26, 2006, washingtonpost.com, http://www.rand.org/commentary/042606WP.html

A U.S. offer of serious talks with Iran that deal with the most critical issues of security, as seen from each side's perspective, may not be enough to deflect the Iranians from their current dangerous course. But it is far better than relying on the Iranians to blink in their current standoff with the United States. If America will not at least test a "grand bargain" to resolve differences with Iran, the two nations will continue drifting toward war.

US military presence in Iraq causes Iran proliferationZuhur 06 (Sherifa D., Faculty, Middle Eastern politics, Islamic world, fundamentalism/political Islam, Strategic Studies Institute, IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES: THE NEW TRIANGLE’S IMPACT ON SECTARIANISM AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT)

Iran’s aim to obtain nuclear technology and, though unacknowledged, efforts to develop nuclear weapons technology demonstrates the concerted effect that external pressures can have on nation-states. Iran has discussed its right to nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons. Basically, it states that one day its energy reserves will be depleted, and it needs to create alternatives. What role does Iraq play here? First, Iran’s cry of “rough neighborhood” has changed in that Saddam Husayn’s intense anti-Iranian policies are no more. However, the U.S. presence in Iraq and in Afghanistan on Iran’s other border places Iran in a strategic sandwich. Even with an eventual American withdrawal from Iraq, that country’s army is going to be a very large one. Iranians can reason that Iraq’s new government may wish to revive a nuclear program if they continue their own efforts. What we need to keep in mind is how Iranian influence in Iraq can be affected by the prospect of a nuclear Iran, now and in the future.

US Iranian cooperation solves Iranian proliferationGuler 10 Claudio Guler Independent International Affairs Analysis/Journalism “Iran, the bomb and a surge capacity” April 9, 2010 http://claudioguler.com/category/arms-control/

To curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, direct US-Iranian dialogue is necessary . The nuclear question must be on the table and confidence-building steps, endorsed multilaterally, should be taken early on. For example, the US could pledge to refrain from using force until a renewed diplomatic effort is exhausted.


http://www.rand.org/commentary/042606WP.html


Iran nuclearization ev

Iranian prolif is a deterrent for US presence in IraqLindholm 09 Oliver Lindholm is in his fourth year of a Bachelor of International Studies, majoring in Government and International Relations.The Sydney Globalist is an undergraduate international affairs magazine “The Fallout from Nowruz” December 19th, 2009 http://thesydneyglobalist.org/archives/882

Second, a nuclear weapon is also of great strategic importance to Iran. With the nuclearisation of Central Asia – that is, Pakistan, India, Russia and China – and the broad flexing of U.S. military might in the region, the regime has become fully aware of its vulnerabilities. Ironically, the constant threat of U.S. military intervention has actually highlighted the need for a deterrent.

Nuclear Iran causes middle east arms raceCFR 08 (The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. “Barack Obama” http://www.cfr.org/bios/11603/barack_obama.html)

President Obama has expressed support for "opening dialogue" with Iran, in part to ask for its assistance in "playing a more constructive role in Iraq." He says the war in Iraq has strengthened Iran's influence in the region. He has also said Iran's nuclear ambitions represent a "serious threat to the United States, to our ally Israel and to international security." A nuclear Iran would be "a game changer," he said in a September 2008 presidential debate. "Not only would it threaten Israel, a country that is our stalwart ally, but it would also create an environment in which you could set off an arms race in this Middle East."



Withdrawal Iraqi Balancing Against Iran

US pullout of Iraq would spark nationalism allowing them to unite against Iran to checkYaphe 08 Judith S. Yaphe Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University “After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq?” February 2008 http://blog.lrei.org/tmurphy/files/2009/11/after-the-surge.pdf

A young Iraqi who serves as an advisor to the prime minister’s office spoke last fall in Washington, arguing that the United States and Iran were trying to kill Iraqis’ national identity. He blamed the United States for creating a political vacuum in Iraq and faulted Iran for institutionalizing instability as part of its strategy to establish hegemony and spread Shi’ite theocracy throughout the region. The only solution, he said, is the revival of Iraqi nationalism, even if it means temporarily shelving the development of democracy. He described Iraqi nationalism—once seen as the special ideological province of the Ba’th Party—as increasingly popular, especially the Islamic brand of Iraqi nationalism preached by Muqtada al-Sadr. He called on the United States to draw on a broad spectrum of Iraqi political parties—including ex-Ba’thists and Communists—to create a new national resistance movement that could counter Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq and a national compact to frame government reforms and national reconciliation. He also encouraged the United States to apply the surge strategy that has been successful in Sunni areas of Iraq to predominantly Shi’a southern Iraq.

US drawdown in Iraq increases Arab-state cooperation to balance Iran Wehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A. Guffey Prepared for the United States Air Force The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract “THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf

Some Israelis also see potential opportunities emerging from a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. For example, an Israeli official suggested that the Saudis could play a more-constructive role in regional security in the context of a U.S. drawdown, including supporting stabilizing steps for Iraq. Because Israel increasingly views itself as tacitly aligned with “moderate” Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in a common concern about growing Iranian influence, Israelis view an expanded regional role for U.S. allies in the wake of a U.S. drawdown as potentially beneficial.75 Israelis also view a U.S. drawdown as providing opportunities to enhance dialogue with Syria. For example, some Israeli officials believe that a U.S. withdrawal may help lead Syria away from Iran, at least in the context of a different U.S.–Syrian relationship, because Syria’s concerns over Iranian dominance in Iraq could increase once the Americans leave.76



Iran strikes ev

IRAN ATTACK CAUSES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR INCLUDING RUSSIA AND PAKISTANMark Gaffney. (Researcher, anti-nuclear activist, principle organizer of first earth day). 05/08/03. www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3288.htm

It is very possible--some would say probable--that the U.S., possibly in conjunction with Israel, will launch a "preventive" raid and destroy the Bushehr reactor before it goes on line. Such a raid would be fateful for the region and the world. It would trigger another Mideast war, and possibly a confrontation with Russia, with effects that are difficult to predict. A war with Iran might bring about the collapse of the NPT, lead to a new arms race, and plunge the world into nuclear chaos. Such a crisis holds the potential to bring the world to the nuclear brink. This article will review the background, and provide



AT: Iranian Agression

Iran’s quest for regional hegemony and nuclear missiles are all a reaction to US presence in IraqWehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A. Guffey Prepared for the United States Air Force The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract “THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf

Indeed, what many view as an Iranian drive for hegemony may in fact be intended as a form of deterrence or a bid for increased stature and “indispensability.” The “new assertiveness” in Iranian external behavior can be characterized as an attempt to consolidate and preserve the strategic gains that were in some sense handed to the Islamic Republic by the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Analysts of Iran suggest largely defensive Iranian ambitions with respect to such key issues as Iraq, where “The overarching priority for Tehran is to prevent Iraq from once more emerging as a military and ideological threat” and where Iran is more interested in stabilizing Iraq to facilitate an American withdrawal than in seeking a preeminent position in the Gulf (Takeyh, 2008, pp. 23, 28). Tehran’s motives for pursuing a nuclear capability for both security (deterrent) and status (reinforcing its regional leadership) reasons are also not new, explaining why Iranian interest in such a capability dates back to the Shah.19 Although there are tactical differences among Iranian domestic factions with respect to the acceptable costs for pursuing a nuclear option, there is broad support for the strategic decision and perceived right of Iran to acquire an indigenous enrichment capability. The Iraq War and the momentous 2009 Iranian presidential election have not fundamentally altered such calculations. This trend likely reflects Iran’s interest in consolidating its regional stature, as well as its interest in bolstering its deterrent capabilities to avoid a military attack from the United States. If Iran’s recent regional activity in part reflects such deterrent and defensive interests, this may open up the possibility of cooperation or rapprochement with Iran for U.S. policymakers, a point the final chapter of this monograph explores further



Withdrawal k/

Pullout key to US ability to facilitate Iraqi democracySean E. Duggan in 08 (He is a research assistant is a research assistant, May 22, 2008 <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/14/opinion/oe-korb14/2>

In order to truly capitalize on those gains, the United States must begin to withdraw its forces from Iraq. An unconditional and open-ended military commitment to a dysfunctional and sectarian Iraqi government will not bring about true national reconciliation, which is necessary to capitalize on what temporary security and political gains have been made. Rather, this commitment forfeits what little leverage the United States has left: the ability to extract political compromises from a status quo Iraqi government by presenting it with a credible threat of a US withdrawal if concessions are not made and implemented. Conversely, an indefinite US military presence will reverse the calculations of Iraqi opposition groups - most notably the Sunni Awakening forces and the Sadr movement - that have been critical in bringing about short-term security improvements. The United States and the Iraqi government share a common interest in a stable Iraq, but further US support must be conditional upon the Iraqi government pursuing political reconciliation. Absent a credible withdrawal plan, the Iraqi government's sectarian political calculations will remain constant and opposition groups' recent alliance or patience with the United States will unravel. First, the Iraqi government. The Bush administration's open-ended commitment has allowed the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to approve only token political benchmarks while core power-sharing legislation remains unaddressed. Unqualified US support has also given Maliki's Dawa party and his Shi'a allies in the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq a free hand to take on their political rivals militarily.Perhaps the only remaining leverage the United States holds over Iraqi lawmakers, regardless of their ethnic or sectarian identity, is the latter's need of a sustained US military presence that ensures their political and physical survival. Faced with the potential loss of their American backers, the predominantly Shi'a Iraqi government will have an incentive to integrate its Sunni Awakening and Shi'a rivals into the Iraqi government and security forces on their terms while the balance of power is in their favor. While there is no guarantee that key power sharing legislation - an oil sharing law, a constitutional review, and the implementation of provincial elections - will be undertaken, the current dynamic has not achieved a resolution of these issues and does not appear to be able to do so in the near future. Second, Sunni Awakening groups and "Sons of Iraq" militias. Despite their cooperation with US forces and recent efforts to form political parties in anticipation of the proposed provincial elections, these Sunni forces still demand a US withdrawal and have predicated their political participation on a US departure. Indeed, the United States must begin to withdraw in order to capitalize on this development. The perception that we will maintain a large military presence in Iraq indefinitely will endanger this cooperation and ultimately undermine the security progress that has been made. As one Awakening commander put it in February, "If nothing changes, then we'll suspend and quit. Then we'll go back to fighting the Americans." Finally, the Sadr movement. Sadr's August 2007 cease-fire restored his once damaged credibility and allowed him to reorganize his forces and wait out the US presence. However, recent confrontations with US and Iraqi forces are changing Sadr's calculations. Fighting in Basra and Baghdad have resulted in a loss of the movement's power and influence and have convinced Sadr rank and file that the United States and other Shi'a groups are conspiring against them. As long as open confrontation with US forces persists, Sadr's patience will continue to wane. In order for the United States to regain control of its security interests in Iraq and the greater Middle East, it must use its only remaining leverage with major Iraqi groups: a credible military withdrawal.



Withdrawal k/

Withdrawal key to maintain stability and decrease violenceMichael Hanna, fellow and program officer at the Century Foundation, Foreign Affairs 4/4 ’10, “Stay the Course of Withdrawal”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal?page=show

For Washington to seek to abrogate its withdrawal commitments -- and thereby suggest that an extended occupation is back on the agenda -- would not enhance security but would undercut the Iraqi government and risk spurring renewed violence.The ISF displayed that independence during the recent elections, when it took the lead in providing security and did not require any unplanned assistance from the United States. U.S. forces played a background role that did not depend on large numbers of U.S. military personnel.In the future, even the most forward-deployed U.S. forces (based in northern Iraq along internal boundaries disputed by Arabs and Kurds) will not rely on large numbers of troops. Under current plans, those forces will include two advisory and assistance brigades constituting approximately 7,000–8,000 troops. The commander of U.S. forces in northern Iraq, Major General Anthony Cucolo, recently indicated that he may need 800 additional troops to constitute a sufficient presence along the region’s fault lines. But even with those additional troops, the total number would be well within the parameters of the Obama administration’s plans and existing U.S.-Iraqi agreements.The past months have shown that violence levels are remaining on a positive overall trajectory even during a critical and tense moment of transition. Although Baghdad witnessed a series of spectacular terrorist attacks in the summer and fall that targeted symbols of government, the sensitive period of campaigning, voting, and vote counting has not seen such devastating attacks or coordinated insurgent activity. This is particularly noteworthy, coming at a time when the ISF has taken greater responsibility and when terrorists would be especially motivated to undermine the political process by executing spectacular attacks.Despite all this, the ISF continues to have glaring deficiencies in the realms of logistics, intelligence, air power, and border control. In light of these shortcomings, it is possible that Iraqi leaders may request security assistance that goes beyond the scope of the current binding framework to include help controlling airspace and borders, defending critical maritime oil infrastructure, and conducting counterterrorism operations. Under the terms of the security agreement, any such request for assistance would have to be initiated by the Iraqi government, not the United States. If Iraq makes such a request, the Obama administration should give it a fair hearing, balancing any possible future commitments with other pressing U.S. concerns around the world and considering the potential radicalizing effects of a continued U.S. presence.This would rule out a South Korea–style military commitment or the establishment of permanent military bases, which would be anathema to Iraq’s emerging political culture and unwise in light of current Middle Eastern realities. Instead, such a mission would be limited to temporary advice, assistance, and support, all of which would be contingent on ISF self-sufficiency. At a minimum, such a mission would require an Office of Security Cooperation based in the U.S. embassy, which would be similar to other arrangements Washington has in other regional capitals, where teams of fewer than 1,000 uniformed military personnel manage foreign military sales and limited training programs. Even the upper limit of any such effort -- possibly including military transition teams (small groups of U.S. forces that live with and train Iraqi counterparts), air support, and intelligence programs -- would be temporary in nature, restricted in size to under 10,000 troops, and not intended to establish a strategic beachhead from which to project U.S. power.


http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal?page=show


Withdrawal k/

Failure to withdrawal increases instability—promises to solve violence encourage bad decisionmaking by Iraqi leadersTom Andrews, former member of congress for Maine, The Huffington Post 2/24 ’10, “Iraq Withdrawal In Danger” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-andrews/dear-mr-president-scrap-t_b_475309.html

As I wrote last May: "Will there continue to be violence and instability in Iraq as U.S. forces are removed? Yes. But if a secure and peaceful Iraq is the requirement for the removal of U.S. forces, then our forces will be there for a very long time. If, on the other hand, the bottom line is that it is time for Iraqis to take responsibility for Iraq - as 80% of the Iraqi population wants -then the president is right. It is time for U.S. forces to go."T he bottom line for US policy in Iraq must be sovereignty, not security. If Iraqi leaders want to engage in flim-flam political maneuvers that enrage their opponents, alienate millions of Sunnis and ignite a new round of sectarian violence, that is their business. Iraq is their country. But the last thing that anyone should be thinking and planning and announcing is that our men and women in uniform might be ordered into harm's way to clean up the mess.Even the existence of so-called "contingency plans" by the US military sends a dangerous signal that once again our soldiers might be ordered to risk life and limb to bail out bad choices by sectarian Iraqis who hold the reins of power. Mr. President, please order General Odierno to dump his contingency plans and read your orders for the withdrawal of all combat forces from Iraq by the end of August. There should not be a shadow of a doubt that our soldiers are leaving Iraq on schedule.

Failure to withdraw increases terrorismKim Sengupta Patrick Cockburn 07 (staffwriters, The Independent UK ,“The War on Terror Is the Leading Cause of Terrorism” ,http://www.alternet.org/world/48620/)

Innocent people across the world are now paying the price of the "Iraq effect," with the loss of hundreds of lives directly linked to the invasion and occupation by American and British forces.An authoritative U.S. study of terrorist attacks after the invasion in 2003 contradicts the repeated denials of George Bush and Tony Blair that the war is not to blame for an upsurge in fundamentalist violence worldwide. The research is said to be the first to attempt to measure the "Iraq effect" on global terrorism.It found that the number killed in jihadist attacks around the world has risen dramatically since the Iraq war began in March 2003. The study compared the period between 11 September 2001 and the invasion of Iraq with the period since the invasion. The count -- excluding the Arab-Israel conflict -- shows the number of deaths due to terrorism rose from 729 to 5,420. As well as strikes in Europe, attacks have also increased in Chechnya and Kashmir since the invasion. The research was carried out by the Centre on Law and Security at the NYU Foundation for Mother Jones magazine.Iraq was the catalyst for a ferocious fundamentalist backlash, according to the study, which says that the number of those killed by Islamists within Iraq rose from seven to 3,122. Afghanistan, invaded by US and British forces in direct response to the September 11 attacks, saw a rise from very few before 2003 to 802 since then. In the Chechen conflict, the toll rose from 234 to 497. In the Kashmir region, as well as India and Pakistan, the total rose from 182 to 489, and in Europe from none to 297.


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-andrews/dear-mr-president-scrap-t_b_475309.html


Withdrawal k/

Even if withdrawal is a setback, continued occupation is worse—super expensive and helps Al QaedaTed Galen Carpenter, VP for defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO institute, Council on Foreign Relations Feb 28, ‘8, “When Should the US Withdraw from Iraq?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/15586/when_should_the_us_withdraw_from_iraq.html

A long-term occupation would be an extremely costly proposition, both in lives and dollars. The mission currently costs more than $10 billion per month. Even if the level of violence remains relatively low, and Washington ultimately achieves its long-delayed objective of reducing troop levels below 100,000 (neither of which is certain), the monthly cost would still run $7 billion to $8 billion. And that is merely the direct financial drain. It does not take into account such indirect costs as the care of thousands of additional wounded veterans over the coming decades—an obligation that will add tens of billions more to the tab. A long-term mission in Iraq is a multi-trillion-dollar commitment.The hawks argue that we have no choice, though, because a withdrawal would, according to James Phillips, be a “disaster.” He worries especially that al-Qaeda would acquire a sanctuary and that Iran would be strengthened. The first concern is greatly overblown. Al-Qaeda [AQI] is universally hated by Shiites and Kurds, and it has clearly worn out its welcome even with its former Sunni allies. A University of Maryland poll reveals that an overwhelming majority of Iraqi Sunnis dislike al-Qaeda (PDF). Who would provide a sanctuary?Fears about Iran’s enhanced influence have some validity, but that train left the station a long time ago. When the United States overthrew the Baathist regime that made Iraq into the principal strategic counterweight to Iran, it guaranteed that Tehran’s position would be strengthened. A Shiite-led government in Baghdad may not be an Iranian vassal, but it will have close ties to Iran. And no extended U.S. occupation (short of making Iraq a outright U.S. puppet) can prevent that outcome.Leaving Iraq will not be without adverse consequences to the United States, but for a superpower, it will be a setback, not a disaster. Conversely, trying to stay in Iraq means having U.S. troops attempt to referee the still simmering Sunni-Shiite internecine struggle—a conflict that could fully re-ignite at any time. Trying to remain in Iraq also plays into the hands of al-Qaeda, which has already benefitted enormously from a U.S. military occupation that has antagonized the overwhelming majority of people in the Muslim world. The Iraq mission was always the foreign policy equivalent of purchasing stock in Enron or Worldcom. It is long past time to acknowledge error and terminate our losses.



Withdrawal k/

Iraqis ready for US to goKukis in 09 (he served as a White House corrospondent Feb. 27, 2009, “Most Iraqis Welcome Obama's Pullout Plan” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1882254,00.html)

It should come as no surprise that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been quick to endorse emerging plans to hasten the departure of U.S. forces from his country. Maliki, after all, had opposed the Bush Administration's decision to increase U.S. troop levels in the surge of 2007, and he had forced a reluctant Washington to accept a hard deadline for withdrawal in the Status of Forces Agreement adopted late last year. The growing abilities of the Iraqi security forces and the strengthening of his political position after last month's provincial elections have added to Maliki's confidence in managing without the Americans. "We welcome such a decision and support it," said Tahseen al-Shekhli, a spokesman for the Iraqi government, of Obama's intention to end the U.S. combat mission in Iraq by August 2010. "We consider this as a good-faith sign from the American Administration toward Iraq and Iraqis." Word of the new White House drawdown plan, which Obama officially announced on Friday morning in a speech at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, was greeted with shrugs of contentment by most Iraqi political figures, largely because the Obama plan appears to be in step with what Iraqis had expected as a result of the Status of Forces Agreement signed by the Maliki government and the Bush Administration last December. That agreement requires most U.S. combat troops to be off the streets of Iraq by this summer and all U.S. troops to have left the country by 2011. The most powerful political factions in Iraq would prefer to see U.S. forces leave sooner rather than later. Maliki's Shi'ite-dominated government and security forces have faced down their biggest foe, the Mahdi Army militia of Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. And Sadr's movement, which remains a political force in Iraq, was the first of the Shi'ite groups to agitate for a U.S. withdrawal . Only two camps in Iraq remain uneasy about seeing U.S. troops move offstage over the next 18 months — the minority Sunnis, who remain fearful of a revival of sectarian violence against them, and the commanders of the Iraqi security forces, who are anxious that U.S. logistical support and equipment may dry up as the U.S. draws down.

Iraqi Populace supports US withdrawalRosen in 05 (Nir Rosen is a freelance writer, photographer and film-maker who has worked in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, December 05, “If America Left Iraq”, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/)

At some point—whether sooner or later—U.S. troops will leave Iraq. I have spent much of the occupation reporting from Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Fallujah, and elsewhere in the country, and I can tell you that a growing majority of Iraqis would like it to be sooner. As the occupation wears on, more and more Iraqis chafe at its failure to provide stability or even electricity, and they have grown to hate the explosions, gunfire, and constant war, and also the daily annoyances: having to wait hours in traffic because the Americans have closed off half the city; having to sit in that traffic behind a U.S. military vehicle pointing its weapons at them; having to endure constant searches and arrests. Before the January 30 elections this year the Association of Muslim Scholars— Iraq's most important Sunni Arab body, and one closely tied to the indigenous majority of the insurgency—called for a commitment to a timely U.S. withdrawal as a condition for its participation in the vote. (In exchange the association promised to rein in the resistance.) It's not just Sunnis who have demanded a withdrawal: the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who is immensely popular among the young and the poor, has made a similar demand. So has the mainstream leader of the Shiites' Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, who made his first call for U.S. withdrawal as early as April 23, 2003. If the people the U.S. military is ostensibly protecting want it to go, why do the soldiers stay? The most common answer is that it would be irresponsible for the United States to depart before some measure of peace has been assured. The American presence, this argument goes, is the only thing keeping Iraq from an all-out civil war that could take millions of lives and would profoundly destabilize the region. But is that really the case?


http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853462,00.html

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1874505,00.html

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1882254,00.html


Withdrawal k/

Withdrawal would cause peace between Iraqi sectsRosen in 05 (Nir Rosen is a freelance writer, photographer and film-maker who has worked in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, December 05, “If America Left Iraq”, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/if-america-left-iraq/4412/)

Would the withdrawal of U.S. troops ignite a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites? No. That civil war is already under way—in large part because of the American presence. The longer the United States stays, the more it fuels Sunni hostility toward Shiite "collaborators." Were America not in Iraq, Sunni leaders could negotiate and participate without fear that they themselves would be branded traitors and collaborators by their constituents. Sunni leaders have said this in official public statements; leaders of the resistance have told me the same thing in private. The Iraqi government, which is currently dominated by Shiites, would lose its quisling stigma. Iraq's security forces, also primarily Shiite, would no longer be working on behalf of foreign infidels against fellow Iraqis, but would be able to function independently and recruit Sunnis to a truly national force. The mere announcement of an intended U.S. withdrawal would allow Sunnis to come to the table and participate in defining the new Iraq. But if American troops aren't in Baghdad, what's to stop the Sunnis from launching an assault and seizing control of the city?Sunni forces could not mount such an assault. The preponderance of power now lies with the majority Shiites and the Kurds, and the Sunnis know this. Sunni fighters wield only small arms and explosives, not Saddam's tanks and helicopters, and are very weak compared with the cohesive, better armed, and numerically superior Shiite and Kurdish militias. Most important, Iraqi nationalism—not intramural rivalry—is the chief motivator for both Shiites and Sunnis. Most insurgency groups view themselves as waging a muqawama—a resistance—rather than a jihad. This is evident in their names and in their propaganda. For instance, the units commanded by the Association of Muslim Scholars are named after the 1920 revolt against the British. Others have names such as Iraqi Islamic Army and Flame of Iraq. They display the Iraqi flag rather than a flag of jihad. Insurgent attacks are meant primarily to punish those who have collaborated with the Americans and to deter future collaboration.Wouldn't a U.S. withdrawal embolden the insurgency?No. If the occupation were to end, so, too, would the insurgency . After all, what the resistance movement has been resisting is the occupation. Who would the insurgents fight if the enemy left? When I asked Sunni Arab fighters and the clerics who support them why they were fighting, they all gave me the same one-word answer: intiqaam—revenge. Revenge for the destruction of their homes, for the shame they felt when Americans forced them to the ground and stepped on them, for the killing of their friends and relatives by U.S. soldiers either in combat or during raids.



Withdrawal k/

Obama withdrawal plan key to winning Iraq warJuan Coles 1/20 (Staff writer, Salon.com, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2010/01/20/winning_iraq_open2010)

But Obama's biggest practical foreign policy success has been in keeping to his withdrawal timetable in Iraq. Most observers have paid too little attention to this, among his most important decisions. When he became president, his top generals, including Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. Ray Odierno, reportedly came to him and attempted to convince him to modify the withdrawal timeline adopted by the Iraqi parliament as part of the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated shortly before he took office. They did not want U.S. troops to cease patrolling independently in mid-June 2009. They did not want to get all combat troops out by summer 2010. They wanted to finesse the agreement. Reclassify combat troops under some other heading, they said.Overturning the Status of Forces Agreement or dragging Washington's feet about it would have produced rage in Baghdad. It had the potential for undermining the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and for reinvigorating both Sunni Arab extremists and Shiite radical movements such as the Mahdi army. It would have made other Arab regimes suspicious of U.S. motives. It would have been a mistake as epochal as the Bush administration's decision to build up a heavy U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan, which restarted the war there and provoked a major insurgency that continues to this day. In Iraq, a country crawling with armed, nationalistically minded groups and dotted with arms depots, such a move would have been a catastrophe. Obama did the right thing. He overruled his generals and began returning to Iraq its sovereignty.



AT: Withdrawal Instability

Withdrawal increase cooperation, all countries want stability, No countries will invade a perceived weak IraqFettweis 07 Christopher Fettweis, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December 2007. [Survival 49.4, On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq, p. 83—98]

The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare



Heg Low Now***US Military Readiness is declining, withdrawal from Iraq is key to sustaining Hegemony. Baldor 9( Lolita C., Published journalist, Associated Press, Report casts doubt on military's readiness Strains from long, repeated tours are cited, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/02/20/report_casts_doubt_on_militarys_readiness)

The latest risk assessment, drawn up by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comes despite recent security gains in Iraq and plans for troop cuts there. The assessment finds that the United States continues to face persistent terrorist threats, and the military is still stretched and strained from long and repeated tours to the warfront. Senior military officials spoke about the report on condition of anonymity because it is a classified document. Prepared every year, and routinely delivered to Congress with the budget, the risk assessment paints a broad picture of the security threats and hot spots around the world and the military's ability to deal with them. Mullen has delivered it to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Because the threat is rated as significant, Gates will send an accompanying report to Congress outlining what the military is doing to address the risks. That report has not been finished. This year's assessment finds many of the same global security issues as previous years - ranging from terrorist organizations and unstable governments to the potential for high-tech cyber attacks. It also reflects the Pentagon's ongoing struggle to maintain a military that can respond to threats from other countries, while honing newer counterinsurgency techniques to battle more unconventional dangers, such as suicide bombers and lethal roadside bombs. Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute, a military policy research group in Arlington, Va., said the assessment would take into account the strains on the force, the wear and tear on aircraft and other military equipment, and a host of global flashpoints. "This is a chairman who looks around the world and sees - right now, today - immediate, near-term problems like North Korea, the larger questions of Pakistan and its future, Iran and what is going on there, Russia and Georgia, Venezuela, which has a close relationship with Russia and is buying arms all over the place, and Cuba," Goure said. While officials are preparing to reduce troop levels in Iraq, they are increasing their forces in Afghanistan - giving troops little break from their battlefield tours. The Pentagon has repeatedly stressed ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps, but that growth is only now starting to have an impact . There are 146,000 US troops in Iraq and 38,000 in Afghanistan - 19,000 in the NATO-led force and 19,000 fighting insurgents and training Afghan forces. One senior military official said that while there have been security gains in Iraq, military units leaving there have been sapped by repeated war tours that have also battered their equipment and vehicles. It will take time to restore the force and repair or replace the equipment. In other cases, equipment has been left in Iraq for use by the steadily growing Iraqi security forces. Two years ago, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace raised the risk level from moderate to significant, pointing to an overall decline in military readiness that he said would take several years to correct. A year later, Mullen maintained that risk level, saying that strains on the military, persistent terrorist activity, and other threats had prevented the Pentagon from improving its ability to respond to any new crises.\



Heg Sustainable

***The decline of American Hegemony is not a yes or no question; decline is a choice. Krauthammer 09 (Charles, Journalist Pulitzer Prize, The Weekly Standard, Decline Is a Choice The New Liberalism and the end of American ascendancy. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/056lfnpr.asp?page=2&pg=1)

Among these crosscurrents, my thesis is simple: The question of whether America is in decline cannot be answered yes or no. There is no yes or no. Both answers are wrong, because the assumption that somehow there exists some predetermined inevitable trajectory, the result of uncontrollable external forces, is wrong. Nothing is inevitable. Nothing is written. For America today, decline is not a condition. Decline is a choice. Two decades into the unipolar world that came about with the fall of the Soviet Union, America is in the position of deciding whether to abdicate or retain its dominance. Decline--or continued ascendancy--is in our hands. Not that decline is always a choice. Britain's decline after World War II was foretold, as indeed was that of Europe, which had been the dominant global force of the preceding centuries. The civilizational suicide that was the two world wars, and the consequent physical and psychological exhaustion, made continued dominance impossible and decline inevitable.



AT: Obama Hates Heg

Obama’s foreign policy is centrist with a goal of preserving hegemony. Van der Linden 09 (Harry, Department of philosophy and religion, Butler University, Barack Obama, Resort to Force, and U.S. Military Hegemony, http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=facsch_papers)

In reality, then, Obama’s “reluctant sheriff” will be prepared to go at it alone; this sheriff will prefer assistance by other forces but their role should be subservient. Adherence to the notion of “American exceptionalism” has made it easier for prior administrations to resort to unilateral military action and Obama enthusiastically endorses the notion. In “The American Moment” speech, he argues against the “cynics” who hold that “the American moment has passed” and that the 21st Century cannot be again a century in which “we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good.” Obama confesses that he “still believe[s] that America is the last, best hope of Earth,” and he goes on to articulate a variety of ways of how under his leadership the American moment can be seized anew, including a fresh beginning of America as reluctant global cop providing security for all .11 Remarkably, Obama recognizes that the American global cop has made serious errors in the past – he mentions the covert action in Iran that brought the Shah into power, the Vietnam War, the funding of El Salvador’s death squads, the invasion of Grenada, among others12 – but he offers no real remedy for why such errors would not happen under his administration. Worse, in the name of counterterrorism the Obama administration might even expand the reach of American military hegemony and so increase the risk of unjust interventions. Obama uncritically embraces the “global war on terrorism” in that he looks at terrorism foremost through a military lens rather than through a law-enforcement or criminal lens and, correspondingly, inflates the size and scope of the threat. He holds that one of the ways in which the “American moment” can be seized again is by American leadership in this war. On his account, this requires that the U.S. military adds superiority in counterterrorism to its traditional conventional dominance, and this will necessitate an “expansion of our ground forces by adding 65,000 soldiers to the Army and 27,000 Marines” because “the ability to put boots on the ground will be critical in eliminating the shadowy terrorist networks we now face.”13 Obama’s proposal to reduce American military presence in Iraq does not contradict his seeming willingness to expand the reach of U.S. military hegemony because his proposal is partly motivated by his concern that continued large-scale presence here would further weaken U.S. military hegemony and prevent the United States from shifting more troops to Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism.



Econ Links (Oil)

Turmoil in Iraq affects the Oil Market hurting the US Economy. Teslik 08 (Lee Hudson, Council on Foreign Relations, Monday Febuary 4th 2008, The Washington Post, Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/04/AR2008020402043.html)

Geopolitical turmoil can also affect oil prices. Crude prices have spiked since the inception of the Iraq war, though experts say turmoil in Iraq is only one of several factors influencing this increase. Still, Iraqi production currently accounts for 3 percent of global oil production, and thus turmoil in Iraq can have a substantial effect on oil prices. This, in turn, bears heavily on the U.S. economy. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the CBO who currently serves as a campaign adviser to Republican presidential candidate Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), notes the impact in a 2006 Financial Times op-ed, saying it could have significant "business cycle effects" by bringing higher oil prices and lower U.S. growth rates.

US access to oil in the Middle East is key to US hegemony Hinnebusch 07 (Raymond, Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 209–228, Fall 2007, Middle East Critique, The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a782790793&fulltext=713240928)

The US role in the oil market is, however, paradoxical. Containing any threats from either the Soviet Union or local nationalism to the (usually) cheap energy needed by the capitalist world economy which Middle East oil provided was one of the functions of hegemony that made US military power indispensable. Moreover, the alliance of US oil companies initially and thereafter of the US government with Saudi Arabia was pivotal to the oil price stability that was crucial to global economic prosperity . However, the particular way the US has exercised its ‘oil protectorate’ over the Middle East regularly has stimulated backlashes and periodic regional conflicts that actually put global energy security at risk . These challenges have been invariably stimulated either by a coercive intervention to sustain Western control of oil or by a linkage between oil and Western backing of Israel. Nationalist challenges to Western control of Middle East oil began with Muhammed Mussadeq’s nationalization of the Iranian oil industry; indigenous reaction to the subsequent CIA-sponsored coup to overthrow him would take decades to mature but it ultimately stimulated the Islamic revolution and its militantly anti-US tangent. Other major challenges to Western control of the oil market would come from the Arab world, where Arab nationalism saw a combination of Western imperialism and Zionism as the main threat and Arab nationalist control of Arab oil as the main key to challenging these forces.





Iraq K/2 Econ

US Involvement in Iraq creates a psychological change damaging the US economy through protectionism. Teslik 08 (Lee Hudson, Council on Foreign Relations, Monday Febuary 4th 2008, The Washington Post, Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/04/AR2008020402043.html)

In addition, experts comment on the psychological toll involvement in Iraq has taken on the United States, and specifically the U.S. economy. In a recent essay in Newsweek International, Fareed Zakaria notes that worries spawned in part from U.S. involvement in Iraq have undermined what was previously an "open and expansive" U.S. attitude toward foreign policy and economics. Zakaria says the United States has become a nation consumed by fear and pessimism. He says this fear has led to protectionist policies on trade, immigration, and markets, which in turn threaten the future of the U.S. economy.



Military Overstretch Links

***US armed forces are on the brink of collapse; the military is overstretched with low recruitment and a lack of reserves. Thompson 08 (Scott, B.A., Whitman College, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHT? THE USE OF FORCE TO IMPOSE DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTHURIAN DILEMMA IN THE MODERN ERA, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.)

The economic and military costs associated with forcibly imposing democracy lead to additional problems that continue to compound. As the costs mount and more resources, including troops, are needed to win the battle, the prospect of winning with a sufficiently large and adequately trained volunteer force becomes less and less likely. Potential volunteers begin to believe, wrongly or rightly, that the mission serves no domestic interest yet involves great personal and national risks, and so they decide against enlisting. Again, the situation in Iraq is instructive. United States generals recently called for more troops to be sent to Iraq, arguing that without more people-power the U.S. armed forces are on the brink of collapse.112 Unfortunately, there are not many more to give, as the reservists have already been sent on extended tours and the U.S. military is on the verge of being overstretched.113 This shortage of human resources not only decreases the chances of successfully imposing democracy, but it also leads to a corresponding erosion of democratic freedom at home. One form of this erosion is the threat of conscription. But democratic freedoms are also eroded because as the conflict intensifies, so does the risk of attack at home. Even if that risk does not increase once war has begun, wartime almost inevitably leads to shrinking domestic liberties as freedom of speech and travel are curtailed and lawmakers prioritize security over liberty. This is not to say that during times of war it is inappropriate to alter the balance between security and liberty, but that in the absence of prolonged conflict, the balance permits greater liberty.

***Military overstretch collapses hegemony.Fakiolas and Fakiolas 07 (Efstathios T and Tassos, PhD from the Department of War Studies, PhD from IMEMO, Mediterranean Quarterly Pax Americana or Multilateralism? Reflecting on the United States’ Grand Strategic Vision of Hegemony in the Wake of the 11 September Attacks, http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/4/53)

On the other hand, an important question arises as to what the concept of hegemony means. Conventional wisdom understands it as an enduring pattern of dominance that a great power imposes over others by building a hierarchical world order in its own right. The principal intellectual tradition developed is the hegemonic stability theory. 17 This assumes that hegemony points to situations in which one state has considerably more economic power than the others. The inequality of this type of power is so great that it allows this state to achieve territorial expansion, establish free trade, and rule the international system politically, thereby making a hegemonic world order possible and stable. However, territorial and military overstretch, coupled with diplomatic over commitments, inevitably result in the economic decline of the hegemon, which in turn lays the ground for its power to wane and the world order to degenerate.


http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/4/53

http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp


Military Overstretch Links

***Imperial Overstretch due to wars of aggression i.e. Iraq threaten US HegemonyScaliger 6/25 (Charles, Published Journalist, 6/25/2010, The New American, Illusions of Empire, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/3838-illusions-and-empire)

Where will it all end? If the verdict of history is any guide, America, like Britain, may well continue to squander her strength and blood waging “savage wars of peace” across the globe until her resources are exhausted. Over the past two decades, America has garrisoned most of the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Central Asia; we have yet to withdraw voluntarily from any of those places. As with Britain, our empire has become bound up with our sense of prestige; too many of us are invested in the status quo, such that withdrawal — from Iraq and Afghanistan, especially — is seen by too many as a betrayal rather than a corrective. In a word, it is not at all certain that America will ever relinquish empire until she is compelled to do so, by the brutal laws of economics, human behavior, and history — “the gods of the copybook headings,” Rudyard Kipling called them — which brook no defiance in the long run. On the other hand , what might it take to steer America away from the destructive, debilitating, potentially suicidal path of empire? A return to constitutional government would be a tremendous start. Merely reasserting the congressional prerogative to declare war would greatly curtail American wars of pure aggression, like the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Illegal wars and consequent occupations, like those of Yugoslavia and the Korean Peninsula, would be nullified and occupying forces brought home. The Koreans, the Japanese, the Europeans, Turkey, the republics of Central Asia — all these would become responsible for their own defense.Of course, any proposal to withdraw from our many so-called “obligations” overseas will provoke howls of protest from the commentariat, as we have seen with the 2008 Ron Paul presidential campaign. Yet ultimately we will have no choice in the matter. American military hegemony will only last for a brief moment, indeed, is already threatened by imperial overstretch combined with economic malaise. We will not be the world’s only superpower forever.



Soft Power Links***The Iraqi Population resents US involvement, a withdrawal would increase the US’ regional soft power. Yaphe 08 (Judith S., Distinguished Research Professor Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq?, http://blog.lrei.org/tmurphy/files/2009/11/after-the-surge.pdf)

Iraq’s political leaders have welcomed the military surge. However, they resent what they view as unwarranted intrusion into sovereign political issues. Whether we like it or not, most Iraqis perceive the U.S. debate over when—not if—the United States should withdraw and the benchmarks Iraq’s National Assembly must meet as intrusive, interven- tionist, and relevant only to American domestic politics, not to the life-or-death struggle for power in Iraq. The resentment is fueling tensions between Iraqis and Americans and further undermining U.S. influence in Iraq and the region. No amount of U.S. pressure seems capable of influencing Iraqi political leaders, who are more absorbed with battling for political power and local control than with pleasing the United States.

***US Hegemony is precipitated on its international perceptionTellis 08 (Ashely J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States, The National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/sa08_Intro.pdf)

Third, a decent regard for the opinions of mankind is always desirable. While the United States as a hegemonic power cannot be expected to be bound by the approval of others, being deaf to the views of others will neither ease the obstacles confronting its policy preferences nor strengthen its standing in the system over which it presides. Whether it can be formalized or not, the views, expectations, and interests of other states define the objective constraints surrounding all U.S. decisions in regard to high politics. Thus, attention to these compulsions not only increases the chances of successfully implementing critical decisions but also forewarns of pitfalls that must be avoided. In this context, the relationship between the United States and the opinions of mankind is not merely unidirectional, with the latter pressing upon the former; rather, Washington should be as much an active shaper of these opinions as it invariably becomes a target of them. The two instruments of critical consequence are classical diplomacy—which pertains to the engagement between countries behind closed doors—and public diplomacy—which pertains to the arts of shaping mass and elite opinion outside of the United States. Both skills, which Washington had perfected during the Cold War, appear to have atrophied disastrously. U.S. diplomacy today often consists predominantly of stating positions and then restating positions, rather than engaging creatively in an exchange of considerations. The U.S. Foreign Service also is under-strength, relative to the tasks that need to be accomplished. During the Cold War, U.S. public diplomacy successfully conveyed the magnificent diversity of the United States through independent organizations such as the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which were not subservient to the administration of the day). By contrast, U.S. public diplomacy has now degenerated into a pedestrian propaganda mill that is neither effective nor credible.



Soft Power Impacts

**US Soft Power can construct international coalitions, which solve multiple scenarios for extinction. Reiffel 05 (Lex, Fellow at the Brookings Institution, December 05, Reaching Out: American’s Serving Overseas, http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf)

By contrast, the first five years of the new millennium have been mostly downhill for the USA. The terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 changed the national mood in a matter of hours from gloating to a level of fear unknown since the Depression of the 1930s. They also pushed sympathy for the USA among people in the rest of the world to new heights. However, the feeling of global solidarity quickly dissipated after the military intervention in Iraq by a narrow US-led coalition. A major poll measuring the attitudes of foreigners toward the USA found a sharp shift in opinion in the negative direction between 2002 and 2003, which has only partially recovered since then.1 The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, failed states like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation . The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.2



Soft Power Real

Soft Power is real, empirics proveNye 04 (Joseph Jr., Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2004. Vol. 83, Iss. 3; pg. 16, The Decline of America’s Soft Power, http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/faculty/hauser/PS293/NyeDeclineSoftPower2004.pdf

Skeptics of soft power (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld professes not even to understand the term) claim that popularity is ephemeral and should not guide foreign policy. The United States, they assert, is strong enough to do as it wishes with or without the world's approval and should simply accept that others will envy and resent it. The world's only superpower does not need permanent allies; the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa, according to Rumsfeld. But the recent decline in U.S. attractiveness should not be so lightly dismissed. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past (such as those regarding the Vietnam War), but that was often during the Cold War, when other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. It is also true that the United States' sheer size and association with disruptive modernity make some resentment unavoidable today. But wise policies can reduce the antagonisms that these realities engender. Indeed, that is what Washington achieved after World War II: it used soft-power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions that has lasted for 60 years. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power. The United States cannot confront the new threat of terrorism without the cooperation of other countries. Of course, other governments will often cooperate out of self-interest. But the extent of their cooperation often depends on the attractiveness of the United States. Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. When Washington discounts the importance of its attractiveness abroad, it pays a steep price. When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries' domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions (witness the defiance of Chile, Mexico, and Turkey in March 2003). And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.

Hard Power is ineffective without Soft PowerBerkowitz 07 (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5933)

Military power will be important, but soft power — American culture and international commerce — will, over time, have a greater effect in defeating or transforming our adversaries. Conventional military power can change facts on the ground dramatically and quickly. But it is too expensive to be used for long periods, and is weak compared to the tidal effects of demographic and economic trends that shape the world over the long haul. Like an expert mariner, the United States needs to ride these tides — which do run in our favor — so that we can reach our destination efficiently and assuredly.



Heg Impacts

***US hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflictKagan 7 (Robert 7, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus . The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power .Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world



Heg Impacts

[continues – no text deleted]enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance . This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.



Heg Impacts

United States Hegemony is key to multinational organizations i.e. NATO and the WTO.Ferguson 03 (Niall, Professor Harvard University, September/October 03, Foreign Affairs, Hegemony or Empire?

The authors' argument about the uniqueness of American hegemony rests on four main pillars. The most obvious is economic: as they point out, the U.S. economy has outstripped almost all of its competitors for much of the past century. This point is developed by another of the book's contributors, Angus Maddison, and explored in almost encyclopedic depth in the chapter by Moses Abramovitz and Paul David. According to these authors, nothing achieved by the United Kingdom -- not even in the first flush of the Industrial Revolution -- ever compared with the United States' recent economic predominance. Second, the authors point to the way the United States has very deliberately used its power to advance multilateral, mutually balanced tariff reductions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organization). As Robert Gilpin argues in his chapter, the tariff reductions achieved in the 1967 Kennedy Round negotiations (and subsequently) owed much to "American pressures." Such pressure was classically exerted through "conditionality" -- that is, the terms under which the Washington-based International Monetary Fund granted its loans. This deliberate process contrasts markedly with the willy-nilly way free trade spread in the nineteenth century, as described by O'Brien and Hobson. The third pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. governments sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency before and after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods institutions, which, according to O'Brien, enabled the United States to be "far less restrained ... than all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or strategic policies Washington decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a "hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy from foreigners in the form of seigniorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). Finally, although this point gets much less attention than the others, U.S. hegemony has also resulted in some part from the way the country has led, for half a century now, a "formally constituted alliance of states" -- namely NATO -- "committed ... to the containment of two rival superpowers."



AT: Loss of Credibility Decreases Heg**US withdrawal from Iraq will not reduce its international credibility or hegemony. Fettweis 07 (Christopher, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December 2007. [Survival 49.4, On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq, p. 83—98]

A moment's historical perspective may provide a bit of comfort and clarity. Many of the same analysts who warn of post-Iraq catastrophes also held that if the United States failed in Vietnam, the blow to US credibility would have had dire consequences. Henry Kissinger's beliefs were by no means atypical: withdrawal from Vietnam would threaten 'the political stability of Europe and Japan and the future evolution of the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia', and would represent a 'fundamental threat, over a period of time, to the security of the United States'.8 The Soviets would have been emboldened to fuel more communist fires across the Third World; America's allies would have begun to doubt the sincerity of our commitments, and would have grown vulnerable to Soviet threats and intimidation; and those countries in the middle ground - the neutrals - would have begun to believe that Marxism represented the wave of the future. Dominoes would have fallen, and the United States would have been left far worse off than before. However, international geopolitical disaster did not follow defeat in Vietnam. Although communist activity did increase somewhat in the 1970s, it only occurred in countries that were even less relevant to the balance of power than Vietnam, such as Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. As scholars like Ted Hopf and Robert Johnson have demonstrated, Soviet adventurism did not increase in the 1970s - actions on the periphery were reactions to changing opportunities, such as the collapse of Ethiopia's monarchy and Portugal's empire, not US impotence.9 It is quite hard to make a convincing case that these extra-regional dominoes were dependent upon a perceived loss of US credibility. Not only did no string of catastrophes follow the collapse of South Vietnam, but the Cold War ended 14 years later. The fears of those making de-escalation decisions proved to be entirely unfounded. Vietnam was hardly unique. Throughout the Cold War, those obsessed with protecting the credibility of the United States supported the most hawkish options in every policy debate, and warned of preposterously hyperbolic consequences of failure to follow them.10 This predictable pattern is repeating itself yet again in the debate over what to do following the debacle in Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has warned that 'the stakes could not be higher for the continued existence of our own democracy'.11 Kissinger fears that a premature pullout from Iraq would be disastrous for America's position in the world, and that the 'respite from military efforts would be brief before even greater crises descended upon us'.12 Since defeat in Vietnam did not lead to any of the predicted disasters, perhaps the burden of proof should be on those who today argue that Iraq is different, that unprecedented catastrophe would follow failure. At the very least, the conventional wisdom regarding the inevitable catastrophes that would follow US withdrawal is in critical need of re-examination.



AT: Withdrawal Increases Terrorist RecruitmentUS withdrawal from Iraq will not reduce its international credibility or hegemony. Fettweis 07 (Christopher, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December 2007. [Survival 49.4, On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq, p. 83—98]

A moment's historical perspective may provide a bit of comfort and clarity. Many of the same analysts who warn of post-Iraq catastrophes also held that if the United States failed in Vietnam, the blow to US credibility would have had dire consequences. Henry Kissinger's beliefs were by no means atypical: withdrawal from Vietnam would threaten 'the political stability of Europe and Japan and the future evolution of the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia', and would represent a 'fundamental threat, over a period of time, to the security of the United States'.8 The Soviets would have been emboldened to fuel more communist fires across the Third World; America's allies would have begun to doubt the sincerity of our commitments, and would have grown vulnerable to Soviet threats and intimidation; and those countries in the middle ground - the neutrals - would have begun to believe that Marxism represented the wave of the future. Dominoes would have fallen, and the United States would have been left far worse off than before. However, international geopolitical disaster did not follow defeat in Vietnam. Although communist activity did increase somewhat in the 1970s, it only occurred in countries that were even less relevant to the balance of power than Vietnam, such as Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. As scholars like Ted Hopf and Robert Johnson have demonstrated, Soviet adventurism did not increase in the 1970s - actions on the periphery were reactions to changing opportunities, such as the collapse of Ethiopia's monarchy and Portugal's empire, not US impotence.9 It is quite hard to make a convincing case that these extra-regional dominoes were dependent upon a perceived loss of US credibility. Not only did no string of catastrophes follow the collapse of South Vietnam, but the Cold War ended 14 years later. The fears of those making de-escalation decisions proved to be entirely unfounded. Vietnam was hardly unique. Throughout the Cold War, those obsessed with protecting the credibility of the United States supported the most hawkish options in every policy debate, and warned of preposterously hyperbolic consequences of failure to follow them.10 This predictable pattern is repeating itself yet again in the debate over what to do following the debacle in Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has warned that 'the stakes could not be higher for the continued existence of our own democracy'.11 Kissinger fears that a premature pullout from Iraq would be disastrous for America's position in the world, and that the 'respite from military efforts would be brief before even greater crises descended upon us'.12 Since defeat in Vietnam did not lead to any of the predicted disasters, perhaps the burden of proof should be on those who today argue that Iraq is different, that unprecedented catastrophe would follow failure. At the very least, the conventional wisdom regarding the inevitable catastrophes that would follow US withdrawal is in critical need of re-examination.



Recruitment/Readiness Key to Heg

Recruitment is key to overall effectiveness and readiness of the US military.Kosiak, 08 (Steven M. Vice President for Budget Studies at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, frequent speaker on defense issues, providing expert testimony before House and Senate Committees, and has been published in multiple major newspapers, “Military Manpower for the Long Haul,” CSBA Publication, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_.pdf)

For more than half a century, the US military has been well known for developing and employing the most advanced weapon systems in the world. However, over the years, perhaps nothing has contributed more to the effectiveness of the US military than the quality of its personnel . Indeed, in order to be effective, the US military must have adequate numbers of high-quality military personnel, with the right experience, training and skills. Military manpower requirements can be successfully met only if adequate resources are provided for recruitment and retention efforts, including appropriate types and levels of compensation. In addition, success depends on less easily quan- tifiable elements such as effective leadership and intangible but important factors including high morale and the relative success of ongoing military operations. It also requires effective long-term planning. First, because it takes considerable time to produce quality military personnel; and, second, because the military is a closed system that—with few exceptions—promotes only from within. The US military faces a range of serious challenges to its ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of quality personnel both in the near term and over the long term. The most critical near-term challenge is related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But these ongoing operations are not the only manpower-related problems confronting the US military. Among other things, those challenges include: Trends in various areas of military technology and concepts of operations that will, over time, likely require that the Services acquire and maintain an increasingly competent, well-trained and well-educated workforce. Obstacles within the Services’ traditional personnel and management cultures that may stand in the way of using the most cost-effective recruitment and retention tools, and creating a more flexible and effective personnel management and compensation system. High and growing budgetary costs associated with military personnel (including the cost of pay and, especially, healthcare and retiree benefits), and the danger that increasing personnel costs may crowd out needed investments in the development and procurement of new weapon systems . Taken together, these and other trends and challenges make it imperative that the Services’ personnel requirements be managed effectively in coming years. Doing so is likely to require both using traditional tools of personnel management (e.g., pay, bo- nuses and recruiting resources) more efficiently and adopting a mix of broader, and in some cases, new and innovative approaches (e.g., restructuring military compensation, and reorienting the military to focus more attention and resources on preparing for stability operations).

Readiness key to US HegemonyConnolly 03 (Thomas, Resident Scholar at AEI, 2/1. ttp://www.aei.org/publications /pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp)

The preservation of today's Pax Americana rests upon both actual military strength and the perception of strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of the cold war is testament to both the futility of directly challenging the United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding to find a weakness in the American global order. Convincing would-be great powers, rogue states, and terrorists to accept the liberal democratic order--and the challenge to autocratic forms of rule that come with it--requires not only an overwhelming response when the peace is broken, but a willingness to step in when the danger is imminent. The message of the Bush Doctrine--"Don't even think about it!"--rests in part on a logic of preemption that underlies the logic of primacy.


http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_.pdf


Iraq Decreases HegemonyUS Hegemony is waning due to military involvement in the Middle East. Philips 5/31 (Steve, Published Journalist, The Guardian, US hegemony in Middle East is ending, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending

Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely, the region's international relations are changing. US power is waning. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower, the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions, while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region, squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global, with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. As ever, it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end, perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness, it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. In such circumstances, it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region, but China, India and Brazil will all bid for a role, too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. Not that this era is yet upon us. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region, should it desire. However, the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will, whether through arms deals, trade agreements or diplomatic coups. A new cold war is unlikely, but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending.

American Hegemony is declining due to the Iraq War, but is fixable.Walt 5/13 (Stephen, professor of international relations at Harvard University, Foreign Policy, The end of the world as we know it?, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/13/the_end_of_the_world_as_we_know_it)

America's situation is more favorable for several reasons (greater growth potential, a younger and still-growing population, more flexible labor markets, greater capacity to borrow abroad , etc.), but it will face analogous pressures of its own. We've piled up some serious debt due to the Iraq war and the 2008 financial crisis, unemployment remains uncomfortably high, the health care bill won't cut costs fast enough to make up for all those aging (and demanding) baby boomers, state and local governments are facing major fiscal problems of their own, resistance to taxation remains endemic, and we've got a lot of deferred maintenance in our national infrastructure. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged in a major speech last week, the Department of Defense won't be immune from these realities and it is going to have to make some serious cuts in the next few years too. And I'm betting that once the dust settles, the combined experience of Iraq and Afghanistan is going to cool U.S. enthusiasm for more open-ended and ill-conceived efforts at "nation-building," "regional transformation" or whatever other label you want to place on our mucking about in areas we don't understand and where we mostly don't belong.


http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1467

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/04/07/the_maturing_saudi-china_alliance_98904.html

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/13/the_end_of_the_world_as_we_know_it

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8685846.stm

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222.html


Iraq Decreases Hegemony

US military involvement in Iraq weakens its hegemonyScaliger 6/25 (Charles, Published Journalist, 6/25/2010, The New American, Illusions of Empire, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/3838-illusions-and-empire)

Today, of course, most of the exuviae of the former British Empire are independent countries, if not altogether free. But now it is our own country, or rather, a small gang of elites, that aims to pick up where the British left off, in the Middle East, and in Central and Southern Asia. The pieces have changed — instead of spices, lumber, and tea, oil is the token of the realm — but the nature of the game remains the same. As with the British, so with us: An overwhelming number of Americans, while deploring American imperialism in practice, have been conditioned to see ourselves as hostages to history. American aircraft carriers instead of British battleships are now deemed indispensable for keeping peace all over the world. American bases are found in most countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. While it seems unlikely that the American Empire will incorporate South Asia as it has the Middle East, thanks to the war on terrorism Afghanistan and Pakistan, at least, are rapidly evolving into house-trained regimes at the beck and call of the U.S. government. If there’s one thing certain about empire building, it is that such projects cannot be sustained. Like the British, we seek to persuade ourselves — or, more accurately, globalist elites seek to persuade us — that empire building can be profitable, that the indefinite occupation of countries like Iraq will pay for itself many times over in oil revenues, and that militarism will open doors for enhanced commerce. Now, of course, we are finding out in the Middle East and Afghanistan, just as the British did in India, that only a few will benefit at a cost to many. Who can possibly tout up the cost of America’s enormous new “Residency” in Baghdad, the largest embassy complex ever built, transparently designed to serve as the headquarters for our newly minted Middle Eastern protectorates? The contractors building the embassy, enriched by U.S. taxpayer dollars, doubtless have few complaints. So likewise the security companies, the weapons manufacturers, and, yes, the oil industry. For ordinary Americans and Iraqis — the former burdened by spiraling oil prices and a deepening economic crisis made worse by a trillion-dollar war, the latter groaning under the yoke of terrorism, civil war, and an ever-deteriorating standard of living — the war in the Middle East is a bitter pill indeed. So also is proving to be the occupation of Afghanistan, which soon will equal the duration of the Soviet Union’s adventure in that unhappy land.



Russia Add-On

Withdrawal solves Russian expansionism—only justified by perceived US expansion in IraqHarasymiw 10 Dr. Bohdan Harasymiw, Professor of political science at the University of Calgary who focuses on democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and Russia, 2010. [Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Russia, the United States, and the New Cold War, p. 22] [Cory Stern]

Russia’s action against Georgia, and its threatening posture towards Ukraine, must be read in the context of relations with the United States, particularly in view of the American response. That response having been rhetorical rather than practical or coercive, the episode clearly shows the hollowness of U.S. support for Georgia and Ukraine. For Russia, it is an assertion and affirmation of its much-sought-after equality with the United States, at least in the immediate proximity of its borders. It means that Russia can go ahead with cultivating its sphere of influence, that invading Georgia is like the U.S. invading Iraq, and that Russia has no inhibitions on using hard power rather than soft power to expand and consolidate its sphere of influence. Whether this incident marks a permanent shift in U.S.-Russia relations is a moot point.

Nuclear Conflict Ariel Cohen, Phd-Senior Fellow @ Heritage, ’96 [The New Great Game, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm]

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destructio n. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.


http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm


Other Russia Cards

Russia likes the timetableAndrei Nesterenko (Russian MFA spokesman, 5/12/2008, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/051208/newen1.htm)

Question: An agreement on US troop withdrawal from Iraq has been reached in Baghdad after several months of fraught negotiations. Could you comment upon this event? Answer: Indeed, the Iraqi Presidential Council on December 4 endorsed an agreement on the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and on their status during their temporary stay on its territory. It had previously been approved by the Iraqi parliament by a majority of votes. The document determines the modalities for the continued stay of US troops in Iraq after expiry of the UNSC mandate for the presence in Iraq of a multinational force. It enters into force on January 1, 2009, with the Iraqis to hold a national referendum on the accord no later than July 30. The document envisages withdrawal by June 30, 2009 US troops from Iraqi cities and settlements and their redeployment to hundreds of US military bases available in Iraq. By December 31, 2011 a complete withdrawal of troops from the country is planned . Virtually all of their military operations on Iraqi territory will require approval by the Iraqi side. Use of Iraqi territory for combat operations against other countries is prohibited. Iraqi legislation will apply to US military and civilian personnel only if they commit “premeditated grave” criminal offenses while off-duty and outside cantonments.The timetable contained in the document for US troop withdrawal from Iraq can only be welcomed. Russia from the very beginning of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 had stood for this. The gradual pullout of foreign troops from Iraq is called upon to be the most important condition of normalization in that country . Furthermore, we firmly advocate that the Iraqis themselves should determine their future, dispose of the wealth of their country and build a territorially integral democratic state as a major factor of stability in the entire region. Moscow still presumes that a genuine settlement in Iraq can be achieved only by reaching national consensus on the basis of a comprehensive dialogue with regard for the interests of all political forces and ethnoconfessional communities of the country.



Syria Add-On

Iraq is key to diplomatic engagement with Syria – Obama talks proveSands, Phil, Foreign Correspondent, 4/18/10, Syria Guards Its New Role In Iraq, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011

As part of a diplomatic re-engagement with Syria, launched by the Obama administration, a series of US delegations have held talks with their counterparts in Damascus on the issue of Iraqi security, hoping to enlist them in stabilisation efforts. The Syrian government’s decision to set up a new Iraq policy forum is, in part, a response to that, according to the Syrian official.“Our role in Iraq is not simply coming from a Syrian perspective, it is also a reflection of western and American requests,” he said. “The Americans and the Europeans have asked for our help to fix the situation in Iraq and to pave the way for a US withdrawal.”

Key to solve terrorismAmies, Nick, German Reporter, 2/24/10, De- World, US Turns to Syria as a Partner in Solving Middle East Problems, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5277616,00.html

The United States is also keen to cooperate with Syria in its fight against international terrorism although Syria's stakeholding in Lebanon through Hezbollah is likely to prove a long-term impediment to better ties as is Syrian support for Hamas. "The US is interested in Syria having an impact on militant groups such as Hamas which are based in Damascus," Dr. Asseburg said. "Syria has shown in the past that it is willing to impact on these groups and pressure them into taking a more conciliatory approach."

ExtinctionYonah Alexander, Director, Terrorism Studies Program, 1999. Abstract. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses. www.isrp.com.au/isrpcom/journal/pa_abstracts/abstract__alexander.htm

Terrorism-the calculated employment of the threat of violence by individuals, subnational groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the violation of law, intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area larger than the victims attacked or threatened-is as old as

civilization itself. Yet unlike their historical counterparts, present day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats. The internationalization and brutalization of modern terrorism make it clear that we have entered into an "Age of Terrorism" with all of its serious implications to

national, regional and global security concerns. This alarming and dangerous trend increases the potential for "Super Terrorism"-biological, chemical or nuclear violence-as well as the advent of information warfare and cyber terrorism. Perhaps the most significant dangers are those relating to: the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and perhaps even the survival of civilization itself.


http://www.isrp.com.au/isrpcom/journal/pa_abstracts/abstract__alexander.htm

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5277616,00.html

http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011



Iraq K/2 US-Syria Relns

Syria Ready For U.S. WithdrawalSands, Phil, Foreign Correspondent, 4/18/10, Syria Guards Its New Role In Iraq, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100419/FOREIGN/704189898/1011

The Syrian government’s decision to set up a new Iraq policy forum is, in part, a response to that , according to the Syrian official. “Our role in Iraq is not simply coming from a Syrian perspective, it is also a reflection of western and American requests,” he said. “The Americans and the Europeans have asked for our help to fix the situation in Iraq and to pave the way for a US withdrawal.“Now Iran is involved in Iraq, so are Saudi Arabia and Syria. The time of America trying to put Iraq into its pocket is now over.”The 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent regional developments, particularly the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, two years later, placed huge pressures on the Syrian president, Bashar Assad. For a time there was even talk of a Washington-enforced regime change in Syria. These hostile conditions gave Damascus every incentive to work against the Americans in Iraq, and to centre its strategic policy on the goal of having US troops withdrawn. Those advocating violent resistance maintain the United States would have effectively colonised Iraq, if not for the opposition of insurgent forces. With the Syrian regime now more confident in its own position and certain the US is trying to cut its military presence in Iraq, the policy aims of Damascus and Washington regarding Baghdad have moved into closer alignment.“Syria wants to see the US out of Iraq, but at the same time wants to safeguard Iraqi unity,” said Mazen Bilal, a Syrian journalist and political commentator. “It’s impossible for Syria to isolate itself from Iraq and now Damascus is looking to play a constructive role.”He said he was “certain” there had been a US-Syrian agreement over the renewed political engagement and that there was a “clear vision” behind Syria’s new strategy, rather than the more improvised one that previously dominated.

Syria Will Help U.S. Withdraw Troops Because They Want America Out of IraqSands, Phil, Foreign Correspondent, May 2010, La Monde Diplomatique, On the Borderline, http://mondediplo.com/blogs/on-the-borderline

Despite their protestations of innocence the Syrian authorities had little reason to want the American experiment in gun-point democracy to run smoothly - they had themselves been threatened with regime change and, for a time at least, that appeared a real possibility. Syria’s strategic aim was simple: US troops must be removed from Iraq. Those advocating support for armed resistance argued this would only happen if the Americans saw a high price was attached to their continued presence. But as the war ground on, Washington’s goal of setting up a friendly government in Baghdad - and perhaps even Damascus - withered, weighed down by grim realities. The United States toned down its lofty rhetoric and decided to settle for relative calm in Iraq, for a functioning administration and a way out of a swamp that was sucking men and money away from another desperate fight in Afghanistan. Under the Obama administration American delegations asked for Syria’s assistance in stabilising Iraq and containing the insurgency which meant controlling the border. After the elections of 7 March, according to Syrian officials, Damascus concurred, apparently having decided that, with the US suitably chastened, the best way of speeding a troop pullout was now through promoting Iraqi peace. American and Syrian policies on Iraq , once mutually exclusive, have moved into closer alignment; Washington wants out, and Damascus wants to help it leave.


http://mondediplo.com/blogs/on-the-borderline

http://mondediplo.com/blogs/on-the-borderline




Iraq K/2 US-Syria Relations

Syria Supports American Pull Out Due to Timetable.Al Kabalan, Marwan, Lecturer in Media and International Relations at Damascus University, Syria, 2/26/10, Gulf News, Iraq Key to US-Syria Rapprochement, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/iraq-key-to-us-syria-rapprochement-1.588720

From that time on, Syria started to show genuine interest in the establishment of a strong central government in Baghdad. For Damascus this was a key requirement to prevent the potential disintegration of the country and the emergence of confessional-based mini-states. To this end, Syria lobbied for the inclusion of the major Sunni powers in the political process. A formula of power and wealth sharing was seen as being essential to get all the parties involved in a national reconciliation process. Reconsidering the de-Baathification law was also seen as a prerequisite for the success of this process. As a secular country, Syria was concerned about the activities of extremists in Iraq and feared a spillover of violence. For Damascus, Iraq might very well turn into another Afghanistan — a breeding ground for extremists. By the same token, it made no efforts to hide its displeasure with Iran's policies in Iraq and suspected that Tehran might well be trying to break up the country and finish once and for all a formidable enemy in the region. In addition, Syria has never called for an immediate US pullout from Iraq, but shown interest in seeing a reasonable timetable for withdrawal. As Iraq's March 7 general elections draw closer, Washington has been doing what Damascus truly wishes for: encouraging the inclusion of all political parties in the electoral process, providing a reasonable level of stability and security and preventing sectarian violence or partition along ethnic lines. Syria still, of course, hopes for the smooth withdrawal of all American troops according to the timetable set out in the US-Iraqi security agreement. Indeed, there are a number of differences between the two countries, such as disagreements over the pace of US withdrawal and Syria's strong ties with elements of the former Iraqi regime. Yet, these differences are not insurmountable and could be easily overcome should the two countries agree on an overall strategy to co-operate to stabilise Iraq. That should be the main role of the new US ambassador to Damascus as five years of frigidity come to an end.


http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/iraq-key-to-us-syria-rapprochement-1.588720


Solves credibility

Withdrawal key to increase US global credibilityLieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00_gard-johns_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

International cooperation will be undermined: The number of countries assisting the U.S. in Iraq, most of which provide few troops, has already fallen by a quarter, from 34 last year to 25 today; and five more are due to leave by year's end. Recently South Korea announced the reduction of its commitment. Furthermore, the international cooperation necessary to confront terrorism may deteriorate further by the continued suspicion of, and hostility toward, the United States in most other countries.A recent Pew Center international poll shows that the United States is held in low esteem across the globe, particularly in the Muslim world, largely as a result of the U.S. Administration’s foreign policies; and the war in Iraq continues to be deeply unpopular internationally, including with the populaces of our allies. Most countries believe that the invasion and occupation of Iraq has made the world a less safe place. Many are also suspicious that the United States intends to establish permanent bases in Iraq to secure the flow of oil from the region, a charge the Administration has not denied.

Withdrawal is popular with IraqisBrian Katulis, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Center for American Progress 4/12 ’10, “Navigating Tricky Timelines in Iraq” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/tricky_timelines.html

First, if anyone is “fanatical” about adhering to the troop withdrawal timelines, it is the Iraqis. Iraq’s leaders demanded a clear timeline for troop withdrawals in its negotiations with the Bush administration, and there are strong political actors in Iraq who are demanding an end to what they view as an “occupation.” Just look at the recent demonstration in the southern Iraqi city of Najaf—the demonstrators marked the seventh anniversary of the fall of Baghdad by calling for the “occupation” to end.Second, many Iraqis do not view U.S. troops favorably. A faulty assumption that many analysts make is to overstate how essential the Iraqi public actually views the U.S. troop presence to be. U.S. troops have for the most part been outside of Iraq’s urban areas since last summer except in certain circumstances. And this is the biggest factor leading to the minimal U.S. troop losses and injuries in Iraq last year.As USA Today reported last year, U.S. troops in Iraq now have time on their hands to take salsa dancing and yoga classes. The U.S. troops that remain behind are playing a support and training role for Iraqi security forces, and that is all part of the plan for a phased strategic redeployment of U.S. troops according to a specific timeline, which I argued for as far back as 2005. At lot has happened since 2005, of course, but one fundamental has remained strong—Iraqis want to regain control over their country, and the United States should not stand in their way.


http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/tricky_timelines.html


Plan popular

Withdrawal popular with Republicans – think the war was a mistake(Paul Joseph Watson, staff writer, 6/25/10, Prison Planet, “Congressman Rohrabacher: Almost All House Republicans Think Iraq War Illegal, Immoral”, http://www.prisonplanet.com/congressman-rohrabacher-almost-all-house-republicans-think-iraq-war-illegal-immoral.html)

Judge Andrew Napolitano’s new Saturday show on the Fox Business Network is set to send shock waves through the political establishment this weekend when his guest – Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher – reveals that almost all House Republicans now believe that the invasion of Iraq was not only a mistake, but also illegal and immoral. “This morning when we taped our show for this weekend, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, a right down the middle conservative Republican from southern California, former speech writer for Ronald Reagan, looked at me and said ‘almost all Republicans in the House of Representatives now believe that the war in Iraq was a mistake, that it was unlawful, that it was immoral, that it wasn’t worth the lives lost or the trillions that will be spent’,” Napolitano told The Alex Jones Show. “That is newsworthy that he would say it, it is newsworthy that so many Republicans would change their mind,” added Napolitano, a former New Jersey Superior Court Judge. As far back as three years ago, GOP support for the war in Iraq was beginning to waver, with a CNN poll finding that 38 percent of Republicans opposed the war. The recent primary success of anti-incumbent candidates like Rand Paul, a vocal critic of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, shows that the tide has rapidly turned. Napolitano pointed out that when he attacked the Bush administration for abusing the constitution, Republicans were upset, but that they are now starting to realize how government is supposed to operate as it was intended by the founding fathers. Napolitano’s show, which was broadcast solely on the Internet until last week, achieved top ratings for its premiere on the Fox Business Network, with viewers hungry to hear true libertarian viewpoints outside of the controlled statist neo-lib/neo-con paradigm. “There is a thirst out there for a focus on the government that has a bias in favor of human liberty and believes that the individual is greater than the state, that the individual has natural rights and an immortal soul and the government is just an artificial creation based on fear and force,” summarized Napolitano. Napolitano’s popularity has even made him a target with his own colleagues. Fellow Fox News host, neo-con and habitual government apologist Shep Smith attacked Napolitano yesterday for “standing up for BP,” when in reality the Judge was merely pointing out that the government has no business under the constitution in regulating the affairs of private companies. The revelation that almost all House Republicans now consider the invasion of Iraq to have been illegal, immoral and a giant mistake illustrates how far we have come in destroying the phony left-right paradigm. Now that Obama has continued and indeed expanded the Bush doctrine of military imperialism and occupation, many establishment neo-libs are defending the wars that they once opposed. Obama campaigned as the “peace candidate,” yet has broken every promise he made and is now a bigger warmonger than George W. Bush. With troops still yet to leave Afghanistan or Iraq, Obama has made it clear that a military attack on Iran is not “off the table”. Obama now has more American troops deployed than at any time under Bush. The date for withdrawing troops from Iraq is continually pushed back, and even then it is admitted that a “residual force” of tens of thousands of troops will remain to occupy the country . Now that the vast majority of Republican Congress members oppose the occupation of Iraq, resolutions need be introduced to bring the troops home from not only Iraq but Afghanistan too, with U.S. forces still engaged in two unwinnable wars which are bankrupting the already shattered U.S. economy while returning nothing but the flag-draped coffins of dead American soldiers.



Plan Popular

Democrats have agreed that withdrawal from Iraq is the best option after seeing other countries pullout(Tom Hayden, staff writer, AlterNet, 6/20/05, “Calls For Withdrawal From Iraq Echoing In Washington”, http://www.alternet.org/world/25686/)

Congressional debate finally has turned to an exit strategy from Iraq after an interminable period of dominance by proponents of war and occupation, as a result of the Sept. 15 hearing on withdrawal chaired by Rep. Lynn Woolsey. Twenty-nine members of Congress attended the four-hour forum, including one Republican, Rep. Walter Jones of North Carolina. After next week's massive anti-war demonstrations, Congress is expected to increase its gradual exploration of how to get out of Iraq. Activists who attended the hearing are demanding a specific exit strategy resolution. A critical moment will come in January 2006, the start of the election year, when Bush is likely to send a request for another $100 billion in Iraq funding on top of $100-plus billion for Hurricane Katrina. According to the Wall Street Journal, "cutting spending on Iraq is Americans' top choice for financing the recovery from Katrina." Despite the hearing and intensified anti-war pressure, there remains a huge gap between the minimum demands of the anti-war movement and the maximum that Congressional representatives are able or willing to offer, at least in the short run. But a deep unease runs through both parties and the military. The original neo-conservative "vision" of a quick victory in Baghdad followed by invasions of Syria and Iran seems out of the question (although a sudden bombing of Iran's nuclear site remains possible). The situation is deteriorating for the Bush Administration. The war continues in the heart of Baghdad while U.S. troops roam around the border. The failed "constitutional process," patched up by a last-minute "codicil," has devolved into a sectarian war with US-backed Kurds and Shiites on one side, and marginalized Sunnis and oppositionists on the other. The coalition of the willing has become the coalition of the vanishing. Troop pullouts by Italy (3,000), Poland (1,700), Ukraine (1,600), and Bulgaria (400) are scheduled by December. Britain is expected to remove 3,000 of its 8,500 troops as well. And Democrats, slowly, painfully, pathetically, are beginning their reconsideration. The internal strategic thinking of party leaders was summarized by one member as: "The Republicans can declare victory and leave, but the Democrats can only declare failure and be blamed." Such reasoning leads to abdication of any opposition to the war. But that has begun to change. One example came in the testimony of former Sen. Max Cleland at the Woolsey hearing. A Vietnam veteran and one of Sen. John Kerry's "band of brothers" in 2004, Cleland issued a Democratic radio message only a month ago in which he said the U.S. should have "a strategy to win or an exit strategy to get out." But by the Woolsey hearing, Cleland had moved to a passionate call for an exit strategy, period: "Now, however, I have concluded that the best way to support our troops is with an exit strategy from Iraq. We need an exit strategy we choose or it will certainly be chosen for us. The question about Iraq is not whether we will withdraw our forces, but when." Cleland also testified that "according to a four-star general, there was a five-year plan for the military occupation of the Middle East" before the occupation became bogged down.



Plan Popular

Dems love the plan – they’re angry at Obama for trying to delay withdrawal(Matthew Burns, 3/9/09, editor of WRAL, “Obama sets August 2010 as Iraq End Date”, http://www.wral.com/news/state/story/4626641/)

President Barack Obama on Friday declared that the U.S. will end its combat mission in Iraq by Aug. 31, 2010, and that all troops would be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2011. That timetable is slower than Obama had promised voters during his presidential campaign last year, but still hastens the U.S. exit. "We will not let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals," he told about 2,000 Marines at Camp Lejeune, many of whom will soon be headed to another war front in Afghanistan. A substantial number of the roughly 100,000 U.S. combat troops to be pulled out of Iraq by August 2010 will remain in the war zone through at least the end of this year to ensure national elections there go smoothly, senior Obama administration officials say. That pacing suggests that although Obama's promised withdrawal will start soon, it will be back-loaded, with larger numbers of troops returning later in the 18-month time frame. Even with the draw-down, a sizable U.S. force of 35,000 to 50,000 U.S. troops will stay in Iraq under a new mission of training, civilian protection and counterterrorism. "As we carry out this draw-down, my highest priority will be the safety and security of our troops and civilians in Iraq," Obama said. "We will proceed carefully, and I will consult closely with my military commanders on the ground and with the Iraqi government. "After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its security forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country." The potential size of that remaining force doesn't please leaders of Obama's own Democratic Party, who had envisioned a fuller withdrawal. Obama personally briefed House and Senate members of both parties about his intentions behind closed doors Thursday. Republican Sen. John McCain, who lost the presidential election to Obama, offered his support for the plan Friday. "I think the plan is significantly different than the plan Obama had during the campaign," said McCain, referring to Obama's campaign pledge to pull combat troops out of Iraq within 16 months of taking office, if possible. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told lawmakers in the briefing that ground commanders in Iraq believe the plan poses only a moderate risk to security, McCain said. The Dec. 31, 2011, deadline for complete withdrawal is the deadline set under an agreement the U.S. and Iraq sealed during George W. Bush's presidency.



Plan Popular

Senate Democrats love the plan – previous advocations for withdrawal prove(Research, GOP, 6/24/10, “Objectivity and Strategy in Iraq”, http://www.gop.com/index.php/briefing/comments/dems_past_statements_betray_them/#ixzz0sHEgiABo)

Senate Democrats Voted Against Condemning MoveOn.Org Ad Attacking Gen. Petraeus As “Gen. Betray Us.” (S.Amdt. 2934, Roll Call Vote #344: Passed 72-25: R: 49-0, D: 23-25, 9/20/07)

Sen. Harry Reid Said Petraeus “Isn't In Touch” With Reality Of Iraq. “Iraq -- I repeat -- the bloodiest three months of the war have just been completed. We're now back up to a thousand attacks a day in Iraq. And for someone, whether it's General Petraeus or anyone else, to say things are great in Baghdad isn't in touch with what's going on in Baghdad, even though he's there and I'm not.” (Sen. Harry Reid, Press Conference, The Capitol, 6/14/07)

Sen. Reid Accused Gen. Petraeus Of Providing Information That “Have Not Proven To Be Factual.” SEN. REID: “I first met General Petraeus when I went to Iraq. At that time he was training the Iraqi troops. He told us at that time it was going great, that they'd be able to take over the country themselves. That was three years ago or thereabouts. He's made a number of statements over the years that have not proven to be factual.” (Sen. Harry Reid, Press Conference, Senate Radio-TV Gallery, 9/7/07)Sen. Durbin Accused Gen. Petraeus Of “Manipulating The Statistics.” Sen. Durbin: “By carefully manipulating the statistics, the Bush-Petraeus report will try to persuade us that violence in Iraq is decreasing and the surge is working.” (Sen. Durbin, Remarks To The Center For National Policy, Washington, D.C, 9/7/07)

And Condescendingly Referred To Gen. Petraeus’ Report As The “Bush-Petraeus Report.” Sen. Durbin: “Now, despite the growing list of independent reports and military experts who say the president is wrong, he is prepared to tell the nation again that his strategy in Iraq is succeeding. We know what the Bush-Petraeus report will say: The surge is working, be patient. The reality? Despite heroic efforts by American troops, the Bush surge is not working.” (Sen. Durbin, Remarks To The Center For National Policy, Washington, D.C, 9/7/07)Sen. Boxer Accused Petraeus Of Painting A “Rosy Scenario” Of The Iraq War And Told Him To “Consider That Others Could Be Right.” “We are sending our troops where they’re not wanted, with no end in sight, into the middle of a civil war, into the middle of the mother of all mistakes. Please, General, don’t do what you did in 2004 when you painted a rosy scenario. Consider that others could be right.” (Sen. Barbara Boxer, “Boxer Asks General Petraeus To Take Off Rose-Colored Glasses And Face Realities In Iraq,” Press Release, 9/11/07)

Sen. Kent Conrad Accused Petraeus Of Being “Overly Optimistic” In His Report On The Iraq War. “Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D., says Gen. David Petraeus' report on Iraq is ‘overly optimistic.’… Petraeus, the commanding general of the war, told Congress on Monday that last winter's buildup in U.S. troops had met its military objectives "in large measure," and said he envisions the withdrawal of roughly 30,000 U.S. troops by next summer… Conrad said he sees little progress.” (Mary Clare Jalonick, “North Dakota Democrats Criticize Iraq Report,” The Bismarck Tribune, 9/10/07)

Sen. Jack Reed Accused Petraeus Of Not Being Objective In His Report Surge. DAVID WELNA: “And Rhode Island Democrat Jack Reed, who also visited Iraq during the break, said he does not expect an independent assessment from the architect of the troop surge, General Petraeus.” SEN. JACK REED: “Ultimately, it'll the president's report - the president views. I can't see him coming in here and differing from the president. So, I don't think he'll be objective. I think what he'll be is careful to argue that the surge has been a success.” (Michele Norris and Melissa Block, “Democrats Question Credibility Of Iraq Reports,” NPR, 9/5/07)

Reed Also Accused Petraeus Of “Playing A Political Role For The President.” DAVID GREGORY: “Critics charge it has fallen on Petraeus to sell a strategy that a weakened president no longer can.” SEN. JACK REED: “In many respects, I think Petraeus is playing a political role for the president. He is a splendid officer, a good soldier.” (NBC’s “Nightly News,” 9/7/07)Sen. Whitehouse Suggested That Petraeus Had “Conflicting Loyalty” In Serving The White House And Serving The Country. “[P]eople who are appointed to high positions in government by a president, sort of inherently have a conflicting loyalty between the desire to please the president who appointed them and to stay on the team because it’s wonderful to be important and on the team and all that good stuff. And on the other hand, particularly where the president’s view is in conflict with the interests of the country … [H]ow General Petraeus chooses to balance those conflicting prerogatives is up to him…” (Nico Pitney, “Sen. Whitehouse: Petraeus Has ‘Conflicting Loyalty,’ Independent Iraq Report Needed,” Think Progress, 6/8/07)


http://www.gop.com/index.php/briefing/comments/dems_past_statements_betray_them/#ixzz0sHEgiABo


Plan popular[continues]

Sen. Schumer Issued A Press Release Stating “The Bush-Petraeus Surge Had Failed To Meet Its Objective.” “Schumer noted that by the President's own measure-Bush originally declared the goal of the surge was to give Iraq's central government ‘breathing room’ to make progress on political reconciliation-the Bush-Petraeus surge had failed to meet its objective. ‘The government is suffocating while the surge goes on. It doesn't have breathing room,’ Schumer said.” (Press Release, “Sen. Schumer: Bush Hype On Anbar Doesn't Vindicate Surge Strategy,” Office Of Senator Schumer, 9/5/07)

And Described The Surge As “A Policy Of Last Resort. This Is A Policy Of Desperation.” (Press Release, “Sen. Schumer: Bush Hype On Anbar Doesn't Vindicate Surge Strategy,” Office Of Senator Schumer, 9/5/07)Sen. Sherrod Brown “Lashed Out” At Petraeus’ Testimony Saying “Stay The Course Is Not A Plan.” “Sen. Sherrod Brown, the region's only Democrat, lashed out at Petraeus' testimony, saying the government has lost its focus on the war on terrorism… ‘Stay the course is more of the same. Stay the course is not a plan,’ said Brown, of Lorain.” (Malia Rulon, “Local Lawmakers React To Progress Report On Iraq War,” The Cincinnati Enquirer, 9/11/07)

Sen. Blanche Lincoln Said Petraeus’ Plan For Iraq Was A “Nonstarter.” “Count Sen. Blanche Lincoln among the unimpressed. Petraeus' plan is ‘too small a step,’ she said. ‘It's kind of a nonstarter.’ Lincoln called the proposal a ‘forced hand,’ noting that the military cannot sustain the escalation past July.” (Alex Daniels, “Testimony On Iraq Fails To Satisfy State Democrats,” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 9/12/07)

Senator Webb Said He Would Ignore Petraeus’ Report. WEBB: “I don't care what the report says next week. I don't care what the report says in September.” (Press Conference, Senate Democrats Hold A News Conference On Iraq, 7/9/07)

During Hearing, Then-Sen. Biden Told Petraeus That The Surge Was Failing And That It Was Time To “Start Bringing Troops Home.” “General Petraeus: the American military cannot sustain a war in Iraq with no end in sight. The American people will not support an indefinite war whose sole remaining purpose is to prevent the situation in Iraq from becoming even worse. It is time to turn the corner… We should stop the surge and start bringing troops home.” (Sen. Joe Biden, “BIDEN: We Should Stop The Surge And Start Bringing Troops Home,” Press Release, 9/11/07)

Biden Said Petraeus Was “Dead Flat Wrong” On His Iraq War Strategy. “Biden, signaling that tough questioning awaits the pair from majority Democrats and moderate Republicans, said Petraeus' assessment missed the point… ‘I really respect him, but I think he's dead flat wrong,’ Biden said.” (“Biden: Petraeus ‘Dead Flat Wrong’ On Iraq,” The Associated Press, 9/9/07)Then-Sen. Obama Told Petreaus “The Time To End The Surge And To Start Bringing Our Troops Home Is Now – Not Six Months From Now.” (Sen. Barack Obama, “Obama Addresses Foreign Relations Committee Hearing With General Petraeus And Ambassador Crocker,” Press Release, 9/11/07)



Plan popular

A majority of democrats support troop withdrawal because combat missions are unnecessary(Richard Auxier, 9/27/07, PewResearchCenterPublications, “Dems Debate Iraq Withdrawal Timetable”. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/604/democrats-debate-iraq)

Iraq emerged as a central issue in Wednesday's Democratic debate in New Hampshire. Tim Russert, who moderated, brought a new angle to the discussion by asking the candidates if they could pledge that by 2013 -- the end of their first term as president -- there would be no U.S. troops left in Iraq. Russert's question first went to Illinois Senator Barack Obama, who would not make the pledge to have all troops removed by 2013. "I believe that we should have all our troops out by 2013," said Obama, "but I don't want to make promises not knowing what the situation's going to be three or four years out." Senator Hillary Clinton of New York also would not pledge to have all troops removed. "Well, Tim, it is my goal to have all troops out by the end of my first term," said Clinton, who agreed with Obama that it would be difficult to make such a pledge without knowing what she would inherit as president in 2009. According to a September Pew survey, 73% of Democrats want troops brought home from Iraq as soon as possible, while 21% want to keep troops in Iraq until the situation is stable. Independents also favor bringing troops home as soon as possible (60-34%), while Republicans (69-27%) favor keeping troops in Iraq until the situation is stable. While there is support for bringing troops home as soon as possible both within the Democratic Party and the general public, this does not mean that public opinion favors an immediate withdrawal. Indeed, a plurality of both Democrats (45%) and independents (39%) prefer a gradual withdrawal over the next year or two. Only 27% of Democrats, 19% of independents and 6% of Republicans favor immediate withdrawal from Iraq. The country as a whole prefers gradual withdrawal to immediate removal by a margin of 34% to 18%. The other candidates were more specific in their statements on troop removals. Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut directly answered Russert's question about removing troops by 2013, stating, "I will get that done." Former North Carolina Senator John Edwards said, "I would have our combat troops out of Iraq over a period of several months, and I would not continue combat missions in Iraq." He would not, though, commit to the 2013 pledge. New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson stated his position was to pull all troops out. Delaware Senator Joe Biden said he would have the troops out, on the condition that there was not a political solution available when he became president. Rep. Dennis Kucinich of Ohio went so far as to pledge a troop withdrawal by April 2007, some five months ago. (He made light of his misstep by saying he was ready to be president now.) Regardless of what Democrats may hope for, they are under no illusions that a withdrawal will happen immediately. Only 9% of Democrats believe troops will be brought home in less than a year. Furthermore, roughly the same amount of Democrats (27%) believe it will take longer than five years to remove troops from Iraq, as do those who believe it will take one to two years (29%) or two to five years (29%). Whatever their variance of views on a timetable for withdrawal, Democratic voters are in strong agreement that their party's leadership in Congress is not doing enough to challenge President George W. Bush's policies on Iraq. Only 27% of Democrats believe their leadership in Congress has done enough, while a 61% majority thinks they have done too little. Clinton defended those in Congress saying, "I think the Democrats have pushed extremely hard to change this president's course in Iraq." Her opponents were quick to draw a contrast with Clinton. "And I also disagree with Senator Clinton," said Richardson. "I don't believe the Congress has done enough to end this war." Dodd also took the opportunity to speak out against the both the war and the front-runners. "If you're going to seek the presidency of the United States and you're in a position today to do something about this, then it's -- in my view, it's the opportunity to stand up and lead on this issue, to bring this war, which is doing great damage to our country, to a halt," said Dodd.



Plan Popular

Influential House Democrats call for withdrawal because of flawed American illusions about Iraq(David Stout, 11/17/05, The New York Times, “Influential House Democrat Urges Immediate Iraq Pullout”, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/politics/17cnd-military.html)

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 - An influential House Democrat called the Iraq campaign "a flawed policy wrapped in illusion" today as he called for the immediate withdrawal of United States troops, intensifying an already bitter debate on Capitol Hill. Matthew Cavanaugh/European Pressphoto Agency Representative John Murtha called the Iraq campaign "a flawed policy wrapped in illusion" today as he called for the immediate withdrawal of United States troops. Democrat Wants Immediate Iraq Withdrawal Cheney Says Senate War Critics Make 'Reprehensible Charges' (November 17, 2005) Transcript: Murtha Calls for a 'Change in Direction' (November 17, 2005) Transcript: House Republicans Respond to Murtha (November 17, 2005) "It is time for a change in direction," sa id Representative John Murtha of Pennsylvania, the leading Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee. "Our military is suffering, the future of our country is at risk." Mr. Murtha, a conservative who voted in 2002 for the resolution authorizing use of force in Iraq and who supported the Persian Gulf war in 1991, called for "the immediate redeployment of American forces." "It is evident that continued military action in Iraq is not in the best interests of the United States of America, the Iraqi people or the Persian Gulf region," Mr. Murtha said during an emotional news conference on Capitol Hill. His remarks were quickly denounced by House Republicans as defeatist and wrongheaded. Mr. Murtha, a 73-year-old Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam combat, lashed back at Vice President Dick Cheney, who in a speech to a conservative group on Wednesday night condemned critics of the Iraq war. "The president and I cannot prevent certain politicians from losing their memory, or their backbone, but we're not going to sit by and let them rewrite history," Mr. Cheney said in an address to the group, Frontiers of Freedom, in Washington. Mr. Murtha was disdainful of the vice president's remarks, saying that "people with five deferments" had no right to make such remarks. Mr. Cheney, like millions of other young men of the era, avoided military service during the Vietnam war. Mr. Murtha's call for a pullout was condemned by some House Republicans. After serving in the Marines in the early 1950's, he re-enlisted in 1966, at the age of 34, and served in Vietnam, earning a Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts and the Vietnamese Cross for Gallantry, according to The Almanac of American Politics. When he won his House seat in a special election in February 1974 he became the first Vietnam veteran to serve in Congress. Mr. Cheney's speech came a day after the Senate overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for the Bush administration to make regular progress reports on the war and for 2006 to be a "transition year" in which the Iraqis will assume responsibility for security of their own country. The vice president's assertions that some politicians want to rewrite history was aimed at those who voted in 2002 to authorize force against Saddam Hussein but have more recently become critics of Iraq campaign, charging that the Bush administration manipulated pre-war intelligence to exaggerate the threat posed by the old Baghdad regime. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic leader, said Mr. Cheney's speech of Wednesday night as well as President Bush's recent remarks on Iraq show that they have "shamlessly decided to play politics." "We're at war," Mr. Reid said. "We need a commander in chief, not a campaigner in chief." Another Democrat, Senator Russell D. Feingold of Wisconsin, praised Mr. Murtha "for having the courage to stand up to the administration's outrageous attempts to intimidate into silence those who are trying to fix our Iraq policy." Mr. Feingold has suggested setting a target date of Dec. 31, 2006, for having United States troops out of Iraq. At his Capitol news conference, Mr. Murtha became emotional as he spoke of hospital visits to wounded troops. "What demoralizes them is going to war with not enough troops and equipment to make the transition to peace," he said. "Our troops have become the primary target for the insurgency," Mr. Murtha said. Insurgents, he said, "are united against U.S. forces, and we have become a catalyst for violence." He went on to say that, before the Iraqi elections in December, the country's people and its emerging government "must be put on notice that the United States will immediately redeploy."



Plan Popular

Democratic leaders support US withdrawal because US presence strains armed forces of Iraq(Rick Klein, Globe Staff, 2/20/06, The Boston Globe, “Democrats May Untie On Plan To Pull Troops”, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/02/20/democrats_may_unite_on_plan_to_pull_troops/)

After months of trying unsuccessfully to develop a common message on the war in Iraq, Democratic Party leaders are beginning to coalesce around a broad plan to begin a quick withdrawal of US troops and install them elsewhere in the region, where they could respond to emergencies in Iraq and help fight terrorism in other countries. The concept, dubbed ''strategic redeployment," is outlined in a slim, nine-page report coauthored by a former Reagan administration assistant Defense secretary, Lawrence J. Korb, in the fall. It sets a goal of a phased troop withdrawal that would take nearly all US troops out of Iraq by the end of 2007, although many Democrats disagree on whether troop draw-downs should be tied to a timeline. Howard Dean, Democratic National Committee chairman, has endorsed Korb's paper and begun mentioning it in meetings with local Democratic groups. In addition, the study's concepts have been touted by the senator assigned to bring Democrats together on Iraq -- Jack Reed of Rhode Island -- and the report has been circulated among all senators by Senator Dianne Feinstein, an influential moderate Democrat from California. The party remains divided on some points, including how much detail to include in a party-produced document, fearful of giving too much fodder for attacks by Republicans. But in its broad outlines, many leading Democrats say the Korb plan represents an answer to Republicans' oft-repeated charge that Democrats aren't offering a way forward on Iraq -- and to do so in a way that is neither defeatist nor blindly loyal to the president. ''We're not going to cut and run -- that's just Republican propaganda," Dean said in a speech Feb. 10 in Boston. ''But we are going to redeploy our troops so they don't have targets on their backs, and they're not breaking down doors and putting themselves in the line of fire all the time. . . . It's a sensible plan. It's a thoughtful plan. I think Democrats can coalesce around it." Reed, an Army veteran and former paratrooper who has been charged with developing a party strategy on the war, said the plan is attractive to many Democrats because it rejects what he calls the ''false dichotomy" suggested by President Bush: that the only options in Iraq are ''stay the course" or ''cut and run." ''It's important to note that it's not withdrawal -- it's redeployment," Reed said. ''We need to pursue a strategy that is going to accomplish the reasonable objectives, and allow us to have strategic flexibility. Not only is it a message, but it's a method to improve the security there and around the globe." The idea of a phased deployment of troops out of Iraq recognizes that a huge US military presence in the country is straining the armed services as well as feeding the insurgency, Reed said. He added that many military commanders agree that the nation should be moving toward taking American troops out of Iraq, to better equip the military to respond to threats around the world and give the Iraqi government a greater incentive to handle its own security. Under Korb's outline, all reservists and National Guard members would come home this year. Most of the other troops would be redeployed to other key areas -- Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and the Horn of Africa -- with large, quick-strike forces placed in Kuwait, where they could respond to crises in neighboring Iraq. Korb said in an interview that setting dates for troop withdrawal would send a message to the Iraqi people that the United States does not intend to set up permanent military bases in Iraq. Starting the redeployment quickly will ensure that the Army does not wear out before the insurgents do, he said. ''The Iraqis want us to go," said Korb, who has opposed Bush's decision to invade Iraq from the start. ''If you're out by the end of 2007, we'll have been there almost five years. That's not cutting and running." But some strategists say the goal of a near-total withdrawal within two years is overly optimistic. US troops that are a plane ride away won't be an effective deterrent, and Iraqi security forces appear unlikely to be able to handle the violence on their own in the near future, said Michael O'Hanlon, a centrist defense specialist who is a lecturer at Princeton University. ''You're demanding that the political system produces a miracle," O'Hanlon said. ''Any plan that envisions complete American withdrawal in such a period of time is still a prescription for strategic defeat." The war has been a source of long-running tension among Democrats. Twenty-nine Democratic senators and 81 House Democrats voted to authorize the president to invade Iraq, and while most are now critical of Bush's handling of the war, some -- notably Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut -- remain staunch supporters. Although ''strategic redeployment" could draw a large portion of Democrats into the same fold, Reed and other Democrats disagree with setting a timeline for troop withdrawal, saying that such decisions should be dictated by commanders on the ground. Still, Reed noted that the Bush administration has begun modest troop withdrawals. The Senate in November overwhelmingly approved a resolution calling for 2006 to be ''a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty," and on Friday, the White House issued a statement reiterating its position: ''In 2006, it is



anticipated that the Iraqi military will take more of the lead for security throughout Iraq." But the president has strongly



Plan Popular[continues]

rejected issuing any time frames, arguing that they would be exploited by insurgents who would strike as soon as troops leave Iraq. Democrats who have suggested time frames for withdrawal have faced harsh attacks from Republicans, who paint them as offering a strategy of defeat. In November, Representative John P. Murtha, a Pennsylvania Democrat, shook much of Washington with his call for an immediate withdrawal of troops, and his estimate that all troops could be out of Iraq within six months. The generally hawkish Vietnam veteran also called for quick strike forces to remain close to Iraq -- similar to the Korb plan -- but that was largely overlooked in the barrage from Republicans. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the Murtha plan amounted to ''surrender to the terrorists." Representative Jean Schmidt, Republican of Ohio, delivered a blistering speech on the House floor aimed at Murtha, who spent 37 years in the Marine Corps: ''Cowards cut and run, Marines never do," Schmidt said, in remarks she later withdrew from the Congressional Record. The attacks on Murtha demonstrated the political peril that could face Democrats who offer plans involving troop withdrawals. Although Murtha has 99 House cosponsors for his plan, some Democrats remain skittish about offering a plan that they know would be attacked harshly -- and, they say, almost certainly misconstrued -- by political opponents. Still, Dean, Reed, and others in the party are trying to develop a united Democratic vision for Iraq, based in part on the calculation that the war will be a big factor in many 2006 congressional campaigns. Representative Martin T. Meehan, a Lowell Democrat who voted in favor of the war and now supports the Murtha plan, said that while the war remains Bush's responsibility, Democrats should be able to tell voters what they would do differently. ''There are a lot of different views, but I personally believe that putting forward specifics about how to move forward in Iraq is important to do," said Meehan, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. ''I would like to see Democrats coalesce around a strategy like Korb's strategy." This fall, in elections that Democrats hope will bring them back to power in Congress, more than 50 military veterans are running in congressional races as Democrats. Those candidates are asked about Iraq all the time, and the idea of strategic redeployment is appealing to many of them, said Eric Massa, who is challenging an incumbent Republican in upstate New York and is helping to organize strategy for the veterans who are running. ''You can't stand in front of people and say, 'We want your vote,' and not tell people what it is they're voting for," said Massa, a former Navy officer. ''We all know that staying the course is not a strategy that's going to work."



Neg Stuff – Withdrawal On track

Withdrawal on trackMarc Heller, Times Washington correspondent, Watertown Daily Times 6/25 ’10, “Gen. Austin Optimistic about Iraq” http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/20100625/NEWS02/306259962

WASHINGTON — A full withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq remains on track for next year, Lt. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III said Thursday at his confirmation hearing to head the U.S. military mission there.Gen. Austin, a former commander of Fort Drum and the 10th Mountain Division, said he still anticipates U.S. forces will be reduced to 50,000 by this September, and all U.S. combat troops will leave by December 2011."We're on a good glide slope to get where we need to be," Gen. Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee.His Senate confirmation as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq is expected to come quickly. He replaces Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, who awaits confirmation as commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. They shared a confirmation hearing Thursday.

On track for 2011 withdrawal—Odierno’s report provesAFP 6/2 ’10, “Odierno gives Obama ‘positive’ report on Iraq security” http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5giXOrrHvhjt0TgUugMKcJGrMOPoQ

PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania — US commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno Wednesday gave President Barack Obama a "positive" report on security as American combat troops prepare to exit within three months."General Odierno provided a positive assessment of the current security conditions and the ongoing transition of responsibilities to Iraqi security forces," White House deputy spokesman Bill Burton told reporters."The President and General Odierno also discussed the encouraging step taken by Iraq's federal Supreme Court to certify election results, as well as US support for an inclusive government formation process."Burton was speaking as Obama headed to Pittsburgh on Air Force One, after meeting Odierno in the Oval Office.The meeting came a day after US military support for Iraqi efforts to secure Baghdad's Green Zone ended, in the latest step in the American withdrawal from Iraq more than seven years after its invasion of Iraq.American combat troops are due to pull out of Iraq by the end of August, leaving behind around 50,000 soldiers who will focus on advising and training their Iraqi counterparts.Under the terms of a US-Iraq bilateral security agreement signed in November 2008, all American soldiers are to leave Iraq by the end of 2011.

Iraqi government and Obama agree to have a withdrawal by 2010Mathew Weaver (staff writer, The Guardian “Iraq government backs Barack Obama's troop withdrawal pledge” 7/21/08 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/21/barackobama.iraq)

The Iraqi government spokesman Ali al--Dabbagh expressed hopes that combat forces could leave by 2010 – in line with Obama's pledge to withdraw troops within 16 months of the US election.

"We are hoping that in 2010 that combat troops will withdraw from Iraq," Dabbagh told reporters, noting that any withdrawal plan was subject to change if the level of violence rises again.


http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5giXOrrHvhjt0TgUugMKcJGrMOPoQ

http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/20100625/NEWS02/306259962


Neg Stuff – Withdrawal on track

Obama and Maliki agree to remove troops by 2010Associated Press (wire services, CBS news “Obama, Maliki Agree On Iraq Withdrawal By 2010” 7/21/08 http://cbs5.com/national/barack.obama.iraq.2.775965.html)

Face to face with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama gained fresh support Monday for the idea of pulling all U.S. combat forces out of the war zone by 2010.

The Iraqi government did not endorse a fixed date, but indicated it hoped American combat units could be out of Iraq sometime in 2010. That timeframe falls within the 16-month withdrawal plan proposed by Obama



Neg Stuff – Withdrawal bad

Drawdown bad—kills Iraqi democracy and causes Iraq instabilityMax Boot, senior fellow in national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, LA Times 5/9 ’10 “There's still time to lose in Iraq; If the U.S. doesn't address Maliki's postelection moves, the billions of dollars spent and the thousands of lives lost could be for nothing” l/n

The presumption was that the drawdown would occur after Iraq had installed a new government. American officials expected that postelection jockeying would end by June at the latest. But Iraqi politicians now expect that no government will emerge before the fall. Thus the Iraqi and American timelines are dangerously out of sync. Large troop reductions at a time of such political uncertainty will send a dangerous signal of disengagement and lessen America's ability to preserve the integrity of the elections.The delay in seating a government also endangers the possible negotiation of a fresh accord to govern Iraqi-American relations after 2011. It is vital to have a continuing American military presence to train and advise Iraqi security forces, which have grown in size and competence but still aren't capable of defending their airspace or performing other vital functions.U.S. troops also play a vital peacekeeping role, patrolling with Iraqi troops and the Kurdish peshmerga along the disputed Green Line separating Iraq proper from the Kurdish regional government. Kurdish politicians I met in Irbil warned that if Iraqi-Kurdish land disputes aren't resolved by the end of 2011 (and odds are they won't be), there is a serious danger of war breaking out once American troops leave. The possibility of miscalculation will grow once the Iraqi armed forces acquire the M-1 tanks and F-16 fighters that we have agreed to sell them. It is all the more important that an American buffer -- say 10,000 to 15,000 troops -- remain to ensure that those weapons are never used against our Kurdish allies.


Documents

Control + 1 – Block Headingsopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/Final_Ir… · Web viewIndex. Index 1. 1AC 2. Inherency 24. Withdrawal/SOFA k/2 stability 42