Control + 1 – Block Headingsopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files… · Web viewExt 2- Relations improving 12. Ext 2 – Relations good 13. Ext 4 – No Need

document.docx DDW10 1

DW10 Turkey Withdraw TNW Neg

DW10 Turkey Withdraw TNW Neg.......................................................................................................................11NC Iran Adv (1/5)..................................................................................................................................................31NC Iran Adv (2/5)..................................................................................................................................................41NC Iran Adv (3/5)..................................................................................................................................................51NC Iran Adv (4/5)..................................................................................................................................................61NC Iran Adv (5/5)..................................................................................................................................................72NC Iran Ext 1—Plan Doesn’t Solve Gas Coop.....................................................................................................82NC Ext 2 and 3 Relations Improving Now............................................................................................................92NC Ext 4 and 5 - New gas deal............................................................................................................................102NC Ext 8—Removing TNWs Hurts US Turkey Relations.................................................................................11Ext 2- Relations improving....................................................................................................................................11Ext 2- Relations improving....................................................................................................................................12Ext 2 – Relations good...........................................................................................................................................13Ext 4 – No Need for Iran’s Gas.............................................................................................................................141NC Terrorism Frontline (1 / 3)............................................................................................................................151NC Terrorism Frontline (2 / 3)............................................................................................................................161NC Terrorism Frontline (3 / 3)............................................................................................................................172nc Ext 1................................................................................................................................................................182NC Ext 3- Terrorists cant do it............................................................................................................................182NC Ext 3- Terrorists cant do it............................................................................................................................192NC Ext 4..............................................................................................................................................................20Security CP 1NC (1/1)...........................................................................................................................................21CP Solvency Extensions........................................................................................................................................22Allied/Turkish Prolif Links........................................................................................................................................................................23

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1NC Iran Adv (1/5)

1) No Aff solvency, other reasons for gas cooperation won’t work Elin Kinnander, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2010, “The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship:Politically Successful, Commercially Problematic” http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf

Natural gas cooperation between Iran and Turkey has, as described in this paper, been far from successful. The contract has run into huge problems, with disputes over both deliveries and prices. Both sides find it hard to compromise on either of these issues and, as a result, the finalization of the gas MoU continues to be delayed. Almost every year since the start of deliveries in 2001, a disruption has occurred, either because of insufficient Iranian supplies, or insufficient Turkish demand. Both countries have given different explanations for the fact that deliveries have never reached the volume stipulated in the contract. However, this paper concludes that the most common causes have been: Iran’s lack of gas during the winter period; Turkey’s lack of demand (or oversupply from its other sources), but also problems with securing the pipelines from terrorist attacks. In other words, Iran has not been a reliable exporter and Turkey has not been a reliable importer. Turkey has taken Iran to arbitration over a price dispute; and Iran has threatened to take Turkey to arbitration due to failure to reach take-or-pay levels. These are very hostile acts in gas trade between any two countries. The intriguing question that this leaves us with is why both countries want to develop and expand the natural gas cooperation, given the relatively unsuccessful history and the lack of mutual trust?

2) Squo solves, Turkey and Iran relations improving nowSABRINA TAVERNISE, an American journalist who is currently the Istanbul bureau chief of The New York Times, 6/15/10, “Turkey and Iran: Strange Bedfellows?” http://www.indianexpress.com/news/turkey-and-iran-strange-bedfellows/633786/0

Viewed from Washington, Turkey and Iran are strange bedfellows. One is a NATO member with a Constitution that mandates secularism, and the other, an Islamic republic whose nuclear programme has been one of the most vexing foreign policy problems for the US in recent years. So why have the two countries been locked in a clumsy embrace, with Turkey openly defying the US last week by voting against imposing new sanctions on Iran? Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates mused that Turkey was “moving eastward,” a shift he attributed to the European Union’s tepid response to Turkey’s application to join it. But many here do not see it that way. Turkey simply disagrees with the US over how to approach the problems in the Middle East. The Obama administration chooses sanctions, Turkey believes cooperation has more of a chance . “I would be appalled if Turkey cut itself off from the West and aligned with the Islamic world, but that’s not what’s happening,” said Halil Berktay, a historian at Sabanci University. “Turkey is saying, ‘You’ve been talking about building bridges. This is the way to build them’ .” For the United States, Iran is a rogue state intent on building a bomb and crazy enough to use it. Turkey agrees that Iran is trying to develop the technology that would let it build a weapon, but says Iran’s leaders may be satisfied stopping at that. “We believe that once we normalise relations with Iran, and it has relationships with other actors, it won’t go for the bomb,” said a Turkish official who works closely with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Part of Turkey’s motivation in reaching out to Iran is based in realpolitik. Iran is Turkey’s neighbour and also supplies the country with a fifth of its natural gas. The approach is also part of a broader policy of economic and political integration in the region that Turkey, under Erdogan, has pursued for nearly a decade. Iranians can travel to Turkey without a visa, as can Syrians, Iraqis, Russians and Georgians. More than a million Iranians travel to Turkey on vacation every year. The recent nuclear talks were part of that effort. They culminated in May in what Turkey, and its partner Brazil, said was a commitment by Iran to swap a portion of its low-enriched uranium with other countries. Iran would ship out part of its stockpile in exchange for a form of uranium less likely to be used for weapons.

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1NC Iran Adv (2/5)

3) Even in light of the new sanctions turkey continues dealing with IranUPI, 7/2/10, “Energy ties with Iran stable, Turkey says” http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/07/02/Energy-ties-with-Iran-stable-Turkey-says/UPI-16271278079811/

Ankara plans to continue activity in the Iranian energy sector because it is not restricted by U.N. sanctions, the Turkish energy minister said. The Security Council voted June 9 to place new sanctions on Iran that allow for searches of banned goods in cargo to or from Iran and increase the number of individuals and companies subject to travel bans and an asset freeze. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz told Iran's state-funded broadcaster Press TV that his country would continue doing business with Iran in light of the Security Council measure. "Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals," he said. Yildiz added that his country was waiting for the results of technical studies to wrap up in the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf. "After we receive the result of this study we will decide how to move forward," Yildiz said According to Press TV, Iran exports more than 880 million cubic feet of natural gas to Turkey every day.

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1NC Iran Adv (3/5)4) Turkey and Europe no longer needs gas from Iran, new deal struckShahin Abbasov, is deputy editor-in-chief of the daily Echo, an independent newspaper based in Baku, Azerbaijan, 6/7/10, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61234

Natural gas sales and transit agreements signed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on June 7 appear to give a long-awaited green light for Azerbaijani gas sales to Europe-bound pipeline projects. While energy executives have welcomed the news, a source at Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR tells EurasiaNet.org that the two sides failed to reach a comprehensive gas agreement. “What was signed today is more of a memorandum of understanding than a commercial contract,” said the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) senior executive, who asked not to be named. The documents signed in Istanbul by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Abdullah Gül nevertheless allow the Azerbaijani government to open negotiations with European companies about gas sales from the second, peak phase of gas production at its Shah Deniz field, since Baku and Ankara have reached an “agreement in principle,” the source said. Talks about “commercial details” for gas supplies and exports from this second phase, expected to kick in after 2016, will continue until the end of this year, according to the SOCAR source. The source did not elaborate. Neither Turkish nor Azerbaijani officials gave a reason for why some details remain outstanding after earlier assurances that a package agreement was a done deal. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. Few details about the Istanbul agreements have been disclosed. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz stated that the new price Turkey must pay for gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz project is higher than the previous price of $120 per 1,000 cubic meters (tcm). Still, Yildiz declined to provide an exact figure, Turkish media reported. A SOCAR source told EurasiaNet.org earlier that the planned price would be $250/tcm. CNN-Turk, however, has reported an agreed price of $300/tcm. The two energy partners also reportedly agreed on the price and volume of Azerbaijani gas supplies to Turkey from Shah Deniz after 2016, when the second phase of production is projected to reach 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Yildiz did not give a price, but said that Turkey had secured the right to buy 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2016, 4 bcm in 2017 and 6 bcm in 2018. A third agreement allows Azerbaijan to set up a company in Turkey to handle issues related to gas transit to Europe via Turkish territory. A separate accord between SOCAR and BOTAS, the Turkish state-run energy transit company, established the conditions and mechanisms for gas sales and shipment. Details were not immediately available. Despite the lack of a package deal, one key potential Azerbaijani gas client – the much-touted Nabucco pipeline–expressed satisfaction with the progress made. In a June 7 statement, the Nabucco consortium’s chief executive officer, Reinhard Mitschek, called the documents “a step in a positive direction.” Officials in both Turkey and Azerbaijan similarly emphasized the positive. “This opens the way for the securing of supplies for European gas projects like Nabucco, ITGI (Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline),” declared Yildiz, the Turkish energy minister, Turkish media outlets reported. SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev forecast that the agreements would pave the way for new large-scale projects that could be compared with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines. Helping to boost optimism, SOCAR announced on June 3 that it could start Phase 2 of Shah Deniz as early as 2014, the Trend news agency reported. A package gas agreement was originally expected to be signed during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s May 16-17 visit to Baku, but the deal was delayed at the last moment. Similar last-minute hiccups may have characterized the Istanbul meeting. Just a few days before the signing of the agreements, SOCAR President Abdullayev and Vice-President Elshad Nasirov, along with BP-Azerbaijan President Rashid Javanshir, made an urgent trip to Istanbul to join discussions involving expert groups. The SOCAR source claimed that the trip took place after Turkey allegedly tried to add terms to the transit agreement that would strengthen Ankara’s position. The source did not specify the terms. Turkey’s NTV television channel reported that the Istanbul agreements were finalized only at a June 7 meeting between President Aliyev and Turkish President Gül. For all the question marks, Baku-based energy expert Ilham Shaban said that Azerbaijan has achieved a key objective – holding talks directly with European companies about gas supplies to Nabucco, ITGI and NAP. “With about 6 bcm of gas from Stage 2 which will be supplied to Turkey, Baku still have about 10 bcm of gas to supply to European markets,” Shaban said.

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1NC Iran Adv (4/5)5) New gas line improves relations.Anav Silverman, the international correspondent for the Sderot Media Center, 6/9/10 “Turkey: Jihadi State Rising” http://www.aina.org/news/2010069141710.htm

Back in February, the Turkish daily, Today's Zaman wrote that the Turkish State Minister, Cedvet Yilmaz stated that his government was committed to working on improving relations with its neighbor Iran. The driving force behind this commitment, indicated Yilmaz, were the mutual gas transfer projects, which both Yilmaz and Iranian Foreign Minister, Manoucheher Mottaki agreed will bring both countries to a "historical era." Turkey and Iran have signed a number of deals to facilitate the flow of gas through Turkey to Europe, including agreements to allocate some Iran's South Pars gas field to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, where Iranian gas will be trasported across Turkey. The Turkey-Iran pipeline transfers natural gas worth around $2 billion every year. "We believe that the projects for the tansfer of Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey will give a momentum to relations between the two largest economies in the world," Yilmaz has stated. Another Turkish government official, Zafer Caglayan, stated that bilateral trade with Iran has grown to $10 billion in the past eight years

(only if they read the Isreal strike impact)

6) Both the Ross and Morning Star evidence give specific timeframes for their impact which have already passed meaning both cards are non-uniqued

7) Recent sanctions non-unique the Mornings Star’s impact—their ev says sanctions are considered an attack that would trigger the impact

Aljazeera, 6/25/10, “Iran faces fresh US sanctions” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062545934360999

The US congress has approved new unilateral energy and financial sanctions against Iran, in a further effort to pressure it into curbing its nuclear programme, which the US suspects is aimed at making a bomb. The House of Representatives passed the bill 408-8 on Thursday, sending it to Barack Obama, the US president, for signing into law. The senate earlier approved the sanctions 99-0. The new measures, which come on the back of the latest UN security council and European sanctions, aim to cut off off Iran's access to imports of refined petroleum products like gasoline and jet fuel and curb its access to the international banking system. "The UN sanctions [passed on June 9], though a good first step, are quite tepid. And they are tepid because there are other members of the security council who want to keep doing business with Iran ... the US ... has to pass these unilateral sanctions," Barbara Mikulski, a Democratic senator, said. The bill would effectively deprive foreign banks of access to the US financial system if they do business with key Iranian banks or the Revolutionary Guards.

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1NC Iran Adv (5/5)

8) Pulling out TNWs would sever ties, and destroy our relationship with turkey, linking to their own impacts

Bell and Loehrke, Benjamin, Bell is the project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow. Loehrke is a research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 09 “The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey”, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey,

In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

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http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey


2NC Iran Ext 1—Plan Doesn’t Solve Gas Coop

Extend 1NC 1. Aff doesn’t solve. Multiple warrants

1. No Turkish demand—supplies from other sources means it doesn’t need Iranian gas. 2. Iranian gas shortage—during winter, Iran can’t even produce enough. 3. Terrorist sabotage—attacks on pipelines means gas won’t make it to Turkey, EVEN IF a deal is

struck.

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2NC Ext 2 and 3 Relations Improving Now

1nc 2-3. . Iran-Turkey relations are improving now. That’s Tavernise and UPI.

1. Turkey is “Moving eastward” because of its recent rejection from the EU2. They intent to improve relations to stop a possible WMD by Iran3. Turkey will continue to deal with Iran EVEN after sanctions4. Relations are high enough now, that gas trade will continue even after recent sanction5. This proves how resilient the gas trade is

2) Iran and Turkey are “Friends and Brothers”, strait from the PresidentTEHRAN TIMES, 10/27/07, “Destiny of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq intertwined: Ahmadinejad” http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=155964

President Mahmud Ahmadinejad said here on Sunday that the nations of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq are “friends and brothers.” “The destiny of all of us is intertwined,” Ahmadinejad told the visiting Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. Ahmadinejad said the enemies are planning to dominate all countries through a long-term plan and “do not want the regional countries including Iran, Turkey, and Iraq to be powerful and live in peace.”

3) Turkey sticking to its vows, increasing its soft power with Iran, plus Nuclear deal passingThe Reuter, 5/22/10 “Iran to go ahead with Turkey atom fuel swap—report” http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKMOS23296620100522

Iran intends to go ahead with a deal reached with Turkey and Brazil for a nuclear fuel swap despite a new sanctions resolution against Tehran pending at the United Nations, an Iranian parliamentarian said on Saturday. "Iran is committed to the vows that it made and wants to make them operational and will submit its letter to International Atomic Energy Agency," Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of parliament's Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee, was quoted as saying by semi-official news agency ISNA. "The Americans' propaganda will not have any effect on Iran's decision ... We advise those countries who want to issue this resolution against Iran not to be manipulated by America." Iran's official news agency IRNA said on Friday Iran will hand an official letter to the IAEA's chief on Monday with details of the fuel swap agreement with Brazil and Turkey. The IAEA brokered the basis of the deal last October in talks involving Iran, France, Russia and the United States, but it soon unravelled amid Iranian demands for amendments. Turkish and Brazilian representatives at the IAEA will accompany Iran's envoy during the meeting with the IAEA chief on Monday, a communique from Iran's Supreme National Security Council published on Saturday in the daily Hambastegi said. Leaders of the three countries announced the agreement last Monday under which Iran will send 1,200 kg of its enriched uranium stocks -- reducing its supply of potential atomic bomb material -- to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods for a Tehran medical research reactor. But the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, after months of negotiations, brushed off the deal with a draft resolution on a new set of sanctions against Iran that Washington handed to the Security Council on Tuesday. A prominent Iranian lawmaker, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, had suggested on Thursday Iran could scuttle the deal if the sanctions resolution is approved. Western powers fear that Iran is secretly trying to produce nuclear weapons, but Tehran denies this and says it is

enriching uranium only to produce fuel for nuclear power stations. Under last week's surprise agreement, the first batch of Iran's uranium would arrive in Turkey within a month, in return for fuel rods to keep a Tehran medical research reactor running. Turkey and Brazil -- both currently non-permanent members of the Security Council -- and Iran have urged a halt to talk of further sanctions because of the deal, but Western powers suspect it is an Iranian tactic to avert or delay sanctions. The new, extended sanctions would target Iranian banks and call for inspection of vessels suspected of carrying cargo related to Iran's nuclear or missile programmes.

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2NC Ext 4 and 5 - New gas deal1nc 4: New deal makes Iran’s gas um-important

1) Their evidence is significantly older, and does not take this into account2) Although both Iran and Turkey are part of this deal, Iran is not the main exporter, so if they pull out there is no impact 3) New gas deal improves relations4) Our evidence quotes the prime minister on his intent to improve relations 5) They both have strong economical ties to this new line, and being rational actors, will try and keep it up and running

2) Turkey, Azerbijan gas deal finalized, new gas network set up.TODAY’S ZAMAN, 6/7/10 “Turkey, Azerbaijan sign Shah Deniz gas agreement” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212385-105-turkey-azerbaijan-sign-shah-deniz-gas-agreement.html

Turkey and Azerbaijan have signed a long-awaited memorandum of understanding for the shipment of 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijani's Shah Deniz field to Turkey. The deal was signed by Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız and Azerbaijani Industry and Energy Minister Natiq Aliyev on Monday during the third summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Speaking at the signing ceremony, Yıldız noted that the two sides had “reached an agreement over the price and quantity of gas to be exported from the Shah Deniz II project, which will go online in 2017, to Turkey.” The minister declined to give figures immediately on the price of the gas or on the percentage of gas for domestic consumption and for export to European countries. An agreement was also reached over the price of natural gas Turkey exports from Azerbaijan, he said. Turkey will retroactively pay for the gas it has purchased since April 15, 2008 at new prices. Turkey currently receives some 6 billion cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan and pumps some of that amount to Greece.

3) New deal signed, Europe and turkey no longer depended on gas from Iran or RussiaWorld Bulletin, 6/17/10, “Turkey, Italy, Greece to sign natural gas deal”, http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087

Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Italy's EDISON, and Greece's DEPA will sign a memorandum of understanding for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline that will carry natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The signature ceremony will take place in Ankara's Rixos Grand Hotel. Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, President of the Executive Board and Director General of BOTAS Fazil Senel, Vice-President of Italian Electric and Natural Gas Company EDISON Roberto Poti and President of the Executive Board of Greek State Natural Gas Company Herry Sachinis will participate in the signature ceremony. The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) Project is considered to be one of the EU's most crucial projects. The natural gas pipeline will be 804 kilometers long and will go into service in 2015. ITGI pipeline begins in Azerbaijan and ends in Italy. Once completed, the pipeline will carry around 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Italy per year. Bulgaria was the last country that joined the ITGI Project. Experts say that Serbia and Romania may join the project either directly or indirectly.

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2NC Ext 8—Removing TNWs Hurts US Turkey Relations

1NC 8: TNWs are Key to US-Turkey Relations1) Turkey sees the TNWs as a sign of US commitment2) They allow for a cohesive relationship, and removing them would completely undermine this

2) Nukes key to credibilityJohan Bergenäs, Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, Dr. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, et al, April 2010 “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?” http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf accessed 7/2/10

Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the Baltic States, have historically been reluctant to support the removal of U.S. NSNW. These states generally perceive these weapons as a means of providing a highly visible deterrent to Russia and see their location and visibility as essential to assuring them of the U.S. defense commitment to Europe and of the value of NATO. To this end, Bruno Tertrais, a prominent European scholar, has stated that “a U.S. nuclear withdrawal could be perceived as a lessening of transatlantic security ties by countries which are particularly keen to shelter behind U.S. protection , such as Poland, the Baltic States and Turkey.” 46 Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn writing in March 2010 cite an unidentified ambassador from a new NATO member: Nuclear deterrence by the US and through NATO and with the American presence of American warheads in Europe is the ultimate test of NATO’s credibility. If that fails, you will see a different NATO – more will follow the Poles in seeking bilateral guarantees. It is the essence of NATO membership.47 Absent the nuclear link, experts fret that the new members will see little benefit from NATO as they will perceive a lack of concern for their security from Germany and other Western European NATO members. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently called for Germany to reassure “NATO’s easternmost members that their security interests will be robustly protected.” 48 Discounting the possibility of a Russian attack worthy of a nuclear response, Perkovich calls on Germany to “seek collective policies to obviate the range of conventional and non-military threats such as cyber warfare and energy coercion that can lead to escalatory crises.”

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http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf


Ext 2- Relations improving

Relations fine, Turkey gas trade continues with Iran, even after new sanctionsTEHRAN TIMES, 7/3/10, “Iran-Turkey energy cooperation to grow” http://news.google.com/news/url?sa=t&ct2=us%2F0_0_s_5_0_t&usg=AFQjCNHtAfN763qUTrym8FrnScKRwo5_-g&cid=0&ei=moAuTJjLDonslQeh9a6sAQ&rt=SEARCH&vm=STANDARD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tehrantimes.com%2Findex_View.asp%3Fcode%3D222437

The Turkish energy minister says the new UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran will not affect the current energy deals between the two countries. “Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals , ” Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz said in an interview with Press TV . “ Energy is not part of the UN sanctions,” he added. Turkey is currently carrying out technical studies in Iran’s south pars gas field which could potentially yield prosperous investment for both countrie s . “After we receive the result of this study we will decide how to move forward,” Yildiz said. Iran exports 25 million cubic meters of natural gas to turkey per day and the figure could increase to 30 in the near future

Turley stands up for Iran, deepening tiesTulay Karadeniz, reporter for the Reuter, 6/10/10 “Turkey says Iran sanctions "mistake"; deepens Arab ties” http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49194320100610

Turkey called the imposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran a "mistake" on Thursday and said that it and Brazil would continue to seek a diplomatic solution to remove concerns over Iran's nuclear programme. In a speech to an Arab and Turkish ministerial forum, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan also announced plans to form a regional free trade zone with three Arab states -- Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The moves will add to concerns, voiced on Wednesday by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that the pivotal Western ally is in danger of swinging eastward because of resistance in Europe to its bid for membership of the European Union. Turkey and Brazil, both non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, were the only members of the 15-strong council to vote on Wednesday against the imposition of new sanctions against Iran. Lebanon abstained. "We would not want to participate in such a mistake because history will not forgive us," Erdogan told a meeting attended by ministers from 22 members of the Arab League. He said Turkey intended, with Brazil, to continue engaging Tehran, having secured a nuclear fuel swap deal last month that they had hoped would head off sanctions. Western countries along with Russia and China viewed that deal as too little too late and pressed on with a fourth round of sanctions, as Iran continued uranium enrichment that world powers fear could be used for nuclear weapons. Turkey believes that sanctions are ineffective and that there are dangers in pushing the Islamic republic into a corner. "Isolation is not the solution to Iran's problems," Erdogan said. EAST OR WEST. Though not an Arab, Erdogan has become a hero to many in the Arab world for championing the cause of Gaza's Palestinians and putting their plight near the top of the world agenda after an Israeli commando raid on a Turkish aid ship.

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Ext 2 – Relations goodIran is shipping its uranium to Turkey, this improves relations and robs Iran of Nuclear capabilities Associated Press, 4/17/10, “Russia: Iran's deal with Turkey may not be enough” ,http://www.salon.com/wires/world/2010/05/17/D9FOMAMG0_iran_nuclear/

Iran agreed Monday to ship most of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in a surprise nuclear fuel swap deal that could ease the international standoff over the country's disputed atomic program and deflate a U.S.-led push for tougher sanctions. The deal, which was reached in talks with Brazil and Turkey, was similar to a U.N.-drafted plan that Washington and its allies have been pressing Tehran for the past six months to accept in order to deprive Iran -- at least temporarily -- of enough stocks of enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran, which claims its nuclear program is peaceful, dropped several key demands that had previously blocked agreement. In return for agreeing to ship most of its uranium stockpile abroad, it would receive fuel rods of medium-enriched uranium to use in a Tehran medical research reactor that produces isotopes for cancer treatment. It was not immediately clear what would happen to the stockpile once the fuel rods were received.

Relations good enough to halt sanctionsJulian Borger, diplomatic editor, 5/17/10 “Iran-Turkey nuclear swap deal 'means new sanctions are unnecessary'” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-turkey

Turkey’s prime minister said today that there was no need for fresh UN sanctions against Iran following an agreement under which Tehran would ship more than a tonne of its enriched uranium to Turkey as part an exchange deal. Iran agreed to ship 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey in return for nuclear fuel rods for a medical research reactor. The deal is intended to defuse the crisis over Iran's nuclear aspirations at a time when a new round of sanctions is being discussed in the UN security council and Israel is contemplating military action. The details of the deal, mediated by Brazil, have yet to be finalised and would have to win the backing of other nuclear powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before it is implemented. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey, which sits on the UN security council, said the deal obviated the need for new sanctions. But British officials said Iran still had to do more to prove that its nuclear ambitions were not threatening. "Iran has an obligation to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions," junior foreign minister Alistair Burt said . "The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has said it is unable to verify this. That is why we have been working with our partners on a sanctions resolution in the security council. Until Iran takes concrete actions to meet those obligations, that work must continue," he said.

Squo solves, Iran and turkey are improving relations nowElin Kinnander, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2010, “The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship:Politically Successful, Commercially Problematic” http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf

This paper has presented the main features and factors influencing Turkish-Iranian natural gas relations and their current outcomes. This was done by first examining the historical evolution of Turkish-Iranian relations, the preconditions for today’s gas contract, and a detailed presentation and discussion of Turkey’s and Iran’s natural gas cooperation over the past decade. The main conclusion reached in this paper is that there exists a clear distinction, in terms of success, between the Turkish-Iranian political relational and the commercial natural gas relationship. The political relationship is strengthening and diplomatic ties are growing stronger. Even Turkish-Iranian trade in commodities other than gas is growing rapidly, but the gas cooperation continues to be delayed and to face problems. However, both countries portray their gas cooperation as developing and growing, and of high priority. The logic behind both Turkey’s but also Iran’s desire to expand this cooperation can be found within the framework of the countries´ foreign policy.

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iran


Ext 4 – No Need for Iran’s Gas

New deal signed, Europe and turkey no longer depended on gas from Iran or RussiaWorld Bulletin, 6/17/10, “Turkey, Italy, Greece to sign natural gas deal”, http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087

Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Italy's EDISON, and Greece's DEPA will sign a memorandum of understanding for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline that will carry natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The signature ceremony will take place in Ankara's Rixos Grand Hotel. Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, President of the Executive Board and Director General of BOTAS Fazil Senel, Vice-President of Italian Electric and Natural Gas Company EDISON Roberto Poti and President of the Executive Board of Greek State Natural Gas Company Herry Sachinis will participate in the signature ceremony. The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) Project is considered to be one of the EU's most crucial projects. The natural gas pipeline will be 804 kilometers long and will go into service in 2015. ITGI pipeline begins in Azerbaijan and ends in Italy. Once completed, the pipeline will carry around 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Italy per year. Bulgaria was the last country that joined the ITGI Project. Experts say that Serbia and Romania may join the project either directly or indirectly.

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http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087

http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087


1NC Terrorism Frontline (1 / 3)

1. Nuclear Terrorism is non-UniqueSteve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10

Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons . A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass . Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism,"

concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all

thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say , shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small ."

2. Nuclear Weapons are safe from terroristsJohn Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed 7/2/10

There has also been great worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia—weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991,are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become “radioactive scrap metal.” Similarly, a careful assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance. Even some of those most alarmed by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded that “It is probably true that there are no ‘loose nukes’, transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way.”10 It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a vicious on-and-off war for well over a decade. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.” Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide pursuit launched. And most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by sensors in the hands of pursuers.12 Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that will trigger a non-nuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high security vaults, and things can be organized so that two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb, but to store, to maintain, and to deploy it.

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http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html



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If the terrorists seek to enlist(or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger stresses, that “only few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained only in a limited set of

functions.13There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray—Pakistan is

frequently brought up in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks (and, in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled), and could probably be followed, located, and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The worst case scenario in this instance requires not only a failed state, but a considerable series of additional permissive conditions including consistent (and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood script writers than to people experienced with reality.

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3. Terrorists wouldn’t be able to acquire, develop, and deliver the nuclear weaponSteve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10

The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes

Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably

while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with

spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.

Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, " We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong.

That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

4. Terrorists could just as easily steal from Italy, Aff evidence not specificClaudine Lamond, Research Intern at British American Security Information Council, 2009 http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm

Italy hosts two nuclear bases. With the shift of attention to southern and eastern Europe, Italy features in NATO plans for expansion. The United States may wish to close a base in Germany and move four infantry battalions to Vicenza, making it Europe's largest US base, and include a possible increase of TNWs stationed in Italy . Public discontent with these proposals was vividly shown in 2007 when there was a demonstration of over 100,000 people against the Vicenza military base and the proposed expansion.[14] The presence of nuclear weapons on Italian soil at another US base, Aviano, is also deeply unpopular. As a consequence, the

Italian Berlosconi Government has voiced its own hesitation over nuclear sharing.[15] Italy has taken delivery of 121 dual-capable Typhoon aircraft since early 2006.[16] It was also planning to purchase the dual-capable Joint Strike Fighter, but under budgetary

pressures, the government announced its decision to op-out from the JSF program in October 2008. It is unclear whether the Typhoon will be modified to carry B-61s.

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2nc Ext 11nc 1: Terroists cant attack

1) They would have attacked by now or even tried to if they can actually steal a bomb

1) Terrorists wont attackJohn Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed 7/2/10Alarm about the possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons have been repeatedly raised at least since 1946 when atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer contended that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could “destroy New York.” Thirty years later, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the problem to be “immediate,” and explained at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it variously already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.”3 Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In the wake of 9/11, concerns about the atomic terrorist surged even though the attacks of that day used no special weapons. By 2003, UN Ambassador John Negroponte judged there to be a “a high probability” that within two years al-Qaeda would attempt an attack using a nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction. And it is in this spirit that Graham Allison in 2004 produced a thoughtful, influential, and well-argued book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, relaying his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” He had presumably relied on the same inspirational mechanism in 1995 to predict that “In the absence of a determined program of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out.”4 He has quite a bit of company in his perpetually alarming conclusions. However, thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.

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2NC Ext 3- Terrorists cant do it

1nc 3: Terroists can’t get or set off a TNW, multiple warrants

1) If it was easy to steal a bomb it would have happened already2) If not maintained then they “expire” and are useless3) They would be easy to follow because of the radiation emitted from the bomb4) They don’t have the technicians to operate it5) THEY ONLY HAVE TO MESS UP ONCE, it would be more complex than a Hollywood movie heist

2) Terrorists can’t USE the nukes even if they get themScott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 “Old weapons, new terror worries” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10

Many Russian experts argue, though, that even if a terror group seized a nuclear weapon, they would not be able to use it. American and most Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles have various safeguards that can permanently disable a weapon if it is tampered with, or require an actual missile launch to arm the warhead. "We can't exclude terrorists seizing a missile, but that will be the end of this terrorist act, because they will not be capable of launching it - never," says Dvorkin, who also discounts chances of an inside job. "There is not a single worker next to a nuclear weapon who is capable of giving this information, because the codes are only known to the highest command."

3) no of inside job low; security solves Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 “Old weapons, new terror worries” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10

Tentative first signs of such collusion are already raising red flags, though making the link hasn't been easy, says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at

Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom. "The connection between the guy in a position to steal, and Al Qaeda, is a pretty difficult step," says Mr. Bunn. "It's not like you can walk in wearing a white turban waving a million dollars around,

and expect to get anywhere." Last year, however, a Russian businessman was found to have offered $750,000 for weapons-grade plutonium, and contacted scientists at a key Russian institute, Bunn says.

They deceived him by selling him a canister of mercury. The days of the "desperate insider" of the 1990s - when guards at nuclear sites left their posts to forage for food, or electricity to alarms and weapons systems was cut because bills had gone

unpaid - are now giving way to the "greedy insider," Bunn adds.

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http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html



2NC Ext 4

1nc 4: TNWs in Italy are being increase1) The aff’s Kibaroğlu evidence is not specific to turkey, it merely uses turkey as an example, but is

talking about all TNW holding countries. Italy is right around the corner from turkey, and will soon hold significantly more TNWs than it. There is no reason that the terrorists wont steal from Italy where they have a better chance.

2) The aff’s Tümer evidence is not talking about terrorist trying to attack the specific base in turkey. It implies that IRAN might send a MISSLE to hit the base, not that the PKK will try and steal a TNW. There is no reason that pulling out of turkey would help, only increase the chance of terrorism in Italy where we CANT get involved.

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Security CP 1NC (1/1)

Increase Security of TNW Counterplan

Text: The United States federal government increase and provide all necessary security support for the B61 gravity bombs located in Turkey.

Contention One: Competition

It leaves the nuclear weapons in Turkey and avoids the disads.

Contention Two: Solvency

Increased security resolves any residual risk of terrorism. Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10

The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as

those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100

pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country

over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb.

It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it.

Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion.

This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an

attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen

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CP Solvency Extensions

Terrorism isn’t probable but enhanced security resolves the risk. John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed 7/2/10

At some point, however, probabilities, become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it begins to make sense to ignore, or at least to back-burner, them: the risk becomes “acceptable.” Consider the odds that a wheel on a speeding automobile will suddenly shear off. That horror is surely “not impossible,” yet legions of motorists effectively find it so improbable that they are routinely willing to risk their lives that it will not happen—it is, in short, an acceptable risk. The British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched

missiles and kill millions of Americans—far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet, the risk that this potential (and fully possible)calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is “accepted.” Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States enjoys a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage still with its nuclear weapons, a fully-imaginable calamity that goes substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein notes that if there is a yearly probability of one in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to one in 10,000 over ten years and to one in 5,000 over twenty. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.”53Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just

perhaps it is at some of the levels suggested here: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt . The same consideration holds for Vice President Dick Cheney’s “one percent doctrine.” A top CIA analyst late in 2001 told him that al-Qaeda probably did not have a nuclear

weapon, but that he couldn’t “assure you that they don’t.” To this, Cheney replied, “If there’s a one percent chance that they do, you have to pursue it as if it were true.”54 Cheney’s observation is a somewhat confused, but effective, way of saying that one should take low probability events that could have an exceedingly high impact very seriously indeed. And a one percent chance of a terrorist atomic attack would clearly fit into that category . It’s just that the chances, while perhaps not zero, do not seem to be anywhere remotely near one percent. It’s not that they are necessarily one in 3.5 billion, but

they aren’t anything like one in 10, one in a hundred, or one in a thousand. Perhaps, in fact, they are comparable to, or even lower than, those for a thermonuclear attack from Russia.

Need security premised on the fact that Al Qaeda can do it later to solveScott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 “Old weapons, new terror worries” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10

Still, the amount of foresight Al Qaeda displayed in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks deepens fears of nuclear terror.

"It's more complicated than slapping on an alarm clock and running a couple of wires, like James Bond," says Jon Wolfstahl, a nuclear

nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. "But we believe it's within the capability of more sophisticated, well-financed groups, especially if they can get their hands on scientists or engineers with knowledge of these systems." Al Qaeda tops that short list. "[Al Qaeda cells] are not very capable, technically, but they're learning more and more, and this isn't going to go away in one or two years ," says David Albright, a physicist who heads the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. Searching for clues about the level of Al Qaeda nuclear expertise, he has

examined troves of documents and videos uncovered in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. "They make a lot of mistakes, [but] they're becoming more capable over time," says Mr. Albright. Recruiting nuclear and computer experts could make the dangers surge. "People have that capability, they may turn sympathetic to Al Qaeda, or be blackmailed by Al Qaeda," Albright says. "You can't build a defense on the premise that Al Qaeda can't do it."

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Allied/Turkish Prolif Links

US TNWs stop Turkish proliferationMalcolm Chalmers, is Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 3/10, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf

Finally, critics of a NATO ‘zero option’ point to the critical role that NATO extended nuclear deterrence has played in preventing proliferation within NATO. Today, the development of independent German and Italian nuclear weapons is not a serious possibility. Given current trends in Iran, however, the risk of Turkey moving in this direction cannot be dismissed so easily. At the very least, any steps towards revising the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine must take the Turkish dimension into account.

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Documents

Control + 1 – Block Headingsopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files… · Web viewExt 2- Relations improving 12. Ext 2 – Relations good 13. Ext 4 – No Need