Boston College International and Comparative Law ReviewVolume 1|Issue 1 Article 91-1-1977Contributions to International Law and WorldOrder by the World Courts Adjudication of theIcelandic Fisheries ControversyDonald A. YoungFollow this and additional works at: htp://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclrPart of the Courts Commons, and the International Law CommonsTis Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted forinclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College LawSchool. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.Recommended CitationDonald A. Young, Contributions to International Law and World Order by the World CourtsAdjudication of the Icelandic Fisheries Controversy, 1 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 175 (1977),htp://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol1/iss1/9ContributionstoInternationalLawandWorld OrderbytheWorldCourt'sAdjudicationof the IcelandicFisheriesControversy INTRODUCTION Natural resources are dwindling in a world of increasing pop-ulationandadvancingtechnology.Oneoftheresourcesmost vitally affected by this development has been that of the oceans; astheexploitationof thisresource - particularly offish - has become more efficient, the nationsof the world have found them-selvesconfrontedwithagenuinelimitationontheWorld Ocean'sabilitytoproducefoodforhumanconsumption.To combatthistrend,lessdevelopedcoastalnationshavesought toguaranteetheirvital harvestsfromtheseathroughtheuni-lateralextensionofexclusivefishingzones.Conflicthasde-veloped where expansion of interestsaffectsthe long-standingbenefitsenjoyedbyotherfishingstates.Withinthis contextissetthecontinuingfisherieszonedisputesbetween theUnitedKingdomandtheFederalRepublicofGermany (West Germany), on one hand,and Iceland onthe other. TheFisheriesJurisdictionCases\decidedbytheInterna-tionalCourtofJusticeintwoseparateopinionsdeliveredon July25,1974,attemptedtoformulateadefinitiveanswerto theresourceallocationproblemforthesenations.Thecases posetwobroadquestionswhichthisarticlewillendeavorto 1 FisheriesJurisdictionOase(UnitedKingdomv.Iceland)[1974]1.0.3'.3; FisheriesJurisdictionCase(FederalRepublicofGermanyv.Iceland)[1974]I.C.3'. 171'i. 175 176BOSTONCOLLEGEINTERNATIONAL&COMPARATIVELAWJOURNAL[Vol.I,No.1 answerinthelightofrecentlawoftheseadevelopments: 1)Arethejudgmentsinthesecasessignificantcontributions tothedevelopmentofinternational lawrelatingtofisheriesex-ploitationandconservationTand2)HoweffectiveistheWorld CourtinpeacefullysettlingmoderndisputesofthisnatureT2 I.BACKGROUNDTOFISHERIESJURISDICTIONISSUES Withinthetwentiethcenturyfishingtechnologyhasbecome extremelyefficient.Fishinggroundsmaybedepletedbythe mechanizedfleetsofjustafewcountrieswithinafewshort years.Andyettheocean'sresourcesaresaidtobelongtoall nations.In1958theUnitedNations,recognizingthatconflicts regardingtheproperallocationofmarineresourcescouldde-velopamongnations,convenedthefirstUnitedNationsCon-ferenceontheLawoftheSea.Thefirstconferencealong withtwosubsequentconferencesprovidebackgroundnecessary toan understandingofthedecisionsintheFisheriesJUf'isdic-dictionCases. TheInternationalLawCommission,createdafterthefound-ing of theUnitedNationsin1945,presentedanumberofpro-posalsforcodificationof thelawoftheseatotheGeneralAs-semblyin1956.ThisreportformedthebasisfortheGeneva - Conferenceof theLaw oftheSea in1958.Upondeliveringits findings,theCommissionproposedadoptionofarule"that in-ternationallawdoesnotpermitanextensionoftheterritorial sea beyondtwelvemiles."8 Four conventions were agreedupon at the 1958GenevaCon-ference.However,theConventionontheTerritorialSeaand theContiguousZonecouldnotsettleuponauniformlimitfor 2Icewnd's Begulations EstabliBhingaFiBheryZoneWitha 50-MileLimit ..freNot OpposabletotheUnitedKingdomandtheFederalBepublicofGermany,10TEXAS INT'L L. J. 150,158(1975)[hereinafter cited as Begulations]. 8Int'lL.Comm'n,Report,11U.N.GAOR,Supp.9,at3,U.N.Doc.A/3159 (1956). ConventionontheTerritorialSeaandtheContiguouBZone,Conventiononthe HighSeas,ConventiononFishingandConservationoftheLivingResourcesof theHighSeas,ConventionontheContinentalShelf,U.N.Doc.A/Coni.la/L. 52-55(1958). 1977]ICELANDICFISHEBIESCoNTBOVEBSY177 territorial waters.Theoldthree-milelimit,establishedbythe "cannonshotdoctrine" IIwhichlimitedterritorialwaterssea-ward the distance of the rangeofeighteenth century land-based guns,wassupportedbyone-thirdoftheparticipants.Several developingstates,togetherwiththeSovietUnion,optedfora twelve-mile limit.The remainder supported a six-mile or greater limit.TheConvention also prescribed.acontiguouszoneswhich wouldextend nomorethantwelvemiles.Sincethiscontiguous zonewouldbeadjacenttothestate'sterritorialseaandwould notextendbeyondtwelvemilesseawardfromthebaselineof theterritorialsea,7someauthoritiesarguethat,ineffect,the Conventionlimitedtheterritorialseatothetwelve-mileex-tension previously recommended by the International Law Com-mission.s Thebreadthofthecontiguouszonecouldnotbe determinedsincenoagreementhadbeenreachedontheinter-relatedbreadthoftheterritorialsea.Norwasanyaccord forthcomingaboutexclusivefisherieszones. The1958Conferenceadvancedthelawoftheseainseveral noteworthycategories.Article1oftheGenevaConventionon theHighSeasdefinedhighseasasaUpartsoftheseanot includedintheinternalwatersorterritorialseaofastate.o II Martens,E1JoZutionofOoastaZStateJuriBdiction:OonflictBetweenDe1Jeloped and De1Jeloping NationB,5 ECOLOGY L. Q.531,532(1976). 8ThecontiguouszonewasdefinedinArticle24ofthisConventionasazone necessaryforimmigrationandotherregulations,butitwasnotthesameasan exclusivefisherieszone(LawoftheSea - El&cl'UBi1JeEconomioZone,16HABv. INT'L.L. J.474,484(1975)[hereinaftercitedasEl&cZ'UBi1JeEoonomicZone)).The confusionofterminologyaboutcontiguouszones,territorialwaters,andexclusive fisheryoreconomiczonesincreasesthemisunderstandingaboutcoastaljurisdic tion(Martens, B'Upra note 5, at 538). 7 PriortotheAngZoNorwegianFiBherieBOasein1951thebaselinefromwhich theterritorialseawasmeasuredhadbeenthelowtidelineofthecoastalstate. In decidingthatNorwaycouldupholdherdecreeof1935whichdrewherbaseline fromanumberof rocksoutatsea,visibleonlyatlowtide,theInternationalCourt ofJusticeredefinedinternationallawandextendedthecoastal'sstate'sjurisdiction. Baselinesarevitalindeterminingfisherieszones(S.BoSENNE,TUBWORLDCOURT: WHAT ITIS AND How IT WORKS144145(1962. 8 Martens,Bupranote5,at 537;BeethejointseparateopinionofJudgesForster, Benpon,JimhezdeAr6chaga,NagendraSingh,andRudaintheFisheriesJuris diction Case(Federal Republic of Germany v.Iceland)[1974] I.C.J. at 218. o [1974]I.C.J. 3, 22. 178BOSTONCoLLEGEINTERNATIONAL& CoJrlPABATIVBLAwJOUBNAL[Vol1.No.1 Article 2 stated that certain freedomsexisted on the High Seas. "These freedoms[includingfishing],andotherswhicharerec-ognizedbythegeneralprinciplesof internationallaw,shallbe exercisedbyallStates withreasonableregardtotheinterests ofotherStatesintheirexerciseofthefreedomofthehigh seas. "10ByArticles1and2oftheContinentalShelfCon-vention theConferenceagreed that therightsofacoastalstate toitsadjacentcontinentalshelfrelatesolelytoresourcesof itsseabedandsubsoilandthatthewatersthemselveswould legallybeconsideredhighseas.ll Preferentialrights,aconceptembodyingparticularfishing rightsowedto acoastalstate because of herspecial dependence upon coastal fisheries,wasproposedby IcelandtotheConven-tiononFishingandConservationoftheLivingResourcesof theHighSeas.12 Icelandfeltthat,evenif adequateconserva-tion measures were toexist andcatch limitations wereimposed, thedependentcoastalstatestilldeservedindividualconsidera-tion.ThisConvention,derivingitsapproachfromPresident Truman'sfisheryProclamationofSeptember,1945,18didpass aresolution whichdeclaredthatacoastalstatehasaninterest inthemaintenanceoftheresourcesofthehigh seasbeyond itsterritorial watersbut doesnothaveexclusiverightsofjur-isdictionoutsideofthosewaters.Negotiationsbetweenthe coastalstateandotherinterestedpartieswouldbethekey to conservation of fishstocks. l' Becausethe1958Conferencefailedtoreachagreementon eitherthelimitoftheterritorialseaoronexclusivefisheries zones,aresolutionwasadoptedrequestingtheGeneralAssem-blytostudytheadvisabilityofconveningasecondLawof the SeaConferencetodealwiththesequestions.Duringthein-terim,inJanuary,1959,fourteenstatesincludingIcelandand 10 [1974] I.C.J. 3, 56. 11 [1974] I.C.J. 3, 108. 12 Article6ofthisConventionisentitled"ResolutionaonSpecialSituationa Relating to Coaatal Fisheries." 18 PreaidentialProelamationNo.2668,59STAT.885(1945).Foranoutlineof the provisiona of this proclamation ,ee Martens, lUI/Til note 5,at 533. u[1974] I.C.J. 3, 109(Separate op. of Judge Waldock). 1977]IC3LA)fJ)10FI8RDtr.sOoNTIOVDBY 178 theUnitedKingdommetattheNorthEast AtlanticFisheries Convention.In MarchandAprilof1960theSecondLawof the Sea Conference was held in GenevL AtthisConferenceajointCanadian-UnitedStatescompro-miseproposalwasmadewhichprovidedforasix-mileterri-torialseaplusafurthersa-milezoneofexclusivelaheries, subject to a ten-year phase out period for nations Aahing in that zone.Thisproposallackedonevoteofthetwo-thirdsmajority necessaryforpassage.Priortothisproposalajointamend-ment concerning preferential rights, sponsored by Brazil,Cuba, and Uruguay,hadbeenpassed. AfteraperiodofAveyearsfonowingtheGenevaConfer-ences, nationsagain began asserting laher,. jurisdiction claims. TheSouthandCentralAmericancountriesinitiatedtwohun-dredmilezones,referring inparttoPresidentTruman'. 1946 continentalshelf Proclamation.1'By June,1972;afterseveral conferences,essentiallyallLatinAmericanstatessupported atwohundred mileeconomic(Asheries)zonewhichrecognized the coastal state'srights overtherenewableand non-renewable natural: resourcesinthewaters,theseabed,qd thesubsoil1. Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta saw theproblem of ocean explorationbeyondthelimitsof nationaljurisdiction andpro-. posedthisareabeconsideredthe"commonheritageofman-kind"inaspeechbeforetheGeneralAssemblyin1967.A moratoriumresolution,opposedbytheindustrializedcoun-tries, waspassedinDecember,1969,and forbadetheexploita-tionof theseabed.Ayear latertheGeneralAssemblypassed the"DeclarationofPrinciplesGoverningtheSeabedandthe OceanFloor,andtheSubsoilThereof,beyondtheLimitsof NationalJurisdiction"ITwhichprovidedthebasisforthecon-vocationoftheThirdLawoftheSeaConference.Bythis IIPreaidentlalProclamationNo.8887,59STAT.884(1945).Thllproclamation It&teathattheUnlte4Statearep.rdathenaturall'eIourceeoftheIUbioUand... bedof thecontinentalshelfcontipoultotheUnite4States&Iappertaininetothe UnitedStatea.ThlIwouldeomprileanareaundertheao-oallecl"laitrh...." and thlI proclamation dilllDelude free-awlmminlr apeetea. 18 KarteDI, "'JWCIDote 5, at MO. lT GoA. "'1749, 85 U.N. GAOB Supp. 88, at 14, U.N. Doc. A./80SS(1970). 180BOSTONCoLLBGBlNTDNATlONAL'" CoXPAL\TlVJ:LAwJOUBNAL[Vol.I,No.1 time,however,thecommonheritageconsistedof muchlessof theWorld'Ocean.,f AfteranorganizationalsessioninDecember,1973,thefirst substantivesessionwasheldinCaracas,beginningJune20, 1974.Effortsweredirectedtowardcreatingacomprehensive Lawof the Sea Treaty;atwelve-mileterritorialseaand atwo hundred-mileeconomiczonewereagreedupon,subjecttothe resolutionofsometangentialissues18 suchastheoutermost limitofjurisdictionoverthecontinentalshelf,18dutiesthe coastal state wouldassumewithrespecttoconservationoffish stocks,thelegalstatusoftheeconomiczone,anddisputeset-tlement mechanisms.to Thesecondsession,heldatGenevain1975,providedfor furthercompromisesanddemonstratedaswelltheincreased influenceofthedevelopingnationsworkinginconcert.Expan-sionof coastaljurisdictionswassupportedevenbylandlocked states. ThethirdconventionofthisConference,heldinNewYork Cityin theearlyspringof1976,attemptedtodraftaLawof theSeaTreatytobeadoptedinthenearfuture.Differences amongdevelopedanddeveloping,maritimeand landlocked,na-tionsmakeacomprehensivetreatydifficulttoachieveinthe lightofrecentincreasedstatejurisdictionovertheseas.This developmentplusotherrecentchangesininternationallaw whichoccurredthroughtheLawoftheSeaConferencesand contemporaneouspoliticalactivityarevitaltounderstandiug theramificationsof theFisheryJt4risdictiofl.Oases. n.THEICELANDICFISHERIESCASES Iceland,aless-developedcoastalnation,haslongsoughtto retaincontroloverherfisheries.OnApril5,1948,tenyears beforethefirstLawoftheSeaConference,theIcelandicPar-liament,theAlthing,passedalawentitled"LawConcerning 18 StevensonandOzman,TheThirdUnitedNGtiOfl8COfI,ferenceontholAwof the 8eG: The 1974 CGrGCGI8emon, 69Ax. J. IN'l"L. L. I, 2(1975). 18 Id. at 13. 20 Id. at 17-18. 1977]ICELANDIOFISHDIlCSCoNTIlOVDSY181 theScientificConservation of theContinentalShelfFisheries" whichgaveauthorizationtoitsMinistryofFisheriestoregu-late all fisheriesin water abovethe Icelandic continental shelf-approximatelyfiftynauticalmilesinbreadth.In 1952Iceland, applyingthisauthority,expandeditsthree-mileterritorialsea byonemile;thisexclusivefishingzonewasfurtherincreased totwelvemilesin 1958.21 In1952theUnitedKingdomprotestedtheextensionand the baselines from whichit wasdrawn.Disagreement continued andBritish-Icelandicnavalencounterswithinthedisputedwa-tersbecameknownasthe"CodWar".In1958bothGreat BritainandtheFederalRepublicofGermanyprotestedIce-land'stwelve-mileextension.Negotiationsbetweenthesena-tionsandIcelandwerebegun,andanagreementintheform of an Exchange ofNoteswasreachedonMarch 11,1961(here-inafterreferredtoasthe1961ExchangeofNotes).Under theaccord,Icelandcouldcontinuetoworktowardtheimple-mentationofits1958resolutionforatwelve-milezoneand wouldgivesixmonths'noticebeforefurtherextendingthe fisheriesjurisdiction.TheUnitedKingdomandtheFederal RepublicofGermanyagreedtoathree-yearphaseoutperiod for fishingbetweenasix-mileandtwelve-milelimit,agreednot . tofishin seven specifiedareas,but did notacceptany Icelandic rightsofjurisdictionoutsidethetwelve-milelimit.22Included in theaccordwasacompromissaryclausewhichprovidedthat anydisputewastobereferredtotheInternationalCourtof Justice at the request of any of the parties. ThisExchangeofNotesaffordedsatisfactionfortenyears, but onJuly 14,1971,Iceland provided her requiredsix months' noticeforterminationoftheagreements.Shecommunicated totheBritishandGermangovernmentsinFebruary,1972, thatshefounditnecessaryandreasonabletoextendherzone ofexclusivefisheriestoincludetheseacoveringthefifty-mile 1n Onesourcesaid1959(Tiewul,TheFisheriesJurisdictionCases(1973)andthe Ghost0/ Rebu.SicStantibUl,6INT'z,.L.&POL.455(1973. 22[1974] I.OoJ.3, 113(Separate op. of Judge Waldock). 182BoSTONCoLLEGElNTEILN..6.TIONAL& CoKPAlU.TIVJ:LAwJOUBNAL[Vol.1,No.1 continentalshelf.28 Thefisherieslimitswouldthusbeextended asofSeptember1,1972.Icelandalsodeclaredthattheobject andpurposeoftheExchangeofNoteshadbeenaccomplished; sheconsideredtheagreementterminated.24 Further,Iceland claimedthatthecompromissaryclausecouldnotapplybecause theInternationalCourtofJusticelackedjurisdictioninthe presentcircumstances.OnJuly14,1972,theAlthingissued regulationscreatingthefifty-milefishingzone. InreferringthedisputetotheInternationalCourtofJ us-ticeGreatBritainandGermanycontended1)thatIceland's fifty-mileclaimwasinvalidunderinternationallaw,2)that Icelandcouldnotunilaterallyextendherfisheriesjurisdiction againsttheUnitedKingdomorGermanybeyondthetwelve-milelimitagreeduponin1961,3)thatIcelandcouldnotuni-laterallyimposerestrictionsonBritishandGermanfishing vesselsbeyondthatlimit,and4)thateachofthedisputing countrieswasundermutualobligationstonegotiateforafish-eriesregime.BothnationsincludedclaimsthatIcelandhada dutytocompensatethemforinterferencewiththeirfishing trawlers. Iceland,conformingwithherpositionthattheCourtlacked jurisdiction,didnotparticipateintheproceedings.Shedid, however,furtherelaborateherjurisdictionalargumenttothe Registrarof theInternationalCourtofJustice.Theargument wasbasedonthedoctrineofrebussicstantib'tes,25adoctrine whichstatesthatatreatyceasestobeinforceifconditions uponwhichit wasfoundedhavechanged.Theallegedchanged circumstanceswere1)theextensionoffishingzonestotwelve milesbyan increasing numberofstates,and2)moreefficient fishingtechniquesby theapplicantstates,thusthreatening Ice-land'slivelihood. Withoutacceptingformaljurisdiction,theCourtannounced aninterimorderonAugust17,1972.Thisordersetalimita-23 AlreadybyJuneof1972a200-milezoneexistedinell8entiallyallofLatin America;BeedUC'UBBiQfl.,p_179mira. 24 Euhuive Economic ZQfl.e, .tuFa note6, at 476. 25 See Tiewul, .tuFa note 21, at 455for afuller discussion of this term. 1977]ICELANDICFISHERIESCONTKOVUSY183 tionon theUnited Kingdomof acatchof nomorethan 170,000 metrictonsper yearwithinthe"Sea Area of Iceland"anddi-rectedIceland torefrain fromenforcing itsregulationsagainst fishingvesselsoftheUnitedKingdomoutsidethetwelve-mile zone.26 Asimilarorder,issuedthesamedate,restrictedGer-manytoacatchof119,000metrictonswithinthe"SeaArea ofIceland".27IcelandrepliedonAugust30,1972,thatshe wouldnotconsidertheinterimorderbindingastheCourt lackedjurisdictioninthiscase. ThedecisiontoadjudicatewasmadeonFebruary2,1973, andwasbasedupontheCourt'sassumptionthatthe1961Ex-changeofNoteswasatreatystillinforce.Thusit foundjur-isdictionwithinArticle36,paragraph1oftheStatuteofthe CourtwhichdefinestheCourt'sjurisdictionasincluding"all caseswhichthe parties refer toit and all mattersspeciallypro-videdfor...intreatiesorconventionsinforce."28The Court could alsohave based itsjurisdiction onArticle36,para-graph6ofitsStatute29 by whichtheCourthasjurisdictionto decideonquestionsofitsownjurisdiction.Thisapproach, however,mayhaveseemedoverlycircuitousonceIceland's contentionsof achangeofcircumstanceshadbeendiscardedas irrelevant.TheCourt heldthattheobjectandpurpose(ofthe compromissaryclauseinthe1961ExchangeofNotes)"was ...toprovideameanswherebythepartiesmightresolvethe questionofthevalidityoffurtherclaims."30Inaddition,the Courtfeltthatifonepartyhasalreadybenefitedfromthe executedprovisionsofatreatyitshouldbeimpermissibleto allowthat party toend obligationsaccepted under thattreaty.81 "Changedcircumstances"wouldhavetoresultina"radical 26 EzoZusweEoonomic Zone, supra note 6, a,t477. 27[1974]I.C.J.175, 188. 26DOCUMENTSONTHEINTERNATIONALCOURT01'JUSTICE75(S.ROSENNE,ed. 1974)[hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS]. 29 Article36,paragraph6oftheStatuteoftheCourtstates:Intheeventofa disputeastowhethertheCourthasjurisdiction,themattershallbesettledbythe decision of the Court.(DOCUMENTS,supra note 28, at 7577). 80 [1974]I.C.J. 3, 17. 81ld. at 18. 184BOSTONCOLLEGEINTERNATIONAL&.CoKPAlLATlVBLAwJOUBNAL[Vol1,No.1 transformationoftheextentoftheobligationsstilltobeper-formed"and here, they had not.S2 DespitetheCourt's assumptionofjurisdictionearlyin 1973, directnegotiationsbetweenthefeudingpartiescontinued.An "InterimAgreementintheFisheriesDispute"fortwoyears wassignedbetweentheUnitedKingdomandIcelandonNo-vember13,1973;noagreementwasconcludedalthoughnego-tiationscontinuedbetweenGermanyandIceland. Afurtherjurisdictionalissuewasraisedbythisinterim agreementbetweenGreatBritain andIceland:thedisputebe-tweenthesepartiesmighthavebeenmootinthelightofthat NovemberExchangeofNotes.Aftertheconclusionofthis agreement,theUnitedKingdomdidwithdrawherrequestfor compensation fromIceland forinterferencewithBritishtrawl-ers.ss Thecontroversyremainedalive,however,sincetheNo-vemberExchangeofNoteswasconsideredbybothpartiesin-volvedand bytheCourt tohavebeenonlyan interimone,con-cluded without prejudice tothe legal position or rightsof either government.Thusthedisputewouldreemergewhentheagree-mentterminatedinNovember,1975.M Additionally,theCourt didnotwishtodiscourageinterimagreementswhichmight promotepeacefulsettlements.SIi AndtheCourtstill hadbefore it thecaseofGermanyv.Icelandforwhichnointerimagree-mentexisted. By avoteoftenjusticestofour,theInternationalCourtof JusticedecidedthatIceland'sregulationswereinvalidagainst nationalsoftheUnitedKingdomandGermany.Thisdecision wasfoundedontheprincipleofopposability,whichappliedas aresultofthetermsofthe1961ExchangeofNotes.Thees-senceof opposability is that onestate seekstoinvoketheterms ofsomeconventionortreaty(inthiscase,the1961Exchange ofNotes),allegingthatthisconventionortreatyshouldpre-82 1d. at 21. as 1d. at 8. 114 1d. at 19. iii 1d. at 20. 1977]ICELANDICFISHERIESCONTROVERSY185 vailovertheprincipleorinstitutionreliedonbyanotherstate (here,thechangeofcircumstancesnecessitatingIceland'sex-tensionofherfisherieszone).86AlthoughtheCourtacknowl-edgedthatthetermsofthe1961ExchangeofNotesshould prevailoverIceland'sclaimofchangedcircumstancesandin validatetheregulationsextendingIceland'sfisherieszonein this instance,it did not concludethat Iceland'sregulationswere invalid as applied toallotherstatesunder general international law. TheCourt'suseoftheopposabilityprincipleflowedfrom tworecentconceptsofcustomarylaw87 - theconceptofthe fisheryzone,anarea ofexclusivefisheryjurisdictionindepend-entoftheterritorialsea,andthe"conceptofpreferential rightsoffishinginadjacentwatersinfavourofthecoastal state,thispreferenceoperatinginregardtootherStatescon-cernedintheexploitationofthesamefisheries".88Eachop-posingpartyhadacceptedtheseconceptseitherinthe1961 ExchangeofNotesorintheapplicationstotheCourt.80Fur-ther,the1958GenevaConventionontheHighSeashadincor-porated, in ArticlesIandII theprinciplesofinternationallaw whichprovidethatnostatecanvalidlyclaimsovereigntyover any partsof thesea notincludedwithinitsterritorial waters.40 Elaboratingontheparties'rightswithintheframeworkof opposability,theCourtrecognizedthatvalidconflictinginter-ests existed.Iceland, as the coastal state, had preferential rights duetoeconomicnecessitythusimplyingacertainpriority; however, this priority could not extinguish theconcurrent rights ofotherStates,especiallythosesuchastheApplicantStates whosefishinginthedisputedwatershadlongbeenofimpor-36 Regulation8, supra note 2,at 152, note10. S7 Therewassomesentimentthattheexclusive:fisheryzonewasnotcustomary-thatiscommon,consistentandconcordant - internationallawin1974([1974] I.C.J.3,50(Dissentingop.ofJudgeIgnacio-Pinto.However,althoughalimit tothiszonehadnotbeendetermined,theconceptofsuchazonewascommonly accepted. 88 [1974]I.C.J. 3,23;[1974]I.C.J_ 175,192. 89[1974]I.C.J. 3,24;[1974]I.C.J. 175, 192-193. 40RegulationB,supranote2,at156;8eealaodiscuBsion,p.177,infra. 186BOSTONCoLLEGEINTER,NATIONAL&COMPARATIVELAWJOURNAL[Vol.1,No.1 tancetotheireconomies.1 ThusIceland'sfifty-milelimitregu-lationswerenotvalidtotheextentthattheyconflictedwith therecognizedrightsoftheUnitedKingdomandGermanyto fishinareasbeyondthetwelve-milelimitestablishedin1961!2 TheCourtfurtherdeclaredthatmutuallylimitingrightsin anareaofthehighseasimpliesmutualobligations!SThe partieswerethereforeundermutualobligationstoundertake goodfaithbilateralnegotiationstoaidinsettlingthedispute. Thesenegotiationsmustbeexercisedwiththepreferential rightsofIcelandandtherightsoftheUnitedKingdomand Germanyconsideredandwithdueregardtotheconservation andexploitation of thefisheriesresourcesconcerned.Secondly, allpartieshadafurtherobligationtocontinuouslyreviewthe fisheriesresourcesandtoexamineconservationandutilization techniquesinthelightofavailablescientificandotherdata! Finally,theCourtfurtherdeclaredthatIcelandcouldnot unilaterallyexcludeorrestrictvesselsoftheUnitedKingdom orGermany fromfishinginareasbetweenthetwelve-mileand fifty-milelimits!5However,Germany'slastsubmissionthat sheshouldbecompensatedforIcelandicinterferencewithher trawlerswasnotacceptedbecausethesubmissionwastooab-stract;theCourtcouldnotmakeanall-embracingfindingof liabilityagainstIceland!e III.CONTRmuTIONsOFTHEFisheriesJu,risdictionCases TOINTERNATION ALLA. w The Court, in the Fisheri'esJurisdictionCases,did contribute tothedevelopmentof international lawbyitstreatmentofthe doctrinesofthechangeofcircumstancesandofpreferential rights,and by its concern with fisherieszonesandmanagement. 1[1974]I.C.J. S,27-28;[1974]I.C.J. 175,196. 2[1974] I.C.J. S,29;[1974] I.C.J. 175, 198. fa [1974]I.C.J. S,Sl;[1974]I.C.J.175, 200. "Id. "[1974]I.C.J. S,SO;[1974]I.C.J. 175. 200 . e [1974]I.C.J.175, 205. 1911]ICELANDICFISHERIESCONTROVERSY181 The doctrine of the fundamentalchangeof circumstanceswas expressed in Article 62of the ViennaConventionof theUnited NationsConferenceontheLawofTreaties(1969): 1.Afundamentalchangeofcircumstanceswhichhasoc-curredwithregardtothoseexistingatthetimeofthe conclusionofatreaty,andwhichwasnotforeseenby theparties,maynotbeinvokedasagroundfortermi-natingorwithdrawingfromthetreatyunless: (a)theexistenceofthosecircumstancesconstitutedan essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by thetreaty jand (b)theeffectofthechangeisradicallytotransformthe extentofobligationsstilltobeperformedunderthe treaty.'7 Thisdoctrineshouldbeinterpretedasanobjectiveruleof lawwithnoimpliedconditionthatthetreatyshouldbetermi-nated if certain events occur; the phrase, "rebussicstantibus", isnot employedin Article62asthisphrasehadcometomean thatthetreaty would containsuchanimpliedcondition!8Em-phasisismadeontherestrictivenatureofthedoctrine;it shouldbeappliedonlyinexceptionalcases.Thisstrictap-proachthusoperatestobuttressthetraditionalnotionthat treatiesmustbehonoredingoodfaith.'9 Article 62speaksof "a fundamentalchangeofcircumstances whichhasoccurredwithregard tothoseexistingatthetime." Earlier drafts ofthisArticlelimitedthechange tofactsalone; "circumstances"ismoreencompassingandwasintendedto includepolitical,economic,legal,moral,andsocialchangesas well. GOIn the caseof Iceland,the change wasallegedtobeboth political(the extension of fishing zones by many states totwelve miles)andeconomic(efficientfishingtechniquesofotherstates depletingIceland'sfoodsupply).TheInternationalCourtof Justicebaseditsjurisdictiononthesuppositionthatcircum-478.RoSENNE,LAWOJ'TREATIES,GUIDETOLEGISLATIVEHISTORYOJ'VIENNA CoNVENTION324(1910). 48Tiewul, supra note 21, at 462-463. 491d. at 463-464. 110ld. at 464. 188BOSTONCOLLEGEINTEBNATlONAL& COMPARATIVELAWJOURNAL[Vol.I,No.1 stanceshadnotchangedsufficientlytoterminatethe1961Ex-changeofNotesanditsarbitration clause.But theCourtalso statedthat"theallegedchangeofcircumstancescouldnot affectintheleasttheobligationtosubmittoits[theCourt's] jurisdiction."111Thustheargumentisself-serving andoblique; even if changesof circumstances had occurredthey wereappar-entlyunimportanttotheCourt'sreasoning. Thesecondprerequisite,thatthechangedcircumstanceshad notbeenforeseenbytheparties,doesnotseemtobeevident. Theinterpretationofthefishingzonewasinfluxin1961,but thetwelve-milezonecompromisehadnearlybeenadoptedat the1960LawoftheSeaConference.1I2 AlthoughIcelandhad bargained withtheapplicantstatesoveratwelve-milefisheries zone,she had indicated in the 1961Exchangeof Notesthat this zonemightbeevenfurtherincreasedin thefuture.1I8 The third requirement is that the changed circumstanceswere thoserelieduponasthebasisofconsenttothetreaty.The Courtheldthatthecircumstancesuponwhichconsentwas basedwasthatofprovidingameansforresolvingtheques-tionofthevalidityoffurtherclaims."Thisremedyforre-solvingthefisheriesjurisdictionquestion - bysubmittingit totheCourt - hadnotchanged. Lastly,thechangemustradicallytransformobligationsstill tobeperformedunderthetreatytocauseterminationofthe treaty.ThisstipulationtheCourtrejectedhandily: Thepresentdisputeisexactlyofthecharacteranticipated in thecompromissaryclauseoftheExchangeofNotes.Not only has the jurisdictional obligation not been radically trans-formedin itsextent;it hasremainedpreciselywhatit was in1961.1111 511d. at 465. 112Beediscussion,p.179,mira. 118Beediscussion,p.181,infra. " EzcZuaWe Economic Zone,supra note 6, at 457. M[1974]I.C.J. S, 21. 1977] ICELANDICFIBBEBIEBCoNTIlOVEBBY189 However, Iceland believed that thetreaty itself wasinvalid;Be thusobligations,such asjurisdiction bythe International Court ofJustice,wouldobviouslyhavebeenradicallytransformed. TheCourtdidnotdirectitsargumenttothisissue. Both Great Britain andGermanycontendedthat thedoctrine ofchangedcircumstancesdoesnotallowanunchallengeable unilateralrevocationofatreaty,ashadbeendonebyIceland. Underthisapproach,thedoctrineofchangedcircumstancesis not onewhich operates automatically;it merely permits aparty tocallforterminationandthentosubmitthequestiontoa judicial body:'7SuchaprocedureofrecoursetotheCourt was alreadyincludedwithinthe1961ExchangeofNotes. Article62couldbeinterpretedascallingforaunilateral terminationorascallingforajudicialdecision.Thestronger argument,however,isthattheCourtwilldecidewhetherthe treaty canbeterminated.1I8 TheCourtsecuresthisrightunder Article36,paragraph1ofitsstatute ;119itisthefinalarbiter ofthedispute.Also,unilateralstateactionhasneverbeena partofthedoctrine,eoandtheUnitedNationsConventionon theLawofTreatiesin1969hadsetdefiniteprocedures,not compatiblewithunilateralaction,forapplyingthedoctrineof thefundamentalchangeofcircumstances. Prior tothejudgmentit wassuggestedthattheCourtcould contribute to the development of international lawby clarifying thegrounds forinvalidating or terminating internationalagree-mentsbyattendingtoIceland'scontentionaboutthechange of circumstances.81 TheCourt didprecisely that whenitstated thatthecircumstanceshadnotchangedsufficientlytoinvali-datethe 1961ExchangeofNotes.ThisExchangeofNoteshad 118Tiewul, suprG note 21, at 469. liTIiI.at 470. 118Id. 119Article36,paragraph1oftheStatuteoftheCourtstates:Thejurisdiction oftheCourtcomprisesalleaseswhichthePartiesrefertoitandallmatters specificallyprovidedforintheCharteroftheUnitedNationsorintreatiesand conventions in force.(DOCUMENTS, suprG note 28, at 75). eoTiewul, suprG note 21, at 471. 81Katz,Issues~ r i i n g intheIl'eZandioFisheriesCGse,22INT'L.&;Con. L.Q.83, 108(1973). 190BoSTONCoLLEGEINTDNATIONAL" CoXPABATIVI:LAWJOUBN'AL[VoL1,No.1 the forceof atreaty, and its compromissary clause wasan inte-gral and still existent section oftheagreement.Thus the Inter-nationalCourtofJusticeretainedjurisdictionoverthedis-putes.. By employingthedoctrineofpreferentialrightsratherthan enteringthelegislativearena,theCourtwasabletoapproach adifficultquestioninaflexibleway.Thepreferentialrights concepthademergedatearlierLawoftheSeaConferences.a Essentially,threeconditionsareacceptedasestablishingpref-erential rights: a)Theclaimantofapreferentialrightmustbeacoastal state. b)Thecoastalstatemust bedependentuponfishingforits physicalsustenanceoreconomicwell-being,and c)Themarine resources must besodepletedasto beunable tosatisfythedemandsofthecoastalstateanddistant-waterfishingstates." In claiming preferentialrights,however,dueregardmustbe giventotheinterestsofotherstateswhosevesselsfishinthe samearea."Considerationssimilartothosewhichhave prompted the recognition of the preferential rights of the coastal Stateinaspecialsituationalsoapplywhencoastalpopula-tionsinotherfishingStatesaredependentoncertainfishing grounds.""GermanyandtheUnitedKingdomdohavetra-ditional economic interests in thesame fishing areasasIceland; anyresolutionofthisquestionrequiresanexaminationand balancing of the expressed interestsofthethree states. Theprobleminherentintheconceptofpreferentialrights isalso itsstrongestpoint - thatthesubstanceofpreferential rights must bedevelopedthrough negotiation by the disputants themselves.Thejudiciary couldnotbeexpectedtoapplythe lawrelyingonstablepreferentialrights.Sociological,eco-nomic, or political changes could occur within a matter of years, aBeediscussionontheLawoftheSeaConferences,pp.176-180,.'N. 88[1974]I.O.J. 3, 25;[1974]I.O.J. 175, 193-194. "[1974J I.O.J. 3, 29;[1974] I.O.J. 175, 197-198. [1974] I.O.J. 3,2G-28. 1977]ICELANDICFISHERIESCoNTBOVDSY191 thusnecessitatingacompleteredefinitionoftheserights.- But byemployingtheconceptof preferentialrightstheCourt could avoidprejudicingtheupcomingLawoftheSeaConference whilediscussingthemutualinterestsinvolvedinthedispute. Negotiation,especiallyinregardtoconservationofthefisher-iesuponwhicheachcountrydepends,wouldleadtonecessary compromisesinthiscomplexissueandnotjust imposealegal decisiononfisheriesjurisdictionlimits. Asforexclusivefisheryzones,theCourttreatedthisconcept asoneofrecentcustomarylawaswell.Thefisheryzoneisa concept accepting national economicspheresof marineexploita-tion.However,suchzonesdonotclearlydefinerelationships in the context ofanactive dispute,8Tand thereislittleevidence that the fisheryzonewas,at that time,customaryinternation.al law.tItI Thelimittothefisherieszonewasdiscussed,andallmem-bersof theCourtagreed toanexclusivetwelve-milezone.Dis-agreement arose, however,over theevolving notionof agreater limit,perhapsfiftymilesasinthiscaseorevenuptotwo hundredmiles.Severaljusticesnotedthatbetweenthirtyand thirty-fivestateshadalreadydelimitedeconomicfisheryzones of morethan twelvemiles.89 Mostof thejusticestherefore pre-. ferredthemiddlestance - concedingthat,whileatwelve-mile zonemightnotbean outerlimit,toapproveanygreaterzone wouldbeaninvalidexerciseinjudiciallegislation. TOThusthe resultingdecisiondiscussedthesespecificdisputesandnota generalfisherieszonelimitation.It waslefttotheupcoming ConventionontheLawoftheSeastodefineabroadergeneral limit. Inexaminingthefishingzoneproblem,theCourtchoseto refertotheGenevaConventionontheHighSeas(1958).By 88 EzcZ'U8i1leEconomicZone,BUpranote6,at483. 87 Begulatioflll, BUpranote 2,at 167. tItI. Onejustice,inhisdissent,arguesthatthefisheryzonehadnot;yetbeende-finedininternationallaw,thusIcelandcouldnotbecriticizedforextendingitl ([1974]I.C.J. 3, 151(Diss!!nting op.of Judge89 EzcZ'U8i1leEconomic Zone,BUpranote6, at 487. TO1d. at 488. 192BoSTONCOLLEGEINTERNATIONAL&CololPAlU.TIVBLAWJO'OBNAL[VoL1,No.1 thatConventionastateisforbiddenfromunilaterallyextend-ingitsexclusivefisheriesjurisdictionbeyonditsterritorial seasintothehighseas.71ButtheConventiondoesnotade-quatelydistinguishtheboundarylinebetweenhighseasand exclusiveeconomiczones;theconceptofexclusivefisheries zoneswas not negotiated.TheCourt wasrelyinguponadefini-tion whichwasprobablyinoperativeinthelightofthemodem trendofexclusivefisheryzones."2 Priortothejudgments,proposalsweremaderegardingthe establishmentoffisheryzonelimitsthroughthislitigation.A decisiononlimitsofthesezonesjust beforetheconveningof theConferenceontheLawoftheSeacouldlessenagreement amongparticipatingnations.Theabsenceofanyjudicialpro-nouncementonthesubjectwouldcontribntetotheuncertainty ofthelawinthisarea,andthismightinduceparticipationat theupcomingConference,sinceallinterestscouldyetbeex-plored."Although therewaslittlelikelihoodat thetimethata definitivetreaty onfisheriesjurisdiction wouldbeforthcoming attheConference,'"adecisiononwhetherIceland'sfifty-mile fisherieslimitwasvalidunderinternationallawergaomnes wastheCourt's primary functionin settlingthedispute."1By decidingthatIceland'sregulationswerenotopposabletoGer-manyortheUnitedKingdomanddecliningdiscussionofthe claimthatIceland'sactionwasinvalidagainsttheworld,the Colirtformulatedaconservativeopinion.Perhapsit wasbest for"the Courttoretreatfromthearena ratherthantoenter and loseby engagingin legislativebehaviorforwhichit isill-suited. "7. In summary,the long-term implicationsoftheFiNlheriesJur-isdictionCasesmaybelimited.TheCourtdidcontributeto developing lawby furtherclarifying thedoctrineofthefunda-71866diaeuaBion,p. 177, "'tf'tJ. 72 BlUiuWe BC01IOfIric ZOfl6, "'1'f'tJ Dote 6, at 484. ft Katz, "'I'f'tJ Dote 61, at 108. "B.6guJaffou, ISfWG Dote 2, at 169. 71 14. at170 .,. BlUiuWe~ ZOfl6, "'P"CI Dote6, at 487. 1977]ICELANDICFISHEBIESCoNTBOVDSY193 mentalchangeofcircumstances.However,thisdoctrinehas beencontinuallyrejectedin international forums,evenin cases suchasthesewhereit mightmeritsomeemphasis.T'1 Byprescribingnegotiationswhichwouldbalancethepref-erentialrightsofIcelandwiththehistoricalfishingrightsof Great Britain andGermany,theCourtinfluencesthecourseof suchnegotiations.Thesenegotiations,frequentlyweightedto-ward powerful nations, must bedirected according toprinciples ofequity.78AlthoughtheCourtdidelaborateonpreferential rights,thisconceptmaynotenduresincecoastalstatesare broadeningtheirexclusivefisherieszones. Thedevelopingconceptofthefisheryzonewasessentially lefttothediscretionoftheupcomingUnitedNationsLawof theSeaConferenceandotherfutureforums.Influx,forma-tion,andreformation,internationallawrequirestheexacting definitionandglobalapplicabilitywhichcanonlybesupplied byinternationallegislativeagencies.79 "Sinceanyextensionof coastal statejurisdiction deprivesotherstatesofthebenefitof certainrightswithinthehighseas,everysuchclaimneedsa basisininternationallaw."80Becauseitdidnotattemptto delineateafisheryzone,theCourtmay:finditsdecisionsin thesecaseswillserveasa moreenduring, albeit weak,contribu-. tiontoevolvinginternationallaw. IV.THEROLEOFTHEINTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE INSIMILARDISPUTES WhatisandwillbetheroleoftheInternationalCourtof Justiceinthepeacefulsettlementofdisputesofthisnature' It issuggestedthattheCourt'sfunctionisexpandingbeyond thestrictlyjudicialrealm - topromotingandguidingsettle-mentsinabroaderpoliticalcontext.Thisexpandedfunction ismanifestedby theCourt'sopinionintheFisheriesJurisdic-tionOases;here,itaddressedissuesofconservationandof 11 Tiewul, B'LIpranote 21,at 472. 18Eoonomic Zone, B'LIpranote 6,at 490. 'f9 Id.. 80 Martenl, supra note 5, at 552. 194:BoSTONCoLLEGlI:INTERNATIONAL'" CoXPABATIVKLAwJOUBNAL[VolI,No.1 preferentialrightsandaffirmedthedutytonegotiateunder formalguidelines.tIl Howevercloselyintertwined,preferential rightsandconservationoffishstocksmaynotbethesame issuesas fisheriesjurisdictions,82buttheyhadbeenconsidered adjuncts to the 1961 Exchange of Notes and the British-Icelandic interim agreement.TheCourt feltit hadto consider"all rele-vant clementsin administeringjustice betweentheParties."811 Thedangeris,ofcourse,thattheCourtwillentertoomuch uponthedutiesofinternationallegislativebodies,suchasthe GeneralAssembly,andnotbeabletorenderadepoliticized applicationof international law. Neitheristotalrestraintfromlegislativeconsiderationsa viable option for the Court.In theFisheriesJurisdictioft Oases, issueswhichrequiremultilateralsettlementamongallstates whofishoff Iceland's coast were limitedtoonlybilateral treat-ment."Ignoring theapplicantstates' firstclaimthat Iceland's fifty-mileextension wasillegal doesnot fosterthe world'strust in the Court for theresolution of futuredisputes.811 That theInternationalCourtofJustice maynot beadequate tosettlefisheriesjurisdictiondisputesisreflectedinseveral ways.The interim agreement between the United Kingdomand Iceland in 1973 indicates, to some degree, that the parties lacked faith in theCourt'sabilitytosettlethedispute.ss Perhapsthe disputants believed an answer wouldbeforthcoming at the Law of the Sea Conference.A working group at the Caracassession of theConference indicatedtheneedforthe establishmentofa LawoftheSeaTribunaltoentertainclaimsfromindividual persons and to havejurisdiction over contentiouscases between astateandaninternationalorganization;TheInternational. Court of Justice,under Article34,paragraph 1of its Statute," 81 Bflgu'lGtiou, "'".(1 Dote2, at 162163. 82 [1974:]I.Col. 3,14:4:(Dissenting op. of Judge Gr08). 88 [1974:]I.C.J.175,190. MBflgu'lGtiOftl,"'".(1Dote2,at164165;in fact,elevennatioDIappearto1lahoff the coaat of Iceland ([1974:1I.C.J. 3, 137(DiSBenting op. of Judge GroB)). 811 BconomiD ZOftfl,"'".(1 Dote 6, at 4:86. 88 Bflgu'lGtiOftl, "'".(1 Dote 2, at 170. "Article34:,paragraph1oftheStatuteoftheCourtItatel:Onlyltates maybe Parties in eaaea before the Court.(DOCUHENTS, ,uprG note 28, at 75). 1977]ICJ:LANDICFISBEIUBSCoNTBOVDST195 hasjurisdiction onlyoverdisputesbetweentwoor morestates. Inaddition,manyofthedevelopingnations - significantly thoselikelytobeinvolvedinafisheriesdispute - havebeen discontentedwithsomedecisionsrendered by theCourtaswell aswith itscompulsoryjurisdictionin disputes.Theymightbe morewilling toacceptthejurisdictionofanewtribunalestab-lishedtoprotecttherightsandinterestsofallstatesinmat-tersrelatingtothesea,especiallyiftheyweretoparticipate in its formation.88 V.CONCLUSION Thefisheriesissuesarecomplexandeverchanging.States increasinglybelievethattheymayextendtheirclaimsfurther seaward,possiblyincludingacontinentalshelfofuptosix hundredmiles,absentinternationallawdirectlyopposingsuch action.89 EvenafterthethirdUnitedNationsConferenceon the Lawof theSea manyissueswereleft unresolved,although there was broad agreementonthecreationof thetwohundred-mileeconomiczone.90 Essentially theworld islookingtowardreasonableandeffec-tiveutilizationoftheW oridOcean'sbiologicalresources.De-cisionsrelating tofisheriesshouldthusbebasedonsubstantial . scientificdata.Somedata,revealingtheinterdependenceof species,indicatethatperhapsthetwohundred-milefisheries zoneitselfwillweakenandnotprotectthelivingresourcesof the ocean.91 Many different theories have been and willcontinue tobeproposedbothtoconserveandtoapportionfairlythese vitalfoodresources. 88 Adede,Bettleme"tof Dispute,A.riIi"gUAdertheLawoftheBeaCO"lIe"tiotl, 69A:u:.J. INT'L.L. 798,817note29(October,1975). 89 Martens, npra note 5, at 551. 90TheUnitedStatesjustputits200-milefisherieszoneintoeifectonMarch1. 1977;Iceland's 1laheryzonewasextended to200milesonOctober15,1975(Martens, npranote5,at 552,note143).BeeTaft.TheThirdU.N.Lawofthe8eGCo,,-lereACe:MajorUnre,ollledFisherie,I'l'U.eB.14COLUll.J.TIlANBNAT'L.L.112-117 (1975). for adiscussion of issues unresolved at theConference. 91 Moiseev,80me BioZogicalBac'kgro'UfidlorIfiternatioAGILegaZAct,OflRatio"aZ UtiZi6ation01theLi1liAgBe,ource, of theWorldOceaA,6GA.J. INT'L.&COllP.L. 143,144(1976). 198BoSTONCoLLEGBINTDNATIONAL"CoXPA.UTIVBLAwJOllBNAL[Vol.I,No.1 Withsomuchdifferenceofopinionastohowinternational agreementsshouldapproachthefisheriesissueandastohow theInternationalCourtofJusticeshouldrespondtofisheries disputes,92theCourt'sactiondeservessomecreditalongwith criticism.Serious problemsariseforadjudication in suchsitu-ationsof rapidly changing valuesystems,sincejusticeisbased upon a fair interpretation of thelaw.98 TheCourt must depend upon voluntaryjurisdictionandvoluntarycompliancewiththe law; thus in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Oases theCourt retreated fromissueswhichit feltshoUldbedecidedwithinthepolitical contextofinternational legislativebodies,whilecoincidentally suggestingsolutions - adelicatebalanceindeed.Inorderto attaincompliancewithitspronouncementstheCourtempha-sized the necessity for fair negotiations to promote mutual bene-fits - perhapsseeingequitabledealingasthebasisforendur-ingcompromise. Theproblemofimpartialallocationoftheworld'sfisheries is acontinuing one.In theFisheriesJurisdictionOasesanar-gumentcanbemadethattheInternationalCourtofJustice may not haveshown fairnesstoIcelandregarding herjurisdic-tional dispute - that the circumstances indeed had changed fun-damentally.ButbydecidingtheinvalidityofIceland'suni-lateral claimwithregardtotheUnitedKingdomandtheFed-eral Republicof Germany,theCourtprovidesasufficientbasis forsubsequentpoliticalsettlementoftheparties'disagree-mentsH whileat thesametimeallowinglatitudeforupcoming internationallegislativeconferencestoestablishlimitstofish-erieszones.Cooperationanddecision-makingbyall-nation participationservesselfinterestsandthusworldorderbetter, perhaps, than wouldan arbitrary decisionof theCourt. DONALDA.YOUN'G t2 BeeKatz, I1lprClnote81,for an analysisof poaaibleapproachestheCourtmight have taken. 18 Falk,BealiBtioHorVOflIfor["tmsatiotud.ddJtuJlctJtlo",11VA.J.INT'L.L. 814, 319(1971). NBegulGtiou, "'fWCI note 2, at 171.