Contentious Politics in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, & the Former East Germany (PSGE 41 1997) Grzegorz Ekiert & Jan Kubik

8/4/2019 Contentious Politics in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, & the Former East Germany (PSGE 41 1997)

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Contentious Politics in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Former East Germany Since 1989 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan KubikHarvard University Rutgers UniversityCenter for European Studies Department of Political ScienceCambridge MA 02138 New Brunswick NJ 08903

Program. on Central and Eastern EuropeWorking Paper Series 141

AbstractThe paper reconstructs and explains the patterns of collective protest in four Central European countries,Hungary, former East Germany, Poland, and Slovakia, dUring the early phases of democratic consolidation(1989.1994). Analytical perspective is provided by protest event analysis. The empirical evidence comesfrom content analysis of several major papers in each country. The patterns found in the data are compared with the predictions derived from four theoretical traditions: (a) relative deprivation; (b) instrumental institutionalism; CC) historical-cultural institutionalism; and (d) resource mobilization theory. Two mainconclusions are reached. First, the levels of "objective" or "subjective" deprivation are unrelated to themagnitude and various feature of protest, which are best explained by a combination of institutional andresource mobilization theories. Second, democratic consolidation is not necessarily threatened by a highmagnitude of protest. If protest's demands are moderate and its methods routinized, it contributes to the political vitality of new democracies.


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I. The locat ion o f our projec t in th e l i terature on democraticconsol idat ions . 1

The research pro j e c t presen ted in th i s paper expands ourunders tanding of democrat ic consol ida t ion . The empi r i ca l evidencecomes pr imar i ly from th e systemat ic data co l l ec t ion on col lec t ivep ro t e s t dur ing the f i r s t years of democratic t r ans i t i on in fourcountr ies : Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the former Eas t Germany.Our ana lys i s focuses on the neg lec ted dimension of thepostcommunist t ransformat ions : con ten t ious act ion by non-el i teco l l ec t ive ac to r s in four Cent ra l European coun t r ies . Our aim i s tocounter th e exis t ing pro -e l i t e bias in th e l i t e r a t u r e , determinethe impact of pro t e s t ac t iv i t i e s on democra t i za t ion , and tor econs t ruc t th e emerging pa t te rns of the s ta te - soc ie tyre l a t ionsh ips in the newly democrat izing soc ie t ie s .

Conceptual izing and expla in ing the rapid , unexpected col lapseof s t a t e - s o c i a l i s t regimes in East Centra l Europe in 1989 and theensuing e f fo r t s a t democra t i za t ion and res t ruc tu r ing o f th e economyi s a cha l l enge fo r s tudents of comparat ive p o l i t i c s . Thes imul tanei ty of th e breakdown, desp i te var ied p o l i t i c a l andeconomic condi t ions in each country , re in fo rced a not ion t ha t theseregimes were bas ica l ly iden t i ca l one-par ty s t a t e s kept in power bythe Sovie t mil i t a ry presence . Addi t iona l ly , some ex p e r t s assumedt ha t in th e wake of communism's col lapse the new regimes developeds imi la r s t ruc tu res and faced s imi la r chal lenges and pres su res andthe re fo re should be t r ea ted as a s ingle p o l i t i c a l type .

1The pro jec t was funded by the Program fo r th e Study ofGermany and Europe administered by th e Center fo r EuropeanStud ies a t Harvard Univers i ty , the Nat iona l Council fo r Sovietand East European Research and the American Council o f LearnedSoc ie t i e s . I t was d i rec ted by Grzegorz Ekie r t and Jan Kubik. Wewould l i ke to thank Sidney Tarrow fo r h is generous he lp andencouragement. For t h e i r ind i spensab le as s i s tance and advice ourspec ia l gra t i tude goes to Martha Kubik, E la Ekier t , AnnaGrzymala-Busse, Jason Wittenberg, Mark Beiss inger , Nancy Bermeo,Valerie Bunce, El len Comisso, Bela Greskovi ts , Janos Kornai ,Michael D. Kennedy, Chris t iane Lemke, Darina Malova, AlexanderMotyl, Mary jane Osa, Die te r Rucht, Mate Szabo, Anna Seleny, andMayer N. Zald.1


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This view i s incorrec t both with respect to the communist pas tand the present developments. East Central European s t a t e soc i a l i s tregimes underwent complex processes of t ransformat ion during t h e i rfour decades in power. Domestic p o l i t i c a l developments d i f fe redfrom country to country. Spec i f i ca l ly , pa t t e rns o f po l i t i ca lc onf l i c t , i n s t i t u t i o n a l breakdowns and s t r a t eg i e s of regimereequi l ibra t ion l e f t l ong- l as t ing l egac ies . As a r e s u l t ofpo l i t i ca l c r i s e s , fundamental changes and adjustments wereint roduced in to th e p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t i t u t i ons andprac t i ces of these regimes, a l t e r ing r e l a t i ons betweeni n s t i t u t i ona l order s of the pa r ty - s t a t e , between th e s t a t e andsocie ty , and producing i n s t i t u t iona l and po l icy d i s s i mi l a r i t i e s . 2Thus each s t a t e soc ia l i s t regime l e f t behind d i s t inc t l egac ieswhich should be ca re fu l ly examined i f we are to expla in the presentrap id ly diverging t r a j ec t o r i e s of po l i t i ca l , soc ia l , and economicchanges tak ing p lace in the region. 3

Similar ly , despi te the c lus te r ing of regime breakdowns in1989, there were important d i f fe rences in the way par t i cu l a rcountr ies exi ted s t a t e socia l ism and ente red the t rans i t ionprocess . "Pacted" t r a ns i t i ons t ha t took place in Poland and Hungaryand displacement of the communist regime through "popular upsurge"t ha t occurred in Czechoslovakia and the GDR produced di f fe ren tt rans i t iona l i n s t i t u t ions and pa t t e rns of p o l i t i c a l conf l ic t s .These d i s t i nc t i ve modes of power t r ans fe r shaped subsequentpo l i t i ca l developments and the capaci ty of var ious p o l i t i c a l actorsin each country.4

2Por the de ta i led e labora t ion of th i s argument see GrzegorzEkier t , The St a t e Against Society: Pol i t i ca l Crises and TheirAftermath in Eas t Cent ra l Europe, Princeton Univers i ty Press1996.3Por an exemplary e f f o r t to cor re la te developments unders t a t e social ism and t h e i r cons t ra in ing impact on the currentt ransformat ion process see Janos Kornai, "Paying th e Bi l l fo rGoulash-Communism," Discussion Paper Ser ies No. 1749, HarvardIn s t i t u t e fo r Economic Research, Cambridge 1996.4See , fo r example, Grzegorz Ekier t , Trans i t ions from Sta te Social i sm in Eas t Cent ra l Europe, Sta tes and Socia l StructuresNewslet ter , (1990) 12, 1-7 ; Bar t lomie j Kaminski, Systemic

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Severa l yea rs a f t e r the col lapse of the communist ru le ,d i s t i nc t ive reg ions o r groups of count r ies with con t ras t ingp o l i c i e s and accomplishments have emerged within the former Sovie tbloc . The new, postcommunist regimes have been confronted withspec i f i c cha l l enges engendered by d i f f e re n t domest ic condi t ions andhave pursued d i f f e re n t s t r a t e g i e s of p o l i t i c a l and economicreforms. Stark i s cor rec t when he argues t ha t we should II regardEast Central Europe as undergoing a p lu ra l i t y of t r a ns i t i ons i n adual sense: ac ross the region, we are see ing a m u l t i p l i c i t y ofd i s t i nc t ive s t r a t e g i e s ; within any given country, we f ind no t onet r a ns i t i on but many occur r ing i n d i f f e r e n t domains - p o l i t i c a l ,economic, and so c i a l - and the t empora l i ty o f these processes a reof ten asynchronous and t h e i r a r t i c u l a t i on seldom harmonious. liS

Despi te i n i t i a l concerns expressed by many s tudents of EastEuropean p o l i t i c s and the t r ag i c exper iences o f the formerYugoslavia , a l l Eas t Cent ra l European s t a t e s have workingdemocracies and a so l id record o f po l i t i ca l l i b e r t i e s and humanr i g h t s p r o t ec t i o n . 6 These newly democrat ized regimes do not faceany immediate t h r e a t s of r ev e r s a l to au thor i t a r i an r u l e . Slovakiai s the only coun t ry which prompted se r ious concerns about p o l i t i c a lr i g h t s and l i b e r t i e s . At th e same t ime, the progress of p o l i t i c a land economic t ransfo rmat ions has been uneven and t h e i r chances of" fu l l " democrat ic consol ida t ion a re still unclear . Consequently,the study of va r ious aspec t s and l imi t s of democrat ic consol ida t ionin postcommunist s t a t e s has emerged as one o f the most i n t r igu ingand cha l l eng ing a reas o f comparative po l i t i c s .

Underpinnings of the T rans i t ion in Poland: The Shadow of th eRoundtable Agreement, Stud ies in Comparative communism (1991) 24,2, 173-90; David Sta rk and Laszlo Bruszt , P o s t so c i a l i s t Pathways:Transforming Pol i t i c s and Proper ty in East Cent ra l Europe,forthcoming in Cambridge Unive rs i ty Press, espec ia l ly chap ter 1.SDavid Sta rk , "Path Dependence and Pr iva t i za t ion S t r a t eg i e sin Eas t Cent ra l Europe,lI East European Pol i t i c s and Socie t i es 6,

1 (1992) ,18 .6In the recen t ed i t ion of the Freedom House survey "Freedom in the World 1994-1995" a l l Cent ra l European coun t r i e s were dec lared to be f r ee and scored high both on p o l i t i c a l r igh t s and c i v i l l i b e r t i e s measures.

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This paper seeks to explore the quest ion of democraticconsol idat ion from a spec i f ic ana ly t ica l and empirica l angle . Wewil l present se lec ted r e su l t s of our research pro jec t on col lec t ivepro tes t in post-1989 East Centra l Europe. Systemat ic datacol l ec t ion from Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the former EastGermany reveals s t r ik ing cont ras ts in the magnitude and forms ofpro t es t s . Different groups and d i f fe ren t organizat ions werechal lenging the pol ic ies of the new democratic regimes andd i f fe ren t forms of contentious act ion became prominent in therepe r to i re s of conten t ion emerging in these count r ies . Thesed i f fe rences in popula r responses to po l i t i c a l and economict ransformations chal lenge many i n i t i a l expectat ions concerning thenature of postcommunist po l i t i c s and generate new ques t ions .

F i r s t a l l count r ies have been undergoing a d i f f i c u l t economicadjustment and s t ruc t u ra l changes tha t engendered majordis loca t ions and exacted considerable socia l cos t s . Therefore weneed to ask whether and how the economic pol ic ie s of the newregimes were act ive ly contested. Did some count r ies experience morepro tes t s than others? Does such var ia t ion in pro t e s t magnitudedepend on the adopted type of t ransformation s t ra t egy , po l i t i ca land soc i a l legacies of the communist ru le , the l evel of soc ia l costand hardship produced by the reforms, new i n s t i t u t iona la rchi tec ture of the post-1989 po l i t y , or the organizat ionalresources and capab i l i t i e s of various col lec t ive actors?

Second, a regime t rans i t ion i s a highly vola t i l e po l i t i ca l.process which leaves wide open opportuni t ies fo r po l i t i ca lpar t i c ipa t ion and conten t ious col l ec t ive act ion, espec ia l ly incount r ies where s ta te i n s t i t u t i ons undergo a s igni f icantt ransformation and repress ive po l i t i c a l prac t ices are abandoned.Thus one would expect a high l evel of p o l i t i c a l mobil izat ion andprotes t ac t iv i t i e s in such t rans i tory po l i t i e s . A prel iminaryoverview of protes t p o l i t i c s ind ica tes tha t the number of protes tevents in the four count r ies under study i s not higher and in twocases i s d i s t i nc t i ve l y lower than in consolidated West European

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democracies. 7 We want to know why.Third, modes o f breakdown of communist regimes had no

no t iceab le impact on the magnitude of protes t : coun t r ies whichexperienced "pacted t rans i t ions" (Poland and Hungary) vary betweenthemselves as much as count r ies where "popular upsurge" forced theremoval of the communist e l i t e s from power (Slovakia and the formerGDR). We would l ike to know which fac tors account fo r di f fe ren tmagnitudes and spec i f ic reper to i res o f protes t .

Fourth, while a high level o f protes t could have been expectedin Poland, i t s magnitude in the former GDR i s su rp r i s ing . Poland i sth e only country in our sample which had a s t rong and recentt r ad i t i on of po l i t i c a l conf l ic t s and protes t s . s Since 1989,however, the former East Germany has been s imi la r ly content ious ,despi te the absence of any considerable pre-1989 pro tes tt r ad i t i ons . What can explain high l evels of pro t e s t in EastGermany?

Comparative s tud ies of col lec t ive pro tes t of fe r four theor iesfo r understanding and explaining the inc idence o f content iousco l l e c t i ve ac t ion , i t s forms, and magnitude. Var ia t ion in protes tcha rac t e r i s t i c s can be expla ined by emphasizing: (1 ) discontentsand grievances t ha t can be t r ans la ted in to pro t e s t throughpsycholog ica l mechanisms of r e l a t i ve depr iva t ion; (2) changes inth e s t ruc ture of po l i t i c a l oppor tun i t i e s and ac to r s ' calcula tedresponses to them; (3) the p r i o r existence of t r ad i t i ons ,repe r to i re s of col lec t ive act ion , and mobil iz ing col lec t ive act ionframes; and (4 ) the ava i l ab i l i t y of resources (mater ial ,organ iza t iona l , and cu l tu ra l ) as main determinants of protes tac t i v i t i e s . We wi l l consider a l l these fac tors in analyzingcontent ious po l i t i c s in post-1989 East Centra l Europe. I t should benoted, however, t ha t these ana ly t ica l perspec t ives are not mutuallyexc lus ive s ince each of them emphasizes a dimension o f co l l ec t ive

7See Hanspeter Kries i a t a I , New Social Movements in WesternEurope, Minneapolis: Universi ty of Minnesota Press 1995.8See Grzegorz Ekier t , Rebel l ious Poles: Pol i t i ca l Crises andPopular Pro tes t under Sta te Social ism, 1945-1989," Eas t EuropeanPol i t i c s and Soc ie t i e s (1997), 11, 2, pp. 1-42.

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p r o t e s t which may be dominant in one se t o f cases but n ot ano ther . 9In add i t ion , it should be noted t h a t many concepts appl ied herewere developed in th e s tudy o f s t ab le democrat ic po l i t i e s and t he i rapp l ica t ion to coun t r i e s undergoing rap id p o l i t i c a l and economict ransformat ions may lead to an a ly t i c a l d i s to r t i ons .Our ana lys i s i s founded on an assumpt ion t h a t democrat icconso l ida t ion i s a highly cont ingent and complex process t ak ingplace in s evera l spheres of th e s oc io -po l i t i c a l organiza t ion ofsoc ie ty . 10 Developments wi th in each sphere and th e r e la t ionsh ipbetween them produce o f t en confusing outcomes and inc reaseuncer ta in ty . Moreover, as democra t ic regimes t ake d i f f e re n t pathstowards conso l ida t ion , so too do the degrees of content iousp o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s t a b i l i t y of t he i r i n s t i t u t i ona larrangements vary .

The preva i l ing modes of studying democrat ic consol ida t ion tendto emphasize s t ruc tu r a l precondi t ions of consol ida t ion o r e l i t e l eve l p o l i t i c s . Recent ly , th e major i ty o f researchers abandoneds t ruc tu r a l approaches and adopted th e e l i t e cen tered pe rspec t ive .0 ' Donnel l , Schmit ter and t h e i r co l labora to r s argued t h a t "e l i t epacts" a re a c r u c i a l element in the success fu l t r a ns i t i on froma u t h o r i t a r ia n ru l e . 11 Simi la r ly , Diamond and Linz c la imed t h a t lithes k i l l s , va lues , s t r a t e g i e s , and choices o f p o l i t i c a l l e ade rs f igureprominent ly in our exp lana t ion o f the enormously var ied experiences

9For recen t overviews of l i t e ra t u re on so c i a l movements andc o l l e c t i v e p ro t e s t see Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald,Comparative Perspec t ives on Socia l Movements, CambridgeUnivers i ty Press 1996; Anthony Oberschal l , Socia l Movements, NewBrunswick: Transact ion Books 1993; Sidney Tarrow, Power inMovement, Cambridge Univers i ty Press 1994.10For th e e labora t ion o f t h i s poin t see our "Col lec t ive

Pro te s t and Democratic Consol idat ion in Poland, 1989-1993," PewPapers on Cent ra l Eas te rn European Reform and Regional ism, N o . 3 ,Center o f In te rna t iona l Stud ie s , Pr ince ton Univers i ty , 1997.l lGuillermo O'Donnell and Phi l ippe Schmi t t e r , Trans i t ions from Author i t a r ian Rule. Tenta t ive Conclusions about Uncer ta in Democracies. Balt imore: Johns Hopkins Unive rs i ty Press 1986, pp. 37-9 .

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wi th democracy in Lat in America. n12 Higley and Gunther contendedt h a t " in independent s t a t e s with long records of p o l i t i c a li n s t a b i l i t y and au thor i t a r i an ru le , d i s t i n c t i v e e l i t et ransformat ions , c a r r i e d out by th e e l i t e s themselves, cons t i tu t eth e main and poss ib ly the only rou te to democrat ic consol ida t ion . ,,13This almost exc lus ive focus on e l i t e s crea tes a t heore t i ca lweakness in th e ex i s t ing s tu d i e s of regime change andconso l ida t ion . Moreover, a methodological emphasis on ra t iona lchoice explanat ions and on modeling po l i t i ca l processes as gamesfu r t h e r re in fo rced the a l ready dominant e l i t e - c e n t e re d focus ofresearch on democrat ic t r a ns i t i on . Addi t iona l ly , the grea te rava i l ab i l i t y of ne l i t e" data favors th e e l i t e - c e n t e re d perspec t ive .Pa r ty programs, publ i c speeches and in terviews o f l eader s , r epor t son e l e c to r a l campaigns, e lec t ion r e s u l t s , j ou rna l i s t i c commentariese t c . , are a l l eas i ly access ib le in th e publ ic domain. Such sourcesof da ta enable one to recons t ruc t t he po l i t i ca l pos i t ions of e l i t ea c t o r s , the barga in ing processes t ak ing place among them, and tot r a c e t h e i r compromises, c o a l i t i o n s , and po l icy choices. Bycon t ras t , data on th e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of n o n -e l i t e ac to rs a ren o t r ead i ly ava i lab le ; publ ic opinion po l l s have been rou t ine lyused as th e sole source of empi r i ca l knowledge on th e po l i t i c s ofth e populace a t l a r g e .

We also f ind t ha t the ex i s t ing l i t e ra t u re has accorded moreprominence to ce r ta in dimensions of consol ida t ion and neglectedo th e r s : th e format ion of pa r ty systems i s usua l ly viewed as th emost important element in the s t a b i l i z a t i on and consol ida t ion of

12Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, In t roduct ion : P o l i t i c sSocie ty and Democracy in Lat in America, in : Democracy inDeveloping Count r ies : Lat in America, edi ted by Larry Diamond,Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipse t , Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1989,p . 14.13John Higley and Richard Gunther , El i t e s and DemocraticConsol idat ion in Lat in America and Southern Europe, Cambridge:Cambridge Univers i ty Press , 1992, p. x i .14See Herber t Kitsche l t , "Comparative His to r i ca l Researchand Rat ional Choice Theory: th e Case of Trans i t ion to Democracy,"Theory and Society (1993) , 22, pp. 413-427.

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democracy. such view i s wel l expressed by Haggard and Kaufman whoemphasize t h a t l i the capaci ty to organize s t ab l e p o l i t i c a l ru l e whether au tho r i t a r i an o r democra t ic - in th e modern con tex t o fbroad s oc i a l mobi l iza t ion and complex economic system u l t i m a t e l yr e s t s on organized systems o f accoun tab i l i ty , and these in tu rnr e s t on p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s . , ,15 In add i t i on to t h i s emphasis on th ecapac i ty and a c t i v i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s - - qu i te prominent inthe s t u d i e s o f South European democra t iza t ions - - the works onEastern Europe tend to focus on the complex i n t e rac t ions betweeneconomic and p o l i t i c a l re forms .1 6 This problem has come to be knownas the "dilemma o f s im ul tane i ty" o r " t r ans i t i ona l incompat ib i l i tyt he s i s . , ,17

Th e preoccupa t ion wi th (a) e l i t e s , (b ) par ty systems, (c) th ere l a t ionsh ip between p o l i t i c a l and economic changes i s respons ib lefo r a cons ide rab le gap in democra t iza t ion l i t e r a t u r e . We know verylittle abou t the a c t i v i t i e s o f non-e l i t e ac to r s and how these

lSStephan Haggard and Rober t R. Kaufman, The P o l i t i c a lEconomy of Democrat ic Trans i t ions , Pr ince ton: Pr ince tonUnivers i ty Pres s 1995, p . 370; Geoffrey Pridham, ed. SecuringDemocracy: P o l i t i c a l Par t i e s and Democratic Consolidat ion inSouthern Europe, London: Routledge 1990; Juan J . Linz, IIChangeand Cont inui ty in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies, II in :Reexamining Democracy, pp. 182-207; Herber t Kitsche l t , "TheFormation o f Par ty Systems in Eas t Centra l Europe, II Po l i t i c s andSocie ty (1992), 20, I , pp . 7-50.

16See, fo r example, Adam Przeworski , Democracy and th eMarket , Cambridge: Cambridge Unive r s i ty Pres s , 1991; GrzegorzEkie r t , "P rospec t s and Dilemmas o f th e Trans i t ion to a MarketEconomy in Eas t Cen t r a l Europe, II in : Research on Democracy andSocie ty (1993), I , pp . 51-82; Luiz Carlos Bresse r Pere i r a , JoseMaria Marava l l and Adam Przeworski , Economic Reforms in NewDemocracies , Cambridge: Cambridge Univers i ty Press 1993.17See Claus Offe , I ICapital ism by Democrat ic Design?

Democrat ic Theory Facing the Tr ip le Trans i t ion in East Centra lEurope," Soc ia l Research (1991) , 58, 4, pp . 865-92; Pi o t rSztompka, IIDilemmas of th e Grea t Trans i t ion : A Tenta t iveCatalogue," Program on Centra l and Easte rn Europe Working PaperSer i es , No. 19, Center fo r European Stud ies , Harvard Univers i ty ,1992; L e s l i e Armijo , Thomas Bier s teke r and Abraham Lowenthal ,liThe Problems of Simultaneous Trans i t ions , " Journa l of Democracy(1994), 5, 4, pp. 161-75.

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a c t i v i t i e s shape th e p ro cesses o f democra t iza t ion . Some s tuden t s o fdemocrat ic t r a n s i t i o n s have begun, however, s tudying th e importanceof t he " re sur rec t ion o f c i v i l soc ie ty" and i t s p o l i t i c a l ro le bothdur ing th e decomposi t ion o f au thor i t a r i an ru le and in i t sa f t e rma t h . 18 I t i s o f t en noted, fo r example, t h a t th e g r ea t e s tcha l l enge to the p o l i c i e s of the newly democrat ized s t a t e s may comefrom va r ious o rgan iza tions of c i v i l s o c i e ty ( labor unions , i n t e r e s tgroups , e t c ) . 19 Yet th e development o f such organ iza t ions and t h e i rp o l i t i c a l ro le i s n ot sys t ema t i ca l ly documented and analyzed . Wealso agree with Neidhardt and Rucht, who conclude " th a t soc ia lmovement research should concen t ra te more on the i n t e r ac t i o n s ofmovements with othe r agents . "20

18For th e most recen t examples o f t h i s growing i n t e r e s t inth e ro l e of c i v i l s o c i e ty in democra t iza t ion see Sidney Tarrow,"Mass Mobi l iza t ion and Regime Change: Pacts , Reform, and PopularPower in I t a ly (1918-1922) and Spain (1975-1978) , in RichardGunter , Niki fo ros Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle , eds . ,Pol i t i c s of Democrat ic Conso l ida t ion , Bal t imore : Johns HopkinsUnive rs i ty Press 1995, pp. 204-230; Vic to r Perez-Diaz, Th e Returnof C i v i l Socie ty , Harvard Univers i ty Press 1993; Nancy Bermeo,"Myths o f Moderation: The Parameters o f Civ i l i ty DuringDemocra t iza t ion ," unpubl ished manuscrip t , Prince ton Univers i ty ;Phi l ippe Schmi t te r , "Some Proposi t ions about Civ i l Socie ty andth e Conso l ida t ion o f Democracy," unpubl ished manusc rip t , StanfordUnivers i ty ; Stephen Fish , Democracy form Scra tch . Opposi t ion andRegime in th e New Russian Revolut ion , Princeton: Pr ince tonUnive rs i ty Press , 1995; Phi l ip D. Oxhorn, Organizing C i v i lSoc ie ty . The Popular Sec t o r s and th e Struggle fo r Democracy in. Chi le , Univers i ty Park: The pennsylvania Sta te U nive rs i ty Press ,1995.

19Charles Ti l l y in h is s tud ie s o f co l l e c t iv e ac t i o n inFrance and Br i ta in convinc ing ly demonstra tes t ha t over the l a s ttwo cen tu r ies , organiza t ions of c i v i l soc ie ty were th e typ ica lveh ic les of p ro t e s t . See Charles T i l l y , Louise Ti l l y and RichardTi l l y , The Rebel l ious Century, 1830-1930, Cambridge: HarvardUnive rs i ty Press 1975; Charles Ti l ly , The Content ious French,Cambridge: Harvard Unive rs i ty Press 1986; Char les T i l l y ,Reper to i res of Content ion in America and Br i ta in 1750-1830, in :The Dynamic of Socia l Movements, ed i t ed by M. Zald and J .D.McCarthy, Cambridge: Winthrop 1979. This regu la r i ty i s confirmedby a l l systemat ic s tu d i e s of p ro t e s t in contemporary so c i e t i e s .

20See FriedheIm Neidhardt and D ie t e r Rucht, "The Analys is ofSo c i a l Movements: The S ta t e of the Ar t and Some Per sp ec t i v es fo r9


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The s tudy of c i t i z e ns ' pa r t i c ipa t ion in democrat icconso l ida t ions has of t en been reduced to an examinat ion o fp o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s , conducted on r ep resen ta t ive samples o f thepopula t ion . "The t h i rd wave l of democrat izat ions al lows, of ten fo rth e f i r s t t ime in the h is to ry of a given soc ie ty , fo r theadmin i s t ra t ion of unconst rained publ ic opinion po l l s .Unders tandably , many schola rs cap i t a l i zed on t h i s opportuni ty ands tud ied pub l ic a t t i t ude s and t h e i r changes dur ing the t r a ns i t i on

21process . Such s tud ies con t r ibu te to our knowledge of publ i cr eac t ions to regime change and a re very usefu l as long as th er e s u l t s o f pub l ic opinion p o l l s a re not accep ted as a su b s t i t u t efo r data on ac tu a l p o l i t i c a l behavior . As Tarrow emphasizes,"unless we t r a c e th e forms of a c t iv i t y people use, how theser e f l e c t t h e i r demands, and t h e i r i n t e rac t ion with opponents ande l i t e s , we cannot unders tand e i t he r the magni tude or th e dynamicso f change in p o l i t i c s and soc ie ty . 1122

Our r esearch p ro jec t was based on th e assumption t h a t eventana lys i s and, in p a r t i c u l a r , the systemat ic co l l ec t ion of da ta onco l l ec t ive ac t ion from newspapers , can shed new l i g h t on thep o l i t i c a l behav ior o f non-e l i t e ac to r s during democrat izat ion .Following th e pioneer ing work o f Charles Ti l l y and h is as soc ia tes ,event ana lys i s has become an accepted and of ten an ind i spensab le

Further Research," in Research on Socia l Movements. The Sta te o fth e Art in Western Europe and th e USA, Die te r Rucht, ed . ,Frankfur t am Main and Boulder: Campus Verlag and Westview Press ,1991, p . 459.21See, fo r example, impress ive se r i e s of Studies in Publ icPol icy , produced by th e Center fo r the Study o f Public Pol icy ,Univers i ty of S t ra thc lyde and coordinated by Richard Rose; Pete rMcDonough, Samuel H. Barnes and A. Lopez Pina , "The Growth o fDemocratic Legi t imacy in Spain ," American P o l i t i c a l ScienceReview (1986) , 80, 3, pp. 735-60; Krzysztof Zagorski ," Hope

Facto r , Inequa l i ty , and Legit imacy of Systemic Transformat ions :The Case o f Poland, II Communist and Post-Communist Stud ies (1994),27, 4, pp. 357-376.22Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder . P r o t e s t and Pol i t i c s i n I t a l y 1965-1975. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989, pp. 7- 8 . See a l so h is "Mass Mobil izat ion and Regime Change, II in The Pol i t i c s of Democrat ic Consolidat ion, pp. 204-230 .

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research method in th e s tudy of co l lec t ive ac t ion , p r o t e s t andsoc ia l movements. Despi te its imperfect ions and l imi t a t ions ,acknowledged by those who use it, th e event ana lys i s i s uniquelycapable of prov id ing researchers with the most extensive andsystemat ic s e t s of data on pro t e s t ac t i v i t i e s and t h e i r d i f f e re n tcomponents and dimensions. I t a l lows to s tudy both the qua l i t a t iveand quan t i t a t ive aspec t s of pro t e s t ac t ions over t ime and in l a rgegeographical areas . I t may be used in various pro jec t s , rangingfrom a s ing le case study to m u l t i - s t a t e comparat ive works. I t canbe app l ied to answer a v a r i e ty o f quest ions concerning co l l ec t iveac t ion , i t s forms and outcomes, i t s organ izers and p a r t i c i p a n t s ,responses of th e s t a t e and broader po l i t i ca l i s sues . Data s e t sconst ruc ted on th e bas i s of s pe c i f i c a l l y se lec ted press sourcesprovide informat ion on pro tes t even t s fo r extended periods oft ime. 23

I I . Incidence and Magnitude o f Col lect ive Pro t es t in Post-1989 EastCentral Europe.

In our r esearch pro jec t we sought to cons t ruc t a de ta i l ed da tabase of a l l forms and i nc iden t s o f co l lec t ive p ro t e s t i n Hungary,Poland, Slovakia , and th e former East Germany. We adopted a broaddef in i t ion of p ro t e s t event to cover a l l types o f non- ins t i tu t iona land unconvent ional p o l i t i c a l ac t ions and used i den t i ca l coding

23For the review of methodological i s sues and variousapp l i ca t ions o f th e p r o t e s t event ana lys is see Roberto Franzosi ,"The Press as a Source of Socio -h i s to r ica l Data: I ssues in theMethodology o f Data Col lec t ion from Newspapers," in : His to r ica lMethods, 1987, 20, pp.5-16; Char les Ti l l y , Popular Content ion inGreat Bri t a in 1758-1834. Cambridge: Harvard Univers i ty Press ,1995, pp. 55-105; Diete r Rucht and Thomas Ohlemacher, "Protes tEvent Data: Col lec t ion , Uses and Perspec t ives ," in : StudyingCol lec t ive Act ion , edi ted by Mario Diani and Ron Eyerman, London:SAGE, 1992, pp. 76-106; Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in theStudy of Col lec t ive Action ," Annual Review of Sociology, 1989,15, pp.119-41; Die te r Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and FriedheImNeidhardt , e d s . , Pro te s t Event Analysis: MethodologicalPerspec t ives and Empirical Resul t s , forthcoming.

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protocols in th e four count r ies we s tudy . 24 Our r esearch teamsco l lec ted in fo rmat ion on ly on IIpublic l p r o t e s t even t s , t h a t i sac t ions which were repor t ed in a t l e a s t one newspaper included inour sample . They sys temat ica l ly scanned two d a i ly newspapers andfour weekl ies in each country fo r th e e n t i r e per iod under s tudy andrecorded a l l ava i lab le information concerning repor t ed pro tes tac t ions . The number of p r o t e s t events recorded in each count ry i spresen ted in the fo l lowing t ab le :

Table 1: Pro tes t even ts in. Hungary, Poland, Slovak iaand th e former East Germany 1989-1993.

The t a b l e revea ls s t r i k i n g di f fe rences in th e number o f pro te s teven ts which occurred in these coun t r i e s . Poland and th e former GDRhad a high number of p r o t e s t events dur ing th e analyzed per iod withr e l a t i ve ly smal l d i f f e r en ces between yea rs . Hungary and Slovakiahad much lower inc idence o f pro tes t s . This s i t u a t i o n c a l l s fo r ac lose examinat ion, given th e fac t t h a t a l l coun t r i e s have beenundergoing a tu rbu len t p o l i t i c a l t ransfo rmat ion and implementedcomprehensive economic adjustment programs invo lv ing a s u b s t an t i a ll eve l o f d i s rup t ion and s o c i a l cos t . In Slovak ia , th e low number ofp r o t e s t a c t i v i t i e s and th e predominance of non-dis rupt ive methods ,such as p r o t e s t l e t t e r s , i s espec ia l ly su rp r i s ing . One may expectt h a t a coun t ry b reak ing from a long l a s t i ng fede ra t ion and bui ld ingan independent s ta tehood would experience a high l e v e l of popularmobi l i za t ion .

The numbers presented in the Table 1 a re not weighted by thes ize of the popula t ion . I t might be assumed t h a t th e l a rger a

24We def ine the p r o t e s t event as c o l l e c t i v e ac t ion o f a tl e a s t t h r ee people, who s e t ou t to a r t i c u l a t e spec i f i c demands.Our database inc ludes a l so extreme I p o l i t i c a l l y motivated ac t ssuch as se l f - immola t ion , hunger s t r i ke s I o r ac t s o f t e r r o rcar r ied o ut by ind iv idua l s . In o rder to qua l i fy as a p ro t e s tevent such ac t ion can not be the rou t ine o r l e g a l l y presc r ibedbehavior o f a s o c i a l o r p o l i t i c a l organ iza t ion . S t r i k e s , r a l l i e sor demonstrat ions a re cons idered to be p r o t e s t even t s fo r thepurpose of our ana lys i s because o f t h e i r r a d i c a l and d is rup t ivenatu re . For var ious d e f i n i t i o n s of even t s used in even t ana lys i ssee Susan Olzak, IIAnalysis o f Events , II pp. 124- 27 .

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coun t ry ' s popula t ion , the more p r o t e s t events it wi l l exper ience .This , of course , may not always be th e case bu t one w i l l never knowun les s some measure of pro t e s t magnitude i s cons t ructed and"weighted" by th e s ize of th e coun t ry ' s popula t ion . Given ourde f in i t i on of p r o t e s t even t , the s e t of pro t e s t events our codersrecorded included both smal l , b r i e f s t r e e t ga ther ings and severa l month- long s t r ike campaigns. Hence, in order to grasp the magnitudeo f p r o t e s t in a given u n i t of t ime we had to cons t ruc t a syn the t i cindex of magnitude. Insp i red by Ti l ly ' s idea to gauges imul taneous ly severa l dimensions of pro t e s t , we a t tempted tocons t ruc t such an index, by mul t ip ly ing three var i ab le s o f our data

25pro toco l : (a ) dura t ion , (b) number of pa r t i c i pa n t s , and (c) scope.Unfor tuna te ly "number of par t i c ipan t s" proved to be the var iab lewi th the h ighes t frequency of miss ing va lues . 26 Two a t tempts toes t imate missing va lues , re ly ing on d i f f e r e n t assumptions , producedvery d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s , thus the v a l i d i t y of our composi te index ofmagnitude proved to be dubious . We se t t l ed fo r a s imple r index,based on the "dura t ion" var i ab l e a lone fo r which we have an almostpe r f e c t record . 27 This index was composed in th e fol lowing way: Thedura t ion of each pro t e s t event was expressed as the number of 24hour per iods it was composed of . For example, a seven day s t r i kewas ascr ibed a va lue of 7 pro tes t -days . Next we summarized theva lues of t h i s new var iab le fo r a l l pro t e s t even t s in a given

25Charles T i l l y , From Mobi l iza t ion to Revolut ion , New York:McGraw-Hill 1978, pp. 162-4 .26There a re more than f i f t y percen t of miss ing va lues in o urPol i sh , Slovak, and Hungarian da tabases fo r severa l ca lendaryear s .27Validity r e f e r s to IImeasuring what we th ink we aremeasur ing." (Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba,Designing Socia l Inqui ry , P r ince ton: Pr ince ton Univers i t y Press1994, p. 25) . The va l id i t y of a syn the t i c cons t ruc t o r categorycan be improved by (a ) increas ing th e number o f independentmeasures it i s based on and (b) f i nd ing such measures whichs t rong ly co r r e l a t e with each o the r (see Robert Phi l ip Weber,Bas ic Content Ana lys i s , Newbury Park : Sage 1990, pp. 18-21) .Since our index o f magnitude i s based on only one measure(durat ion) i t s v a l i d i t y i s weak. But we t r aded v a l i d i t y fo r highr e l i ab i l i t y_

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calendar y ea r . That gave us an approximation of th e p ro t e s tmagnitude fo r each year in a l l four coun t r ies . Addi t iona l ly , weca lcu la ted means o f p r o t e s t magnitude fo r each country fo r theen t i re per iod under s tudy . This number was then divided by thenumber o f adu l t s (15-64) in order to a r r i v e a t th e weighted indexo f maqnitude fo r each coun t ry . The r e s u l t s of these ca lcu la t ionsare repor t ed in Table 2 and i l l u s t r a t ed in Graphs 1 through 4.

Table 2: General measures of pro tes t ac t iv i t i e s in th efour count r ies .

Graphs 1-4: Magnitudes o f Pro tes t

As Graphs 1 through 4 c l ea r l y demonstrate each country had i t s ownspeci f ic dynamic of p r o t e s t dur ing the per iod s tudied . 28 In Poland,the magnitude o f pro t e s t decreased in 1990, but then increasedevery year a f t e r . This increas ing magnitude of p ro t e s t in Poland i sthe most unexpected f ind ing of our s tudy . 29 We assumed t ha t th eregime t r ans i t i on , t r ans fe r o f p o l i t i c a l power, and thein t roduct ion o f dramatic economic reforms would produce a higherl eve l o f popular mobi l iza t ion and con ten t ious p o l i t i c s a t thebeginning of the analyzed per iod . In Hungary, the magnitude ofpro tes t was highes t in 1989, dec l ined in the fol lowing two yearsand inc reased again in th e end of the analyzed per iod . In Slovakiapro tes t was i n t ens i fy ing u n t i l 1992 and dec l ined a f te rwards . In th eformer E as t Germany the magnitude of pro t e s t peaked in 1992 anddecl ined in 1993.

The o r d e r o f weighted indexes of magnitude produces a somewhatsu rp r i s ing ranking o f th e four countr ies . Poland t u rns out to be

280ne index of magnitude based p a r t i a l l y on the "numbers ofpar t i c ipan t s" var iab le (whose missing values were es t imated)produced almost i de n t i c a l approximations o f p ro t e s t dynamicsbetween 1989 and 1993.

29This phenomenon i s analyzed in Grzegorz Ekie r t and Jan Kubik The Rebel l ious C i v i l Society : Popular Pro tes t and Democratic Consol idat ion in Poland, unpubl ished manuscrip t under review. 14


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most content ious s t a t e during the ear ly phase of democraticconsol idat ion , which - - given Poland 's t r a d i t i ons of content iousp o l i t i c s - - i s not a su rp r i se . But Slovakia ' s second place rankingi s . This country d id not have as much protes t as i t s o ther s ta te s ,bu t on the "per cap i t a" bas is i t s populat ion proved to be qui tecontent ious . The biggest surpr ise i s Hungary coming in l a s t . Weexpected t ha t Hungarians, who by a l l accounts are more dissa t i s f i edwith the post-1989 changes than are Poles o r East Germans, would bemore content ious . In the four th sec t ion we of fe r severalexplana t ions fo r both the d i f fe ren t i a l pa t t e rns of pro t e s t dynamicand each coun t ry ' s s tanding in our "protes t ranking."I I I . Selected Ch aracter i s t ics of Protes t P ol i t i c s .

The countr ies analyzed in t h i s paper d i f f e r not only in termsof incidence and magnitude of pro t es t . There were i n t e res t ingvar ia t ions among o t h e r protes t cha rac te r i s t i c s as wel l . The genera lrepe r to i re of content ion was s imi la r in a l l coun t r ies and closelymirrored standard s t ra teg ies used by protes t ing groups incontemporary p o l i t i c s . Protes t ac t ions in Poland, Hungary andSlovakia were dec idedly non-violent . In Poland, dis rupt ives t ra teg ies such as s t r e e t demonstra t ions and s t r ikes were mostcommon but in Hungary and Slovakia near ly 70 percent of thes t r a t eg i e s used by protes t ing groups were o f a non-disrupt ivecharacter . In cont ras t to these th ree countr ies , the number ofv io len t protes t s in the former GDR was s ign i f i can t ly higher anddisrupt ive s t r a t eg i e s dominated the reper to i re o f col lec t iveact ion .

Table 3: General Pro tes t St ra teg ies in East Centra l EuropeOur database did not record any important s h i f t s i n p ro tes ts t r a t eg i e s used by cha l lenging groups. Dominant types o f s t ra teg ieswere cons i s t en t throughout the ent i re per iod under s tudy. Nor didwe r eg i s t e r any s i gn i f i can t innovat ions in pro tes t ac t iv i t i e s whichwere l a t t e r dif fused from one category of pro tes to rs to another o ramong var ious groups and organizat ions . Thus the reper to i res of

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content ion in each country were no t s ign i f i c a n t ly dive rse andre la t ive ly s t a b l e over t ime . This s t a b i l i t y of reper to i res mayindicate t h a t East Centra l European count r ies d id not exper ience acycle of p r o t e s t which accord ing to Tarrow i s charac te r ized amongothe r th ings by expanding r e p e r t o i r e s of content ion . 30Although th e genera l s t ra teg ies of p ro t e s t (v io len t ,d i s rup t ive , and non-violent ) did not va ry s igni f icant ly fromcountry to coun t ry , spec i f i c forms of pro t e s t dominated pro t e s treper to i re o f the cha l lenging groups in each country. In a l l fourcount r ies , d i s rup t ive s t r a t eg i e s inc luding demonstra t ions, marchesand s t r e e t blockades were f requent ly used by pro tes t ing groups andwere most common in the former Eas t Germany. In Poland s t r i kes (thenumber of s t r i k e s wa s three t imes h igher than in any other country)and s t r i ke a l e r t s were used r egu la r ly . I f we combine s t r i kes ands t r i ke a l e r t s , t h i s form o f pro t e s t comprises 36.4 percen t , t h a t i sthe major i ty among p ro t e s t s t r a t e g i e s in th e Pol i sh r e p e r t o i r e .The number of s t r i kes was s imi la r and s ign i f i c a n t ly sma l l e r inothe r three coun t r ies . In Hungary and Slovakia pro tes t l e t t e r s andsta tements were the most f requent s t ra t egy used to expressgr ievances and convey demands. The most f requent ly used s t r a t eg i e srecorded in our database a re presen ted in Table 4 .

Table 4: Spec i f i c protes t s t ra teg ies in East Centra l EuropeNot a l l soc ia l groups and categor ies were ac t ive in

content ious p o l i t i c s ; those who seem to have been hardes t h i t bythe market reforms were o f t e n absent from th e pro tes t scene . Inth i s respect , it i s i n t e r e s t i ng to note t ha t r e l a t i ve l y few pro t e s tac t ions were organized by marginal ized soc ia l groups (homeless ,unemployed) o r minor i t i e s . I t wa s the mainstream soc ia l andprofe s s iona l groups who were most of t en involved in pro t e s tact ions . In Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia pub l ic sec to r employees(excluding workers in sta te-owned en te rp r i s es ) comprised th e most

30Sidney Tarrow, "Cycles of Col lec t ive Action: BetweenMoments o f Madness and th e Reper to i re of Content ion , II in :Reperto i res and Cycles o f Collect ive Action , ed i ted by MarkTraugott , Durham: Duke Univers i ty Press 1995, pp. 89-115.16


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protes t prone so c i a l ca tegory . In Poland workers and farmers weremore prominent i n p ro t e s t ac t iv i t i e s than in the o ther threecoun t r ies . Youth was more f requent ly involved in pro tes t ac t ions inthe former GDR and Poland than in the o ther two coun t r ies . Thisf inding, however, has to be care fu l ly in t e rp re ted ; we were unableto determine the category of pa r t i c ipa n t s in the major i ty ofdemonst ra t ions , because we have a subs tan t ia l amount o f missingdata regarding the soc ia l and profess ional pro f i l e of p ro t e s t o r s .This amount i s lower fo r Poland because it i s eas ie r to ident i fypa r t i c ipa n t s in a s t r i ke , which were the dominant s t ra t egy in t h a tcountry. The data on soc io-voca t iona l ca tegor ies of p ro t e s tpa r t i c ipa n t s are presented in Table 5:

Table 5: Socio-vocat ional category of par t i c ipan t sOur da ta regarding pro t e s t organizers a re more r e l i ab l e . We

f a l s i f i ed our i n i t i a l hypothesis tha t during the ear ly s tages ofregime t r ans i t i on the inc idence o f spontaneous pro tes t s i s going tobe high. Pro t e s t events in a l l countr ies were usual ly organized byex i s t ing , wel l es tabl i shed organizat ions . Each country ' s p ro t e s tpo l i t i c s was dominated by a di f fe ren t s e t of organiza t ions , bu t therange of organiza t ions sponsor ing pro t e s t ac t ions wa s s i m i l a r tothose sponsoring pro tes t a c t i v i t i e s in o th e r European coun t r ies .They inc luded labor movements, po l i t i ca l par t i e s , i n t e re s t s groups,and s oc i a l movements. The only con t ras t with West Europeanexper iences was the much smal le r ro le of soc ia l movements insponsor ing pro t e s t a c t i v i t i e s and the r e l a t i ve l y l a rge r ro le oft r ad i t i ona l organiza t ions such as p o l i t i c a l par t ie s , t rade unionso r profes s iona l groups.31 In Poland t rade unions were most ac t ivein organiz ing protes t a c t i v i t i e s . In Hungary and Slovakia p o l i t i c a lpa r t i e s were the most f requent organizers o f pro t e s t s . In theformer Eas t Germany s oc i a l movements were dominant, p o l i t i c a l

31Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni in t h e i r ana lys i sof four West European coun t r ies determined tha t new soc ia lmovements organized 36.1% of pro tes t s in France, 73.2% inGermany, 65.4% in Nether lands, and 61.0% in Switzer land (see NewSocia l Movements in Western Europe, p. 20) .17
http:///reader/full/groups.31http:///reader/full/groups.31


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par t i e s fol lowed. The data on p r o t e s t organ izers are presented inTable 6.

Table 6: Organ iza t ions sponsoring or leading pro t e s t ac t ionsI n i t i a l l y , we expected t h a t th e demands put forward by th e

pro tes t ing groups would be pr imar i ly concerned with p o l i t i c a li s sues . We accep ted the not ion common in th e l i t e r a t u r e on Eas tEuropean t r a n s i t i o n s t h a t in the wake of s t a t e so c i a l i sm ' s col lapsepeople are confused about t he i r r e a l economic i n t e r e s t s . Yet ourda ta show t h a t p o l i t i c a l l y con ten t ious regime t r a n s i t i o n s and thees tab l i shment o f democracy a f t e r decades of a u t h o r i t a r i a n ru l e d idno t crea te a h igh ly po l i t i c i z e d environment charac te r ized by thepredominance o f symbolic p o l i t i c s . The demands pressed bypro tes t ing groups were predominant ly concrete , r e f l e c t e d "everyday"economic concerns , and when they were p o l i t i c a l , t h e i r t enor wasmainly r e fo rmis t . Anti-sys temic proclamations were r a r e . Thus inth e language of con ten t ion one can f ind evidence o f a broad supportfo r democracy and market economy.

The way demands in a l l four count r ies c l u s t e r re f lec t s th econcerns of th e dominant organizers . In Poland, where t rade unionsplayed th e most a c t i v e ro le in organ iz ing p ro t e s t , economic demandswere predominant , while in Hungary and Slovakia p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e sorganized more p r o t e s t s than o ther groups and p o l i t i c a l demandswere most common. In th e former East Germany p o l i t i c a l demands onlys l i g h t l y outnumbered economic demands. The data on types of demandsa re presen ted in Table 7.

Table 7: Types of demands

Desp i te the va r i a t i on in p r o t e s t s t r a t e g i e s , demands, and p ro t e s tsponsoring organ iza t ions , pro tes t ac t ions were uni fo rmly directeda t th e s t a t e and demands were addressed to s t a t e a u thor i t i e s . Therewas an evident s i mi l a r i t y in th e t a rg e t s of p r o t e s t ac t ions in a l lcoun t r ies . (Targets a re understood to be the a u thor i t i e s to whichth e demands were addressed and who were expected to respond tothem.) The governments, fol lowed by parl iaments and othe r na t iona l

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l evel s ta te agencies , were by fa r th e most frequent t a rge t s ofpro t e s t act ions . Only in the former East Germany do we see as ign i f i can t number of demands addressed to loca l and regionalauthor i t i es due to the federal s t ruc ture of the s ta te . Asurpr i s ingly low number of demands were addressed to the managementof ente rpr i ses and domestic or fore ign owners. I t seems t ha tregardless of the i s sue a t s take , protes t ing groups look to thes t a t e and cen t ra l author i t i es fo r so lu t ions . The fol lowing t ab lepresents the dis t r ibu t ion of t a rge t s of protes t in a l l countr ies.

Table 8: Targets of protes tIn sum, even a cursory look a t various fea tures of pro tes t

ac t ions , presented in t h i s sec t ion , reveals considerable contras tsand unexpected s imi l a r i t i e s among the four post-communistcount r ies . Such var ia t ions in magnitude, scope, and forms ofpro t e s t act ions as wel l as in types of pro tes t organizers andgroups prone to par t i c i pa t e in col lec t ive act ion , r a i s e a number ofin te res t ing ques t ions . In order to account fo r such di fferences wewil l br i e f ly examine several poss ib le explanatory l eads , derivedfrom the arsenal o f avai lab le theor i es of socia l pro tes t . Beingcons t ra ined by the format of th i s paper we wi l l o f f e r only fourexplana tory sketches, suggested by the fol lowing s e t of theor ies :

1. re la t ive depr ivat ion , which l inks var ia t ion in protes tac t iv i t i e s to th e changing percept ions and assessments ofpeople ' s (pa r t i cu la r ly economic) s i tua t ion;2. "inst rumenta l" ins t i tu t iona l i sm, founded on th e concept ofp o l i t i c a l oppor tun i ty s t ruc ture , which focuses oni n s t i t u t iona l cons t ra in t s and oppor tuni t ies , avai lable toprotes tor s , including those which are l inked to thet ransformation processes taking place in the reg ion;3. h i s to r i ca l - cu l tu ra l ins t i tu t iona l i sm, which emphasizesin te rac t ions between ins t i tu t iona l i za t ion and cul tura llearn ing and tu rns our a t ten t ion toward h i s to r i ca l ly shaped" t rad i t ions ll of content ious ac t ion ;4. resource mobi l iza t ion theory, which emphasizes resourcesavai lab le to challenging groups.

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An examination of the IIfitll between these t heor i es and our da tashould al low us to determine which fac to rs are primari lyrespons ib le fo r peop le ' s pro t es t behavior . This , in turn , shouldshed new l i gh t on the p o l i t i c s o f postcommunist consol idat ion .IV. Explaining the patterns of protes t po l i t i c s in East Central

Europe.

Conventional wisdom among observers of East Centra l Europeant ransformat ions holds t h a t bui ld ing new democratic s t a t ei n s t i t u t i ons could be accomplished with r e l a t i ve ease . Also, thein t roduct ion o f compet i t ive e lec t ions and the format ion of party systems was seen as a more o r l e s s uncomplicated t a sk . The recrea t ion o f c i v i l socie ty , however, was pred ic ted to be a lengthyand d i f f i c u l t process , spanning a generat ion o r two. 32 We argue t ha tthese claims should be r ev i sed . During the f i r s t f ive years ofconsol idat ion , the reb i r th and/or expansion of c iv i l soc ie tyoccurred with unexpected speed and in tens i ty in every country. Thes t a t e , however, was not so much reformed, as weakened. Thedevelopment of p o l i t i c a l soc ie ty was of ten slow, ted ious , andunpredic table . Moreover, these processes have d i f fe red from count ryto country. The former Eas t Germany exper ienced the swi f testabl ishment of a new p o l i t i c a l and legal framework as a r e su l t ofth e uni f ica t ion , and the new s t a t e adminis t ra t ion has been s t rongerand more e f f i c i e n t than in any other post-communist regime.However, it can be argued t h a t it i s still weaker than in theWestern pa r t o f Germany. Simi lar ly , the par ty system crys ta l l i zedand s tab i l i zed much fa s te r , with th e West German par t i e s extendingt he i r organ iza t iona l reach to the f ive new Lander. In the o therth ree coun t r ies the s t a t e s and party systems have been in f lux ,with Hungary having the most success in developing a r e l a t i ve l ys tab le and c l ea r l y a r t icu l a t ed par ty system. 33

32See Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflect ion on the Revolut ion in Europe, New York: Random House 1990. 33See Herber t Kitschel t , liThe Formation o f Party Systems in East Centra l Europe, II and IIFormation of Party Cleavages in Post

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The four coun t r i e s inc luded in th e p r o j ec t rep re sen t d i s t i nc ttypes o f post-communist t ransformat ions and have experiencedcon t ras t ing p o l i t i c a l and economic developments s ince 1989. Themajor d i f fe rences among them stern from (1) the type and sequence ofeconomic p o l i c i e s and (2) the nature and extent of the s t a t et ransformat ion . These di f fe rences can be summarized in thefo l lowing t ab le :

Table 9: Economic t ransfo rmat ions and th e s t a t e con t inu i tyin Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the former East Germany

cont inui ty d iscon t inu i tyrap id Poland former GDR

gradua l Hungary SlovakiaThe f i r s t dimension r ep resen t s the ex ten t o f changes exper ienced bythe bureauc ra t i c s t ruc tu r e s of the post-communis t s t a t e . In a l lcoun t r i e s a c l a s s i c a l par ty - s t a t e was r ap id ly dismant led . Thedominant ro le of the communist par ty was e l imina ted , supreme s t a t ei n s t i t u t i ons re -des igned , cons t i tu t ions amended, par l iaments andgovernments were given supreme au thor i ty and re -es t ab l i shed underdemocratic con t ro l . The o f f i c e of pres iden t , a l b e i t with d i f f e re n tpre roga t ives , was crea ted in a l l coun t r i e s . Other e x i s t i n g s ta teagencies were reformed to a d i f f e re n t degree and new wereincorpora ted in the s t a t e i n s t i t u t i ona l des ign .

In Poland and Hungary the re has been a notable con t inu i ty inthe i n s t i t u t i o n a l organ iza t ion and personnel of the s t a t e both inthe c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a ry sectors . Almost a l l s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n si n h e r i t ed from the o ld regime survived and secured t h e i r place inthe new i n s t i t u t i ona l framework of the s t a t e . This con t inu i ty i s ar e su l t o f two f ac to r s : f i r s t , in the f i na l years of th e communistru l e these coun t r i e s in t roduced a number of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reformscompatible with the requirements o f a market economy and democracYi

communist Democracies: Theore t i ca l Propos i t i ons , " Pa r ty Pol i t i c s(1995), 1, 4, pp. 447-472.21


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second, both coun t r ies ex i ted s t a t e social ism on the bas i s ofi n t r a - e l i t e negot ia t ions and pac t s which assured a s igni f icantdegree of con t inu i ty of s t a t e i n s t i t u t i ons . In con t ras t to thesetwo countr ies , the former GDR and Slovakia exper ienced a moreprofound change in the s t a t e organizat ion . In October 1990, theGerman Democratic Republic was uni f ied with West Germany and thef ive new Lander were incorporated in to the federa l framework of theWest German Republ ic . At the same t ime, a l l i n s t i t u t i ons of th eformer East German s t a t e were thoroughly di smant led and t h e i remployees screened and purged. Slovakia became an independent s t a t eon January 1, 1993, fo l lowing f a i l ed e f for t s to renegot ia te theCzechoslovak f edera t ion . Many i n s t i t u t i ons of the Slovak Republicexis t ing under the federa l arrangement of the Czechoslovak s ta tesimply became Slovak nat ional i n s t i t u t i ons ; however, new segmentso f the s t a t e adminis t ra t ion had to be organized almost fromsc ra tch . Moreover, the rapid and content ious depar ture from s t a t esocial ism in these countr ies cont r ibuted to i n s t i t u t i ona ldiscont inui ty with the old regime.

Newly emerged democratic s t a t e s inher i ted d i f fe ren t economicl egacies and pursued contras t ing economic pol ic ie s . The former EastGermany and Poland exper ienced rapid and rad ica l economict ransformat ions . The Balcerowicz Plan int roduced in January 1990 inresponse to dramatic de te r iora t ion of the Pol ish economy and th et h rea t of hyperinf la t ion imposed harsh macro-economic s t ab i l i za t i onmeasures. This adjus tment program ins tan t ly re-shaped Poland 'seconomic system, ar res t ed an esca la t ing economic c r i s i s , andimposed new, marke t - f r iendly ru les . I t opened the way fo rcomprehensive s t ruc t u ra l economic reforms combined withpr iva t i z a t i on and welfare reforms. 34 In the former Eas t Germany theeconomic t ransformat ion was designed to unify economici n s t i t u t i ons , f i s ca l and monetary po l i c i e s , and economic condi t ionsbetween two par t s of the country. The change affec ted the en t i r e

34See Je f f rey Sachs, Poland 's Jump to th e Market Economy,Cambridge: MIT Press 1993j Ben Slay , The Pol i sh Economy. Cris i s ,Reform, and Transformat ion, Prince ton: Princeton Univers i ty Press1994 and Kazimierz Poznanski, Poland 's Protracted Trans i t ion ,Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press 1996.22


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i n s t i t u t iona l s t ruc tu re of the economy. S t a b i l i z a t i o n po l i c i es werecombined with s t ruc tu r a l reforms, comprehensive p r i v a t i z a t i o n , anda thorough t ransformat ion of wel fa re i n s t i t u t i o n s . The dismant l ingo f a l l l egac ie s o f s t a t e social i sm was f a s t e r and more r ad i ca l thanin any o th e r post-communist count ry . I t included th e massive ands w i f t pr iva t i z a t i on o f a l l economic asse t s previous ly con t ro l l ed byth e communist s t a t e . This ~ m m e n s e i n s t i t u t i ona l change wascushioned by an unprecedented t r a ns f e r of c a p i t a l , bureaucra t icknow-how, and as s i s tance from the West to the Eas t . In con t ras t toPoland and East Germany, Hungary and Slovakia have chosen a moregradual pace fo r economic t ransfo rmat ions both in te rms of macroeconomic and pr iva t i z a t ion po l i c i e s .

This ana lys i s does not revea l any c l e a r p a t t e rn s . There i s noc o r re l a t i o n between the nature of power t r a n s fe r and the type ofeconomic reforms on th e one hand and the p r o t e s t magnitude on theo th e r . However, if one puts as ide Slovak ia and former East Germany,two coun t r i e s where a s ign i f i can t amount of p ro t e s t r esu l ted fromth e dramatic r e d e f i n i t i o n of the p o l i t y , and focuses on Poland andHungary, one may conclude t ha t the f ac to r which seems to explainth e va r i ed magnitude of co l l ec t ive p r o t e s t i s the type andsequencing of economic reforms in t roduced by th e post-communistregimes: rapid reforms resu l t i n more pro tes t s than do gradualre fo rms . I t i s customary to bui ld such an argument on the logic ofsome "depr iva t ion theory , II accord ing to which rap id reformsproduced higher so c i a l cos t and are perceived wi th more hos t i l i t yamong th e popUlat ion. This , in t u rn , l eads to the heightenedincidence of pro t e s t . As we wil l demonst ra te in th e nex t sec t ion ,ne i the r l i nk in t h i s reasoning i s confirmed by our empi r i ca l data .4 . 1 . Pro tes t as an expression of depr iva t ion or gr ievances .

The re l a t ionsh ip between r ap id economic o r p o l i t i c a l reformsand the populace ' s (dis) s a t i s f a c t i on o r depr iva t ion i s usua l lytheor i zed with the he lp of some s impl i f i ed vers ion of th e r e l a t i v edepr iva t ion theory . It i s impossible to summarize the c l a s s i c a lv a r i a n t of t h i s theory , proposed fo r example by Ted Gurr in h i sc l a s s i c Why Men Rebel i it i s a non-parsimonious and i n t r i ca t e

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t h e o re t i c a l system, founded on the concept of " r e l a t i vedepr iva t ion . ,,35 However, the main t h ru s t of th e argument - a t l e a s tin i t s most popular and i n f l u e n t i a l ve rs ion - - i s s imple ande a s i l y f a l s i f i a b l e . In genera l , var ious r e l a t i ve depr iva t ionapproaches assume t ha t :an inc rease in ex ten t o r i n t e ns i t y of grievances o r

depr iva t ion and the development of ideology occur p r i o r to th eemergence o f s o c i a l movement phenomena. Each of theseperspec t ives holds t h a t discontent produced by somecombinat ion of s t ruc tu r a l cond i t ions i s a necessary i f nots u f f i c i e n t cond i t ion to an account of the r i s e of spec i f i csoc ia l movement (or p ro t e s t - G.E. & J .K . ) phenomenon36

In t h i s rend i t ion o f the theory , proposed by McCarthy and Zald , th econcept o f "deprivat ion" replaces I I re la t ive depr iva t ion , " whichconsiderab ly changes the na tu re of the argument . Yet we w i l l followt h i s common prac t i ce , most ly because we do not know o f anycomparat ive s tudy o f r e l a t i ve depr iva t ion in th e four Eas t Cent ra lEuropean s t a t e s , while we found seve ra l compara t ive s tud ie s dea l ingwith va r ious aspec t s ( indica tors ) of p o l i t i c a l and economic"depr iva t ion" o r " in tens i ty of gr ievances . "

We w i l l t e s t a simple hypothes is : th e higher the l e v e l o fdiscontent with th e post-1989 economic and p o l i t i c a l changes o r th ehigher th e i n t e n s i t y of grievances o r the sense of depr iva t ion , thehigher th e magni tude of pro t e s t . In o rder to t e s t t h i s hypothesiswe w i l l rank the four coun t r i e s according to th e r e s u l t s o f seve ra l.comparative s tud ies which measured var ious aspec t of peop le ' s

35Relative depr iva t ion i s Ita perceived discrepancy betweenmen's value expec ta t ions and t h e i r value c a pa b i l i t i e s . Valueexpec ta t ions a re th e goods and condi t ions of l i f e to which peoplebel ieve they are r i gh t fu l ly e n t i t l e d . Values capabi l i t i e s aregoods and cond i t ions they th ink they are capable o f a t t a i n i n g o rmainta ining, given the so c i a l means ava i lab le to them." TedGurr , Why Men Rebel , Princeton: Princeton Unive rs i ty Press 1970,p . 13 .36John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobil izat ionand Socia l Movements: A P a r t i a l Theory," in Socia l Movements inan Organ iza t iona l Society , New Brunswick: Transac t ion 1978, p .17.

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discon ten t and compare th e r e s u l t s of such rankings with th eranking based on th e magnitude o f pro tes t .

The s tu d i e s we have chosen fo r t h i s exerc ise were conducted ina t l e a s t t h ree coun t r i e s we a re i n t e res t ed in dur ing th e 1989-1993per iod . The surveys asked th e same se t of ques t ion in a l lcount r ies , producing thereby comparable r e s u l t s . These s tud iesinclude:

a . New Democracies Barometer IV: A l a -Nat ion Survey;37b . Mason's s tudy on a t t i t u d e s towards the market and the s t a t ein postcommunist Europe; 38c . Korna i ' s ca lcu la t ions o f th e dec l ine o f r e a l wages in Eas tCent ra l Europe; 39d. ca l cu l a t i o n s of Gini coeff ic ients;40e . ca l cu l a t i o n s of th e r a t i o s o f top t en percen t to bottom tenpercen t o f wage earners (dec i l e r a t ios ) ;41f . Ferge ' s s tudy on th e sa t i s f a c t i o n with th e post-1989

37Richard Rose and Chr i s t i an Haerpfer , "Change and St ab i l i t yin the New Democracies Barometer . A Trend Analys i s , " Center fo rth e Study of Publ ic Pol icy , Glasgow: Univers i ty o f Stra thc lyde ,1996.38David Mason, "At t i tudes Towards the Market and th e Sta te

in Postcommunist Europe," paper presen ted a t th e 1992 AnnualMeeting of APSA, Chicago, Ill., p .14 .39Janos Kornai , "Paying B i l l fo r Goulash-Communism." Thef igure fo r 1990 r e f e r s only to th e ca tegory of workers andemployees, exclud ing workers in agr i cu l tu ra l coopera t ives ; s ince1991, t he da ta inc lude these .4World Development Repor t : From Plan to Market , New York:Oxford Univers i ty Press 1996, p . 69 and Michael Wyzan, "IncreasedInequa l i ty , Pover ty Accompany Economic Trans i t i on , " T rans i t i on , 4October 1996, pp. 24-27.41Jan Rutkowski, "Becoming Less Equal: Wage Effec t s ofEconomic Trans i t ion in Poland," Pew Papers on Cent ra l EasternEuropean Reform and Regional ism, Center fo r In te rna t iona lStud ies , Pr ince ton Univers i ty , 1996 and Zsusa Ferge , liTheEvalua t ion o f Freedom, Secur i ty , and Regime Change," paperprepared fo r th e Euroconference on So c ia l Pol icy , organized byICCR-Vienna, Lisbon, November, 8-11, 1995.

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re fo rms . 42

Table 10: Selec ted Rankings o f Cent ra l European St a t e s 43

Table 10 pre sen t s t he r e s u l t s of our ana l yses . The hypothes i s i snot confi rmed: Hungar ians are c l e a r l y most d i s s a t i s f i e d with thepost-1989 changes, and y e t th e magnitude o f pro tes t in t h i s count ryi s l ower than elsewhere . The con t ra s t with Poland i s pa r t i c u l a r lys t r i k i n g ; even i f we assume tha t Poles and Hungarians a re equal lyd i s s a t i s f i e d , th e IIdeprivat ion hypothes i s ll f a i l s , fo r Poland has ahi ghe r magni tude of pro t e s t . Another "anomaly" from th e po in t ofview o f th e regu la r i ty suggested by our hypothesis emerges from acomparison o f Hungary with former Eas t Germany. The s i t ua t ion inthe l a t t e r country i s dramat ica l ly d i f f e r e n t from otherpostcommunist s t a t e s , given th e f i n an c i a l t r a n s fe r s between th eWestern and Eas tern areas of the count ry and th e e f f o r t s of th eGerman government to equa l ize t h e i r s tandards of l i v i n g . As ar e s u l t o f t h i s massive as s i s tance , th e economy o f t he f ive newGerman Lander has grown between 7 and 10 pe rcen t a yea r s ince 1992and as Kopste in po in t s out "purely in terms of l i v ing s tandards ,Eas t Germans are th e c l e a r winners of communism's co l lapse . ,,44 Andye t E as t Germans engage i n p r o t e s t a c t i v i t i e s with a higher

42Zsusa Ferge, i b i d .43For columns (2) and (3) th e numbers were obta ined bys u b t r ac t i n g th e percentage of the responden ts who approved of theregime in Winter 1993/94 (New Democracies Barometer I I I ) from thepercentage o f those who approved the regime i n F a l l 1991 (NDB-I).I t should be a lso emphasized tha t Poles disapproved of th ecommunist regime and th e s o c i a l i s t economic system much mored ec i s iv e ly than e i t h e r th e Slovaks o r th e Hungar ians . For themean ranking (Column 9) we used Ferge ' s P90/P10 index (7") ; it i smore IIhost i le" to our hypo thes i s than Rutkowski ' s index (7 ' ) .

Column (11) i s based on Je f f rey Sachs and Andrew M. Warner,"Achieving Rapid Growth in th e Trans i t i on Economies o f Cent ra lEurope," Development Discuss ion Papers , Harvard I n s t i t u t e fo rI n t e r n a t i o n a l Development, No. 544 ( Ju ly 1996) .

44Jeffrey Kopstein, nWeak Foundations Under East GermanReconst ruc t ion ," Trans i t ion 26 January 1996, p .64 .26


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frequency and more zea l than Hungarians, who are fa r l e s s sa t i s f i edwith the r e su l t of communism's col lapse .Graph 5-8: Approval of current p o l i t i c a l and economic systems45

A comparison of the pa t t e rn of changes dur ing the s tudiedper iod produces mixed r e su l t s . As Graphs 5 to 8 i l l u s t r a t e , theSlovak and Hungarian data conform to the pred ic t ions of theIIdepr ivat ion theory: II the f luc tua t ions o f pro tes t magnitude inthese coun t r ies are cor re l a t ed with the f luc tua t ions in people ' sapproval of economic and p o l i t i c a l sys tems. However, the theoryf a i l s dismal ly when it i s appl ied to Poland. As the people ' sapproval of the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems increasessys temat ica l ly , so does the magnitude o f protes t ! ! !

Given the data repor ted in Table l a , it i s poss ib le to fa l s i fyour "depr iva t ion hypothesis" in many d i f f e r e n t ways. For example,given th e data in column (5) (Kornai ' s es t imates of th e r e a l wagesdecl ine) t h i s hypothesis would pred ic t t ha t Poland and Slovakiashould have the same magnitude of s t r ikes which would be higherthan in Hungary, whose wage earners exper ienced a much smal lerdecl ine i n t he i r incomes. Also, Pol i sh and Slovak pro tes to rs shouldput for th economic demands (higher wages) with g re a t e r frequencythan t h e i r Hungarian counte rpar t s . The f i r s t expec ta t ion i s notconfi rmed by the data presented in t ab les 2 and 4: Poles organizedfa r more s t r i ke s than e i t he r Hungarians o r Slovaks. The secondexpecta t ion f a i l s in the l i gh t of da ta presented in t ab le 7: Polesconcent ra ted t he i r demands on economic i s sues fa r more of ten thandid the Hungarians - - as expected - - but also more of ten than theSlovaks.

One could o f course argue t h a t Poles - on the one hand, andHungarians and Slovaks - on the o ther , expressed t h e i r economicdepr iva t ion through d i f f e r e n t idioms and organizat ional s t r a t e g i e s .But t h i s i s prec i se ly the kind of argument t ha t the l ldeprivationapproach 11 i s i l l - equ ipped to f i e l d . Changes in magnitude,

45Richard Rose and Chris t ian Haerpfer , op. c i t . , pp. 23-27 and 45 49 . 27


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s t r a t e g i e s , mobil iza t ional ef f i cacy , success, e t c . of pro tes t donot r e f l ec t th e f luc tua t ions in people ' s sense of depr iva t ion(d i s s a t i s f a c t i on ) . Nei ther do they fol low the changes in the soca l l ed ob jec t ive economic i nd ica to rs , as c l e a r ly evidenced by thecomparison of da ta repor ted in columns (1), (10), and (11) of Table10. According to Sachs ' and Warner ' s analys is , Poland, Hungary, andSlovakia have almost i den t i ca l scores on th e composite ReformIndex; moreover t he i r scores a re the h ighes t in the wholepostcommunist world . Yet the p a t t e rn s of pro t es t ac t iv i t i e s inthese th ree coun t r i e s were widely divergent . Fina l ly , it should beemphasized t ha t th e country where th e accumulat ive dec l ine of GDPduring the 1989-93 per iod was the smal les t and which was f i r s t inovercoming the " t rans i to ry recess ion ," t ha t i s Polandexper ienced the highes t and i n t ens i fy ing magnitude o f pro tes t .

Our "depr ivat ion hypothesis , II suggested by a popularin te rpre ta t ion of r e l a t i ve depr ivat ion theory, i s not confirmed. Inorder to exp la in f luc tua t ing magnitudes and pa t t e rns of pro tes t inthe four coun t r ies we must tu rn elsewhere.4 .2 . Ins t i t u t i ona l explana t ions .

To comprehend the var i a t ions in co l l ec t ive a c t o r ' s responsesto economic and p o l i t i c a l reforms, we have to examine East Cent ra lEuropean t ransformat ions as combinations o f complex developmentst ak ing p lace in seve ra l d i s t i nc t i n s t i t u t i ona l domains. We pose ahypothesis t h a t th e many d i f fe rences in th e magnitude andc ha ra c t e r i s t i c s o f pro tes t ac t ions in the four countr ies unders tudy are r e l a t ed both to the i n s t i t u t i ona l l egac ies of s t a t esocia l ism and th e post-1989 processes of the recons t i tu t ion andi n s t i t u t i ona l i za t i on of democrat ic po l i t i c s . But before we a t t emptto expla in the more sub t le d i f f e rences among the dimensions ofcontent ious p o l i t i c s , we wi l l comment on the o v e ra l l dif ferences inthe magnitude of p ro t e s t among these coun t r ies .I f opportuni t ies fo r col lec t ive act ion af forded by the s t a t eare one of the most c r i t i c a l var i ab le in expla in ing the incidence

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and magnitude o f co l l ec t ive protest ,46 t r a ns i t o ry po l i t i e s where a l ls tab le c ha ra c t e r i s t i c s o f th e po l i t i ca l oppor tun i ty s t ruc tu re a rein f lux shou ld have been an arena of cons tan t co l lec t ive s t rugg les .Since they are not , and th e magnitude o f pro t e s t var ies from s t a t eto s t a t e , th e concept o f p o l i t i c a l oppor tun i ty s t ruc tu re has to becare fu l ly reconsidered fo r app l i ca t ion to cases o f regime change. 47

We argue t h a t the re i s a need to d is t ingu ish between th es t ruc tu re o f p o l i t i c a l oppor tun i ty ( c h a ra c t e r i s t i c fo r s t ab lep o l i t i e s ) and uns t ruc tured opportuni ty (a fea tu re of t r a n s i t o ry ,II open " p o l i t i e s ) .48 A change in some p a r t i a l opportuni ty s t ruc tu reso r a p a r t i a l a l t e r a t i on of some dimensions of the oppor tun i tys t ruc tu re in s t ab le coun t r i e s wil l be immediately t r e a t e d as anincen t ive to ac t by a l l those co l l ec t ive ac to rs who have beenprepared to p re s s t h e i r cla ims aga ins t th e s t a t e . Such a changew i l l s i g n a l to th e groups or o rgan iza t ions with resources ,es tab l i shed agendas, and long-held c la ims t h a t now i s th e t ime toac t . When t he se groups o r organ iza t ion a re successfu l in press ingt h e i r demands o t h e r may fo l low, expanding th e range o f i s sues andi n s t i t u t i o n a l arenas of con ten t ious p o l i t i c s . 49 Thus one could argue

46See, fo r example Hanspeter Krie s i , liThe Pol i t i c a lOpportuni ty St ruc tu re o f New Socia l Movements: I t s Impact onThei r Mobi l iza t ion ," in J . Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans,eds . , The P o l i t i c s of Soc ia l P ro te s t . Comparative Perspec t iveson Sta tes and Socia l Movements, Minneapolis: Univers i ty o fMinnesota Press , 1995.

47There i s an argument to be made t h a t th e s t ruc tu re ofp o l i t i c a l oppor tun i ty i s mul t id imens ional . There a re d i f f e r e n toppor tun i ty s t ruc tu res fo r ac to r s d i f f e r e n t ly s i tua ted with in agiven s o c i a - p o l i t i c a l system (Kr ies i , op cit.). Thus th e changein one dimension of the oppor tun i ty s t ru c t u re may a f f e c t some butno t a l l r e a l o r p o t e n t i a l co l l ec t i v e a c t o r s . We do not developt h i s thought here .48l1The most s a l i e n t changes in oppor tun i ty s t ruc tu re a refour: th e opening up of access to p a r t i c i p a t i o n , sh i f t s in ru l ingal ignments , th e ava i l ab i l i t y of i n f lue n t i a l a l l i e s , and cleavageswithin and among e l i t e s , " Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, p .86.49See debates on cyc les of p r o t e s t and espec ia l ly DougMcAdam, " ' I n i t i a t o r ' and ' S p in - o f f ' Movements: Diffusion

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t ha t in s t ab le and gradua l ly changing po l i t i e s , a l t e ra t i ons of thep o l i t i c a l oppor tun i ty s t ruc tu res provide incent ives fo r content iousac t ion .

By con t ras t , in count r ies undergoing r ap id p o l i t i c a l andeconomic t r ans i t i on , the four elements o f the p o l i t i c a l opportuni tys t ruc tu r e spec i f i ed by Tarrow are wide open and unconst rained. Sucha s i t ua t ion may have e i the r demobil iz ing e f f e c t s o r simplyencourage mobi l i za t ion without l i m i t s . For organized co l l ec t iveac to rs i s sues which were important in the pas t may not be re levantany more, new i s sue-a renas may become unc lea r o r not ye tes tab l i shed , t h e i r a t t en t ion i s drawn toward genera l i s sues whicha re not e a s i l y t r a ns l a t e d in to paradigms of col lec t ive act ion theyhad l ea rned e a r l i e r . Moreover, agendas fo r content ious po l i t i c s inmore s t ab le p o l i t i e s are b u i l t on the assumption t ha t it i sr e l a t i ve l y c l e a r who i s th e f r iend and who i s the adversary and whobea rs r e s pons ib i l i t y fo r spec i f i c i s sues and problems. Thed i s t i nc t i on between "them" and I IUS" serves as a guide-pos t fo r th es t rugg le . But in t rans i tory p o l i t i e s t h i s underly ing c u l t u ra lmatr ix of enemies and c u lp r i t s becomes unclear and muddled: formeroppos i t iona l a c t i v i s t s take over th e s t a t e appara tus and it i s nolonger c l e a r who i s "us" and who i s IIthem."

such cond i t ions , which we w i l l c a l l uns t ruc tured opportuni ty ,o f f e r pro tes to rs considerab le freedom of ac t ion : there are fewes tab l i shed organ iza t iona l boundaries t ha t should be abol i shed;t he re a re no predef ined agendas whose expansion may be demanded;ru l ing al ignments change of ten; the re are po te n t i a l l y manyava i l ab le a l l i e s ; and cleavages "wi th in and among e l i t e s " are f lu idand poorly s t ruc tu red . The s t a t e manages to p ro t e c t orde r withinthe publ i c domain, but it offe rs little r es i s tance to non-v io len tp r o t e s t ac t ions and it seems to ignore pro tes to rs . Addi t iona l ly ,s t a t e func t ionar ies do not know how to dea l with p ro t e s t o r s : formaland informal procedures through which pro tes to rs could become a

Processes i n P ro tes t Cycles ," in Reper to i res and Cycles ofCol lec t ive Act ion , pp. 217-39 .30


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p a r t of the pol icy-making processes are poorly developed. 50 I t i sthe re fo re d i f f i c u l t to analyze changing fea tures of p r o t e s t asresponses to changing oppor tun i t i e s : oppor tun i t i e s simply do notchange much.

In East Cent ra l Europe, where such an unchanging and poor lys t ruc tu red oppor tuni ty emerged a f t e r 1989, the magnitude of p r o t e s ti s by and l a rge lower than in more es tab l i shed democracies. Wesuspec t t ha t t h i s i s a r e su l t of (a) the demobil iz ing e f f e c t thelIexcessive" openness o f the opportuni ty s t r u c tu r e and (b) weakerthan in Western Europe i n s t i t u t i ona l support s t ru c t u re fo r p r o t e s ta c t i v i t i e s , inc luding th e a c c e s s ib i l i t y of organ iza t iona l ,mater ia l , and symbolic resources.

At th e same t ime, the p ro t e s t magnitude in a l l coun t r i esf luc tua ted al though th e openness of the system (p o l i t i c a loppor tun i ty s t ruc tu re ) did not . Also, p ro t e s t s t r a t e g i e s anddemands va r i ed from country to count ry , al though t h e i r po l i t i ca lsystems seem to have been equal ly opened. Since n e i t h e r depr iva t iontheory nor th e f ea tu r e s of the oppor tun i ty s t ru c t u re exp la in suchvar iance I we need to tu rn to o ther theor ies . We observe t ha tdesp i te of the cons iderable opening in th e p o l i t i c a l opportuni tys t ru c t u re , c o l l e c t i ve ac t ion i s channel led through var ious "old"and "new" i n s t i t u t i o n a l cons t ra in t s . The opening i s ex tens ive anduns t ruc tu red , i.e., pro tes to rs ' demands and s t r a t e g i e s cannot bec a re fu l l y c ra f t ed as responses to p a r t i a l openings here o r the re inth e es tab l i shed i n s t i t u t i o n a l network of the po l i t y . Such a networki s simply no t yet es tab l i shed . But s ingu la r i n s t i t u t i o n a l points ofre fe rence do ex i s t : some of them should be found among thei n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d l egac ies of p a s t s t rugg les and among th e elementsof the emerging new p o l i t i c a l oppor tun i ty s t ruc tu re which can o f fe rconcre te i ncen t ives fo r co l lec t ive ac t ions .

This new, uns t ruc tu red p o l i t i c a l opportuni ty can be examinedwi th th e use of the ava i lab le i n s t i t u t i ona l modes o f ana lys i s . 51 For

SOFor an ana lys i s o f the s ign i f i cance of such mechanisms seeHanspeter Krie s i , op. c i t . pp. 173-179.51A very use fu l typology of i n s t i tu t iona l i sms has been proposed by Pe te r H al l and Rosemary C. R. Taylor , 1994,

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example, we rea l i zed tha t th e re la t ive ly high magnitude of p ro t e s tin Poland can be expla ined through a comparative s tudy of d i s t i n c t ,though mutua l ly r e in fo rc ing , i n s t i t u t i ona l mechanisms, sugges ted bythe two i n s t i t u t i o n a l t heor i es l i s t ed in Sect ion 3, cu l t u r a l h i s to r i c a l and ins t rumenta l , as well as by the resourcemobi l iza t ion theory . In th e East European f i e ld , th e well-knowndilemma of more cases than var iab les makes a r igorous t e s t , whichwould allow us to pinpoint th e "bes t n exp lana t ion , imposs ib le , bu twe can determine whether th e pa t t e rns ex i s t ing in our data conformto th e expec ta t ions sugges ted by major i n s t i t u t i ona l arguments.

In th e f i e l d of pro t e s t s tud ies the re are two major argumentsconcerning the l ink between p ro t e s t magnitude and c ha ra c t e r i s t i c sand othe r i n s t i t u t i o n a l fea tu res of the p o l i t i c a l system:

1. Pro tes t ing can be construed as a ra t iona l , ca lcu la tedresponse to the lack o f access to pol icy making th rough othe rchannels (e. g . , the l ack of a t r i - pa r t i t e commission, t hus thelack o f corpora t i s t inc lus ion) . The smal le r the access toothe r channels , the highe r th e probab i l i ty of pro t e s t ;2. Pro tes t ing can b e s t seen as a usefu l s t ra t egy in i n t e r organ iza t iona l compet i t ion involv ing seve ra l compet i to r s( t rade unions) . When the re a re s evera l unions (or unionfedera t ions) I they tend to engage in pro tes t s in order todemons t ra t e t h e i r "champions -o f - the -work ing-peop le"creden t i a l s and to outb id each o ther in wooing p o t e n t i a lsuppor t e r s . 52 The higher the number of l abor unions th e higherthe p ro b a b i l i t y of pro t es t .

Following the log ic of th e f i r s t exp lana t ion we expect t h a t the re

"Po l i t i ca l Science and the Four Ins t i tu t iona l i sms , " APSAconvention paper .52This exp lana t ion draws on the logic of h i s to r i c a l

i n s t i tu t iona l i sm, as def ined by Hal l and Taylor . His to r i ca li n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s , while searching fo r explana t ions of groupconf l i c t , began paying "g rea te r a t t en t ion to the way in whichi n s t i t u t i ons s t ruc tu re p o l i t i c a l in te rac t ions" and "began toargue t ha t o ther [than s t a t e ] soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i onscould a l so con t r ibu te to p o l i t i c a l outcomes by s t ruc tu r ingconf l i c t among indiv iduals o r groups over scarce resources . IIPeter Hal l and Rosemary C. R. Taylor , op. c i t . , p. 3.32


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w i l l be l e s s s t r i kes and l abor - re l a t ed demonstra t ions in s t a t e swhich i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d th e i n t e rac t ion between l abor unions ,employers , and the re levant s t a t e agencies . As Wallace and Jenkinsnoted , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of neocorpora t i s t barga in ingdiminishes the l i ke l ihood o f p ro t e s t . Countr ies with a s t rongsoc ia l democrat ic par ty (Hungary) and a cen t ra l i zed l abor sec to r(Hungary, former Eas t Germany, Slovakia) a re expected to have l e s si n d u s t r

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