Contempt of Courts Act

Name of the file in the Computer: “Contempt of Courts Act”

Index

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Subject Matter/Contents

Index

A. Detail of sections of the contempt of courts Act, 1971

B. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (1) of CCA

C. Detail of judgments and propositions of law containing the definition of contempt as given in section (2) of CCA

C-1. Synopsis and judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per AIR Manual :-

C-2. Synopsis and judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per the book titled “Iyer’s Law on Contempt of Courts” 4th edition published by Delhi Law House :-

C-3. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts pertaining to Civil Contempt

C-4. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub-clause (i) of Clause (C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court).

C-5. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub-clause (ii) of clause (C ) of section 2 of Contempt of Court Act (Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings)

C-6. Detail of judgments pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub clause (iii) of Clause ( C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Interferes or tends to interfere with , or obstruct or tends to obstruct, the Administration of justice in any manner ) decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and Other High Courts

1. “ Court on its own motion v. K.S. Sethi, AIR 1968 Delhi 248” (FB) (24.11.1967)(referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur. Irrelevant) (Available)

2 “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another, AIR 1980 SC 946” (Available)

3. “In the Matter of Nanak Chand Theog, AIR 1989 Himachal Pradesh 46” (19.8.1988). (Available)

4. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. S.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. And others, AIR 1990 S.C. 1881” (6.4.1990) (Available) (M.Imp.)

5. “Delhi judicial service association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and other, AIR 1991 SC 2176” (11.9.1991) (Available)

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6. “Court of its own Motion v. B.D. Kaushik 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur) (Not available)

7. “Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” (19.2.1992) (Available)

Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC)

8. “Modern Food Industries (I) Ltd & Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass & Another, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 465 (21.9.1992) :- (Contempt for non-compliance with Court’s orders) (Available)

Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.

9. “National Textile Corporation v. Sundram Ors, 1994 (1) Scale 344” (Contempt for non-compliance with Court’s orders) (Not available)

10. “Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd.) And Another Vs, Russel Estate Corporation and Another, 1993 (2) SCC 533” (4.2.1993) (Available)


11. “National Textile Corporation Vs, V. Sundaram & Ors., 1994 (1) Scale 71” (19.1.1994) (Available) :-


12. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, JT 1994(6) S.C. 584” (4.10.1994) (Available):-

13. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 : 1995 RLR 1 (SC) : 1994 AIR SCW 4994” (14.11.1994) (M.I.) (Available) :-

14. “Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 130 : 1994 (4) Scale 1088” (23.11.1994) (Available)

15. “Prof. Shradha Kumari Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad And Others, 1996 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 85” (24.1.1995) (Available) :-


16. “In Re: Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 SCC 619 : JT 1995 (3) SC 538” (Both Available) (19.4.1995)


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17. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1795” (2.5.1995) (M.I.) (Available):-

18. “Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” (17.1.1996) (Available):-

(Contempt of Court and IPC)

19. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411” (10.4.1996) (Available)

20. The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR 1996 SC 1925 (9.5.1996) (Fining false proceeding in the court) (Available)

21. “J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 SC 113” (11.9.1996) (Available) :-


22. “Rita Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 SC 2174 : 1996(2) RCR 472” (27.9.1996) (M.I.) (Both Available):-

23. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1 AD (Delhi) 927” : “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997) (Available but not attached herewith) :-

24. “Indian Airports Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chattarjee And Another, AIR 1999 SC 880” (2.2.1999) (Available) :-


25. “K.S. Villasa Vs. M/S Ladies Corner & Another, AIR 1999 SC 2140” (3.2.1999):-


26. “Ms. Sophy Kelly and another Vs., Chandrakant Ganpat & Others, AIR 1999 SC 1042 “ (4.2.1999) (Not Available):-Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.

27. “Suo Motu Contempt, in Re : Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300 (26.2.1999)” (Available):-

28. “T.C. Mathews and anr. V. Distt. and Session Judge, 2000 RLR (N. S.C. ) 19” (Not Available)

29. “Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction And Another, (1999) 6 SCC 18” (5.4.1999) (Available):-


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30. Kapil Deo Prasad Sah And Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3215” (25.8.1999) (Available):-


31. “Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of Indian and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345” (15.10.1999) (Available):-


32. “Padmahasini alias Padmapriya Vs. C.R. Srinivas, AIR 2000 SC 68” (16.11.1999) (Available) :-


33. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124 (SC)” (25.1.2000) (Available):-

34. “P.C. Singhal Vs. R.B.S. Tyagi, 84 (2000) DLT 264 (DB)” (4.2.2000)(Referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur. Not relevant) (Available)

35. “Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000) (Not Available):-

Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case and moreover, this judgment has been overruled in the judgment reported as “Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549” (10.8.2001) (Available)

36. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal, Advocate, 2001 RLR 144 :89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB) (Delhi) : (16.1.2001) (Both Available):-

37. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001) (Available) (For filing false proceedings in court)

38. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt. Madhu Trehan & Ors, 92 (2001) DLT 665” (F.B.) (28.5.2001) (Available):-


39. “Rajeev Malhotra Vs. Union of India And Others, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)” (Available)

40. “Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549” (10.8.2001) (Available)

41. “Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali and Anr, AIR 2001 SC 3041 and VII (2001) SLT 153” (9.10.2001) (Both Available):-

42. “Sudhir Chona vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (62) DRJ 346 (DB)” (Delhi) (13.3.2002) (Available)

43. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri L.J. 493” (30.7.2003) (Available)

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44. “S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039” (19.8.2003) (A Three Judge Bench)

45. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004 SC 3114” (12.4.2004) (Available)

46. “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004) (Available)

Note: This judgment explain the procedure to be followed for registering a criminal contempt petition.

47. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367” (8.3.2006) (Available)

48. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 : 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” (9.2.2007) (Available)

49. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB) (17.2.2009) (Available)

50. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Delhi) (Not available)

Note: Relevant extract of this judgments pertaining to Contempt of Court has been quoted by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in its following judgment.

51. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)” (Delhi) (21.8.2008) (Paras 2, 8,10,11,20,78,125,127,143,155,169,206 & 207) (Available)

(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were Public Prosecutor and Defence Counsel respectively)

52. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261” (20.10.2008) (Available)

53. “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC) (Available)

54. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009) DLT 466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)

55. “Court on its own motion against Ajay Yadav, 165 (2009) DLT 520 (DB)” (6.11.2009)

56. “ST. Ives Laboratories Inc. Vs. Lotus Herbals UK Ltd , 164 (2009) DLT 473 (9.11.2009)

C-7. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub clause (iii) of Clause ( C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Interferes or tends to interfere with , or obstruct or tends to obstruct, the Administration of justice in any manner ) decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and Other High Courts

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C-8. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Contempt of Courts Act. which are important for the present case and appeal against the order dated 28.3.2008

D. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (3) of CCA

E. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (4) of CCA

F. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (5) of CCA

G. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (6) of CCA

H. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (7) of CCA

I. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (8) of CCA

J. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (9) of CCA

K. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (10) of CCA

L. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (11) of CCA

M. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (12) of CCA

N. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (13) of CCA

O. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (14) of CCA

P. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (15) of CCA

Q. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (16) of CCA

R. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (17) of CCA

S. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (18) of CCA

T. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (19) of CCA

U.. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (20) of CCA

U-1. Detail of judgments and propositions of law pertaining to section (20) of CCA as given in the court of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

95-132

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133-137

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U-2. Detail of judgments and their relevant extracts as given in the AIR Manual

U-3. Commentary on section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as given in the book titled “Iyer’s Law on Contempt of Courts” 4th Edition published by Delhi Law House.

U-4. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts which contain the proposition of law that Limitation as provided S. 20 of the Courts of Contempt Act, 1971 does not apply in a case of continuing wrong.

V. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (21) of CCA

W. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (22) of CCA

X. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (23) of CCA

Y. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (24) of CCA

Z. Prosecution of Judges and public servants

Z-1. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Contempt of Courts Act. which are important for the present case and appeal against the order dated 28.3.2008

Z-2. Important proposition of law pertaining to ‘Contempt of Courts Act’ relevant for arguments on the petitioner’s application U/o 12, R, 6 CPC:-

142-159

160-167

168-170

171

171-172

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173-174

175-192

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A. Detail of sections of the contempt of courts Act, 1971

Note : “The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971” contains 24 sections.

B. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (1) of CCA

Note : Section 1 of CCA deals with ‘short title and extent’ (Not relevant)

1. Offence of Contempt is one between Court and Contemner –Third party cannot intervene –Provisions of CPC do not apply vide “1991 Cri L.J. (NOC) 8 (DB)(Cal.)”.

C. Detail of judgments and propositions of law containing the definition of contempt as given in section (2) of CCA

Note : This Section deals with definitions and this section particularly defines contempt of court including criminal contempt and this section reads as under :-

“Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-(a) “contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt;

(b) “civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court,

(c ) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court ; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding ; or

(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;

(d) “High Court” means the High Court for a State or a Union territory, and includes the court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory.

Comments

(i) Attributing improper motive to a Judge or scurrilous abuse of a Judge will amount to scandalizing the court; Rajesh Kumar Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of M.O.,

(ii) Any action on the part of a litigant- be he a lawyer appearing in person – which has the tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due course of justice has to be dealt with sternly and firmly to uphold the majesty of law. No one can be permitted to intimidate or terrorise Judges by making scandalous unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant ‘wants’, vide Ajay Kumar Pandey (in re:), AIR 1998 SC 3299.

(iii) Contempt by speech or writing may be by scandalizing the court itself, or by abusing parties to actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour of or against a party before the cause is heard. It is incumbent upon courts of justice to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, for prejudicing the mind of the people against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is finally heard has pernicious consequences. Speech or writings misrepresenting the proceedings of the court or prejudicing the public for or against a party or involving reflections on parties to a proceeding amount to contempt. To make a speech tending to influence the result of a pending trial, whether civil or criminal is a grave contempt.

Comments on pending proceedings, if emanating from the parties or their lawyers, are generally a more serious contempt than those coming from independent sources; State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajanlal, AIR 1993 SC 1348.

(iv) Non caring of the warrant issued by the criminal court amounts to criminal contempt; E. Venkaiah Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1992 (3) ALT 193 (199).

(v) Any willful disobedience to the orders of the court to do or abstain from doing any act or breach of any undertaking given to the court is prima facie civil contempt; Vidya Sagar Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1991 All CJ 586 (588).

(vi) The law of contempt must be strictly interpreted and complied with before any person can be committed for contempt; Roshan S. Boyce Vs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd, AIR 1990 SC 1881.

C-1. Synopsis and judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per AIR Manual :-

1. S. 2 (a)=”Contempt of Court” means Civil Contempt or Criminal Contempt

2. S.2(b)= “Civil Contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, DIRECTION, order, writ OR OTHER PROCESS OF A COURT or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.

3. 2(c )= “Criminal Contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which :-

(i) Scandalises or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court ; or

(ii) PREJUDICES, or interferes or tends to interfere with, THE DUE COURSE OF ANY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ; or

(iii) INTERFERES OR TENDS TO INTERFERE WITH, OR OBSTRUCTS OR TENDS TO OBSTRUCT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN ANY OTHER MANNER

4. A Proceeding under CCA is a quasi –Criminal and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt vide “AIR 2001 SC 3468 (3469)”

5. In proceeding under CCA, court should take care to ascertain WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROOF before the Court that the respondent is guilty of contempt vide “1998 (3) Crimes 115 (DB)”

6. There is A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE between Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt, in that Civil Contempt is a wrong for which the law awards to reparation to the injured party though nominally a Contempt of Court is in fact a wrong of a private nature as BETWEEN SUBJECT AND SUBJECT AND THE KING IS NOT A PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS to punish it. The criminal contempt relates to causing of prejudice or INTERFERES OR TENDS TO INTERFERE WITH DUE COURSE OF ANY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE vide “1998 (1) Cal. LT 447 (451” (DB).

7. Initiation and institution of Contempt Proceedings are not identical or similar. They are different –proceeding is instituted by a litigant and it is initiated by a court vide “1993 (2)WLC 397 (411)(DB)(Raj.)”

8. Highly placed police officials disregarding order of Court-Even if order obtained by fraud remains valid unless revised-Violation amounts to contempt vide “1980 Cri LJ 57 : 1979 Pat. LJR 174.”

9. Contempt is of two kinds : (a) that which interferes with the due course of justice and pollutes the stream of justice in so far as it concerns parties to a cause, as for instance, when comments are made on a pending case; (b) that which is calculated to bring a Judge into contempt or lower his authority or to interfere with the lawful process of the Court vide “AIR 1953 Orissa 33 (38) : 1953 Cri LJ 349 (DB).”

10. There are three categories of contempt : (i) contempt in respect of orders of Court, (ii) contempt by letters or pamphlets addressed to the Judge who is to decide the case with the intention either by threats or flattery or bribery to influence his decisions, and (iii) constructive contempt depending upon the influence of an intention to obstruct the course of justice vide AIR 1955 Andhra 156 (159) : 1955 Cri LJ 1028 (DB).”

11. THE SUBORDINATE AUTHORITIES ARE BOUND TO ACQUAINT THEMSELVES WITH THE DECISIONS OF HIGH COURT AND IN CASE THESE RULINGS ARE NOT FOLLOWED IN APPROPRIATE CASES THEY ARE LIABLE TO BE PROCEEDED WITH FOR CONTEMPT VIDE “1972 TAX LR 1952 (1953) : 37 CUT LT 1232.”

12. There can be o comprehensive or final definition of what would constitute contempt of Court; but any conduct which has the effect of diminishing the prestige and authority of the Court, which is likely to lower the esteem of the Court in the minds of the public and which gives an impression that, with impunity the orders of the High Court could be disobeyed by mere stratagem or contrivance, would certainly amount to contempt vide “(1969) Mad. LW (Cri) 25 (27, 28)(DB).”

13. For constituting civil contempt essential ingredient is “willful disobedience” and “willful” connotes “Purposeful” and “clear intention to flout”. For constituting criminal contempt essential ingredients are “iterferna” or “tending to interfere with” the due course of any judicial proceeding or “interference” or “tending to interfere with” or “obstructing” or “tending to obstruct” the administration of justice in any manner vide “1986 Pat. LJR (HC) 933 (940, 941) :1987 BLJR 386 (DB) ** 1993 (21) All LR 155 (157) ** 1993 (1) All Rent Cas. 114: 1993 (1) Civ LJ 394 (398) ** 1993 (I) Pun LR 226 (229) : 1993 (1) Rev LR 202 (DB).”

14. Letter written by contemner to Union Home Minister regarding corruption in judiciary- Sole object in writing the letter was to invite the attention of the concerned authorities to increasing corruption – No improper motive or malicious intention attributable- Not a fit case for taking action against contemner vide “1978 Cri LJ 1440 (1444) : 1978 Raj LW 224 (DB).”

15. Proceedings in contempt-Vague and general allegations not sufficient to make out a case for proceedings in contempt of Court vide “1972 UJ (SC) 462(2)(463).”

16. The High Court can initiate contempt proceedings suo motu even in a civil contempt. No particular form of procedure is necessary so long as the proceedings are initiated giving an opportunity to the contemner to defend himself. Art. 21 of the Constitution is not I any way of violated thereof vide “AIR 1974 Mad. 313 (316) : (1974) 1 Mad LJ 155.”

17. The question of initiation of contempt proceedings in exercise of suo motu power by a Judge or Judges will arise only when they are hearing a particular case and conduct of case comes to notice of Court vide “2004(1)Andh WR 418 (468) : 2003 (12) Ind LD 342 (DB).”

18. Contempt proceedings power to initiate suo motu ca be exercised only by Court of record such as Supreme Court ad High Court- Status quo order- Alleged violation of –Detention of defendant by trial Court in civil prison straightway- Trial Court had dealt with contention in reply affidavit treating it as application U/O 39, R. 2A CPC- Such approach of trial Court runs counter to principles governing contempt proceedings- Order of trial Court liable to be set aside vide “AIR 2005 (NOC) 173 : (2004) 6 Andh LD 579.”

19. Where suo motu notice of contempt has been initiated and determined initiation of inquiry and proceedings under S. 340 Cr. P.C. would not be in interest of justice vide “2007 Cri LJ 2339 (2347) : 2007 (138) Delhi LT 682.”

20. Criminal contempt- High Court taking suo motu cognizance under Art. 215- Provisions of Act, not attracted vide “1996 Cri LJ 1090 (1095) : 1996 (1) Mah LJ 491 (DB) (Bom).”

C-2. Synopsis and judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per the book titled “Iyer’s Law on Contempt of Courts” 4 th edition published by Delhi Law House :-

1. Scope

1. “Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of M.P. 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 529 : AIR 1992 SC 904”

(i) Para 61 of the above referred judgment :-

“61. To punish an advocate for contempt of court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the courts from being deflected or interfered with and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the court, though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to court or court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice.”

2. “R.K. Tiwari Vs. N.K. Pandey, 1999 Cri L.J. 4008 at 4009 (M.P.)”

3. Accused bringing some persons to impersonate as contesting respondents and persuading court to accept compromise held guilty of contempt

1. “Pushpendra Pal Singh Vs. Devraj Pandey, 1999 Cri L.J. 3706 (All.)”

2. “Kedar Nath Sinha Vs. Sahadeo Jha, 1977 Cri L.J. 1174(Pat.)”

3. “V.C. Govindaswami Mudali Vs. B. Subba Reddy, 1986 (3) Crimes 170 (AP)”

26. Non-compliance with courts order

1. “Daya Shankar Dubey Vs. Subhas Kumar, 1992 Cri L.J. 319 (All.)

27. THE SUPREME COURT CANNOT ALLOW A PATENT DISHONESTY ON THE PART OF A LITIGANT TO PERPETUATE

1. “Roshan Sam Boyce, Dr. (Mrs.) Vs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd , AIR 1990 SC 1881

33. BREACH OF UNDERTAKING DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY – CONTEMPT PROCEEDING BEST METHODTO DEAL WITH SUCH SITUATION

1. “Hindustan Level Limited Vs. Cavinkare Limited, 2004 Cri L.J. 349”

34. Willful disobedience of the order

1. “R. Narapa Vs. Jagarlamudi Candramouli, AIR 1967 A.P. 219 at page 228”

38. USING OF FORGED ORDERS OF COURT

1. “In re : Vineet Kumar Singh AIR 2001 SC 2018”

(A false, or misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order is contempt.)

59. NON-COMPLIANCE OF ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT

1. “Dhurandhar Prasad Sinha Vs. Jai Prakas University AIR 2001 SC 2552 “

(THE SUCCESSOR IN OFFICE IS BOUND BY THE ORDER EVEN IF IT IS NOT BROUGHT ON RECORD AT THE TIME OF ENFORCEMENT OF THIS ORDER SUCH A PLEA BY THE SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST IS NOT IN TENABLE.)

61. Order passed without jurisdiction :

1. “1913 A.C. 417, Drewry Thacker, (1819) 3 Swan 529 at page 564 and Amar Nath Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1981 Cri L.J. 1880 at page 1884 (Delhi)”

(The remarks of Viscount Haldane, V.C. in Scott Vs. Scott, do support the view that when there is an irregularity of substance, or lack of jurisdiction to make the order, then there is no duty that the order be first obeyed before its is quashed by the same or a superior court. Therefore, the court would forget its duty, if it did not give the respondents the benefit of the fact that the order might not to have been made.)

2. “Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale Vs. Vidyavardhini Sabha, 1984 Mah. L.J. 520 at pages 532-533” (Most important)

(Where an authority which purports to pass an order is acting without jurisdiction, purported order is a nullity and it is not necessary for a party, who objects to that order to apply to set it aside. He can rely on its in validity when it is set up against him, although he has not taken steps to set it aside. The order of which contempt is alleged to have been committed was without jurisdiction, and hence, the contemners and the other members of the governing council who tended and proceeded with the meeting did not commit any contempt when the ignored the order of injunction passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal)

3. “Kuldip Narain Lal Vs. Mahendra Pal Jain, 1984 Cri L.J. 1243 (All.)

(The proposition that the executing court cannot go into the legality or otherwise of the decree is not an absolute proposition and certainly the court could go behind the decree if the decree is said to be without jurisdiction. In the instant case, the order of the Tribunal is said to have been committed was wholly without jurisdiction and as such, in the particular circumstances of this case, this could not be the subject matter of punishment under the Act. Once the order is held to be without jurisdiction then the disobedience of the order would not be a contempt.)

62. Fair criticism of the conduct of a judge

1. “P.N. Duda Vs. P. Shiv Shankar, (1988) 3 SCC 167”

(Administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office i.e. to defend and uphold the constitution and lodge without fear and favour. Thus the Judges must do, in the light given to them to determine what is right. Any Criticism about the Judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of the judges and brings administration of justice to ridicule must be prevented the contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticized. Motives to the judges need not be attributed.)

2. “Arunadhati Roy, In re : (2002) 3 SCC 349 : AIR 2002 SC 1375”

(In a democracy, judges and courts alike are, therefore, subject to criticism and if reasonable arguments or criticism in respectful language and tampered with moderation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or public good, no court would treat criticism as a contempt of court.)

70. AN ADVOCATE OWES A DUTY NOT ONLY TO HIS CLIENT BUT ALSO TOWARDS THE COURT- HE MUST OBSERVE LIMITATIONS

WHILE DRAFTING THE CONTENTS OF THE PLEADINGS

1. “Anita Sohania Ghai Vs. Snehlata 1996 Cri. L.J. 3641 at page 3643 Bombay

2. “Union of India Vs. Gulsha Bajwa (2003) 7 SCC 545 at page 545”

3. “Court on its own motion Vs. Ajay Bansal, 2004 Cri L.J. 2601 at pages 2614 (P & H)

4.. “B. Ramakrishana Reddy Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149”

71. Heartfelt apology and paper apology –distinguished

1. “Ramesh Chandra Vs. J.R. Chaudhury, 1996 Cri L.J. 1554 (All.)”

2. “L.D. Jaikawal Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374”

73. BREACH OF UNDERTAKING GIVEN TO THE COURT IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND ITSELF AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT

1. “Virendra Nath Sorav Vs. Sajjan Kumar, 1996 Cri L.J. 2564 at Page 2567 (Raj.)”

(Law has been well settled by the Apex Court that a party giving undertaking to the court based on implications or exemptions which are false to its knowledge is guilty of misconduct amounting to contempt of court within the ambit of section 2).

2. “Bank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin Hasan Haya (2004) 1 SCC 360 at page 371”

(The violation of breach of undertaking which became part of the decree of the court certainly amounts to contempt of court.)

78. ORDER PASSED BY ANY AUTHORITY CONTRARY TO JUDGMENT OF HIGH COURT AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT

1. “Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Hari Nath Sharma, 1995 Cri L.J. 1290 (Raj.)”

2. “C. Sadhanandam Vs. Prof. Rama Murthy, 1997 (A) ALD 225 (DB)”

80. Breach of undertaking

1. “Noor Ali Babul Thanewala Vs. S. K.M.M. Shetty, (1990) 1 CRC 378 (All.) : 1990 (2) Bom. C.R. 236 at Page 241”

84. BREACH OF SOLEMN UNDERTAKING GIVEN TO THE COURT AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

1. “Srinivasa Rao Kumbhari Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 Cri L.J. 353 (AP)”

2. “Subramanian Swamy Vs. Hari Bhhaskar (2003) 1 SCC 504”

3. “K.C.G. Verghese Vs. K.T. Rajenderan, AIR 2003 SC 1555”

86. Breach of undertaking given to court amounts to contempt –Apology not acceptable

1. “Rajiv Choudhary Vs. Jagdish Narain Khanna, 1996 J.C.C.L. at pages 6, 7 (SC)”

90. Interference with administration of justice

1. “Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176

2. “Dr. D.C. Saxena Vs. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, AIR 1996 SC 2481”

91. Breach of undertaking

Breach of undertaking is a type of civil contempt.

1. “Nisha Kanto Ray Chowdhury Vs. Smt Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Cal. 294 at page 296”

2. “Bajrang Lal Gangadhar Khemka Vs. Kapur Chand Ltd, AIR Bom. 326 at p. 337”

3. “Sambhu Charan Nundy Vs. Gopi Mohan Bhattacharjee, AIR 1951Cal. 507 at page 509

4. “Bukhtiartur Bihar Light Rly. Co. Ltd Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1951 231 at page 237.”

5. “Raziya Mahboob Patel Vs. Rajesab Hasan, 2001 Cri L.J. 269 at P. 273, 274 (Kant.)”

6. “Smt Lajuklata Vs. Narishingha Prosad, AIR 1952 Cal. 669 at Page. 670”

7. “Sukumar Mitra Vs. Tarasankar Ghosh, AIR 1952 Cal.591 at p. 593.”

8. “Suretennaessa Bibi Vs. Chaintaharan Das AIR 1955 Cal. 182 at p. 183”

9. “Bhatanagar and Company Ltd Vs. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 478 at p. 482”

10. “Ram Juwan Vs. Devendra Nath Gupta, AIR 1960 MP 280 at p. 281, 282”

11. “Chhaganbhai Norshinbhi Vs. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai, 1976 (3) SCR 786 at p. 787 : AIR 1976 SC 1909

12. “Babu Ram Gupta Vs. Sudhir Bhasin, (1980) 3 SCC 47”

13. “R.M. Ramaul Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171 at p. 172”

14. “Saleemuddin Vs. Sharfuddin, AIR 1980 Delhi 39” at p. 42”

15. “Virochan Vs. Ram Saran Das, 1982 Cri. LJ 1219 at p. 1222”

16. “J.P.Goyal Vs. Ajeet Kaur (1985) 27 DLT 197 at p. 201”

17. “Union of India Vs. Mario Cabralae Sa, 1982 Cri LJ 187 (SC )

18. “State Bank of India, New Delhi Vs. D.S. Dalal, 1982 Cri. LJ 395” at p. 399.(Delhi)

19. “K.B. Shiva kumar Vs. Kanak Raj Mehta, AIR 2000 SC 3515 at p. 3515”

20. “Mohd. Idris Vs. Rustam Jahangir, AIR 1984 SC 182”

21. “J.Vasudevan Vs. T.R. Dhananjaya , (1995) 6 SCC 249”

22. “Shanti Lal Makanji Kalyanji Shah Vs. Ranchoddas Girdhardas,1980 (1) SCC 205”

92. CONTEMPT IN PLEADINGS

The averments made by the second respondent in his affidavit before the Sub-Court, Trivandrum, affirmed as they are by the statements made by him and in the affidavit filed in this Court clearly show that he has committed criminal contempt as defied in Sec. 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. These statements scandalize and lower the authority of this Court and obstruct the administration of justice. Vide “Advocate General, Kerala State, Ernakulam Vs. Rev. Further. K.T. Mathew, 1986 (1) Crimes 294 at p. 299 (Ker.)”.

At one place in the writ petition, he has alleged :“Thus the working of the Judges are cocktail based on Western Common Laws and American techniques, s such unproductive and out-dated according to socio-economic conditions of the country.”

At one another place, the petitioner has stated that :

“This Court has become a constitutional liability without having control over the illegal acts of the Government. Thus the people for whom the Constitution is meant have now turned down their faces against it which is a disillusionment for fear that justice is a will of the wisp.”

Yet at another place, the petitioner has stated that this Court is sleeping over the issues like Kumbhakarna. The reading of the writ petition gives the impression that it is clearly intended to denigrate this Court in the esteem of the people of India. Prima facie view is that the petition has been drawn up with a designed purpose of bringing the Court into contempt and the petitioner is, therefore, prima facie guilty of contempt. Vide “Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 107 at pp. 107, 108.”

Moving contempt application against a Judge on flimsy grounds with deliberate intention of embarrassing and disqualifying him from trying a case, setting up against him unfounded plea of bias, open expression of lack of confidence in the Judge without any valid reason and then urging him to release a case, and seeking unnecessary adjournments on non-existent grounds with oblique motive of arresting or obstructing the progress of a case are the instances of contumacious conduct tending to interfere with the administration of justice inviting action for contempt. Vide “Ram Ji Lal Sharma Vs. Civil Judge, A.I.R. 1988 All. 143 at pp. 145, 146.”

The object of writing these offending paragraphs and particularly of filing the representation petition in the High Court at the time it was actually done was quite clearly to influence or affect the minds of the Judges and to detract them from the strict performance of their duties. Vide “Sarat Chandra Biswas Vs. Surendra Mohanty, A.I.R. 1969 Orissa 117 at p. 128.”

Action of the respondents in SWEARING PRIMA FACIE TO THE FALSE FACTS IN THE AFFIDAVITS AND IN THEIR STATEMENTS amounts to gross contempt of this Court as the action of the contemner substantially interferes with the due course of justice. Vide “Sudesh Kumar Vs. Jai Narain, 1974 P.L.R. 23 at p. 26.”

No person is permitted to make allegations scandalizing the Judge of the Court even in an application for transfer of a case from that Court. The nature of the allegations in such case assumes importance. It was opined that the allegations in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the transfer application in the instant case, and to which allegations Shri C.K. Saraf was an active subscriber leave no manner of doubt that they were made mala fide to disrepute the Judge and to scandalize

him. Vide “State of M.P. Vs. Chandra Kant Saraf, 1985 (2) Crimes 208 at p. 213 (M.P.) see also Barely Vs. Xavier, m1986 (3) Crimes 544.”

The review application is LACKING IN BONA FIDES BASED ON FALSE AVERMENTS and constitutes a flagrant abuse of the process of the Court. The allegations contained in the said two letters are WHOLLY INACCURATE AND TOTALLY FALSE. Such attempts to question the sanctity of the Court proceedings, unless ruthlessly curbed, will have the tendentious effect of making fearless dispensation of justice by the courts in India almost impossible. Vide “Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union of India, 1986 S.C.C. (Cr.) 67 at p. 71.”

Shri M.L. Sood, Under Secretary (Education), should never have sworn the affidavit unless he had personally verified the facts from the official record. Of course, he was at liberty to say in the verification that he was verifying from the copies of the record shown to him by the particular person. He is warned not to repeat it in future. Vide “Court on its own motion Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1984 Sim. L.C. 51 at pp. 56,59.”

Swearing affidavits personally for the purpose of the same being used in this Court, ought to be extremely careful as to what language they use and what statements of fact they make. False affidavit may amount to contempt of Court. Vide “Tarafatullah Mandal Vs. S.N. Maitra, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 919 at p. 925.”

If some allegations are made in the oral or written representations which turn out to be true, even then the petitions ridiculing the Courts and lowering their position in the eyes of the general public are not permitted. It is the prestige of the Court which is at stake, not the individual who sits as a Judge. Contempt proceedings, therefore, are clearly to safeguard only the interest and prestige of the public justice. Vide “Court on its own motion Vs. Ajit Singh, 1986 Cr. L.J. 590 at p. 601.”

The submissions made in pursuance of the order of the Court, they cannot be held to be private communications to the Company Judge in order to decide the case. As these documents were filed before the Court under the directions of the Court itself, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that these documents prejudiced, interfered or tendered to interfere with the due course of justice. Vide “Major R.S. Murgai Vs. Major P.N. Kaushik, 1980 (1) S.C.R. 936 at p. 937.”

It depends upon facts and circumstances in a case whether the allegations contained in transfer application amount or do not amount to contempt of Court. Vide “S. Sher Singh Vs. Raghu Pati Kapur, A.I.R. 1968 P & H 217 at p. 231.”

The mere statement that Magistrate is friendly with a party who happens to be an advocate and enjoys his hospitality or has friendly relations with him will not constitute contempt unless there is an imputation of some improper motives as would amount to scandalizing the Court itself and as would have a tendency to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the Courts. In the garb of a transfer application, a person cannot be allowed to commit contempt of Court by making allegations of a serous and scurrilous nature scandalizing the Court and imputing improper motives to the Judge trying the case. vide “Govind Ram Vs. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 989 at pp. 993, 995.”

The opposite party committed contempt of Court by attributing mala fides to the Assistant Registrar in his memorandum of appeal so much so that the Assistant Registrar in his memorandum of appeal so much so that the Assistant Registrar was made a respondent in the appeal and cost was sought to be recovered personally against him. Vide “Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd Vs. Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha, AIR 1965 Pat. 227 at p. 235.

A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the Court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, IT SHOULD ALSO DECIDE THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the Court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that Supreme Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the Court to modify these orders while holding that it has no

jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise in such a case, the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction. Vide “Tyabbhai M. Bagasarwalla Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1240 at p. 1250 : (1997) 3 SCC 443.”

93. Instances of civil contempt

1. “AIR 2000 Cal. 68”

2. “A.S. Socha Gowder, In re: AIR 1956 Mad. 335”

(A person is not desirous of complying with the order amounts to contempt of civil court).

3. “Hastings Mill Limited Vs. Hira Singh 1978 Cri L.J. 560 (Cal.)

(An act of misleading the court by deliberate suppression of fact or by the presentation of falsehood is as much abuse of the courts process as the act of bringing frivolous and vexatious and oppressive proceedings )

4. “1982 Cri. L.J. 2199 at P. 2200”

5. “(1980) 3 SCC 311” (Most important)

6. “(1983) 1 Cri L.J. 528 (Imp.)

7. “AIR 1942 Bom. 257 (FB) ; AIR 1954 SC 340 & 1985 Cri. L.J. 359”

(It is well settled that an order without jurisdiction is a nullity which can be ignored with impunity )

97. Deliberately making effort to disobey the orders of the court amounts to contempt

1. “T.R. Dhananjaya Vs. J. Vasudevan, AIR 1996 SC 302 at p. 304 & 305”

98. Attempt to exploit the courts order by illegal means amounts to contempt

1. “A. Dharamarajan Vs. Collector of Kamarajar, 1994 Cri LJ 2960 at p. 2964 (Mad.)

113. CONTEMPT OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS BY MAKING FALSE AND FABRICATED STATEMENT

In the instant case, the question was- Whether he committed contempt in the proceedings of Supreme Court ? Section 2(b) defines, “Contempt of Court” to mean any civil or criminal contempt. “Criminal contempt” defined in Sec. 2(c ) means interference with the administration of justice in any other manner. A false or a misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings. It is seen that Ahlawat, respondent No. 3, to the main writ petition and incharge of the criminal administration, with his connivance, caused

two minor boys wrongful detention. He made an averment in the counter-affidavit dated 30t October, 1993, that they were not in wrongful detention nor are they taken into custody which was later found to be false. He first used fabricated counter-affidavit, forget by Krishan Kumar in the proceeding to obtain a favourable order. But when he perceived adverse atmosphere to him, he fabricated further false evidence and sought to use an affidavit evidence to show that Krishan Kumar had forget his signature without his knowledge and filed the fabricated document. Thereby, he further committed contempt of the judicial process. He has no regard for truth from stage to stage, he committed contempt of the Court by making false statements. Being a responsible officer, he is required to make truthful statements before the Court, but he made obviously false statements. Thereby, he committed criminal contempt of judicial proceeding of Supreme Court. Vide “Afjal Vs. State of Haryana, 1996 (1)Crimes 58 at p. 75 (S.C.) 1996 Cr.L.J. 1679 : A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2326 : (1996) 7 S.C.C. 397.”

The investigating officer by the false statements on oath had clearly tried to misland the Court with the intention to get the petition dismissed and at no point of time till the disposal of the petition expressed willingness to withdraw from pursuing with his objection for transfer of the investigation even after the A.P.P. himself had fairly conceded to the need of transfer of the investigation to the Economic offences wing. Thus the investigating officer by his conduct and statements tried to interfere with the administration of justice in as much as that he tried to get the petition dismissed by making false statements on oath and to the prejudice of the petitioner when the facts clearly warranted the relief as prayed for by the petitioner. When the act complained of substantially interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of justice which is a facet of the broad concept of the administration of justice, then the contemner is not entitled to evade the peal consequences of such act, by taking shelter of section 13 of the said Act. vide “The Kapol Co-op. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Cr.L.J. 765 at pp. 769, 774.”

117. Affidavit containing false, mischievous and scurrilous allegation amounts to criminal contempt

There are no good reasons to infer that the respondent was interested in the purity of administration of justice and, therefore, he made complaints believing them honestly to be true to the High Court against the officers. He submitted an advocate copy of his affidavit to the Bar Association and the bar Association, after discussing the contents of the affidavit, came to the conclusions that all of them were false and the respondent was requested not to submit the same to the High Court. In spite of it, the respondent had chosen to submit to the Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, his affidavit containing false, mischievous and scurrilous allegations against the Subordinate Judge. He thus gave wide publicity to what he intended to do and this was done, according to Court in the circumstances, only with an oblique motive to bring the administration of justice into disrespect. He scandalised the authority of the Court and tried to bring it down by his false accusations. Being a senior Advocate of 32 years standing at the Bar, e tried to gain an unfair advantage by insisting that the cheque should be given in his name without filing the affidavit of the decree-holder. He was aware of the clear legal position but he tried to bamboozle and over-awe the judicial officer in the open court by threatening to show his power. Not satisfied with that, he made a written complaint against the District Munsif making a false allegations to what happened in connection with the passing of orders o the cheque petition. One of the advocates who written statement present in the Court gave an affidavit describing in verbatim the scurrilous attacks made by the respondent against the officer in the open court. He has no regard for decency and decorum, his attitude appears to be to terrorise judicial officers and show his prominence to everybody with a view to gain unfair advantage as a legal practitioner. His plea in the counter-affidavit that he was interested in the purity of administration of justice is only a camouflage to gain sympathy of the Court. His attempts to justify his conduct and his offer to tender unconditional apology do not go together. Court does not find any bona fides in his expression of regrets. In a deliberate and calculated manner, he tried to denigrate the two judicial officers- the Subordinate Judge and the District Munsif. A full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Advocate General Vs. Rachapudi Subba Rao, vide 1990 (3) A.L.T. 531 after reviewing the case law on contempt of court, observed :

“Any attack on the competence and integrity of a Judge, whether of a superior Court or a subordinate Court, amounts to scandalizing the Court itself. If an apprehension is created in the public mind about the integrity, ability or fairness of a judge, it is a Contempt of Court. Affirmatively it need not be proved that there is an interference with the administration of

justice. An individual occupying a judicial officer cannot be treated apart from his office in respect of the work he does in the court.”

The conduct of the respondent falls clearly within the ambit of the definition of criminal contempt under sec. 2(c )(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act. vide “Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, 1995 (1) Crimes 86 at pp. 90-91 (A.P.)”

118. CONCEALING OF FACTS AND FALSE REPRESENTATION AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT

The petitioners obtained favourable orders in the writ petitions by concealing the material facts and making false representation. Punjab and Haryana High Court was influenced by the suppressio veri and suggestion falsi. The conduct of the petitioners prima facie amounts to gross contempt of Court. Let show cause notice to issue to them. The counsel undertook to produce the petitioners in the Court, as and when desired. The petitioners, through their counsel, are directed to appear inn Court on 11th February, 1994, so that the show cause notices be served upon them. Vide “Harbhajan Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 (P&H) 216 at pp. 220, 221; see also Rita Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 S.C. 2174 at pp. 2177, 2178.”

138. Any conduct intended to interfere with the administration of justice amounts to a criminal contempt

1. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar, AIR 1994 SC 4994 : (1995) SCC 421” (Available)

2. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 1795” (Available)

141. Judicial order passed in bonafide belief cannot be treated as contempt but an error of judgment

1. “Yaqub Ali Vs. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cri L.J. 1376” (Important for Mr. Khanna C/o Mr. B.L. Mehta Advocate)

154. Reprehensible conduct and indifference to implement the order of Supreme Court calls for strong condemnation and the contemner is unworthy to hold ay office of

responsibility

1. “Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt; Ltd. Vs. Terai Tea Co. (Petitioner) Ltd, 1996 (1) SCC 589 at p. 592, 593”

156. INDIFFERENT AND NEGLIGENT ATTITUDE OF THE OFFICIALS TO ANY ORDER OR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AMOUNTS TO CIVIL CONTEMPT

1. “State of A.P. Vs. National Council for the Church & Social action, India, 1996 Cri LJ 2857 at p. 2859, 2860 (A.P.)

157. Filing of forged and fabricated documents with the help of others amounts to gross contempt of court

1. “Phool Singh Vs. Tulai Ram Gangwar, 1996 Cri LJ 3818 at p. 3821 (All.)”

2. “Vineet Kumar Singh, in re: (2001) 5 SCC 501 at p. 506, 507”

176. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution Guarantees freedom of speech and expression but makes an exception in respect of contempt of court

1. “E.M. Sankran Namboodripad Vs. T. Narayanan Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325”

2. “Arundhati Roy, in re : AIR 2002 SC 1375”

178. Contemner the advocate questioning the conduct of the judges of Supreme Court demanding apology and compensation from them- 6 months’ imprisonment

1. “In re : - Ajay Kumar Pandey AIR 1997 SC 260 at Page 272” (Important for Mr. Khanna C/o Mr. B.L. Mehta Advocate )

184. A FALSE OR A MISLEADING OR A WRONG STATEMENT DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY MADE BY USING FABRICATED COUNTER AFFIDAVIT TO

OBTAIN FAVOURABLE ORDER AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

1. “Afzal Vs. State of Haryana AIR 1996 SC 2326” (Available)

188 . UNCONCERNED APPROACHED OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO THE DIRECTIONS OF SUPREME COURT MEANS A WILLFUL

DISREGARD AND CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

Where disobedience or on-compliance of an order of a superior court is not by a party to a proceeding but by a subordinate court or tribunal, different considerations may arise. Thus, when an act or omission complained of is committed by a Judicial Officer and it involves violation of an order of a superior court it can amount to criminal contempt of superior court depending on the nature and magnitude f the violation and the manner of violation establishing willfulness, absent good faith. The adjournments granted by the respondent in the I.A. From 11 th

July, 1995 onwards he had clearly disclosed that he was willfully and intentionally accommodating the plaintiff, who was not able to bring his advocate to the Court in view of the advocates boycott, the plaintiff’s advocate being the President of the local Bar Association. The plaintiff’s advocate never attended the respondent’s court, till the boycott was lifted on 5 th

September, 1995. Under these circumstances, if the respondent was inclined to diligently follow the directions of A.P. High Court he ought have gone through the papers himself, which were all before him and disposed of the matter keeping in view the provisions of Rule 3A of order XXXIX of the Code. Their Lordships had to consider the matter by not looking at each adjournment granted but on an overall view of the manner in which the respondent proceeded with the matter and adjudge his attitude. The dilatory and leisurely manner in which he dealt with the matter discloses a certain casualness and unconcerned approach to the directions of this Court, which means a willful disregard of the orders of Court and, therefore, constitutes contempt of court. As Judicial Officer, the respondent should realize that his first duty is to the institution of Justice and that he should not, in any manner, hinder or hamper the even flow of justice. In the present case, the respondent did not tender any apology in his counter affidavit. He sought the dismissal of the contempt case with costs. He did not even mention that he disposed of the I.A. on 3rd November 1995. In his additional-affidavit, he offered apology in the following terms. “I offer unconditional apology for any act I may have done inadvertently and pray this Hon’ble Court to exonerate me in the interest of justice in view of the facts and circumstances stated above and in my earlier affidavit….”.

In view of this, their Lordships close the contempt proceedings recording that the conduct of the respondent, merits admonition and a warning to be careful in future. He shall heed this. Vide “G. Raja Kumari Vs. B. Krishna Rao (D.B.), 1996 (3) A.L.D. 848 at pp. 855, 863,864.

189. Overruled case law cited –Not amount to contempt

1. “AIR 2001 P & H 49”

C-3. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts pertaining to Civil Contempt

C-4. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub-clause (i) of Clause (C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court).

C-5. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub-clause (ii) of clause (C ) of section 2 of Contempt of Court Act (Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings)

C-6. Detail of judgments pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub clause (iii) of Clause ( C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Interferes or tends to interfere with , or obstruct or tends to obstruct, the Administration of justice in any manner ) decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and Other High Courts

1. “ Court on its own motion v. K.S. Sethi, AIR 1968 Delhi 248” (FB) (24.11.1967)(referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur. Irrelevant) (Available)

2 “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another, AIR 1980 SC 946” (Available)

3. “In the Matter of Nanak Chand Theog, AIR 1989 Himachal Pradesh 46” (19.8.1988). (Available)

4. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. S.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. And others, AIR 1990 S.C. 1881” (6.4.1990) (Available) (M.Imp.)

5. “Delhi judicial service association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and other, AIR 1991 SC 2176” (11.9.1991) (Available)

6. “Court of its own Motion v. B.D. Kaushik 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur) (Not available)

7. “Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” (19.2.1992) (Available)


8. “Modern Food Industries (I) Ltd & Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass & Another, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 465 (21.9.1992) :- (Contempt for non-compliance with Court’s orders) (Available)


9. “National Textile Corporation v. Sundram Ors, 1994 (1) Scale 344” (Contempt for non-compliance with Court’s orders) (Not available)

10. “Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd.) And Another Vs, Russel Estate Corporation and Another, 1993 (2) SCC 533” (4.2.1993) (Available)


11. “National Textile Corporation Vs, V. Sundaram & Ors., 1994 (1) Scale 71” (19.1.1994) (Available) :-


12. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, JT 1994(6) S.C. 584” (4.10.1994) (Available):-

13. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 : 1995 RLR 1 (SC) : 1994 AIR SCW 4994” (14.11.1994) (M.I.) (Available) :-

14. “Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 130 : 1994 (4) Scale 1088” (23.11.1994) (Available)

15. “Prof. Shradha Kumari Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad And Others, 1996 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 85” (24.1.1995) (Available) :-


16. “In Re: Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 SCC 619 : JT 1995 (3) SC 538” (Both Available) (19.4.1995)

Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC) 17. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1795” (2.5.1995) (M.I.) (Available):-

18. “Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” (17.1.1996) (Available):-

(Contempt of Court and IPC)

19. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411” (10.4.1996) (Available)

20. The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR 1996 SC 1925 (9.5.1996) (Fining false proceeding in the court) (Available)

21. “J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 SC 113” (11.9.1996) (Available) :-


22. “Rita Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 SC 2174 : 1996(2) RCR 472” (27.9.1996) (M.I.) (Both Available):-

23. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1 AD (Delhi) 927” : “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997) (Available but not attached herewith) :-

24. “Indian Airports Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chattarjee And Another, AIR 1999 SC 880” (2.2.1999) (Available) :-


25. “K.S. Villasa Vs. M/S Ladies Corner & Another, AIR 1999 SC 2140” (3.2.1999):-


26. “Ms. Sophy Kelly and another Vs., Chandrakant Ganpat & Others, AIR 1999 SC 1042 “ (4.2.1999) (Not Available):-Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.

27. “Suo Motu Contempt, in Re : Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300 (26.2.1999)” (Available):-

28. “T.C. Mathews and anr. V. Distt. and Session Judge, 2000 RLR (N. S.C. ) 19” (Not Available)

29. “Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction And Another, (1999) 6 SCC 18” (5.4.1999) (Available):-


30. Kapil Deo Prasad Sah And Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3215” (25.8.1999) (Available):-


31. “Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of Indian and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345” (15.10.1999) (Available):-


32. “Padmahasini alias Padmapriya Vs. C.R. Srinivas, AIR 2000 SC 68” (16.11.1999) ( Available) :-


33. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124 (SC)” (25.1.2000) (Available):-

34. “P.C. Singhal Vs. R.B.S. Tyagi, 84 (2000) DLT 264 (DB)” (4.2.2000)(Referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur. Not relevant) (Available)

35. “Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000) (Not Available):-

Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.36. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal, Advocate, 2001 RLR 144 :89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB) (Delhi) : (16.1.2001) (Both Available):-

37. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001) (Available) (For filing false proceedings in court)

38. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt. Madhu Trehan & Ors, 92 (2001) DLT 665” (F.B.) (28.5.2001) (Available):-


39. “Rajeev Malhotra Vs. Union of India And Others, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)” (Available)

40. “Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549” (10.8.2001) (Available)

41. “Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali and Anr, AIR 2001 SC 3041 and VII (2001) SLT 153” (9.10.2001) (Both Available):-

42. “Sudhir Chona vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (62) DRJ 346 (DB)” (Delhi) (13.3.2002) (Available)

43. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri L.J. 493” (30.7.2003) (Available)

44. “S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039” (19.8.2003) (A Three Judge Bench)

45. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004 SC 3114” (12.4.2004) (Available)

46. “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004) (Available)

Note: This judgment explain the procedure to be followed for registering a criminal contempt petition.

47. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367” (8.3.2006) (Available)

48. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 : 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” (9.2.2007) (Available)

49. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB) (17.2.2009) (Available)

50. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Delhi) (Not available)

Note: Relevant extract of this judgments pertaining to Contempt of Court has been quoted by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in its following judgment.

51. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)” (Delhi) (21.8.2008) (Paras 2, 8,10,11,20,78,125,127,143,155,169,206 & 207) (Available)

(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were Public Prosecutor and Defence Counsel respectively)

52. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261” (20.10.2008) (Available)

53. “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC) (Available)




C-7. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Criminal Contempt as defined in sub clause (iii) of Clause ( C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Interferes or tends to interfere with , or obstruct or tends to obstruct, the Administration of justice in any manner ) decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and Other High Courts

1. Court on its own motion v. K.S. Sethi, AIR 1968 Delhi 248 (referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur) (Not relevant)

2. “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another, AIR 1980 SC 946”

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (1971), Section 2 (c ) – ‘Criminal contempt’ – What amounts to –

Proceedings for contempt – Duty of Court. Original Cri. Misc. No. 7 of 1973, D/- 24.4.1974

(Pat), Reversed.

Every abuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of

Court ; ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT CALCULATED TO HAMPER

THE DUE COURSE OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING OR THE ORDERLY

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS A CONTEMPT OF COURT. It may be that certain

minor abuses of the process of the Court may be suitably dealt with between the parties, by

striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on

the other hand, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO PUNISH AS CONTEMPT, A COURSE OF

CONDUCT WHICH ABUSES AND MAKES A MOCKERY OF THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action

and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an

interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly

administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights

and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the

due administration of justice and, so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of

Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Curt against insult or injury as the expression

“Contempt of Court” may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public

that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, or interfered with. “It is a

mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and

outrage”. THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO SIT BY LIMPLY, WHILE THOSE

WHO DEFY IT GO FREE, AND THOSE WHO SEEK ITS PROTECTION LOSE HOPE.

(ii) Head Note (B) of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (1971), Section 12 – Punishment for contempt of court – Apology –

Contemners expressed unconditional apology to High Court – HELD, THE CONDUCT

OF CONTEMNERS WAS SO REPREHENSIBLE AS TO WARRANT

CONDEMNATION BY IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE – Supreme Court sentenced – each

of the contemners to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-

3. “In the matter of Nanak Chand Theog, AIR 1989 Himachal Pradesh 46 (19.8.1988)”

(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (1971), S. 10-Contempt of subordinate Courts-POWER TO

PUNISH VESTS IN HIGH COURT ALONE, except in cases covered by S. 228, Penal Code

and O. 39, R. 2-A, Civil P.C. –Disconnection of office telephone of subordinate court for non-

payment of bills-Initiation of suo motu contempt proceedings against Junior Engineer, Telephone

by subordinate Court –Illegal and without jurisdiction-Proper course is to take up matter on

administrative side with higher Telephone authorities with intimation to Registry of High Court.

Penal Code (1860), S. 228

Civil P.C. (1908), O. 39, R. 2-A.”

(ii) Relevant extract of para 10 of the above referred judgment :-

“------At the very outset, it may be mentioned that under the Contempt of Courts Act,

1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), a subordinate court has no jurisdiction, power and

authority to punish for the contempt of itself, even if the contempt is found to have been

committed by any person or authority. The power to punish for the contempt of the

subordinate courts is vested in the High Court under S. 10 of the Act. THE PROPER

PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED IN SUCH A CASE BY A SUBORDINATE COURT,

THEREFORE, IS TO MAKE A REFERENCE TO THE HIGH COURT. Of course, cases

by S. 228 of the IPC or O. 39 R. 2A of the Civil P.C. stand on a different putting and they

are required to be dealt with in accordance with law WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION

OF THE HIGH COURT.---.”

Note (1) : S. 228 of IPC reads as under :-

“Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant,

while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished in the

simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine.”

Note (2) : O. 39, R. 2-A reads as under :-

“Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.”

4. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. SR Cotton Mills Ltd. And other, AIR 1990 SC 1881”

(6.4.1990)

(i) Head Note of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Court Act. (70 of 1971), S. 2- Contempt – Giving undertaking to Court based on

assumptions which undertaker knows are false.

Constitution of India, Art. 142.

The party giving undertaking to Court BASED ON IMPLICATIONS OR ASSUMPTIONS

WHICH ARE FALSE TO ITS KNOWLEDGE IS GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT

AMOUNTING TO CONTEMPT. Thus where the tenant, a Company, who had filed a writ

petition against the eviction decree passed against it, on the petition being dismissed prayed for

grant of time to vacate the premises and the time was granted subject to its filing a written

undertaking that it would not part with the possession of the suit premises or create third

party interests in the suit premises and the tenant Company ALTHOUGH KNOWING

FULLY WELL THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMPANY WAS ALREADY A

LAWFUL SUB-TENANT OF THE SUIT PREMISES, gave the requisite undertaking

which clearly implied that the Company was in possession of the suit premises and in a position

to hand over possession of the suit premises after the time granted to vacate the premises

expired, and thus mislead the Court, the tenant was guilty of misconduct amounting to

contempt.

5. “Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and

other, AIR 1991 SC 2176 (11.9.1991)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (C) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Article 20 (3) – Double jeopardy – Contempt proceeding against police

officials- Criminal proceedings already pending against them- they are not “persons accused of

an offence” - Mere issue of notice of contempt and asking them to file their version before

commissioner appointed by court – Not Violative of Art. 20 (3).

Criminal P.C. ( 2 of 1974), S. 300

Double jeopardy – Contempt proceedings against police officials

Contempt proceeding is sui generis, it has peculiar features which are not found in criminal

proceedings. In this view, the condemners, police officials, involved in arrest, assault, wrongful

detention of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and against whom criminal cases were also registered

do not stand in the position of a “person accused of an offence” Merely on account of issue of

notice of contempt by the Supreme Court…….In this view, there has been no violation of Art. 20

(3) of the constitution and commission’s findings are not vitiated…..”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (E) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Art. 129—Scope- Contempt of Subordinate Courts – Powers of

Supreme Court – CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971 DOES NOT IMPINGE

(ENCROACH) UPON POWERS OF SUPREME COURT WITH REGARD TO

CONTEMPT OF SUBORDINATE COURTS UNDER ART. 129. --------.

There is no provision is Contempt of Courts Act. 1979 curtailing the Supreme Court’s Power

with regard to contempt of Subordinate Courts. Section 15, on the other hand, expressly refers

to the Supreme Court’s power for taking action for contempt of Subordinate Courts.

SECTION 15 PRESCRIBES MODES FOR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT BY THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT, --------. Section 15 (2)

does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of the contempt of itself or

of a Subordinate Court on its own motion although apparently, the section does not say so.

(iii) Relevant extract of Head Note (F) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India Art. 129 – Scope – Contempt of Subordinate Court – expression

“including the power to punish for contempt of itself” in Art. 129 – not restrictive but extensive

in nature.

Interpretation of statutes – Expression “including”.

Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a Court of record and it further provides that the

Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for

contempt of itself. The expression used in Art. 129 is not restrictive, instead it is extensive in

nature.---------- Art. 129 recognized the existing inherent power of a Court of record in its

full plentitude including the power to punish for the contempt of inferior courts.-----------

THE SUBORDINATE COURTS ADMINISTER JUSTICE AT THE GRASS ROOT

LEVEL THEIR PROTECTION IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE

OF PEOPLE IN THE EFFICACY OF COURTS AND TO ENSURE UNSULLIED FLOW

OF JUSTICE AT ITS BASE LEVEL.”

(iv) Relevant extract of Head Note (H) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Articles, 129, 32, 134, 36, 215- Contempt of Subordinate Court –

SUPREME COURT POSSESSES SIMILAR INHERENT POWER AS THAT OF HIGH

COURT UNDER ART. 215 ----------.

Since the Supreme Court has power of judicial superintendence and control over all the

Courts and Tribunals functioning in the entire territory of the country, it has a corresponding

duty to protect and safeguard the interest of inferior courts to ensure the flow of the stream of

justice in the courts without any interference or attack from any quarter. THE SUBORDINATE

AND INFERIOR COURTS DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE POWER UNDER THE LAW

TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, THEREFORE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE

SUPREME COURT SHOULD PROTECT THEM. --------- NO DOUBT, HIGH COURTS

HAVE POWER TO PERSIST FOR THE CONTEMPT OF SUBORDINATE COURT

BUT THAT DOES NOT AFFECT OR ABRIDGE THE INHERENT POWER OF THE

SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 129. -------There may be occasions when attack on

Judges and Magistrates of Subordinate Courts may have vide repercussions throughout

the country, in that situation, it may not be possible for a High Court to contain the same,

as a result of which the administration of justice in the country may be paralaysed, in that

situation, the Apex Court must intervene to ensure smooth functioning of Courts. ---------

Ordinarily, the High Court would protect the Subordinate Court from any onslaught on

their independence, but in exceptional cases, extraordinary situation may prevail affecting

the administration of public justice or where the entire judiciary is affected, the Supreme

Court may directly take cognizance of contempt of subordinate Courts. However, it was

observed that the Supreme Court will sparingly exercise its inherent power in taking cognizance

of the contempt of Subordinate Courts, as ordinarily matters relating to contempt of

Subordinate Court must be dealt with by the High Courts. The instant case is of exceptional

nature, as the incident of arrest, assault and handcuffing of the Chief Judicial Magistrate by

police created a situation where functioning of the Subordinate Courts all over the country was

adversely affected, and the administration of justice was paralysed, therefore, the Supreme Court

took Cognizance of the matter.”

(v) Para 1 of the above referred judgment:-

“K.N. Singh, J.:- On 25th September, 1989, a horrendous incident took place in the town of

Nadiad, District Kheda in the State of Gujarat, which exhibited the berserk behavior of police

undermining the dignity and independence of judiciary. S. R. Sharma, Inspector of Police, with

25 years of service posted at the police Station, Nadiad, arrested, assaulted and handcuffed N.L.

Patel, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad and tied him with a thick rope like an animal and made a

public exhibition of it by sending him in the same condition to the Hospital for medical

examination on an alleged charge of having consumed liquor in breach of the prohibition law

enforced in the State of Gujarat. The Inspector S.R. Sharma got the Chief Judicial Magistrate

photographed in handcuffs with rope tied around his body along with the constables which were

published in the newspapers all over the country. This led to tremors in the Bench and the Bar

throughout the whole country.

(vi) Relevant extract of para 2 of the above referred judgment:-

“This incident undermined the dignity of Courts in the Country.------------ The Delhi Judicial

Service Association, the All India Judges Association, Bar Counsel of Uttar Pradesh, Judicial

Service of Gujarat any many others approached the Apex Court by means of telegrams and

petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for saving the dignity and honour of the

judiciary. On 29.9.1989, this court took cognizance of the matter by issuing notices to the State

of Gujarat and other police officers.----------“

(vii) Relevant extract of para 3 of the above referred judgment:-

“In petition No. 518 of 1989 alongwith contempt petition No. 6 of 1989 filed by the president, all

India Judges Association, notices for contempt were issued by this court on 4.10.1989 to seven

police officials,-----------“

(viii) Relevant extract of para 6 of the above referred judgment:-

“Since, there was serious dispute between the parties with regard to the entire incident, the Court

appointed Justice R.M. Sahai, senior Punshi Judge of the Allahabad High Court (as he then was)

to inquire into the incident and to submit report to the court

(ix) Relevant extract of para 14 of the above referred judgment:-

“Mr. F.S. Nariman contended that this court has no jurisdiction or power to indict the

Police Officers even if they are found to be guilty as their conduct does not amount to

contempt of THIS COURT. He urged that Arts 129 and 215 demarcate the respective areas of

jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts respectively. This Court’s jurisdiction

under Art 129 is confined to the contempt of itself only and it has no jurisdiction to indict a

person for contempt of an inferior court subordinate to the High Court.----------Shri Soli J.

Sorabji Learned Attorney General (as he then was) urged that power to punish contempt is a

special jurisction which is inherent in a Court of record. A superior Court of Record has inherent

power to punish for contempt of itself and it necessarily includes and arres with it the power to

punish for contempt committed in respect of subordinate or inferior Court.--------“

(x) Relevant extract of para 26 of the above referred judgment:-

“---------The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was enacted to define and limit the powers of Courts

in punishing contempts of Courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. ---------- S.

10 which relates to the power of High Court to punish for contempt of Subordinate Courts.

-----we have scanned the provisions of the 1971 Act., but we find no provision therein curtailing

the Supreme Court;’s power with regard to contempt to subordinate courts. S. 15 on the other

hand expressly refers to this Court’s power for taking action for contempt of subordinate

courts.--------- S. 15 of the Act reads as under :-

“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases (1) In the case of a criminal

contempt other than a contempt referred to in S. 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may

take action on its own motion or a motion made by:-

(a) the Advocate General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General (or)

(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union Territory of Delhi, such law Officer as the

Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette, specific in this behalf or

any other person with consent in writing of such of law Officer.

(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of Subordinate Court, the High Court may take

action ON A REFERENCE MADE TO IT BY THE SUBORDINATE COURT or on a

motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union Territory, by Such Officer

as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this

behalf.

(3) x x x x

(xi) Relevant extract of para 27 of the above referred judgment:-

“Under sub-sec. (1) the Supreme Court and High Court both have power to take cognizance of

criminal contempt and it provides three modes for taking cognizance. -------- SUB-SECTION

(2) PROVIDES THAT IN CASE OF ANY CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF SUBORDINATE

COURT, THE HIGH COURT MAY TAKE ACTION ON A REFERENCE MADE TO IT

BY THE SUBORDINATE COURT or on a motion made by the Advocate –General, and in

relation to a Union territory, on a motion made by any officer as may be specified by the

Government. ---------.

(xii) Relevant extract of para 37 of the above referred judgment:-

“-----------Ordinarily, the High Court would protect the Subordinate Court from any

onslaught on their independence, but in exceptional cases, extraordinary situation may

prevail affecting the administration of public justice or where the entire judiciary is

affected, the Supreme Court may directly take cognizance of contempt of subordinate

Courts. We would like strike a note caution that this court will spraining

(xiii) Relevant extract of para 40 of the above referred judgment”-

“In the instant case, Patel, CJM, was assaulted, arrested handcuffed by Police Inspector Sharma

and other police officers. The police officers were not content with this, they tied his with thick

rope round his arms and body as if NL Patel was a wild animal.---------The commission has

recorded detailed finding that the object was to wreck vengeance and to humiliate the CJM who

had been policing the police by his judicial orders.”

(xiv) Relevant extract of para 42 of the above referred judgment”-

“-------. The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person

WHICH WOULD TEND TO INTERFERE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE or which would lower the authority of Court.------.”

(xv) Relevant extract of para 47 of the above referred judgment:-

“This takes us to the petition filed by N. L. Patel for questing the criminal cases initiated against

him on the basis of to first Information Reports made by Police Inspector S. R. Sharma. -------

During the pendency of the contempt proceeding before the court the police continued the

investigation and submitted charge sheet in both the cases against N.L. Patel and at present

criminal cases are pending in the court of Chief judicial Magistrate Nadiad. These proceeding are

short to be quashed.”

(xvi) Relevant extract of para 48 of the above referred Judgment:-

“-----------The gravamen of the charge in the two case registered against N.L. Patel is that he had

consumed liquor without a pass or permit and under influence of liquor, he entered the chamber

of police inspector Sharma at the police station and assaulted him. The police over powered and

arrested him and a panchnama was prepared and he was taken to the Hospital for medical

examination and the report of Medical examination indicates that he had consumed liquor. These

very facts have been inquired into by the commissioner and found to be false. We have recorded

findings that police inspector Sharma and other police officers manipulated records and

manufactured the case against N.L. Patel with a view to humiliate and teach halation as the

police was annoyed with his judicial orders.--------. The commission’s as well as our finding

clearly demonstrate that the allegations contented in the two FIRs are false.-----In the

circumstance, proceedings against N.L. Patel are liable to be quashed.”

(xvii) Relevant extract of paras 52-53 of the above referred judgment:-

“The question arises what punishment should awarded to the contemners found guilty of

contempt,---------having regard to the facts and circumstance and individual part played by each

of the aforesaid contemners we hold them guilty of contempt and award punishment as under:-

S. R. Sharma, the then police inspector Nadiad shall under do simple inprisment for a period of

six months and he shall pay fine of Rupees 2000/- , K.H. Sadia, Sub inspector Nadiad shall under

go simple imprisonment for a period of five months and will pay a Rupee 2000/---------.”

6. “Court of its own motion Vs. B.D. Kaushik & Ors., 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Full Court)

(19.12.1991) (Available) (Referred by Sh Vinod Gaur)

(i) Relevant extracts of the Head Note of the above referred DLT :-

“Constitution of India- Art. 215- Court of Record-Evolve its own procedure- Respondents

advocates, proceeded for contempt of Court- Aided and abetted by large number of advocates

invaded the High Court and prevented the Judges from discharging their judicial function-Full

Bench initiated proceedings- Contemners expressed regrets –And the apology bonafide-Whether

the act of the contemners tantamounts to an attempt to erode the majesty of the Court ? (Yes).

Per G.C. Mital, C.J. for himself & 11 others.

Held that we must realize that they are members of the noble profession and in their

misguided zeal, ventured upon the defiant course for which they have offered apology. At the

same time we must also keep in mind that simply accepting the apology and discharging

the rule may not appear to be warranted in the circumstances of the gross contempt.

Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, including the outrageous

incident and unqualified apology, we do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it

as we would like to further watch their conduct and behaviour for a period of one year from

today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of Court or

undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But

if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behaviour and do not indulge themselves in

the repetition of such act within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged

on the expiry of the period.

“Per S.B. Wad, J & three Others.

Held that having considered all relevant aspects and authorities, we are of the opinion

that in the present case the contemners deserve the punishment of sentence. The contempt

committed by the contemners is gravest. It cannot be imagined that any contempt worse than

the present one is possible. IT IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT THE

CONTEMPT IS NOT COMMITTED BY LAY CONTEMNERS BUT BY THE

ADVOCATES, WHO ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT.

Per D.P. Wadhwa, J

Held that what these contemners have done, one would not expect even from street

hooligans such a conduct. Simply because they are officers of the Court and right has been

given to them to practice in Court do not mean that they have to be dealt with leniency. If

anything, they deserved severe punishment and not mere reprimand or even suspension of

sentences, I do not find any extenuating circumstances in the present case for me to take a

lenient view.

--------------------

Per Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

Held that having regard to the totality of the circumstances, this Court cannot adopt

an attitude of unwarranted leniency at the cost of principle. It is always easy to show

magnanimity and to pursue populist line of showing uncalled for indulgence rather than to

adhere to the nail studded path of duty. Bearing in mind the outrageous conduct of the

contemners, the gross contempt which they committed and the fact that the acts were

preconceived, the populist line of showing over indulgence and magnanimity would not

subserve the ends of justice but would amount to giving a licence to contemners to repeat

such incidents. ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT HAS TO PERFORM THE PAINFUL

DUTY OF DIRECTING IMPOSITION OF IMPRISONMENT AND FINE ON THE

CONTEMNERS. It is necessary to adopt the course with a view to uphold the honour and

dignity of the institution. I am in complete agreement with Wad J.

-----------------------

Result-Sentence deferred

“Gokal Chand Mital, CJ, (for himself and for 11 other Judges)


“------. It goes without saying that they are guilty of the grossest possible contempt of this court.

A very civilized behavour and attitude is expected from the members of the Bar. In fact, they

are part and parcel of the Administration of justice -----. They must discharge their duties

with dignity, decorum and discipline. They are expected to abide by the rule of law and not

violate by participating in violent acts. If lawyers fail in their duty, faith of the people in the

judiciary will be undermined to a large extent.”

S.B. Wad, J. (For himself and on behalf of B.N. Kirpal, P.K. Bahri & Arun Kumar

J.)

(iii) Relevant extract of para 12 of the above referred judgment :-

“Of all the unpleasant duties which the court is required to perform, the most painful duty

is to proceed against the advocates, the Officers of the Court for contempt of court.--.”

(iv) Relevant extract of para 22 of the above referred judgment :-

“This is not a case of spontaneous emotional outburst of a litigant disappointed by an

unfavourable verdict. --- On the other hand we have here, a group of lawyers, WHO ARE

THE OFFICERS OF THE COURT, admitted to the privilege of representing needy

litigant AND BOUND BY HIGH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,

OBSTRUCTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.---.”

(v) Relevant extract of para 32 of the above referred judgment :-

“Now the question arises whether the apology tendered by the contemnors should be

accepted or not. It may be noticed that the apology has not been tendered by any of the

contemnors immediately after notice was served on them. They had no factual defence and,

therefore, IF THERE WAS GENUINE REPENTANCE, THE APOLOGY SHOULD

HAVE COME AT FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.---.”

(vi) Para 37 of the above referred judgment :-

“Even if it is assumed that the apology is sincere, we are not satisfied that we should accept

the apology on the facts of the present case AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF

EXTREME GRAVITY OF CONTEMPT COMMITTED BY A GROUP OF LAWYERS in

a predetermined manner.”

(vii) Relevant extract of para 38 of the above referred judgment :-

“---The right to practice and exclusive privilege of audience given by section 29 and section 30

of the ct cannot be unreasonably utilized to the detriment of the society. ---.ABSTENTION

FROM WORK WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE CLIENT WOULD AMOUNT

TO BREACH OF CONTRACT WITH THE CLIENT. Where there is deliberate failure to

attend the court, it would be contempt of court because that would amount to interfering

with course of justice.---.”

(viii) Relevant extract of para 40 of the above referred judgment :-

“In Kuldeep Rastogi Vs. Vishwanath, (AIR 1979 Delhi 202 at page 216) after reviewing the case

law the Full Bench of this Court held that THE APOLOGY MUST COME AT THE

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND IT SHOULD BE IN WRITING.---- In AIR 1980 SC 946

(referred to above) the Court has held that WHERE THE CONDUCT IS REPREHENSIBLE,

THE APOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. ----- In AIR 1985 SC 1726, the

Supreme Court has warned that IT WOULD BE A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE IF ITS

GROSS CONTEMPT GOES UNPUNISHED.”

(ix) Para 41 of the above referred judgment :-

“With regard to apology in proceedings for contempt of Court, it is well settled that an apology

is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate

as a universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.” (M.Y. Shareef &

Anr. Vs. The Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur and Ors., 1955 (1) SCR 757 at page

764.)

(x) Para 43 of the above referred judgment :-

“Having considered all relevant aspects and authorities, we are of the opinion that in the

present case the contemnors deserve the punishment of sentence. THE CONTEMPT

COMMITTED BY THE CONTEMNORS IS GRAVEST. It cannot be imagined that any

contempt worse than the present one is possible. It is compounded by the fact that the

contempt is not committed by lay contemnors but by the advocates, who are officers of the

Court.”

(xi) Relevant extract of para 45 of the above referred judgment :-

“----Since we have held that the apology is not bonafide and not acceptable, we direct that

contemnors, viz. S/s. B.D. Kaushik Rajiv Khosla, R.K. Sharma, Judgal Wadhwa, R.N.

Vats, Jatan Singh and P.S. Rathee, should undergo simple imprisonment for one month

and shall pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- each.

D.P. Wadhwa, J :

(xii) Relevant extract of para 47 of the above referred judgment :-

“----Mind you, they were students. Here we are dealing with advocates well versed in law who,

by fiction of law are officers of the Court. ----There was vulgar and disgusting display of

hooliganism, never heard or seen before. THIS WAS INDULGED IN BY THE VERY

PERSONS WHO THEMSELVES SUPPOSED TO UPHOLD THE MAJESTY OF LAW

AND THE COURTS. ---.”

(xiii) Relevant extract of para 48 of the above referred judgment :-

“----Contempt in this case is serious enough to merit imprisonment and fine. I would have even

thought of going to the extent of injecting these contemnors from appearing in the High Court

and or other Courts and Tribunals throughout the Territory of Delhi over which this court has

superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution for a certain period . There cannot be any

soft peddling on this issue. The apology which these contemnors tendered is no apology either

in law or on the facts of the case. I would unhesitatingly reject the apology.”

(xiv) Para 50 of the above referred judgment :-

“In this very judgment Edmund Davies, L.J. quotes with approval the following memorable

aphorism of his Honour Judge Curtis-Releigh, the County Judge :

“THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO SIT BY LIMPLY, WHILE THOSE

WHO DEFY IT GO FREE, AND THOSE WHO SEEK ITS PROTECTION LOSE

HOPE.”

(xv) Relevant extract of para 52 of the above referred judgment :-

“Then the question arises : What are the parameters of the punishment to be awarded in such a

case ? ------ In my view, the punishment to the contemnors in the present case must be an

quintessence for the others so that it creates an awe not only in the mind of contemnors

alone but in the mind of other also deter them from committing such an act again.”

Sunanda Bhandare, J.

(xvi) Relevant extract of para 59 of the above referred judgment :-

“Now coming to the question of sentence.----Lawyers belong to a noble and learned profession.

They are the vital link between the court and the members of the public. They are also officers

of the court. IF LAWYERS THEMSELVES BRING DOWN THE PRESTIGE AND

IMAGE OF THE COURT, IT WILL IMPAIR THE MAJESTY OF THE COURTS OF

LAW IRREPARABLY. If the dignity of the court is not safe in the hands of the lawyers, it

is not save anywhere. --- In recent times there has been a sharp fall in ethical standards at all

levels. SOFT ATTITUDE TOWARDS YOUR OWN COMMUNITY ENCOURAGES

INDISCIPLINE AND LEADS TO FURTHER EROSION OF STANDARDS.---.”

(xvii) Relevant extract of para 60 of the above referred judgment :-

“Thus, if anything as lawyers the responsibility on the contemnors was much greater. ----.

THOSE WHO SEEK TO DESTROY THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM NEITHER DESERVED

SYMPATHY NOR COMPASSION.---.”

(xviii) Para 69 of the above referred judgment :-

“Indeed, what is expected of an advocate is beautifully stated in the preamble to Chapter II

laying down standards of professional conduct and etiquette in Part VI of Rules framed by the

Bar Council of India in the exercise of its rule making powers under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Here, it may be useful to extract the relevant portion. It reads :-

“AN ADVOCATE SHALL, AT ALL TIMES, COMPORT HIMSELF IN A MANNER BEFITTING HIS STATUS AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT, A PRIVILEGED MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY, AND A GENTLEMAN, BEARING IN MIND THAT WHAT MAY BE LAWFUL AND MORAL FOR A PERSON WHO IS NOT A MEMBERS OF THE BAR, OR FOR A MEMBERS OF THE BAR IN HIS NONPROFESSIONAL CAPACITY MAY STILL BE IMPROPER FOR AN ADVOCATE.”

(xix) Relevant extract of para 75 of the above referred judgment :-

“----. It is high time, in the prevailing conditions to infuse confidence in the minds of

the[public, the subordinate judiciary, and the same majority of members of the bar, that

THE HIGH COURT WILL TAKE COGNIZANCE OF EVERY CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT COMMITTED BY ANYONE, IN ANY FORUM, RELATED TO THEIR

RESPECTIVE AND COMPLIMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, AND PUNISH THE SAME

AS CONTEMPT OF ITSELF.

Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

(xx) Relevant extract of para 84 of the above referred judgment :-

“------Bearing in mind outrageous conduct of the contemners, the gross contempt which

they committed and the fact that the acts were preconceived, THE POPULIST LINE OF

SHOWING OVER INDULGENCE AND MAGNANIMITY WOULD NOT SUB-SERVE

THE ENDS OF JUSTICE BUT WOULD AMOUNT TO GIVING A LICENCE TO

CONTEMNERS TO REPEAT SUCH INCIDENTS. Accordingly, this court has to

perform the painful duty of directing imposing of imprisonment and fine on the

contemners.---.”

7. “Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of M.P., Jabalpur (SC) 1992 (2) RCJ 16” ? : 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” referred to by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its above referred judgment reported as “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130 (SC)”


(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred RCJ :-

“Constitution of India, Articles 129 and 215- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Contempt proceedings-Inherent powers of Supreme Court and High Court- The power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied in Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammeled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit.----.”

(ii) Para 11 of the above referred judgment :-

“Finally, the High Court held that the contemner, Mr. Pritam Lal is guilty of criminal contempt of not only scandalizing the Court and lowering its authority but also substantially interfering with the due course of justice. Coming to the question of sentence, the High Court taking note of the defiant attitude of the contemner who even did not think it necessary to apologize but tried to justify the aspersions, sentenced the contemner to suffer simple imprisonment for two months. Hence the present appeal.”

(iii) Para 42 of the above referred judgment :-

“There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon particular instances of conduct which has been held to constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few.”

(iv) Para 43 of the above referred judgment :-

“Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J. has laid down the Law of Contempt in 1900 (2) Q.B. 36 at 40 as follows :-

“Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a Contempt of Court.”

(v) Para 45 of the above referred judgment :-

“Lord Justice Donovanin Attorney General Vs. Butterworth, 1963 (1) Q.B. 696 after making reference to Reg. Vs. Odham’s Press Ltd, ex parte A.G. 1957 (1) Q.B. 73 said, “Whether or not there was an intention to interfere with the administration of justice is relevant to penalty, not to guilt.” This makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of Court and it is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere.”


“In Morris Vs. The Crown Office, 1970 1 All. E.R. 1079 at page 1081, Lord Denning, M.R. said :

“The course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of our society.”

In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke :The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented.”

(vii) Para 48 of the above referred judgment :-

“In Jennison Vs. Baker, 1972 (1) All. ER 997 at page 1006, it is stated : “The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.”

(viii) Para 49 of the above referred judgment :-

“Chinnappa Reddy, J speaking for the Bench in Advocate General, Bihar Vs. M.P. Khair Industries, 1980 (3) SCC 311 citing those two decisions in the cases of offut and Jennison (supra) stated thus :

“…it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression “Contempt of Court” may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with.”

(ix) Relevant extract of Para 54 of the above referred judgment :-

“Reference may be made to recent decision of this Court in M.B. Sanghi Vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, 1991(3) SCC 600. In that case, the appellant, a practicing advocate having failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad-interim injunction pending filing of a counter by the opposite party, made certain derogatory remarks against the learned Judg3e who instead of succumbing to such unprofessional conduct made a record of the derogatory remarks and forwarded the same to the High Court through the District Judge to initiate proceedings for Contempt of Court against the appellant. The High Court holding that the remarks made on the learned Sub-Judge are disparaging in character and derogatory to the dignity of the judiciary found the appellant guilty of Section 2 (c ) (i) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The appellant therein though denied to have made the remarks however, offered an unqualified apology. But the High Court without accepting the apology punished the appellant therein with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.---.”


“After having made the above observation, the learned Judge concurred with the conclusion of Agarwal, J. dismissing the appeal and while doing so, he expressed his painful thought as follows :“When a member of the bar is required to be punished for use of contemptuous language it is highly painful- it pleases none- but painful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and dignity of the individual Judge and his office and the prestige of the institution. Courts are generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against erring members of the profession in the hope that the concerned Bar Council will chasten its member for failure to maintain proper ethical norms. If timely action is taken by the Bar Councils, the decline in the ethical values can be easily arrested.”

(xi) Para 56 of the above referred judgment :-

“We are in full agreement with the above view.”

(xii) Relevant extract of Para 57 of the above referred judgment :-

“-----It is highly painful to note that the appellant/contemnor who is none other than an Advocate practicing in the same highest Court of the state after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person has escalatingly scandalized the Court by making libelous allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious, intimidatory, malicious and beyond condonable limit.---.”

(xiii) Para 59 of the above referred judgment :-

“To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with, and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court,

though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice.”


“Coming to the question of sentence, it appears from the order of the High Court that the appellant had adopted a defiant attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by him even without thinking it necessary to apologize. Before this Court also , the appellant has neither expressed any contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious allegations made against the learned Judges of the High Court. But on the other hand, he has exhibited a dogged determination to pursue the matter, come what may. A reading of his memorandum of grounds and the written and signed arguments show that he has ventured into another bout of allegations against the High Court Judges and persisted in his campaign of vilification. His present conduct has aggravated rather than mitigating his offence.”

(xv) Para 62 of the above referred judgment :-

“Therefore, having regard to the sentencing policy that punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence, we hold that the sentence of 2 months imprisonment in no way calls for interference and accordingly the sentence is confirmed.”

8. “Modern Food Industries (I) Ltd & Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass & Another,

1995 Supp. (4) SCC 465 (21.9.1992) :-

Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.

9. “National Textile Corporation v. Sundram Ors, 1994 (1) Scale 344” (Contempt for non-compliance with Court’s orders)

10. “Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd.) And Another Vs, Russel Estate

Corporation And Another, (1993) 2 SCC 533” (4.2.1993)


11. “National Textile Corporation Vs, V. Sundaram & Ors., 1994 (1) Scale 71”

(19.1.1994):-


12. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, J.T. 1994 (6) SC 584”(4.10.1994) :-

“Section 12 – Conviction of the advocate for raising the pitch of his voice unusually high

and using derogatory language against the Magistrate-Held-When the advocate was warned of

his unruly behaviour, he should have stopped and not retained a defiant and aggressive posture-

‘Lawyers were created for the Course, not Courts for the lawyers’ –Belated apology not

accepted and the appellant was rather admonished for his conduct-However, having admonished

payment of fine was set aside.”

13. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 Supreme Court cases 421”: “1995

Rajdhani Law Reporter Page 1” (Vol. 25) (14.11.1994) :-

(i) Index-A of the Head Note of the above referred SCC at page-422:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- S. 2(c ) – Criminal Contempt- Fraud on Court--

FORGED AND FABRICATED DOCUMENT FILED IN COURT WITH OBLIQUE

MOTIVE OF DECEIVING OR DEFRAUDING THE COURT-HELD, RESULTS IN

INTERFERENCE WITH ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND AMOUNTS TO

CONTEMPT OF COURT-words and phrases- “Interfere”, meaning of.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Index –B of the above referred SCC at page-422:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ----- HELD, APOLOGY NOT OUTCOME OF REAL

REMORSE OR CONTRITION BUT TENDERED AS A WEAPON OF DEFENCE AND

THEREFORE, NOT ACCEPTABLE –“TWO WEEKS” IMPRISONMENT AWARDED

TO CONTEMNOR WITH A VIEW THAT IT SHOULD SERVE AS DETERRENT AND

EYE-OPENER, a mere sentence of fine would not meet the ends of justice in the

circumstances--------.

Held from the facts it is clear that the respondent contemnor had filed a forged and

fabricated document in court TO RESIST THE PRAYER OF HIS WIFE to get the

matrimonial proceedings transferred on the ground of her poverty i.e. it was done with an

oblique motive.

As to whether filing of a forged document with intention to defraud amounts to contempt

of court, as this expression has been defined in section 2 of the contempt of courts Act, 1971,

there being no decision of the Supreme Court (or for that matter of any High Court), the same is

required to be examined as a matter of first principle. Contempt jurisdiction has been

conferred on superior courts not only to preserve the majesty of law by taking appropriate

action against one however high he may be, if he violates courts order BUT ALSO TO

KEEP THE STREAM OF JUSTICE CLEAR AND PURE so that purity of court’s

atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the state and the parties who approach the

courts to receive justice do not have to wade through dirty and polluted water before

entering their temples.

To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, THOSE

WHO INDULGE IN IMMORAL ACTS LIKE PERJURY, PREVARICATION AND

MOTIVATED FALSEHOODS HAVE TO BE APPROPRIATED DEALT WITH, without

which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the

satisfaction of those who approached it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. Any one

who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or if anything is

done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. The word

‘interfere’ means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the

functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Obstruction of justice is to

interpose obstacles or impediments or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the

administration of justice. If recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same

would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the

courts from performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.

Therefore, if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an

intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of

justice-----. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens

rea. In the case and hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court, the

intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt---.

THE POLLUTERS OF JUDICIAL FIRMAMENT ARE REQUIRED TO BE

WELL TAKEN CARE OF TO MAINTAIN THE SUBLIMITY OF COURTS’

ENVIRONMENT, so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all

concerned. SUCH PERSONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE PROPERLY DEALT WITH, NOT

ONLY TO PUNISH THEM FOR THE WRONG DONE BUT ALSO TO DETER

OTHERS FROM INDULGING IN SIMILAR ACTS WHICH SHAKE THE FAITH OF

PEOPLE IN THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. ------------. This apart,

the increasing tendency of taking recourse to objectionable means to get a favourable

verdict in the courts has to be viewed gravely to deter the large number of persons

approaching courts from doing so. SUCH A TENDENCY IS REQUIRED TO BE

CURBED, WHICH REQUIRES SOME WHAT DETERRENT SENTENCE. --------------.

THEREFORE, THE CONTEMNOR HAS TO BE AWARDED A SENTENCE OF

‘TWO WEEKS’ IMPRISONMENT. A longer period of incarceration could have been

awarded because of the gravity of contumacious act fabrication of document to defeat just

cause of an adversary and thereby seriously affecting the purity of courts proceeding BUT

THAT IS NOT NEEDED HERE AS THIS IS THE FIRST OCCASION IN FREE INDIA

WHEN THE SUPREME COURT (FOR THAT MATTER MAY BE ANY COURT OF

THE COUNTRY) HAS FELT CALLED UPON TO SEND A PERSON LIKE THE

CONTEMNOR BEHIND IRON BARS IN EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT JURISDICTION.

THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT HAS BEEN RESTRICTED TO TWO WEEKS IN

THE HOPE THAT THE INCARCERATION OF THIS CONTEMNOR WILL WORK AS

EYE OPENER AND NO COURT WILL HENCEFORTH FEEL CONSTRAINED AND

TO DO SO IN ANY OTHER CASE.”

(iv) Para 8 of the above referred judgment:-

“--------------. People would have faith in courts when they would find that “lR;eso

t;rs” (Truth alone triumphs) is an achievable aim there or (“Yato Dharamstato Jai”) (It is

virtue which ends in victory) is not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the portals of

courts.”

(vi) Relevant portion of para 12 of the above referred judgment:-

“---------. What emerges from this decision is that IF A PERSON DOES

ANYTHING TO DEFRAUD THE COURT, HE COMMITS ITS CONTEMPT.”

14. “Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla (1995) Supp. (2) SCC 130” : 1994 (4) Scale

1088 : 1995 (1) SCJ 310” (23.11.1994)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred SCC :-

“Constitution of India-Art. 129- Criminal Contempt –Act or conduct tending to prevent, hinder,

impede or thwart due course of justice or broad stream of administration of Justice would

amount to contempt of court -----.”

(ii) Propositions of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred

case and as mentioned at page 131 of the above referred SCC :-

“Held :

The contempt of Courts Act deals with any acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or

witness “in any manner.” The tendency on the part of the contemner in his action or

conduct to prevent the course of Justice is the relevant fact. ANY INTERFERENCE IN

THE COURSE OF JUSTICE, ANY OBSTRUCTION CAUSED IN THE PATH OF

THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE AN AFFRONT TO THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND,

THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. --------

Due course of justice means not only any particular proceeding but a broad stream of

administration of justice. Therefore, the words “due course of justice” used in Section 2

(c ) or Section 13 of the Act are of wide import and ARE NOT LIMITED TO ANY

PARTICULAR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. ------.


“----It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties EITHER TO PRODUCE FABRICATED EVIDENCE AS A PART OF THE PLEADINGS OR RECORD or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of justice or judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. THIS TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE OR TENDENCY TO UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT NEEDS TO BE SEVERELY DEALT WITH TO DETER THE PERSONS HAVING SIMILAR PROCLIVITY TO RESORT TO SUCH ACTS OR CONDUCT.---.”

15. “Prof. Shradha Kumari Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad And Others, 1996

Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 85” (24.1.1995) :-


16. “IN RE (1) Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi (2) Kailash Vasdev, Advocate and (3) Kitty Kumaramangalam (Smt), Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 619” referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its above referred judgment reported as “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130 (SC)”

Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC) (i) Head Note (A) of the above referred SCC :-

“A Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 142- Contempt of Supreme Court- Criminal contempt-Intentionally obstructing course of justice- Public official filing affidavit in Supreme Court criticizing its order and casting aspersions and accusations calculated to malign the Court and undermine its authority- Held, amounted to criminal contempt-Coming from the Executive branch it has the potentiality of subverting the rule of law- Unconditional apology tendered by the contemnor not acceptable as his statements were intentional and deliberate knowing well their repercussions, being a responsible Govt. Officer- Hence, sentence of fine of Rs. 2000 and in default simple imprisonment for one week imposed- However, contemner having committed the offence not for his personal gain or benefit, no departmental proceedings need be initiated against him, nor should his conviction affect his service career- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Ss. 2(c ) and 12.”

(ii) Head Note (B) of the above referred SCC :-

“Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 142- Criminal contempt-Contemptuous statements made against Supreme Court by public officer in his affidavit- Advocate who files the affidavit in Court also commits the contempt-However, having regard to explanation submitted by the advocate, in response to the contempt notice issued by the Court, that he had no opportunity to peruse the affidavit before filing the same and the fact that his conduct as practising lawyer in the Court had been fair, his unconditional apology accepted and contempt notice discharged-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 12.”

(iii) Relevant extract of Head Note (C ) of the above referred SCC :-

“Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 142- Criminal contempt-Contemptuous statements made against Supreme Court by public officer in his affidavit- Advocate who drafts or settles the document also commits contempt- However, accepting the explanation of the advocate that the draft affidavit which was corrected or settled by him/her was not the same which was filed in the Court, contempt notice discharged-Contempt of Courts Act 1971, S. 12.------.”

(iv) Relevant extract of the Head Note (D) of the above referred SCC :-

“Constitution of India ---Contempt of Court -----Court has to function freely and fearlessly undaunted by abuses, attribution of notice, terrorism and defines –Court can also commit errors but for that law provides internal as well as external cheques –Rule of law must be maintained by the three organs of the State (Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) by respecting each other’s functioning ----.”

(v) Head Note (E) of the above referred SCC :-

“Legal Profession- Nature and importance of – Role of lawyers- Casual and indifferent attitude of some of the lawyers deprecated-Improvement in quality of service stressed.”


“Of late, we have been coming across several instances which can only be described as unfortunate both for the legal profession and the administration of justice. It becomes, therefore, our duty to bring it to the notice of the members of the profession that it is in their hands to improve the quality of the service they render both to the litigant-public and to the courts, and to brighten their image in the society. Some members of the profession have been adopting perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from their absence when the matters are called out, the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings-many times even illegible and without personal check and verification, the non-payment of court fees and process fess, the failure to remove office objections, the failure to take step to serve the parties, etc. They do not realize the seriousness of these acts and omissions. They not only amount to the contempt of the court but do positive disservice to the litigants and create embarrassing situation in the court leading to avoidable unpleasantness and delay in the disposal of matters. This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system.”


“The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilized society. Both as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his professional and in his private and public life. The society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. It must not be forgotten that the legal profession has always been held in high esteem and its members have played an enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and judicial systems in this country is in no small measure due to the tireless role played by the stalwarts in the profession to strengthen them. They took their profession seriously and practiced it with dignity, deference and devotion. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalized. No service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible. The casualness and indifference with which some members practice the profession are certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in the profession on account of the deviant ways of some of its members, it is not only the profession which will suffer but also the administration of justice as a whole. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a stage when the system will be found wrecked from within before it is wrecked from out side. It is for the members of the profession to introspect and take the corrective steps in time and also spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more.”

17. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court

1795” (2.5.1995) :-

(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred judgment :-

“(A) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2(C ) –Criminal Contempt –filing false

affidavit in court- Not only obstructs but perverts Course of justice-deponent is guilty of criminal

contempt.

ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO INTERFERE WITH THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OR THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.

The swearing of false affidavit in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing

obstructions in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede,

obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false affidavits in judicial

proceedings in any court of law exposes the intention of the concerned party in perverting the

course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of

law be made a mockery by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even

while appearing as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or

obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the FILING OF

FALSE EVIDENCE commits criminal contempt of the court and renders himself liable to be

dealt with in accordance with the act. Filing of false affidavit for making a false statement on

oath in courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law and NO COURT CAN IGNORE

SUCH CONDUCT which has the tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial

institutions because the very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great

public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by any one resorting to

filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a

court of law.”

(ii) Relevant portion of para 40 of the above referred judgment :-

“THE STREAM OF JUSTICE HAS TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND PURE AND ANY

ONE SPOILING ITS PURITY MUST BE DEALT WITH STERNLY SO THAT THE

MASSAGE PERCOLATES LOUD AND CLEAR THAT NO ONE CAN BE PERMITTED

TO UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT AND INTERFERE WITH THE

DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE. In Chandra Shashi V. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421 : (1994 AIR SCW

4994) the respondents produced a false and fabricated certificate to defeat the claim of the

respondent for transfer of a case. This action was found to be an act amounting to interference

with the administration of justice. Brother Hansaria, J. Speaking for the Bench observed : (at P.

4995 of AIR)

“The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court’s

atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are,

therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment; so

also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who

takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if any thing is done

with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. SUCH

PERSONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE PROPERLY DEALT WITH not only to punish them

for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith

of people in the system of administration of justice.”

(iii) Relevant portion of para 41 of the above referred judgment:-

“The actions of respondents 3 to 5 in filing false affidavit and denying that the detenu and

Sushil Kumar had been whisked away and detained illegally in their custody between 15 th

January 1994 is not only reprehensible and condemnable but also requires to be dealt with rather

sternly.------. During the pendency of the proceeding in this court, as already observed,

respondent No. 4 Sham Lal Goel and respondent No. 5 Rajinder Singh SHO ‘tutored Sushil

Kumar Taxi Driver and forced him to make a false statement and file a false affidavit in this

court and to falsely assert that he had never been waylaid by the Haryana Police --- was false.

Their action was deliberate and an attempt to over reach the due process of law without

compunction. Their action is an affront to the Majesty of Law. ---.”

(iv) Relevant portion of para 45 of the above referred judgment :-

“We sentence respondent No. 3 to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months

for committing contempt of court by filing false affidavits denying the allegations made in the

writ petition and in the affidavit of Shri S.C. Puri.”

(v) Relevant portion of para 62 of the above referred judgment:-

“----. The Court expects candour and frankness from the parties to the litigation before it.

We cannot allow the court proceedings to be trifled with. In the facts and circumstances of the

case, respondent No. 3 to 5 do deserve the punishment awarded to them to serve as a deterrent to

others in future.”

18. “Afzal And Another Vs. State of Haryana & Others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” :-

(i) Head Note (B) of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (b) - Criminal contempt-Superintendent of

Police in charge of criminal administration, first, filed fabricated counter-affidavit to obtain

favourable order- Later, perceiving adverse atmosphere to him, fabricating further false

evidence to show that his subordinate had forged his signature without his knowledge and filed

fabricated document.- He is guilty of committing contempt of judicial process.”

(ii) Head Note (C) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Art. 129- Contempt of Courts Acts, (70 of 1971), S. 12- High

ranking police officer guilty of committing contempt of proceedings of Supreme Court- Not

making candid admission nor tendering unqualified apology. – Sentenced to rigorous

imprisonment for six months.”

(iii) Relevant extract of para 31 of the above referred judgment:-

“----------- Section 2 (b) defines “contempt of court” to men any civil or criminal contempt.

“Criminal contempt” defined in section 2 (c ) means interference with the administration

justice in any other manner. A FALSE OR A MISLEADING OR A WRONG

STATEMENT DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY MADE BY A PARTY TO THE

PROCEEDING TO OBTAIN A FAVOURABLE ORDER WOULD PREJUDICE WITH

THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. It is seen that Ahlawat, respondent

No. 3 to the main writ petition and in-charge of the criminal administration, with his connivance

caused two minor boys’ wrongful detention. He made an averment in the counter affidavit dated

October 30,1993 that they were not in wrongful detention nor are they taken into custody which

was later found to be false. HE FIRST USED FABRICATED COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,

FORGED BY KRISHAN KUMAR IN THE PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN A

FAVOURABLE Order. But when he perceived adverse atmosphere to him, he fabricated

further false evidence and sought to use an affidavit evidence to show that Krishan Kumar had

forged his signature without his knowledge and filed the fabricated document. Thereby he

further committed contempt of the judicial process. HE HAS NO REGARD FOR TRUTH.

FROM STAGE TO STAGE, HE COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF THE COURT BY

MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS. Being a responsible officer, he is required to make

truthful statements before the Court, but he made obviously false statements. Thereby, he

committed criminal contempt of judicial proceedings of this court.”

Note:- As per para 31 of the above referred judgment, A FALSE OR MISLEADING OR A

WRONG STATEMENT DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY MADE BY A PERSON

TO OBTAIN A FAVOURABLE ORDER IS CONTEMPT.

19. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”

(10.4.1996)

(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred SCC :-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- S. 19- Appeal before Supreme Court from any order or decision

of High Court- Held, appeal will not lie under S. 19 against an interlocutory order of High Court

dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceeding- Words ‘any order’ must be read with

‘decision’ so as to exclude any interlocutory order of High Court from the scope of appeal –

Unless by the order High Court imposes punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for

contempt, no appeal will lie against it- However, even against an order dropping/refusing to

initiate contempt proceedings, Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136 can be invoked –

Constitution of India, Art. 136 and 215 – Appeal –Nature of right of –Words and phrases –“Any

order.”

(ii) Relevant extract of 3 of the above referred judgment :-

“----. It is well settled that an appeal is a creature of a statute. Unless a statute provides for an

appeal and specifies the order against which an appeal can be filed, no appeal can be filed or

entertained as a matter of right or course. Section 19 of the Act says :

“19. Appeals- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order OR decision of High

Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-

-------

On a plain reading, section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order

or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.---- The words

“any order” has to be read with the expression ‘decision’ used in the said sub-section which the

High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. “ANY ORDER” IS

NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE EXPRESSION ‘DECISION’. THEY HAVE BEEN PUT

IN AN ALTERNATIVE FORM saying ‘order’ or ‘decision’. IN EITHER CASE, it must

be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression “Any order” is read

independently of the ‘decision’, then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of section 19

even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High

Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.”

Note : The above quoted rulling is also most important for appeal to explain the meaning

of the expression ‘pay or tender’ used in section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act.

(iii) Head Note (B) of the above referred SCC :-

“Contempt of Court-Contempt proceeding-Nature of-Whether to punish the contemner or

discharge him, has to be decided by the court having regard to the facts and circumstances-

Person who brings to the notice of the court the commission of contempt by anyone only

assists the court in maintaining dignity and majesty of the court.


“It is well known that Contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties; the proceeding

is primarily between the court and the person who is alleged to have committed the contempt of

court. The person who informs the court or brings to the notice of the court that anyone

has committed contempt of such court is not in the position of a prosecutor, he is simply

assisting the court so that the dignity and the majesty of the court is maintained and

upheld. It is for the court, which initiates the proceeding to decide whether the person against

whom such proceeding has been initiated should be punished or discharged taking into

consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case.------.”

20. “The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR

1996 SCC 1925 (9.5.1996) (For filing false proceeding in court)

(i) Head Note of the above referred judgment:-

“Constitution of India, Art. 129 – Contempt - Contempt of Supreme Court – Apology – Police

Officer asked by Supreme Court to submit report about death of undertrial prisoner submitting

false report–When subsequently called upon to file affidavit, he not bringing true facts to notice

of Court – He ignoring injuries noted in record- Contemner, held, deliberately forwarded

inaccurate report to mislead court and thus interfered with course of justice – Apology rejected –

Sentenced to simple imprisonment for 3 months.

(ii) Para 1 of the above referred judgment:-

“This case arises out of a notice issued to A.K. Sinha Casshyap, Superintendent of Police,

Hailakandi to show cause why he should not be held guilty to Contempt of Court. The allegation

against the contemner is that a shocking case of police brutality leading to the heath of an

undertrial prisoner was sought to be covered up by him by an untrue and misleading report

sent to this Court followed by a false affidavit.

(iii) Relevant extract of para 27 of the above referred judgement:-

“This goes to show that the contemner was trying to highlight the fact that Nurul Haque was a

veteran dacoit and possibly deserved the treatment that he got at the hand of the police.------ The

report from the very beginning had tried to mislead the court as to the cause death of Nurul

Haque and the alleged events that lead to his apprehension by the police. The emphasis that he

was a verna dacoit was also obviously with a view to create prejudice. Far from trying to

halp the court to do justice, his report has tried to mislead the court and prevent the court

and finding out the truth about the allegations made by the Bar Association of

Hailakandia.”


“We, therefore, hold that the contemner deliberately forwarded an inaccurate report with

a view to misleading this Court and thereby interfered with the due course of justice by

attempting to obstruct this court from reaching a correct conclusion. In the facts and

circumstances of the case, we cannot accept his apology and hereby reject it. We hold him

guilty of contempt under Art. 129 of the Constitution read with S. 12 of the Contempt of

Courts Act. 1971. Having regard to the gravity of the case, we sentence the contemner A. K

Sinha Cashyap to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of three months. The contempt

rule is disposed of finally as above.

21. “J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 SC 113” (11.9.1996) :-


22. “Rita Markandey V. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2174”

(27.9.1996) :-

(i) Relevant portion of Head Note (a) of the above referred judgment :-

“(A) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2(b)- Civil Contempt- No undertaking

given by tenant for vacating premises----.

If any party gives an undertaking to the Court to vacate the premises from which he is

liable to be evicted under the orders of the Court and there is a clear and deliberate breach

thereof, it amounts to Civil Contempt.----.”

(ii) Head Note (B) of the above referred judgment :-

“(B) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2(C) Criminal Contempt-Eviction

vacation of premises – false affidavits given by tenant before Supreme Court from time to time

that he had already vacated premises though he had not done so-tenant is guilty of criminal

contempt of court as by filing affidavit he had not only deliberately attempted to impede

administration of justice but also succeeded in his attempt in delaying delivery of

possession.”


“To seek an answer to the other question as to whether by making false statement before

this court in the affidavits filed, the respondent has committed criminal contempt, we may

profitably referred to the judgment of this court in Dhananjay Sharma V. State of Haryana (1995)

3 SCC 757 : (1995) AIR SCW 2815), in which one of us (Justice Dr. A.S. Anand) observed P.

2828 of AIR) ;

“Section 2 ( C) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short the Act) defines criminal

contempt as “the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or visible

representation or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever to (1)

Scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of any court; (2)

prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or (3)

interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in

any other manner. THUS, ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO

INTERFERE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OR THE DUE COURSE

OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT. The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the

tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the

tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false

affidavits in judicial proceedings in any court of law exposes the intention of the party concerned

in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor

the Majesty of Law be made a mockery of by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to

the litigation or even while appearing as witnesses. ANYONE WHO MAKES AN ATTEMPT

TO IMPEDE OR UNDERMINE OR OBSTRUCT THE FREE FLOW OF THE

UNSOILED STREAM OF JUSTICE BY RESORTING TO THE FILING OF FALSE

EVIDENCE, COMMITS CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF THE COURT AND RENDERS

HIMSELF LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACT.”

23. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1 AD (Delhi) 927” : “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997):-

(i) Head Note (ii) of the above referred DLT:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2 (c), 15 & 18 – Criminal Contempt – Abuse of

process of the court – No interim injunction in earlier suit granted – Same relief sought in

subsequent suits – No copy of earlier plaint and documents filed – Played fraud to gain

advantage – Attempt to over reach the court – Guilty of contempt.

Held: We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over reach

the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as upon the opposite party

and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CAN NOT BE HEARD IN THE

CASE UNLESS IT PURGES IT SELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED and in

our view, it can only be if we non suit the respondents in suit no. 261/97. while, therefore, we

do not purpose to take action against the respondent for contempt except to issue a warning to

respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future, we direct the dismissal of the suit (being suit no.

261/97) suit it self.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note of the above referred AD:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Secs. 2 (c ), 15 & 18 – Criminal Contempt – Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 0 Or. XXXIX rule 1 & 2 – Ad-interim injunction – Ex-parte – Non-disclosure

of dismissal of such application in earlier suit – Amounts to fraud upon the Court – Guilty

of Contempt.

Held: In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by not

disclosing that in the earlier suit, the respondent has not been able to get an injunction, the

respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and such acts

had been done only in order to gain advantage on the other side and to get a stay in the second

suit.

We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over – reach the

court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as on the opposite parte and

is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HEARD IN THE CASE

UNLESS IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED and in our view,

it can only be if we non-suit the respondents in suit no. 261/97. While, therefore, we do not

purpose to take action against the respondent for contempt for except to issue a warning to

respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future we direct the dismissal of the suit (being suit no.

261/97) it self.---------.”

(iii) Head note of the above referred DRJ:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Section 2 (c ) (iii) – Criminal contempt – Civil suit for specific performance of agreement –

Relief of stay not granted – Another suit filed – Concealed rejection of grant of relief in

earlier suit – Sought stay for not disturbing or interfering with the quiet and peaceful

possession, use and occupation of – Granted – Appealed against – Contempt petition for

criminal proceedings for filing proceeding and application intentionally and deliberately –

Alleged : Abuse of process of law, deliberate attempt to hamper and obstruct due course of

judicial proceedings and administration of justice and fraud upon court – Suppressed

material facts- Not come with clean hands – Over-reached the court – Necessary to punish as a

contempt – Conduct abuses and mockery of judicial process – LAWYER SHOULD HAVE

REFUSED TO MOVE FOR – Played fraud upon court – CANNOT BE HEARD UNLESS

IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT – Warned to be more careful in future – Suit

dismissed – Appeal allowed – Contempt – petition disposed of.

Held: In our view, the arguments are wholly fallacious. A party must come to the Court with

clean hands and must disclose all the relevant facts which may result in appreciating the

rival contentions of the parties. In our view, a litigant, who approaches the court, must produce

all the documents which are relevant to the litigation and he must also disclose to the Court about

the pendency of any earlier litigation between the parities and the result thereof. In the present

case, after suit No. 3064/96 had been first listed before the Court on 17 th December, 1996, no

stay had been granted to it till 20th January, 1997 in spite of three hearings having taken place

before the Court. It was only after 20th January, 1997 when the case was adjourned to May 1997

that the respondent filed the second suit and though in one of the paragraphs, it is

mentioned that it had filed an earlier suit for injunction, however, it did not disclose to the

Court either in the plaint or in the application as to what had transpired in the Court on

the dates when the said suit was fixed, nor it was disclosed to the Court that injunction has

not been granted in its favour by the Court and the relief claimed in the application in the

earlier suit was almost similar to the relief which had been claimed in the subsequent suit. In our

opinion, it was obligatory upon the respondent to disclose to the Court that in the application

filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief had been claimed, the Court had not granted the said

relief. In our view, if these facts were before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit

came up for hearing before it, may be Hon’ble the Single Judge was persuaded not to grant any

ex-parte stay in favour of the respondent. Moreover, in a suit for specific performance of an

agreement to register the agreement of lease, it appears to us that the plaintiff could not claim an

injunction which had already been claimed in suit no. 3064/96. We are, therefore, of the

opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also

suppressed material facts from the Court with a view to gain advantage in the second suit.

This in our view is clearly over-reaching the Court.

IT MAY BE THAT CERTAIN MINOR ABUSES OF THE PROCESS OF THE

COURT MAY BE SUITABLY DEALT WITH AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, BY

STRIKING OUT PLEADINGS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ORDER 6 RULE 16 OR

IN SOME OTHER MANNER. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of

conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus ex-tends

it pernicious influence beyond to the action and affects the interest of the public in the

administration of justice.

In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by not

disclosing that in the earlier suit the, respondent has not been able to get the injunction, the

respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party and such acts

had been done only order to gain advantage on the other side to get a stay in the second suit.

We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over-reach the

Court and the respondents have played fraud upon the Court as well as upon the opposite party

and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. Respondents cannot be heard in the case unless it

purges itself of the contempt so committed and in our view it can only be if we non-suit the

respondents in Suit No. 261/97. While, therefore, we do not propose to take action against the

respondent for contempt except to issue a warning to respondent No. 2 to be more careful, we

direct the dismissal of suit (being Suit no. 261/97) itself. While, therefore allowing this appeal,

we dismiss Suit No. 261/97 and dispose of the contempt petition in the above terms.

(iv) Relevant extract of para 2 of the above referred judgment:-

“That the appellant is the owner of the premises being cottage no. 6 situated within the

complex of Shanti Sports Club, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi. ---------- Within the Sports Complex,

there are a few residential cottages. One of such cottages being cottage No. 6 is at the back of the

complex. Between Cottage no. 6 and Cottage no. 7, there is a big lawn. The dispute between

the parities is about the letting out and used and enjoyment of the said lawn by the

occupants of cottage No. 6, namely, the respondent.”

(v) Relevant extract of para 3 of the above referred judgment:-

“By a lease deed entered into between the parties on 2nd September, 1996, Cottage No. 6 ------

was let to the respondent by the appellant for the resident of its managing director Mr.

Christopher J. Shaw and his family members. ----------.”


“It appears that the lawn between Cottage Nos. 6 & 7 was being given on higher for marriages

and private parties by the appellant which allegedly caused disturbance to the Managing Director

of the respondent and a suit being suit no,. 3064/96 was thereupon filed by the respondents on or

about 11th December, 1996. It was alleged in the plaint in the said suit that the appellant had

represented to the respondents that the lawn between Cottages 6 and 7 would always remain

vacant and was meant to be used for the families of the occupants of the said Cottages and their

guests. However, due to the said lawn being given on higher for marriages another parties, there

was hardly any moment when respondent no. 2 and is family have been able to have free and

unobstructed access to the premises and enjoy its quite and peaceful possession.”


“The said suit came up for hearing before the Hon’ble Single Judge on 17 th December 1996

------. Ex –parte was not granted in favour of the respondent No. 1 & 2 ----in the said suit no

stay had been granted in favour of the respondents.”


“On or about 4th February, 1997, respondents filed the suit being Suit No. 261/97 for specific

performance of the agreement -----. Alongwith the suit, the said respondents had also filed an

application for the grant of an injunction restraining the appellant, his agents, employees and

servants from in any manner disturbing or interfering with the quit and peaceful possession, use

and occupation of the demised premises being cottage No. 6 and its appurtenant lawn ---.”


“On 6th February, 1997 the Hon’ble Single Judge passed the order of injunction in favour of the

respondent No. 1 and against the appellant ---. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has

filed this appeal and has also filed a Contempt petition for initiating criminal contempt

proceedings against the respondents for their having intentionally and deliberately filed the

proceedings and applications being Suit Nos. 261/97 and I.A. 1124/97 which amounted to abuse

of the process of the Court and an attempt to cercumvant the order of the court passed in Suit No.

364/96.”

(x) Para 13 of the above referred judgment:-

“It is apparent that in the application in Suit No. 261/97, the respondent seeking the same relief

of temporary injunction as had been sought for in Suit No. 3064/96.”

(xi) Para 14 of the above referred judgment:-

“Was it not obligatory on the part of the respondent to disclose to the Court that in an earlier suit

filed by it, the Court had not granted any stay in its favour and if on such a disclosure having

been made, the Court still granted stay in favour the respondent, it could be said that the

respondent had not concealed any material fact from the Court ? But not mentioning anything

about the Court having not granted any stay in similar circumstances in favour of the

respondent in the earlier suit, it appears to us that the respondent had not only concealed

material facts from the Court but had also tried to over-reach the Court. Being

unsuccessful in obtaining stay in Suit No. 3064/96, it was not permissible to the respondent to

file the subsequent suit and seek the same relief which had not been granted to it in earlier suit.”

(xii) Para 15 of the above referred judgment:-

“In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Others, AIR 1994 SC 853 was held that

the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the

Court, must come with clean hands. “It can be said without hesitation that a person whose

case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. HE CAN BE SUMMARILY

THROWN OUT AT ANY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION. A litigant who approaches the

Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by which are relevant to the litigation. If

he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be

guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.”

(xiii) Relevant extract of para 16 of the above referred judgment:-

“We are informed that in Suit No. 261/97, the plaintiff had not even filed the plaint of the earlier

suit being Suit No. 3604/96 nor the court had an opportunity to go through the allegations made

in the said plaint. We, therefore, of the opinion that by withholding the plaint and the

application in the earlier suit from the Court and by not disclosing to the Court about the

proceedings in the earlier suit and the stay having not been granted to it, the

plaintiff/respondent had tried to get an advantage from the Court and was, therefore,

guilty of playing fraud of the court as well as on the respondent. The following

observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are relevant for purposes of

present case :-

“The High Court in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court-----. We do not aggrieve with the High Court that “THERE IS NO LEGAL DUTY CASTE

UPON THE PLAINTIFF TO COME TO COURT WITH A TRUE CASE AND PROVE IT BY TRUE EVIDENCE.” The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. He courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands.----.”

-----. A party must come to the Court with clean hands and must disclose all the relevant

facts which may result in appreciating the rival contentions of the parties. In our view, a litigant,

who approaches the Court, must produce all the documents which are relevant to the litigation

and he must also disclose to the Court about the pendency of any earlier litigation between the

parties and the result thereof.------.In our opinion, it was obligatory upon the respondent to

disclose to the Court that in the application filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief had been

claimed, however, the Court had not granted the said relief. In our view, if these facts were

before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit came up for hearing before it,

MAY BE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE WAS PERSUADED NOT TO GRANT ANY EX-

PARTE STAY IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT. ----. We are, therefore, of the

opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also


THIS IN OUR VIEW IS CLEARLY OVER –REACHING THE COURT.”

Note : ‘Over-reach’ means to reach or extent beyond, to outwit or get the better of, to

defeat by one’s oversubtlety

(xiv) Para 17 of the above referred judgment:-

“As held by the Supreme Court in Advocate-General, State of Bihar Vs. M/S Madhya Pradesh

Khair Industries and another, (1980) 3 SCC 311, every abuse of the process of the Court may not

necessarily amount to contempt of Court. ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT

CALCULATED TO HAMPER THE DUE COURSE OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING OR

THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS A CONTEMPT OF COURT. It

may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as

between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16 or in some

other manner. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which

abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it pernicious

influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the

administration of justice.

(xv) Para 18 of the above referred judgment:-

“In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by not

disclosing that in the earlier suit the respondent has not been able to get the injunction,

THE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF PLAYING FRAUD ON THE COURT AS WELL

AS ON THE OPPOSITE PARTY and such acts had been done only in order to gain advantage

on the other side and to get a stay in the second suit.”

(xvi) Relevant extract of para 19 of the above referred judgment:-

“As held by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and another AIR

1977 SC 2421, the pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this county and the

Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious

cases. “It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly

fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And

remembering that AN ADVOCATE IS AN OFFICER OF JUSTICE he owes it to society

NOT TO COLLABORATE IN SHADY ACTIONS. The Bar Council of India, we hope will

activate this obligation.---.”

(xvii) Para 20 of the above referred judgment:-

“We are of the opinion that the above noted passage of the aforesaid judgment in T.

Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal’s case is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the

present case. Having not succeeded in getting stay in Suit No. 3064/96, IN OUR VIEW, THE

LAWYER SHOULD HAVE REFUSED TO MOVE AN APPLICATION FOR STAY IN

THE SECOND SUIT.”

(xviii) Relevant extract of para 21 of the above referred judgment:-

“We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over-reach the Court and

the respondents have played fraud upon the Court as well as upon the opposite party and is thus

clearly guilty of contempt. Respondents cannot be heard in the case unless it purges itself of the

contempt so committed and in our view it can only be if we non-suit the respondents in Suit No.

261/97. While, therefore, we do not propose to take action against the respondent for contempt

except to issue a warning to respondent No. 2 to be more careful in future, we direct the

dismissal of the suit (being Suit No. 261/97) Itself. ------.”

24. “Indian Airports Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chattarjee And Another, AIR 1999

SC 880” (2.2.1999) :-


25. “K.S. Villasa Vs. M/S Ladies Corner & Another, AIR 1999 SC 2140” (3.2.1999) :-


26. “Ms. Sophy Kelly and another Vs., Chandrakant Ganpat & Others, AIR 1999 SC

1042 “ (4.2.1999) :-


27. “Suo Motu contempt in Re: Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300”:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 14, 12–b Constitution of India, Art. 129-

Criminal Contempt on face of Court-Advocate shouted slogans in open Court. And hurdled his

shoe towards Court- His action intimidates the Court and causes interference with judicial

proceedings-Advocate guilty of gross criminal contempt-Advocate not appearing to be repentant-

Apology tendered, not genuine-Sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for 4 months and fine.

--------. A lawyer does not enjoy any special immunity under the Contempt of

Courts Act where he is found to have committed a gross contempt of Court. ----. It is

unfortunate that a person belonging to the Bar should have behave in this manner. The

action of the contemnor advocate is most reprehensible and has been tendency to interfere with

the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the Court and the Majesty of Law. ---.

Keeping in view of the seriousness of the offence committed by the contemnor deterrent

punishment imposed on him so that it serves an example to others and no one indulges in

repetition of such acts. Court sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for 4 months and to

pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-.”

28. “T.C. Mathews and anr. V. Distt. and Session Judge, 2000 RLR (N. S.C. ) 19”

“Attorney, Power of. Is not entitled to appear and plead on behalf of an accused or a party with

permission of court. He himself cannot apply. Permission must be sought by the party himself.

Court may grant permission if P.O.A. is honest and intelligent. Lawyers are allowed as they

are accountable to courts.”

29. “Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction And Another, (1999) 6

SCC 18” (5.4.1999) :-


30. Kapil Deo Prasad Sah And Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3215”

(25.8.1999) :-


31. “Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of Indian and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345”

( 15.10.1999) :-


32. “Padmahasini alias Padmapriya Vs. C.R. Srinivas, AIR 2000 SC 68” (16.11.1999) :-


33. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124(SC)” (25.1.2000):-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 2(c ) (iii). WHEN THERE IS INFRACTION OF

MAJESTY OF LAW, COURT MUST NOT KEEP ANGELIC SILENCE. Contempt law is

for inducing confidence in people for due administration of justice. LATTER MAY

SUFFER WHEN A PARTY MAKES FALSE DENIALS IN AN AFFIDAVIT AND

STATES POSITIVE ASSERTIONS MAKING SAME AS MOTIVATED FALSEHOOD.

People approach Courts with firm hope that truth would ultimately prevail. FRAUD AND

FALSEHOOD DEFLECT EVEN FLOW OF JUSTICE AND LOWER AUTHORITY OF

COURT. Punishment for contempt is for ensuing rule of law by upholding majesty and

dignity of Court. Respect for judiciary is bound to strengthen democracy. Filing false

affidavits and fabricated documents are matters of great concern. Degeneration of moral conduct

makes it difficult to rely on facts in affidavits. By false affidavit justice is defeated as attempt is

to delay delivery of possession. It is criminal contempt and as falsehood had been repeated, offer

of apology is not genuine. CONTEMNOR DESERVED PUNISHMENT TO DETER

OTHERS and had taken advantage (Rita Markand’s case). If obstruction of justice is allowed,

it would permeate society. Litigant public ought to be very cautious in making statements lest

these become offence under the Act. Fabrication on oath in an affidavit is a serious matter

calling for severe punishment when there is substantial interference with course of justice.

Practice of filing false affidavit is deprecated and a court would be failing in its duty to

maintain majesty of law if it does not give proper punishment.”

34. “P.C. Singhal Vs. R.B. S. Tyagi , 84 (2000) DLT 264” (Referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur) (Not relevant)

35. “Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000):-

(i) Head Note of the above referred RLR :-

“Contempt of courts act, Ss. 12, 19 & 20 –Limitation for initiation of contempt

proceedings is one year and if court does not imitate within one year by asking contemnor to

show cause why he should not be punished, then matter becomes time barred. Mere filing of

contempt petition or issuing show cause notice is not initiation. Latter occurs when court applies

its mind. A complainant is not an aggrieved person and if court does not initiate, then he

has no right of appeal u/s 19 of the Act.”

36. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal

Advocate, 89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB)= 2000 RLR 144” :-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note ------ of the above referred DLT:-

“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 226 – Issuance of Suo Motu Notice to Commissioner,

MCD : Corruption, unauthorized construction and encroachments : Statement made by MCD

Counsel in Court :Explanation sought from him by Chief Law Officer, MCD. Amounts to

interference with action of person having duty to discharge in court and contempt of court Chief

Law Officer, MCD called for explanation of MCD counsel regarding statement attributed to him

by newspaper report whereby he highlighted factum of corruption amongst J.Es of MCD-Writ

petition in first instance was filed in Supreme Court and later transferred to this court and

renumbered- Before transferring matter Supreme Court made various directions to MCD and

other authorities-Instead of complying with directions and checking corruption, unauthorized

constructions, explanation of MCD Counsel was sought by Chief Law Officer MCD-This was

not expected of Chief Law Officer who is instructed in law and lives by law. This amounts to

interference with action of person having duty to discharge in court-IT HAMPERS JUSTICE

AND CLEARLY AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT-Counsel is not mouth piece of his client-

His duty is to uphold truth and honesty-In making statement, MCD counsel has answered call

of duty towards court –explanation of the counsel was called to strike fear in him and to render

him incapable of performing his duty before court-Chief Law Officer and Commissioner MCD

not well advised to adopt this course of action-They have filed affidavits and tendered

unconditional apology and stated they have highest esteem for court-Best measure to judge same

would be through their actions taken for implementing order passed in CWP No. 841/98 and

other similar matter.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note of the above referred RLR :-

“Advocates Act. LAWYER OWES A DUTY TO UTTER TRUTH IN COURT even if

statement is against corruption amongst officers of his client (MCD). When MCD (the

Comm. & C.L.O. ) asked his explanation then they are guilty of contempt of court.---.”

37. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001)

(i) Relevant extract of

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c ) – Constitution of India , Art. 129 – Criminal of

High Court in connivance with Secretary of Physical Education Institution got orders of Court

forged – Used the forged documents to obtain favourable orders from Govt. for holding

examination for students of institution who were otherwise not eligible – Contemnors, held are

guilty of criminal contempt.

The Govt. of Maharashtra did not grant permission to the institution Lokmata Indira Gandhi

College of Sports, Yavatmal for the academic year 1994-95 but the institution admitted several

students and then persuaded the Government for grant of permission. At later stage, the

Government did grant the permission for the academic year 1994-95, so that the students who

have already studied in the institution could appear in the examination. An examination was

conducted in the year 1996 but many of the students could not appear in the said examination,

allegedly because of lack of proper information. Therefore, a writ petition in the court for a

direction that the remaining students who have already studied for the academic session 1994-95,

should be permitted to appear at the examination to be held by the appropriate authority. This

ES/ES/S100245/2001/BNG/CSL writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. Against the said

order of the High Court a special leave petition was filed in Supreme Court and that special leave

petition was also dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the special leave petition, the so-called

students of institution, would not get any chance of appearing at any future examination.

However, the employee of High Court who had filed writ petition in connivance with Secretary

of institution forged the orders of Supreme Court and sent forged order to state Govt. which

indicated that while dismissing Court had directed State Govt. to conduct examination fro those

students list of which had been annexed to writ petition. Question arose whether Secretary and

employee of High Court can be held to be guilty of contempt.

Held, that the order of Supreme Court has been forged and fabricated is proved beyond

reasonable doubt and there cannot be any dispute about the same. It is further established that the

aforesaid forged order of Supreme Court was received by Secretary, which she had indicated in

her latter, to the Director. She was the Secretary of the institution, which institution had not been

granted permission to present the students by the state of Maharashtra and in her letter, she had

requested that examination be conducted, complying with the orders of the Supreme Court for

the remaining students, since according to the Court’s order, examination of students mentioned

in the list had to be conducted. Along with the said letter, the purported true copy of the order of

the Supreme Court has been enclosed. The said secretary had been instructing counsel to file

petitions even at times

by impersonation.

(ii) Relevant extracts of para 6 of the above referred judgment:-

“The law of contempt of Court is essentially meant for keeping the administration of justice

pure and undefiled……….The Supreme Court is the Highest Court of record and it is

charged with the duties and the responsibilities of protecting the dignity of the court. To

discharge its obligation as the custodian of the administration of the justice in the

Country…..it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the power to see the stream

of justice in the country remains pure, THAT ITS COURSE IS NOT HINDERED OR

OBSTRUCTED IN ANY MANNER……. To discharge this obligation, the Supreme Court

has TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE DEVIATION FROM THE PATH OF

JUSTICE……. Criminal Contempt has been defined in Section 2 (c) to mean interference

with the administration of justice IN ANY MANNER. A FALSE or MISLEADING or a

wrong statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings TO

OBTAIN A FAVOURABLE ORDER would undoubtedly tantamount to interfere with the

due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is found to have utilized an order of a

court which he or she KNOWS TO BE INCORRECT for conferring benefit on persons

who are not entitled to the same, THE EVERY UTILIZATION OF THE FABRICATED

ORDER BY THE PERSON CONCERNED WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HOLD

HIM/HER GUILTY OF CONTEMPT, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or

herself is the author of fabrication. On the aforesaid parameters, it would be necessary to

examine whether it can be said that Mrs. Megha Rude can be held to be guilty of contempt. In

view of our conclusion on the basis of materials available in the Inquiry proceedings with regard

to the role played by Mrs. Megha Rude, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that

Mrs. Megha Rude is guilty of gross Criminal Contempt and must be suitably punished for the

same.”


“So far as Mr. Dilip Wamanrao Gund is concerned, he was an employee in the High Court of

Bombay, Nagpur Bench……..The material documents were in the hand writing of Mr. Dilip

Wamanrao…….. Shri Palshikar further states that he handed over the order of the court which he

had received from Mr. Deshpande to Dilip Wamanrao Gund…….. Shri Dilip Wamanrao

subsequently requisitely for three more certified copies of the order and pursuant to such request,

to copies of the orders had been obtained to dispatched to said Shri Dilip Wamanrao Gund on

15.9.1998……. The aforesaid facts unequivocally establish the fact that Shri Wamanrao Gund

was present in the court when special leave petition was dismissed…… By user of a document

which he new to be forged, said Shri Wamanrao Gund committed gross contempt of court and as

such he is liable to be punished to the same.”


“Mrs. Megha Rude and Shri Dilip Wamanrao Gund were fully aware of the original order that

had been passed by this court in dismissing the special leave petition and they used the forged

order by which they tried to have another examination conducted by the state government at

enable the remaining students to appear at the examination……


“We therefore hold both Mrs. Megha Rude and Mr. Dilip Wamanrao Gund to be guilty of

contempt having committed criminal contempt as well as under Article 129 of the Constitution

of India and for such gross act on their part, they are sentenced to imprisonment for six months.

38. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt Madhu Trehan & Ors. 92 (2001) DLT 665”

(F.B.) (28.5.2001) :-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT :-

“Constitution of India, 1950 –Art. 215 –Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 2(c ) –

Contempt of Court : Article published in scurrilous manner in Journal named “ Wah India” ,

scornfully denigrating judges, causing expressions aspersions on integrity and capability of

Hon’ble Judges of this Court: unqualified apology tendered by respondents –journalists :

bonafides and genuineness of apologies not doubted –anyone who intends to tarnish image of

judiciary should not be allowed to go unpunished ---unconditional apologies tendered by

respondents deserve acceptance- respondents are journalists of standing and repute – respondents

expressed feeling of remorse –apologies accepted ---.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (ii) of the above referred DLT :-

“Constitution of India, 1950 –Art. 215 –Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 2(c ) –

Contempt of Court-publication in question ---casting aspersion on competent of judiciary ---

publication in question scandalizes judges –it attempts to rob High Court of its owner and

prestige –CONTEMNORS CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO TAMPER WITH STREAM OF

JUSTICE WHICH MUST FLOW PURE AN UNHINDERED – contemnors cannot be

allowed to commit contempt of court in garb of criticism ----It was not innocent publication –

contempt of court committed by contemnors is of grave nature and tends to substantially

interfere with due course of justice –apologies of contemnors not accepted.”

39. “Rajiv Malhotra Vs. Union of India & Ors, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)

(i) Head Note of the above referred DRJ:-


Contempt- Punishment – False affidavit – Petitioner’s building demolished despite greasing

palm of officials of MCD – Sought direction against erring officials – Directions issued to MCD

restraining unauthorized construction in unauthorized colonies in CW 7441/93 – MCD officials

allowed constructions in violation of order – False affidavit furnished that certain properties

demolished – Committee of Advocates appointed to report nature of demolitions – Report

reveals certain properties were punctured and not completely demolished – Deliberate and

willful false statements of JE and Baildar – Disregard of truth – Interference in the course of

justice – Guilty of contempt of court – Sentence of one month’s SI with fine of Rs. 25,000/-

on each.

(ii) Relevant portion of para 20 of the above referred judgment:-

“In view of the foregoing, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT BY FALSE

AFFIDAVIT AND TAKING LIBERTIES WITH TRUTH IN ORDER TO MISLEAD US,

SHRI U.S. CHAUHAN AND R.S. SEHRAWAT HAVE COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF

COURT and the same is of such a nature that it tends to substantially interfere with the

due course of justice. ACCORDINGLY, THEY ARE HELD GUILTY OF COMMITTING

CONTEMPT OF COURT ----.”

40. “Pallav Sheth vs. custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549 (10.8.2001)

Note: Limitation of one Year from the date of filing of contempt application or one year from the

date of knowledge for filing a contempt application

41. “Pravin C. Shah Vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali & Another, VII (2001) SLT 153” (9.10.2001) :-

“(i) Contempt of Court : Mere statement by contemnor (advocate) before Court that he

apologizes is hardly enough to amount to purging himself of contempt: Court must be satisfied

of genuineness of apology to hold contemnor has purged himself of contempt : Till such order

passed by Court delinquent advocate would continue to be under spell of interdict contained in

rule 11 of the rules- Respondent-Advocate continued to appear in all Courts he was earlier

appearing even after he was convicted by High Court for Criminal Court without being objected

by any Court- This was on account of fact that presiding officers of Court not informed of what

happened-This Court directs in future whenever advocate is convicted by High Court for

contempt of Court, Registrar of that High Court shall intimate that fact to all courts within its

jurisdiction to inform all presiding officer that particular advocate is under spell of interdict

contained in Rule 11 of rules until he purges himself of contempt-Respondent can still purge

himself of contempt in manner indicated under Rule-11-Unless that process is complete

respondent cannot plead in any Court within domain of Kerala High Court including subordinate

Courts-Registrar of High Court of Kerala shall intimate all courts about this interdict as against

respondent-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 12-Kerala High Court Rules-Rules 11-

Advocates Act, 1961 –Section 34 (1).

(ii) Contempt of Court- Person who committed contempt of court cannot have

unreserved right to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in courts without any quaim

or remorse: Bar Council cannot overrule such regulation concerning orderly conduct of court

proceedings.”

42. “Sudhir Chona vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (62) DRJ 346 (DB)” (13.3.2002)

43. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri L.J. 493” (30.7.2003)

(i) Head Note (B) of the above referred Cri. L.J.:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971). S. 2(c ) – Criminal contempt – Accused bringing some

persons to impersonate as contesting respondents in writ appeal and persuading Court to accept

compromise petition signed by them as if contesting parties had settled matter to allow writ

appeal filed by accused and withdraw writ petition filed by contesting respondents – Held,

accused was guilty of criminal contempt as defined in S. 2(c ).

If any person tries to either file any false affidavit, forged document or ever makes

false statement on oath, the conduct of such person has a tendency to interfere with the

administration of justice or the due course of judicial proceedings. This conduct is having

tendency of impeding, obstructing or interference striking a blow on the role of law and

NO COURT CAN IGNORE SUCH CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO

SHAKE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC AND IN THE JUDICIAL

INSTITUTION. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be

poisoned by anyone resorting to file false affidavits by giving false statements or fabricating

false evidence ever by impersonation in a court of law and as such, this type of acts clearly fall

within the definition of criminal contempt as defined U/s 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act.

-----.”

(ii) Relevant extract of para 29 of above referred judgment:-

“Insofar as accused 1 is concerned, before adverting to the evidence, we would like to remind

ourselves to the law as laid down by the Apex Court in this regard. In the case of Chandra Shashi

v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 : (1994 AIR SCW 4994) the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has laid down thus:-

“2. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial

proceedings, or if anything is done with oblique motive, the justice. Such

persons are required to be property dealt with, not only to punish them for

the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which

shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice.

44. “S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039” (19.8.2003) (A

Three Judge Bench)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2- Contempt –FALSE VERIFICATION

OF STATEMENT OF FACTS- IS CONTEMPT –But pleading/defence made on basis of

facts which are not false-Howsoever the pleading may be an abuse process of court –Does

not amount to contempt.

WHERE A VERIFICATION IS SPECIFIC AND DELIBERATELY FALSE,

THERE IS NOTHING IN LAW TO PREVENT A PERSON FROM BEING

PROCEEDED FOR CONTEMPT. But it must be remembered that the very essence of

crimes of this kind is not how such statements may injure this or that party to litigation

BUT HOW THEY MAY DECEIVE AND MISLEAD THE COURTS AND THUS

PRODUCE MISCHIEVOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. A person is under a legal obligation to verify the

allegations of fact made in the pleadings and if he verifies falsely, he comes under the

clutches of law. In order to expose a person to the liability of a prosecution of making false

statement, there must be a false statement of fact and not a mere pleading made on the basis of

facts which are themselves not false. Merely because an action or defence can be an abuse of

process of the Court, those responsible for its formulation can not be regarded as committing

contempt, BUT AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE COURT BY DISGUISING THE

NATURE OF CLAIM IS CONTEMPT. If the facts leading to a claim or defence are set out,

but an inference is drawn thereby stating that the stand of the plaintiff or defendant is one way or

the other, it will not amount to contempt unless it be that the facts as pleaded themselves are

false.

The appellant a Bank Officer was held guilty of contempt of Court on ground of taking

up a false defence as pleaded in the written statement and repeating the same in the evidence-in-

chief. The written statement had been verified by the appellant stating that what is

contained in written statement is based on the information received from the records of the

defendants and he believed the same to be true. THE VERIFICATION OF FACTS

ADVERTED TO IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT IS NOT MADE ON THE BASIS OF

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPELLANT and the defence set up by him is on

the basis of the stand taken by his bank in the companion suit. When in a suit of the

appellant’s Bank, the stand had been accepted, but in the suit against appellant’s Bank, such

stand had been disbelieved, it becomes difficult to say that the appellant had deliberately stated

falsehood to mislead the Court or to simply gain time to the disadvantage of the other party in

this matter.

Further, when the appellant tried to explain his case in his evidence, the same was shut

out on the basis that it is hearsay. An officer of Bank who had no personal knowledge of the

transactions in question and was deposing on the basis of material on record, his evidence cannot

be from his knowledge and necessarily has to be hearsay. Hence, the lower Court was not

justified in shutting out that part of the evidence.”

45. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004

SC 3114” (12.4.2004)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (B) of the above referred AIR:-

“Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974), S. 311-Evidence Act. (1 of 1872), S. 165 ----------- Presiding judge

must not a spectator and a mere recording Machine- but should play active role in evidence

collecting process – AND ELICIT all relevant materials necessary fro reaching the correct

conclusion to find out truth----------

Section 311 of the Code and S. 165 of the evidence Act. confer vast and vide powers on residing

Officers of Court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence

collecting process--------.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (C ) of the above referred AIR:-

“Criminal PC (2 of 1974), Ss. 386, 391,401 –Evidence Act (1 of 1872) S. 165-------- Object of

391 is to subserve ends of justice and to get at the truth-Best Bakery case with horror and terror –

oriented History-Star eye-witness had not stated truthfully before trial court- willing to speck

truth before the appellate court on basis of affidavit power Under S 391 can be exercise by

appellate court----------Re-trial observed to be conducted out side state--------

it is no doubt true that the accused persons have been acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal

has been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and based on tainted evidence, tailored

investigation, unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and evidence of

threatened/terrorized witnesses, IT IS NO ACQUITTAL IN THE EYE OF LAW and no

sanctity or credibility can be attached and given to be so called findings. It seems to be

nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on legal process AND THE RESULTANT DECISIONS

OF COURTS-CORAM NON JUDIS AND NON-EST, therefore, interference in appeals is

warranted.


“As pithily stated in Jennison vs. Baker (1972 (1) All ER 1006), “The law should not be seen to

sit limply, WHILE THOSE WHO DEFY IT OF FREE and, those who seek its protection

lose hope.”

COURTS HAVE TO ENSURE THAT ACCUSED PERSONS ARE PUNISHED ---------. If

deficiency in investigation or prosecution is visible or can be perceived by lifting the veil trying

to hide the realities or covering the obvious deficiencies. Courts have to deal with the same with

an iron hand appropriately within the frame work of law--------.”


“-----This appears to be a case where the truth has become a casualty in the trial. ------.”


“-------- TI is one of the salutary principles of the administration of justice that justice

should not only be done but it should be seen to be done.-------.”

46. “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004)


“Contempt of Courts Act. (70 of 1971), S. 15-Cognizance of criminal contempt–

PROCEDURE – proceedings before High Court were initiated by respondents for filing

contempt petition under S. 15 – petition were vigorously pursued and strenuously argued as

private petitions – same were never treated as suo motu petitions – non-compliance of

mandatory requirement of obtaining consent of Advocate- General –petition held, would

not be maintainable


“For determination of the main issue in these appeals---------, it is necessary to briefly note the

object of power of the court to punish a person for contempt.”

(iii) Para 7 of the above referred judgment ;-

“Every High Court besides powers under the act has also the power to punish for contempt as

provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India. ----. The Act lays down ‘contempt of Court’

to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt. We are concerned with criminal contempt.

‘Criminal; contempt’ is defined in section 2 (c ) of the act. It, inter alia means the

publication (whether by words, spoken or written for by signs, or by visible representation, or

otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to

scandalizes, OR LOWERS OR TENDS TO LOWER THE AUTHORITY OF ANY

COURT. The procedure for initiating a proceeding of contempt when it is committed IN

THE FACE OF THE SUPREME COURT OR HIGH COURT has been prescribed in

SECTION 14 of the Act. IN THE CASE OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, OTHER THEN A

CONTEMPT REFERRED TO IN SECTION 14, THE MANNER OF TAKING

COGNIZANCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 15 OF THE ACT. This

section, inter alia provides that action for contempt may be taken on court’s own motion or

on a motion made by –

(a) the Advocate – General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the advocate general

(iii) Para 12 of the above referred judgment:-

“For determination of the issues involved, it would also be useful to note the observations may in

the case of S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow vs. Vinay Chandra Mishra

((1981) 1 SCC 436) to the following effect:-

“Section 15 does not specify the basis or the source of information on which the

High Court can act. on its own motion. If the High Court acts on information

derived from its own sources, such as FROM A PERUSAL OF THE

RECORDS OF A SUBORDINATE COURT or on reading a report in a

newspaper or hearing a public speech, WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY

REFERENCE FROM THE SUBORDINATE COURT or the advocate

General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion. But, if

the High court is directly moved by a petition by a private person feeling

aggrieved, not being the Advocate General can the High Court refused to

entertain the same on the ground that it has been made without the consent in

writing of the advocate General? It appears to us that the High Court has, in

such a situation, a discretion to refused to entertain the petition, or to take

cognizance on its own motion on the basis of the information supplied to it in

that petition.”


“In P.N. Duda’s case (AIR 1988 SC 1208), it was held that:-

“54. A conjoint perusal of the Act. and rules makes it clear that so far as this

Court is Concerned, action for contempt may be taken by the court on its own

motion or on the motion of the attorney General (or Solicitor General) or of any

other person with his consent in writing. There is no difficulty where the court

or the attorney General chooses to move in the matter. But when this is not

done and a private person desires that such action should be taken, ONE

OF THE THREE COURSES IS OPEN TO HIM. He may place the

information in his possession before the court and request the court to take

action (vide C.K. Daphtary vs. O.P. Gupta and Sarkar vs. Mishra (AIR 1971 SC

1132 and AIR 1981 SC 723 respectively) ; HE MAY PLACE THE

INFORMATION BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND

REQUEST TO TAKE ACTION ; OR HE MAY PLACE THE


REQUEST HIM TO PERMIT HIM TO MOVE TO THE COURT.”


“The whole object of prescribing procedural mode of taking cognizance in section 15 is to

safe guard the valuable time of the court from being wasted by frivolous contempt petition.

47. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 : 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” (9.2.2007)

(i) Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT :-

“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 215- Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 340 r/w section

195- Contempt of Court-Cognizance of abuse of legal process- Recovery suits –Loan agreements

not executed on dates recorded thereon- Stamp papers on which they were engrossed, were of

later date- Show cause notice issued to plaintiff and his Advocates for abuse of legal process in

institution and prosecution of suits based on agreements in question- Defendants claimed

plaintiff forged and fabricated loan agreement for institution of suit- Loan agreement was dated

15.5.1997 and 1.7.1997 and notarized on same date- Non-judicial stamp paper on which

agreement engrossed is dated 21.7.1997 – Defendants filed written statement denying execution

of loan agreements- DELIBERATE FALSE STATEMENTS ON OATH, PRACTISING

FRAUD AND FALSE AVERMENTS TO KNOWLEDGE OF COUNSEL IN PLAINT,

witnessing agreement either not executed on dates mentioned or not executed at all APART

FROM BEING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF CODE OF CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS ALSO AMOUNT TO OBSTRUCTING DUE COURSE OF ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL CONTEMPT- Act of instituting suits on

loan agreements knowing that legal notice of demand sent for return of consideration,

claiming it to have been paid in USA, would not be filed by counsel deliberately- It can be

filed by counsel either on account of his total forget-fullness with regard to notice sent or

his being blissfully ignorant of legal provisions and consequences thereof- Dr. Diwan is

Advocate with decades of experience and submits he and plaintiff suffered for their lapses-

Plaintiff lent money, has lost right to recover same on account of manipulation of

documents by defendants-keeping in view age of Counsel and his blemish less tack record,

apology tendered by him accepted- Apology of another Counsel Kiran Singh is bona fide

and accepted-Directions issued accordingly.”

(ii) Head Note (ii) of the above referred DLT :-

“Contempt of Court- Party taking recourse to fraud deflects course of judicial proceedings and

same constitutes interference in administration of justice- Making of false statement on oath

deliberately also constitutes criminal contempt.”

(iii) Head Note (iii) of the above referred DLT :-

“Judicial Administration-Role of Advocates vis-à-vis Courts and administration of justice- Judge

and Counsel are two wheels of chariot of justice-Mutual confidence in discharge of duties and

cordial relations between Bench and bar Smoothen movement of chariot.”

(iv) Relevant extract of Head Note (iv) of the above referred DLT :-

“Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 340 r/w Section 195, 195(1)(b)(ii)- Cognizance of

abuse of legal process-Initiation of proceeding under section 340 Cr. P.C. –Contempt of

Court----As suo motu notice of contempt initiated and determined, initiation of proceedings

under section 340 Cr. P.C. not in interest of justice- Inquiry under section 340 Cr. P.C. would

not serve any useful purpose nor be in interest of justice – Parties requested for quietus in

matter.”

48. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB) (17.2.2009)

(i) Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT:-

“Contempt of court – Contradictory stand taken by contemnor in written statement,

deposition before Court and in letter addressed to L & DO regarding property being HUF

property and contrary stand before L & DO – These contradictions caused an inordinate

delay in trial of suit – It has resulted in unfortunate situation where plaintiff No. 1 passed away

dent No. 1 ) is living in Gurudwara – Appellant an advocate though aged one – He is fully

familiar with legal pleas and consequences of his conduct – Fit case for issuance of notice

for criminal contempt to respondent who has tried to pollute course of justice and interfere

with same knowing falsehood of his statements – FACT THAT HE IS AN ADVOCATE

MAKES CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT ALL THE MORE DEPLORABLE and mere

advanced age of respondent should not defer this court from proceeding further in matter –

Appropriate notice to show cause be issued to respondent of being proceeded against and

punished for criminal contempt of Court.

(ii) Head Note (ii) of the above referred judgment:-

“Contempt of Court – Party taking recourse to fraud deflects course of judicial

proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration of justice and liable for

contempt of Court in vide Kanwaljit S. Sareen case 138 (2007) DLT 682.


Learned Counsel for respondent in appeal has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1195) 1 SCC 421, to explain that the word ‘interfere’

in the context of the criminal contempt under the Contempt of Court Act 1971 means any action

which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty.

Thus, if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder,

hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the Courts from performing the legal

duties as they are supposed to do. The polluters of judicial firmament are required to be well

taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment. A similar view has been

expressed in Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = AIR

1995 SC 1795 where false affidavits had been filed. In Ram Autar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla,

(1995) Supp (2) SCC 130, it was observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any

acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or witnesses ‘in any manner’. The tendency on

the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice is the

relevant fact. Any interference in the course of justice, ANY OBSTRUCTION CAUSED

IN THE PATH OF THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE AN AFFRONT TO THE

MAJESTY OF LAW AND, THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS PUNISHABLE AS

CONTEMPT OF COURT. Learned Single Judge of this Court in Court on its own motion Vs.

Kanwaljit S. Sareen & Ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 has observed that a party taking recourse to

fraud deflects course of judicial proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration

of justice.”


“In view of the aforesaid plea and the factual matrix discussed in the appeal, we are satisfied that

it is a fit case for issuance of a notice for criminal contempt to the respondent herein who has

tried to pollute the course of justice and interfere with the same knowing the falsehood of his

statements. THE FACT THAT HE IS AN ADVOCATE MAKES THE CONDUCT OF

RESPONDENT ALL THE MORE DEPLORABLE and the mere advanced age of the

respondent should not, in our considered view, deter us from proceeding further in the

matter.”

49. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367”

(8.3.2006)

(i) Head Note (D) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Arts. 129, 142 (2) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 15 – false

statements before Courts- Witness made statement before National Human Rights Commission

and Supreme Court that she was intimidated, threatened and coerced to make statement in

particular way before trial Court-Subsequently disowned it – Inquiry set up to find out truth –

Finding by Inquiry Officer that money has exchanged hands which made said witness to

state in particular way in trial court – Said witness could not explain her assets sources of

bank deposits – Report of Inquiry Officer found acceptable – Said witness thus, held,

committed contempt of Supreme Court - Sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for

one year and to pay cost of Rs. 50,000,00- Income tax Authorities directed to initiate

proceedings requiring her to explain source of acquisition of various assets and expenses met by

her during relevant period.

(ii) Relevant extract of para 4 of the above referred judgment:-

“----------We direct the Register General of this Court to conduct inquiry and submit a report to

this court within three months. The Registrar General shall indicate in the report (a) if Zahira

Habibullah Shekiah was in any manner threaded, coursed, induced and/or in any manner

pressurized to depose/make statement (s) in any particular way, by any person or persons, and

(b) if the answer to (a) is in the affirmation, who the person/persons is (or) are.


“The Inquiry Officer has categorically recorded that Zahira had changed her stands at different

stages and has departed from statements made before this court. So far as the question whether

she was threatened, coerced, leored, induced and/or in any manner pressurized to make

statements in a particular way by any person or persons, it has been found that Zahira has not

been able to explain the assets in her possession -----------.”


“Above being the position, there is no reason to discard the report given by the Inquiry Officer

which is accordingly accepted. Further, what remains to be done is what is the consequence of

Zahira having made such conflicting statements and the effect for changing her stand from the

statements made at different stages, particularly in this Court.


“-----------Serious questions arise as to the role played by witness how changed their versions

more frequently than Chameleons. Zahira’s role in the whole case is an eye-opener for all

concerned with the administration of criminal justice. As highlighted at the threshold, the

criminal justice system is likely to be affected if persons like Zahira are to be left

unpunished.--------.”

(vi) Para 18 of the above referred judgment:-

“Zahira has committed contempt of this court.”

(vii) Para 22 of the above referred judgment:-

“It was significantly said that law, to be just and fair has to be seen devoid of flaw. It has to keep

promise to justice and it cannot stay petrified and sit non-challantly. The law should not be seen

to sit be limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection loose hope

(See Jennison v. Backer (1972 (1) All ER 1006). Increasingly, people are believing as observed

by SALMON quoted by Diogenes Laertius in “Lives of the Philosophers” laws are like spiders’

webs: if some light or powerless thing falls into them. It is caught, but a bigger one can break

through and get away”. Jonathan Swift, in his “Essay on the Faculties of the Mind” said in

similar lines: “Laws are like cobwebs, which may catch small files, but let wasps and hornets

break through”.


“Right from the inception of the judicial system, it has been accepted that discovery, vindication

and establishment of truth are the main purposes underline existence of Courts of Justice.-------.”


“In the aforesaid background, we direct as follows:-

(1) Zahira is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay costs of Rs.

50,0000/- and in case of default of payment within two months, she shall further imprisonment

of one year------.

50. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Not yet

obtained)

51. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”

(21.8.2008)

(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were

the counsel for the state and defence respectively)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT:-

“Contempt of Court - Interference with judicial proceedings and administration of justice –

Nexus between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – Sting Operation by NDTV –

Role of Defence Lawyer and Special Public Prosecutor in on-going session trial of BMW case

-----Complicity between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – both were More than

mixed up in BMW case – conduct of both had tendency to interfere with or obstruct the

administration of justice as influencing a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify

amounts to interference in administration of justice -------Contempt very much before eyes and

within herein – contempt of courts act, 1972, -section 2 (C ) (Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 20, 78, 125,

127, 143, 155, 156, 169,206 & 207)

(ii) Head Note (vii) of the above referred DLT:-

“Contempt of court – jurisdiction - to be exercised suo-motu sparingly, with scrupulous care and

caution – contempt of court is serious business – no court should want only invoke its

contempt jurisdiction only because it is vested with power to do so.”

(iii) Head Note (xi) of the above referred DLT:-

“Constitution of India, 1950- Art, 215- Contempt of Court – Punishment –Imposition –

Interference with judicial proceedings and administration of justice proved – Collusion between

SPP I.U. Khan and defence lawyer R.K. Anand in BMW case- Both lawyers Senior Advocate –

They have not tendered, conditional or unconditional, expressed any contrition or repentance for

their conduct – Both R.K. Anand and I.U. Khan prohibited from appearing in this Court or

Courts subordinate to it for 4 months – However they are free to discharge their professional

duties –Further Full Court recommended to strip them of their designation of Senior

Advocate, both of them liable to pay fine of Rs. 2000/- respectively.


“On 7th August, 2007 , on a consideration of the material available, the court ------ was

prima-facie satisfied that these persons ‘HAVE WILLFULLY AND DELIBERATELY

TRIED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY THE COURTS’. It was observed that

prima-facie THEIR ACTS AND CONDUCT WERE INTENDED TO SUBVERT THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE PENDING BMW CASE AND IN

PARTICULAR INFLUENCE THE OUT COME OF THE PENDING JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS. Accordingly, in exercise of powers conferred by Article 215 of the

constitution, proceedings for contempt of Court (as defined in Section 2 (c) of the contempt of

Courts Act. 1972) were initiated against Mr. Anand, Mr. Khan and Mr. Sri. Bhagwan Sharma

and they were asked show cause why they should not be punished accordingly. --------.’


“Consequently, it does not appear to be necessary to deal with the cases cited by Mr. Anand.

However, we are doing so because we feel it necessary to clear the air in so far as the rights of

litigants and their advocates are concerned. Even if a different perspective or view than the

findings and views expressed by us can be propounded, that would not affect the finding on

merits given by us in respect of criminal contempt having been committed by the alleged

contemnors. This is because of overwhelming and unimpeachable evidence on record

beckoning and calling for maintaining the purity of the stream of justice especially WHEN

IT IS SOUGHT TO BE POLLUTED BY THOSE HAVING A PIVOTAL ROLE WITHIN

THE SYSTEM.”


“-----------. In R. V. Machin, (1980) 3 ALL ER 151, it was noted that the gist of an offence of

contempt of court is ‘CONDUCT WHICH MAY LEAD AND IS INTENDED TO LEAD

TO A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE WHETHER OR NOT A MISCARRIAGE

ACTUALLY OCCURS’. We agree with this exposition of the law.”


“---------. In Murray and Co, it was held (as in Dhananjay Sharma vs. State of Haryana, II (1995)

CCR 128 (SC) = (1995) 3 SCC 757) that deliberately filing a false affidavit in court or

MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT ON OATH would also amount to a contempt of court

if it tends to cause obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings or impedes and

interferes with the administration of justice.”

(viii) Para 241 of the above referred judgment:-

“In these circumstances, we feel the adequate punishment would be to prohibit them from

appearing before this court and the Courts subordinate to it for a specified period and also to

recommend to the Full Court that they should be stripped of their designation as Senior

Advocates. In this context, we may refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court authored

by one of us (Manmohan Sarin, J.) titled Court “On Its Own Motion v. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (I)

AD (Delhi) 567. In that case, the defence lawyer had assured the accused of his release on bail

for a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- having spoken to ‘the people, who would be responsible for his

release on bail’. After being given a full opportunity of representing his case, he was found guilty

of criminal contempt and subsequently interfering, with the administration of justice. In that

case, the contemnor had refunded Rs. 4,00,000/- as directed by the Bar Counsel and a plea was

made to bring a quietus to the matter. This submission was rejected by the Bench holding:

“TO OUR MIND, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ABERRATION COMMITTED BY

THOSE WHO ARE INTEGRAL PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE ARE STERNLY AND FIRMLY DEALT WITH. Magnanimity and

latitude should be available to those who are not knowledgeable conversant with

the system or commit the offence unwittingly or innocently. We may also observe

that throughout these prolonged proceedings, despite several opportunities being

available, there has not even been expression of any slightest remorse or regret on the

part of respondent-contemnor and be continues to maintain his high ground.”

A fine of Rs. 2000/- was imposed on the contemnor, Further, in exercise of powers conferred by

Article 215 of the Constitution of India, he was debarred from appearing in this Court and the

Courts subordinate to it for a period of two months while permitting him to discharge his

professional duties in terms of consolation, etc.

(ix) Relevant extract of para 242 of the above referred judgement:-

“We are of the view that the ratio of the above case would apply to the present situation,

particularly as regard the punishment to be given to Mr. Anand and Mr. Khan. We accordingly

direct:- ------------------------------------------------------.”

52. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261” (20.10.2008)

(i) Head Note (ii) of the above referred SLT:-

“Contempt of Court – Matter deserves to be dealt with all seriousness.”


“--------. Contempt of Court is a matter which deserves to be dealt with all seriousness.

In Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. V. Sayed Hasibur Rahman & ors., II (2001) SLT 819 =

(2001) 3 SCC 739, this Court held:-

“13. Before however, proceeding with the matter any further, be it noted that

exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious

and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the

contemptuous conduct. The Court must otherwise come to a conclusion that the

contempt complained of TENTAMOUNTS TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

which if allowed, would ever permeate in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok

Ku. Newatia). This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law Courts to punish

an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction the majesty of law.”

(iii) Relevant extract of para 36 of above referred judgment:-

“-----------. If appellants have been found to be guilty of commission of contempt , they

should have been punished on the same day. Why the extraordinary procedure of asking them to

appear on another day for hearing on quantum of sentence was adopted is not understood. THEY

HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO PURGE THEIR CONTEMPT. --------.”

53. “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130(SC)” (A Three Judge Bench Decision)

A. Relevant extracts of the above referred DLT and the judgment pertaining to prohibition for advocate against appearing in Courts

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (V) of the above referred DLT:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (c ), 12 – Constitution of India, 1950- Arts. 145, 215

– Advocates Act, 1961- Section 34- Contempt of Court- BMW case- Sting operation-

Negotiation between SK and Special Public Prosecutor and R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate, for

his sellout in favour of defence for a very high price- Prohibition against appearing in Courts-

Observations made in case of Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. UOI followed- No conflict or clash

between section 34 of Advocates Act and Art. 145 of Constitution – Art. 145 and section 34 of

Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an Advocate to appear in Court – An Advocate

appears in Court subject to conditions laid down by Court- Two appellants were debarred from

appearing before High Court and Courts subordinate to it for a period of 4 months.-----


“We were also addressed on the validity of the High Court’s direction prohibiting the two

appellants from appearing before the High Court and the Courts subordinate to it for a period of

four months. Though by the time the appeals were taken up for hearing the period of four

months was over, Mr. Altaf Ahmed contended that the High Court’s direction was beyond its

competence and authority. In a proceeding of contempt punishment could only be awarded as

provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, though in a given case the High Court could debar

the contemnor from appearing in Court till he purged himself of the contempt. He further

submitted that professional misconduct is a subject specifically dealt with under the Advocates

Act and the authority to take action against a lawyer for any professional misconduct vests

exclusively in the State bar Council, where he may be enrolled, and the bar Council of India.

The counsel further submitted that a High Court could frame rules under Section 34 of the

Advocates Act laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate would be permitted to

practice in the High Court and the Courts Subordinate to it and such rules may contain a

provision that an advocate convicted of contempt of Court would be barred from appearing

before it or before the subordinate Courts for a specified period. But so far the Delhi High Court

has not framed any rules under Section 34 of the Act. According to him, therefore, the

punishment awarded to the appellant by the High Court had no legal sanction.”


“Mr. Nageshwar Rao learned Senior Advocate assisting the Court as amicus shared the same

view. Mr. Rao submitted that the direction given by the High Court was beyond its jurisdiction.

In a proceeding of contempt the High Court could only impose a punishment as provided under

Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court was bound by the provisions

of the Contempt of Courts Act and it was not open to it to innovate any new kind of punishment

in exercise of its power under Articles 215 of the Constitution or its inherent powers. Mr. Rao

submitted that a person who is a law graduate becomes entitled to practice the profession of law

on the basis of his enrolment with nay of the State Bar Councils established under the Advocates

Act, 1961. Appearance in Court is the dominant, if not the sole content of a lawyer’s practice.

Since the authority to grant licence to a law graduate to practice as an advocate vests exclusively

in a State Bar Council, the power to revoke the licence or to suspend it for a specified term also

vests in the same body. Further, the revocation or suspension of licence of an advocate has not

only civil but also penal consequences, hence the relevant statutory provisions in regard to

imposition of punishment must be strictly followed. Punishment by way of suspension of the

licence of an advocate can only be imposed by the Bar Council, the competent statutory body,

after the charge is established against the advocate concerned in the manner prescribed by the

Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The High Court can, of course, prohibit an advocate

convicted of contempt from appearing before it or any court subordinate to it till the contemnor

purged himself of the contempt. But it cannot assume the authority and the power statutorily

vested in the bar Council.”


“The matter, however, did not stop at Supreme Court Bar Association. In Pravin C Shah Vs.

K.A. Mohd. Ali and Anr. VII (2001) SLT 153 = (2001) 8 SCC 650, this Court considered the

case of a lawyer who was found guilty of contempt of Court and as a consequence was sought to

be debarred from appearing in Courts till he purged himself of contempt. Kerala High Court has

framed Rules under Section 34 of the Advocates Act and Rule 11 reads thus :-

“No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court shall be permitted to appear act or plead in any court unless he has purged himself of the contempt.”


“An Advocate, notwithstanding his conviction for contempt of Court by the Kerala High Court

continued to freely appear before the Courts. A complaint was made to the Kerala State Bar

Council on which a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the advocate concerned and

finally the State Bar Council imposed a punishment on him debarring him from acting or

pleading in any Court till he got himself purged of the contempt of Court by an order of the

appropriate Court. The concerned advocate challenged the order of the State bar Council in

appeal before the Bar Council of India. The bar Council of India allowed the appeal and set

aside the interdict imposed on the advocate. The matter was brought in appeal before this Court

and a two Judges’ Bench hearing the appeal framed the question arising for consideration as

follows :

“When an advocate was punished for contempt of Court can he appear thereafter as a counsel in the courts, unless he purges himself of such contempt? If he cannot, than what is the way he can purge himself of such contempt ?”

The Court answered the question in paragraphs 27,28, & 31 of the judgment as follows :

“27. We cannot, therefore, approve the view that merely undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of the contempt, particularly in a case where the contemnor is convicted of criminal contempt. The danger in giving accord to the said view of the Ld Single judge in the aforesaid decision is that if a contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediately pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same court, and then again pay the fine and persist with contemptuous conduct. Their must be something to be done to get oneself perjured of the contempt when it is case of criminal contempt.”

“28. -----The first thing to be done in get direction when a contemnor is found guilty of a criminal contempt is to implant or infuse in his on mind real remorse about his conduct ---. Next step is to seek pardon from the court concerned ------. It is not enough that he tender and apology. The apology tendered should impress the court to be genuine and sincere.---.”

“31.------.”

(vi) Relevant extract of para 141 of the above referred judgment :-

“More importantly, another Constitution Bench of this Court in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs.

Union of India and Another, VII (2002) SLT 229= (2003) 2 SCC 45, examined the question

whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court(s). In paragraph 34

of the decision the Court made highly illuminating observations in regard to lawyers’ right to

appear before the Court and sounded the note of caution for the lawyers. Para 34 of the decision

need to be reproduced below :-

“34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in Courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of Courts. Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not been brought in to force and rightly so control of conduct in Court can only be within domain of course. Thus Art. 145 of the Constitution of India gives to the Supreme Court and Section 34 of the Advocates Act gives to the high Court powers to frame rules including rules regarding condition on which a person (including an advocate) can practice in the Supreme Court and/or in the High Court and Courts subordinate thereto ----. The right of the Advocate to practice envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in discharge of his professional duties. Apart from appearing in the Courts, he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for he can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other document, he can participate in any conference involving legal discussion, he can work in any office or firm as a legal officer, he can appear for his clients before an Arbitrator.----. Conduct in Court is a matter concerning the court and hence the bar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the Court could also be regulated by them in exercise of their disciplinary powers.--- But the right to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court must and does have major supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested of control or supervision of conduct in Court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate. A RULE CAN STIPULATE THAT A PERSON WHO HAS COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF COURT OR HAS BEHAVED UNPROFESSIONALLY AND IN AN UNBECOMING MANNER WILL NOT HAVETHE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD AND CONDUCT CASES IN COURTS.---- The very sight of an advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct, standing in the Court would erode the dignity of the court ---. Art. 145 of Constitution of India and section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an advocate who appear in a court.----.”


“In both Pravin C. Shah and Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal the earlier Constitution Bench decision was

extensively considered. The decision in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal was later followed in a three

Judge Bench decision in Bar Council of India Vs. The High Court of Kerala, III (2004) SLT 464

=(2004) 6 SCC 311.”


“In Supreme Court bar Association the direction prohibiting an advocate from appearing in

Court for a specified period was viewed as a total and complete denial of his right to practice law

and the bar was considered as a punishment for professional misconduct but as a measure

necessary to regulate the Court’s proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning

of the Courts. We may respectfully add that in a given case a direction disallowing an advocate

who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in Court may not only be a measure to

maintain the dignity and though in paragraph 80 of the decision, as seen earlier there is an

observation that in a given case it might be possible for this Court or the High Court to prevent

the contemnor advocate to appear before it till he purge himself of the contempt orderly

functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self protection of the Court and for

preservation of the purity of Court proceedings. Let us, for example, take the case where an

advocate is shown to have accepted money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of

influencing him; or where an advocate is found tampering with the Court’s record ; or where an

advocate is found actively taking part in faking Court orders (Fake bail orders are not unknown

in several High Courts) or where an advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and abuse

Judges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a case transferred from an inconvenient

Court; or where an advocate is found to be in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiated

allegation petitions against judicial officers and judges to the superior Courts. Unfortunately

these are not from imagination. These things are happening more frequently than we care to

acknowledge. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustive but there may be other

ways in which a male factor’s conduct and actions may pose a real and imminent threat to the

purity of Court proceedings, cardinal to nay Court’s functioning, apart from constituting a

substantive offence and contempt of Court and professional misconduct. In such a situation the

Court does not only have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon it to protect itself and

save the purity of its proceedings from being polluted in any way and to that end bar the male

factor from appearing before the Courts for an appropriate period of time. It is already explained

in Ex. Captain Harish Uppal that a direction of this kind by the Court cannot be equated with

punishment for professional misconduct. Further, the concerned lawyer to carry on his legal

practice in other ways as indicated in the decision.”


“We respectfully submit that the decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India places

the issue incorrect perspective and must be followed to answer the question at issue before us.”


“Lest we are misunderstood it needs to be made clear that the occasion to take recourse to the

extreme step of debarring an advocate from appearing in Court should arise very rarely and only

as a measure of last resort in cases where the wrong doer advocate does not at all appear to be

genuinely contrite and remorseful for his act/conduct, but on the contrary shows a tendency to

repeat or perpetuate the wrong act(s).”


“Ideally every High Court should have rules framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act in

order to meet with such eventualities but even in the absence of the Rule the High Court cannot

beheld to be helpless against such threats. In a matter as fundamental and grave as preserving

the purity of judicial proceedings the High Court would be free to exercise the powers vested in

it under Section 34 of the Advocates Act notwithstanding the fact that Rules prescribing the

manner of exercise of power have not been framed. But in the absence of statutory Rules

providing for such a course an advocate facing the charge of contempt would normally think of

only the punishments specified under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He may not

even imagine that at the end of the proceeding he might end up being debarred from appearing

before the Court. The rules of natural justice, therefore, demand that before passing an order

debarring an advocate from appearing in Courts he must be clearly told that his alleged conduct

or actions are such that if found guilty he might be debarred from appearing in Courts for a

specific period. The warning may be given in the initial notice of contempt issued under Section

14 or Section 17 (as the case may be ) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Or such a notice may be

given after the proceedee is held guilty of criminal contempt before dealing with the question of

punishment.”

(xii) Relevant extract of para 147of the above referred judgment :-

“In order to avoid any such controversies in future all the High Courts that have so far not

framed rules under Section 34 of the Advocates Act are directed to frame the rules without any

further delay. It is earnestly hoped that all the High Courts shall frame the rules within four

months from today.-----.”



“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10,11,12,14,15,18,19- Civil

Procedure Code, 1908- Order 39 Rule 2A- Contempt of Court- Criminal Contempt-

CONTRADICTORY STANDS TAKEN IN HIS PLEADINGS/ AFFIDAVITS BY

DEFENDANT/CONTEMNOR REGARDING OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF

SUIT PROPERTY- On receipt of REFERENCE from Court of Civil Judge, Division Bench

also found to be case of criminal contempt and charge framed against defendant No. 1

contemnor was also of criminal contempt- FILING OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR

STATEMENTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT AS IT TENDS TO OBSTRUCT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE-

Defendant/Contemnor filed written statement in suit of plaintiff and made statement on

oath before trial court AND ADMITTING HE SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF

AND HANDED OVER POSSESSION TO HIM- But subsequently in his reply to contempt

application filed by plaintiff, contemnor took a somersault AND TOOK PLEA THAT HE

NEITHER SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF NOR HANDED OVER

POSSESSION TO HIM- That fraud was played upon him by plaintiff in collusion with any

other person in making statement- No evidence in this behalf led by defendant/contemnor-Ipse

Dixit of defendant is difficult to be accepted- Apology tendered by contemnor, not at all

apologetic and not accepted- It was tendered by defendant/contemnor for first time while

giving evidence in these proceedings-Defendant/contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt.”


“Fraud- To be established by adducing cogent evidence.


“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10, 14, 15, 18, 19- Contempt of Court-

Civil and Criminal- To be decided on basis of facts which are brought to notice of High Court-

As per scheme of 1971 Act, cases of civil contempt can be heard and decided by Single

Judge bench only and criminal contempt petition to be heard and decided only by Bench of

not less than 2 Judges.”


“In the present case, as noticed already, the Division Bench had taken cognizance of “Criminal

Contempt” only against the defendant/contemnor for his having taken contradictory stands in his

pleadings/affidavits regarding the ownership and possession of the suit property. So, we have to

examine whether the defendant/contemnor has committed “Criminal contempt” or not we are of

the view that since no cognizance was taken of “Civil Contempt”, by this Court that aspect

cannot be gone into in the present proceedings even though strongly urged on behalf of the

plaintiff. We say so because of certain provisions of the Act of 1971 as well as some judicial

pronouncements. Under Sections 2 (a), (b) and (c) “contempt of Court”, “civil contempt” and

“criminal contempt”. We reproduce below these definition clauses:

“2(a) “contempt of court” means “civil or criminal contempt” 2(b) “civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction,

order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of undertaking given to a Court.”

2(c ) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

(i) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court, or

(ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings, or

(iii) Interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.”

Section 10 reads as under :-

“Section 10. Power of High Court to punish contempt of subordinate Courts-Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself :

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”.

Section 18 also needs to be noticed. It reads as under :-

“Section 18. Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches-(1)Every case of criminal contempt under section 15 shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges.

(2) Sub-section (I) shall not apply to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner.Section 19 provides as to where would an appeal lie against an order of a Single Judge bench and that of a Division bench. The relevant part of this section for our purpose is as follows :

“Section 19. Appeals –

(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-

(a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;

(b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court :

Provided………………………………………….”


“From these provisions of the Act of 1971, it becomes evident that the question whether

contempt of any subordinate court is committed or not and whether the alleged contempt is civil

or criminal to be decided by the High Court on the basis of facts which are brought to the

notice of the High Court. Those facts can be brought to the notice of the High Court by any

party to the litigation. If the High Court considered on perusal of the facts brought to its

notice that contempt of a Subordinate court is made AND THE SAME IS CIVIL IN

NATURE, then the matter can be entertained STRAIGHTWAY by a Single Judge Bench.

However, if the contempt of any court Subordinate to the High Court is alleged to be

“CRIMINAL CONTEMPT” THEN THE REFERENCE IS MADE TO IT BY THE

SUBORDINATE COURT CONCERNED OR ANY OF THE OTHER AUTHORITIES

MENTIONED IN SECTION 15 OF THE ACT 1971----.”


“Now, we proceed to examine if the defendant/contemnor has committed criminal

contempt or not. Although Section 2 (c ) does not specifically provide that FILING OF

FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR PLEADINGS WHICH ARE DULY VERIFIED IN JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS amounts to criminal contempt, BUT IT HAS NOW BEEN HELD BY

VARIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT FILING OF

FALSE AFFIDAVITS/STATEMENTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY ANY PARTY

TENDS TO INTERFERE WITH OR OBSTRUCTS OR TENDS TO OBSTRUCT THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND SO THAT ACT AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT. Some of those decisions of the Supreme Court are reported as Murray & Co. Vs.

Ashok Kr. Newatia and Anr. I(2000) SLT 550= 1(2000) CLT 310 (SC)= (2000) 2 SCC 367; Rita

Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh Arora, (1996) 6 SCC 14 and Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of

Haryana and Ors. II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = (1995) 3 SCC 7578. And even the learned Counsel

for the defendant/contemnor did not dispute this proposition.”


“In the present case, the defendant/contemnor had filed a written statement in the suit of the

plaintiff and had also made a statement on oath before the trial court on 29.4.2003 admitting that

he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff and had also handed over its position to him. In his

statement on oath also which admittedly was made by him before the Ld Civil judge in the suit

on 29.4.2003 he had admitted that he had already sold the suit property to the plaintiff and so he

will not dispossess him . However, subsequently when the plaintiff filed contempt application,

the contemnor in his reply to that contempt application field before the Reference Court, which

was supported by his affidavit wherein he affirmed the correctness of the assertion made by him

in his reply, he took a somersault and took the plea that neither he had sold the suit property to

the plaintiff nor he had handed over its possession to him. Even before this Court, the

defendant/contemnor filed an affidavit in response to the show cause notice and claimed that

neither he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff not was he given its possession. The

admissions made in the written statement and in the statement made before the trial court,

however, according to the defendant/contemnor, were not made by him voluntarily but were as a

result of fraud played upon him by the plaintiff and one Ved Prakash. Learned counsel for the

plaintiff did not dispute that if any party to a suit has made any admission of fact either in the

pleadings or by way of statement on oath, that party is not precluded from showing that that

admission was got made by the opposite party by indulging in fraud and it is shown that any

fraud was played upon the party making any admission of some important fact in dispute then

that party would not be bound by that admission. However, ld Counsel submitted, in the present

case the defendant/contemnor had failed miserably to show that any kind of fraud was played

upon him by the plaintiff in collusion with any other person.


“-----In our view, the ipsi dixit of the defendant/contemnor that he had made the admissions

regarding sale of property in question to the plaintiff and also handing over of its possession to

him were as a result of fraud having been played upon him is difficult to be accepted. ---.

Consequently, he did commit criminal contempt for which he deserves to be punished. The

stage at which he has tendered an apology shows that he was really not apologetic at all since at

no earlier point of time he tendered apology.---- We are therefore, not inclined to accept the so

called apology tendered by the defendant/contemnor for the first item while giving evidence in

these proceedings.”


“While holding the defendant/contemnor guilty of criminal contempt we straightaway proceed

to punish him also in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme court in para No. 36 of

its judgment in Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd and Ors. Vs. C.E.S.C. Ltd (Supra). We

impose upon the contemnor punishment of simple imprisonment for four months.


(i). Head Note of the above referred DLT :-


“ The matter, however, did not rest at this since the learned Company Judge took a serious view of the conduct of Mr. Ajay Yadav. This conduct was a consequence of an order passed on 6.10.2006 in an interlocutory application filed in CS (OS) No. 1906/2006 by the company in terms where of the society, Mr. Ajay Choudhary and other members of their group who were defendant in the suit had been restrained from representing themselves as share holders/representatives of the company till further orders.----. The Learned Company Judge came to the conclusion that in the light of the prohibitions, it was not open to Shri Ajay Yadav to represent the company and this fact had not been informed to the Court by the counsel representing Mr. Ajay Yadav. The vakalatnama filed by the counsel on behalf of Shri Ajay Yadav as if he was representing the company was found to be in the teeth of the order of injection and the action of Shri Ajay Yadav singing the vakalatnama was observed to be a blatant attempt to lower the authority of the court in violation of the order dated 6.10.2006 passed in CS (OS) No. 1906/2006. The conduct of Shri Ajay Yadav was held to be an effort to prejudice due course of judicial proceedings and would fall into the definition of criminal contempt and the matter was thereafter directed to be placed before the appropriate Bench after registering the petition as such.”

(iii) Sub para 16 of para 11 of the above referred judgment :-

“The action of Shri Ajay Yadav in signing the vakalatnamas purportedly on behalf of the respondent No. 1, is a blatant attempt to lower the authority of the Court in violation of order dated 6th October, 2006 passed in CS (OS) o. 1906/2006. As a result a dispute was raised by Mr. Chaudhary, Advocate in the present proceedings as to who is to represent the company. Such vakaltnama has been signed even as late as on 23rd April, 2009 despite the judgment dated 20th

April, 2009. Despite specific prohibition, Shri Ajay Yadav has made an effort to prejudice due course of the present judicial proceedings. There can be no manner of doubt that the action is willful. These acts on the part of Shri Ajay Yadav would clearly fall with the definition of “criminal contempt “ as defined under Sub-clauses 1 and 2 of Sub section of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”


“A perusal of the reply filed by the respondent shows that Sh Ajay Yadav has justified his conduct of putting an appearance on behalf of the Company through advocates despite the injunction order. He has sought to raise preliminary objections that no consent of Advocate General or any State Law Officer has been obtained for initiation of contempt proceedings against him which plea is without any basis in view of the proceedings having been initiated suo moto by the Court.---.”


“We find that the respondent has shown no regret. After setting forth 26 grounds of challenge, in the last paragraph it is stated that the respondent has the highest regard for the Court and does not want to lower its dignity or authority willfully or otherwise and that the respondent is prepared to tender unconditional apology in the event of the Court considering the present reply as not being sufficient to drop or discharge the notice. We find this apology s no apology at all. the respondent has defended his action.”


“---After having done everything possible to frustrate the orders of the court by acting in an improper and illegal manner, the respondent has tried to justify his conduct.---.”


“We may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 to explain that the word ‘interfere’ in the context of the criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 means any action which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Thus, if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the Courts from performing the legal duties as they are supposed to do. The polluters of judicial firmament are required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment. A similar view has been expressed in Dhannjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = AIR 1995 SC 1795, where false affidavits had been filed. In Ram Avtar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla, (1995) Supp (2) SCC 130, it was observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or witnesses ‘ in any manner’. The tendency on the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. any interference in the cause of justice, any obstruction caused in the path of those seeking justice are an affront to the majesty of law and therefore, the conduct is punishable as contempt of court. Learned Single Judge of this court in court on its own motion Vs. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & Ors. 138 (2007) DLT 682 = II (2007) BC 362, has observed that a party taking recourse to fraud deflects course of judicial proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration of justice.”


“We deem it appropriate to also refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Sudhir Chona Vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (97) DLT 642 that while civil contempt is an offence of private nature depriving a party of the benefit of the Court order, criminal contempt is contumacious or obstructive conduct or behaviour directed against the court and involves an element of criminality in it. It is despising, undermining and eroding the authority of the Court and is punishable to protect and safeguard the public faith in the administration of justice.”


“Despite the conduct of the respondent/contemnor, we restrain from taking an extreme harsh view and impose fine of Rs. 2,0000/- on the respondent/contemnor and sentence him till the rising of the Court.”



“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2(b), 9- Civil Contempt – Constitution of – There must exist judgment, decree, direction, order, or writ or process of Court or there should be an undertaking given by defendant to Court---.”


“Section 2 sub section (b) of the Contempt of Court Act defines civil contempt which reads as under :-

“2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-(a) “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt”(b) “Civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction,

order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to court.”s


“In the present case, this court did not pass any judgment in favour of plaintiff and against defendant not decreed the suit of plaintiff nor given any directions to defendant nor passed an order in favour of plaintiff or against defendant nor issued any writ nor an undertaking of defendant was recorded.---.”

C-8. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Contempt of Courts Act. which are important for the present case and appeal against the order dated 28.3.2008 :-

1. “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another, AIR 1980 SC 946”

(i) “ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT CALCULATED TO HAMPER

THE DUE COURSE OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING OR THE ORDERLY

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS A CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MAY BE

NECESSARY TO PUNISH AS CONTEMPT, A COURSE OF CONDUCT WHICH

ABUSES AND MAKES A MOCKERY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. “It is a mode of

vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage”.

THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO SIT BY LIMPLY, WHILE THOSE WHO

DEFY IT GO FREE, AND THOSE WHO SEEK ITS PROTECTION LOSE HOPE. (Head

Note A)

(ii) “Punishment for contempt of court – Apology – Contemners expressed

unconditional apology to High Court – HELD, THE CONDUCT OF CONTEMNERS

WAS SO REPREHENSIBLE AS TO WARRANT CONDEMNATION BY IMPOSITION

OF SENTENCE – Supreme Court sentenced – each of the contemners to pay a fine of Rs.

500/-.” (Head Note B)

2. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. SR Cotton Mills Ltd. And other, AIR 1990 SC 1881”

(MISLEADING A COURT KNOWINGLY AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT)

(Head Note A)

3. “Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and

other, AIR 1991 SC 2176”

(i) “The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person

WHICH WOULD TEND TO INTERFERE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE or which would lower the authority of Court.” (Para 42)

4. “Court of its own Motion Vs. B.D. Kaushik & Ors., 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Full Court)

(19.12.1991) (Available)


“Constitution of India- Art. 215- Court of Record-Evolve its own procedure- Respondents

advocates, proceeded for contempt of Court- Aided and abetted by large number of advocates

invaded the High Court and prevented the Judges from discharging their judicial function-Full

Bench initiated proceedings- Contemners expressed regrets –And the apology bonafide-Whether

the act of the contemners tantamounts to an attempt to erode the majesty of the Court ? (Yes).

Per G.C. Mital, C.J. for himself & 11 others.

Held that we must realize that they are members of the noble profession and in their

misguided zeal, ventured upon the defiant course for which they have offered apology. At the

same time we must also keep in mind that simply accepting the apology and discharging

the rule may not appear to be warranted in the circumstances of the gross contempt.

Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, including the outrageous

incident and unqualified apology, we do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it

as we would like to further watch their conduct and behaviour for a period of one year from

today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of Court or

undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But

if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behaviour and do not indulge themselves in the

repetition of such act within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the

expiry of the period.

“Per S.B. Wad, J & three Others.

Held that having considered all relevant aspects and authorities, we are of the opinion

that in the present case the contemners deserve the punishment of sentence. The contempt

committed by the contemners is gravest. It cannot be imagined that any contempt worse than

the present one is possible. IT IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT THE

CONTEMPT IS NOT COMMITTED BY LAY CONTEMNERS BUT BY THE

ADVOCATES, WHO ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT.

Per D.P. Wadhwa, J

Held that what these contemners have done, one would not expect even from street

hooligans such a conduct. Simply because they are officers of the Court and right has been

given to them to practice in Court do not mean that they have to be dealt with leniency. If

anything, they deserved severe punishment and not mere reprimand or even suspension of

sentences, I do not find any extenuating circumstances in the present case for me to take a

lenient view.

--------------------

Per Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

Held that having regard to the totality of the circumstances, this Court cannot adopt

an attitude of unwarranted leniency at the cost of principle. It is always easy to show

magnanimity and to pursue populist line of showing uncalled for indulgence rather than to

adhere to the nail studded path of duty. Bearing in mind the outrageous conduct of the

contemners, the gross contempt which they committed and the fact that the acts were

preconceived, the populist line of showing over indulgence and magnanimity would not

subserve the ends of justice but would amount to giving a licence to contemners to repeat

such incidents. ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT HAS TO PERFORM THE PAINFUL

DUTY OF DIRECTING IMPOSITION OF IMPRISONMENT AND FINE ON THE

CONTEMNERS. It is necessary to adopt the course with a view to uphold the honour and

dignity of the institution. I am in complete agreement with Wad J.

-----------------------

Result-Sentence deferred



“------. It goes without saying that they are guilty of the grossest possible contempt of this court.

A very civilized behavour and attitude is expected from the members of the Bar. In fact, they

are part and parcel of the Administration of justice -----. They must discharge their duties

with dignity, decorum and discipline. They are expected to abide by the rule of law and not

violate by participating in violent acts. If lawyers fail in their duty, faith of the people in the

judiciary will be undermined to a large extent.”


J.)





“This is not a case of spontaneous emotional outburst of a litigant disappointed by an

unfavourable verdict. --- On the other hand we have here, a group of lawyers, WHO ARE

THE OFFICERS OF THE COURT, admitted to the privilege of representing needy

litigant AND BOUND BY HIGH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,

OBSTRUCTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.---.”



accepted or not. It may be noticed that the apology has not been tendered by any of the

contemnors immediately after notice was served on them. They had no factual defence and,

therefore, IF THERE WAS GENUINE REPENTANCE, THE APOLOGY SHOULD

HAVE COME AT FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.---.”


“Even if it is assumed that the apology is sincere, we are not satisfied that we should accept

the apology on the facts of the present case AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF

EXTREME GRAVITY OF CONTEMPT COMMITTED BY A GROUP OF LAWYERS in

a predetermined manner.”

(vii) Relevant extract of para 38 of the above referred judgment :-








“In Kuldeep Rastogi Vs. Vishwanath, (AIR 1979 Delhi 202 at page 216) after reviewing the case

law the Full Bench of this Court held that THE APOLOGY MUST COME AT THE

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND IT SHOULD BE IN WRITING.---- In AIR 1980 SC 946

(referred to above) the Court has held that WHERE THE CONDUCT IS REPREHENSIBLE,

THE APOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. ----- In AIR 1985 SC 1726, the

Supreme Court has warned that IT WOULD BE A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE IF ITS

GROSS CONTEMPT GOES UNPUNISHED.”






764.)




COMMITTED BY THE CONTEMNORS IS GRAVEST. It cannot be imagined that any

contempt worse than the present one is possible. It is compounded by the fact that the

contempt is not committed by lay contemnors but by the advocates, who are officers of the

Court.”

(xi) Relevant extract of para 45 of the above referred judgment :-





D.P. Wadhwa, J :


“----Mind you, they were students. Here we are dealing with advocates well versed in law who,

by fiction of law are officers of the Court. ----There was vulgar and disgusting display of

hooliganism, never heard or seen before. THIS WAS INDULGED IN BY THE VERY

PERSONS WHO THEMSELVES SUPPOSED TO UPHOLD THE MAJESTY OF LAW

AND THE COURTS. ---.”


“----Contempt in this case is serious enough to merit imprisonment and fine. I would have even

thought of going to the extent of injecting these contemnors from appearing in the High Court

and or other Courts and Tribunals throughout the Territory of Delhi over which this court has

superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution for a certain period . There cannot be any

soft peddling on this issue. The apology which these contemnors tendered is no apology either

in law or on the facts of the case. I would unhesitatingly reject the apology.”






HOPE.”

(xv) Relevant extract of para 52 of the above referred judgment :-

“Then the question arises : What are the parameters of the punishment to be awarded in such a

case ? ------ In my view, the punishment to the contemnors in the present case must be an

















(xviii) Para 69 of the above referred judgment :-






(xix) Relevant extract of para 75 of the above referred judgment :-








Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

(xx) Relevant extract of para 84 of the above referred judgment :-







contemners.---.”

5. “Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of M.P., Jabalpur, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” This

judgment has been relied upon by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported as

“R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130 (SC)”


“To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme

measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with,

and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court,

though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. NO ONE CAN

CLAIM IMMUNITY FROM THE OPERATION OF THE LAW OF CONTEMPT, if his

act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to

obstruct the due course of justice.”


“THEREFORE, HAVING REGARD TO THE SENTENCING POLICY THAT

PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE

OFFENCE, we hold that the sentence of 2 months imprisonment in no way calls for

interference and accordingly the sentence is confirmed.”

6. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, J.T. 1994 (6) SC 584”(4.10.1994) :-

‘Lawyers were created for the Courts, not Courts for the lawyers’ –BELATED

APOLOGY NOT ACCEPTED.”


Rajdhani Law Reporter Page 1” (Vol. 25) (14.11.1994) :-

(i) Index-A of the Head Note of the above referred SCC at page-422:-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- S. 2(c ) – Criminal Contempt- Fraud on Court--

FORGED AND FABRICATED DOCUMENT FILED IN COURT WITH OBLIQUE

MOTIVE OF DECEIVING OR DEFRAUDING THE COURT-HELD, RESULTS IN

INTERFERENCE WITH ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND AMOUNTS TO

CONTEMPT OF COURT-words and phrases- “Interfere”, meaning of.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Index –B of the above referred SCC at page-422:-










oblique motive.

As to whether filing of a forged document with intention to defraud amounts to contempt

of court, as this expression has been defined in section 2 of the contempt of courts Act, 1971,

there being no decision of the Supreme Court (or for that matter of any High Court), the same is

required to be examined as a matter of first principle. Contempt jurisdiction has been

conferred on superior courts not only to preserve the majesty of law by taking appropriate

action against one however high he may be, if he violates courts order BUT ALSO TO

KEEP THE STREAM OF JUSTICE CLEAR AND PURE so that purity of court’s

atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the state and the parties who approach the

courts to receive justice do not have to wade through dirty and polluted water before

entering their temples.



MOTIVATED FALSEHOODS HAVE TO BE APPROPRIATED DEALT WITH, without

which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the

satisfaction of those who approached it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. Any one

who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or if anything is

done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. The word

‘interfere’ means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the

functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Obstruction of justice is to

interpose obstacles or impediments or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the

administration of justice. If recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same

would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the

courts from performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.

Therefore, if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an

intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of

justice-----. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens

rea. In the case and hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court, the

intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt---.




























courts.”

(vi) Relevant portion of para 12 of the above referred judgment:-




1088 : 1995 (1) SCJ 310” (23.11.1994)

(i) “------. ANY INTERFERENCE IN THE COURSE OF JUSTICE, ANY

OBSTRUCTION CAUSED IN THE PATH OF THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE AN

AFFRONT TO THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND, THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS

PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. -------- Due course of justice means not only

any particular proceeding but a broad stream of administration of justice. Therefore, the

words “due course of justice” used in Section 2 (c ) or Section 13 of the Act are of wide

import and ARE NOT LIMITED TO ANY PARTICULAR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING.”

(Head Note A of SCC)

(ii) “It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties EITHER TO

PRODUCE FABRICATED EVIDENCE AS A PART OF THE PLEADINGS

OR RECORD or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of

justice or judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. THIS

TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE OR TENDENCY TO

UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT NEEDS TO BE SEVERELY DEALT

WITH TO DETER THE PERSONS HAVING SIMILAR PROCLIVITY TO RESORT TO

SUCH ACTS OR CONDUCT.” (para 7)

9. “IN RE (1) Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting, New Delhi (2) Kailash Vasdev, Advocate and (3) Kitty Kumaramangalam

(Smt), Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 619” This judgment has been relied upon by Hon’ble

Supreme Court in its judgment reported as “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court,

161 (2009) DLT 130 (SC)”

(i) “The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all

those who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be

had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional

has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the

court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do,

affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the

civilized society. Both as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and a

responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his

professional and in his private and public life. ------.” (Para 20)


1795” (2.5.1995) :-

(i) “ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO INTERFERE WITH THE



The swearing of false affidavit in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing

obstructions in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede,

obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. ------. Anyone who makes an attempt

to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by

resorting to the FILING OF FALSE EVIDENCE commits criminal contempt of the court

and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act. Filing of false affidavit

or making a false statement on oath in courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law

and NO COURT CAN IGNORE SUCH CONDUCT which has the tendency to shake

public confidence in the judicial institutions because the very structure of an ordered life is

put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be

poisoned by any one resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and

fabricating false evidence in a court of law.” (Head Note A)

(ii) “THE STREAM OF JUSTICE HAS TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND PURE AND ANY





JUSTICE.” (Para 40)



“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (b) – Criminal contempt – SUPERINTENDENT

OF POLICE IN CHARGE OF CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATION, first, filed fabricated

counter-affidavit to obtain favourable order – Later, perceiving adverse atmosphere to

him, fabricating further false evidence to show that his subordinate had forged his signature

without his knowledge and filed fabricated document – He is guilty of committing contempt of

judicial process.

(ii) Head Note (C ) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Art. 129 – Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 12 High ranking

police officer guilty of committing contempt of proceedings of Supreme Court- Not making

candid admission nor tendering unqualified apology. – SENTENCED TO RIGOROUS

IMPRISONMENT FOR SIX MONTHS.”


“Criminal contempt” defined in section 2 (c ) means interference with the administration of

justice in any other manner. “A FALSE OR A MISLEADING OR A WRONG


PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN A FAVOURABLE ORDER WOULD PREJUDICE OR

INTERFERE WITH THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. It is seen that

Ahlawat, respondent No. 3 to the main writ petition and in-charge of the criminal administration,

with his connivance, caused two minor boys’ wrongful detention. He made an averment in the

counter affidavit dated October 30,1993 that they were not in wrongful detention nor are they

taken into custody which was later found to be false. He first used fabricated counter affidavit

------- to obtain a favourable order. But when he perceived adverse atmosphere to him, he

fabricated further false evidence -------. Thereby he further committed contempt of the judicial

process. HE HAS NO REGARD FOR TRUTH. FROM STAGE TO STAGE, HE

COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF THE COURT BY MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS.

Being a responsible officer, he is required to make truthful statements before the Court,

but he made obviously false statements. Thereby, he committed criminal contempt of

judicial proceedings of this court.” (Para 31)

12. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”

(10.4.1996)

(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred SCC :-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- S. 19- Appeal before Supreme Court from any order or decision

of High Court- Held, appeal will not lie under S. 19 against an interlocutory order of High Court

dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceeding- Words ‘any order’ must be read with

‘decision’ so as to exclude any interlocutory order of High Court from the scope of appeal –

Unless by the order High Court imposes punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for

contempt, no appeal will lie against it- However, even against an order dropping/refusing to

initiate contempt proceedings, Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136 can be invoked –

Constitution of India, Art. 136 and 215 – Appeal –Nature of right of –Words and phrases –“Any

order.”

(ii) Relevant extract of 3 of the above referred judgment :-

“----. It is well settled that an appeal is a creature of a statute. Unless a statute provides for an

appeal and specifies the order against which an appeal can be filed, no appeal can be filed or

entertained as a matter of right or course. Section 19 of the Act says :

“19. Appeals- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order OR decision of High

Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-

-------

On a plain reading, section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order

or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.---- The words

“any order” has to be read with the expression ‘decision’ used in the said sub-section which the

High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. “ANY ORDER” IS

NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE EXPRESSION ‘DECISION’. THEY HAVE BEEN PUT

IN AN ALTERNATIVE FORM saying ‘order’ or ‘decision’. IN EITHER CASE, it must

be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression “Any order” is read

independently of the ‘decision’, then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of section 19

even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High

Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.”

Note : The above quoted rulling is also most important for appeal to explain the meaning

of the expression ‘pay or tender’ used in section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act.

(iii) Head Note (B) of the above referred SCC :-






“It is well known that Contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties; the proceeding

is primarily between the court and the person who is alleged to have committed the contempt of

court. The person who informs the court or brings to the notice of the court that anyone

has committed contempt of such court is not in the position of a prosecutor, he is simply

assisting the court so that the dignity and the majesty of the court is maintained and

upheld. It is for the court, which initiates the proceeding to decide whether the person against

whom such proceeding has been initiated should be punished or discharged taking into

consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case.------.”

13. “The secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR 1996

SCC 1925 (9.5.1996) (For filing false proceeding in court)

(i) Head Note of the above referred judgment:-

“Constitution of India, Art. 129 – Contempt - Contempt of Supreme Court – Apology – Police

Officer asked by Supreme Court to submit report about death of undertrial prisoner submitting

false report–When subsequently called upon to file affidavit, HE NOT BRINGING TRUE

FACTS TO NOTICE OF COURT – He ignoring injuries noted in record- Contemner, held,

deliberately forwarded inaccurate report to mislead court and thus interfered with course

of justice – Apology rejected – Sentenced to simple imprisonment for 3 months.

14. “Rita Markandey V. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2174”

(27.9.1996) :-


“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2(C) Criminal Contempt-Eviction vacation of

premises – false affidavits given by tenant before Supreme Court from time to time that he had

already vacated premises though he had not done so-tenant is guilty of criminal contempt of

court as by filing affidavit he had not only deliberately attempted to impede administration

of justice but also succeeded in his attempt in delaying delivery of possession.”


“---------. THUS, ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO

INTERFERE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OR THE DUE COURSE

OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT. The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the

tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the

tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false

affidavits in judicial proceedings in any court of law exposes the intention of the party concerned

in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor

the Majesty of Law be made a mockery of by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to

the litigation or even while appearing as witnesses. ANYONE WHO MAKES AN ATTEMPT

TO IMPEDE OR UNDERMINE OR OBSTRUCT THE FREE FLOW OF THE

UNSOILED STREAM OF JUSTICE BY RESORTING TO THE FILING OF FALSE

EVIDENCE, COMMITS CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF THE COURT AND RENDERS

HIMSELF LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACT.”

15. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1

AD (Delhi) 927” : “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997):-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note of the above referred AD:-




of Contempt.

Held: In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by

not disclosing that in the earlier suit, the respondent has not been able to get an injunction,

the respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and

such acts had been done only in order to gain advantage on the other side and to get a stay

in the second suit.

We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over – reach

the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as on the opposite

parte and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HEARD IN

THE CASE UNLESS IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED and

in our view, it can only be if we non-suit the respondents in suit no. 261/97. While, therefore,

we do not purpose to take action against the respondent for contempt for except to issue a

warning to respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future WE DIRECT THE DISMISSAL OF

THE SUIT (BEING SUIT NO. 261/97) ITSELF. ---------.”













in the said plaint. We are, therefore, of the opinion that by withholding the plaint and the




guilty of playing fraud of the court as well as on the respondent. The following observations

of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are relevant for purposes of present case:-

“The High Court in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court-----. We do not agree with the High Court that “THERE IS NO LEGAL DUTY CASTE UPON THE PLAINTIFF TO COME TO COURT WITH A TRUE CASE AND PROVE IT BY TRUE EVIDENCE.” THE PRINCIPLE OF “FINALITY OF LITIGATION” CANNOT BE PRESSED TO THE EXTENT OF SUCH AN ABSURDITY THAT IT BECOMES AN ENGINE OF FRAUD IN THE HANDS OF DISHONEST LITIGANTS. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. ------. We have no hasitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. --------.”

-----. A party must come to the Court with clean hands and must disclose all the

relevant facts which may result in appreciating the rival contentions of the parties. In our

view, a litigant, who approaches the Court, must produce all the documents which are relevant to

the litigation and he must also disclose to the Court about the pendency of any earlier litigation

between the parties and the result thereof. ----.In our opinion, it was obligatory upon the

respondent to disclose to the Court that in the application filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief

had been claimed, however, the Court had not granted the said relief. In our view, if these facts

were before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit came up for hearing

before it, MAY BE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE WAS PERSUADED NOT TO GRANT

ANY EX-PARTE STAY IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT. ----. We are, therefore,

of the opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also






“---------. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt

with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16 or

in some other manner. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct

which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it

pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in

the administration of justice.



1977 SC 2421, the pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the






activate this obligation.--.”






THE SECOND SUIT.”

16. “Suo Motu contempt in Re: Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300”:-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 14, 12–b Constitution of India, Art. 129-

Criminal Contempt on face of Court-------.

--------. A lawyer does not enjoy any special immunity under the Contempt of

Courts Act where he is found to have committed a gross contempt of Court. ----. Advocate

shouted slogans in open court and hurled his shoe towards the court ------. It is unfortunate that

a person belonging to the Bar should have behaved in this manner. The action of the

contemnor advocate is most reprehensible and has been tendency to interfere with the

administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the Court and the Majesty of Law. ---.

Keeping in view of the seriousness of the offence committed by the contemnor deterrent

punishment imposed on him SO THAT IT SERVES AS EXAMPLE TO OTHERS and no

one indulges in repetition of such acts. Court sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment

for 4 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-.”

17. “Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345”

(i) Head Note of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Art. 19 (1) (a) – freedom of speech – Right of criticizing judgment of

court – Cannot be exercised with malice or by attempting to impair administration of justice – no

one can be permitted to distort orders of Court and deliberately give a slant to its proceedings,

which have been tendency to scandalize the court or bring it to ridicule – Court expressed its

displeasure about distorted writings about court’s order permitting increase in height of Dam

made by a literary figure and about actions of one of the party to proceedings – However keeping

in view the importance of the issue of resettlement and Rehabilitation – No contempt

proceedings were initiated.”


‘---------. In deed, freedom of speech and expression is “life blood of democracy. But this

freedom is subject to certain qualifications. --------. COURTS ARE NOT UNDULY

SENSITIVE TO FAIR COMMENT OR EVEN OUTSPOKEN COMMENTS BEING

MADE REGARDING THEIR JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS MADE OBJECTIVELY,

FAIRLY AND WITHOUT ANY MALICE, but no one can be permitted to distort orders of

the court and deliberately give a slant to its proceedings ---.”


“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 2 (c) (iii) WHEN THERE IS INFRACTION OF








dignity of Court. ------. Filing false affidavits and fabricated documents are matters of great

concern. --------. By false affidavit justice is defeated as attempt is to delay delivery of

possession. It is criminal contempt and AS FALSEHOOD HAD BEEN REPEATED, OFFER

OF APOLOGY IS NOT GENUINE. CONTEMENOR DESERVED PUNISHMENT TO

DETER OTHERS and had taken advantage (Rita Markand’s case). If obstruction of justice is

allowed, it would permeate society. Litigant public ought to be very cautious in making

statements lest these become offence under the Act. Fabrication on oath in an affidavit is a

serious matter calling for severe punishment when there is substantial interference with course

of justice. PRACTICE OF FILING FALSE AFFIDAVIT IS DEPRECATED AND A

COURT WOULD BE FAILING IN ITS DUTY TO MAINTAIN MAJESTY OF LAW IF

IT DOES NOT GIVE PROPER PUNISHMENT.”

19. “Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000):-

(i) Head Note of the above referred RLR:-

“Contempt of courts act, Ss. 12, 19 & 20 –Limitation for initiation of contempt

proceedings is one year and if court does not initiate within one year by asking contemnor to

show cause why he should not be punished, then matter becomes time barred. -----------. A

COMPLAINANT IS NOT AN AGGRIEVED PERSON and if court does not initiate, then

he has no right of appeal u/s 19 of the Act.”


“----------. On 19.12.1986 Shri A.K. Mohiley, the counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents gave in the taking in the following terms--------.


“According to the appellant, the employees of the respondent’s demolished the appellant’s

constructions on 11.1.1987. The appellant moved an application before the court seeking

initiation of proceedings U/s 12 of the Act against the respondents. On 15.1.1987 the court

passed the following order:-

“Issue show cause notice to opposite parties as to why contempt proceedings should not be

initiated against them for defiance of order dated 19.12.1986 passed by this court in civil writ

petition No. 20471 of 1988, O.P. Jaiswal v. Nagar Mahapalika. List it for orders on 4.2.1987.”


“The respondents, i.e. the alleged contemners appeared before the court and filed their reply on

16.12.1987. When the matter came up for hearing before the court it passed the following order:-

“Apparently till now show cause has been issued to the opposite parties as to why proceedings be

not initiated. Manifestly the application would become no maintainable after 11.1.1988. The

Ld. Advocate General has very fairly conceded that in view of the matter having being heard on

several dates the noticed to so cause to the opposite parties as to why they should not be

punished disobeying order of this court dated 19.12.1986 can be issue

20. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal

Advocate, 89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB)= 2000 RLR 144” :-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note ------ of the above referred DLT:-

“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 226 – Issuance of Suo Motu Notice to Commissioner,

MCD ---------: Counsel is not mouth piece of his client-His duty is to uphold truth and

honesty-----------.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note of the above referred RLR :-

“Advocates Act. LAWYER OWES A DUTY TO UTTER TRUTH IN COURT even if

statement is against corruption amongst officers of his client (MCD). When MCD (the

Comm. & C.L.O. ) asked his explanation then they are guilty of contempt of court.---.”


(i) Relevant extract of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c) – Constitution of India, Art. 129 – ---.”


“----------. Criminal Contempt has been defined in Section 2 (c) to mean interference with

the administration of justice IN ANY MANNER. A FALSE or MISLEADING or a wrong

statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings TO OBTAIN A

FAVOURABLE ORDER would undoubtedly tantamount to interfere with the due course

of judicial proceedings. WHEN A PERSON IS FOUND TO HAVE UTILIZED AN

ORDER OF A COURT WHICH HE OR SHE KNOWS TO BE INCORRECT FOR

CONFERRING BENEFIT ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE SAME,

THE VERY UTILIZATION OF THE FABRICATED ORDER BY THE PERSON

CONCERNED WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HOLD HIM/HER GUILTY OF

CONTEMPT, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of

fabrication. On the aforesaid parameters it would be necessary to examine whether it can be said

that Mrs. Megha Rude can be held to be guilty of contempt. In view of our conclusion on the

basis of materials available in the inquiry proceedings with regard to the role played by Mrs.

Megha Rude, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that Mrs. Rude is guilty of gross

criminal contempt and must be suitably punished for the same. -------.”

(iii) Para 9 of the above referred judgment;-

“We, therefore hold both Mrs. Megha Rude and Mr. Dilip Wamanrao Gund to be guilty of



22. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt Madhu Trehan & Ors. 92 (2001) DLT 665”

(F.B.) (28.5.2001) :-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (ii) of the above referred DLT :-

“Constitution of India, 1950 –Art. 215 –Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 2(c) –

Contempt of Court-publication in question ---casting aspersion on competent of judiciary ---

publication in question scandalizes judges –it attempts to rob High Court of its owner and

prestige –CONTEMNORS CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO TAMPER WITH STREAM OF

JUSTICE WHICH MUST FLOW PURE AN UNHINDERED – contemnors cannot be

allowed to commit contempt of court in garb of criticism ----.”

23. “Rajiv Malhotra Vs. Union of India & Ors, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)

(i) Head Note of the above referred DRJ:-


Contempt- Punishment – False affidavit – Petitioner’s building demolished despite greasing

palm of officials of MCD – Sought direction against erring officials – Directions issued to MCD

restraining unauthorized construction in unauthorized colonies in CW 7441/93 – MCD officials

allowed constructions in violation of order – False affidavit furnished that certain properties

demolished – Committee of Advocates appointed to report nature of demolitions – Report

reveals certain properties were punctured and not completely demolished – Deliberate and

willful false statements of JE and Baildar – Disregard of truth – Interference in the course of

justice – Guilty of contempt of court – Sentence of one month’s SI with fine of Rs. 25,000/-

on each.

(ii) Relevant portion of para 20 of the above referred judgment:-

“In view of the foregoing, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT BY FALSE

AFFIDAVIT AND TAKING LIBERTIES WITH TRUTH IN ORDER TO MISLEAD US,

SHRI U.S. CHAUHAN AND R.S. SEHRAWAT HAVE COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF

COURT and the same is of such a nature that it tends to substantially interfere with the

due course of justice. ACCORDINGLY, THEY ARE HELD GUILTY OF COMMITTING

CONTEMPT OF COURT ----.”

24. “Pravin C. Shah Vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali & Another, AIR 2001 SC 3041 : VII (2001)

SLT 153” (9.10.2001) :-


“Contempt of Court Act (70 of 1971), ------ Ss. 2, 12 -------- ADVOCATE FOUND GUILTY

OF CONTEMPT- CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO APPEAR, ACT OR PLEAD IN

COURT UNLESS HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT --------.

The very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of court on the previous

hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness on the same day,

unaffected by the contemptuous behavior he hurled at the court, would erode the dignity of the

court and even erode the majesty of it, besides impairing the confidence of the public in the

efficacy of the institution of the courts. ---------.”

25. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri

L.J. 493” (30.7.2003)


“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971). S. 2(c ) – Criminal contempt – Accused bringing some

persons to impersonate as contesting respondents in writ appeal and persuading Court to accept

compromise petition signed by them as if contesting parties had settled matter to allow writ

appeal filed by accused and withdraw writ petition filed by contesting respondents – Held,

accused was guilty of criminal contempt as defined in S. 2(c ).

If any person tries to either file any false affidavit, forged document or ever makes



tendency of impeding, obstructing or interference striking a blow on the rule of law and



INSTITUTION. ----------.”

26. “S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039” (19.8.2003) (A

Three Judge Bench)


“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2- Contempt –FALSE VERIFICATION

OF STATEMENT OF FACTS- IS CONTEMPT –But pleading/defence made on basis of

facts which are not false-Howsoever the pleading may be an abuse process of court –Does

not amount to contempt.

WHERE A VERIFICATION IS SPECIFIC AND DELIBERATELY FALSE,

THERE IS NOTHING IN LAW TO PREVENT A PERSON FROM BEING

PROCEEDED FOR CONTEMPT. But it must be remembered that the very essence of

crimes of this kind is not how such statements may injure this or that party to litigation

BUT HOW THEY MAY DECEIVE AND MISLEAD THE COURTS AND THUS

PRODUCE MISCHIEVOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. A person is under a legal obligation to verify the

allegations of fact made in the pleadings and if he verifies falsely, he comes under the

clutches of law. In order to expose a person to the liability of a prosecution of making false

statement, there must be a false statement of fact and not a mere pleading made on the basis of

facts which are themselves not false. Merely because an action or defence can be an abuse of

process of the Court, those responsible for its formulation can not be regarded as committing

contempt, BUT AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE COURT BY DISGUISING THE

NATURE OF CLAIM IS CONTEMPT. If the facts leading to a claim or defence are set out,

but an inference is drawn thereby stating that the stand of the plaintiff or defendant is one way or

the other, it will not amount to contempt unless it be that the facts as pleaded themselves are

false.

The appellant a Bank Officer was held guilty of contempt of Court on ground of taking

up a false defence as pleaded in the written statement and repeating the same in the evidence-in-

chief. The written statement had been verified by the appellant stating that what is

contained in written statement is based on the information received from the records of the

defendants and he believed the same to be true. THE VERIFICATION OF FACTS

ADVERTED TO IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT IS NOT MADE ON THE BASIS OF

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPELLANT and the defence set up by him is on

the basis of the stand taken by his bank in the companion suit. When in a suit of the

appellant’s Bank, the stand had been accepted, but in the suit against appellant’s Bank, such

stand had been disbelieved, it becomes difficult to say that the appellant had deliberately stated

falsehood to mislead the Court or to simply gain time to the disadvantage of the other party in

this matter.

Further, when the appellant tried to explain his case in his evidence, the same was shut

out on the basis that it is hearsay. An officer of Bank who had no personal knowledge of the

transactions in question and was deposing on the basis of material on record, his evidence cannot

be from his knowledge and necessarily has to be hearsay. Hence, the lower Court was not

justified in shutting out that part of the evidence.”

27. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004

SC 3114” (12.4.2004)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (C) of the above referred AIR:-

“Criminal PC (2 of 1974), Ss. 386, 391, 401 – Evidence Act (1 of 1872) S. 165 -------- Object of

391 is to sub serve ends of justice and to get at the truth-Best Bakery case with horror and

terror –oriented History-Star eye-witness had not stated truthfully before trial court- willing to

speck truth before the appellate court on basis of affidavit - power Under S 391 can be exercised

by appellate court ---------- Re-trial observed to be conducted out side state -------

The primary object of S. 391 is the prevention of guilty man’s escape through some

careless or ignorant proceedings before a court or vindication of an innocent person wrongfully

accused. --------.

it is no doubt true that the accused persons have been acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal

has been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and based on tainted evidence, tailored

investigation, unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and evidence of

threatened/terrorized witnesses, IT IS NO ACQUITTAL IN THE EYE OF LAW and no

sanctity or credibility can be attached and given to the so called findings. It seems to be

nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on legal process AND THE RESULTANT DECISIONS

OF COURTS-CORAM NON JUDIS AND NON-EST, therefore, interference in appeals is

warranted.


“As pithily stated in Jennison vs. Baker (1972 (1) All ER 1006), “The law should not be seen to

sit limply, WHILE THOSE WHO DEFY IT GO FREE and, those who seek its protection

lose hope.” COURTS HAVE TO ENSURE THAT ACCUSED PERSONS ARE

PUNISHED ---”

28. “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004)







not be maintainable

(ii) Para 7 of the above referred judgment ;-

“---------. Criminal; contempt’ is defined in section 2 (c ) of the act. It, inter alia means the











(c) the Advocate – General, or

(d) any other person, with the consent in writing of the advocate general













aggrieved, not being the Advocate General can the High Court refuse to



such a situation, a discretion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take


that petition.”

















(v) Relevant extract of para 16 of eth above referred judgment:-



29. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” : 138

(2007) DLT 682 : (9.2.2007)

(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri. L. J.:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c ) – Criminal Contempt – Interference by Advocate

in due course of administration of justice

The judge and counsel are two wheels of the chariot of justice. While the direction of the

movement is controlled by the judge holding rains, the movement it self is facilitated by the

counsel and litigants, without which the chariots the justice may not move and may ever

collapse. --------- AS RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS OF THE COURT, THE COUNSEL

HAVE AN OVERALL OBLIGATION OF ASSISTING THE COURTS IN A JUST AND

PROPER MANNER, IN THE JUST AND PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Deliberately making false statements on oath, practising fraud and making of averments which

were false to the knowledge of the counsel in the plaint, witnessing agreements which were

either not executed on the dates mentioned thereon or were not executed at all, apart from being

gross violations of code of conduct or professional ethics, in the present state of circumstances

would also amount to obstructing the due course of administration of justice and interfering with

the same and thus constitute criminal contempt. If the notice issued by the counsel runs contrary

to the averment in the plaint, such conduct on the part of the counsel cannot be condoned or

simply excused or washed away. The responsibility of the members of the Bar for keeping the

stream of justice pure and unsullied is far greater.”

(ii) Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT:-

“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 215- Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 340 r/w section

195- Contempt of Court-Cognizance of abuse of legal process- Recovery suits –Loan agreements

not executed on dates recorded thereon- Stamp papers on which they were engrossed, were of

later date- Show cause notice issued to plaintiff and his Advocates for abuse of legal process in

institution and prosecution of suits based on agreements in question- Defendants claimed

plaintiff forged and fabricated loan agreement for institution of suit- Loan agreement was dated

15.5.1997 and 1.7.1997 and notarized on same date- Non-judicial stamp paper on which

agreement engrossed is dated 21.7.1997 – Defendants filed written statement denying execution

of loan agreements- DELIBERATE FALSE STATEMENTS ON OATH, PRACTISING

FRAUD AND FALSE AVERMENTS TO KNOWLEDGE OF COUNSEL IN PLAINT,

witnessing agreement either not executed on dates mentioned or not executed at all APART

FROM BEING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF CODE OF CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS ALSO AMOUNT TO OBSTRUCTING DUE COURSE OF ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL CONTEMPT- Act of instituting suits on

loan agreements knowing that legal notice of demand sent for return of consideration,

claiming it to have been paid in USA, would not be filed by counsel deliberately- It can be

filed by counsel either on account of his total forget-fullness with regard to notice sent or

his being blissfully ignorant of legal provisions and consequences thereof- Dr. Diwan is

Advocate with decades of experience and submits he and plaintiff suffered for their lapses-

Plaintiff lent money, has lost right to recover same on account of manipulation of

documents by defendants-keeping in view age of Counsel and his blemishless track record,

apology tendered by him accepted- Apology of another Counsel Kiran Singh is bona fide

and accepted-Directions issued accordingly.”

(iii) Relevant extract of Head Note (iv) of the above referred DLT:-






matter.”

(iv) Relevant extract of the para 10 of the above referred judgment:-

“It would be seen from the foregoing that apart from the false deposition with regard to the dates

on which the lone agreement were executed, plaintiff’s counsel, Dr. D.C. Vohra, WHO HAD

HIMSELF SERVED A NOTICE DATED 1.4.1998 regarding payment the amount

equivalent to Rs. 16 lakhs in U.S. Dollar in America, filed a suit based on the loan

agreements dated 1.7.1987 and 15.5.1997, wherein it was alleged that the sum of Rs. 16

lakhs was paid on 1.7.1997 and that the amount was paid at New Delhi. The said averments

WERE OBVIOUSLY FALSE TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF the plaintiff and HIS

COUNSEL, as they claimed that the money had been paid in USA. Similar is the position

with regard to the agreement dated 15.5.1997.


“The suits instituted by the plaintiff and signed through counsel, Dr. D.C. Vohra and Ms. Kiran

Singh are on the basis of loan advanced under agreements dated 15.5.1997 and 1.7.1997 not

being repaid. The stamp papers bear the date 21.7.1997, which belie the dates given on the

agreement. The consideration under the agreement, as admitted by the plaintiff, $ 35,000 was

paid in USA to the representative of the defendant. The agreements did not disclose any such

thing, rather money was claimed to be paid under the agreements in Delhi. THE NOTICE

ISSUED BY THE COUNSEL RUNS CONTRARY TO THE AVERMENTS IN THE

PLAINT.


“One of the suits (suit no. 1357/1999) has already been permitted to be withdrawn dive order

dated 20.2.2003, while prayer for withdrawal, in the second suit (S, No. 62/1999) has been made

by the plaintiff in the reply to the application under S, 340 Cr. P.C. … which is pending. During

the advanced stage of hearing of contempt proceedings, the plaintiff and the defendants both

desired a quietus to be applied to the matter.

(vii) Para 14 of the above referred judgment:-

“Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Senior Advocate who had been appointed Amicus Curiae, succinctly

brought forth the facts from the averments in the pleadings, statements and documents on record,

which form the basis for proceeding for contempt as also in relation to the application

moved under S. 340, Cr. P.C. IN ESSENCE, HE SUBMITTED THAT A MATURED AND

EXPERIENCED ADVOCATE WITH DECADES OF EXPERIENCE HAS INSTITUTED

SUITS BASED ON AVERMENTS, WHICH RUN CONTRARY TOTE NOTICE GIVEN

BY HIM. The suits were instituted on the basis of loan agreements where under monies were not

paid and the said loan agreements were not executed on the dates thereof. A junior advocate of

the plaintiff has signed the agreement as witness without the agreements having been executed in

her presence.

(viii) Relevant extract of 20 of the above referred judgment:-

“Having noticed the explanations tendered an apology offered, let us notice the legal position in

this regard. It is now fairly well settled that A PARTY TAKING RECOURSE TO FRAUD

deflects the course of judicial proceeding and the same constitute interference in the

administration of justice. Making of a false statement on oath deliberately also constitutes

criminal contempt. Reference may be made to Murray and Company v. Ashok Kumar Newatia

reported as (2000) 2 SCC 367 : 2000 Cri L.J. 1394.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR FOR KEEPING

STREAM OF JUSTICE PURE OR UNSULLIED IS FAR GREATER THEN THAT OF

THE LITIGANTS. ------.”


“Coming to the role of Advocates and counsel vis-à-vis the courts and administration of justice.

-----. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. and ors. Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association,

reported in 1994 (2) SCC 204 : (AIR 1994) SC 1654) emphasized upon the role of counsel :

(Para 6)

“The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The

client engages the lawyer for person reasons --------. The lawyer in turn is not an agent of his

client but his dignified, responsible spokesman. ---------. Being a responsible a the court and an

important adjunct of the administration of justice, the lawyer also ows a duty to the court as well

as the opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that justice is done. He demeans himself if he

acts merely as a mouth piece of his client.’

(x) Para 22 of the above referred judgment:-

“Having noticed the legal position regarding deliberately making false statements on oath,

practising fraud and making of averments which were false of the knowledge of counsel in the

plaint, witnessing agreements which were either not executed on the dates mentioned thereon or

were not executed at all apart from being gross violations of the code of conduct or professional

ethics, in the present state of circumstances would also amount to obstructing the due course of

administration of justice and interfering with the same and thus constitutes criminal contempt.

(xi) Para 23 of the above referred judgment:-

“-------. The notice issued by the counsel runs contrary to the averments in the plaint. Such

conduct on the part of the counsel cannot be condoned or simply excused or washed away. As

noticed by this court, the responsibility of the members of the Bar for keeping the stream of

justice pure and unsullied is far greater. Dr. Vohra initially sought to urge that these were lapses

falling short of contempt which could be corrected by striking out the pleadings, this court is

unable to appreciate this submission and rejects the same

(xii) Relevant extract of para 24 of the above referred judgment:-

“Considering that ever of the outset Dr. Vohra had, while making the submission, prayed that if

the court was not inclined to accept the same, he should be permitted to tender unconditional

apology, this court is inclined to considered the apology has tendered. -----. I am of the view that

the act of instituting suits on loan agreements knowing fully well that a legal notice of demand

has been sent asking for return of consideration, claiming it to have been paid in USA, would not

file by a counsel deliberately. It can only be filed by a counsel either on account of his total

forget fullness with regard to the notice sent or his being blissfully ignorant of the legal

provisions and consequences thereof. It could not be deliberate or intentional act. Dr. Dewan C

Vohra is a counsel with decades of experience. He submits that he and the plaintiff have suffered

for their lapses. --------.”

(xiii) Para 25 of the above referred judgment;-

“In these circumstances, considering that this could not have been a deliberate or intentional act,

as discussed therein be fore, but one actuated either by extreme for getfulness or blissful

ignorance of the provisions of law, as also the age of the counsel and his blemishless track record

so far, the apology tendered by him is accepted. However, he is directed to pay a sum of Rs.

15,000/- within two weeks from today, as costs to the Advocates Welfare Fund. He shall also

render pro bono service for a period of six months for at least two hours, twice a week, at any of

the Delhi Legal Service Centers under the supervision and direction of the Member Secretary,

Delhi Legal Services Authority or such other suitable word as may be assigned by the Member

Secretary.

(xiv) Para 26 of the above referred judgment:-

“As regards Kiran Singh, she is a young budding advocate and she has faced this ordeal at the

beginning of her profession itself. She was inexperienced and claims to have signed the

agreements as witness not eh asking of the senior counsel for his clients. She has recognized that

this is a humbling experience and she would exercise extreme care in future and discharge her

functions with responsibility. It appears that the experience for her has indeed been a humbling

one. Her apology, which was tendered at the outset, is a bona fide one and is accepted. She is

directed to do pro bono work and render services under the supervision of the Member Secretary,

Delhi High Court legal Service Authority for a period of six months, for two hours, twice a

week.”

30. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB)

(17.2.2009)




property and contrary stand before L & DO ---------– Appellant an advocate though aged

one – He is fully familiar with legal pleas and consequences of his conduct – Fit case for

issuance of notice for criminal contempt to respondent who has tried to pollute course of

justice and interfere with same knowing falsehood of his statements – FACT THAT HE IS

AN ADVOCATE MAKES CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT ALL THE MORE

DEPLORABLE and mere advanced age of respondent should not deter this court from

proceeding further in matter – Appropriate notice to show cause be issued to respondent of

being proceeded against and punished for criminal contempt of Court.






“-----------------. The tendency on the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to

prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. Any interference in the course of justice,

ANY OBSTRUCTION CAUSED IN THE PATH OF THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE

AN AFFRONT TO THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND, THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS

PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. --------.”

31. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367”

(8.3.2006)

(i) Head Note (D) of the above referred AIR:-

“Constitution of India, Arts. 129, 142 (2) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 15 – false

statements before Courts- Witness made statement before National Human Rights Commission

and Supreme Court that she was intimidated, threatened and coerced to make statement in

particular way before trial Court-Subsequently disowned it – Inquiry set up to find out truth –

Finding by Inquiry Officer that money has exchanged hands which made said witness to

state in particular way in trial court – Said witness could not explain her assets sources of

bank deposits – Report of Inquiry Officer found acceptable – Said witness thus, held,

committed contempt of Supreme Court - Sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for

one year and to pay cost of Rs. 50,000,00-------.”


“Right from the inception of the judicial system, it has been accepted that discovery,

vindication and establishment of truth are the main purposes underlying existence of

Courts of Justice.-------.”

32. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Not yet

obtained)

Note: Observations made by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the above referred judgment have

been quoted by it in its following judgment reported as COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS.

STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”


(21.8.2008)(Delhi High Court)





Nexus between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer –-----Complicity between Special

Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – both were More than mixed up in BMW case –

conduct of both had tendency to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice as

influencing a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify amounts to interference in

administration of justice -------Contempt very much before eyes and within hearing –

contempt of courts act, 1972, -section 2 (C ) (Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 20, 78, 125, 127, 143, 155,

156, 169,206 & 207)

(ii) Head Note (xi) of the above referred DLT:-

















PROCEEDINGS. ---------.”










THE SYSTEM.”








appearing before this court and the Courts subordinate to it for a specified period and also

to recommend to the Full Court that they should be stripped of their designation as Senior

Advocates. In this context, we may refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court

authored by one of us (Manmohan Sarin, J.) titled “Court on Its Own Motion v. Rajiv Dawar,

2007 (I) AD (Delhi) 567. In that case, the defence lawyer had assured the accused of his release

on bail for a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- having spoken to ‘the people, who would be responsible for

his release on bail’. After being given a full opportunity of representing his case, he was found

guilty of criminal contempt and subsequently interfering, with the administration of justice. In

that case, the contemnor had refunded Rs. 4,00,000/- as directed by the Bar Counsel and a plea

was made to bring a quietus to the matter. This submission was rejected by the Bench holding:





the system or commit the offence unwittingly or innocently. --------.”

34. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261”

(20.10.2008)

(i) Head Note (ii) of the above referred SLT:-

“Contempt of Court – Matter deserves to be dealt with all seriousness.”

(ii) Relevant extract of para 36 of above referred judgment:-

“-----------. If appellants have been found to be guilty of commission of contempt , they

should have been punished on the same day. Why the extraordinary procedure of asking them to

appear on another day for hearing on quantum of sentence was adopted is not understood. THEY

HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO PURGE THEIR CONTEMPT. --------.”

35. “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130(SC)” (A Three

Judge Bench Decision)

A. Relevant extracts of the above referred DLT and the judgment pertaining to

prohibition for advocate against appearing in Courts







between section 34 of Advocates Act and Art. 145 of Constitution – ART. 145 AND

SECTION 34 OF ACT CLEARLY SHOW THAT THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT

TO AN ADVOCATE TO APPEAR IN COURT – An Advocate appears in Court subject to

conditions laid down by Court- Two appellants were debarred from appearing before High Court

and Courts subordinate to it for a period of 4 months.-----






competence and authority. In a proceeding of contempt punishment could only be awarded

as provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, THOUGH IN A GIVEN CASE THE

HIGH COURT COULD DEBAR THE CONTEMNOR FROM APPEARING IN COURT

TILL HE PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT.--------- .”




whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court(s). In paragraph 34

of the decision the Court made highly illuminating observations in regard to lawyers’ right to

appear before the Court and sounded the note of caution for the lawyers. Para 34 of the decision

need to be reproduced below :-

“34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in Courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of Courts. ----. Conduct in Court is a matter concerning the court and hence the bar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the Court could also be regulated by them in exercise of their disciplinary powers.--- But the right to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court must and does have major supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested of control or supervision of conduct in Court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate. A RULE CAN STIPULATE THAT A PERSON WHO HAS COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF COURT OR HAS BEHAVED UNPROFESSIONALLY AND IN AN UNBECOMING MANNER WILL NOT HAVETHE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD AND CONDUCT CASES IN COURTS.---- The very sight of an advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct, standing in the Court would erode the dignity of the court ---. Art. 145 of Constitution of India and section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an advocate who appear in a court.----.”


“----------- . We may respectfully add that in a given case, a direction disallowing an advocate

who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in Court may not only be a measure to

maintain the dignity and though in paragraph 80 of the decision, as seen earlier there is an

observation that in a given case it might be possible for this Court or the High Court to prevent

the contemnor advocate to appear before it till he purge himself of the contempt orderly

functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self protection of the Court and for

preservation of the purity of Court proceedings.---------.



extreme step of debarring an advocate from appearing in Court should arise very rarely and only

as a measure of last resort in cases where the wrong doer advocate does not at all appear to be

genuinely contrite and remorseful for his act/conduct, but on the contrary shows a tendency to

repeat or perpetuate the wrong act(s).”

36. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009)

DLT 466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)


“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10,11,12,14,15,18,19- Civil

Procedure Code, 1908- Order 39 Rule 2A- Contempt of Court- Criminal Contempt-



SUIT PROPERTY- On receipt of REFERENCE from Court of Civil Judge, Division Bench

also found to be case of criminal contempt and charge framed against defendant No. 1

contemnor was also of criminal contempt- FILING OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR

STATEMENTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT AS IT TENDS TO OBSTRUCT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE-

Defendant/Contemnor filed written statement in suit of plaintiff and made statement on

oath before trial court AND ADMITTING HE SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF

AND HANDED OVER POSSESSION TO HIM- But subsequently in his reply to contempt

application filed by plaintiff, contemnor took a somersault AND TOOK PLEA THAT HE

NEITHER SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF NOR HANDED OVER

POSSESSION TO HIM- That fraud was played upon him by plaintiff in collusion with any

other person in making statement- No evidence in this behalf led by defendant/contemnor-Ipse

Dixit of defendant is difficult to be accepted- Apology tendered by contemnor, not at all

apologetic and not accepted- It was tendered by defendant/contemnor for first time while

giving evidence in these proceedings-Defendant/contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt.”


“Fraud- To be established by adducing cogent evidence.


“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10, 14, 15, 18, 19- Contempt of Court-

Civil and Criminal- To be decided on basis of facts which are brought to notice of High Court-

As per scheme of 1971 Act, cases of civil contempt can be heard and decided by Single

Judge bench only and criminal contempt petition to be heard and decided only by Bench of

not less than 2 Judges.”


“In the present case, as noticed already, the Division Bench had taken cognizance of “Criminal

Contempt” only against the defendant/contemnor for his having taken contradictory stands in his

pleadings/affidavits regarding the ownership and possession of the suit property. So, we have to

examine whether the defendant/contemnor has committed “Criminal contempt” or not we are of

the view that since no cognizance was taken of “Civil Contempt”, by this Court that aspect

cannot be gone into in the present proceedings even though strongly urged on behalf of the

plaintiff. We say so because of certain provisions of the Act of 1971 as well as some judicial

pronouncements. Under Sections 2 (a), (b) and (c) “contempt of Court”, “civil contempt” and

“criminal contempt”. We reproduce below these definition clauses:

“2(a) “contempt of court” means “civil or criminal contempt” 2(b) “civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction,

order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of undertaking given to a Court.”

2(c ) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

(iv) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court, or

(v) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings, or

(vi) Interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.”

Section 10 reads as under :-

“Section 10. Power of High Court to punish contempt of subordinate Courts-Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself :

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”.

Section 18 also needs to be noticed. It reads as under :-

“Section 18. Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches-(1)Every case of criminal contempt under section 15 shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges.

(2) Sub-section (I) shall not apply to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner.Section 19 provides as to where would an appeal lie against an order of a Single Judge bench and that of a Division bench. The relevant part of this section for our purpose is as follows :

“Section 19. Appeals –

(2) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-

(a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;

(b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court :

Provided………………………………………….”


“From these provisions of the Act of 1971, it becomes evident that the question whether

contempt of any subordinate court is committed or not and whether the alleged contempt is civil

or criminal to be decided by the High Court on the basis of facts which are brought to the

notice of the High Court. Those facts can be brought to the notice of the High Court by any

party to the litigation. If the High Court considered on perusal of the facts brought to its

notice that contempt of a Subordinate court is made AND THE SAME IS CIVIL IN

NATURE, then the matter can be entertained STRAIGHTWAY by a Single Judge Bench.

However, if the contempt of any court Subordinate to the High Court is alleged to be

“CRIMINAL CONTEMPT” THEN THE REFERENCE IS MADE TO IT BY THE

SUBORDINATE COURT CONCERNED OR ANY OF THE OTHER AUTHORITIES

MENTIONED IN SECTION 15 OF THE ACT 1971----.”
















“In the present case, the defendant/contemnor had filed a written statement in the suit of the

plaintiff and had also made a statement on oath before the trial court on 29.4.2003 admitting that

he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff and had also handed over its position to him. In his

statement on oath also which admittedly was made by him before the Ld Civil judge in the suit

on 29.4.2003 he had admitted that he had already sold the suit property to the plaintiff and so he

will not dispossess him . However, subsequently when the plaintiff filed contempt application,

the contemnor in his reply to that contempt application field before the Reference Court, which

was supported by his affidavit wherein he affirmed the correctness of the assertion made by him

in his reply, he took a somersault and took the plea that neither he had sold the suit property to

the plaintiff nor he had handed over its possession to him. Even before this Court, the

defendant/contemnor filed an affidavit in response to the show cause notice and claimed that

neither he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff not was he given its possession. The

admissions made in the written statement and in the statement made before the trial court,

however, according to the defendant/contemnor, were not made by him voluntarily but were as a

result of fraud played upon him by the plaintiff and one Ved Prakash. Learned counsel for the

plaintiff did not dispute that if any party to a suit has made any admission of fact either in the

pleadings or by way of statement on oath, that party is not precluded from showing that that

admission was got made by the opposite party by indulging in fraud and it is shown that any

fraud was played upon the party making any admission of some important fact in dispute then

that party would not be bound by that admission. However, ld Counsel submitted, in the present

case the defendant/contemnor had failed miserably to show that any kind of fraud was played

upon him by the plaintiff in collusion with any other person.








called apology tendered by the defendant/contemnor for the first itm e while giving evidence in








(i). Head Note of the above referred DLT :-


“ The matter, however, did not rest at this since the learned Company Judge took a serious view of the conduct of Mr. Ajay Yadav. This conduct was a consequence of an order passed on 6.10.2006 in an interlocutory application filed in CS (OS) No. 1906/2006 by the company in terms where of the society, Mr. Ajay Choudhary and other members of their group who were defendant in the suit had been restrained from representing themselves as share holders/representatives of the company till further orders.----. The Learned Company Judge came to the conclusion that in the light of the prohibitions, it was not open to Shri Ajay Yadav to represent the company and this fact had not been informed to the Court by the counsel representing Mr. Ajay Yadav. The vakalatnama filed by the counsel on behalf of Shri Ajay Yadav as if he was representing the company was found to be in the teeth of the order of injection and the action of Shri Ajay Yadav singing the vakalatnama was observed to be a blatant attempt to lower the authority of the court in violation of the order dated 6.10.2006 passed in CS (OS) No. 1906/2006. The conduct of Shri Ajay Yadav was held to be an effort to prejudice due course of judicial proceedings and would fall into the definition of criminal contempt and the matter was thereafter directed to be placed before the appropriate Bench after registering the petition as such.”

(iii) Sub para 16 of para 11 of the above referred judgment :-

“The action of Shri Ajay Yadav in signing the vakalatnamas purportedly on behalf of the respondent No. 1, is a blatant attempt to lower the authority of the Court in violation of order dated 6th October, 2006 passed in CS (OS) o. 1906/2006. As a result a dispute was raised by Mr. Chaudhary, Advocate in the present proceedings as to who is to represent the company. Such vakaltnama has been signed even as late as on 23rd April, 2009 despite the judgment dated 20th

April, 2009. Despite specific prohibition, Shri Ajay Yadav has made an effort to prejudice due course of the present judicial proceedings. There can be no manner of doubt that the action is willful. These acts on the part of Shri Ajay Yadav would clearly fall with the definition of “criminal contempt “ as defined under Sub-clauses 1 and 2 of Sub section of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”


“A perusal of the reply filed by the respondent shows that Sh Ajay Yadav has justified his conduct of putting an appearance on behalf of the Company through advocates despite the injunction order. He has sought to raise preliminary objections that no consent of Advocate General or any State Law Officer has been obtained for initiation of contempt proceedings against him which plea is without any basis in view of the proceedings having been initiated suo moto by the Court.---.”


“We find that the respondent has shown no regret. After setting forth 26 grounds of challenge, in the last paragraph it is stated that the respondent has the highest regard for the Court and does not want to lower its dignity or authority willfully or otherwise and that the respondent is prepared to tender unconditional apology in the event of the Court considering the present reply as not being sufficient to drop or discharge the notice. We find this apology s no apology at all. the respondent has defended his action.”


“---After having done everything possible to frustrate the orders of the court by acting in an improper and illegal manner, the respondent has tried to justify his conduct.---.”


“We may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 to explain that the word ‘interfere’ in the context of the criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 means any action which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Thus, if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the Courts from performing the legal duties as they are supposed to do. The polluters of judicial firmament are required to be well taken care of to

maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment. A similar view has been expressed in Dhannjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = AIR 1995 SC 1795, where false affidavits had been filed. In Ram Avtar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla, (1995) Supp (2) SCC 130, it was observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or witnesses ‘ in any manner’. The tendency on the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. any interference in the cause of justice, any obstruction caused in the path of those seeking justice are an affront to the majesty of law and therefore, the conduct is punishable as contempt of court. Learned Single Judge of this court in court on its own motion Vs. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & Ors. 138 (2007) DLT 682 = II (2007) BC 362, has observed that a party taking recourse to fraud deflects course of judicial proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration of justice.”


“We deem it appropriate to also refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Sudhir Chona Vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (97) DLT 642 that while civil contempt is an offence of private nature depriving a party of the benefit of the Court order, criminal contempt is contumacious or obstructive conduct or behaviour directed against the court and involves an element of criminality in it. It is despising, undermining and eroding the authority of the Court and is punishable to protect and safeguard the public faith in the administration of justice.”


“Despite the conduct of the respondent/contemnor, we restrain from taking an extreme harsh view and impose fine of Rs. 2,0000/- on the respondent/contemnor and sentence him till the rising of the Court.”



“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2(b), 9- Civil Contempt – Constitution of – There must exist judgment, decree, direction, order, or writ or process of Court or there should be an undertaking given by defendant to Court---.”


“Section 2 sub section (b) of the Contempt of Court Act defines civil contempt which reads as under :-

“2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-(a) “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt”(b) “Civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction,

order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to court.”s


“In the present case, this court did not pass any judgment in favour of plaintiff and against defendant not decreed the suit of plaintiff nor given any directions to defendant nor passed an order in favour of plaintiff or against defendant nor issued any writ nor an undertaking of defendant was recorded.---.”

D. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (3) of CCA

Note :This section deals with ‘Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt’ (Irrelevant)

E. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (4) of CCANote : This section deals with ‘fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings not contempt (Irrelevant)

F. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (5) of CCA

Note : This section deals with fair criticism of judicial act, not contempt and this section 5 reads as under :-

“5. Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.- A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided.

CommentsJudgments are open to criticism that must be done without casting

aspersions on the judges and the courts and without adverse comments amounting to scandalizing the courts; Advocate General Vs. Abraham George, 1976 Cr. L.J. 158 (161).

G. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (6) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Complaint against Presiding Officers of Subordinate Courts when not contempt’. (Irrelevant)

H. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (7) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Publication of information relating to proceedings in Camera not contempt except in certain cases’. (Not relevant)

I. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (8) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘other defenses not affected’. (Not relevant)

J. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (9) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Act not to imply enlargement of scope of contempt’ (Not relevant)

K. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (10) of CCA(Most important)

Note : This section deals with ‘Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts.’

Section 10 of CCA reads as under :-

“10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself :

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the India Penal Code.”

A. Synopsis of section 10 as per AIR manual :-

(1) Power of High Court to punish contempts.(2) Proceedings against State or Union. (Not relevant )(3) Scope of enquiry.(4) Evidence and mode of proof.(5) Exercise of power is discretionary.(6) Contempt proceedings and Criminal P.C.(7) Bar of jurisdiction under the Proviso(8) Ex parte order.(9) Parallel proceedings.(10) Other remedy.(11) Court.

(1) Power of High Court to punish contempts.

(i) Sections 10 & 11 make it manifestly clear that even in respect of contempt of any subordinate court, it is only the High Court that take action against the contemner vide AIR 1957 Hyd. 17(DB) and AIR 1989 HP 46

(ii) Contempt of subordinate courts –Power to punish vests in High Court alone, except in cases covered by S. 228, Penal Code and O. 39, R. 2-A CPC vide 1985 MPLJ 730.

(iii) Subordinate Court can make a reference Under S. 15(2) only in respect of ‘Criminal Contempt”-Cannot entertain application wherein ‘Civil Contempt’ is alleged

(iv) Criminal Contempt of Subordinate Court-Suo Motu action for contempt by High Court-Permissible vide AIR 2004 SC 2579 (2588)

(v) The High Court may take cognizance even on its own motion of the contempt of a subordinate court vide 1994 MPLJ 424 (427) (DB)

(vi) Violation of injunction issued by subordinate Court- High Court ca take cognizance o petition filed by aggrieved party in view of R. 9 of Contempt of Courts (Gauhati High Court) Rules (1977), which applies in case of civil contempt other than contempt referred to in S. 14 of the Act. 1992 Cri LJ 1375 (1377) : 1991(1) Gauhati LR 214.

(vii) Order passed by Court having o jurisdiction is nullity and a void order- Its disregard-o contempt committed-Contempt petition not maintainable. 1981 Cri LJ 1880 (Delhi) ** (1987) 2 Rajasthan LR 864(867) ** 1984 Cri LJ 1243 (1246) : 1984 All Cri Respondent 374 (DB). (1982) UPLT NOC 79. Reversed.) (Plea of alleged contemner that order of Tribunal was passed without jurisdiction can be gone into by High Court entertaining contempt petition.)

(viii) The High Court while exercising jurisdiction in contempt proceedings can undo the wrong which have bee done to petitioner and restore status quo ante. 1992 (1) Rec Cri Respondent 257 (259) (P&H).

(ix) When single Judge had passed orders on a contempt petition and single Judge was not conferred with the power of contempt of Court by any order of Chief Justice, the orders passed by said single Judge on contempt petition were liable to be set aside. 2005 (1) All WC 992 (993) : 2005 (1) ESC 14 (DB).

(x) No cognizance of criminal contempt of subordinate Court alleged to have been committed by contemners can be taken on the application by a third party before the High Court, which is not supported by written consent of Advocate General. 1994 (1) Cal. HN 291 (293) : 1993 Cal Cri LR 411 (DB).

(3) Scope of enquiry.

(xi) Disobedience of order of High Court –Eviction order passed by authority – Order upheld by High Court and direction issued to opposite parties – Police Officers to give vacant possession of premises-Non-compliance of order – Such police officers transferred and other Police Officers succeeding them- Order of High Court ultimately complied with by the new officers who took pains to see that premises were vacated- Held, that it was not necessary to initiate contempt proceedings against opposite parties. 1990 Cri LJ 479 : 1989 All LJ 173.

(4) Evidence and mode of proof.

(xii) In a allegation being of criminal contempt, unless there is clear material at least to suggest the parties were prima facie involved in the matter as alleged, there would be no justification to continue contempt proceedings against them. The allegations should not be circumstantial. ILR (1983) 1 Cut 377 (385) (DB) ** 2002 (2) All Rent Cas 212 (213) ** 1998 Cri LJ 3126 (3127) : 1998 (2) Rec Civ Respondent 195 (Petitioner & H). Interim order alleged to be violated found to have been subsequently vacated-Contempt petition not therefore tenable).

(xiii) For punishing contemners either under Art. 215 of Constitution or under S. 10 of Contempt of Courts Act or under O. 39, Respondent 2A of CPC, willful and deliberate disobedience must be proved beyond all shadow of doubt. 1997 (3)Raj LW 1773 (1775) : (1998 (1) WLC 106.”

(xiv) Where respondent/tenant filed an undertaking in the Court of Rent Controller specifying particular date to vacate the premises and hand over the possession to the landlord, fact of illness cannot be a ground for not delivering possession and vacating the premises particularly when respondent suffering from heart disease from long back as per his own averments. On-vacating of premises as per undertaking given I Court amounts to contempt of Court and respondent is liable for imprisonment and fine both. ILR (1986) 2 Delhi 60 (62).

(xv) Case of contempt cannot be made out on the basis of constructive notice through counsel, contempt proceedings being in the nature of quasi criminal proceedings actual knowledge of the order is sine qua non before finding a person guilty of disobedience of orders. 1991 All WC 117 (119).

(5) Exercise of power is discretionary.

(xvi) Where the Municipal Corporation failed to comply with the orders of the High Court to return the belongings of the hutment dwellers which were taken from them at the time of demolition of the hutments, it is fit case in which the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act can be exercised. 1990 Cri LJ 619 : (1989) 3 Bom CR 267.

(xvii) Contempt proceedings initiated by High Court on its own motion against Executive Magistrate- Charge that he had disobeyed administrative directions of High Court in that he had failed to send certain monthly returns in time- Explanation for delay found to be just- High regard for High Court also expressed by concerned Executive Magistrate- Rule discharged. 1990 Cri LJ (NOC) 62 : (1989) 2 Sim LC 201 (HP).

(xviii) The fact that in a case of contempt committed in its face the Court before it calls upon the Contemner to show cause comes to a decision that a contempt has been committed does not disqualify the Court from adjudicating upon the matter when cause is shown by the Contemner. AIR 1932 Lah. 502 (503) : 33 Cri LJ 675 (FB).

(xix) In action by ay of contempt, Court is both the accuser and judge of the accusation.. It behoves the Court to act with due circumspection – Court must always be jealous in vindicating its dignity and impartiality while at the same time, it must exercise its power with restraint and care- Litigant may have a grievance in a matter decided by Courts, but that cannot justify use of intemperate or improper language by aggrieved party in reference to Courts. AIR 1969 Delhi 169 (170) (FB).

(xx) A Court will not exercise its extraordinary power of committal upon light occasions and where the ends of justice do not require its use. AIR 1956 Sau 102((104) : 1956 Cri LJ 1355 (DB) ** 2004 (1) Andh LT 1 (11) (DB) ** AIR 1951 Punj 49 (52) : 52 Cri LJ 950 (DB) ** AIR 1950 All 285 (286) : 51 Cri LJ 595 ** AIR 1941 Pat 185 (192) (DB) ** AIR 1969 Delhi 137 (141) : 1969 Cri LJ 599 (DB) ** 1968 Cri LJ 107 (All) ** 1961 (2) Cri LJ 104 (109) (DB) (Ker) ** AIR 1960 All 231 (234) : 1960 Cri LJ 442 (DB) ** AIR 1958 Cal. 474 (482) : 1958 Cri LJ 1162 ** ILR (1955) Mys 524 (DB).

(xxi) Interference with course of justice- Likelihood and not actual interference is essential. AIR 1969 Delhi 201 (210) (FB).

(xxii) The power to commit for contempt should be used only when contempt is deliberate. AIR 1939 Mad 257 (260) : 40 Cri LJ 533 (SB) ** AIR 1953 All 266 (270) : 1953 Cri LJ 630 (DB) ** AIR 1969 Delhi 137 (140) : 1969 Cri LJ 599 (DB) ** 1968 Cri LJ 107 (108, 109) (All) ** 1966 All WR (HC) 759 ** 1963 (2) Cri LJ 219 (223) : 1963 MPLJ 1121 (DB) ** AIR 1959 Pat 262 (266) : 1959 Cri LJ 754 (DB).

(xxiii) Interference with due course of justice in pending proceedings- Case in question referred to in public speech made by P- P explicitly declaring that case was sub judice and he would refrain from any discussion about it – In view of cautionary trends of speech, jurisdiction relating to contempt of Court held could not be invoked. AIR 1969 Mad. 378 (380) (DB)

(xxiv) The matter of dealing with the contempt is totally within the jurisdiction of the High Court and is not the right of ay party in any sense. Further, this jurisdiction must be very sparingly used only where the interests of justice imperatively require its use, and even then only to the limit strictly called for by such interests ay impression that the exercise of such jurisdiction or the power to punish for contempt, has been made in a somewhat hasty or dominating mode without carefully considering the consequence involved to parties may be even more unfavourable to the administration of justice, than permitting such acts of contempt to go unnoticed. (1969) Mad LW 25 (28) (DB) (Cri).

(xxv) The jurisdiction to commit for contempt should not be used to vindicate any personal interest of the Judge but only the general administration of law which is the public concern. AIR 1956 Andhra 84 (86) : 1956 Cri LJ 475 (DB) ** AIR 1950 All 285 (286) : 51 Cri LJ 595 ** ILR (1968) 1 Ker. 384 (403) : 1968 Ker LJ 197 (FB) ** 1968 Cri LJ 248(251) : 71 Cal WN 771 (DB) ** 1968 MPLJ 725 (DB) ** AIR 1967 Andh Pra 299 (308) : 1967 Cri LJ 1470 (DB) ** AIR 1961 J & K 76 (81) : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 766 (DB) ** AIR 1959 Orissa 89 (93) : 1959 Cri LJ 626 (DB).

(xxvi) Proceedings by ay of contempt of Court should not be used as a ‘legal thumbscrew’ by a party against his opponent for enforcement of his claim. AIR 1970 Mad. 14 (16,17)(DB).

(xxvii) Power of High Court to punish contempts can be invoked only when facts ex facie support such proceeding and not for enforcement of decreetal rights between parties. AIR 1966 Mad 21 (22) : 1966 Cri LJ 35 : (1965) 2 Mad LJ 162 (DB).

(xxviii) The Court must take into consideration the fact that there is another remedy available while exercising its discretion to commit or not to commit a person its discretion to commit or not to commit a person for contempt of Court. AIR1945 PC 147 (150) : 47 Cri LJ 61 ** AIR 1958 Cal 474 (482) : 1958 Cri LJ 1162 ** 1968 Cri LJ 430 (431) (Punj).

(xxix) A party guilty of disobedience of an interim injunction order can be punished under Order 39, Rule 2-A (Allahabad) of the Civil Procedure Code and also under the contempt of Courts Act. It is however not necessary to award separate punishment. 1964 All WR 127(128).

(xxx) Where the circumstances require it, Courts should not hesitate to exercise the powers conferred by the Act. AIR 1954 Pat. 203 (208) : 1954 Cri LJ 533 (DB) ** AIR 1967 Bom. 305(307) : 38 Cri LJ 942 ** (1966) Bom. LR 453.

(xxxi) Contempt of Court by one person another person taking entire responsibility for offence ad expressing unqualified regrets- Is no ground for absolving former. AIR 1969 Delhi 201 (205) (FB).

(xxxii) Committal for contempt is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with reference to the interests of the administration of justice. 1970 MLJ (Cri) 139.

(xxxiii) Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts- Commitment for contempt is discretionary- Power to be exercised to maintain the course of justice pure and unaffected. ILR (1971) Cut. 237 (SC).

(6) Contempt proceedings and Criminal P.C.

(xxxiv)

L. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (11) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside jurisdiction. (Not relevant)

M. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (12) of CCA

Note : This section deals with punishment for contempt of court and it reads as under :-

“12. Punishment for contempt of Court.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both :

Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.

Explanation- An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if accused makes it bona fide.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a Court subordinate to it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.

(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any undertaking give to a Court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention is civil prison of each such person :

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of Court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.

Explanation- For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5) –(a) ‘Company’ means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of

individuals; and (b) ‘director’, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.

COMMENTS(i) Purpose of imposing punishment is to ensure faith, trust and confidence in administration of justice ; Rajesh Kumar Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 2725.

(ii) Court dealing with application for contempt of court cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible; Prithavi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2004 SC 4277A.

(iii) The various different modes of execution of orders and decrees, as recognized by law, cannot be resorted to by the Court in a contempt proceeding; Bonbehari Roy Vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, AIR 2004 Cal. 254B.

(iv) The common English phrase “he who asserts must prove” has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the standard of proof, be it noted that a proceeding under the Courts Act is quasi judicial, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt; Mrityujoy Das Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, AIR 2001 SC 1293.

(v) The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court, though quite wide, is yet limited and cannot be expanded to include the power to determine whether an advocate is also guilty of “Professional misconduct” in a summary manner; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 1895.

(vi) Breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil proceeding amounts to contempt; Noorali Babul Thanewala Vs. K.M. Shetty AIR 1990 SC 564.

(vi) Committing the contemer to prison is always discretionary with the court; Shakuntala Sahadevram Tiwari Vs. Hemchand M. Singhania, (1990) 3 Bom CR 82 (Bom).

N. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (13) of CCA

Note : This section deals with contempts not punishable in certain cases.

O. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (14) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or the High Court.’ and this section 14 reads as under :-

P. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (15) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases’ and this section provides the procedure to follow in the High Court and this section 15 reads as under :-

Q. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (16) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Contempt by Judge, Magistrate or other person acting judicially.’

R. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (17) of CCA

Note : This section deals with procedure after cognizance.

S. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (18) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches.’

T. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (19) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘appeal. And reads as under :-

“19. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its Jurisdiction to punish for contempt.-

(a) Where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;

(b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court : Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial

Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that –(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended ;(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c ) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt.

(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfied the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).

(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed –(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days ;(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of

the order appealed against.

U. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (20) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Limitation for actions for contempt.’ (Most Important)

This section, as framed, is not happily worded. The heading of the section, however,

indicates that it was to provide for “Limitation for actions for contempt.” and thus, this section

provides that action for contempt can be taken within a period of one year from the date on

which the contempt was committed. In order to enable the High Court to take action for

contempt within a period of one year, it must legally follow that proceedings for contempt are

initiated when the applications are made and as such an application for contempt of court

should be moved within a period of one year from the date when contempt was committed.

(Paras 34 & 39 of the judgment reported as Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, AIR 2001 SC

2763: 2001 Cri LJ 4175)

U-1. Detail of judgments and propositions of law pertaining to section (20) of CCA as given in the court of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Note No. 1: This section deals with ‘Limitation for actions for contempt’ and as such, this

section does not directly deal with limitation for filing of contempt application within a

period of one years because as per the said section, the period of one year is for actions for

contempt and not for filing contempt application :-

Note No. 2 : In order to understand and appreciate the point of limitation mentioned in the

above referred section, it is essential to understand the meaning of the phrases ; “terminus

a- quo” and “terminus ad quem”

The above mentioned two phrases are used respectively to designate the starting point and

terminating point of a private way. In the case of a street, road or railway, either end may

be, and commonly is referred to as the ‘”terminus” (As per Black’s Law Dictionary)

Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 reads as under :-

“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.- No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt,

either its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on

which the contempt is alleged to have been committed

Comments

(i) In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression “initiate any proceedings of

contempt”, it is necessary to notice several situations or stages which my arise before the court

dealing with contempt proceedings. These are –

(i)(a). a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any

proceedings for civil contempt ;

(b). the court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate -General or with

his consent in writing from any other person or a specified Law Officer or a Court

subordinate to High Court

(ii)(a) the court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against,

or

(b) the court may issue notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause why

the proceedings for contempt be not initiated

(iii) the court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against calling

upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt.

In the cases contemplated by (i) or )ii_ it cannot be said that any proceedings for

contempt have been initiated. It is only when the court has found an opinion that a prima facie

case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out ad that the respondents or the alleged

contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished then the court

can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt; Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal, AIR

2000 SC 1136.

(ii) Initiation of any proceedings for contempt is barred after the expiry of a period of

one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed; V.M. Kanade

Vs. Madhao Gadkari, (1990) 1 Mahh LR 544 (Bom.).

(iii) No intervening event or order stops the running of time specified in this section

Golcha Advertising Agency Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 Bom. CR 262 (Bom.).

(iv) Delay in initiating contempt proceedings cannot be condoned; T.M.A. Abdul

Hamed Vs. S. Radhakrishnan, 1989LW (Cri) 237.”

U-2. Detail of judgments and their relevant extracts as given in the AIR Manual

1. “Dineshbhai A. Parikh Vs. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society Nagarvel,

Ahmedabad and others, AIR 1980 Guj. 194”(D.B.) (1.7.1980)(Available)

Note : This judgment has been overruled.

2. “Firm Ganpat Ram Raj Kumar Vs. Kalu Ram, AIR 1989 SC 2285 : 1989 Supp. (1)

SCR 223”

Note: As per the above referred judgment, in a case of continuing wrong, S. 20 of CCA is

not applicable.

(i) Head Note (B) of the above referred AIR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20- Limitation- Order of eviction- Contempt consisting

of act of not giving possession by force of order of temporary injunction obtained in another suit-

Held, failure to give possession if it amounts to contempt in facts of case was continuing wrong

to which S. 20 was not applicable.”


“Another point, was taken about limitation of this application under S. 20 of the Act. S. 20 states

that no courts shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise,

after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have

been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3 rd November, 1988

as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt consisted, inter alia,

of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Sr. Sub Judge,

Narnaul dated 3 rd November, 1988. Therefore, the application was well within the period of

one year. FAILURE TO GIVE POSSESSION, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of

this nature IS A CONTINUING WRONG. THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR

APPLICATION OF S. 20 OF THE ACT.”

(iii) Para 19 of the judgment reported as “Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, AIR 2001

SC 2763 (A three Judge Bench Decision ) pertaining to the above referred judgment :-

:-

“In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram, 1989 Supp (1) SCR 223 : (AIR 1989 SC 2285)

where an order of this Court ordering delivering of premises had not been complied with, an

application was filed for initiation of contempt proceedings, “A contempt was raised on behalf

of the alleged Contemner based on Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Dealing with

this contention, this Court observed as follows (Para 7 of AIR ) :

“Another point was taken about limitation of this application under section 20 of the Act,

Section 20 stats that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own

motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt

is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on/or about 3 rd

Nov., 1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt considered,

inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Sr. Sub

Judge, Narnaul dated 12th Feb., 1988. therefore, the application was well within the period of

one year. Failure to give possession if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a

continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of S. 20 of the Act.”

(iv) Para 20 of the above referred judgment reported as “Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and

others, AIR 2001 SC 2763 (A three Judge Bench Decision ) pertaining to the above referred

judgment :-

“The abovementioned observations indicate that the contention based o Section 20 was not

accepted for two reasons firstly that application for initiating action for contempt was filed

within one year of the date when the contempt was alleged to have been committed and secondly

failure to give possession amounted to continuing wrong and, therefore, there was no scope for

application of Section 20 of the Act. This case is important for the reason that the Court

regarded the filing of the application for initiating contempt proceedings as the relevant date

from the point of view of limitation.”

3 “Engg. Projects (I) Ltd Vs. I.D. Ganeriwala, 1990 RLR 180” (Delhi) (22.2.1990) (Available)

(i) Head Note of the above referred RLR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Ss. 11, 12 & 20. If a person obtains a favourable interim order

on a condition and does not fulfill the condition, then he is guilty for disobeying or non-

compliance of orders of Court. A petitioner in such a case is not an applicant but only an

informant and hence limitation of one year U/S 20 is not applicable. There was no terminus quo

for complying with condition and disobedience continued. It seems contemner had never any

intention to obey order of Court. If apology is not bonafide it cannot be accepted to help

contemner escape action.

4. “Yogesh P. Sukhanandi Vs. State of Gujrat and Others, 1997 Cri L.J. 497” (21.11.1995)(Gujrat High Court) (Available)

(a) Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri L.J. :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971) S. 13- Contempts not punishable-Party obtaining

favourable order of court by suppressing material facts within exclusive knowledge of him---

Contempt of that order-Contempt jurisdiction would not be exercised in favour of him.”

(b) Para 2 of the above referred judgment :-

“We are of the view that jurisdiction under Contempt of Courts Act should not be exercised in

favour of the persons who have no regard for the truth. If the order is obtained by suppressing

material facts, the party concerned will hesitate to enforce that order and we it is brought to the

notice of this Court that in fact and in substance the said order came to be passed on suppression

of material facts which were within the exclusive knowledge of the petitioner, tis Court should

refuse to exercise jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act. so is the case in these

applications.”

(c ) Relevant extracts of para 3 of the above referred judgment :-

“In view of the affidavit in reply, it is clear that the following facts were suppressed by the

petitioner and is the petitioner would have disclosed these facts, no court have passed the order

which is sought to be enforced by action under the Contempt of Courts Act ----.”

(d) Para 4 of the above referred judgment :-

“The above fact5s were within the personal knowledge of the petitioner. These facts could not

be within the knowledge of the respondents and if these were within the knowledge of the

respondents they ought to have disclosed the same when the ord3er came to be passed in the

main petition. For due administration of justice duty is cast on all the parties concerned to tell

the truth before the Court and disclose all the facts relevant to the case, if the same is within their

knowledge. Principle of burden of proof also coveys that it is the duty of all the parties to bring

the truth before the Court if same is within their knowledge. In the instant case, the petitioner

has suppressed relevant facts and it can be said that he has obtained relevant facts and it can be

said that he has obtained favourable order by suppressing material facts. This court, in these

facts and circumstances of the case, would not like to exercise its contempt jurisdiction.”

5. “Sandeep Chandra Vs. Vice-Admiral Subhash C. Chopra (RTD) & Ors., 76 (1998)

DLT 776” (DB) (28.8.1998) (available)

6. “Pathan Nawabkhan Vs. Dr. Liyakatalikhan and others, 2000 Cri L.J.

1237”(23.9.1999) (available)

Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant.

7. “Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal and another, AIR 2000 SC 1136” (22.2.2000)

(Available)


“Section 20 of the Act reads as under :-

“20. Limitation for actions for contempt- No Court shall INITIATE any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, AFTER THE EXPIRY OF A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONTEMPT IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20 – Limitation for action for Contempt –

Expression ‘initiate any proceedings for Contempt’-Connotation –Proceedings can be said

to be initiated –NOT ON RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR TAKING ACTION- NOT ON

ISSUE OF NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN –

BUT WHEN NOTICE IS ISSUED TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CONTEMNOR SHOULD

NOT BE PUNISHED.--------.”

(iii ) Head Note (D) of the above referred AIR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20- Limitation for action for contempt-S. 20 strikes at

jurisdiction of Court- Does not provide limitation in sense understood in limitation Act- S. 5 of

Limitation Act does not apply. Limitation Act (36 of 1963), S.5

8. “Devi Kishan Vs. Madan Lal Verma, 2000 Cri. L.J. 3619” (29.5.2000) (available)

Note : This judgment has been overruled.

9 “T. Sudhakar Prasad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) 1 SCC 516 : 2000

AIR SCW 4611” 13.12.2000 ( available) (Three Judge Bench Decision)

(i) Head Note (C ) of the above referred judgment reported in the above referred SCC :-

“Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 215- Jurisdiction and power of Supreme Court and High

Court under – Nature of –Restated – Power to punish for contempt of themselves, held, is an

inherent and inalienable one and has not been originally conferred by Arts. 129 & 215 but has

been recognized therein –This power cannot be curtailed by law and is governed only by

principles of natural justice –further held, provisions of contempt of courts Act, 1971 are in

addition to, and not in derogation of articles 129 & 215-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 S. 22.”

(ii) Para 9 of the above referred judgment as reported in the above referred SCC :-

“Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India declare the Supreme Court and every High

Court to be a court of record having all the powers of such a court including the power to punish

for contempt of itself. These articles do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme

Court and the High Court. They merely recognize a preexisting situation that the Supreme Court

and the High Courts are courts of record and by virtue of being courts of record have inherent

jurisdiction to punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power to punish for contempt is

summary. It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles

of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It

cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the

constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and

not in derogation of Articles 129 & 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of

jurisdiction contemplated by the said two articles.”

Note : The above quoted observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have been re-iterated by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs.

Sukumar Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60” as is evident from the relevant extract of the following

paras of the said judgment :-

(i) Relevant extract of para 59 of the said judgment reported as Shyamal Krishana

Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60 :-

“Recently in another case the Supreme Court again considered the width of contempt jurisdiction

of the High Court in the context of Art. 215 of the Constitution in the case of T. Sudhakar

Prasad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2001) 1 SCC 516 : (2000) AIR SCW

4611. In this decision, the supreme court considered the constitution bench judgment in

Supreme Court Bar Association (AIR 1998 SC 1895) (Supra). After considering the said

judgment, the Supreme Court has held in para 9 that under article 215 of the Constitution no new

jurisdiction or states is conferred in the High Court. It merely recognized the pre-existing

situation. It also held that such inherent power of punishment for contempt is summary and

further went on to held as follows :-

“ It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles of natural

justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be

taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the constitution.

The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or

regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two articles.”

(ii) Para 83 of the said judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar

Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60”

:-

“It may be noted that subsequently a Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar

Prasad (2000 AIR SCW 4611) (Supra) accepted the consistent view of the Supreme Court as

noted above and the Court has take note of its judgment in the case of Supreme Court Bar

Association (AIR 1998 SC 1895) (Supra). But in the previous Two Judge Bench judgment in

Om Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1700) (SC) (Supra) this aspect of the matter was unfortunately not

brought to the notice of the Apex Court, Therefore, the subsequent judgment of the larger

Bench, in T. Sudhakar Prasad (Supra) which is in accord with the consistent views of Supreme

Court right from 1954 may be taken to the binding precedent on this aspect.

(iii) Para 84 of the said judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar


:-

“In Om Prakash (supra) the observations to the effect that “Section 20 strikes at the root of the

Court to initiate any proceeding of the contempt” and the further interpretation that where

proceeding has not been initiated within one year the “jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding for

contempt is lost” have been made without consideration of the previous judgments of the

Supreme Court in the context of High Court’s contempt jurisdiction under Article 215 of the

Constitution. Therefore, those observations in Om Prasad (supra) on interpretation of section 20

of CCA 71, with great respect, do not have the binding nature of precedent, especially in view of

its subsequent larger Bench Judgment in the case. T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra). The observations

in Om Prasad (Supra) may be confined to the facts of that case since interpretation on High

Court’s jurisdiction in contempt was made without reference to Article 215 of Constitution or te

law laid down by the Supreme Court on this point.

(iv) Para 88 of the said judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar


:-

“It is clear in this case that the decision of Supreme Court in Om Prakash on the jurisdiction of

High Court vis-à-vis section 20 of the CCA was not rendered after considering the effect of

Article 215 on the power of a high Court as a Court of Record in matters of contempt

jurisdiction. In the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court of a larger Bench it has held that the

provisions of CCA cannot limit or regulate the exercise of contempt jurisdiction of a High Court

under Article 215. Therefore, the decision in Om Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1700) (SC) (Supra)

must yield to the subsequent well considered and larger Bench decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad

(2000 AIR SCW 4611) (Supra).”

10 “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60”

(27.7.2001)(Available)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri L.J. :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 20, 23 – Constitution of India, Art. 215 – Contempt

jurisdiction- Is inherent in High Court and recognized as such under Art. 215 of Constitution-

Not to be truncated and circumscribed by narrow interpretation of S. 20 – S. 20 operates as guide

in exercise of discretion of High Court contempt jurisdiction- It cannot inhibit or prohibit

exercise of jurisdiction of High Court.”


“So except the aforesaid limited area pointed out above, the Supreme Court did not overrule the

other aspect of the law laid down “in Re : Vinay Chandra Mishra (supra). In fact, the Supreme

Court did not interfere with the other punishment of suspended sentence of imprisonment

imposed ‘In Re : Vinay Chandra Mishra’(supra).”


“The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, relied on various judgments of different

High Courts in order to contend that bar created under Section 20 of the CCA must operate

regardless of the Constitutional provision under Article 215. ---.”


“The learned Counsel for the petitioner Court in the case of Sarladevi Parbati Kumari Rungta Vs.

Shiba Prosad Rungta, reported in 1988 Cri LJ 558. In that case, the learned Judge held that the

order in respect of which the contempt proceeding was initiated was an order for payment of

maintenance during the pendency of the appeal. The learned Judge held that such payment of

maintenance has to be given every month and on-payment is a recurring cause for contempt. In

view of such recurring causes, the proceedings for contempt are not barred by limitation under

Section 20 of CCA.”


“Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganpat Ram Raj

Kumar Vs. Kaluram, AIR 1989 SC 2285 where the learned Judges held in para 7 of the

Judgment that the case of contempt consisted of acts of not giving possession. The learned

Judges held that failure to give possession being the alleged act of contempt it is a case of

continuous wrong. Therefore, there is no scope for application of Section 20 of the Act.”


“Relying on those two judgments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that in the instant

case the failure on the part of the respondent to pay the petitioner his pay for the period in

question is a continuing wrong inasmuch as for such failure to pay the petitioner his due pay

scale has not been fixed and the petitioner is suffering every month for this. So the alleged

contempt committed by the respondent being a continuing wrong, section 20 cannot be applied.

There is ample substance in this contention but because of the view which this Court is taking I

this matter, no finding is given on this aspect of this matter.”


“In the Indian context in view of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court which has been

pointed out above and which binds all Courts in India, this Court respectfully and humbly is of

the view that interpretation of section 20 of CCA in Om Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1700) (SC)

(Supra) is perhaps not in consonance with the consistent declaration of law by the Supreme

Court about the nature of Contempt jurisdiction of the High Court. In fact, the nature of

contempt jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of Article 215 was unfortunately not at all

brought to the notice of the Apex Court in Om Prakash (Supra).”


“It may be noted that subsequently a Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar

Prasad (2000 AIR SCW 4611) (supra) accepted the consistent view of the Supreme Court as

noted above and the Court had taken note of its judgment in the case of Supreme Court Bar

Association (AIR 1998 SC 1895) (Supra). But I the previous Two Judge Bench judgment in Om

Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1700) (SC) (supra) this aspect of the matter was unfortunately not brought

to the notice of the Apex Court. Therefore, the subsequent judgment of the larger bench, in T.

Sudhakar Prasad (supra) which is in accord with the consistent views of Supreme Court right

from 1954 may be taken to be the binding precedent on this aspect.”


“It has been settled authoritatively by the Hon’ble Supreme Court more than once that when a

finding is reached without argument and without consideration of the previous judgments of the

Supreme Court such a finding does not have the binding nature of the precedent. Reference in

this connection may be made of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of M/S Goodyear

India Ltd Vs. State of Haryana Judges held a decision on a question which has not been argued

cannot be treated as a precedent.”


It is clear in this case that the decision of Supreme Court in Om Prakash on the jurisdiction of

High Court vis-à-vis section 20 of the CCA was not rendered after considering the effect of

Article 215 on the power of a High Court as Court of record in matters of contempt jurisdiction.

In the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court of a larger Bench it has held that the provisions of

CCA cannot limit or regulate the exercise of contempt jurisdiction of a High Court under Article

215. Therefore, the decision in Om Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1799) (SC) (supra) must yield to the

subsequent well considered and larger Bench decision I n T. Sudhakar Prasad (2000 AIR SCW

4611 (supra).”


“So, in my considered view, in exercising the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court, th

learned Judges, will follow the same principle of not entertaining causes which are belated and

where it is clear that the persons invoking Court’s jurisdiction are guilty of laches which has not

bee explained. But any interpretation which robs of the High Court of its inherent jurisdiction to

act as a Courts of Record to punish a contempt of its own order after a certain time, even though

the petition was presented in time would have the effect of denuding the effectiveness of the

remedy not only under Article 215 but also under Article 226.”

(xii) Para 99 of the above referred judgment :-

“For the aforesaid view which this Court has taken on interpretation of Section 20 of CCA, this

Court is of the opinion that section 20 of CCA has not been correctly interpreted in the following

cases ad the ratio of the following decisions is not approved : (a) Hari Nandan Agarwal Vs. S.N.

Padita, reported in AIR 1975 All 48, (b) Gulab Singh Vs. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das, reported

in AIR 1975 All 366 (c ) Dineshbhai A. Parikh Vs Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society

reported in AIR 1980 Guj. 194 and (d) N. Venkataramanappa Vs. D.K. Nikar, reported in AIR

1978 Kant 57 : (1978 Cri LJ 726). This court, however, approves the decision of a learned

Single Judge of this Court rendered in the case of Begunkodar High School Vs. Samarendra

Bondopadhyay reported I (1996) 2 Cal. LJ 349 and also approves the decisions of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court in the case of Nallamal Vekateshwara Rao Vs. P. Prabhakar reported in

(1997) 6 Andh LT 718 and the Full Bench judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of A.

Mayilswami Vs. State of Kerala reported in 1995 Cri LJ 3830.”

11. “Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, AIR 2001 SC 2763 : 2001 Cri. L.J. 4175”

(10.8.2001)(A three Judge Bench Decision ) (AIR and Cri. L.J., both available)

Note : In the case of civil contempt, proceedings normally commence with a person aggrieved

bringing to the notice of the court the willful disobedience of any judgment, decree etc which

could amount to the commission of offence by filing application in this regard within a period of

one year from the date of commission of alleged contempt. But in the case of criminal contempt

of subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the

Subordinate Court or on a motion made by the advocate general or the Law Officer of the

Central Govt. in the case of Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably

commence on an application being filed by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the

advocate-general if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. When the judicial

procedure requires an application being filed either before the Court or consent being sought by a

person from the advocate-general or a Law Officer, it must logically follow that proceedings for

contempt are initiated when the applications are made thus, in the case of civil contempt or

criminal contempt, application must be moved within a period of one year from the date of

commission of alleged contempt as per paras 38 & 39 of the above referred judgment.

Besides that, as per the above referred judgment, OBITER DICTA IS NOT

BINDING UPON A COURT .


“Constitution of India, Arts. 215 – 129- Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20-Supreme

Court and High Court –Constitutional power to punish for contempt- Law prescribing period for

initiation of contempt proceeding- cannot be taken to abrogate constitutional powers-------

Om Prakash Vs. D.K. Mittal, 2000 AIR SCW 722, Overruled.

Observation in AIR 1974 SC 2255, Held obiter. (Para 18)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.

Section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It

applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme

Court but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the Subordinate Court . The

procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different. Section 20 as framed is

not happily worded. The heading of the section, however, indicates what it was to provide for

“Limitation for actions for contempt.” The wording of the sections are negative but it is clear

that terminus ad quem is the initiation of proceedings for contempt. The crucial question that

arises is as to how or when are the proceedings for contempt initiated.

In the case of criminal contempt of subordinate Court, the High Court may take

action on a reference made to it by the subordinate Court or on a motion made by the

Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of Union

Territory. THIS REFERENCE OR MOTION CAN CONCEIVABLY COMMENCE ON

AN APPLICATION BEING FILED BY A PERSON whereupon the subordinate court or

the advocate-general if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the high court. Proceedings

for civil contempt normally commence wit a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court

the willful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount to the

commission of the offence. The attention of the Court is drawn to such a contempt being

committed ONLY BY A PERSON FILING AN APPLICATION IN THAT BEHALF. In

other words, unless a Court was to take a suo motu action, the proceeding under the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the

attention of the Court to the contempt having been committed. When the judicial procedure

requires an application being filed either before the Court or consent being sought by a person

from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer it must logically follow that PROCEEDING FOR

CONTEMPT ARE INITIATED WHEN THE APPLICATION ARE MADE.(Paras 33, 34 &

39)

One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act

diligently and not sleep over its rights. -------The proper construction therefore to be placed o

section 20 must be that ACTION MUST BE INITIATED, EITHER BY FILING OF AN

APPLICATION OR BY THE COURT ISSUING NOTICE SUO MOTU, WITHIN A

PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONTEMPT IS

ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.” (Paras 41, 42 & 44)

(ii) Head Note (B) of the above referred AIR :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20- Limitation Act (36 of 1963), S. 17- Action for

contempt- Limitation-Contemnor restrained by Court from alienating, transferring etc. of his

assets- Found to have set up benami companies ad transferred his assets despite restraint order –

Fraud perpetrated by contemnor revealed in Income –tax raid conducted 3 years after

restraint order- Application for initiating contempt proceedings filed immediately on

becoming aware of fraud- Section 17 of Limitation Act applies- Initiation of contempt

proceedings is well wetter limitation under S. 20.”(Para 48)

(iii ) Head Note (C ) of the above referred AIR :-

“Limitation Act (36 of 1963), S. 17- Limitation-Running of –In cases of fraud-Provision

embodies fundamental principle of justice and equity.” (Para 47)


“Sections 20 and 22, with which we are concerned in the present case, read as follows :-

“20. Limitation for actions for contempt. No Court shall initiate any proceedings for

contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the

date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

22. Act to be in addition to and not I derogation of, other laws relating to contempt.

The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any

other law relating to contempt of Courts.”


“-----Reliance was placed by Mr. Venugopal on a decision in Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Mr.

Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court (1975)3 SCC 535 : (AIR

1974 SC 2233) : 1975 Cri LJ 1 and it was contended that it was held in this section that section

20 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 provided a period of limitation by saying that no court

shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry

of a period of one year from the date of on which the contempt is alleged to have been

committed. In Baradakanta Mishra’s case (supra) the appellant had filed an application before

the High Court for initiating contempt proceeding against the Chief Justice and other Judges in

their personal capacity. Full Bench of three Judges were of the opinion that no contempt of

court had been committed and the application was rejected. The appellant then purported to

avail the right of appeal U/S 19(1) of the Act and filed an appeal in this court. A

preliminary objection was taken by the state against the maintainability of the appeal on

the ground that where the High Court had not initiated proceedings ad had refused to take

action, no appeal as of right would be lie U/S 19(1). THIS WAS ONLY ISSUE WHICH

AROSE FOR CONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT IN BARADAKANTA MISHRA’S

CASE and this court upheld the preliminary objection and held that no appeal U/S 19(1) was

maintainable. It is no doubt true that during the course of discussion reference was made two

sections 15, 17 & 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 BUT THIS COURT WAS IN THAT

CASE NOT CALLED UPON TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE PROVISIONS OF

THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT VIS-À-VIS INHERENT POWERS OF THE HIGH

COURT TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT. No reference is made in the judgment to Art. 129

or Art. 215 of the constitution. FURTHER MORE, INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 20

WAS NOT AN ISSUE AND NO QUESTION OF LIMITATION AROSE THEREIN.

Under the circumstances, we hold that the observations made by this court with reference

to section 20 WERE IN THE NATURE OF OBITER DICTA AND NOT BINDING ON

THIS COURT IN THE PRESENT CASE. In any case, Baradakanta Mishra’s case decision

does not specifically deal with the question as to when or how proceedings for contempt are

initiated for the purposes of section 20and or has it considered the applicability of the provisions

of the limitation act to which we shall presently refer.”


“The rules so framed by all the courts in India do show that proceedings are initiated inter alia

with the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf. IF, HOWEVER, PROCEEDINGS

ARE NOT INITIATED BY FILING OF AN APPLICATION WITHIN A PERIOD OF

ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONTEMPT IS ALLEGED TO

HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, THEN THE COURT SHALL NOT HAVE JURISDICTION

TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT. If , on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by

the filing of an application in the case of Civil Contempt like the present before the Court within

the period of limitation then the provisions of section 20 will not stand in the way of the court

exercising its jurisdiction.”


“In the case of criminal contempt of subordinate Court, the High Court may take action

ON A REFERENCE MADE TO IT BY THE SUBORDINATE COURT or on a motion

made by the Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case

of Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably commence on an application

being filed by a person whereupon the subordinate Court or the Advocate-General if it is so

satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil contempt normally

commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court the willful disobedience

of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount to the commission of the offence. The

attention of the Court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a person filing an

application in that behalf. In other words, unless a Court was to take a suo motu action, the

proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing

of an application drawing to the attention of the Court to the contempt having been committed.

When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed either before the Court or

consent being sought by a person from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer, it must

logically follow that PROCEEDING FOR CONTEMPT ARE INITIATED WHEN THE

APPLICATIONS ARE MADE.”


“The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (2000 AIR SCW 722 : AIR 2000 SC 1136 : 2000

Cri LJ 1700) (supra), to the effect that initiation of proceedings under section 20 can only be said

to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been

committed and issued notice to the Contemner to show cause why it should not be punished, is

taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only

going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be

interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a

contempt of a subordinate Court I committed a report is prepared whether on an application to

Court or otherwise and reference made by the subordinate Court to the High Court. It is only

thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. I the process, more often

than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash

Jaiswal’s case (supra) is correct, if would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate Court

and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the high Court

would become powerless to take ay action. O the other hand if the filing of an application before

the subordinate Court or the High Court making a reference by a subordinate Court in ow motion

or the filing an application therefore an Advocate-General for permission initiate contempt

proceedings is regarded initiation by the Court for the purposes Section 10, then such an

interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for

contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts, Act, 1971 is enshrined in Art. 215 of the

Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section wit the powers

of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognized by the Constitution.”

(ix) Relevant extract of para 43 of the above referred judgment :-

“A question arose before a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of

Manjit Singh Vs. Darshan Singh 1984 Cri LJ 301 with regard to the application of section

20 to the proceedings of Criminal Contempt. ------- The Court then proceeded to observe

in paras 13 and 19 as follows :

“13. Once that is so, one must now proceed to analyse and construe S. 20

independently. A plain reading thereof would indicate that the legislature drew a clear line of

distinction betwixt proceedings for contempt initiated by the Court on its own motion and those

not so done. Suo motu action by the High Court is thus clearly a class by itself. Consequently

the statute in express terms refers to these two classes separately namely, any proceedings

for contempt on COURT’S OWN MOTION, and proceedings for contempt initiated

“OTHERWISE”. The use of the word ‘otherwise’ is significant and indeed provides the

clue to be the true interpretation of Section 20. Therefore, initiation of contempt

proceedings otherwise than on Court’s own motion would include within its sweep

a motion by the Advocate General,

a reference by a subordinate Court to the High Court to take action for contempt

and an application before the Advocate General seeking his consent by any other person

under S. 15

and lastly in cases of civil contempt the motion by a private litigant directly in the Court.

“19. To finally conclude it must be held that the terminus a quo for limitation begins

under Section 20 of the Act on the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been

committed. The terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would necessarily vary

and be related to the modes of taking cognizance thereof provided for in S. 15.

In cases where it is initiated on the Court’s own motion, it would necessarily be

from the issuance of the notice for contempt by the Court.

In case of a motion by the Advocate General under Section 15(1)(a), the

proceedings would initiate from the date of the filing of such a motion in the High Court.

Where any other person moves the Advocate General for his consent in writing as

prescribed in S. 15(1)(b), the initiation of proceedings would be with effect from the date of

such application.

Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate Court on a reference made

by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is

made.”


“Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the

Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court’s own motion. THE MODE OF

INITIATION IN EACH CASE WOULD NECESSARILY BE DIFFERENT. While in the

case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice .

IN OTHER CASES INITIATION CAN ONLY BE BY A PARTY FILING AN

APPLICATION. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on section 20

must be that ACTION MUST BE INITIATED, EITHER BY FILING OF AN

APPLICATION OR BY THE COURT ISSUING NOTICE SUO MOTU, WITHIN A

PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONTEMPT IS

ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.”

12. “Ratan Chandra Sharma and Another Vs. Kumari Sheetal Sharma and others,

2003 CRI. L.J. 740” (21.8.2002) (Karnataka High Court) (Available)

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri LJ :-

“Constitution of India, Art. 215- Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 10, 15- Motion of

criminal contempt of subordinate court- By private party-Consent of Advocate General is

necessary-Consent has to accompany motion-Subsequently obtained consent- Is of no

significance.

The contempt of court alleged in the instant case is that the contemners are in the habit of

filing suit after suit just to frustrate the decrees obtained by the complainant from the Apex Court

and High Court ----. It is undisputed that the party who moved the motion in this contempt

petition is a private party falling under clause (b) of section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act.

It was a motion made by the complainants without obtaining the consent of the advocate

general in writing for contempt of court.---The complainant has prayed High Court to punish

the accused by invoking the powers of the High Court U/S 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act for

committing Contempts of Subordinate Courts. SECTION 10 OF THE ACT PROVIDES FOR

PUNISHING THE ACCUSED FOR COMMITTING CONTEMPT ON SUBORDINATE

COURT. The procedure to initiate contempt action is provided U/S 15 of the Act. For a valid

motion, compliance of the requirement of section 15 of the Contempt Court Act is

mandatory ---. The plea that complainant have obtained the consent of the advocate general as

directed by the Court and hence, complied with the office objections and, therefore, compliance

of section 15 (1)(b) is made by the complainant and the petition is perfectly maintainable is not

tenable. Subsequent obtaining of the consent does not cure the initial defect so as to convert

the incompetent motion into maintainable petition. The contempt petition fails for want of

consent of Advocate General in writing as contemplated U/S 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act.”

(ii) Head Note (B) of the above Cri LJ :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 15- Motion for criminal contempt of subordinate

Court- Consent of Advocate General asked by private party-Refused –High Court as yet has

discretion to take suo motu cognizance- However, the Court should exercise this power

sparingly.”

(iii) Head Note (C ) of the above referred Cri LJ :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20- Motion for contempt-Limitation- S. 20 fixing

period of limitation- Does not apply to case of continuing offence.”

(iv) Para 21 of the above referred Cri LJ :-

“Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for limitation for actions or contempt.

It reads as follows :

“No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or

otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged

to have bee committed.:”

The provisions, admittedly are not applicable in a case of continuing offence. It is the

specific contention of the learned counsel for the complainants that this is a case of continuing

offence. The very fact that the first accused has challenged the or5fer of the court below which

vacated the stay order inn O.S. No. 7206/98 and challenged the stay order in Misc. Appeal No.

4226/01 on the file of this Court in the year 2001shows that it is a case of continuing offence and

therefore, there is no delay in fling this contempt petition. There is no satisfactory counter

argument offered on behalf of the respondents. We are satisfied that there is no delay in filing

the complaint and the petition does not suffer for want of limitation. We therefore, reject the

contention of the learned counsel for the respondents and answer point No. 2 ccordingly.”

13 “Court on its own motion Vs. Kuldip Singh, 2003 Cri L.J. 4483” (D.B.) (Punjab &

Haryana High Court) (30.5.2003) (Available)

(a) Head Note (B) of the above referred Cri L.J. :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20- Contempt proceedings-Initiation of –Limitation-

Contemner produced interpolated order dated 9.1.1998 before authorities on 21.2.1998-

Contempt proceedings initiated against him on filing written statement on 13.7.1998 – Held,

were initiated within period stipulated under Section 20.”

(b) Head Note (C ) of the above referred Cr. L.J. :-

“Constitution of India, Art. 215- Contempt proceedings-Initiation of by High Court in exercise of

powers under Art. 215- Limitation provided U/S 20 of Contempt of Courts Act- Would not be

applicable.”

(c ) Head Note (E) of the above refereed Cri. L.J. :-

“Constitution of India, Art. 215- Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 12- Contempt of

Court- Punishment –Petitioner, Contemner interpolated order of High Court-Authority before

whom interpolated order was produced acted on bonafide belief that order had been passed by

High Court- Such reprehensible conduct of contemner cannot be excused by High Court –At no

stage, contemner expressed any remorse at his reprehensible behaviour-Counsel for contemner

made offer of apology only at end of arguments- Thus, apology tendered by contemner would be

liable to be rejected- Contemner sentenced to undergo one month R. 1 and to pay a fine of Rs.

2000/-.”

14 “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004)







not be maintainable


“For determination of the main issue in these appeals---------, it is necessary to briefly note the

object of power of the court to punish a person for contempt.”

(iii) Para 7 of the above referred judgment ;-

“Every High Court besides powers under the act has also the power to punish for contempt as

provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India. ----. The Act lays down ‘contempt of Court’

to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt. We are concerned with criminal contempt.

‘Criminal; contempt’ is defined in section 2 (c ) of the act. It, inter alia means the











(e) the Advocate – General, or

(f) any other person, with the consent in writing of the advocate general













aggrieved, not being the Advocate General can the High Court refused to



such a situation, a discretion to refused to entertain the petition, or to take


that petition.”




















15 “P. Damodaran Vs. Cherkalam Abdulla and Ors., AIR 2007 Kerala 153 ”(7.3.2007)

(F.B.) (Kerala) (Available)

(a) Head Note of the above referred judgment :-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 20, 2(b)-Civil Contempt-Limitation prescribed U/S 20

for initiation of proceedings-Aggrieved party should file application within 1 year of date of

contempt-Date of application will be considered as date on which contempt proceedings were

initiated-petitioner filed application within1 month from date of contempt-Court delaying posting

of case for more than 4 years for no fault of petitioner- Maxim ‘Actus curiae neminem gravabit’,

applies-Petition not barred by limitation.”

(b) Para 3 of the above referred judgment :-

“In this case, petitioner filed the application to bring to the notice of the Court regarding the

alleged contempt in time, i.e. within one month of the alleged date of incident. At the time of

filing the application, correct address of the first respondent was given, but, this Court delayed

in posting the case and by the undue delay in posting the case by the Court for no fault of the

petitioner, they cannot suffer. The maxim ‘Actus curiae neminem gravabit’ – an act of the Court

shall prejudice no man –is well accepted in Indian jurisprudence as held by the Apex Court in

Rajesh D. Darbar V. Narsingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni (2003) 7 SCC 219 and South Eastern

Coalifields Ltd Vs. State of M.P. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : (AIR 2003 SC 4482). In any event, in

view of the Apex Court’s decision in Pallav Sheth’s case (Supra) that action is initiated on the

date of filing of the complaint, we are of the view that this contempt petition cannot be closed as

barred by limitation.”

U-3. Commentary on section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as given in the book

titled “Iyer’s Law on Contempt of Courts” 4 th Edition published by Delhi Law House.

1. Scope – Article 215 no doubt empowers every High Court to punish contempt of Court

subordinate to it, but the Contempt of Courts Act lays down how that power has to be exercised.

Article 215 of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act have to be

read together. The High Court cannot take cognizance even of contempt of itself if the period of

one year has already elapsed. (Harphool Singh Vs. Ranbir Singh, 1980 A. Cr.R. 339 at pp. 339,

340; see also, High Court of Karnataka Vs. Y.K. Subbanna, 1990 (1) Cr.L.C. 281 at pp. 297,

298, 299, 300, 301 ; Ram Dhyan Ram Yadav Vs. State of U.P., 1990 U.P.L.B.E.C. 94 at p. 99;

V.M. Kanade Vs. Madhav Gadkari, 1990 Cr.L.J. 190 at pp. 193, 194 (Bom.) ; Om Prakash

Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal, 1990 All. L.J. 116 at p. 120.)

2. Contempt committed during earlier law, if can be initiated with the force of new law –

3. Recurring cause of action – It is true that action for contempt of Court must be taken

within one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The

payment of maintenance during the pendency of appeal has to be made every month and non-

payment thereof by respondent No. 1 is the recurring cause for the contempt and the appeal is

still pending and Respondent No. 1 is refusing to pay any amount towards the maintenance

though specifically ordered by this Court. Therefore, the present proceedings for contempt, are

not barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. (Sarladevi

Bharatkumar Rungta Vs. Bharathhkumar Shivprasad Rungta, 1988 Cr. L.J. 558 at p. 564 (Bom.).

It is an obligation on the part of the respondent-husband to pay the amounts, one for the

petitioner-wife and the other for the minor daughter, on the stipulated time-frame of every month

till the date of disposal of the petition. This would definitely go to show that the orders are in the

nature of imposing recurring obligation on the part of the respondent-husband till the

proceedings are decided by the trial Court. Any default to make the payment, in terms of the

above said order, can definitely be said to be a continuing wrong. It cannot, therefore, be urged

that the contempt proceedings would be barred under Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,

1971. (Lopaben Patel Vs. Hitendra R. Patel, 1999 (2) Guj, L.R. 1616 : at P. 1626 : 2000 Cr. L.J.

2709 at p. 2716 (Guj.).

Starting point of limitation is the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been

committed and not date of knowledge of complaint. As was held in . Venkataramanppa Vs. D.K.

Nikar (AIR 1978 Karnataka 57) and Romesh Kumar Vs. Bhagwan Das Ahuja { (1986) 89 P.L.R.

493 at p. 494 (Petitioner & H) }.

No contempt proceedings ca be initiated by the Court after expiry of the period of one

year from the date of alleged commission of contempt. If an application for taking action under

the Contempt of Courts Act is filed within the period of one year from the date of alleged

commission of the contempt but the Court has not initiated proceeding before the expiry of one

year from such date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the Court is

barred. In the instant case, the application for initiating proceedings for civil contempt has been

filed well within time yet as proceedings for civil contempt have not been initiated within a

period of one year from the date of the commission of the contempt, it is not possible to initiate

proceedings, thereafter. (Kishan Lal Vs. Chhotey Lal, 1987 (13) All. L.R. 44 at p. 46.) Section

20 applies not only to those cases, where the Court takes action suo motu, but also where

contempt application is made after obtaining the permission of the Advocate-General. (Hari

Nandan Agrawal Vs. S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All. 48 at p. 52.)

The date on which the contempt can be alleged to be committed within the contemplation

of Sec. 20 of the Act that has to be reckoned from the time when the Court becomes aware of the

commission of its contempt and not from the date on which the act comprehended to be

contemptuous of the Court was committed by the contemner. (Sudesh Kumar Vs. Jai Narain,

1974 P.L.R. 23 at p. 126).

It is the duty of the person who institutes an action to satisfy the Court that it is within

time. (Dineshbhai A. Parikh Vs. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad,

A.I.R. 1980 Guj. 194 at p. 197.)

It appears that on the unequivocal language of Sec. 20 itself as also on principle, the date

when time begins to run or the terminus a quo here is inflexibly fixed from the point on which

the criminal contempt is alleged to have been committed. This follows from the clear cut ad

plain grammatical construction of Sec. 20 itself. This apart, on principle also the terminus of

limitation has to be a fixed and precisely determinable one. Therefore, the actual awareness of

the Court of an act of criminal contempt would inevitably remain a fortuitous circumstance. For

limitation to run from a point of time so uncertain as the knowledge of the Court itself or when it

is brought to its notice, would introduce a double element of uncertainly for the start of the point

of limitation which would be contrary to sound principles of construction. On such a view, an

action for criminal contempt can be visualized many years after its actual commission because

factually it may be brought to the notice of the Court even after a decade. This, in essence,

would frustrate the very purpose of the Legislature in introducing a period of limitation. (Manjit

Singh Vs. Darshan Singh, 1984 Cr. L.J. 301 at p. 303, 304 (Petitioner & H). It was held in N.

Venkataramanappa Vs. D.K. Naikar. (AIR 1978 Kant. 57 at p. 60), it is not possible to accede to

the by Secalle of Sri Seshagiri Rao, Learned counsel appearing for the complainant, that it is the

date of knowledge of the contempt that is the starting point for the limitation prescribed by Sec.

20, and not the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Having regard to

the clear language employed in Sec. 20 of the Act, namely, “From the date on which the

contempt is alleged to have been committed” it is impossible to take the view that the date of

knowledge of the complaint has any relevance for the purpose of computing the period of

limitation.

4. Date of initiation of proceedings – The proceedings for civil contempt cannot be initiated

after the expiry of the period of one year from that date. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts

Act does not prescribe any limitation. It prohibits initiation of proceedings by High Court.

(Balbhadra Singh Vs. S.K. Viswad, 1987 A.L.J. 326 at p. 327 ; see also High Court of Karnataka

Vs. Y.K. Subbana, 1990 Cr.L.J. 1159 at pp. 1173, 1174 (Kant.) ; Golchha Advertising Agency

Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1990 (2) Bom. C.R. 262 at p. 265. T. Deen Dayal Vs. High Court of

Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3451 at p. 3455 : (1997) 3 S.C.J. 139 : 1997 Cr. L.J. 4080.)

The Apex Court held that action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely,

that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court’s motion.

The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo

motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases,

initiation can only be by a party fling an application. In their lordships, opinion, therefore, the

proper construction to be placed o Sec. 20 must be that action must be initiated either by filing of

an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date

on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. (Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian, AIR

2001 SC 2763 at p. 2777 : 2001 (4) Mh. L.J. 1 at p. 19 (S.C.) 2001 Cr. L.J. 4175 at 4189 (S.C.)

2001 (7) S.C.C. 549 at p. 572; see also Sabirabai Vs. Brobula Reddy, 2001 Cr. L.J. at p. 1288

(A.P.)

It would be the bounden duty of the Court to examine the question of limitation before

proceeding to take cognizance, much less initiate any action. That obligation clearly flows from

the mandate of Sec. 20 of the Act. moreover, even if the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963

were inapplicable to the contempt proceeding, but the principle underlying Sec. 3 of the

Limitation Act can be telescoped in the provisions of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act so

as to obligate the Court to decide the issue of limitation even if the same has not been

specifically set up by the respondent, having regard to the settled position that fundamentally

contempt is a matter between the Court and the Contemnor. (Earth Designers and Developers

Pvt. Ltd Vs. M.K. Patil, 2003 Cr. L.J. 3785 at p. 3790 (Bom.).

Section 20 of the Act does not intend to “abrogate” the powers under Art. 215, either

wholly or partially. The powers can be exercised in all their amplitude within the period of one

year prescribed in Sec. 20 of the Act. (Advocate General, A.P. Vs. A.V. Koteswara Rao, (1984)

2 Cr. L.J. 1171 at p. 1176 : 1984 (1) A.L.J. 69).

Initiation of the contempt proceedings is the time when the Court applies its mind to the

allegation in the petition and decides to direct, under Sec. 17 the alleged contemner to show

cause why he should not be punished. If the Court had not, within one year of the period limited

by Sec. 20, applied its mind nor decided to issue show cause notice to respondents, the petition

would be barred by time. (Kishan Singh Vs. H’onable Mr. Justice T. Anjaih, Chief Minister,

1985 Cr. L.J. 1428 at p. 1430 (A.P.)

The jurisdiction of the Court is that the court shall not initiate any proceedings for

contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiration of a period of one year from

the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. (Dineshbhai a. Parikh Vs.

Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad, AIR 1980 Guj. 194 at p. 199.)

There is no matter of doubt that the Court did not initiate proceeding for civil contempt

and did not call upon the respondents to show cause why they not be punished for having

committed civil Contempt of Court. It is very clear that the proceeding for contempt have not

been initiated has admittedly expired. (Ratan Singh Vs. Pheree, 1986 (2) Civil L.J. 560 at p. 562

(All.) : 1986 All. C.J. 471 at p. 472.)

The Court wanted respondents Nos. 1 to 5, to make their submissions and for that

purpose, in clearest possible words notices have been directed to be issued why the petition not

be admitted and why action for Contempt of Court be not taken against them. There is no

manner of doubt that on 3rd December, 1985, the Court did not initiate proceeding for civil

contempt and did not call upon the respondents to show cause why they not be punished for

having committed civil contempt of Court. It is very clear that the proceedings for contempt

have not been initiated so far and the period during which the proceedings could be initiated has

admittedly expired on 5th December, 1985. It is not possible to initiate proceedings after the

expiry of such period. (Ratan Singh Vs. Pheree, 1986 (2) Civil L.J. 560 at p. 562 (All.) : 1986

All. C.J. 471 at p. 472).

The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a

proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the

terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Sec. 20 is the date when a proceeding for

contempt is initiated by the Court. In the instant case, the Court has not yet decided to take

action for contempt against the Contemner and the proceedings have not yet been initiated and

the period during which such proceedings could be initiated has expired. It is not possible to

initiate proceedings thereafter. ( Smt Bano Vs. Ram Autar Gautam, 1987 Cr. L,J,. 647 at p. 649

(All.)

It is the Court which initiates the proceedings and the period of limitation under Sec. 20

of the Act is to be reckoned up to the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt by the Court

for the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Even if the applications

are considered to be under Art. 215 of the Constitution, still, for the purpose of limitation, they

will be governed by Sec. 20 of the Act and in this view of the matter also, the application for

taking action of the contempt were barred by limitation. (Manjit Singh Vs. Darshan Singh, 1984

Cr. L.J. 301 at p. 304 (F.B.).

The petitioners filed the present application within five months getting knowledge of the

undertaking given by the respondents in the said case. in such a situation, the proceedings

initiated against the respondents cannot be held to be barred by limitation in view of the law laid

down by the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian, ((2001) 7 SCC 549), wherein it has

been held that the period of limitation in a case like the present one has to be counted from the

date of knowledge. (Bank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC 360 at pp. 369-

70.

5. Whether initiation of proceeding start when court gives show cause notice to contemner –

6. Application of the Limitation Act –

7. Limitation – Contemner was asked to produce buses when called to do so –Time taken on

several occasion for the purpose –Limitation starts when for the last time the contemner fails to

produce the buses.

8. Limitation – Plea urging bar of limitation created by Sec. 20 of the Act, is also not

sustainable in the present case, because the obligation to keep the bank guarantees alive was

operative till the Court passed ay further order or the application was disposed of. It is not a case

where there was ay definite terminus for some act to be done by the respondent. (Engineering

Projects (Petitioner) Ltd Vs. Ishwari Prashad Ganeriwala (1990) 40 DLT 567 at p. 573).

9. Limitation prescribed by section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act is not ultra vires –

10. Cardinal principle of section 20 is to initiate the proceedings for Contempt not to

adjudicate the proceedings –

11. Bar of limitation applied to the facts of the case –

12. Enhancement of period of limitation – The mere fact that the petitioner had been filing

representation one after the other will not, in any manner enhanced the period of limitation.

13. Saving of limitation – It is apparent that the show cause notice issued by the Civil Judge

to Sri Chaturvedi will not amount to initiation of contempt proceedings, so as to arrest the

running of limitation. Even if the Court has issued a notice to Sri Chaturvedi to show cause as to

why the petition be not admitted would not have amounted to initiation of proceeding to save

limitation. It follows, limitation could be saved only if Allahabad High Court had, after the

receipt of the reference from the Civil Judge under Sec. 15 (2), considered the matter and issued

notice to Sri Chaturvedi of show cause as to why he should not be punished for having

committed the contempt of the Court of the Civil Judge. (State of U.P. Vs. Civil Judge, Agra,

1991 All. C.J. 1105 at pp. 1106, 1107; see also Advocate General of A.P. Vs. C. Chekrapani,

1997 (3) A.L.D. 588 (D.B.)

14. Date of commencement of the period of limitation for contempt where no time limit was

fixed by the court for compliance of its order-

15. Limitation for initiation of Contempt proceedings is one year from the date of violation -

Violation is the date when court issues show cause notice-

16. “Court” –Meaning of –

17. Contempt, it will be deemed to have initiated on the day when a court has passed an order

was issuing notice against contemner and thereby applying its mind

18. Barred by time- Admittedly, the period of one year from the date on which the contempt

is alleged has expired and the contempt application has not yet been admitted by the High Court.

Thus, even otherwise the court cannot proceed in the matter to punish the contempt vide (Gopal

Krishna Mishra Vs. Nagar Palika, 1994 JIC 400 (All.)

Period of limitation for initiation of contempt proceedings as provided U/S 20 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is within one year from the date on which contempt is committed.

Keeping in view of the provisions of section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,

there is no occasion to direct for issuance of notices to the opposite parties after a lapse of about

10 years, since the alleged commission of contempt by the opposite parties in January 1994. No

peculiar circumstances have been brought to the notice of the High Court persuading it to direct

for issuance of notices on the contempt petition to the opposite parties as such a late stage.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the contempt petition is liable to be dismissed as

having become infructuous vide (2005 Cri. L.J. 2012 (All.)

19. Contempt proceedings should be initiated within a period of one year from the date of

taking cognizance -

20. Continuing wrong –If under the given circumstances, failure to give possession amounts

to a contempt is no scope for the application of section 20 – Failure to give possession, if it

amounts to a contempt in a given situation is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for

application of section 20 of the Act vide (Firm Ganpat Ram Raj Kumar Vs. Kalu Ram, 1990 SC

F.B.F. B.R. cases 79 at p. 83.

21. Institution of contempt proceedings – When -. The “Court” contemplated by Sec. 20 of

the Contempt of Courts Act, in the case of a contempt of a subordinate Court, is the high Court.

In the case where contempt is of subordinate Court it would not be sufficient compliance of Sec.

20 if the subordinate Court initiates a proceeding for the purpose of making reference to the High

Court. Simply because the Subordinate Court is moved by the party aggrieved and the

Subordinate Court holds an enquiry for the purpose of making a reference to the high Court, it

cannot be said that the Subordinate Court has initiated proceedings for contempt. The

proceedings for contempt can be said to be initiated only when the High Court decides to take

action against the contemner and initiates the proceedings by issuing notice to the contemner

show cause why action under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be taken against him. Vide

(Yashodabai, W/o Khayyalal P. Saraf Vs. Narayandas G. Saraf, 1992 (1) Bom. Cr. 259 at p.

265).

22. There is nothing in the Act that an Act amounting to Contempt of Court should not be

taken cognizance at all merely because sometime has passed after the commission of the said

Act.- The spirit of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, suggests that after the expiry of

considerable period of time, no notice should be taken of the action which are alleged to amount

to Contempt of Court. It is not possible to accept this argument because there is nothing in the

Contempt of Courts Act, either in its letter or in its spirit, which could suggest that a act

mounting to Contempt of Court should not be taken cognizance of, at all merely because

sometime has passed after the commission of the said Act. What is provided in Sec. 20 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, is that no Court shall initiate ay proceedings for contempt after the

expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been

committed. Vide (V.M. Kanade Vs. Madhao Gadka, (1990) 1 Cr. L.C. 712 at p. 717 (Bom) :

1990 Cr. L.R. 425 at p. 417 (Mah.) : 1990 (1) (Mah.) L.R. 511).

23. Period of limitation mentioned in section 20 is not applicable in Contempt proceedings

initiated under article 215 of the constitution- Section 20 can not make any in rod into the power

vested in the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The period mentioned in

section 20 cannot be made applicable to a case of contempt of the High Court. Article 215 of the

constitution of India gives a supreme position to the High Court compared to the lower courts.

As the article and envisages that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all

the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself, (Rajan Nair Vs.

Mohan, (1993) 1 Ker. L.T. 782) cannot be approved. As every high Curt has power to determine

questions about its own jurisdiction and it has inherent power to punish for its contempt

summarily, period of limitation in section 20 of the Contempt of Court Act has no application to

contempt proceedings initiated in the high Court on its own motion or own complaint regarding

contempt of High Court.

In the instant case, it is not possible for their Lordships to hold that the period of one year

mentioned in section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to a case where contempt

proceeding is initiated by the High Court for having disobeyed or not complied with its order.

As the power conferred on the High Court under article 215 of the Constitution of India is

absolute and unfettered and it cannot be said that the time limit specified in section 20 would

apply and the proceeding before Kerala High Court is barred by limitation. Vide (A.

Mayilaswami Vs. State of Kerala, 1995 Cr. L.J. 3830 at p. 3832) and ‘Nallamalo Vekateswararao

Vs. P. Prabhakar, 1998 (1) ALD 370.

24. No court to initiate proceedings of contempt after expiry of period of one year,

25. The court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance beyond one year of the act or omission

committing or constituting contempt of the court.- In view of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts

Act, 1971, the Court has no jurisdiction to take a cognizance beyond one year of the act of

omission, committing or constituting contempt of the court, in view of these facts, both these

applications are filed beyond the stipulated time. Hence, the Gujarat High Court has no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same. Vide (Yogesh P. Sukhanandi Vs. State of Gujarat,

1997 Cr. L.J. 497 at p. 499 (Guj.).

26. Section 5 of the limitation act dos not deal with condonation of the period of limitation

for cognizance by a court vide

(i) “Harphool Singh Vs. Ranvir Singh, 1980 ALJ 1028

(ii). “T.M.A. Abdul Hameed Vs. Radha Krishan 1989 LW (Cr) 257)

27. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply if the wrong done is not of a continuous

nature vide

(i) “Devi Kishan Vs. Madan Lal Verma 2000 Cri LJ 3619at p. 3622”

28. If there is no definite terminus for some act to be done, Bar of limitation created by S. 20

of CCA is not sustainable vide

(i) “Engineering projects--- Vs. Ishwari Prasad, (1990) 40 DLT 567”

29. There are only two points of time that are material. One is the date of commission of

alleged contempt and the other of actual initiation of proceedings of contempt. No intervening

event or order stops the running of time of one year. Vide

(i) “Golcha Advertising Agency Vs. State of Maharashtra 1990 (2) Bom. CR 262”

U-4. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts which contain the proposition of law that Limitation as provided S. 20 of the Courts of Contempt Act, 1971 does not apply in a case of continuing wrong.

V. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (21) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Act not to apply to Nyay Panchayats or other Village Courts’ as is evident from section 21 of CCA which reads as under :-(Not relevant)

“21. Act not to apply to Nyay Panchayats or other Village Courts-Nothing contained in this act shall apply in relation to Contempt of Nyay Pancayats or other Village Courts, by whatever name known, for the administration of justice, established under any law.”

W. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (22) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of other laws relating to contempt’ as becomes evident from section 22 of CCA which reads as under :-

“22. Act to be I addition to, and not in derogation of, other laws relating to contempt- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts.

COMMENTS

The provisions incorporated in the Act are supplemental to already existing law of contempt, Harish Chandra Misra Vs. S. Ali Ahmed, AIR 1986 Pat. 65.”

A. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per AIR manual :-

1. S. 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act postulates that the provisions contained in the act are supplementary to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts. This is a reiteration of inherent power to punish for contempt of its by court of record vide (i) 1987 Cri L.J. 2018 (2020) (ii) (1999) 1 Jab. L.J. 217 (220)(MP) (iii) 1993 (1) BLJR 690 (701) (iv) 1990 U.P. Cri. R. 158 (160) (DB) (All.)

2. The court cannot be a mere spectator of its process being abused only to punish the person so abusing after the abuse but in incompetent to prevent its re-petition. The right to prevent such acts is inherent in court vide (i) 1978 Cri L.J. 560 (DB) (Cal.)

3. Section 22 does not control S. 20 vide (i) 1981 Cri L.J. (NOC) 141 (1981) 1 Rent L.R. 715 (Delhi) .

4. Contents proceedings for breach of injunction order under the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be disallowed merely because Order 39, Rule 2 (a) of the Civil Code provides a remedy for breach of injunction order because S. 22 of the contempt of Court Act provides that the right to proceed under the Act is an additional right. Vide 2006 (32) PTC 190 (191, 192) (SC)

5. The law of contempt is conceived in the public interest. Where I a case the corporate veil is being blatantly used as a cloak to willfully disobey the orders of the Court, Public interest requires that the corporate veil must be lifted to find out the person who disobeyed the order of

the Court. Where A and B willfully disobeyed the order of the Court by which they were restrained for transferring the property, they are guilty of flagrant disobedience of the order of the Court. Vide 1987 Cri. LJ 1281 (1286, 1287) : (1987) 32 Delhi LT 198.”

B. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per the book titled Iyer’s Law of Contempt of Courts, 4th Edition published by Delhi Law House :-

(i) Scope –An act or action which was not contempt of Court before the Act came in force shall not be punishable as contempt of Court under the Act. The provisions incorporated in the Act are supplemental to already existing law of contempt as interpreted by the Supreme Court and different High Courts. (Shri Harish Chandra Mishra Vs. Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ali Ahmed, A.I.R. 1986 Pat. 65).

(ii) Prevention of Contempt of Court. – The Court cannot be a mere spectator of its process being abused only to punish the person so abusing after the abuse but incompetent to prevent its repetition. The right to prevent such acts is inherent in Court. (Hastings Mill Limited Vs. Hira Singh, 1978 Cr. L.J. 560 at p. 569 (Cal.).

(iii) Principles of order XXI, Rule 32 (5) can be extended to Contempt proceedings –N.C. Mazdoor Union Vs. Union of India, 1994 (98) C.W.N 474 Cal.

(iv) In case of violation of the order passed by the Court, the court has inherent powers to put back the aggrieved person in the same position as before.-- It is well settled that the inherent powers of the High Court under Sec. 151, C.P.C. are wide and are not subject to any limitation. Where, in violation of any order passed by the High Court something has bee done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. The inherent power will not only be available inn such cases but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interest of justice. Since the respondent has, in utter violation of any order, conducted as secret enquiry behind the back of the applicant and the applicant has been affected because of that order, the applicant can approach the High Court and ask for relief on the ground that the order passed by the respondent would be destructive of her stand-point and the High Court, on a consideration of the entire circumstances and facts, will have to put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to the passing of the order. (Prabhavathi Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, 1994 (1) MLJ 14 at p. 16)

Note : This section deals with ‘Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of other laws relating to contempt.’

X. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (23) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to make rules’ as

is evident from S. 23 which reads as under :-

“Section 23. Power of Supreme Court and High Court to make rules : The Supreme Court or, as

the case may be, any High Court may make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this

Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure.”

Y. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (24) of CCA

Note : This section deals with ‘Repeal’.

Z. Prosecution of Judges and public servants

1. Section 197 of Cr. P.C. deal with the prosecution of judges.

Z-1. Important propositions of law pertaining to ‘Contempt of Courts Act’ relevant for the present case and appeal :-

1. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. SR Cotton Mills Ltd. And other, AIR 1990 SC

1881”

(MISLEADING A COURT KNOWINGLY AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT)

(Head Note A)

2. “Court of its own motion Vs. B.D. Kaushik & Ors., 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Full Court)

(19.12.1991) (Available)


“Per S.B. Wad, J & three Others.Held -----The contempt committed by the contemners is gravest.----. IT IS

COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT THE CONTEMPT IS NOT COMMITTED BY

LAY CONTEMNERS BUT BY THE ADVOCATES, WHO ARE OFFICERS OF THE

COURT.

Per D.P. Wadhwa, JHeld ----. Simply because they are officers of the Court and right has been given to

them to practice in Court do not mean that they have to be dealt with leniency. If anything,

they deserved severe punishment-----.”

Per Y.K. Sabharwal, J.Held ----. Bearing in mind the outrageous conduct of the contemners, the gross

contempt which they committed and the fact that the acts were preconceived, the populist

line of showing over indulgence and magnanimity would not subserve the ends of justice

but would amount to giving a licence to contemners to repeat such incidents.

ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT HAS TO PERFORM THE PAINFUL DUTY OF

DIRECTING IMPOSITION OF IMPRISONMENT AND FINE ON THE

CONTEMNERS-----.”



“------.A very civilized behavior and attitude is expected from the members of the Bar. In fact,

they are part and parcel of the Administration of justice -----. They must discharge their

duties with dignity, decorum and discipline. ----- If lawyers fail in their duty, faith of the

people in the judiciary will be undermined to a large extent.”


J.)






accepted or not. ----- They had no factual defence and, therefore, IF THERE WAS

GENUINE REPENTANCE, THE APOLOGY SHOULD HAVE COME AT FIRST

AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.---.”









“------.THE APOLOGY MUST COME AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND IT

SHOULD BE IN WRITING.---- In AIR 1980 SC 946 (referred to above) the Court has held

that WHERE THE CONDUCT IS REPREHENSIBLE, THE APOLOGY SHOULD NOT

BE ACCEPTED. ----- In AIR 1985 SC 1726, the Supreme Court has warned that IT

WOULD BE A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE IF ITS GROSS CONTEMPT GOES

UNPUNISHED.”






764.)




COMMITTED BY THE CONTEMNORS IS GRAVEST.----- It is compounded by the fact

that the contempt is not committed by lay contemnors but by the advocates, who are

officers of the Court.”

(ix) Relevant extract of para 45 of the above referred judgment :-





D.P. Wadhwa, J :

(x) Relevant extract of para 47 of the above referred judgment :-

“------. Here we are dealing with advocates well versed in law who, by fiction of law are officers

of the Court. ----. THIS WAS INDULGED IN BY THE VERY PERSONS WHO

THEMSELVES SUPPOSED TO UPHOLD THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND THE

COURTS. ---.”






HOPE.”


“------------ In my view, the punishment to the contemnors in the present case must be an













(xiv) Relevant extract of para 60 of the above referred judgment :-




(xv) Para 69 of the above referred judgment :-














Y.K. Sabharwal, J.








contemners.---.”

3. “Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of M.P., Jabalpur, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” This

judgment has been relied upon by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported as

“R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130 (SC)”


“To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme

measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with,

and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court,

though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. NO ONE CAN

CLAIM IMMUNITY FROM THE OPERATION OF THE LAW OF CONTEMPT, if his

act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to

obstruct the due course of justice.”


“THEREFORE, HAVING REGARD TO THE SENTENCING POLICY THAT

PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE

OFFENCE, we hold that the sentence of 2 months imprisonment in no way calls for

interference and accordingly the sentence is confirmed.”


Rajdhani Law Reporter Page 1” (Vol. 25) (14.11.1994):-

(i) Relevant extract of Index –B of the above referred SCC at page-422:-










oblique motive.

------. Contempt jurisdiction has been conferred on superior courts not only to

preserve the majesty of law by taking appropriate action against one however high he may

be, if he violates courts order BUT ALSO TO KEEP THE STREAM OF JUSTICE

CLEAR AND PURE -------.



MOTIVATED FALSEHOODS HAVE TO BE APPROPRIATED DEALT WITH, --------.

Any one who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or if

anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice.

--------. If recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely

hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from

performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.

--------. In the case and hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the

court, the intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt--.




























courts.”

(iii) Relevant portion of para 12 of the above referred judgment:-




1088 : 1995 (1) SCJ 310” (23.11.1994)

(i) “------. ANY INTERFERENCE IN THE COURSE OF JUSTICE, ANY



PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. -------- Due course of justice means not only

any particular proceeding but a broad stream of administration of justice. Therefore, the

words “due course of justice” used in Section 2 (c ) or Section 13 of the Act are of wide

import and ARE NOT LIMITED TO ANY PARTICULAR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING.”

(Head Note A of SCC)

(ii) “It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties EITHER TO

PRODUCE FABRICATED EVIDENCE AS A PART OF THE PLEADINGS

OR RECORD or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of

justice or judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. THIS

TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE OR TENDENCY TO

UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT NEEDS TO BE SEVERELY DEALT

WITH TO DETER THE PERSONS HAVING SIMILAR PROCLIVITY TO RESORT TO

SUCH ACTS OR CONDUCT.” (para 7)


1795” (2.5.1995) :-

(i) “ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO INTERFERE WITH THE



--------. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of

the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the FILING OF FALSE EVIDENCE commits

criminal contempt of the court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with

the Act. Filing of false affidavit or making a false statement on oath in courts aims at

striking a blow at the Rule of Law and NO COURT CAN IGNORE SUCH CONDUCT

which has the tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions because the

very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the

fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by any one resorting to filing of false affidavits

or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law.” (Head Note

A)

(ii) “THE STREAM OF JUSTICE HAS TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND PURE AND ANY





JUSTICE.” (Para 40)


(i) Relevant extract of para 31 of the above referred judgment:-

“Criminal contempt” defined in section 2 (c ) means interference with the administration of

justice in any other manner. “A FALSE OR A MISLEADING OR A WRONG


PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN A FAVOURABLE ORDER WOULD PREJUDICE OR

INTERFERE WITH THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. It is seen that

Ahlawat, respondent No. 3 to the main writ petition and in-charge of the criminal administration,

with his connivance, caused two minor boys’ wrongful detention. He made an averment in the

counter affidavit dated October 30,1993 that they were not in wrongful detention nor are they

taken into custody which was later found to be false. He first used fabricated counter affidavit

------- to obtain a favourable order. But when he perceived adverse atmosphere to him, he

fabricated further false evidence -------. Thereby he further committed contempt of the judicial

process. HE HAS NO REGARD FOR TRUTH. FROM STAGE TO STAGE, HE

COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF THE COURT BY MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS.

Being a responsible officer, he is required to make truthful statements before the Court,

but he made obviously false statements. Thereby, he committed criminal contempt of

judicial proceedings of this court.” (Para 31)

8. “State of Mahrashtra Vs. Mehboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”

(i) Head Note (B) of the above referred SCC :-





9. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1 AD (Delhi) 927”: “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997):-

(i) Relevant extract of Head Note of the above referred AD:-




of Contempt.

Held: In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by

not disclosing that in the earlier suit, the respondent has not been able to get an injunction,

the respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and

such acts had been done only in order to gain advantage on the other side and to get a stay

in the second suit.

We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over – reach

the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as on the opposite

parte and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HEARD IN

THE CASE UNLESS IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED

AND IN OUR VIEW, IT CAN ONLY BE IF WE NON-SUIT THE RESPONDENTS IN

SUIT NO. 261/97. While, therefore, we do not purpose to take action against the respondent for

contempt for except to issue a warning to respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future WE

DIRECT THE DISMISSAL OF THE SUIT (BEING SUIT NO. 261/97) ITSELF. ---------.”













in the said plaint. We are, therefore, of the opinion that by withholding the plaint and the




guilty of playing fraud of the court as well as on the respondent. The following observations

of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are relevant for purposes of present case:-

“The High Court in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court-----. We do not agree with the High Court that “THERE IS NO LEGAL DUTY CASTE UPON THE PLAINTIFF TO COME TO COURT WITH A TRUE CASE AND PROVE IT BY TRUE EVIDENCE.” THE PRINCIPLE OF

“FINALITY OF LITIGATION” CANNOT BE PRESSED TO THE EXTENT OF SUCH AN ABSURDITY THAT IT BECOMES AN ENGINE OF FRAUD IN THE HANDS OF DISHONEST LITIGANTS. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. ------. We have no hasitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. --------.”

-----. A party must come to the Court with clean hands and must disclose all the

relevant facts which may result in appreciating the rival contentions of the parties. In our

view, a litigant, who approaches the Court, must produce all the documents which are relevant to

the litigation and he must also disclose to the Court about the pendency of any earlier litigation

between the parties and the result thereof. ----.In our opinion, it was obligatory upon the

respondent to disclose to the Court that in the application filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief

had been claimed, however, the Court had not granted the said relief. In our view, if these facts

were before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit came up for hearing

before it, MAY BE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE WAS PERSUADED NOT TO GRANT

ANY EX-PARTE STAY IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT. ----. We are, therefore,

of the opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also






“---------. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt

with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16 or

in some other manner. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct

which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it

pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in

the administration of justice.



1977 SC 2421, the pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the






activate this obligation.--.”






THE SECOND SUIT.”


“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 2 (c) (iii) WHEN THERE IS INFRACTION OF








dignity of Court. ------. Filing false affidavits and fabricated documents are matters of great

concern. --------. By false affidavit justice is defeated as attempt is to delay delivery of

possession. It is criminal contempt and AS FALSEHOOD HAD BEEN REPEATED, OFFER

OF APOLOGY IS NOT GENUINE. CONTEMENOR DESERVED PUNISHMENT TO

DETER OTHERS and had taken advantage (Rita Markand’s case). If obstruction of justice is

allowed, it would permeate society. Litigant public ought to be very cautious in making

statements lest these become offence under the Act. Fabrication on oath in an affidavit is a

serious matter calling for severe punishment when there is substantial interference with course

of justice. PRACTICE OF FILING FALSE AFFIDAVIT IS DEPRECATED AND A

COURT WOULD BE FAILING IN ITS DUTY TO MAINTAIN MAJESTY OF LAW IF

IT DOES NOT GIVE PROPER PUNISHMENT.”


(i) Relevant extract of the above referred AIR:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c) – Constitution of India, Art. 129 – ---.”


“----------. Criminal Contempt has been defined in Section 2 (c) to mean interference with

the administration of justice IN ANY MANNER. A FALSE or MISLEADING or a wrong

statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings TO OBTAIN A

FAVOURABLE ORDER would undoubtedly tantamount to interfere with the due course

of judicial proceedings. WHEN A PERSON IS FOUND TO HAVE UTILIZED AN

ORDER OF A COURT WHICH HE OR SHE KNOWS TO BE INCORRECT FOR

CONFERRING BENEFIT ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE SAME,

THE VERY UTILIZATION OF THE FABRICATED ORDER BY THE PERSON

CONCERNED WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HOLD HIM/HER GUILTY OF

CONTEMPT, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of

fabrication. On the aforesaid parameters it would be necessary to examine whether it can be said

that Mrs. Megha Rude can be held to be guilty of contempt. In view of our conclusion on the

basis of materials available in the inquiry proceedings with regard to the role played by Mrs.

Megha Rude, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that Mrs. Rude is guilty of gross

criminal contempt and must be suitably punished for the same. -------.”

(iii) Para 9 of the above referred judgment;-

“We, therefore hold both Mrs. Megha Rude and Mr. Dilip Wamanrao Gund to be guilty of



12. “Pravin C. Shah Vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali & Another, AIR 2001 SC 3041 : VII (2001)

SLT 153” (9.10.2001) :-


“Contempt of Court Act (70 of 1971), ------ Ss. 2 , 12 –----- ADVOCATE FOUND GUILTY

OF CONTEMPT- CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO APPEAR, ACT OR PLEAD IN

COURT UNLESS HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT --------.”

13. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri L.J. 493” (30.7.2003)


“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971). S. 2(c ) – Criminal contempt –-------.

If any person tries to either file any false affidavit, forged document or even makes



tendency of impeding, obstructing or interference striking a blow on the rule of law and



INSTITUTION. ----------.”

14. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” : 138 (2007) DLT 682 : (9.2.2007)

(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri. L. J.:-

“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c ) – Criminal Contempt – Interference by Advocate

in due course of administration of justice

The judge and counsel are two wheels of the chariot of justice. While the direction of the

movement is controlled by the judge holding reins, the movement it self is facilitated by the

counsel and litigants, without which the chariots of justice may not move and may even collapse.

--------- AS RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS OF THE COURT, THE COUNSEL HAVE AN

OVERALL OBLIGATION OF ASSISTING THE COURTS IN A JUST AND PROPER

MANNER, IN THE JUST AND PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Deliberately making false statements on oath, PRACTISING FRAUD and making of

averments which were false to the knowledge of the counsel in the plaint, witnessing

agreements which were either not executed on the dates mentioned thereon or were not executed

at all, apart from being gross violations of code of conduct or PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,

in the present state of circumstances would also amount to obstructing the due course of

administration of justice and interfering with the same and thus constitute criminal contempt. If

the notice issued by the counsel runs contrary to the averment in the plaint, such conduct

on the part of the counsel cannot be condoned or simply excused or washed away. THE

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR FOR KEEPING THE STREAM

OF JUSTICE PURE AND UNSULLIED IS FAR GREATER.”

(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (iv) of the above referred DLT:-






matter.”


“Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Senior Advocate who had been appointed Amicus Curiae, succinctly

brought forth the facts from the averments in the pleadings, statements and documents on record,

which form the basis for proceeding for contempt as also in relation to the application

moved under S. 340, Cr. P.C. IN ESSENCE, HE SUBMITTED THAT A MATURED AND

EXPERIENCED ADVOCATE WITH DECADES OF EXPERIENCE HAS INSTITUTED

SUITS BASED ON AVERMENTS, WHICH RUN CONTRARY TOTE NOTICE GIVEN

BY HIM. The suits were instituted on the basis of loan agreements where under monies were not

paid and the said loan agreements were not executed on the dates thereof. A junior advocate of

the plaintiff has signed the agreement as witness without the agreements having been executed in

her presence.

(iv) Para 25 of the above referred judgment;-

“In these circumstances, considering that this could not have been a deliberate or intentional

act, as discussed therein before, but one actuated either by extreme forgetfulness or blissful

ignorance of the provisions of law, as also the age of the counsel AND HIS BLEMISHLESS

TRACK RECORD SO FAR, the apology tendered by him is accepted. HOWEVER, HE IS

DIRECTED TO PAY A SUM OF RS. 15,000/- within two weeks from today, as costs to the

Advocates Welfare Fund. He shall also render pro bono service for a period of six months

for at least two hours, twice a week, at any of the Delhi Legal Service Centers under the

supervision and direction of the Member Secretary, Delhi Legal Services Authority or such other

suitable work as may be assigned by the Member Secretary.


“As regards Kiran Singh, she is a young budding advocate and she has faced this ordeal at

the beginning of her profession itself. She was inexperienced and claims to have signed the

agreements as witness on the asking of the senior counsel for his clients. She has recognized

that this is a humbling experience and she would exercise extreme care in future and discharge

her functions with responsibility. It appears that the experience for her has indeed been a

humbling one. Her apology, which was tendered at the outset, is a bona fide one and is

accepted. She is directed to do pro bono work and render services under the supervision of

the Member Secretary, Delhi High Court legal Service Authority for a period of six

months, for two hours, twice a week.”

15. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB)

(17.2.2009)




property and contrary stand before L & DO ---------– Appellant an advocate though aged

one – He is fully familiar with legal pleas and consequences of his conduct – Fit case for

issuance of notice for criminal contempt to respondent who has tried to pollute course of

justice and interfere with same knowing falsehood of his statements – FACT THAT HE IS

AN ADVOCATE MAKES CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT ALL THE MORE

DEPLORABLE and mere advanced age of respondent should not deter this court from

proceeding further in matter – Appropriate notice to show cause be issued to respondent of

being proceeded against and punished for criminal contempt of Court.






“-----. The tendency on the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the

course of justice is the relevant fact. Any interference in the course of justice, ANY



PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. --------.”


(21.8.2008)(Delhi High Court)





Nexus between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer –-----Complicity between Special

Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – both were More than mixed up in BMW case –

conduct of both had tendency to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice as

influencing a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify amounts to interference in

administration of justice -------Contempt very much before eyes and within hearing –

contempt of courts act, 1972, -section 2 (C ) (Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 20, 78, 125, 127, 143, 155,

156, 169,206 & 207)

(ii) Head Note (xi) of the above referred DLT:-

















PROCEEDINGS. ---------.”










THE SYSTEM.”








appearing before this court and the Courts subordinate to it for a specified period and also

to recommend to the Full Court that they should be stripped of their designation as Senior

Advocates. In this context, we may refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court

authored by one of us (Manmohan Sarin, J.) titled “Court on Its Own Motion v. Rajiv

Dawar, 2007 (I) AD (Delhi) 567. ---------. This submission was rejected by the Bench holding:





the system or commit the offence unwittingly or innocently. --------.”

17. “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130(SC)” (A Three

Judge Bench Decision)







between section 34 of Advocates Act and Art. 145 of Constitution – ART. 145 AND

SECTION 34 OF ACT CLEARLY SHOW THAT THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT

TO AN ADVOCATE TO APPEAR IN COURT – An Advocate appears in Court subject to

conditions laid down by Court- Two appellants were debarred from appearing before High Court

and Courts subordinate to it for a period of 4 months.-----






competence and authority. In a proceeding of contempt punishment could only be awarded

as provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, THOUGH IN A GIVEN CASE THE

HIGH COURT COULD DEBAR THE CONTEMNOR FROM APPEARING IN COURT

TILL HE PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT.--------- .”




whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court(s). In paragraph

34 of the decision the Court made highly illuminating observations in regard to lawyers’

right to appear before the Court and sounded the note of caution for the lawyers. Para 34 of

the decision need to be reproduced below:-

“34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in Courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of Courts. ----. Conduct in Court is a matter concerning the court and hence the bar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the Court could also be regulated by them in exercise of their disciplinary powers.--- But the right to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court must and does have major supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested of control or supervision of conduct in Court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate. A RULE CAN STIPULATE THAT A PERSON WHO HAS COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF COURT OR HAS BEHAVED UNPROFESSIONALLY AND IN AN UNBECOMING MANNER WILL NOT HAVETHE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD AND CONDUCT CASES IN COURTS.---- The very sight of an advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct, standing in the Court would erode the dignity of the court ---. Art. 145 of Constitution of India and section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an advocate who appear in a court.----.”



extreme step of debarring an advocate from appearing in Court should arise very rarely

and only as a measure of last resort IN CASES WHERE THE WRONG DOER

ADVOCATE DOES NOT AT ALL APPEAR TO BE GENUINELY CONTRITE AND

REMORSEFUL FOR HIS ACT/CONDUCT, BUT ON THE CONTRARY SHOWS A

TENDENCY TO REPEAT OR PERPETUATE THE WRONG ACT(S).”

18. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009)

DLT 466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)


“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- ---Sections 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c ), ---------- Criminal Contempt-



SUIT PROPERTY- ----- FILING OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR STATEMENTS IN

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AS IT TENDS

TO OBSTRUCT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE- Defendant/Contemnor filed written

statement in suit of plaintiff and made statement on oath before trial court AND

ADMITTING HE SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF AND HANDED OVER

POSSESSION TO HIM- But subsequently in his reply to contempt application filed by

plaintiff, contemnor took a somersault AND TOOK PLEA THAT HE NEITHER SOLD

SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF NOR HANDED OVER POSSESSION TO HIM- ---- -

Apology tendered by contemnor, not at all apologetic and not accepted- It was tendered by

defendant/contemnor for first time while giving evidence in these

proceedings-Defendant/contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt.”






















called apology tendered by the defendant/contemnor for the first time while giving evidence in







Z-2. Important proposition of law pertaining to ‘Contempt of Courts Act’ relevant for

arguments on the petitioner’s application U/o 12, R, 6 CPC:-

Documents

Contempt of Courts Act