Contemporary Youth and Youth Culture in Japan

Contemporary Youth and Youth Culture in Japan

Akihiko Takada

Abstract This paper begins with a profile of Japanese youth which compares them statisti- cally and sociologically with those of other nations. Next, I attempt to differentiate between "adolescent" and "youth," and explain the adolescent as a consequence of industrial society. I also try to divide youth culture into three types: partial culture, sub-culture. and counter- culture. Finally, I discuss the history of Japanese youth culture, primarily since the coming of the industrial age after World War 11. As examples of adolescent cultures, I refer to "Taiyo-zoku." "Zenkyoto," "Hippie," "New Young,"and "Shin-jinrui."Among these, "Zenkyoto" and "Hippie" are important as counter-cultures; they reject the prevailing

society and actively seek a new post-industrial society. Adolescent sub-culture. on the other hand, has dwindled since the decline of the "Zen- kyoto" around 1970. Since 1980, Japanese youth can be grouped into three main categories. The majority enjoy affluence and consumer goods, like the "Crystal-zoku," who are obsessed with famous brands. They are in the partial culture, and are oriented to super-industrial society. The second group is made up of those who have unique adolescent cultures. like the "Shin-jinrui," who are sensuous and highly responsive to information. They are in the sub-culture, and are oriented to the modified industrial society. Minority groups who take action to protect their interests and human rights, like ecological groups derived from the counter-culture movement, comprise the third category. They are in the counter-culture, and are oriented to post-industrial society.

JAPANESE YOUTH TODAY

What is the notion of "youth" which people embrace? It is usually defined by age, apart from subtle difference of class, sex, residence, school, and occupation. What is the range of age of "youth?" Psychologically and psychiatrically, we can say that youth runs from the age of the development of secondary sexual characteristics, around thirteen years (perhaps eleven or twelve a t the earliest), to around thirty years of age, after which chronic mental illness may appear (Kasahara 1977, p. 1 7 ) .

Looking a t some representative research on youth or young people, we see a range of age for "youth" as follows. The Office of the Prime Minister has done much research on youth. Examples are:

Research on the solidarity of youth, in which the age range is from

International opinion survey of youth (eighteen to twenty-eight) , Youth and vitality (fifteen to twenty-four) , and Lifestyle and value of contemporary youth (nineteen to twenty-

fifteen to twenty-three years,

eight).

From the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) , we have:

9 Japanese youth (thirteen to twenty-nine) , and

IJJS Number 1 (1992) - 99 -

International Journal of Japanese Sociology

Survey on Attitudes and Behavior of Japanese Youth (eighteen to twenty-seven) .

Thus, we seen that Japanese researchers consider the range of age of youth as being from nineteen to twenty-three, plus or minus six years. I informally asked twenty students within this age range for their definitions of the age and characteristics that define “youth.” Their answers ranged from fifteen or sixteen years (senior high school students) to about twenty-eight years. Therefore, from a perspective of age, we shall consider youth as ranging from fifteen or sixteen years to twenty-seven or twenty-eight years.

We shall now examine how youth view themselves. Some typical senti- ments follow:

“We are separated from each other. We have a growing sense of discrimination against those different from ourselves. ” “We are in chronic apathy. We lack the will to do something. We assert ourselves, but we do not really act. ” “In contemporary society, we cannot do anything, because society is already established. The youth feel like floating just as the adults direct them to do.” “We are much afraid of being injured by others, so relationships among us have become very superficial. ”

Japanese youth, as the above statements demonstrate, tend to think that they have been separated from each other; they feel powerless in the society which has been established by adults, and which is beyond their own control. Therefore, when youth want to express themselves, they tend to deny others the opportunity to speak. As a result, they become increasingly isolated. Interrelation grows superficial and insubstantial; behaviour patterns become standardized. Society enjoys diversification and freedom of action, but youth are unable to find their own destination. Although the situation has not changed in the last twenty years, recently some youth have taken different opinions:

1 ) “Youth has become serious and less frivolous these last few years. “There still remain some youth who try to break down the status

“We cannot judge these youths by their appearance. They are quo. ”

worried about being isolated, without any true friends. ”

Their remarks show that there are youth who do their best to improve the status quo, without falling into despair, or feeling powerless. But it is difficult to judge them by their appearance. I would like to confirm these impressionistic remarks with some recent research on Japanese youth.

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TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF THE SUM OF “SATISFIED” A N D “MORE OR LESS SATISFIED” I N EACH

D O M A I N OF YOUTH’S L I F E ( % ) ~~~~ ~

Home School Place of Relations Country

work w i t h friends

Japan 74.0 68.4 51.1 89.7 51.3

U. S. A . 91.4 90.1 82.6 96.4 63.1

England 85.9 88.8 81.3 96.4 48.4

West Germany 87.8 85.3 81.3 96.0 74.2

France 93.1 77.6 80.3 95.1 36.3

Sweden 97.0 94.6 80.3 98.6 86.1

Aust ra l ia 90.3 84.8 82.8 97.4 63.5

Singapore 96.0 94.2 87.1 97.0 94.8

Korea 70.8 63.5 69.1 90.0 17.2

China 75.1 40.9 59.2 48.8 55.6 Brazil 92.0 79.6 90.1 94.5 22.0

N0TE.- Almost 1000 samples in each country i n 1988. The age range i s from

eighteen to twenty-four years.

SOURCE: Youth Affairs Administration of Prime Minister’s Off ice (1989, p.78)

T H E PROFILE OF JAPANESE YOUTH FROM RECENT RESEARCH

According to the Report of International Survey of Opinions of Youth (fourth) , which researched youth from eighteen to twenty-four years in eleven countries in 1988, we can grasp some important features of Japanese youth. They are more dissatisfied with everyday life than are youth in other countries.

Only 33 per cent are satisfied with life a t home (the lowest among the eleven countries). 25 per cent are satisfied with school life (only China is lower) . 11.2 per cent are satisfied with “the place you work” (lowest) . 54.1 per cent are satisfied with the relations with their friends (only China is lower). 9 . 4 per cent are satisfied with “the way things are in our country” (ranked seventh, ahead of Brazil, Australia, France, and Korea).

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I ’ I ’ I I I ’

65.0[

57.71 ‘

53 9L

53.51

51.71

5 0 . 4 [

45 4 1 . 44.6 1

40 01

38.6[ I 25.11

West Germany England Japan France Korea Australia U. S. A. Sweden China Singapore Brazil

I 0 The most important thing for me is to make my own life satisfying. @ That alone is not enough. I also want to do something to society.

FIG. 1.- Preference of personal interest or social interest. (Question: “We all of us think not only about ourselves but about society as well. Which of the following comes closer to describing your feeling about your relationship with society ?”)

SOURCE: Youth Affairs Administration of Prime linister’s Office (1989, p.57)

Japanese youth are discontented with the basic elements of everyday life, such as home, school, place of work, and relations with friends. They are highly dissatisfied with their own lives.

They also tend to place their private lives ahead of their social lives; they are more likely to want to live in personal affluence than are youths from other countries.

3 3 . 4 per cent prefer their social life to their personal life (only West Germany is lower). 38 .7 per cent list getting rich as a goal in life (highest among the eleven countries), while only 2 . 8 per cent want to “work on behalf of society” (only Sweden is lower). 41 per cent want to “do something to serve their own country” (only West Germany is lower), but when asked is they would sacrifice their own interests in order to serve their country, only 5 . 5 per cent said yes (lowest). Asked “when do you get personal satisfaction?”, only 9 . 7 answered “doing something on behalf of society” (the lowest of the eleven countries). This figure has decreased every year since the second survey in 1977.

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2

2.6

S i n g apore

China

Japan

2.

2

. . .

2.7

0 50 100 ( % I

@ I will resort to violence andfor other illegal measures, if necessary @ I will actively resort to a variety of measures, such as petitions,

letters of complaint, demonstrations, strikes, etc. so long as the means are permitted by law.

@ I will use my voting right but nothing more. @I I will become a drop-out from soceity.

FIG. 2.- Four attitudes to dissatisfaction with society (Question: "Suppose you are dissatisfied with society, what attitude do tou think you would take?") SOURCE: Youth Affairs Administration of Prime Minister's Office (1989, p.62)

Japanese youth tend to give priority to their personal interests; they pursue their own economic affluence, without regard for their society or nation.

Finally, they do not want to participate in active social reform, even when they are discontented with society.

Only 21.7 per cent of those surveyed would become involved in either legal or illegal social reform (the lowest among the eleven countries).

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Most answer “I will use my voting right but nothing more.” 70.8 per cent answer that “the problems involved are beyond the reach of individuals” as a reason for giving this response. This figure is the largest in the eleven countries, and has been increasing constantly. 44 per,cent are dissatisfied with present society because “hard work is not rewarded.” 43.3 per cent are dissatisfied because “what is right all too often fails to go through.” This may mean that they regard the present society as unfair. Among the other ten countries, only Chinese youths answered this question in the same ordering.

Japanese youth, in their incomprehensible and complicated society, do not vent their dissatisfaction through paction; they tend to express themselves by running away from the problems. Thus, they are far from taking an active approach to serving their society.

But what do they think of themselves? We may find the answer in the NHK research on youth carried out in 1986. Referring to their frivolity, passivity, and irresponsibility, the following three questions were put to young people (from eighteen to twenty-seven years) :

1) Do you think seriously about everything? 2) Do you want to actively change your daily life? 3) Do you worry about society?

Referring to youth in general, 36 to 43 per cent answered no; however, considering only themselves, 64 to 74 per cent answered yes. This indi- cates that the majority of young people think these features apply to youth in general, but not to themselves. Their attitude towards society is highly negative, not because they lack the will to act, but because they do not have the incentive. This is probably because their view of society has changed. In the 1970s, their image of society was gloomy; they describe it as “disorderly, cold, poor, and antagonistic.” But in the 1980s this image changed to “peaceful, affluent, stable, and free” (NHK’s Research on the opinion of youth, 1986). 1980 was a turning point in this drastic change, which has nothing to do with a cohort or generation. Youth’s entire image of society has changed since 1980; they have lost the object on which they must work. They have become aimless, and have no sense of fulfilment. When asked, “taking all things together, would you say you are happy?”, only 30.8 per cent say they are (ahead of only Korea and China).

YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE

We have explained the features of youth as an age group. But, historical- l y , youth became important not as an age group but as a stage of life. As such, youth has been the subject of much attention, and the cause of many problems in modern society. Those who are not children but who are not yet adults are the object of an initiation into adult society. They also have a certain status within society. “Adolescence” becomes a stage of life, and

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a new concept of youth develops, in which the “adolescent” is a youth in the stage of adolescence. By the early nineteenth century in western Europe, after the industrial revolution, “adolescence” emerged in the middle-class as a historical phenomenon, and was no longer confined to upper class youth. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, it began in earnest (Gillis 1981, Chap. 3). However, as Margaret Mead (1928) indicated, adolescence, especially as a crisis, does not exist in societies where the developmental process from childhood to adulthood is continuous, because a particular period of transition is not needed. The drastic social change initiated by the industrial revolution has brought about the separation of places of living and working, urbanization, and high social mobility. As a result, it has divided a continuous sphere of adults and children into two spheres, and the transition itself becomes a crisis. Adolescence particular to the industrial society was not recognized in the academic world until 1904, when Adolescence: Its Psycholugy and Its Relation to Physiology , Anthropology , Sociology , Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education was published by G . Stanley Hall (Keniston 1971, p. 4 ) . The category of adolescence is a socio- historical one limited to industrial society.

Those in this unique stage in the life cycle have made up their own society based on their interaction, that is, James Coleman’s “adolescent society” (Coleman 1961, p. 3) . Youth’s own values and patterns of action have come to be called “adolescent culture.” It is a part of the youth culture which is applied to all youth in the society concerned, regardless of the continuity of transition from childhood to adulthood. In other words, it is a youth culture in industrial society in which the development of the economic division of labor, the technological professionalization , the prolongation of a period of education, and so on are accelerated. From the perspective of the dominant culture, adolescence is a sub-culture sustained by adolescent society, which is an enclave of industrial society.

Generally speaking, there are three types of relations between a culture of a certain group and the dominant culture. The first is a “partial culture.” such as a set of rituals for the initiation of youth into the traditional society. Villages in Japan have the custom of “wakamono-gumi” (the traditional youth group), which has the group’s own values and patterns of action, and is composed of the dominant culture. It is supported as desirable and suitable by the dominant culture, because the social structure sustaining it is incorporated in the. entire social structure.

The second is a “sub-culture,” which remains a part of the dominant culture while attempting to be relatively independent of it. Examples are minority group cultures and the adolescent culture in industrial society. They are neither endorsed nor flatly rejected, and become enclaves within the society. Their sustaining social structures are different from and relatively independent of the larger social structure, although they coexist.

The third is a “counter-culture,” which is treated as deviant. It has a value system which is incompatible with the fundamental values of the dominant culture. If it exceeds the tolerance limits of the mainstream

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culture, it may be rejected or eliminated. Some examples are the communist ideology within capitalist societies, the Beatniks of the 1950s, and the Hippies in the 1960s. Their alternative value systems make it impossible for them to coexist with mainstream society. Their sustaining social structures are heterogeneous, and different from the established structure. The counter-culture anticipates a culture of an alternative structure a t large, and shows the values and behavior patterns of a future society.

The adolescent culture emerging from industrial society is basically a “sub-culture,” according to the above typology. Its members are adoles- cents who are culturally independent of the adult society, but who are economically dependent on it. Furthermore, they are destined to participate in it. In other words, the basic features of the adolescent culture are the dependent and transitional ones. I t is therefore impossible that the adolescent culture could become a counter-culture, rejecting adult society. Nor is it a “partial culture,” for if it were, it would be unable to support itself. It is born of adolescence, which is relatively independent of the present industrial society. However, it is affected by the times and situations of society, and may take on an aspect of a “partial culture” as a result of the pressure of incorporation by the dominant culture. Occasion- ally, it may also imitate the counter-culture without restraint.

Now we shall discuss the three types within Japanese adolescent culture.

ADOLESCENT CULTURE IN THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY OF JAPAN Japanese adolescent culture can be chronologically divided into four periods, and characterized under the above three types. The industrial society which was fully prepared for adolescent culture came into exis- tence in 1955, in postwar Japan, when steel production finally surpassed that of prewar Japan. The 1956 edition of the Economic White Paper said that Japan’s economy could no longer be termed “post-war.” In 1955, two conservative political parties merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party, while reformist parties also unified. The system of two major parties was established, and Japan became stabilized politically.

The first period of adolescent culture ranges from 1955 to the middle of the 1960s. During this time, the Japanese economy rushed into high economic growth, exemplified by the Jinmu economic boom (1955-57), the Iwato boom (1959-61), and the “economic doubling program” (proposed in 1960). Indeed, the Japanese real GNP grew a t an annual average rate of 10.9 per cent for fifteen years (from 1959 to 1973).

At the beginning of this period, a group of young people appeared whose values differed from those of the industrial society. They were called “Taiyo-zoku” (Sun Gang) after Shintaro Ishihara’s “Taiyo no kisetu” (The Season of the Sun) , written in 1955. In this book, we find a new type of youth who is completely different from those incorporated into society; they show a dramatically new way of life rarely found in adult society (for example, rejection of established values and orders,

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impulsive behavior, unrestrained sexual desire, and business-like human relations).

However, it was only upper class youth who could enjoy the affluence of the industrial society, which had been restored after World War 11. Their economic future was guaranteed, despite deviant behavior or the criticism of established values. But these youth could not reject the industrial society itself, for they would risk their future. Therefore, their culture could not become a counter-culture. Their actions and attitudes were obviously contrary to the dominant culture, but they were also not an established youth culture (that is, they were not a partial culture, incorporated into the existing social structure) . Their culture, coexisting with the dominant culture, was a youth sub-culture. Their lifestyle (and ishihara’s hair style) became popular among the youth at the time. Why was this?

In 1950, the term “teenager” was introduced to describe the young people who were educated under the new system (six years of elementary school, three years of junior high school) which was based on American pragmatism. Until 1958, two groups were recognized: “highteen” (those in their late teens), and “lowteen” (those in their early teens), because highteen became a visible cause of social problems, and also a big target market for merchandisers. The word “teenager” describes youth by the single index of age, although they are heterogeneous in class, sex, occupation, and community (Sakata 1979, p.263). In other words, as the development of mass media and the penetration of the urban way of life due to industrialization almost homogenized youth in each age band of two or three years, the index of age became most useful to explain their features. By way of this homogenization, “Taiyo-zoku” appeared. There- fore, the youth of this age group received it as their own new culture, although its values and lifestyle were special to only some of them. It became a great fad.

Here are two kinds of adolescent culture. One is Taiyo-zoku, and the other is Taiyo-zoku as a fad (that is, those who receive the values and lifestyle of Taiyo-zoku). The former is an adolescent culture as a sub- culture, and the latter is an adolescent culture as an age group. We cannot specify the socio-economic features of Taiyo-zoku as a fad, because it spreads so widely that the bearers of its culture are only speci- fied by their external appearance. As they are distinguished merely by being young, they come to be seen as an age group. Fads begin as sub- cultures, but in a few months they may be institutionalized as partial cultures. in general, people see an adolescent culture as an age group, which verges on being a partial culture.

After Taiyo-zoku, some adolescent cultures emerged as sub-cultures. They were the “Kaminari-zoku” (Thunder Gang) of 1959, motorcyclists who were absorbed in speed and thrills; the “Miyuki-zoku” in 1964, who, in their original long skirts, gathered with shopping bags on Miyuki street in Tokyo’s Ginza district; and the “Harajyuku-zoku” in 1966, who were the counterpart of the Miyuki-zoku in Tokyo’s Harajyuku district. How-

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ever, these “sub-cultures” were too parochial to become widespread among youth in general.

In the field of politics, in 1960, “Zengakuren” (the National Federation of Students’ Self-Government Association) broke into the Diet to oppose the extension of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu- rity, against which many youths had demonstrated. Zengakuren was organized by the Japan Communist Party and broke away from it in 1958, but continued to advocate Marxism. However, in storming the Diet the youths were mainly acting to preserve the freedom and democracy introduced after Wnrld War 11. In this respect, they were part of the established progressive forces acting to protect the developing civil society, and can be thought of as a partial culture rather than a sub-culture. It was not until the rise of the “Zenkyoto” (the All-Campus Joint Struggle Committee) within the student movement, from 1967 to 1969, and of the “Hippies” (calling themselves Freaks) in the counter-culture movement that groups independent of the established society formed their own culture. It was, as Kenneth Keniston (1971, p. 146) explained, the emergence of “the political activist or protester” and “the withdrawn, culturally alienated. ”

ADOLESCENT CULTURE A T THE BEGINNING OF T H E POST- INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

In the period from the middle of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1970s, we witnessed a youth culture as “counter-culture,” which appeared in the student movement and as a lifestyle revolution. It began to appear in 1965 as campus unrest, led by several Marxist sects in response to such issues as increased college fees, university administrative practices, and the Vietnam war. However, by the time the Zenkyoto was organized, leader- ship of student movements was by non-sectarian radical students, who had decided to participate through their own initiative. The Zenkyoto movement intensified from 1967, and peaked in the summer of 1969, but de- clined soon after.

The movement of Zenkyoto was born during the prosperity that continued from the autumn of 1965 to the summer of 1970. In this respect, it was similar to the Taiyo-zoku movement. However, while prosperity during the Taiyo-zoku period was limited to the youth of the upper class, during the Zenkyoto days it was extended to the middle class youth by means of increased real wages and an abundance of consumer goods. But this prosperity derived from industrial society was also accompanied by serious pollution, resource exhaustion, and human alienation. In other words, it was a society in which economic growth took precedence over everything else. It became clear that such growth turned human relations calculative, in a widely manipulative but highly efficient society. The university itself was incorporated into this industrial society, under the opposition of radicals and dissenting students. Their opposition to the university was therefore also opposition to the kind of society in which

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they would be forced to participate after graduation. However, even while they confronted established society in making their concrete political demands, they were searching for their own place to settle down, and established their own new value systems and lifestyles. In sum, Zenkyoto was basically a cultural movement searching for its own identity. Critics have in fact found many elements of festival, amusement, and entertain- ment within the movement (Nakano 1987, p. 100).

The counter-culture movement had also started in Japan. The “Buzoku” (tribe) commune was set up in 1967. This movement was a fusion of the spirit of the American west coast and the soul of Buddhism and Hinduism in India. They alienated themselves from the entire value system of the industrial society, and dropped out voluntarily to form their own world. Therefore, their values and lifestyles were literally a counter-culture which they lived every day. Youth movements sharing these values could be found in the fields of music, drama, and the free press (Takada 1978, pp.41-43). Here we can see an authentic searching for a new identity in an a!ternative world. This attitude attracted many youths who had doubts about their own lifestyles and the course of mainstream society, an aspect they had in common with the Zenkyoto. After the collapse of the Zen- kyoto movement around 1970, some joined the counter-culture in order to seek their own life within the established society. Therefore, we can count both political radicalism and cultural alienation as factors in the counter-culture movement.

The alienated, and those who participated in or supported radical movements, were born during the unprecedented baby-boom which occurred after World War 11. They have recently come to be called “the mass generation.” The magnitude of this generation was one of the reasons behind the number of dissenters on campuses and throughout society. From 1968 to 1969, nearly half of all universities and colleges suffered from campus unrest. This shows that the values and action patterns of the counter-culture had become widespread.

What did the development of adolescent culture as a counter-culture mean? It meant an increasing rejection by youth of the industrial society, which had produced many negative phenomena during the high economic growth (at an annual rate of over 10 per cent during this period). It also meant the possibility of a new culture in the developing post-industrial society. Nevertheless, as of 1970, this new culture was not yet in evi- dence. If we consider, as Daniel Bell did, the word “transition” to be equivalent to “post-,” we can say that Japan entered the post-industrial stage around 1970. In other words, the emergence of adolescent culture as a counter-culture signified the beginning of post-industrial society.

Youth in the counter-culture had to take two steps in sequence to obtain their own identity: first, they had to reject the industrial society into which they had been born, then they had to create a new society for themselves. Adolescence is the time of transition from childhood to adulthood, and is, as Erik Erikson (1950) pointed out, the crisis of identity which concerns the consistency between self and society, and the continu-

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ity between self in the past and self in the present. In the post-industrial society, however, youth in the counter-culture began to discuss what adulthood should be in industrial society, and then asked themselves whether or not the continuity and consistency were valid. They questioned adolescence itself in industrial society. Here we need Kenneth Keniston’s concept of “youth” to analyze the situation.

Keniston pointed out that “we are witnessing today the emergence on a mass scale of a previously unrecognized stage of life” (Keniston 1971, p. 7 ) , and proposed calling it the stage of “youth.” According to him, among the youth in the so-called “prolonged adolescence,” there exist those who must stay in that state despite an “accurate analysis of the perils and injus- tices of the world in which they live” (p. 81, and that there are “millions of young people ” who enter this stage of life “in the advanced nations of the world” (p. 7 ) . He also argued that the emergence of “youth” was linked with the transition from industrial society to post-industrial society. Referring to the difference between adolescence and “youth,” he said that “the adolescent is struggling to define who he is; the youth begins to sense who he is and thus to recognize the possibility of conflict and disparity between his emerging selfhood and his social order” (p. 8 ) . We might say that “youth” are those who have reached the second of these two steps, trying to establish their own identity by creating a new society. Thus we see a close relationship between the beginning of “post-industrial” society, the emergence of adolescent culture as a counter-culture, and the proportion of “youth” as a stage of life.

YOUTH CULTURE IN THE 1970s

The third period was the decade of the 1970s. The Japanese industrial structure was forced to reorganize by drastic changes in the world situation, such as the dollar shock of 1971, and the oil crisis in 1973. Inexplic- able social unrest spread throughout the nation in the midst of stagflation. Powerlessness and resignation were widespread, especially among youth after the failure of the anti-establishment dissent of the 1960s. They suffered from apathy and ennui, and became too passive to initiate their own action. For example, in 1970, high school students were described as apathetic, indifferent, and irresponsible towards social and political situations.

Despite the recession, there was an abundant supply of consumer goods, and youth were free to buy them. They became beneficiaries of the mass consumption society, and were financially parasitic on their parents and other adults. There were more opportunities to participate in sports, concerts, and travel, and money was easy to earn in part-time jobs. Although their values and action patterns were, as a whole, different from those of adults, and unique to the adolescent culture, it became difficult to specify their socio-economic background, because of the diffu- sion of the urban way of life and the development of mass media. They

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became absorbed with trivial personal details, and asserted themselves only in those matters. They were the “new young” of 1977.

The “new young” were gentle but vulnerable. They typically had their own artistic taste, made much of limited but intimate relationships, and kept their distance from competitive industrial society. They would not commit themselves to social and political situations, and withdrew into their private and exclusive world. Their attitude remained fundamentally unchanged, but as the economy improved through the 1980s, a more active kind of youth began to appear on the scene.

Youth in the counter-culture movement had entered into “youth” as a stage of life. In other words, they had begun to try to create new relationships between counter-culture ways of life and the established society. It was in their mid-twenties and mid-thirties, according to my interview research in 1980 (Takada 1987, p. 294) . that they left the “youth” stage (that is, they found a place for their own activities and lifestyles within the established society). But it was not until the next decade that they began to extend their activities to the rest of society.

YOUTH CULTURE IN THE 1980s

The fourth period runs from the beginning of the 1980s to the present. The Japanese economy has fully recovered from the dollar shock and the oil crisis, and, especially since December 1986, has been in a larger and longer economic boom than the “Izanagi economic boom” (57 months). One of the most striking phenomena of this period has been the entry of more women into the business world: women workers have exceeded housewives in number since 1984, and the Equal-Opportunity Employment Act came into being in 1986. The tendency towards family disintegration cannot be neglected. Examples are business bachelors (1982), the elderly living along (19841, divorce in the home (19841, and singles (1987).

In the 1980s, youth became self-expressive. “Takenoko (Bamboo Shoot) zoku” emerged in 1980. They wore strange Middle Eastern style clothes purchased a t the Takenoko boutique and danced about on the streets a t Yoyogi Park in Tokyo. In 1981, the “CrystaI zoku” appeared, taking their name from a novel entitled Being Somehow Crystal, as if from a catalog. They tried to express themselves by wearing name brands, following the characters in the novel. Both groups emphasized some of the characteristics shared with the “new young,” such as amusement and sensitivity; their conspicuous performances showed a desire to be a t the center of attention. Their activities were implicitly manipulated by the commercialism of the fashion business; theirs was almost a partial culture rather than a sub- culture.

After the word “ne-kura” (a gloomy character by nature) came to be used as an accusation in 1982, youth were increasingly pressured to remain cheerful. To them, “kurai” (gloomy) meant to be serious, to worry about one’s life, and to discuss political or economic problems.

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Therefore, young people, already apathetic, became further estranged from political and economic activities as a whole. As they could not discuss their worries or other serious topics with one another, they re- frained from exchanging intimate views, and their relationships became temporary, superficial, and floating. Their interests focused on culture and the pleasures of life, although it was important not to become too deeply involved or serious about them, The word “kei-haku-tan-sho” (light, thin, short, small) , which originally referred to IC chips, appeared in 1983 to describe the social conditions of the time. It was particularly appropriate for the behavioral patterns and relationships of the youth. The word “shin-jinrui” (new type of human beings) emerged in 1985 to describe them.

The characteristics of “shin-jinrui” were said to be as follows:

1 ) They were born after 1960, and therefore took it for granted that they lived in an affluent society following high economic growth.

2 ) They were “sensuous” persons, highly responsive to information. 3 1 They were characterized by self-acceptance and cool minds.

They did their duties well, but they would not do more than they had to. As a result, adults saw them as aliens. They were so unpredictable as consumers that companies could not work out strategies for the youth market. They remained slightly distant from the industrial society, form- ing their own sub-culture.

Those who entered youth as a stage of life in the 1970s decided where and how to live in the established society around 1980. In the early 1980s, they began to show their ways of life actively in various parts of Japan. It was after “Networking” (published in 1982) was translated into Japanese in 1984 that they found that their activities belonged to a more inclusive social reformist movement. Those who chose new ways of life alternative to those of industrial society found they were not alone, and that they might become a larger social force. When they got together by means of “networking,” they were the pioneers of the post-industrial society. As those who began to live an alternative lifestyle became visible through the web of networks, the counter-culture movement gained its raison d’ere in industrial society. The counter-culture movement has found active adher- ents with a social and economic base in the industrial society. I t consists of, on the one hand, grassroots movements which take action to protect their interests and human rights whenever they are infringed upon, and on the other hand, individuals who live their own lives detached from the ideology of industrial society. Both are spread throughout the country, but share basic values, which include “integrity” (Lipnack and Stamps, 1982) , “conspiracy” (Ferguson, 1980) , and “voluntary simplicity” (Elgin, 1981). Their fundamental beliefs are as follows:

1 ) All forms of life in the world, including human life, are closely interrelated with one another, and are integrated as a whole.

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2 The earth is an ecosystem and an integrated whole of life.

Therefore, in a broader sense, these values can be called the ecological view of the world on a global scale. Their activities in making networks have been conspicuous since around 1985.

CONCLUSION

Japanese youth are in a variety of states: “partial culture,” “sub-culture,” and “counter-culture.” Those in the partial culture are in the majority; they are content with affluence in the established society, and are concerned only about their private lives. (See “The present situation of Japanese youth” and “The profile of Japanese youth from recent research” for more detail. )

Those in the sub-culture create their own unique (adolescent) culture, but they are unable to provide any alternative direction to society in crisis, as they do not question the relevance of the established society. (See “New Young” and “Shin-jinrui.”)

The youth of the counter-culture are in the minority. As they raise questions about established society, they have the possibility of overcom- ing its crisis. Youth as a stage of life is a new moratorium for them to cope with the industrial society a t a critical turning point, namely post- industrial society.

However, youth think that Japan is obviously blessed with affluence, peace, and stability, as indicated by the statistics in “the profile of Japanese youth from recent research.” They seldom consider the crisis of industrial society to be closely related to themselves. Accordingly, it is clear that most will remain in the partial culture, and that some will make sub- culture, if they have the talent and opportunity. Since the middle of the 1980s, with the growing concern about networking and ecology, those who choose counter-culture are gradually increasing. However, they are still in the minority, and are not expected to increase rapidly. It is evident that their values and alternative way of life are the key to the future of our society.

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Akihiko Takada is a Professor of Sociology a t Seikei University.

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Documents

Contemporary Youth and Youth Culture in Japan