Contemporary challenges: globalisation, global interconnectedness and that ‘there are not plenty more fish in the sea’.: Fisheries, Governance and globalisation: is there a relationship?

Ocean & Coastal Management 46 (2003) 77–102

Contemporary challenges: globalisation, globalinterconnectedness and that ‘there are not plenty

more fish in the sea’.Fisheries, Governance and globalisation: is there

a relationship?

Hannah Cole*,1

34 Rue d’Alsace Lorraine, Brussels 1050, Belgium

Abstract

The article offers an analysis of the globalisation debate in the context of international

fisheries governance. It argues that there are significant transformations in fisheries policy-

making in international economics, international institutions and international law-making

which alter state authority in fisheries management. Thus, decision-making at international,

regional and national levels is increasing, displaced from the state level. This ‘multi-level’

decision-making is exemplified in the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation’s

Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 1995. The Code represents a sound instrument of

fisheries governance, capable of responding to contemporary global transformations. Changes

are illustrated by comparing the Code and the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and

Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, in the areas of international economics, institutions and

law-making. Reference is made to interaction between a range of actors and to formal and

informal procedures. In conclusion, a process of ‘fisheries governance’ is confirmed, emerging

from a new environment of international fisheries relations.

r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

*Corresponding author. Tel.: +32-486-67-87.

E-mail address: cole [email protected] (H. Cole).1 The article is based on a thesis produced by the author for an MA in International Relations in 2001,

at the University Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. The author works at the European Commission, Belgium

(e-mail: [email protected]).

0964-5691/03/$ - see front matter r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

PII: S 0 9 6 4 - 5 6 9 1 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 1 2 2 - 9

mailto:[email protected]

1. Introduction

Faced with global interconnectedness, new technological challenges, developmentsin international law and increasing international institutional co-operation thestructure for decisions taken on fisheries issues is being transformed. This articleidentifies a number of the principal transformations in fisheries policy-making ineconomics, international institutions and international law-making. It argues thatthese changes are the result of complex structural changes to the internationalpolitical system. Some comments are made on the impact of the changes, in light ofmodern environmental challenges, to the management of fisheries resources.

The central argument speaks to current debates in international fisheries policyconcerning globalisation and global fisheries governance. Globalisation theoryhighlights contemporary dynamics in international relations as well as the structuralchanges that result. Transformationalist theory serves as the analytical frameworkfor this article because it exposes the shifts in state authority in economic,institutional and legal sectors. At issue is the emergence of fisheries decision-makingat the global, national and regional levels—referred to as multi-level governance.Initially, the article identifies the main transformations in state authority and thedevelopment of multi-leveled authority. It exposes the key changes to formal stateauthority with respect to the international economy, international institutions, andinternational law-making in light of governance of fisheries issues. That will serve asan essential background to the case studies in order to define fisheries governance byapplying the changes recognised to the case studies. I will then turn to an analysis oftwo case studies: the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations(FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (‘the Code’) and the Agreementon Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks (‘the Agreement’). Engaging thatanalysis with the theory from earlier sections will be an opportunity to explore thenature of fisheries governance and confirm the impact of globalisation.

2. Globalisation and fisheries

The argument presented in this section exposes globalisation as a driving force forcreating significant shifts in state authority in economic, institutional and legaldomains.2 The focus is upon the dynamics which have catalysed a decision-makingprocess that takes place at the international, regional and national levels.

2 A number of frameworks for analysis of globalisation issues could be applied to the case of fisheries,

this article will focus on the transformationalist perspective. The Transformationalists perceive a growing

interconnectedness between actors based on transnational networks. The other two categories identified

for analysing globalisation are the hyper-globalists and sceptics. The hyper-globalists are a group of

authors who reflect upon an overwhelming influence of globalisation, notably leading to the decline of the

state which is replaced for the most part by economic powers such as Multinational Corporations

(MNCs), see Ohmae [1], dominated by MNC transactions. The sceptics—as their name suggests, are

dubious of any influence of globalisation, they argue that international relations is currently undergoing a

similar process to that seen previously in history, see for example Waltz [2].

H. Cole / Ocean & Coastal Management 46 (2003) 77–10278

Globalisation is seen as the intensification, widening and deepening, ofinternational networks across the economic, military, technological, ecological,migratory, political and cultural flows [3, p. 7]. That definition, supported by the‘transformationalist’ perspective, argues that the intensification of internationalnetworks, leading to ‘interconnectedness’, is unique to the contemporary period, butstresses that the networks are created as part of an ongoing process [4].

Global interconnectedness has developed in terms of economics, politics,technology, and law [5, p. 209]. The implication for states is two-fold. Internallyfor the nation state, there is erosion of the link between decision-makers and citizensand in turn, the capacity of the state to regulate (internally and externally)diminishes. Links between individuals and state authority are being reconstituted atnew levels and state borders are increasingly permeable. There is a transformation toauthority, ‘shifting patterns of power and constraints’, which lead to ‘disjunctures’internally and externally to the nation state [3, p. 30]. This article will focus onexternal disjunctures ‘‘between the formal domain of political authority states claim for

themselves and the actual practices and structures of the state and economic system at

national, regional and global levels’’ [5, p. 212]. Relations between actors are re-constituted and networks, constituting global interconnectedness, ensue. Actorsfrom a wide range of sectors participate in the web of relations, ranging frompoliticians to local fishermen. They are all implicated in the decisions madeconcerning fisheries, although the access to decision-making may vary amongst theseactors. Parallel to the development of global interconnectedness is a globalawareness which is exemplified in the environment. There is a shift in perceptionto the global level generating a global awareness ‘‘a community of fate’’ [3, p. 378].Global awareness contributes to a fundamental shift in the nature and practice ofstate sovereignty and autonomy, as it suggests an additional level of identificationand representation, but it does not de facto suggest an end to the nation–state.

State sovereignty has been challenged by regulations governing the Law of theSea, namely changes to authority and new collaborative forms of decision-making.This argument, which I shall pursue during this article, challenges the notion of anation state as enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia 1648 [3, pp. 37, 38]. Underclassical Westphalia law, the sea was recognised, with the air and earth, as aphenomenon falling under the sovereign authority of those states which were able toexercise control. The sea’s resources were seen to be infinite [6]. Fishing efforts byone nation’s vessels did not interfere with the right of another nation’s vessels to fishin the same region. However, since the later half of the last century, the high sea hasbeen considered a shared resource. In 1967 the high sea was claimed as ‘commonheritage of mankind’, suggesting a collective means of governing the appropriationand exploitation of the sea. Foreign policy concerning the ocean has becomeincreasing interconnected.3 The International Convention on the Law of the Sea1982, promotes the notion of common heritage by attempting to accord states equalrights and responsibilities towards the high sea. At the same time the Conventiongrants coastal states 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) over

3 See reference to US ocean foreign policy making [7, pp. 96, 97].

H. Cole / Ocean & Coastal Management 46 (2003) 77–102 79

which they have exclusive economic access to the living resources and minerals[8, Article 17]. EEZs provide coastal states with the opportunity of exploiting thefisheries resources in the 200-mile area. The zones shifted management of fishresources to coastal states, notably previous colonies [9], and led to negotiationsconcerning migratory stocks [8, Article 63 (2)]. The Convention is a cleardevelopment from Westphalian law that recognised all natural resources as fallingunder sovereign authority once claimed by those authorities, providing they wereable to exercise control over the resource [3, pp. 37, 38]. The Convention madefishing subject to rights and duties [10] and also established a Court to resolvedisputes: the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. There are currently 130parties to the Convention and it has been built upon to include the Agreementrelating to Part XI of the Convention and the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocksand the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks4 (see below).

Parallel to structural changes to fisheries decision-making procedures, there is anincreasing environmental crisis. Fish constitute a finite resource and in many parts ofthe world essential stocks are in substantial decline. Technical progress has allowedfor an augmentation in the number and efficiency of fishing vessels leading to yetmore intense exploitation of stocks.5 Numbers of adult fish are falling rapidly andsmaller fish are targeted. At the same time the number of females reaching spawningage is reduced. Stocks are thus replaced at a lower rate often at a critical level.Ecological crisis and institutional management are interconnected through necessity.The commercial position of fisheries businesses has deteriorated, over-fishing hasmeant falling returns and increased competition. Political decision makers areimplicated, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (August 2002) inJohannesburg, national and regional representatives decided at an international levelto take steps to restore fish stocks by 2015.6

Through interconnectedness, authority is displaced amongst a variety ofactors at different levels. Authority is re-constituted at multi-levels. If that is sowe should be able to observe a number of distinctions against past levels authority[5, pp. 212–222] and in this article we should note divisions to authority regardingthe fisheries sector. The three disjunctures relevant to international fisheriesdecision-making are: the international economy, international institutions, andinternational law. A review of each of these follows below in relation to fisheriesmanagement.

2.1. Disjuncture: international economy

The activities of the international economy have increased, creating new forms ofinteraction beyond those of the nation state. There are a number of characteristicsthat distinguish the emerging system: the internationalisation of production and theinternationalisation of trade are central processes. They are exemplified by growing

4 http://www.fao.org/Legal/default.htm.5 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news corner/doss inf/mesure2 en.htm.6 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news corner/press/inf02 27 en.htm.


http://www.fao.org/Legal/default.htm

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news_corner/doss_inf/mesure2_en.htm




http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news_corner/press/inf02_27_en.htm




Multi-National Companies (MNCs), which are stimulated by the rapidity as well asthe mobility of transactions.

Fish markets are increasingly internationalised and interconnected. The globalisa-tion of fish markets can be traced to the extension of EEZs which radicallyredistributed rights to fish resources [11]. Consumption and production of fishproducts has increased, notably in the most industrialised countries [3, p. 402]. Thoseincreases present in themselves management challenges for fisheries regulators.Furthermore, the critically low fish stocks explained above are in opposition to theproduction demand, placing a further dilemma before decision-makers.

Technological advancements have been instrumental factors in augmenting thefish trade. The expansion in aquaculture processes and quality has led to a new typeof fish production. The aquaculture sector’s contribution to total food fish andshellfish more than quadrupled during the last 47 years, increasing from 7% to 30%in 1997.7 Improved techniques in the processing of fisheries products have facilitatedthe speed of production large-scale modern fishing practice bears little resemblanceto the romantic image of a local fishing boat taking a daily catch. The socio-economic impact of technological developments is becoming increasingly evident.Employment in marine fishing has been declining steadily since the 1970s. Small-scale fishermen, often at the lower level of the decision-making scale, are particularlyat risk: more efficient large-scale fishing threatens their existence [12, p. 5].

The capacity of states to manage the changes to the economy has implications forthe fishing trade. In general terms, states are increasingly turning towardsinternational institutions, principally the World Trade Organisation (WTO), toresolve trade disputes. Regarding fisheries there are two notable references: tunacatches [13, p. 127] and fisheries subsidies [14].

2.2. Disjuncture: international institutions

International fisheries institutions have expanded to create a network of global co-ordination. Over the past 50 years, fisheries policy making has developed from aposition of minimal international co-operation and the pre-occupation of individualstates, into a range of organisations holding authority on global fisheries manage-ment. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) fisheries department, underthe guidance of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI), of the United Nations (UN) hasdeveloped a key role at the international level. There has been a significantdevelopment in Regional Fisheries Bodies (RFBs) which implement policy at theregional level.8 The regional and international levels of authority are in principlecomplementary; the RFBs have been strengthened by FAO. The two levels work

7 http://www.fao.org/fi/fifacts/newfact.asp.htm.8 http://www.fao.org/fi/body/rfb/chooserfb.htm (a number RFB directly under FAO authority:

APFIC—Atlantic–Pacific Fishery Commission, CECEAF—Fishery Committee for the Eastern Southwest

Atlantic, CIFA—Committee for Inland Fisheries of Africa, COPECSCAL—Inland fisheries commission

for Latin America and the Caribbean, EIFAC—European Inland Fisheries Advisory Commission,

OITC—Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, RECOFI—Regional Commission for Fisheries, SWIOFC—

Southwest Ocean Fisheries Commission, WECAFC—Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission).


http://www.fao.org/fi/fifacts/newfact.asp.htm

http://www.fao.org/fi/body/rfb/chooserfb.htm

with states, attempting to integrate state interests into overarching objectives. Inaddition, the two levels work with non-state actors, such as companies from thefishing industry and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). In response, thesenon-state actors have re-aligned their strategies towards different levels of authorityheld by regional/international and state levels. Fisheries interest groups arerepresented before the UN, states, the EU, and RFBs.

Central regional bodies such as the EU are an important result of interconnected-ness. The EU is the strongest example of regional policy making, as it holdslegislative competencies. Defining the annual Total Allowable Catches (TACs) formember states has been one area of considerable authority [15, p. 87]. The EU hasalso developed policy in terms of EU fishing in third country waters and consultationof fishing stakeholder interests [15, pp. 190–201, 70–80].9

2.3. Disjuncture: international law

The development of international law has created some differences between theformal political authority claimed by a state and the actual practices and structuresof the state at the national, regional and global levels. Over the past 50 years therehas been a huge development in the scope of international fisheries law. The 1982International Convention of the Law of the Sea created an important basis for suchlaw. The development of environmental practice and law complements thedevelopment in the fisheries area. In particular the 1992 United Nations Conferenceon the Environment and Development (UNCED) produced Agenda 21 Chapter 17,makes recommendations for actions on specific marine living resource issues.International rules have emerged, and notions of sustainability, responsibility, andtransparency in decision-making are re-iterated in the legal instruments. Further-more, a number of guiding principles have been introduced. The Rio Earth SummitDeclaration underlined principles of sustainability and the ‘precautionary principle’.The precautionary principle is fully endorsed in the Code of Conduct forResponsible Fisheries.

The transfer of government autonomy to international instruments and thedevelopment of collective enforcement are identified in the number of importantinternational instruments related to fisheries that have been put into place since theearly 1990s. Notable are: the Agreement for the Conservation and Management ofStraddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks [16], the FAO Code ofConduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995), the complementary FAO Agreement toPromote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measuresby Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (1993), the Global Programme of Action for theProtection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (the GlobalProgramme of Action 1995).

The international fisheries instruments signify a development of traditionalinternational law. States are still the key points of reference, but there are significantresponsibilities placed on the role of regional fisheries organisations. In addition the

9 Interview with Mr Cueff [24], see also Lesquene [15, pp. 190–201, 70–80].


input of fisheries stakeholders is perceived as essential in the conduct of policy, whenthey should be consulted, and in the implementation procedure. The Code ofConduct, Article 1.0, prioritises the involvement of fisheries stakeholder interests.

Stakeholders therefore realign their representation towards all three multi-levelsand respond to the changes in international law, economics and institutions.Fishermen should be considered part of the interconnected web of internationalrelations explained above. Their work is regulated by international, regional andnational decision-makers, they compete within an international economy and havemore and more possibilities to be represented within a multi-leveled framework ofauthority.

The three ‘disjunctures’ examined above create new processes for decision-makingregarding fisheries, and by drawing on a transformationalist perspective develop-ments in the fisheries sphere have been clearly acknowledged. The next section turnsto governance, highlighting a definition by the Commission on Global Governance.This will allow a closer examination of contemporary fisheries dynamics, to be builton in the case studies in sections four and five.

3. Fisheries governance in a ‘globalised’ world?

As transformations to state authority materialise and as global ‘interconnectedness’appears in international relations the question must be asked whether suchinterconnectedness establishes a new form of governance.

Governance recognises norms and regulations, but may include informal practicesemanating from either an official or non-official authority [17, p. 5], within a sphereof activity. The practices of governance are inseparable from international order,including systems of rules, control and management operating at multi-levels [17, p.9], as multi-level governance. The case studies below will highlight how multi-levelgovernance of fisheries management is integrating divergent economic, political orcultural interests.

In its 1995 report ‘Our Global Neighbourhood’, the Commission on GlobalGovernance has created a broader definition of governance with a constructiveapplication. It defines four properties of governance at the global level: thatgovernance is a process, not a system of rules or an activity, that it is founded oncompromise not on domination, that it implies input from private and public actors,and that it is not a formal procedure but is made up of constant interaction [18, pp.2–5]. There is an emphasis upon change and transformation, as argued bytransformationalists.10 Multi-level governance can be expanded to include sectorsbeyond legal regulations. Negotiations between supra national, national, regionaland local authorities are highlighted [20] as well as an interaction between public andprivate actors [45]. This interaction constitutes part of the interconnectednessreferred to in Section 2. In particular, non-state actors such as NGOs are integratedinto negotiations at the different levels of authority.

10 For further examination of the idea of structural change resulting from globalisation see Giddens [19].


It follows that governance is distinct from regimes which occur only in specificissue areas. This is not the place to examine regime theory in detail but it isimportant to stress that governance is more comprehensive than a regime and thatthe growth in regimes in contemporary international relations contributes to thedevelopment of governance [21,22]. Regimes only occur in precise domains, whilegovernance is neither inseparable from the global order nor limited to specificactivities.

Having confirmed the importance of applying a definition of governance to theactual practice of policy making, to prevent it from being an abstract concept [20, p.92], I am in a position to review current issues in fisheries governance based on thethree ‘disjunctures’ examined earlier and the definition of governance selected above,in light of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the Agreement onStraddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.

4. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 1995

The FAO Code is a unique document prescribing global norms of behaviour forfisheries practice. It is comprehensive, encompassing all fisheries practice and itsscope is vast. A voluntary instrument, it nonetheless incorporates relevant rules ofinternational law, notably those identified in the UN Convention on the Law of theSea of 10 December 1982. The Code contains provisions for obligatory legalinstruments which have a binding effect amongst parties, in particular, theAgreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Manage-ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993, which forms an integralpart of the Code.11 Furthermore, the Code is supported by four Plans of Action,which set guidelines in specific areas; seabirds by-catch, management of by-catch,shark management, illegal fishing.

The all-encompasing nature of the Code and its particular quasi-legal statusbegs the question whether this document is one representation of global governance.The following discussion will identify changes to state sovereignty in the context ofthe Code. I will first focus on the development of international institutionsand practice relevant to the Code. I shall then turn to the three disjunctures: those ofthe international economy, international institutions and international law, asexplained above. Reference to global transformations and governance will showthat the Code represents a form of global governance. The four principles ofgovernance identified by the Commission on Global Governance will beused to recognise fisheries governance. In summary, the four principles are the ideaof a process, practicing compromise amongst parties, involvement of publicand private actors, constant interaction between actors involving informalprocedures.

11 According to FAO Conference resolution 15/93 paragraph 3 [23].


4.1. Interconnectedness

Patterns of international interconnectedness have developed in two main ways ininternational fisheries management. Firstly in the increase of actors integrated intodecisions made and secondly in the development of multi-level decision-making.Importance is now placed on involving fisheries ‘stakeholder interests’ and theseinclude Non-Governmental Organisations and Industry. Environmental interestshave become increasingly active in the fisheries field, and consideration of thoseinterests has become part of the policy process in both the private and publicsector.12 Scientists have also played a role in the area of fisheries policy, as a naturalresource, scientific opinion is increasingly incorporated into the formal decision-making process. In an attempt to regulate fisheries practice states have collaboratedto support the FAO and RFBs to monitor stock levels, transfer information,integrate interests into policy making. In turn they have accepted co-operating tocontrol policy outcomes favourable to sustainable fisheries. It is important to notethat creating multi-level co-operation in fisheries has led to acceptance of commonobjectives that are applied globally. The Code of Conduct underlines a number ofcommon principles such as ‘sustainability’, or the ‘pre-cautionary principle’.13 Themanifestation of such common principles suggests an ideological shift to the globallevel [25, p. 19]. States still maintain authority within the multi-level system butaccept compromise over broad themes. The system is not without conflict, but theimportance of international decision-making cannot be ignored at the national level.Fisheries management presents a sound example of how states are realising that co-operation may be the only means to resolve a global problem: that of low fish stocks.

4.2. Disjunctures

The Code represents an initiative that encompasses changes to the internationalsystem. It is a document of particular political importance and represents anevolution in organising fisheries at the international level.14

4.2.1. Economy

The Code recognises some significant aspects of the international fisherieseconomy. Aquaculture procedures and development are covered, there arerecommendations for the responsible development of aquaculture under nationaljurisdiction, for ensuring responsible transboundary aquatic ecosystems and forpromoting responsible aquaculture farming (Article 9). In addition, the Codereinforces the role of the WTO as the institution to co-ordinate international fish

12 Interview with Mr Cueff [24]. see also Lequesne [15, p. 163].13 Both these terms are general guidelines to consider in decision-making. The precautionary principle is

integrated into the Code as a guiding principle: see 7.5 of the Code of Conduct, for an analysis, and see

Young [22, p. 219].14 Interview with Mr Belier [26].


trade issues. The Code should accord with the WTO principles, rights andobligations (Article 11.2.1). The WTO is the institution that ensures equitable,non-discriminatory trade in fish and fish products (Article 11.2.14) and the Codesupports its initiatives to liberalise trade in fish and fishery products and eliminatebarriers and distortions to trade (Article 11.2.4) ensuring the further economic,international organisations, international law. However, it is the ‘rapid and often

uncontrolled exploitation’ which has brought about a need to respond through theCode and instigate more responsible fisheries practices [27]. Instigating moresustainable fisheries practices also addresses the socio-economic threat to fishermans’employment, explained above, as a result of technological developments in thefisheries sector.

4.2.2. International institutions

The development of international institutions was essential to the creation of theCode. The FAO is the creator of the Code, but the UN institutional structure is alsoimportant. FAO and UN developments worked in parallel. The UN environmentalconferences contributed to the Code’s principles, for example the Kyoto Conferenceon Environment (below). In turn the Code’s preparation fed into the UNconferences, the FAO conference of Canc !un 1992 providing input into the 1992UNCED conference [28, p. 1]. The Code recognises RFBs as intrinsic to itsimplementation [29]. A growing international consciousness can be traced,referenced earlier, which has stimulated international fisheries debate, parallel tothe institutional development. Global environmental threats including decreasingfish stocks have led to international level policy-making, notably surrounding theidea of sustainable development [25, pp. 210, 211].

Other international organisations are now adding to the implementation of theCode. In March 2000, the OECD, under the Committee for Fisheries adopted aStudy on the Transition to Responsible Fisheries. The study examined technicalmeasures and costs involved in a transition to responsible fisheries designated by theCode. The empirical material produced from the study, which reviewed a range ofcase studies, demonstrated that the transition to more responsible and sustainablefisheries offers the potential for long-term gains that are beneficial to producers,consumers and society as a whole [12, p. 4].

4.2.3. International law

The Code represents international law, in itself a rupture with national rulemaking. As a voluntary instrument, the Code is more an example of ‘soft law’ than adocument of classic international law based on a society of sovereign states. TheCode refers to a shared responsibility amongst all fisheries stakeholders. While thestates are the signatories to the Code and therefore make up the essential parties ofthe document, individuals, companies, non-governmental fisheries and RFBs arealso considered party to responsible fisheries. Law making creates rights and dutieswhich surpass the nation state to include a range of fisheries stakeholders.


Tuna fishing shows how the Code encompasses a new type of responsibility and ofrule making. Tuna poses particular difficulties to regulate, as it is a highly migratoryspecies—catching often takes place in the high seas by larger vessels. Correctmanagement of tuna fisheries requires agreement between several countries. In thelight of the notion of ‘shared responsibilities’ of the Code, responsibilities thereforeapply to industrial, small-scale fisheries and fishing (flag) states and coastal (port)states. For industry, the fishers are encouraged to carry documentation, maintainsustainable equipment, operate in a safe manner and comply with specific gearrequirements developed through expert consultation [30]. States are expectedamongst other requirements: to guarantee the working conditions and the safetyof fishermen, set up consultation arrangements, and provide information andtraining regarding international agreements. There are a range of responsibilitiesregarding small-scale fishing: fishers should aim to consider the environmentalimpact of their practices; avoid conflict with large-scale fishers; and states shouldguarantee the fishing rights of small-scale fishers and monitor the coastalenvironment.

4.3. Process (development, continuity)

The Code is, though, arguably more than a legal document. It was brought aboutthrough an evolution of international negotiation and its success will depend on theextent of interaction across multi-levels of authority.

The concept of a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was firstacknowledged at the Nineteenth Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries(COFI) in 1991, within the context of its deliberations concerning the threat tosustainability by large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing. Responding to this call, FAO inco-operation with the government of Mexico organised the International Conferenceon Responsible Fishing in Canc !un in May 1992, attended by more than 60 countries,the EC representatives from key intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and fisherymanagement organisations. The Conference adopted the Declaration of Canc !un thatnoted inter alia the vital need for fishing to continue and to develop within acomprehensive and balanced system under the concept of ‘responsible fishing’ [28, p.1]. In addition, the Declaration called upon FAO to draft an International Code ofConduct for Responsible Fishing. The Code evolved during a period of dynamicinternational environmental and fisheries debate, as noted above. International legalinstruments made up an important part of defining international priorities as well asinternational conferences and actors [25, p. 207]. The 1992 UNCED conference andAgenda 21 as well as the 1995 Kyoto Declaration brought to the fore questions oversustainability and application of the precautionary principle. Moreover, the 1993Compliance Agreement which makes up part of the Code, the UN Conference andAgreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and theexpansion in RFBs all contributed to a process which suggests an emerging fisheriesgovernance.

The Code recognises the need for a process of governance, by identifying long-term objectives and multi-levels of governance. The objectives (Article 2) are to bring


about long-term responsible fisheries practices. The implementation of the Codeacross multi-levelled authority will be crucial to its success (Article 4). The Code evenaims to be a ‘living document’ which is capable of being adapted and changed tomeet new fishery developments and situations [28, p. 3]. Implementation andendorsement of the Code has taken place at the national, regional and internationallevel, with strikingly varied applications. The UK government, has endorsed theCode, introducing a project in West African Coastal State Communities,‘Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Programme’ (SFLP). The World Bank supportsresponsible fisheries; it has a unit for sustainable fisheries and aquatic research(SIFAR). At the regional level catch limits have been imposed where the stockspecific reference points have been approached or exceeded by CCBST, CCPPS,IATTC, NASCO. Some organisations have adopted long-term managementstrategies. The precautionary approach is being applied through the adoption ofmeasures such as catch limits, zero catches, quota regulations, closed areas andmoratoria on fishing in the waters covered by the mandates of the organisations.15

The EU refers to the Code’s objectives in its Green Paper on the future of theCommon Fisheries Policy as the overall objective of a fisheries policy [32]. The studyof a transition to responsible fisheries, carried out by OECD, shows that adapting tochange is vital to responding to contemporary challenges in fisheries management.The two significant challenges identified for policy makers in the transition are(i) dealing with the complex and, to some extent, uncontrollable nature of the fishery

ecosystem; and (ii) managing the effects of change that must inevitably be faced by the

stakeholders in the industry [33, p. 4].

4.4. Compromise

Article 4.1 underlines the importance of compromise in implementation of theCode. All members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities and relevantsubregional, regional and global organisations, whether governmental or non-governmental, and all persons concerned with the conservation, management andutilisation of fisheries resources and trade in fish and fishery products shouldcollaborate in the fulfilment and implementation of the objectives and principlescontained in this Code. The importance of compromise at the international level onthe overall objectives is allowed for by the margin of interpretation for regionalparticularities, or for certain fish stock needs. The essence is the notion of co-operation between stakeholder interests, and co-operation transforms the notion ofstate anarchy where states compete for authority.

By accepting the Code, states must agree to compromise a part of nationalsovereignty. The Code suggests that rather than fishing actions being theresponsibility of nation–states they ought rather to take the form of a sharedresponsibility towards fishing. Could this be an example of the emerging ‘communityof fate’ referred to in section one? There are increasing moves towards the globallevel consensus: the WTO to dispute resolution, regional standards introduced via

15 FAO COFI 24th Session, points 38–40 [31].


RFBs, accepting the precautionary principle to set technical guidelines. In practice,conflict is still prevalent in fisheries policy, but increasingly at the international level.There are particular tensions between industrial large-scale fishing and small-scalecoastal fisheries or distant water fishing states and coastal states [26]. The dichotomyis particularly apparent between fisheries-dependant regions and industrial distantfisheries, the latter increasingly abstracting the resources previously fished only bythe former.

The objective of the Code is to present overarching objectives for all interests.Perhaps it still lacks sufficient means with which to effectively resolve disputes, thiscould only happen by adding to its authority in the legal sense or providing greaterpowers to regional authorities so that they may resolve disputes through proceduresfound in the EU. Unlike the Agreement, there are no dispute resolution mechanisms,which are specific to the instrument. The WTO and the International Tribunal of theLaw of the Sea are nonetheless recognised as bodies with the legal authority toresolve relevant disputes.

4.5. Private and public

The Code encourages private and public actors in the fisheries sector to takeresponsibility for their involvement in fishing (Article 4). The FAO has attempted tofollow up the initiatives of non-state actors in the implementation procedure. Foodsafety (Article 11) provides a useful example. Regional Marketing Information andFishery Product organisations in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean informed FAO thatin most of their member countries effective food safety and quality assurance systemsfor exports are in place as stipulated in Article 11 of the Code.16 States too confirmedthat such systems were in place. Shortfalls identified were in the lack of measures toovercome the processing or trade of illegally harvested resources and NGOshighlighted the inadequate measures in place to monitor aquaculture operations andto minimise the effects of non-native species or genetically altered stocks foraquaculture.

NGOs have become more involved in fisheries policy. In the Code’s elaborationprocess, close relations between FAO and international NGOs were encouraged.NGOs made important technical contributions to the elaboration process, whichadded to the transparency of the drafting process [28, p. 2]. In addition NGOs haveparticipated in Code workshops and seminars in the publicising and translating ofthe Code into local languages and through technical publications of the Code’sobjectives.17

Interest groups debate over issue areas at the international level, as a result ofinterconnectedness. Private and public interests clashed over the issue of dolphins asa by-catch in fishing, resulting in the negotiation of the Convention on DolphinProtection. Industry and NGOs can also be in alliance. In the case of subsidies, freetrade MNCs support the reduction of subsidies for the reason that they distort trade.

16 COFI 24th Session point 36 [31].17 COFI 24th Session point 46 [31].


Environmental NGOs support the reduction of subsidies because they claim thatthey support the development of fishing capacity beyond levels of sustainability withthe environment.18 Governance implicates a wide selection of stakeholders and theCode endorses stakeholder involvement in decision-making.

4.6. Constant interaction, informal procedures

The input of NGOs into the Code’s implementation highlights the interactivenature of the instrument. Informal recognition is essential to accepting the Code as aguidance document, the ‘voluntary nature’ of the document encouraging informalpractice. The establishment of the Marine Stewardship Council, set up by the WorldWildlife Fund (WWF) and Unilever represents a move towards creating continuousinteraction on the Code’s principles. This organisation uses the Code’s principles topromote responsible fisheries and has undertaken considerable work in researchingeco-labelling of fisheries products.19

The Code’s objectives must also be born in mind when regional organisations setup agreements. In February 1998 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna commission (I-ATTC) concluded a binding agreement amongst its members for provisions ondolphin protection (Agreement for the International Dolphin programme). Thedolphin Agreement has conditions concerning the reduction of by-catch and discardsand provides for measures to be taken to achieve those objectives that are consistentwith the Code.

It is the regional level which defines the technical implementation of the Code andwhich is in turn the point of contact in policy making. Technical guidelines areprepared by RFBs, articles are prioritised and interpreted for application, experts arenominated, and progress is monitored.20 The Code’s four Action Plans provide areference to the implementation procedure by regional organisations. The fouraction plans are: the International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch ofSeabirds in Longline Fisheries, the International Plan of Action for the Conservationand Management of Sharks, the International Plan of Action for the Management ofFishing Capacity and the International Plan of Action to prevent, deter andeliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The last of these plans wasrecently adopted by COFI and is particularly significant in changing the approachtowards creating a more constant co-operation at international level. The Plan todeter illegal fishing aims to regulate the allocation of fishing rights to ships inNational waters. Though we assume that ships in the EEZ are national ships,increasing evidence before the international community suggests otherwise. Rights tofish are often issued by private companies, to private fishing companies, with noregulation by states or regional institutions. The effect is that these unregulated boats

18 For further details on the sustainability and subsidy debate see Porter [34].19 For more information on this initiative see WWF and Marine Stewardship Council’s web pages:

http:// www.panda.org and http://128.242.41.51, respectively.20 SEAFDEC. Regionalisation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. April 2000, http://

www.seafdec.org/stra/Default.htm.


http://,0,0,2

http://128.242.41.51

http://www.seafdec.org/stra/Default.htm

http://www.seafdec.org/stra/Default.htm

escape regulation of any kind of their catch, for this reason they are called piratefishers. The action plan encourages a more consistent and constant multi-level co-operation to integrate fishing rights issuing companies into the international system.The action plan has been endorsed by a number of fisheries interest groups (in theindustry and environmental sectors) as well as states and regional organisations.21

An important aspect of the interaction is the consultation and integration of arange of stakeholders into the policy making process. Consultation is encouragedthroughout the Code—Article 6 governing general principles insists upon consulta-tion procedures. Stakeholder consultation is also seen as vital to responsible fisheriesmanagement in Article 7. The report produced by the OECD examining thetransition to responsible fisheries, stresses that it is only through interaction andconsultation that consistent policies will be implemented [33, p. 7].

This section has demonstrated that the Code emerges out of, and compliments, anenvironment of multi-levelled decision-making. The Code responds to modificationsto authority in international relations. Furthermore, the Code corresponds to allfour aspects of governance identified in section three; particularly as a process and asan instrument that demands constant interaction amongst stakeholders. Byconfirming a correlation with governance the Code appears as a critical instrumentfor managing contemporary international relations. A multi-level approach includesconsultation, interaction between private and public actors or state and non-stateactors, this facilitates mediation in cases of conflict. Given the increasing competitionfor fisheries resources, conflict prevention techniques are ever more important. Thefollowing section will pick up on similar themes, thus developing arguments oninterconnectedness and governance identified in sections two and three. This willdeepen an understanding of governance in the fisheries sector, notably in identifyingthe major global dynamics and the Code’s interaction with other instruments.

5. The Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995

The Agreement covers fish straddling the EEZs of one or more states and the highseas (straddling stocks) and those that move across vast expanses of ocean space(highly migratory stocks). The stocks that cross international boundaries can only bemanaged and conserved through interaction between coastal stakeholders (withinEEZs) and fish stakeholders who fish for those stocks on the high seas. The casestudy analyses whether the Agreement represents global governance or whether it ismore suitably defined as a regime. Comparisons will be drawn with the Code. Asimilar structure will be followed to the former case study, referring closely tomaterial from sections two and three. I will first focus on the increased globalinteraction relating to fisheries, already examined in Section 2. I shall then turn to thethree areas of transformations to international economics, institutions and law. Thelater part of the section examines the Agreement in the context of governance.

21 European Commission. ‘Peche illicite, non d!eclar!ee et non r!eglement!ee’. In, La P#eche Europ!eenne

February 2001; vol. 6, Brussels: European Commission.


5.1. Interconnectedness

The Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks encourages state interaction and reliesupon the interconnectedness of international actors. The very subjects of theAgreement are transnational: it covers fish stocks that migrate across fishing zones,from one national economic area to another, or from the high seas into EEZs.

The Agreement is based upon a pattern of international, national and regionalauthorities that have emerged over the past 50 years. Earlier, reference was made to a‘community of fate’; awareness of fisheries problems at a global level has meant thatinternational instruments have been established. Like the Code of Conduct theAgreement was produced in the context of the development of internationalenvironmental debate and the extension of FAO’s activities in fisheries issues. TheAgreement was negotiated at the same time as the Code of Conduct, it containssimilar principles for obtaining environmental sustainability as recognised at the UNconferences of Rio and Stockholm. It recognises a collective responsibility and thelink to local levels, notably fisheries communities and arguably, the internationalinterconnectedness of fisheries issues contributed to the Agreement. As mentionedabove, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 states that further measures are required to ensurethe implementation of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The ‘oceans chapter’states that the right to fish is conditional and accompanied by the duty to manageand conserve resources for present and future generations.22 This right is linked tosustaining the livelihoods and rights of fishing communities. The theme of collectiveresponsibility was developed in the negotiations of UN Fish Stocks Agreements andthe FAO Code [36].

Developments in fisheries technology have significantly increased the capabilitiesof vessels to catch straddling stocks. The harvesting and processing efficiency pervessel has risen considerably, some estimates suggest by a factor of three [37, p. 206].Fishing companies have introduced a wide range of new technologies enabling themto find, catch and process fish in higher concentrations or at significantly lowerdepths. This has enlarged the number of independent fisheries vessels, now able tofish at a distance the straddling stocks [37, p. 207].

5.2. Disjunctures

5.2.1. Economy

Migratory fish stocks are often species of high commercial value—tuna providesan example, being important economically and as a source of food [38]. Due tomodern technologies in fishing techniques, fish catching on the high-seas is highlycompetitive. In addition the high seas do not have the national claims held withinEEZ areas so the incentive to maximise profit is increased. Modern technologiesallow the catching industries to exploit fish catches in an attempt to augmenttheir economic gain. Fishing companies are able to catch and process fish inconcentrations or at depths which previously would have been impossible or

22 UN Agenda 21, Chapter 17, Para. 17.49 (e) see [35].


uneconomic. As a result, a growing number of stocks straddling high-seasboundaries have become available to vessels operating independently of the coastalstate infrastructure. A tension ensues between distant fishers and coastal commu-nities attempting to reap the benefits of straddling stocks along the high-sea/EEZfrontier. The global production of tuna and tuna-like species has increased from lessthan 0.6 million tonnes in 1950 to 5.5 million tonnes in 1998.23 Tuna has aparticularly strong commercial value as it is sold globally fresh, frozen, and canned.This leads to global patterns of trade as the fish is caught in one region of the worldand produced in other parts of the world and this leads to import and exportpatterns across the globe, enhanced by modern technology, which have in turn led totrade conflicts in international organisations in the GATT/WTO and theInternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.24

5.2.2. International institutions

There is a need for a new form of response to problems of straddling stocks, soinstitutions have begun to co-operate on a multi-level structure. As the stocks aremigratory, they pose a challenge in themselves to state authority. These fishundermine the notion of territory by crossing borders. In addition, technologicaldevelopments and changes in coastal management (in particular EEZ zones) havemeant that regional organisations have come to play a role in co-ordinating fisheries,conservation and management of the stocks. There is a strong interplay, underlinedby the Agreement between regional and global authority that has led to aharmonisation of management tasks. In the area of compliance control, globalminimum standards of compliance mechanisms have been introduced, for examplein port-state measures to adherence of regional conservation measures [37, p. 231].

5.2.3. International law

The Agreement represents a re-enforcement and development of internationalfisheries law. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement confirms provisions of the Law of theSea Convention 1982. The Fish Stocks Agreement incorporates the disputesettlement provisions of the Convention [16, Article 30]. Along with the AgreementRelating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea of 10 December 1982, the Agreement on Fish Stocks gives substanceto the general provisions of the 1982 Convention. The Part XI Agreementcontributed to international co-operation by settling a number of inter-stateconflicts and resolved many of the obstacles for ratification of the Convention by

23 http://www.fao.org/fi/atlas/tunabill/english/intro.htm.24 See [39]. Mexico contended that the direct and secondary embargoes imposed by the United States

under the latter’s amended Marine Mammal Protection Act 1998 constituted disguised restrictions on

international free trade and therefore contravened fundamental GATT principles. See also: Dispute

concerning Southern bluefin tuna Australia and New Zealand versus Japan [40], hearing held 18–20

August 1999, Australia and New Zealand held that Japan’s fishing actions amounted to a failure to

conserve and to cooperate in the conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna stock.


http://www.fao.org/fi/atlas/tunabill/english/intro.htm

developed states, in particular the US, which objected to Part XI of the actual Lawof the Sea Declaration covering deep seabed mining [36, p. 325].

However, implementation has been particularly slow. In 1998, 3 years after thetext had first been adopted at the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks andHighly Migratory Fish Stocks, only 59 of the 112 states which participated in thenegotiations had signed the Agreement. At the same time, only 18 states had ratifiedor acceded [36, p. 329]. This indicates hesitancy amongst states to formally share apart of their authority at the international level. While there is a new type of law andpolicy making emerging, characterised by interaction across multi-levels ofauthority, the evolution to a formal order has been slow. The Code has developedsignificantly compared to the Agreement, though this could not have been foreseenwhen the instruments were negotiated. This shows that end results of the Agreement,and the Code, are hard to predict.

5.3. Process

A formal legal instrument, the Agreement should be applied strictly. It placesresponsibility with RFBs for implementation, and it is at this level where moreintense interaction should take place. However, it has been suggested that theseorganisations have been slow to bring their operating procedures in line with theAgreement. This criticism highlights vulnerability in the co-ordination betweennational and regional authority. As states are members of the RFBs, until thestates have ratified the Agreement, there is a lack of impetus to implement measures[36, p. 330].

What is most important is that the Agreement corresponds to part of a structureof international instruments designed to regulate fisheries practice. The Agreement isseen as a complement to the Code. Together they represent a ‘mosaic’ of newinternational instruments that aim to establish a durable and stable regime for themanagement and conservation of fish resources. These instruments propose broadprinciples that are applied via the RFBs. The Agreement re-iterates that specificregional considerations can be accounted for in terms of stocks, regionalenvironment or state requirements [16, Article 8.1, 8.3, and 8.5]. Furthermore,references during negotiations were made to ensure complimentarity with theessential regional agreements such as the Donut Hole Agreement [41], the SouthPacific Tuna Treaty [42] and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO)[43]. The Code and the Agreement share a similar approach in decision-making: arange of actors, a process for implementation and they emerge from a similarenvironment of changes towards multi-leveled authority. However the specificreference to straddling and migratory stocks initially draws a comparison to a regime(identified above), which interacts with similar instruments to make up governance.

5.4. Compromise

The Agreement is a new way of managing stocks between states—based on co-operative management principles. States must compromise to arrive at an accord


and the regional authorities are the forums in which negotiation takes place.There is therefore a kind of spirit of compromise that must be used when applyingthe Agreement. In a strictly legal sense the Agreement contains a clause whichguarantees that state sovereignty is not lost. States agree to compromise oneaspect of their authority—those of property rights over a species. These propertyrights are defined as sovereign rights that are legally distinguishable from sovereignty[44].

Tuna in the Pacific provides a useful illustration of how the Agreement hasencouraged new approaches to management of stocks. The role of states is balancedby regional organisations—in the Pacific area this is taken up by the South PacificForum Fisheries Agency (FFA). A total of 14 Pacific Island Countries (PICs) areparty to the FFA.25 For many PICs the tuna resource is their only exploitablenatural resource and the only major source of income. Therefore tuna must beprotected because it is not just a resource, it is the only resource that sustains theireconomies. The possibility that the resource may become overexploited provides theincentive to co-operate while the Agreement prescribes mechanisms for that co-operation to take place [44, p. 26]. In addition there is a growing concern fromoutside the PIC group about Pacific tuna sustainability, for example from the USgovernment. FFA must consider its relationship with neighbouring Pacific states,such as Indonesia and the Philippines. They may have to become members of FFAor make-up an informal grouping for application of the Agreement [44, p. 35].

Like the Code the weight is upon compromise rather than conflict to resolvefishing disputes. It is important to note interaction with other internationalorganisations and instruments. The WTO and the Tribunal of the Law of the Seaare identified in both documents. However, the Agreement has only a minority ofsignatories (29 out of 150 FAO members), so its scope is limited. As a stand-alonedocument the Code holds more influence than the Agreement and the value of theAgreement is augmented when it interacts with the Code or other internationaldecision-making bodies. The Agreement represents more a regime that constitutesgovernance when it interacts with other regimes or global order.

5.5. Private and public

The level of NGO participation in negotiation of the treaty is notable. NGOs wereallowed to participate in the plenary sessions and some informal sessions of thenegotiations of the Agreement, like the FAO. Their involvement was based on aprecedent set by UNCED [36, p. 328]. The Agreement has a specific article thatensures the future participation of NGOs in regional fisheries bodies.26 There issome resistance to participation of non-state actors. Governmental support forinvolvement of state and non-state in negotiations of the Agreement was variable

25 Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau,

Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islans, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.26 Straddling Stocks Agreement [16, Article 12], which covers mechanisms for international co-operation

concerning straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.


[36, p. 328]. Some states allowed NGOs to participate on their delegation,a confidence which had been developed during preparations for UNCLOS III[43, p. 79].

5.6. Constant interaction

The Straddling Stocks Agreement relies principally upon state and regionalauthority to implement management mechanisms. The emphasis is upon arrangingformal arrangements between signatories, which are elaborated by RFBs. Applica-tion of technical fisheries management and co-ordination of fisheries policy isimportant.27 Interaction between national and international institutions takes placeprincipally through the RFBs, which are interlocutory bodies. Concepts such as theprecautionary principle or stock assessment are measures that are encouraged, likeunder the Code. However, there is less emphasis upon informal participation—thereis less emphasis upon the consultation of stakeholders compared to the Code. Thereliance upon scientific bodies to provide guidance is notable.28 The InternationalCouncil for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) provides advice to co-ordinatescientific investigations and to provide fisheries management advice to at least threedifferent regional organisations and a number of bilateral fisheries agreements [37, p.211]. The notion of interaction with scientific bodies is also encouraged under theCode.

Relations with other international agreements and treaties are important to thesuccess of the Agreement. It has been argued earlier that the Agreement represents aregime, covering only one specific issue area—that of straddling and highlymigratory stocks and it relies upon interaction with other international instruments.However, it has been shown that the Agreement includes wider issues—such as theprecautionary principle or sustainability that suggest that there are widerimplications of the Agreement. What is important is that the Agreement should beseen within the context of other institutions and instruments. The interaction withininternational institutions, regional institutions, and international instruments showssimilarities between fisheries governance principles. Parallels between the Code andthe Agreement represent wider guidelines on fisheries governance.

The level of interaction within the Agreements’ regulations is limited whencompared to the Code—the Agreement has 29 signatories against the Code that hasbeen ratified by 150 of FAO’s members. Those 150 make up virtually all of FAOmembers. The Agreement is binding and has procedures for correcting offences viathe International Court of the Sea, nonetheless the limited signatories make theinstrument’s international legal value limited. However, the Code’s ratificationmakes it a much more significant political document—in terms of providing political

27 For a more in-depth explanation of the various types of operations covered by the Agreement see

Schram Stokke [37].28 In this light the role of the regional science RFBs have been important. CWP—Coordinating Working

Party on fisheries statistics, ICES—International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, PICES—North

Pacific Marine Science Organisation, SPC—Secretariat of the Pacific Community.


will and pressure for enforcing the Codes principles. Furthermore, the potentialfor interaction by non-state actors is limited under the Agreement. This leavesthe Agreement less potential to respond to all levels of authority and to the complexweb of relations emerging from the global transformations identified in the firstsection.

6. Conclusion

The article argued that there have been structural changes to fisheries decision-making, notably a transformation from a state-led approach towards multi-levelleddecision-making procedures. Section 2, on globalisation and fisheries, establishedthat fisheries state authority has been re-constituted across the national, regional andinternational levels due to key developments to the international economy,international institutions, and in international law. It concluded that whilst stateauthority is still important in international relations, international and regionallevels are increasingly important. A new awareness parallels these changes. A‘community of fate’ is emerging with regards to environmental politics and isinfluencing the fisheries sector. Section 3, on fisheries governance, demonstrated theconnection between globalisation and governance, acknowledging the need toidentify a working definition of governance which can be applied to contemporarypolitics. Fisheries policy-making thus provides an important test for governance andglobalisation theory. The case studies engaged with Sections 2 and 3 to analyseglobal governance in international fisheries decision-making, using the example ofthe Code and the Agreement.

The Agreement and the Code should be seen as complementary, but theAgreement can only operate within the wider framework of governance regardinginternational fisheries management. The examination of the Agreement shows that itrepresents a regime interacting with the governance prescribed in the Code. It hasbeen underlined that both instruments contain overarching principles which respondto significant changes to the international system. They both necessitate interna-tional co-operation and repose upon a ‘community of fate’.

6.1. Multi-level decision-making in fisheries regulation authority and a revision of

sovereignty

The case studies examined show that the two instruments respond to a number ofdivisions between formal state authority and the informal and formal practice ofinternational decision-making concerning fisheries. Globalisation has led to threeimportant modifications to formal state authority regarding fisheries, followingincreased global interconnectedness. In each of the three areas—internationaleconomy, international institutions, and international law—transformations toformal state authority have been identified. Fisheries issues are being dealt withglobally; state authority on fisheries matters is re-distributed through new decision-making channels at the regional, national, and international level.


In the case of the international economy, the traditional role of the state isadjusted by technological developments which have led to an augmentation infishing effort and production. The technological developments pose particularchallenges to decision-makers, based on the finite nature of the resource and itsimportance to the consumer, and the socio-economic importance to individuals ofthe fisheries industry. In response there appears to have been a shift to internationalbodies to resolve economic problems.

An international multi-level structure is emerging to manage fisheries issues ineconomic, political and legal fields. The Code of Conduct implements sustainablefisheries management through a variety of levels of authority. Regional levelmanagement is attributed specific functions. International institutional developmentis acknowledged by the Code and the interaction between economic, political andlegal fields and between levels of authority. Non-state actors and state actors at thedifferent levels of authority are integrated into decision-making. Decision-makersmore often consult relevant interest groups to resolve disagreements particularlybetween economic and environmental positions. By considering the emergingpatterns of authority and the panoply of actors, more effective solutions can befound to overcome ever-dwindling fish stocks.

International law supports multi-level decision-making. While states retain animportant role in implementation there is necessary co-operation with theinternational and regional levels. Authorities are accepting new forms ofresponsibility, the ‘collective responsibility’ of the Code, and are resorting to co-operative measures to prevent disputes. Fisheries problems exemplify a ‘communityof fate’ and collaborative decision-making, rather than an international ordergoverned by anarchy. The developments in international environmental law havealso fed into supporting an organised international order. Disputes have and do stilloccur, and regarding fisheries there is an absence of sufficient resolution bodies.While the WTO and the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea have dealt with somesignificant cases, these are lengthy and rare. The Code lays out some importantconflict prevention measures, such as consultation procedures amongst stakeholders.Until some formal procedures can be identified, the Code will have some difficultybeing fully incorporated into the fishing world. The instrument does not provide forconflict resolution, without which states will continue to protect their own interestsand avoid eventual full integration of the Code into their decision structures. TheAgreement on the other hand does have provisions for dispute settlement throughthe Tribunal of the Law of the Sea but the Agreements limited signatories mean thatas a formal legal instrument it has taken a considerable amount of time toimplement, illustrating the difficulties for states of conceding authority to theinternational level.

The Code’s strength over that of the Agreement lies in its prescriptive values andprinciples. The Code has political commitment from virtually all of FAO’s members.In addition its values have filtered down through national and regional levels ofauthority and have been interpreted, justly, relevant to the species or environment ofapplication. Sovereignty is conceded, through accepting a multi-levelled approach totreating problems in the economic, legal and political fisheries fields.


6.2. Fisheries governance—a modern trend

The two case studies reveal that the Code represents a sound example of fisheriesgovernance. The Code has been widely accepted, has been implemented in a diverserange of instances, rests upon global principles, requires interaction from variedstakeholders and involves formal and informal processes. While the Agreementcontains principles of governance, it represents governance through interaction withother international instruments, notably the Code.

The definition of governance by the Commission on Global Governance, asclarified in Section 3 shows the scope of the Code compared to the Agreement. Thelatter represents a part of a global governance structure, feeding into the Code. Theguidelines stipulated within the Code are very specific, even though they may containreference to some of the general objectives in international fisheries policy. These areobjectives, as explained above, including the idea of sustainability, or integratingstakeholder interests.

The Agreement contains legal obligations, but the minimal adherents limit itsscope. It corresponds to a social institution which defines practices, assigns roles andguides the interaction of occupants of such roles within a given issue area [37, p. 207].Thus, it seems that the Agreement represents a regime rather than an example ofglobal governance in itself. Its value to governance is through interaction with otherregimes or forms of governance, ideally the Code of Conduct. Nonetheless, theAgreement contains principles synonymous with governance concepts. It should beseen as contributing towards a form of global fisheries governance, although theCode has a practical worth which adds to its value as a document prescribingfisheries governance. Different actors have applied the Code in considerablymore circumstances than the Agreement, showing its flexible nature as well as asignificant political commitment to its values. The application of the Code is likely tointensify as more regional state groups acknowledge its value. The EU alreadyrecognises it as the guiding document for fisheries policy making in its green paperfor the post-2002 Common Fisheries Policy. The Code thus has greater potential toeffectively manage the looming crisis as a result of low levels of international fishstocks.

The future of the Code in fisheries governance will depend on the consistency atthe regional and national levels to integrate concrete measures based on the fisheriesprinciples. It will be then the responsibility of international bodies to extend theguidelines enshrined in the Code. FAO, as the co-ordinator of the Code, isparticularly important in this respect. It must clarify and develop some of the keyconcepts, notably ‘sustainability’ and the ‘precautionary principle’, before imple-menting authorities may correctly enforce practice of such norms. It also follows thatthe two less represented aspects of governance, noted above are significantlyexpanded before the Code may have a truly global impact upon fisheries actors anddisputes.

The article shows that it is necessary to consider economic, legal and institutionaldisjunctures and the trend towards multi-level governance to resolve fisheriesdisputes. The Code presents solutions to fisheries management by referring to


multi-levelled authority. If the Code is implemented in practice it could reconcile thetensions and new challenges that lie ahead in international policy-making. Theoverarching principles of the Code provide for a structure to integrate interests fromdifferent economic, institutional or legal positions.

Multi-level governance, as considered under the Code, provides mechanisms formanaging problems resulting from a finite resource. Fish exist across multi-levels ofauthority, fishing takes place increasingly across local, regional and internationallevels, developments in fishing capacity and production intensify the mobility offisheries practices. Independent state-centred management cannot possibly regulatethe variety of networks, fishermen and practices in existence. Given that stock levelsare ever-more endangered, tensions between diverse interests will increase, thestability of fisheries’-dependant regions will continue be threatened, technology willbecome more sophisticated, and competition for access to resources will becomemore acute. It is only by reconciling the diverse levels and networks of fisheries thatstocks may be responsibly managed.

There have been considerable shifts in authority dealing with fisheries regulationand a new, distinct, global structure is emerging, in essence attributed toglobalisation. State authority still remains an important point of reference indeciding policy, but it is shared with the regional and global levels. Fish are notlimitless; our interdependent world is resorting to a multi-levelled approach torespond to an ecological, economic, and political crisis.

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Documents

Contemporary challenges: globalisation, global interconnectedness and that ‘there are not plenty more fish in the sea’.: Fisheries, Governance and globalisation: is there a relationship?