Consumer Decision Making 2

The Attribution Process in ConsumerDecision Making

RICHARD W. MIZERSKILINDA L. GOLDENJEROME B. KERNAN*

Attribution, as a process, is related to consumer decision making by a descrip-tive model. Published papers that have applied attributional approaches toconsumer scenarios are analyzed to highlight both existing problems andopportunities forenhanced understanding. An assessment of the potential forattribution theory in consumer research is offered.

• Why is the salesman telling me to buy thiscar?

• Why did I buy Brand B detergent?

• What causes my car to knock and misssometimes, but not other times?

These are typical of the kinds of questions con-sumers ask about other people, about them-

selves, and about the objects aroundIhem. Moreover,the way in which consumers answer such questions ishighly relevant to an understanding of their subsequentbehavior.

As human beings search for order and meaning intheirenvironment, they attempt to explain the causes ofthe events they observe. This quest to know and under-stand the world is the focus of attribution theory. AsKelley (1973, p. 107) defines it, "Attribution theory is atheory about how people make causal explanations,about how they answer questions beginning with'why?'." The theory attempts to describe the informa-tion people use in making causal inferences and howthey use that information.

Attribution theory deals only with the processes bywhich attributions are derived from information input(Kelley 1973, p. 126). It encompasses the cognitivesequence from stimulus manipulation to the attribution,but strictly speaking, does not treat the consequencesof the attribution. However, "If one has managed to

*Richard W. Mizerski is Assistant Professor of Marketing andJerome B. Keman is Professor of Behavioral Analysis, both at theUniversity of Cincinnati. Cincinnati. OH 45221. Linda L. Golden isAssociate Professor of Marketing Administration at the University ofTexas. Austin, TX 78712.

alter an individual's attitude or self-attribution, it is notunreasonable to expect that this will induce consequentchanges in other response systems"' (Bem 1972, p. 45;also see Ajzen and Fishbein 1975). Kelley (1973) takesan even stronger stand by asserting that causal explana-tions play an important role in providing an impetus toaction and in decisions among alternative courses ofaction (p. 127). Therefore, it is this extension (i.e.,behavioral consequences) of attribution theory thatmakes the study of how people attribute causes ger-mane to the analysis of consumer decision making.

MAJOR MODELS OF ATTRIBUTIONTHEORY

As evidenced by the following discussion, attributiontheory is not a single theory, but an evolution of theoriesthat form a set of major developments in the area ofcausal attribution. This section discusses these theoriesby presenting the major contributors and theirparadigms. To facilitate comparisons along some im-portant dimensions these models are summarized in theTable.

Attribution theory can be divided into three foci:person-perception (Heider, Jones and Davis, Kelley);self-perception (Bem, Kelley), and object-perception(Kelley). Since Heider is generally considered to be the'•father of attribution theory," the discussion of themajor theories begins with Heider and person-perception.*

'This is not necessarily to imply that Heider developed attributiontheory independent of the work of others. However. Heider s workrepresents the earliest organized discussion of what is currentlycalled attribution theory.

123©JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH • Vol. 6 • September 1979

124 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

TABLE

COMPARISON OF MAJOR PARADIGMS OF ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Dimension

Major contribution

Data used for makingattributions

Treatment of others'perceptions or attri-butions

Attributable causesof actionPersonal

Environmental

Basis for attribution

Output of attribution

Major focus

Heider(1944, 1958)

Originator of modernattribution theory

Others' actions orknovi/ledge of others'actions

Implicit

Intention, exertionability

Task difficulty

Naive analysis of ac-tion, using levels ofpersonal responsi-bility

Judgment of extentactor is personallyresponsible foraction

Person-perception

Contributors

Jones and Davis(1965)

Made Heider's attribu-tion theory amenableto empirical test

Perceived effects ofothers' actions

Implicit

Intention/knowledge,ability/possibilityof action (i,e,, "can")

Situation and role

Commonality anddesirability of effects

Intention and under-lying disposition ofthe actor

Person-perception

Bem(1965, 1967, 1972)

Extended attributiontheory to self-perception

One's own behavior

None

"Tact" responses

"Mand " responses

Perceived freedomof choice, salienceof initial attitude''

Perception of personalor environmentalcausality

Self-perception

Kelley(1967, 1971, 1973)

Extended attributiontheory to object andgeneralized p)ercep-

Actions or effects ofactions (events)

Explicit—specificallydevelops paradigmto reflect the pro-cessing of informa-tion from others

Intention

Entities, modalities,persons

Covariance; causalschemata

Cause of an action oreffect

Object and generalperception

•'Often operationalized through investigator inference.

Person-Perception

Heider's Naive Psychologist. Heavily affected bythe Gestalt school of psychology, Heider's primaryinterest has been in the area of interpersonal relations,focusing specifically on how individuals understand andattempt to validate their perceptions of others, i.e.,person-perception.

During an investigation with Simmel (1944), Heidernoticed that a vast majority of their subjects interpretedthe movements of simple inanimate geometric shapesas the actions of animated beings. Although this findingappears equivocal (Shaver 1975, p. 37), it promptedHeider to develop one of the major threads of attribu-tion theory: the concept that individuals seem to oper-ate as "naive psychologists" in understanding the be-havior of others. He proposes that people do this byviewing others as the "prototypes of origins," i.e., thattheir actions best explain causality (Heider 1958).

Heider then focused on the rationalization processinvolved in distinguishing among degrees of personalresponsibility for the action under consideration. Didthe actor consciously try, as well as have the ability, toprompt this action (personal force), or was it somethingabout the environment that prompted the action (en-vironmental force)? Obviously, the more the

perceiver/observer felt that personal force was behindthe action (a causal inference), the more s/he could inferfrom that action. Of special interest are Heider's"levels," or ways of determining personal responsibil-ity, which bear close resemblance to many of the con-cepts later developed by Jones and Davis (1965) andKelley (1%7). Although Heider was a pioneer in de-veloping many of the basic concepts of attribution forperson-perception, his work does not provide a readyframework for direct application to consumer analysis.

Jones and Davis' Correspondence of Inference.In continuing the work of Heider and attemptingto make it more amenable to empirical tests, Jonesand Davis (1965) focused on the effects of actionsrather than the actions themselves. They proposed threebasic criteria that individuals use personally, or whenobtaining information about the actions from others, formaking attributions.

1. Choice and effects—individuals are assumed to havea choice among actions (or inaction),

2. Commonality—only "noncommon effects" (thoseunique to specific actions) are useful for inferringpersonal, as opposed to environmental, causality.

3. Desirability—the more undesirable the action or the

ATTRIBUTION PROCESS 125

effects of the action, the more readily and more con-fidently causality can be inferred.

Consider the following example; Brian walks into acar dealership, possibly to purchase a new BX-70. Thesalesman spends 45 minutes discussing the purchasewith Brian and, just as the sale is about to be completed,the salesman says that he is more interested in Brian'ssatisfaction than a sales commission. The salesmanthen details complaints received about the BX-70, andsuggests that Brian could get a better value at a lowerprice with a BZ-59. Brian realizes that the salesman hasinvested considerable time, and will make significantlyless commission on the sale of a BZ-59. In light of thesalesman's actions (offering information about theBX-70), Brian (the observer) infers that the salesman(the actor) is a very honest, helpful and/or credibleperson (the potential correspondent inferences). Thisinference can be explained by the criteria of Jones andDavis.

The salesman chose to provide unfavorable informa-tion about the BX-70, and his choice appeared to bevoluntary. The effects of this choice are shown inFigure A. Only the noncommon effects, those unique toeach course of action, are used to infer the reasons(causes) that the actual choice was made, as the com-mon effect (in this case, "may sell an automobile")could not have been decisive in the salesman's choice ofaction. Therefore, Brian would base his causal in-ferences on effects b, c, and d (noncommon effects).Some of these multiple effects are more desirable thanothers to the salesman and, thus, are less diagnostic ofhis intentions. In this example, spending more time onthe sale and helping the consumer get a better deal (and

FIGURE A

CORRESPONDENT INFERENCE EXAMPLE

Salesman

(actor)

Says favorablethings aboutthe BX-70/

Says unfavorablethings aboutthe BX-70

(effects)*

•Effects:

a May sell an automobileb. Makes a large commissionc. Helps consumerd. Spends a long time on sale

at the cost of a larger commission) prompt Brian to inferthat these effects (which are "undesirable" for sales-men) must reflect an underlying personal disposition ofthis salesman, or what Jones and Davis call "corre-spondence of inference."

High correspondence of inference tends to occuronly with certain combinations of noncommon effectsand assumed desirability for the actor. When thenumber of noncommon effects is high, the observerfinds it extremely difficult to attribute behavior to asingle personal disposition, because there are manycompeting explanations for the behavior. Fven in thisexample Brian could not be certain which trait bestexplained the salesman's "stepping out of character."Was it his honesty, his altruism, or is he simply a credi-ble source of information?

The concepts of noncommon and desirable effectsare ultimately woven into what Jones and Davis call the"action-attribute paradigm." This suggests the se-quence of attribution and the influence of Heider's con-cepts of actor knowledge and ability. Their model statesthat the actor must have knowledge of the effects thatwill be produced from his action, as well as the abilityand intention to perform the action. Jones and Davis'focus is primarily person-perception, although person-perception may intervene in object-perception.

Self-PerceptionDanl Bem's Radical Behavioralism. Just as

Heider proposed that people attempt to understandtheir environment by viewing others' actions to infercausation and disposition, Bem (1965; 1967; 1972) hasargued that individuals also look to their own actions orverbal reports to judge inferences about themselves.For example, consumers judge others' attitudes aboutsuch issues as ecology in terms of those individuals'actions and the conditions in which they were ob-served. Similarly, consumers judge their own attitudesand beliefs about ecology by observing their own be-havior and the conditions under which they feel itoccurs. Bem believes that only slight differences existbetween self- and person-perception in the type of in-formation available, although others disagree (e.g.,Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).

Bem's specific focus is on the process one uses toinfer his/her "true'' attitude from verbal reports or simi-lar actions. His theoretical development employs a dis-tinct behavioralist flavor by employing Skinner's (1957)distinction between "tact" and "mand. " This "radicalbehavioralist" position was developed as an alternativeexplanation for cognitive dissonance in early attitude-change studies. Bem's determination of whether a re-sponse had tact or mand properties involved a simplepresence or absence test. The presence of a strongreward or threat would suggest mand properties, i.e., astrong inference of environmental causation. If nostrong reinforcement was present, this would suggest


tact properties and lead the individual to infer an inter-nal cause (e.g., his/her true attitude) for the behavior.Also implicit in the judgment of strong environmentalreinforcement is that most people would react in thesame way to that situation.

Bem's work in self-perception is readily adaptable toKelley's covariance paradigm (Kelley 1967), and in-creases its usefulness to consumer reasearchers.Perhaps most influential in prompting increasing appli-cation is the recent work in low-involvement decisionmaking (Calder 1977; Ray 1973) and compliance tech-niques (Reingen and Kernan 1977; 1979; Scott 1977;Swinyard and Ray 1977).

Object and Generalized PerceptionKelley's attribution theory (1967; 1971; 1972; 1973) is

derived from the work of Heider, Jones and Davis, andBem, although there is an interactive influence betweenKelley and Bem. Kelley describes the attribution pro-cess within an analysis-of-variance framework andmakes a distinction between the attributional processfor two types of information; information from multipleobservations over time and information from a singleobservation. In a multiple observation-over-time situa-tion, the "covariation principle" of causal attribution isevoked. In the single inference situation, "'configura-tion principles," or single inference rules, are evoked.Because of the widespread applicability of Kelley'scontributions to consumer behavior, his principles arediscussed in some detail.

Kelley's Covariance. Also developed within theperson-perception literature, Kelly's information-processing approach has helped achieve a muchbroader application to all areas of social perception. Hismodel, based on a perceptual analog of J. S. Mill's(1846) "method of difference," bears close re-semblance to Heider's (1958) level of association—theeffect (e.g., an action, product experience, product in-formation) is attributed to the condition that is presentwhen the effect is present, and absent when the effect isabsent (Kelley 1967, p. 194).

This principle of covariance between effects and theirpotential causes is the major theme of Kelley's concep-tual approach. Kelley delineates three dimensions ofpotential causal inference; (1) the stimulus object,which is placed on the entities dimension; (2) the ob-server(s) of the effects, placed along the person's di-mension; and (3) the context, in terms of time and/ormodality, in which an effect occurs. These dimensionsappear to exhaust all the potential causes for an effectand offer a further partitioning of Heider's "environ-mental force" causation (Shaver 1975).

Kelley displays these dimensions in what is now re-ferred to as the "Kelley Cube."' The logic of thisanalysis is taken directly from the analysis-of-variancestatistic and is illustrated in Figure B. The entities di-

FIGURE B

KELLEY'S MODELS OF OOVARIANCE AND OONFIGURATION

DISTIKCTIVEHESS( E n t i t l e s )

S • smooth operat ion

M • engine mi.sscR

K - engine knocks

"Affects the stability ot the attribution.NOTE: Adapted from Settle. Faricy. and Warren (1971).

mension is placed along the vertical axis and refers tothe person or object being observed—the target of theattribution, e.g., brands of gasoline. One horizontaldimension relates to the persons who interact with theentities. In the present example, the consumer is repre-sented (self), along with other individuals who provideinformation about the product (other drivers; Oj, O2,03). The other horizontal dimension consists of thevarious times (twice for each type of driving condition)or modalities (ways to observe it, i.e., city and countrydriving) in which the entity can be observed. The in-teraction of these dimensions leads to attributingcausality to one or several of these factors.

There are four criteria the consumer/observer sup-posedly uses to ascertain whether the impression re-flects the inherent properties of the entity rather thansome environmental influences.

1. Distinctiveness—the effect is attributed to the entityif it uniquely occurs when the entity is present anddoes not occur in its absence.

2. Consistency over time—each time the entity is pres-ent, the individual's reaction must be the same, ornearly so.

3. Consistency over modality—the reaction must be

^Assurance reached by information from others is quite differentfrom assurance reached through the consumer's direct experience,as the communicator's message is, in itself, an effect.


consistent even though the mode of interaction withthe entity varies.

4. Consensus—actions or their effects are perceived thesame way by all observers.

Kelley proposes that;

To the degree that a person's attributions fulfill thesecriteria, he feels confident that he has a true picture of hisexternal world. He makes judgments quickly and withsubjective confidence . . . When his attributions do notsatisfy the criteria, he is uncertain in his views and hesi-tant in action (Kelley 1967. p. 197).

A consumer's product experience illustrates this con-cept. If Kathy observes that her car runs smoothly (theeffect) on Brand A gasoline, but knocks and misses(also effects) with all other brands, she may think thatsmooth operation is uniquely associated with Brand A.If Kathy further finds that Brand A is associated withsmooth operation every time she uses this brand, sheshould be more confident that her initial observationswere valid. Similarly, she will also be more confidentif she finds that this effect is present in both city andcountry driving. Finally, Kathy will have more con-fidence in her perceptions to the extent that otherdrivers recognize the same association between thebrand and smooth engine performance.

In this example, Kathy observed that smooth engineoperation was distinctive with Brand A gasoline, andconsistently smooth during the four times she used it inboth city and country driving. Her inference that the"cause " for smooth engine operation must be some-thing about Brand A is strengthened by the consensusinformation provided by other drivers.

Kelley's principle of covariance was later modified toevaluate situations of limited information processing,with his development of causal schemata (discussed inthe next section). But Kelley's major contribution liesin his greater specificity of potential causes for actionand his extension of the focus of attribution beyond thearea's initial work with person-perception. As will benoted later, these factors make Kelley's model particu-larly applicable for a wide range of consumer investiga-tions.

SummaryThis discussion has merely highlighted the work of

Heider, Jones and Davis, Bem, and Kelley, who are thepioneers in, but by no means the only contributors to,the development of attribution theory. Many facets ofeach of these models were not discussed, either be-cause of space constraints or because they have lessdirect application in consumer analysis.^ For present

'Several other authors have considered and compared these con-cepts in great depth, e.g. Kelley 1967; Shaver 1975; Harvey. Ickes,and Kidd 1976; and Ross 1977.

purposes, it is sufficient to note that the models differ inseveral important aspects (see Table).

ATTRIBUTIONS TO DECISIONS: ADESCRIPTIVE MODEL

As the preceding discussion revealed, the views ofattribution theory are varied in both orientation andconceptual development. Also, little has been done todefine how the process of attribution ultimately affectsdecision making. While it is clear that consumers canuse causal inferences to establish the validity of theirperceptions, how do different attributions ultimatelyinfluence actual purchase or other marketplace activ-ity? This section integrates the various attributionmodels into a unified paradigm—a descriptive modelthat portrays the attribution process in a decision-making context.

Based on Kelley's Covariance ModelFor several reasons, Kelley's covariance concept

provides a promising framework for most consumerresearch. First, although person-perception canmediate object-perception, the majority of problemsconfronting consumers involve the evaluation of prod-ucts, which requires the processing of information aboutgoods and services, rather than about other persons.Second, Kelley's framework is capable of explainingthe other models previously discussed (Kelley 1967;Shaver 1975; Harvey, Ickes, and Kidd 1976; 1978), yetthe opposite is not true. Finally, most of the work in theconsumer area has borrowed from, or is based on, thecovariance model, which includes concepts of con-figuration or "causal schemata."

The F-Statistic Analog. The covariance model isable to encompass the many diverse areas of attributionthrough Kelley's conceptualization of the way indi-viduals use the attribution criteria of distinctiveness,consistency over time and modality, and consensus. Inan extension of Heider's "pseudo-experimental" opera-tions, Kelley suggested that there be parallels betweenan index of attributional validity and statistical indicesused in analyzing experimental data;

Naive F/information state = distinctivenessconsistency over

time/modality, consensus.The first criterion (distinctiveness) seems to correspondto the numerator or between-condition term in the usualF ratio, and the last three criteria (consistency over time,modality, and persons) correspKjnd to the error orwithin-condition term. . . In conceiving the denominatorof this ratio, we are assuming that both the person's ownconsistency evidence and the evidence from social con-sensus contribute to the stability of his own reaction. Theattribution he makes on any given occasion depends onsome sampling of the information available to him, both


from his own present and recent experience, and fromsocial sources. The more consistent this information is.the more stable his attribution will be. Insofar as thisstability is high (or his variability in reaction is low), the"error term" in the ratio is small and, assuming he canmake a more or less distinctive attribution to the entity,his information state is high, , , In brief, information level(Naive F) is high for a person who can make highly stablebut differential attributions (Kelley 1967, p, 198),

This analogy is graphically represented in Figure B,which portrays the earlier example of determiningwhich gasoline delivers the smoothest engine opera-tion. Notice that Kathy attempted to gain a feel for thestability of the attribution by testing the gasoline severaltimes in both city and country driving. The less distinc-tive the effects, the more a consumer would be ex-pected to repeat the observation.^ Stability also isgained through processing information from othersources, but the effects and the resulting attributionprocess are somewhat different from those acquiredthrough one's own observations.

Information Seeking and Persuasion. Given thisconcept of an index of information state or level of at-tribution stability (Naive F), consumers would be ex-pected to seek product information from some specificsource, if they believed that the information would in-crease their information state (or attribution stability)more than data from alternate sources. In fact, it seemsplausible " . . . to assume that persons have conceptionsof the level of information they may expect to achievefor various types of problems, tasks, or phenomena"(Kelley 1967, p. 199). For example, actual persuasionshould result iJf the information source's message ena-bles Kathy to achieve a higher level of distinctiveness,or increases the stability of her attribution by providingconsistency and/or consensus information.

An information source could affect the stability ofconsumer's attribution through the consistency dimen-sion by providing education or instruction. Someexamples would be:

• provide new procedures for evaluating differentmodalities, e.g., suggest that driving up a steep hillwill accentuate the potential for knocking or missing;

• provide new ways of interacting with the entity,e.g., suggest checking the spark plugs for carbonbuild-up;

• institute training in discrimination and judgment.e,g.. show the consumer how to evaluate whether thespark plugs show carbon build-up:

• demonstrate the relevance of information that waspreviously ignored or weighted lightly, e.g.. ShellOil's automobile information booklets (Answer Book).

•KDther factors, such as one's general product knowledge, alsoaffect the need for stability. However, this area has had little study(Kelley and Thibaut 1969),

These techniques are likely to be effective becausethey increase attributional stability and may be usedindependent of the source who provided the instruc-tion. Source credibility is not a critical factor in deter-mining the consumer's acceptance of this education,although it might affect willingness to pay attention tothe information source (Kelley 1967, p. 201).

This situation is quite different for the acceptance ofconsensus information when credibility is a very salientattribute (MeArthur 1972), The question in this lattercase is whether the consumer should accept thesource's information when acceptance depends on howthe message is attributed. Here the message is itself aneffect, and the consumer's problem is whether to attri-bute it to the good or service being discussed (a"stimulus" attribution), or to some element of the envi-ronment (a "circumstance'" attribution such as thesalesman selling the item, or a "person" attributionpossibly dealing with a perceived lack of expertise).

The elements of credibility are readily translated intothe covariance model, Fxpertise involves the capabilityof attaining a high information level through one's ownattributions by virtue of extensive interaction (timeand/or modality) with the environment. Therefore, anexpert's information is presumed to have high validity.The concept of trustworthiness implies the absence ofirrelevant causal factors (e.g.. personal motives, roledemands) in the source's statements. It should be notedthat the consumer's awareness of these factors is ac-quired through previous contacts (or information fromothers' contacts) with the source (see Kelley 1967;McArthur 1976: Wells and Harvey 1977: and Eagley,Wood, and Chaiken 1978 for extensive discussions ofthis process).

The covariance principle is most applicable for un-derstanding how consumers learn to make attributions,particularly in extended information-processing/attribution situations. However, it is generally too un-manageable for actual application in understanding aspecific consumer response. Consumers rapidly learnto associate causes with events, and to generalizeacross similar attribution situations. These generalizedcausal expectancies and the attributional rules govern-ing the inference procedure are captured in the deriva-tives of the covariance model referred to as causalschemata or "configuration" concepts.

The Link Between Covariance andConfiguration

The preceding description of the attribution processis undoubtedly idealized, as consumers often lack thenecessary time and motivation to make multiple obser-vations. In these situations, causal inferences are madeon the basis of a single observation. The buyer rarelyinitiates this activity in complete ignorance. Similareffects have probably been observed in prior situations,and expectancies have developed of the potentially rel-


evant causes and how they may relate to the effect to beattributed. These types of attribution situations areconceptualized in terms of a' 'causal schema,"—a con-ception of the way in which two or more causal factorsinteract to prompt an effect. A schema is developedfrom the individual's experience in observing cause andeffect relationships, from experiments in which theconsumer exercises deliberate control over causal fac-tors, and from what s/he is taught about the causalstructure of the world. As an individual matures, s/hebuilds a repertoire of schemata that enables him/her tomake economical and fast attributional analyses byproviding a framework within which bits of relevantinformation can be fitted (Kelley 1972, p. 2).

The difference between the covariance and config-uration models is operationally and theoreticallysignificant in determining which model applies in aspecific attribution situation (Hansen and Scott 1976;Golden 1977). Unfortunately, a simple delineation bywhether the situation affords single or multiple observa-tion of events has led to various and conflicting interpre-tations. Although differences do encompass thenumber of observations, the critical factor is whetherthe consistency dimension (time and/or modality) isinvolved. This can be illustrated by referring back toKelley's F-statistic analog.

Unless the consumer encounters unacceptablevariances in distinctiveness or consensus (e.g.. any-thing that does not lead to "highly stable but differ-entiated attributions") s/he can refer to past attributionexperience over time and/or modalities. In a sense, theconsistency dimension operates similar to repeatedmeasures in an analysis of variance. As Kelley notes,". . . time's main significance lies in its permitting un-specified unstable causal factors to vary" (Kelley 1972,p. 161).

Figure B shows how the concept of causal schemarelates to the full covariance paradigm. When the lim-ited information situation (configuration model) isanalyzed in terms of whether a particular brand ofgasoline reduced engine noise, note that Kathy re-ceived information that did not detail the long-run sta-bility or the differential effects of city versus country onengine operation. Nonetheless, she would tend to makea stimulus (or entity) attribution based on the high dis-tinctiveness of the effects between gasolines and thestrong consensus among other drivers. However, ifeither distinctiveness or consensus had substantiallymore variance, Kathy might be prompted to seek con-sistency data. The factors that would prompt a need foradditional data have not been investigated in any detail,but elements such as product involvement (Merenski1978), product type (Mizerski 1975; Mizerski andWeinberger 1977), the consumer's personality or cogni-tive style (Settle, Faricy, and Mizerski 1972; Mizerski1978), and perceived risk would appear relevant.

Although causal schemata appear to capture a limitedportion of the attribution process, they may prove to be

more applicable for understanding and predicting con-sumer behavior. If we know which configuration anindividual will evoke, we will be able to predict theresultant causal attribution and the certainty with whichit is made. This will require identification of the entireset of schemata commonly used and the conditionsunder which each schema is evoked (Kelley 1973).

The investigation of consumer causal schemata is alargely unexplored area, although two general types,multiple sufficient and compensatory schemata, appearto be evoked with such regularity that they haveachieved the status of attribution principles. With themultiple sufficient schema or "discounting principle"(Kelley 1972; 1973), the attributor believes that anynumber of plausible causes could individually promptan observed effect, with any specific cause discountedwhen the attributor believes other causes are also pres-ent. This can be illustrated by reviewing the automobilepurchase example. The consumer (Brian) was attempt-ing to infer the true motivation (causal attribution) forthe salesman"s unfavorable comments (the effect to beattributed) about the more expensive BX-70 automobile(the stimulus object). Notice Brian's perception of theplausible causes for a salesman providing favorable(Case I), as compared to unfavorable (Case II), informa-tion about the BX-70;

Case I

Case II

Observedeffect

Says favor-ablethingsabout theBX-70

Says un-favorablethingsabout theBX-70

Plausiblecause(s)

Believeswhat hesays

Would losehis job ifhe didn't

Makes ahighercommis-sion onBX-70's

Would sayanythingto sell aBX-70

Believeswhat hesays

Type ofattribution

Stimulus

Circumstance

Circumstance

Person

Stimulus

These perceptions are derived from Brians past ex-perience with salesmen, information from other indi-viduals, and other sources (e.g.. Consumer Reportsand home economics literature), using the covarianceprocess. Brian has learned to believe that there aremany plausible causes (nonstimulus attributions) otherthan the product"s actual performance that couldprompt the salesman to provide favorable product in-formation. Therefore, Brian discounts the possibility of


FIGURE C

THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS IN CONSUMER DECISION MAKING

High Involvement:

I'Self-Perception Feedback

STIMULI(product experience,comnunications, etc.)

ATTRIBUTIONPROCESS

BELIEFF0RI4ATI0N

INTEGRATIONPROCESS ATTITUDE

Low Involvement: output of theattributionprocess

OVERTBEHAVIOR

OTHER VARIABLES(norms, other

attitudes, etc.)

STIMULI(product experience,conani-uiications , etc.)

ATTRIBUTIONPROCESS

BELIEFFORMATION

OVERTBEHAVIOR

Self-Perception Feedback

INTEGRATIONPROCESS

ATTITUDE*

1

'May or may not occur under conditions of low involvement.NOTE: Adapted from Ray 1973: Mizerski 1975: and Calder 1977

a stimulus cause—i.e., that the salesman was giving hishonest opinion—and is unable to make a very strong orconfident attribution for the salesman's comments.

Unfavorable information presents a substantially dif-ferent plausible causal array. In Case II, Brian finds itdifficult to think of any nonstimulus causes. Becausethis situation involves no discounting of the plausiblestimulus cause, Brian would tend to infer that the BX-70's poor performance prompted the unfavorable in-formation. Either stimulus or nonstimulus causes canaccount for the effect, but the presence of both makes astrong and confident attribution difficult, if not impossi-ble.

Unlike the multiple sufficient schema, where a simplepresence or absence of plausible causes determines thestrongest attribution, a compensatory schema repre-sents a learned causal configuration where two or morecauses act in a compensatory manner. This type ofschema is often referred to as the "augmentation prin-ciple" (Kelley 1971), or as the "principle of social de-sirability of effects" (Jones and Davis 1965). It operatesin situations where the nonstimulus cause(s) may beinhibitory for the observed effect, i.e., where the pres-ence of the nonstimulus cause(s), such as constraints,costs, sacrifices, or risks involved in taking an action.

serves to heighten the impression that a stimulus causeis present and is a potent force {Kelley 1973).

Attribution, Cognition, and Decision MakingWhen an attribution is made, whether by invoking a

discounting or augmentation schema or the more exten-sive covariance analysis—what is affected? And wheredoes this fit into consumer decision making?

It appears that the attribution process has a cognitiveoutput; specifically it seems to result in a person form-ing a belief. Kelley (1973, p. 107) notes that attribution ispart of the process " . . . by which man 'knows' hisworld and has a sense that his beliefs and judgments areveridical." Consistent with many researchers, Fishbein(1965, p. 107) has stated that " . . . a belief about anobject may be defined as the probability or improb-ability that a particular relationship exists between theobject of belief and some other object, concept, orgoal." In the example where Kathy was attempting to

It should be noted that the schemata discussed are only two of apotentially infinite variety that can vary both in number of causalfactors considered and in their method of interaction. (For extensivediscussions of these possibilities, see Kelley 1972: 1973; Brickman,Ryan, and Wortman 1975.)


determine which brand of gasoline would deliversmooth engine operation, a stimulus (or entity) attribu-tion was ultimately decided on, given the informationavailable. It follows that this attribution to Brand A willmanifest itself in a belief that a relationship exists be-tween Brand A and those performance characteristics.

In Fishbein's terminology, the stimulus attributionsuggests a high probability that the information (e.g.,product attribute ratings) is related to the product. Ingeneral, the stronger the stimulus attribution, thestronger the belief formed. In situations where the con-sumer is unsure about the correct attribution, eitherbecause of the perceived lack of covariance betweencause(s) and effect(s), or some idiosyncratic attributionstyle (Settle, Faricy, and Mizerski 1972; Mizerski 1978),the consumer will be unable to form a strong belief. Incases of person-perception or self-perception, the re-spective relevant beliefs deal with other persons(usually beliefs about personality traits or motives) orwith one's own attitudes and motives (for discussionsand tests of these assumptions see Mizerski 1975; Ajzenand Fishbein 1975; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Mizerski1978).

Figure C presents a general model of the way in whichcausal attributions may lead to consumer decisions.Consumers make attributions concerning incomingstimuli either through the full covariance approach or, ifthe situation is readily generalizable to past experi-ences, by calling on their repertoire of causal schemata.Beliefs are then formed as output of the attributionprocess. These beliefs have a different impact on thenext stage depending on how involved the decision is tothe consumer (Krugman 1%5; 1977; Ray 1973). In thehigh involvement condition, the beliefs are integratedinto the formation of affect or attitude. Low involve-ment conditions do not necessitate this step, and overtbehavior, e.g., purchase, may occur before affect orattitude is formed. In either case, the consumer's resul-tant behavior is itself a source of stimuh that are subjectto attribution through self-perception.

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ATTRIBUTIONLITERATURE

Since attribution theory was introduced into the con-sumer behavior hterature in the early 197O's (Settle,Faricy, and Warren 1971), it has been loosely appliedand sometimes misinterpreted. The Exhibit reviews 34articles focusing specifically on attribution theory inconsumer behavior. (Several studies that use self-perception to explain another theory or technique, suchas foot-in-the-door, are discussed later.) The discussionof the matrix proceeds by descriptor category, whichrepresents our attempt to summarize the state of investi-gations in attribution theory and to identify issues rele-vant to consumer behavior.

Attributional FocusOne of the most critical aspects in consumer-oriented

attribution research is the choice of an attributionalfocus, i.e., object, person- or self-perception. Mis-specification will lead to an inappropriate theoreticalparadigm. The determinant of the attributional focusshould be the "object" of the attribution process, thatis, the entity about which causal beliefs will be formed.In some consumer behavior situations, the "object" ofthe attribution process is obvious. For example, directobservation of a product's performance (leading tocausal behefs or attributions about why the productperformed the way it did) is object-perception. Attribu-tions regarding why a particular person spoke favorablyabout a product would be person-perception (e.g., tes-timonials, endorsements, sales speeches). In bothexamples, the entity about which attributions are beingmade is relatively straightforward and would dictate theappropriate focus to be used.

Many consumer behavior situations are not as clear,however, particularly when the study investigates in-teractions between perceptual areas. There may be aseries of causal belief processes, e.g., causal chains(Brickman, Ryan, and Wortman 1975), involving severalattribution objects with more than one attributionalfocus. For example, the studies concerning how at-tributions about a source that provides product infor-mation affect perceptions (beliefs) about the productdescribed may be approached in several ways. Onewould be to first apply principles of person-perceptionto assess beliefs concerning source credibility, and thento apply object-perception tojudge the effect of others'attributions on causal inferences and the ultimate be-liefs formed about the product.

An alternative would be to utilize the object-perception paradigm from Kelley only, as Kelley'smodel specifically incorporates the way in which theopinions of others will affect object-perception. Thelatter approach was used by Settle and Golden (1974b)in their investigation of the effects of disclaiming onadvertisement claim believability; however, Hansenand Scott (1976) prescribe the former two-stage ap-proach. Unfortunately, the theory does not provideclear rules for selecting an attributional focus. To makematters more confusing, a combination of perceptualorientations may be best for some consumer situations.

Just as person-perception may influence object-perception, such as when investigating advertisingand personal selling, the reverse might also betrue. However, just because the perceptions of oneentity influence the causal beliefs resulting from theattribution process for another entity, it does not neces-sarily follow that one is focusing on a two-stage causalchain. For example, several studies have focused on theway in which object-perception mediates person-perception, focusing on the dispositional or trait at-

132 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCHEXHIBIT

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ATTRIBUTION LITERATURE

DescriptionI. Attributional focus

A. Object perceptionB. Person perceptionC. Self-perceptionD, Other

II. Theoretical source and paradigm or principleA. Bem

1. LabelingB. HeiderC. Jones and Davis

1. Correspondence2. Social desirability of effects

D. Kelley1. Configuration (schema) principles

a. Discountingb. Augmentation

2. Covariance principle3, Attribution validity

a, Distinctivenessb. Consensusc. Consistency

III, Ajjplication of attribution theoryA. Attribution framework formally developedB. Formal test of attribution processC. Test of theoretical implications only

IV, MeasurementA. Attribution stated or measuredB. Attribution inferredC. Internal causes stated or measuredD, External causes stated or measuredE, Attributional confidence measured •F. Attributinnal rnnfirlpncp surrogatpG. Actions foilowing attribution measuredH. Personality variable measured

1, Locus of control2. Inner-other directedness3, Other

I, Demographic variable measured1, Racial differences2. Social Class3. Sex4, Other

V. ManipulationsA, Information sourceB. Information type or content

1, Direct versus endorsed2. Positive versus negative

C. Channel of communicationD. Amount of info-mationE. Choice condition (high or low)F. Task outcome and effort

VI, Product and brand scopeA. Single productB, Multiple productsC. Sinqle brandD. Multiple brands

vn. Article type or designA. Designed experimentB. SurveyC. Review article, critical com,iient or rejoinder

VIII,Topic classificationA, Product dissatisfactionB. Symmetry versus transitivity and verb strengthC. Attributions from product cuesD. Personality factors and attribution information dependenceE. Racial factors influencing attributionsF. Promotion--advertising and/or personal sellirigG. Physical attractivenessH. Information assurance/confidenceI. Children--attribution of advertising intentJ. Test of cpvariance PrincipleK. Information used in attributionsL. Causal complexityM. Identification of causal schemaN. Source credibilty0. Voter choice decisions

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tributions made about a consumer (actor), based on in-formation about the brand purchased. Settle and Gibby(1972) investigated person-perception as influenced bythe brand of automobile purchased, while Jolibert andPeterson (1976) investigated person-perception as in-fluenced by the accessories purchased with the au-tomobile.

Although perception of the brand or choice of acces-sories influenced the resultant person-perception inboth studies, the appropriate attributional focus wasperson-perception and not object-perception preced-ing person-perception. The perceptions that had beenformed about the product were inputs into person-perception, but the process by which the products'causal beliefs were formed was not an attributionalfocus in the studies. In these situations, only person-perception is appropriate because object- and person-perception attribution processes are not interacting,even though perceptions of the object may influenceperceptions of the person.

If one is interested in the process by which traitsare attributed to products (object-perception), alter-nate approaches also exist. Principles in person-perception have been formulated concerning theinformation expectancies individuals develop throughtheir continued interactions with others. The Jonesand Davis concept of "social desirability of ef-fects" suggests that unfavorable information aboutothers tends to be less expected than favorable informa-tion, and thus unfavorable information promptsstronger stimulus attributions, i.e., the individual dis-cussed or observed actually has the attributed traits.Some studies (Mizerski 1975; Smith and Hunt 1978a,b)have used the concept of "social desirability of effects"to explain causal inferences for object perception(usually products). However, simply extending princi-ples of person-perception to the product area may notbe appropriate if the same generalized information ex-pectancies do not operate for products. In other words,is unfavorable information as unexpected when indi-viduals discuss products as when they discuss people?

While object-perception, followed by person-perception, has received the most attention, investiga-tions into self-perception, where attribution theory isthe primary conceptual framework, are relatively re-cent and few. Two studies reflect the research in self-perception. Yalch (1975) investigated the behavioraland attitudinal influence of experimentally inducedself-attribution, while Swinyard and Ray (1977) focusedon the impact of labeling on the effectiveness of per-sonal selling. Self-perception research is more prolificwhen these principles are used to explain another pri-mary conceptual framework, as will be discussed later.

Although person-perception has been used to inves-tigate attributions from product cues to other persons,self-perception has not been used to investigate theattributions made to the self from product purchasecues. The study of self-perception, with its potential

interactions with other attributional foci, suggeststhe same caveats as that for person- and object-perception.

Theoretical Source and Paradigm or PrincipleAccording to Kelley (1973), a certain set of condi-

tions evokes a particular paradigm of the attributionprocess. However, as with the choice of an attributionalfocus, the theory does not always provide a clear de-lineation of the appropriate paradigm or principle. Thisdifficulty is most prevalent with Kelley's models of theattribution process, as he has developed the two relatedand often confused attribution principles of covarianceand configuration.

The problem initially surfaced with Settle and Gol-den's study (1974a) of the potentially favorable effectsof disclaiming (i.e., admitting a less than superior rat-ing) in advertising. They based their predictions—thatdisclaiming would increase the consumer's confidencein the claims for which superiority was asserted—onKelley's covariance principle, noting that an effect(e.g., a product claim) is more likely to be attributed tothe actual characteristics of the product if the claimcovaries with product characteristics rather than withadvertisers.

Hansen and Scott (1976) criticized their interpreta-tions and experimental manipulation of covariance, andstated that the design should evoke single inferencerules (principles of configuration) rather than thecovariation principle (based on multiple observationsover time). In a rejoinder. Golden (1977) asserted thatindividuals attempt to validate their perceptions withavailable information that may entail reference to expe-.riences previous to and outside of the experimentalsetting. This extended frame of reference would suggestpredictions by the covariance principle, and furtherquestions which paradigm is most appropriate. How-ever, it should be noted that simply presenting the re-spondent with multiple observations over time does notmean that the covariance principle was investigated(e.g., Kakkar 1974). The same caveat applies to severalsingle observation studies (Settle 1972a; Settle andGibby 1972; Peterson 1973).

Application of Attribution TheoryThe statement "attribution theory formally de-

veloped" in the matrix implies that the study was con-ceived within an attribution theory framework, and thatthis framework was formally presented in the article.Approximately 40 percent of the empirical investiga-tions described in the matrix provide a formal test ofattribution principles. Due to the breadth of the topicsstudied, however, it is difficult to point to a consensusamong these studies, except for the relevance of at-tribution theory for consumer behavior investigations.Most research tested only the theoretical implicationsof attribution theory for consumer behavior and, there-


fore, the validity of the attribution explanation wasnot substantiated.

One of the difficulties with assignments in this cate-gory is that sometimes the author(s) will couch thediscussion as though attribution theory concepts werebeing tested when this may not actually be the case.This is most obvious in articles assigned to the category"tests of theoretical implications only," but it may alsobe true of articles that purport to formally test attribu-tion theory. For example, in the article by Mowen andBrown (1978), concepts developed by Heider are dis-cussed, but this discussion is irrelevant to the hypothe-ses developed in the study. In fact, this article uses anattribution theory of performance and not the naivepsychology of action as developed by Heider. Studiesthat purport to have applied attribution theory, alsofrequently have not done so, e.g.. Settle and Carr 1972:Settle and Golden 1974b; Valle and Koeske 1977.

Many studies describe investigations of perceptionsof an object or a person, but not the process of causalattribution with which attribution theory is concerned.This is particularly characteristic of the product dis-satisfaction applications of attribution theory. When aperceived cause of dissatisfaction is isolated, thesecauses are labeled attributions and the investigation islabeled an attribution theory investigation. Causal be-liefs are the output of the attribution process (see theExhibit), simply to identify causes is not to investigateattribution theory; rather it is to identify causes (whichmay be representative of the output of the process or.depending on the methodology used, may be theevoked causal set from a pre-attribution cognitivestage).

MeasurementAlthough a wide variety of attribution measures have

been used, they can be placed into four broad cate-gories;

1. measures of confidence, either in terms of theattribution(s) made or in the cognitive output (e.g.,beliefs, affect, intention) proposed to be a result of theattribution process;

2. measures of ••internal" attributions, i.e., attributionsto the actor if used in person-perception, or"stimulus" attributions if applied in object-perception:

3. measures of "extemar" attributions, i.e., causal at-tributions to environmental or nonstimulus factors;and

4. measures of both internal and external causal attribu-tions, elicited either with scales for each or by elicitingthe total causal array.

Confidence was the first dimension measured largelybecause Jones and Davis (1965) had argued, withoutempirical justification, that extremity of attribution/correspondent inference and confidence in the attribu-

tion were equivalent and inseparable measures. How-ever, serious challenges to this view have been raisedby Newtson (1973) and Mizerski (1975), both of whomfailed to find an isomorphic relationship between thetwo dimensions. If the two factors can operate inde-pendently in some situations, the validity of this tech-nique appears doubtful.

Studies that attempt to "prove" an attribution expla-nation by measuring the subject's confidence that aproduct has certain attributes (Settle 1972a: Settleand Carr 1972) are simply evoking another methodof measuring belief strength, a cognitive stage be-yond the attribution process® and potentially affectedby past experiences and information obtained outsideof" experimental manipulation (Mizerski 1975: Golden1977). However, there may be a relationship betweenattributional confidence and actions resulting from at-tributions , such that the higher the confidence, the morelikely that actions will follow from attributions. Thisquestion has not been investigated previously.

Studies that measure only the internal or externalcausal attribution may lose substantial information, de-pending on the paradigm chosen. The Jones and Davismodel proposes a limited internal versus external at-tribution (Shaver 1975), and therefore measures ofeither would appear sufficient. Applications of KeUey'smodel, however, require thinking in terms of thenumber ofcauses the observer/consumer employs (Kel-ley 1973), as the overall causal array evoked may affectthe way in which the consumer reacts to information inthe marketplace (Mizerski 1978).

The attribution process does not have to be con-scious, and information may be lost when it is broughtto the conscious level. Further, each time an individualmakes a causal attribution, s/he may not go through anelaborate attribution process. As in habitual purchasingbehavior, attributions may be "learned" and a previ-ously made attribution may be generalized from a simi-lar situation to a "new" situation, saving the consumertime and energy. Attempts to make the process con-scious may, in some cases, superimpose a nonexistentstructure. Therefore, it becomes extremely importantto develop measures with this problem in mind.

The measurement of actions following attributions,or at least behavioral intention, is germane to the appli-cation of attribution theory to consumer decision mak-ing. Most product dissatisfaction studies (Landon andEmery 1975: Settle and Golden 1974b: Valle andKoeske 1977: Valle and Wallendorf 1977) measure ac-tions following attributions of product failure. All threestudies of self-perception (Yalch 1975; Dholakia andSternthal 1977: Swinyard and Ray 1977) assess actionsor intentions following attribution, and three person-perception studies measure actions or intentions(Robertson and Rossiter 1974: Baker and Churchill

' Affect and intention are even further away and more readilyaffected by situational factors.


1977; Mowen and Brown 1978). With the exception ofthe product dissatisfaction literature, studies intoobject-perception usually do not investigate actions fol-lowing attributions.

A number of variables specific to the individual havebeen shown to influence the attribution process (Settle1973). The individual difference variables investigatedare personality variables, such as locus of control, anddemographic variables, including composite variablessuch as social class. While these variables have notbeen extensively investigated, they appear to have astrong influence on the attribution process.

ManipulationsAs attribution theory is concerned with the way in

which people process information, it is only reasonablethat most researchers (with the exception of Calder andBumkrant 1977) manipulate the choice condition inorder to investigate the implications of this variable onattributions and interpersonal influence. Overwhelm-ingly, studies have tended to manipulate the content ofthe experimental exposure to determine the effect onattributions or the attribution process.

Attribution ObjectAttribution investigations have, more often than not,

involved multiple products, brands, or objects. How-ever, the intent of most studies has not been to comparedifferences across product situations, but rather toprovide some type of repeated exposure to stimuli.Involvement with the product, the risk inherent in thepurchase situation, and other potential variables mightcreate differences in attributions for different productsituations. Investigations that include several productswould help to identify any differences in the behavioraleffects of attributions across products and producttypes.

Article Type or DesignThe vast majority of attribution theory studies are

experiments, while survey research tends to be mostprevalent in the product dissatisfaction area. Becauseattribution theory has been conceptualized within ananalysis-of-variance experimental design (the KelleyCube), and Kelley has been the source of much of theattribution theory development in consumer behavior,an experiment is almost a necessity to investigate theformal conceptual framework and the relevance ofattribution theory to consumer decision making. On theother hand, survey research has focused on identifyingthe output of the attribution process (i.e., the causalbeliefs), rather than making predictions from the theoryabout the output of the process and testing these pre-dictions.

Topic Classification

As evidenced by the matrix, applications of attribu-tion theory to consumer behavior span a wide range oftopics. Product dissatisfaction has received the mostattention, though this area represents a loose applica-tion of the theory. As further evidenced by the matrix,attribution theory has not been directly related to con-sumer decision making. This is because the theory fo-cuses on the process by which one interprets his/herenvironment, not what is done behaviorally with theattributions. To extend the theory to behavioral aspectsof decision making is to go beyond the theory as cur-rently formulated in social psychology.

It has been argued (Hansen and Scott 1976; Scott1978) that attribution theory should be more rigorouslyapplied to consumer behavior; it should be applied as ithas been formulated in social psychology. On the otherhand, Calder and Bumkrant (1977) further assert thatthe current form of attribution theory is not rich enoughto explain consumer behavior, and that there is a needfor reanalyzing its assumptions. They allude to severalthings. First, there is a need to broaden the paradigmsthat have focused on consumer behavior. As indicatedin the matrix, the covariance and the discounting prin-ciples have been the most frequently appliedparadigms. Second, consideration of the assumptionsobservers make about prior choices implies the need toinvestigate causal chains as a perspective on the proc-ess of causal attribution. Also, there is a need for someadaptation of the attribution theories to the unique con-text of consumer behavior.

However, prior to extending or expanding attributiontheory, consumer behaviorists need to correctly inter-pret the existing concepts. Attribution theory, becauseof its naive appeal, is vulnerable to being treated as apost hoc explanation for the results of research, al-though it may not have been considered in the originaldesign of the experiment or study. Also, there is atendency to use the attribution theory jargon withoutinvestigating attribution theory.

Me or Thee? Related Research inSelf-Perception

While many self-perception studies have not beencouched as "attribution theory investigations" per seand, hence, are not presented in the matrix (Exhibit),attribution theory has nonetheless provided a basisfor the prediction and explanation of other findings.One of the most recent studies of this nature involvesthe impact of deals and deal retraction on brand switch-ing (Dodson, Tybout, and Stemthal 1978).

A series of studies has focused on self-perceptionexplanations for compliance situations, specifically thefoot-in-the-door technique as a method of inducingcompliance with a request (Reingen 1977a,b; Reingenand Keman 1977; 1979; Scott 1976; 1977; Sternthal,


Scott, and Dholakia 1976; Tybout 1978). These studiesand the underlying theoretical framework illustratethe direct relevance of attribution theory for topicscurrently in the consumer behavior literature.

The foot-in-the-door technique had its inception insocial psychology when Freedman and Fraser (1966)demonstrated that obtaining compliance with a smallrequest substantially increases the likelihood that a per-son will then comply with a larger request. The explana-tion for the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door tech-nique is in the self-perception theory—when a personcomplies with the first request, s/he begins to think ofhim/herself as the kind of person who "does this sort ofthing." This self-attribution (following from self-observation) then leads to compliance with the largerrequest. Social psychological researchers have repli-cated the Freedman and Fraser study, and supportedthe effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique forinducing behavioral compliance (Cann, Sherman, andFlkes 1975: Pliner, Hart, Kohl, and Saari 1974; Selig-man. Bush, and Kirsch 1976).

The foot-in-the-door technique and the self-perception explanation have been investigated in sev-eral contexts in the consumer behavior literature.Reingen and Kernan (1977) found that foot-in-the-doorwas at least as effective in inducing compliance with atelephone interview as a monetary incentive, and as ef-fective as prior telephone contact in inducing compli-ance with a mail questionnaire (Reingen and Kernan1979). Scott (1977) demonstrated the usefulness of thetechnique for modifying socially conscious behavior.Specifically, gaining compliance with a small initial re-quest under conditions of no incentive tended to en-hance the likelihood of positive behavior intentions forsubsequent moderate and large requests; however,actual behavior tended to be affected only when thesubsequent request was relatively moderate.

Tybout (1978) investigated the relative effectivenessof foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face (the opposite offoot-in-the-door, whereby refusal of a large requestshould lead to compliance with a smaller request), andpersuasion (personal selling and mass media) on en-rollment in a new social service. The results indicatedno significant differences in effectiveness of the strate-gies. The foot-in-the-door technique was most effectivewhen compliance had high salience and the com-municator had low credibility. Studies by Reingen(1977a,b) further support the effectiveness of thefoot-in-the-door technique, as well as the door-in-the-face technique, within the context of donations to theheart fund.

Two studies have investigated the foot-in-the-doortechnique in a commercial setting with subscriptions toa new newspaper, Sternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976)suggest that the foot-in-the-door strategy is a viablepersonal influence technique provided that the "appro-priate" level of incentive (small) is used to motivatetrial. Scott (1976) found that foot-in-the-door employing

large incentives was no more effective than cold-calling, or no initial request, in generating subsequentcompliance with a purchase request. Due to the applica-tion of the technique, however, it is not clear thatSternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) and Scott (1976)provided a valid test of the foot-in-the-door strategy forinducing compliance.

In the consumer behavior investigations, the efficacyof the foot-in-the-door technique appears to be influ-enced by conditions surrounding its use. Specifically,the size of the first request, the size of the secondrequest, the communication channel, the timing of thesecond request with respect to the first request, andcharacteristics of the communicator may influence theeffectiveness of this technique. Whereas, one explana-tion for the potential effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique lies in self-perception theory and self-observation of behavior as a cue for beliefs, attribu-tion theory provides further insights into the situationsthat are likely to make the technique a more viablebehavioral infiuence strategy.

For the foot-in-the-door technique to be explained byattribution theory, the initial compliance must result ina self-attribution about the cause of the compliance. Ifthe behavior is believed to be caused by some plausibleexternal factor, then internal factors can be discountedand no self-attributions will be formed (the discountingprinciple, Kelley 1973). This implies that the initial re-quest cannot be so large that the person attributes initialcompliance to the request rather than to characteristicsof the self.

One study investigating the impact of the size of thefirst request conceptualized the self-perception predic-tion diff'erently from the one advanced by the discount-ing principle, Seligman, Bush, and Kirsch (1976) inves-tigated what they refer to as a self-perception predic-tion. They say that according to self-perception theory,the larger the size of the first request, the greater is thelikelihood of compliance with the second request. Ac-cording to this interpretation, the strength of the self-attributions of commitment should increase with thesize or cost of the initial compliant act. This hypothesiswas supported by the research. The Seligman, Bush,and Kirsch prediction and the discounting principleprediction are not in conflict; rather, they suggest thenecessity of having a first request strong enough toinduce conformity, yet mild enough to evoke an internalattribution. Indeed, the studies by Scott (1976) and bySternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) suggest that theinitial incentive offered may require an "optimum"level.

As with the size of the initial request, attributiontheory, through the discounting principle, makesspecific predictions regarding characteristics of thecommunicator. If an individual complies with a requestfrom a high-credibility communicator, then a plausibleexternal cause is present and internal causes (self-attributions to beliefs) for compliance may be dis-


counted. Stemthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) andTybout (1978) generally support this attribution theoryprediction for the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-doorstrategy under conditions involving a low-credibilitycommunicator, although the salience of the compliancemay influence the effects of source credibility on foot-in-the-door (Tybout 1978).

In general, investigators have inferred self-attributions on the basis of acceptance or non-acceptance of self-perception predictions. Stemthal,Scott, and Dholakia (1976), Scott (1976; 1977), Reingenand Kernan (1977; 1979), Reingen (1977a,b), andTybout (1978) all report at least equivocal support forself-perception hypotheses regarding the effectivenessof foot-in-the-door. Scott (1977) explicitly measuredself-attributions, but these measures offered no conclu-sive evidence of the self-perception process. The valueof self-perception theory for predicting the effective-ness of the foot-in-the-door technique is apparent,but similar to other uses of attribution theory in con-sumer behavior research, the actual process andexistence of the self-attribution phenomenon awaitsvalidation.

CONCLUDING REMARKSAlthough this paper has focused on the role of attribu-

tion theory in understanding the information processingaspects of consumer decision making, it should not beassumed that attribution theory has no other relevanceto consumer research. Indeed, there are many otherapplications that, although less direct, are neverthelesssignificant. For example, attribution theory offers analternative explanation to cognitive dissonance (Bem1967; Kelley 1967) and an explicit formulation for as-sessing self-fulfilling prophecy and social-stereotypephenomena (Heider 1944; Jones and Davis 1965;Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977). It offers insightinto group-influenced decision making (Burnstein andVinokaur 1975; Myers and Lamm 1976) and forms thebasis for equity theory (Berkowitz and Walster 1976)and the foundation of much consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction research (Huppertz, Arenson, andEvans 1978).

Perhaps the most integral concept underlyingattribution theory is learning. Individuals clearly learnto make attributions (Piaget 1948; Kelley 1973; Bettman1979) as a way to validate their perceptions. The man-ner in which this validation takes place and the resultantcognitive output suggest that attribution theory mayoffer a vehicle to reconcile the often opposing views ofbehavioralists and cognitivists (Fishbein and Ajzen1975; Rest 1976).

Yet, attribution theory is mute in some areas of con-sumer analysis where one might expect it to have a greatdeal to say. For example, it does not explain why con-sumers integrate information according to one cogni-tive algebra and not another (Anderson 1974). We must

content ourselves with the knowledge that an integra-tion process occurs, without understanding why.Clearly, attribution theory is no panacea for the studentof consumer behavior (Scott 1978).

Finally, attribution theory is not a single theory, butseveral related theories that provide a common approachto a large class of questions related to the cognitiveprocesses. The associated absence of unified hypothe-ses and propositions might apjDear to be a weakness ofattribution theory. However, this characteristic lendsflexibility to the application of the theory, and the lackof specificity acts as a stimulus to expand research intothe area. The breadth of the theory, coupled with theinevitable attempts to define and refine it, allow thisapproach to be applicable to a wide range of consumersituations. Thus, attribution theory may be classed as an"epitheory'" (Jolibert 1975).Mn this regard, Jolibert hasmade an astute observation; attribution theory as anepitheory is best cited in two areas that are well knownfor their lack of unity, the behavioral sciences and con-sumer behavior.

[Received Januaiy 1979. Revised June 1979.]

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Consumer Decision Making 2