Constructing the Ottoman State

Ode to the 14th century:

Do not cultivate a vineyard,you’ll be bound.

Do not cultivate grains,you’ll be ground.Pull the Camel,herd the sheep.

A day will come, you’ll be crowned.

[early 20th century poem from Bithyniam region,quoted Kafadar, p.118]

Understanding the State:Kafadar asks same questions in this chapter as

we did when we began a few weeks ago:– Why did this particular clan/house succeed

when there were many competitors?– How did Osman and his descendents

perpetuate power when others (including powerful Mongol Khans and Seljuk rulers) lost it after short periods of time?

– How do we define ‘power’ and ‘authority’ in the early Ottoman state?

Understanding the State (Cont):

• Need to understand problems in ‘knowing’ based on the chronicles available

• Need to question how Islam came into play and the associated role of the gazi[reference last week’s handout ‘The nature of history’, excerpts from Gibbons]

• Need to look at the nature of the ‘military’ as it evolved from the gazi and reflected changing social/political structure of state

• Last point: develop further in context of broader sense of what constituted ‘state’

Understanding the State (cont):

“ The social and political configuration as a whole kept changing, while power, shared and contested in varying degrees at any given moment, was gradually concentrated in the hands of an administration serving a dynasty.” (p.120)

He argues that we must see the establishment of the Ottoman state as a process, that passed through several stages – ‘state’ and ‘power’ looked different at different conjunctures of time and situation

Understanding the State: Early stages

• Initially comprised of several ‘layers’ of authority (he identifies eight) ranging from recognizable powers such as the Mongols and Byzantines through to local clans and villages

• Politics about shifting alliances • Religion, ethnicity, tribe -- cross-cut by

alliances• Notes importance of symbiotic relations,

especially pastoral --sedentary, urban -- rural• Relations have economic, political importance

Understanding the State: the nature of ‘conquest’

Kafadar offers story of Mikhail and his ‘house’:• Christian enters into partnership with Osman• Fights as gazi, takes division of spoils• Becomes vassal• Ultimately becomes ‘part’ of Ottoman

hierarchy and converts to Islam• He and his ‘people’ become an extension of

Ottoman state but• Not without tensions and resentments,

especially with original gazi

…nature of conquest (cont):• Reminder that ‘conquest’ and conflict not

limited to Christians• Mentions the Tatars – Mongol origin, allied

with competitors of Osman (House of Germiyan), probably pagan

• Chronicles emphasize this enmity more than Christian-Muslim

• 15th century, sided with Timur against Ottomans

Understanding the State: the role of marriage

• Returning to the Chronicles: emphasis on Osman’s marriage to Sheikh Ede Bali’s daughter [see earlier handout, especially : ‘Conversion and Expansion’]

• Sheikh controlled prosperous community of dervishes and of frontier pastoralists

• Question: was marriage actually contracted • Story interpreted (in conjunction with another

tale of Osman ‘rescuing’ his bride from a Christian marriage) as means to prevent Christian alliance

… role of Marriage (cont):• Kafadar speaks of marriage strategies as

being closely linked to political ‘gamesmanship’, even military undertakings

• Notes that leaders often made temporary use of warriors who frequently ‘shared’ their services between different clans

• Osman’s success may have been tied to his ability to keep some of these ‘volunteer gazi’ loyal

• Part of the answer may have been economic (location); part ability to be ‘fair’, equitable

… role of Marriage (cont):• Kafadar seeks explanation in ‘dream’

chronicles, to downplay significance because they replicate a genre or appear to be a myth is to miss key element: the ‘dream’ in its various forms metaphor for compact

• Compact between those who recognized ‘dream’ as sign of divine sanction for Osmanlirule, those who saw it as guarantee Osmanand descendants would guarantee prosperity

• If either side betrayed, the state would be at risk

… role of Marriage (cont):• The dream sequence (in various forms) also:

- reinforces the continuing role of the religious cleric (here the Sheikh) in assuring both sides of compact- also implicitly confirming the sedentary nature of the future state

• By mid 1320s, Ottoman administration struck coins, gave offices to slaves and eunuchs, established waqfs, issued written documents (in Persian), had possession of Bursa

Understanding the State: inheritance

• Kafadar notes unusual circumstances by which Orhan inherits territories uncontested –contrary to traditional Monol-Turk practices

• Chronicle accounts for one brother becoming dervish, ‘advisor’ to state, reinforcing concept of partnership between religion and power

• 15th century chronicle (Apz) notes Osmangave power to Orahn during his lifetime so that people would accept him

• Even chronicler saw need to explain unusual succession after the fact

… role of Inheritance (cont):• Evidence of repeated ‘unigeniture’ inheritance

suggests that this was not a fluke• Dangers of sharing power among successors

recognized by Osman and descendants• Specific ‘Ottoman’ character commented on

by Mongol sources as well: son of Timurcriticized Mehmed I

• Response: “Ottoman sultans from the beginning made experience their guide and refused to accept partnership in government.”

… role of Inheritance (cont):• Successful where those following traditional

practices were not• By time of Bayezid, fratricide the ‘norm’• In this argument, Kafadar departs from

Quataert’s analysis• Quataert holds to position that Ottomans

followed traditional central Asian practices in sending all sons to provinces for administrative and military training until Mehmed II formally introduced and codified fratricide as state policy

… role of Inheritance (cont):• For Quataert, this shift to fratricide coincided

with the ‘victory’ of the Sultans over the traditional Turkish noblility and the frontier beys [anslysis then continues through other shifts in power 17th century onwards]

• Kafadar’s argument seems a closer examination of the extant evidence, one which provides a different understanding of what it meant to be Ottoman during this early phase of state construction

Later stages:• 1370s, evidence of warriors in Thrace

seeking autonomy, organized around semi-mythologized figure that seems to have been both dervish and warrior (model for Bektashi)

• Ottoman reaction (Murad I): create more fully dependent new army (yeni ceri)or ‘janissary’ ,youths drawn from slave backgrounds

• Creation of vizier in person Candarli Kara Halil (actually three known to have preceded but he is remembered – [see lecture notes from week Sept 27])

…Later Stages (cont.)• Kafadar points out that linking of vizier post

with arrival of ‘foreigners’ emphasized importance of early influences Byzantine-Christian and Persian-Islam

• Process actually under way before Bayezidand Candarli Kara Halil: created by flexibility and mobility of frontier

• Notes that only a situation like this could have supported growth of devshirme system, where children of peasants become upper-level administrators in empire

… later stages (cont):• Also looks to changing role babas, mystical

religious leaders operating local levels, retaining loyalty peasants

• Initial support (as in ‘dream’ metaphor and early chronicles) shifts to more urbanized and stable sufi orders

• Many rural, frontier areas became vulnerable to recruitment by Shia Safavids 2nd part 15th

century• Ahi bands/orders in towns became more like

extensions of state power (similar to guilds)

… later stages (cont):• ‘warriors’ gradually felt their partnership with

the state being eroded• Break came following disturbances of 1370s:

Murad I levied tax on warrior booty – in particular, a 1/5th taxation on slaves

• These slaves were first members of janissary• ‘betrayal’ by sultan twofold: tax itself and

creation of competition (ultimately, replacement) for their military power in the structure of the state

… later stages (cont):• Betrayal epitomized as well in two new

offices:– (1) kadi ‘asker: judge specifically for the

military administrator (askeri) class, demarcated clear boundary around ‘ruling’ class as distinct from ‘people’

– (2) uc Beyleri: lords of the frontier, reflecting right of sultan to name (and remove) beys in the frontier regions

… later stages (cont):• Kafadar provides case study (drawn from

Halil Inalcik) 1430s, 1440s: ‘frontier lords’ played central role in forcing abdication of Murad II 1444

• “victory” overturned two years later by revolt of kul army, instigated by the Candarli family

• Mehmed II’s second enthronement 1451 marked move towards more aggressive attitude to Byzantines but did not mark return for support of frontier lords: both CandarliHalil and several leaders of original revolt killed [see Ottoman Rulers, “Readings” Sept.27],

… later stages (cont):• Gazi emerge as class with distinct lifestyle,

alliances, culture – sometimes opposing state but always ‘part’ of it

• State provided security and promise of growing prosperity

• Clans like that of Mikhail represent range of relationships one group could have with state, over time

• Kafadar suggests this is the model representing 15th century state

… later stages (cont):• Kafadar draws attention to Mehmed II’s

symbolic act: refusal to stand at sound of martial gazi music

• Custom honoured the power of the gazi, the ‘vasselage’ of the state to the gazi --relationship that clearly no longer pertained

• Notes that while Ottomans once receivers of drums and banner (insignia) of Seljuk Sultan, now sent such insignia to Crimean Khan (descendant of Ghengis Khan) – representing vasselage of latter

… later stages (cont):• If the growth of the state was about gradual

sedentarization, centralization --also about transforming frontier from one of pastoralists, independent clans undertaking periodic raids to one of agriculturalists, dependent on central state, tied to ‘fiefs’ or pieces of land ultimately ‘owned’ by the sultan.

• Conquest of Constantinople,making of that city into the capital constituted crucial moment in the crystallization of a political vision marginalizing the gazi [Kafadar, p.147,8]

Video Presentation:Empire of Faith II

(excerpt two)

Elements of the State:devshirme

• [see ‘Devshirme’ in this week’s “Additional Readings”]• Levy ‘one in forty’ applied to Christian boys

mostly in Balkan states [see also lecture week of Sept. 27]

• Became members not only of military but of administration; Bosnian recruits ‘favoured’ for palace duties

• Origins late 14th century; important source of state personnel – some debate over howimportant

Elements of the State:devshirme (cont.)

• Quataert cautions against extending notion of ‘important’ to ‘dependent’

• Argues key role in 15th and 16th centuries, declined after that

• Early stages of state development, military and administration in need of personnel

• Few barriers to social mobility (consistent with Kafadar’s presentation of the devshirme)

• Creating a ‘class’ defined by and dependent upon the state

Elements of the State:devshirme (cont.)

• After first few generations brought as ‘recruits’, families began to reproduce; fathers arranged for sons to move into system and training

• By late 16th century, little need for levies as self-reproduction fulfilled state needs

• Quataert suggests that at same time, rise in power of viziers, pashas and the ‘noble household’ which began to put forward its own young clients, contributed to declining demand for devshirme

Elements of the State:the Harem

• [see Pierce ‘Wives and Concubines’ and “Harem” link in this week’s “Readings”]

• Women chosen from among prisoners of war and slaves purchased in the market [see also ‘Slaves and Slave Trading’ in “Readings]”

• Pierce shows way in which role of Harem ‘evolved’ during the early centuries of Ottoman state, replaced strategic marriage alliances

• Critical part of process of ‘centralizing’ administration and defining power of sultan

Elements of the State:slaves and slavery

• [see “Slaves and Slave Trading’ under “Reading” for this week]

• Neither Kafadar nor Quataert enter into the discussion of ‘slavery’ per se as an element of the state

• The question is worth considering: were European observations that the Ottoman state was ‘based on slavery’ extensions of European understandings of the term – or a realistic analysis of 15th and 16th century Ottoman experience?