FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

Case 1 In Re: Query of Mr. Roger PrioreschiA.M. No. 09-6-9-SCAugust 19, 2009

Facts:

In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the privilege of exemption from docket and filing fees to “indigent persons”. He questioned why the rules excluded foundations or associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons, as in the case of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been reaching out since 1985 “to the poorest among the poor, the newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, broken families who returned to a normal life”, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.

To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme Court held that it could not grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty”.

Held:

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court.

The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicated that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil

or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

The Court stated that the free access clause of the Constitution applies only to a natural person who suffers from poverty. It added that extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.

SECTION 12 – CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Case 2 HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 176229October 19, 2011

Facts:On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab

Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists.

At the arrival area, Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers and found, all in all, 18 chocolate boxes with white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic from the baggages of the petitioner and his five co-accused.

Six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425. After pleading not

guilty to the crime charged, all the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their defense.

They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.

The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming the RTC decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated.

ISSUE:Did CA err in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation?

HELD:No. While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the

rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decisionon the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu.

Case 3 Gamboa v CruzG.R. No. L-56291June 27, 1988

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.

Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest; hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

Case 4 People v MacamG.R. Nos. 91011-12November 24, 1994

Facts: Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with homicide as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Defense assails the court decision contending the constitutional rights of the accused were violated for subjecting them to a police line up at the hospital where they were identified by the victims without the presence of their counsel and without any warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated.

Held: The right to counsel is extended to critical stages of prosecution which include police line-up. After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.

Although the accused were arrested without a warrant such defect was cured during the proceeding when the defense failed to object on the issue during the initial proceedings before the court. Having failed to assail the issue beforehand the accused is estopped to assail the validity of their arrest as they further voluntarily submitted their self before the court by entering the plea of not guilty instead of moving to quash the information before the court on ground of an invalid arrest. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. The witnesses and victims positively identified the

accused thereby further affirming the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Case 5 People v Judge AysonG.R. No. 85215July 7, 1989

Facts:Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the

Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. During the investigation, private respondent freely answered the questions given to him which were recorded.

After 2 months, private respondent was charged with estafa. During the trial, respondent judge dismissed the case stating that the evidence was inadmissible because private respondent was not reminded of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have counsel. Further, it did not appear that private respondent waived his rights thereto.

The private prosecutors are here now alleging that the judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the evidence.

Issue:Whether or not private respondents rights to a proper custodial

investigation were violated?

Held:Petition is granted. Sec. 12 of Article III of the 1987 constitution provides

that the accused must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated

by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected.

Case 6 People v PinlacG.R. Nos. 74123-24September 26, 1988

Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

Case 7 People v BolanosG.R. No. 101808July 3, 1992

Facts: Police authorities arrested the accused for murder. Together with the accused the police boarded a jeep to take him to their station. While on board the jeep the accused started admitting killing the deceased. This extrajudicial confession was used as evidence in court and the accused was convicted.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

Held: Yes. The accused on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under custodial investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution and be informed of his Miranda rights. Any extrajudicial confession he makes without his counsel is deemed inadmissible to court.

Case 8 People vs. Pablito AndanG.R. No. 116437March 3, 1997

Re.: Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media Admissible

Facts:

Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries. "Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbors, and that he was merely a lookout. The police likewise brought Larin and Dizon there. The following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin

mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.

Held:Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that

appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

Case 9 Navallo v SandiganbayanG.R. No. 97214July 18, 1994

Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational School found to have misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign the certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure to do so resulted to the fund shortage.

Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the COA audit

Held: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since

the procedure is not within the ambit of “custodial investigation.” A person may be subject to malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with convincing justification.

Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 5 A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony.Case 10

People v DyG.R. No. 74517February 23, 1988

Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.

Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

Case 11People vs AlicandoGR No. 117487December 12, 1995

Facts:

Arnel Alicando was charged of the crime of rape with homicide for raping a 4 year old girl named, Khazie Mae Penecilla. The records show that appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. The accused verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. The trial court convicted Alicando with the

crimes and charged sentencing him death penalty thus; the case is submitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issue:

Whether or not admission of guilt made without the presence of counsel is valid

Held:

The evidence gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan as a result of the custodial investigation is inadmissible because appellant verbally confessed without the benefit of counsel.As provided in Section 12(1) and (3) Article 3 of the Constitution “any person under investigation for a commission of an offense have the right to xxx have competent and independent counsel xxx”; “any confession or admission obtained in violation of this and preceding section shall be inadmissible against him”We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection, apprehension, conviction, and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness and without impinging on the dignity of the individual.

SECTION 13 – RIGHT TO BAILAll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Case 12BASCO vs RAPATALOA.M. No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Inocencio Basco filed a complaint against respondent Judge Leo H. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union for gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

Basco is the father of the victim of a murder by three men. There were three accused men; one of them is Roger Morente. Roger Morente filed for a petition for bail. A hearing for the petition was set for several times but did not push through.After allegedly seeing Morente in Rosario, La Union, the petitioner learned that the respondent Judge granted the Morente’s petition for bail even though the petition was not heard at all.The Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor’s option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter’s recommendation setting the bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00. Respondent said that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. The respondent approved the petition for bail based on his presumption that the prosecutor was more familiar with the case and more knowledgeable on what he was doing since the latter conducted the preliminary investigation. The respondent further added that when he approved the petition, he presumed that the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail. Eventually, Morente’s bail bond was cancelled. A warrant of arrest was issued on account of Basco’s motion for consideration. Morente is then confined in the La Union Provincial Jail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Judge can grant a petition for bail without a hearing for such.

HELD:

No, a judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the discretion of the court.

The Supreme Court reiterated the following rules outlining the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is set:

1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended).

2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra).

3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra).

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.

While it may be true that the respondent Judge set the application for bail for hearing three times, thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for purposes of bail.The Judge is reprimanded with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Case 13People v. Judge Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

Facts:

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion. on 24 October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135. Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, 9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987. the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that: Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person.

Issue:

1. WON the accused can have the right to bail2. WON the respondent Waive such right

Ruling:

1. We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute.

2. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009. It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail. When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that: b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person. they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons.

CASE 14PEOPLE VS. FORTES

G.R. NO. 90643JUN 25,1993

Facts: This case is about the conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape of

a young girl. Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. The bond for the accused’s temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00 upon motion of the accused. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) found him guilty. An appeal to the RTC was filed and the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and

sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The accused filed again an “Application for Bail on Appeal” but was denied. The accused later on filed a special civil action for certiorari to the Supreme Court for the denial of RTC on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.

Issue: Whether or not the accused’s right to bail has been violated.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.

The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong, which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction, it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

CASE 15COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLAG.R. No. 93177, Aug. 2, 1991

Facts:

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation in the failed coup d’ etat on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held:

NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation. Instead, they filed a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to peremptory challenge.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the

petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

Case 16Baylon v Judge SisonA.M. No. 92-7-360-0April 6, 1995

Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the

grant of bail to the accused.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the

judge in granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed

on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday thereby

depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day

notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well-established

rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the

accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized

the validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.

A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:

. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence

because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of

such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether

the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised

regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after

evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the

absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and

caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Case 17

Manotoc v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-62100

May 30, 1986

FACTS:

There was a torrens title submitted and accepted by Manotoc Securities

Inc., which was suspected to be fake. Six of its clients filed separate criminal

complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and V-President

respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post

bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the

country stating his desire to go to U.S. relative to his business transactions and

opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the

judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and

the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad. According to

the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts

that granted bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent

him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying

the petitioner’s motion for permission to leave the country.

HELD:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving

the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a

bail bond. Rule 114 Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security

required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,

that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as

stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner

to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence

operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. If the accused were allowed to

leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach

of the courts. As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate

court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of

his surety to the proposed travel, we find no abuse of judicial discretion in their

having denied the petitioner’s motion for permission to leave the country, in much

the same way, albeit with contrary results, that we found no reversible error to

have been committed by the appellate court in allowing him to leave the country

after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail

bond.

Case 18Gov. of the US vs Judge PurugananGR no. 148571Sept 24, 2002; Dec 17, 2002

FACTS:Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States

Government through diplomatic channels requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A petition for extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/ Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. This was granted by the Court. After hearing,

Jimenez submitted a required memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.

ISSUE:Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while

the extradition proceedings are pending.

HELD:As suggested by the use of the word “conviction”, the constitutional

provision on bail, as well as Sec. 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgements of conviction or acquittal.

Case 19 Gov of Hong Kong vs Hon. OlaliaGR no. 153675April 19, 2007

FACTS:Juan Antonio Munoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with 3

counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as an agent,” conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hong Kong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms. On September 23, 1999, he was arrested and detained. On November 22, 1999, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his extradition. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which judge Felixberto Olalia granted.

ISSUE:Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there

is nothing in the constitution or statutory law providing a potential extraditee a right to bail.

HELD:The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in

the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favour of human liberty. While extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision

prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, alright to due process under the Constitution.

Case 20Tatad v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. L-72335-39 March 21, 1998

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a

report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal information were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to

due process?

Ruling: Yes. Due process and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.

First, the complaint came to life, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Second, departing from established procedures prescribed by

law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. P.D. 911 prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. Although, the period fixed by law was merely directory, a delay of close to three years cannot be deemed reasonable.