Constitutional Law 1 Digest

7/27/2019 Constitutional Law 1 Digest

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Amigable vs Cuenca Case Digest

VICTORIA AMIGABLE,plaintiff-appellant, vs.NICOLAS CUENCA,as Commissioner of Public Highwaysand REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS: Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of Cebu City asshown by Transfer Certificate of Title. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest inthe property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, thegovernment used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and verynarrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads wasbegun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925." *

On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of theportion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the AuditorGeneral, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement dated December 9, 1958.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of thecomplaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, theclaim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for therecovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the actionbeing a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no validbasis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuchas it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of MangoAvenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case?

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without goingthrough the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain asuit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suitwithout its consent.


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Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of titleand that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, theappellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recoverpossession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes ofownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neitherconvenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only reliefavailable is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done yearsago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof atthe time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the priceof the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition,the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court afterhearing.

Case Digest - Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971

Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971

FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 squaremeters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives tookphysical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a nationalroad, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal.There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession,but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approvedResolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meteror a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense thatthe remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of thejust compensation.

In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now AssociateJustice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against

the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11,1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registeredowners of Lot 647-B of the Bailed estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, andused the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approvedResolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That LotNo. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the


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Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the landwhich is being utilized for public use."

The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly againstthe National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be sued inthis case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they areentitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Governmentimmunity from suit correct?

HELD: NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating aninjustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sadplaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires andthe petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Courtdecided that the lower courts decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded tothe lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.

Froilan v Pan Shipping (1954)

FACTS:

On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, PanOriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000,paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments; that to secure the payment ofthe balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the ShippingCommission; that for various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commissiontool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping Commissionchartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of thePresident of the Philippines; that he appealed the action of theShipping Commission to the President of the Philippinesand, in its meeting on August 25, 1950,the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with theShipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of thevessel in question but the latter refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond

accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment andappurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof On February 3, 1951,the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. wasdivested of its possession of said vessel. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying theright of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25,1950, restoring Froilan to his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void; that,in any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition precedent imposed by the Cabinet for the restoration of hisrights to the vessel under the original contract; that it suffered damages in the amount of P22, 764.59 for wrongfulreplevin in the month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered for wrongfulreplevin from March 1, 1951; it is alleged that it has incurred necessary and useful expenses on the vessel amountingto P127,057.31 and claimed the right to retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had beenreimbursed(Rec. on App. pp. 8-53).On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, theintervenor-appellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan

had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission (which name was later changed to Shipping Administration) the balancedue on the purchase price of the vessel in question, the


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Interest excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the session of the said vessel either under theterms of the original contract as supplemented by Froilan's letter dated January 28, 1949, or in order that it may causethe extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. It, therefore, prayed that Froilan be declared to bewithout any rights on said vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or alternately that the said vessel bedelivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may have its chattel mortgage extrajudicially foreclosedin accordance with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on the merits, the saidvessel be delivered to its owner On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to thecomplaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver thevessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16,1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it had made necessary and useful expenses of thevessel and claimed the right of retention of the vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic vessel, to comply with itsobligations of delivering to it(Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan onNovember 29, 1951, Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which was liquidating the affairs of the ShippingAdministration, a check in the amount of P162,576.96 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration forthe said vessel as claimed in the complaint in intervention of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. TheBoard of Liquidators issued an official report therefore stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an orderofthe Court of First Instance of Manila On December 7, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesbrought the matter of said payment and the circumstances surrounding it to the attention of the lower court 'in order thatthey may be taken into account by this Honorable Court in connection with question that are now pending before itfor determination. On February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan of the amount

of P162,576.96 On November 29, 1951, to the Board of Liquidators constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan'sobligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and ordered the dismissal of the latter's complaint inintervention. In the same order, the lower court made it very clear that said order did not pre-judge the questioninvolved between Froilan and the Oriental Shipping Co. which was also pending determination in said court. This orderdismissing the complaint in intervention, but reserving for future adjudication the controversy between Froilan and thePan Oriental Shipping Co. had already become final since neither the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnor the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had appealed therefrom. On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines filed a motion to dismiss the

Counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the ground that the purpose of said counterclaim was tocompel the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver the vessel to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the

event that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines recovers the vessel in question from Froilan. In view,however, of the order of the order of the lower court dated February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made byFroilan's obligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had already become final, the counterclaim of the PanOriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred byprior judgment and stated no cause of action. It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of thecourt in connection with the counterclaim. This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. in its writtenopposition dated June 4, 1952.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit.

HELD:

NO! because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability."Theimmunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state asplaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in anaction against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of thedefendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and otherdefense he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains: No direct suit can bemaintained against the United States. But when an action is brought by the United States to recover money inthe hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right ofsetting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.'". It is however,


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contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom thecomplainant in intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint inintervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendants claim over the possession of the vessel in question.

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Constitutional Law 1 Digest