1CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:1. Right to life2. Right to health3. Freedom of religion and right to free speecha.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitionersb.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objectionsc.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom6. Due process clause7. Equal protection clause8. Prohibition against involuntary servitudeB. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is validC. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)* HELD:A.1. NO.2. NO.3.a.) NO.b.) YES.c.) NO.4. YES.5. NO.6. NO.7. NO.8. NO.B. NO.C. NO.* RATIO:1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientifc and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unbornchild upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,and thus constitutionally permissible.The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defning abortifacient(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.2However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their ofce when they redefned the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortionor the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the preventionof the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the defnition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and efective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines andsupplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulflling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualifed medical practitioner.Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortifcient and efective.3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive useis contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medicalpractitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well ascompelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the efective implementation of the law. Excluding public health ofcers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health ofcers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of 3policies and programs that afect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing aprocedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efciency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kinshall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be fled before it.Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Departmentof Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school ofcials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the defnitions ofseveral terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.The defnition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defnes a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RHservice and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.The RH Law also defnes incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent thepublic as to the nature and efect of programs and services on reproductive health.7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it ispursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states thatthe State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are sufering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RHeducation program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to controland regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).4C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would beneft the general welfare.CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. CASE 2014-0041: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,- versus MARICELLE M. CORTES, Respondent. (G.R. No. 200103, 23 APRIL 2014, ABAD J.) SUBJECT/S: NEPOTISM (BRIEF TITLE: CIVIL SERVICE VS CORTES) DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated January 10, 2012 of the Comi ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP 115380 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated March 2, 2010 afrming the CSC-NCR Decision dated September 30, 2008 invalidating the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for being nepotistic is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST: WHAT IS NEPOTISM? NEPOTISM IS DEFINED IN SECTION 59 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE AS AN APPOINTMENT ISSUED IN FAVOR OF A RELATIVE WITHIN THE THIRD CIVIL DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: (1) APPOINTING AUTHORITY; (2) RECOMMENDING AUTHORITY; (3) CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OR OFFICE; AND (4) PERSON EXERCISING IMMEDIATE SUPERVISION OVER THE APPOINTEE. ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS? YES, AS FOLLOWS: (1) PERSONS EMPLOYED IN A CONFIDENTIAL CAPACITY; (2) TEACHERS; (3) PHYSICIANS; AND (4) MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. CORTEZ WAS APPOINTED AT CHR AS INFORMATION OFFICER. ISHER APPOINTMENT COVERED BY THE PROHIBITION ON NEPOTISM? YES. SHE IS THE DAUGHTER OF CHR COMMISSIONER MALLARI. AND SHE IS NOT COVERED BY THE EXCEPTIONS. RESPONDENT CORTES ARGUES THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 59 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IS THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND NOT THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS WHO COMPOSE IT. IS HER ARGUMENT CORRECT? NO. TO RULE THAT THE PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO THE COMMISSION, AND NOT TO THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS WHO COMPOSE IT, WILL RENDER THE PROHIBITION MEANINGLESS. APPARENTLY, THE COMMISSION EN BANC, WHICH IS A BODY CREATED BY FICTION OF LAW, CAN NEVER HAVE RELATIVES TO SPEAK OF. FURTHER, IF ACTS THAT CANNOT BE LEGALLY DONE DIRECTLY CAN BE DONE INDIRECTLY, THEN ALL LAWS WOULD BE ILLUSORY. BUT COMMISSIONER MALLARI ABSTAINED FROM VOTING ON HER APPOINTMENT. DID HIS ABSENTION NOT CURE THE NEPOTISTIC CHARACTER OF THE APPOINTMENT? NO BECAUSE THE EVIL SOUGHT TO BE AVOIDED BY THE PROHIBITION STILL EXISTS. HIS MERE PRESENCE DURING THE DELIBERATION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF IO V CREATED AN IMPRESSION OF INFLUENCE AND CAST DOUBT ON THE IMPARTIALITY AND NEUTRALITY OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC.*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:1. Right to life2. Right to health3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech5a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitionersb.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objectionsc.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom6. Due process clause7. Equal protection clause8. Prohibition against involuntary servitudeB. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is validC. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)* HELD:A.1. NO.2. NO.3.a.) NO.b.) YES.c.) NO.4. YES.5. NO.6. NO.7. NO.8. NO.B. NO.C. NO.* RATIO:1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientifc and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unbornchild upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,and thus constitutionally permissible.The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defning abortifacient(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their ofce when they redefned the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortionor the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the preventionof the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the defnition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.62.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and efective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines andsupplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulflling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualifed medical practitioner.Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortifcient and efective.3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive useis contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medicalpractitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well ascompelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the efective implementation of the law. Excluding public health ofcers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health ofcers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that afect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing aprocedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efciency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian 7or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kinshall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be fled before it.Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Departmentof Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school ofcials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the defnitions ofseveral terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.The defnition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defnes a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RHservice and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.The RH Law also defnes incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent thepublic as to the nature and efect of programs and services on reproductive health.7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it ispursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states thatthe State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are sufering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RHeducation program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to controland regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law 8does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would beneft the general welfare.92 SCRA 358 Political Law Constitutional Law Constitutional Commissions The Commission on Elections COMELECs Constitutional IndependenceIn December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president tocreate a fact fnding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointedin an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justifcation as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justifcation, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most senior member).But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman the point here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELECG.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001FACTS:Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001 GeneralElections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, aroundfour million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.8189.A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No.8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.ISSUE:Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.HELD:The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The right to sufrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been fled in Congress to amend Republic Act No.8189. Read full textCagas vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012)Facts: Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista fled an electoral protest on May 24, 2010. The Comelec issues orders stating that the protestant paid the cash deposit for fling of the case, and his petition set out specifc acts complained of. Petitioner moved to reconsider, which was denied. Petitioner fled a petition for certiorari directly with the SC. Issue: Whether the Comelec erred in no dismissing the petition for insufciency of form. Held: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest maynot directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. The court may have the power to review any decision, order or ruling ofthe COMELEC, limits such power to a fnal decision or resolution of theCOMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court hasno power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a fnal 9resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relativeto an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under anyof the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856 March 18, 2011Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and Reno Lim both fled certifcates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd district of Albay in the May 10, 2010 election. Lim was the incumbent Congressman while Gonzales was the former Governor of Albay. On March 30, 2010 a petiton for disqualifcation and cancellation of certifcate of candidacy was fled by Stephen Bichara on the ground that Gonzales is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a spanish father and a flipino mother, and that failed to elect Philippines citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act no. 625. And that his certifcate of candidacy contains misleading information. The Comelec second division division disqualifed Gonzales in the forthcoming National and Local elections. Gonzales thru counsel, received a copy of the aforesaid resolution on May 11, 2010. Lim petitioned the Provincial Board of Canvassers to consider the votes cast for Gonzales as stray or not counted and/or suspend his proclamation, citing the second divisions May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying Gonzales as a candidate. PBOC dismissed the petition stating that the period for fling the of a motion for reconsideration of the comelec resolution has not yet elapsed, and hence, the same is not yet fnal and executory. Based on the results of the counting, Gonzales emerged as the winner having garnered a total vote of 96000 while Lim ranked second with a vote of 68701 votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC ofcially proclaimed Gonzales as the duly elected Representative of the 3rd district of Albay.Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over a Representative which was ofcially proclaimed as a winner.Held: We have constantly held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed ofce as a member of the house of rep. the comelecs jurisdiction over election, returns, and qualifcations ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. We declared that the court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was already a member of the house at the time of the fling of the petition for cerctiorari.G.R. NO. 191771,MAY 06, 2010 LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS II AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA,PETITIONERVS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR AND NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY, JR.,RESPONDENTS.FACTS:On February 12, 2010, the LP fled with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) fled a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "itbe recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an accreditation caseOn February 12, 2010, the LP fled with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) fled a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "itbe recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an accreditation case.ISSUES:I.Preliminary Issues:A.Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infrmities?B. Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue?C.Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petitionfor registration, time-barred?D.Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize without need of registration?II. Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the frst instance to entertain the petition?III. On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of the NP-NPC?A.Was due process observed in granting the registration?B. Did the coalition take place as required by law:i. in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC?ii.in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, thecoalition?RULING:The court see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to the coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefts these recognitions provide - particularly, the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors 10(BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to ofcial election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that thedominant-party status brings - constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations. The value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose efectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure to transparency and to the election's credibility, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not anyway afect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and theCOMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections.The respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one as they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we overrule the objection raised,given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered above.When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctablethrough the original civil action of certiorari."The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition.The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the otherhand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualifed registered parties.Where the registration is fawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the fling of a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event - the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorariquestioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullifcation of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless.In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the registration of political organizations and coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc on the procedural orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations to introduce late and confusing signals to the electorate, not to mention their possible adverse efects on election systems and procedures. This, the en banc very well knows, and their lack of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how unusual the majority's reading has been.We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the frst in a list of election-related activities that peaks in the voting on May 10, 2010. This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure the COMELEC has to undertake in implementing the automated election system (AES). We note, too, that a closely related activity is the holdingof political conventions to select and nominate ofcial party candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009, and November 20, 2009 was the deadline for the fling of the certifcates of candidacy for all elective positions - an undertaking that required the candidates' manifestation of their ofcial party afliation. There is also ahost of election activities in which ofcially registered parties have to participate, principally: the examination and testing of equipment or devices for the AES and the opening of source codes for review; the nomination of ofcial watchers; and the printing, storage and distribution of ofcial ballots wherein accredited political parties may assign watchers. Of course, registered political parties have very signifcant participation on election day, during the voting and thereafter; the COMELEC needs to receive advance information and make arrangements on which ones are the registered political parties, organizations and coalitions.All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least sufer disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected applications for registration for having been fled out of time. A case in point is the application of thepolitical party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., where the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been fled out of time,among other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might nothave been the only political party whose application for registration wasdenied at the COMELEC level for late fling. We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry foul - and rightly so - because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late fling, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason. Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change the en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Efectively, the mandatory 11deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should have been satisfed and was not.Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefts accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a diferent legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exerciseof their and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive ofcial recognition for their coalition. Or they can chooseto secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms.The court solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.the court grants the petition and nullify and set aside the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition as apolitical coalition, docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for lack of the requisite registration as a political coalition. This Decision is declared immediately executory. [ G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009 ]H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, AND ALVIN A. PETERS, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTEDBY HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION AND SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MOVANT-INTERVENOR.VELASCO JR., J.:FactsOn 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending the frst automated election law, RA 8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which amendment took efect on 10 February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in diferent provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording automated election system as it may deem appropriate and practical forthe process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after efectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide. (Emphasis supplied)The COMELEC did not use any automated election system in the 14 May 2007 elections, the national and local elections held after RA 9369took efect.On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM and Smartmatic (Provider), on the other, signed the Contract for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast nationwide in the 10 May2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related equipment) and hired ancillary services of the Provider.On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, fled this petition[4] to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms of the Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its subcontractors.[5] Petitionerssought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an automated election system before deploying it nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1) the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only failed to submit relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show "community of interest" among its constituent corporations as required in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech).IssueWhether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it entered to contract with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to an automated election.RulingAssayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court fnds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And surely, the 12winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner.The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and leadimplementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not bestymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justifed in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be aforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, COMELEC has to make decisions under difcult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the COMELECs exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its ofce properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the comelec the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission x x x requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but frmly in appropriate cases..This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.IBRAHIM VS. COMELECG.R. No. 192289, JANUARY 8, 2013KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.REYES, J.FACTS:Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) fled his certifcate of candidacy to run as municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Ofcer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name. cjurisConsequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudiceto his fling of an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to fle Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certifcation, which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected. cjurisOn the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained fnality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Boardof Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition. cjurisISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuseof discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. cjurisHELD: The petition is meritorious. cjurisCONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ComelecThe COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as acandidate for the position of Vice-Mayor. cjurisIn the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahims disqualifcation even when no complaint or petition was fled against him yet. Let it be stressed that if fled beforethe conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certifcate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality disqualifed him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been fled, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions. cjurisREMEDIAL LAW: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition fled under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc. cjurisUnder the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by way of fling before us a petition for certiorari. What the instant Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the 13assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify asone which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.