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Revised edition Paper presented at South-South Symposium on ‘Constitutional Design for Diversity and Conflict in Asia’ International IDEA and NAM CSSTC Four Seasons Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia 12-15 October 2009

CONSTITUTIONAL AGENCY AND THE TRANSMISSION OF

FAITH :

The Indonesian Experience

Azyumardi Azra*

Indonesia is neither an Islamic state, nor is Islam the official religion

of the state. However, given the fact that the vast majority of Indonesian

population is Muslim, one could love to assume that the Indonesian 1945

Constitution gives only a limited room for diversity, particularly in religion -

Islam could be perceived as having hegemony on the state. In contrast, the

Constitution that is in effect today - despite four amendments in the post

Soeharto period - recognizes the importance of all religion - not only Islam -

as well as diversity of the faiths.

This can be seen for instance in the Preamble of the 1945

Constitution, which in the very first paragraph states that the independence

of Indonesia is a blessing of God Almighty. The Indonesian people had

struggled to gain freedom during the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods,

but it is only in the aftermath of World War Two, after a series of bloody

wars for independence, that Indonesia, with the blessing of God Almighty

finally achieved its long-fought independence.

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This paper is an attempt to discuss the politics of constitutional

recognition of religious diversity in the Indonesian context. The paper will

also discuss political processes that influenced the Constitution in the course

of Indonesian history, as well the constitutional agencies responsible for

formulating and amending the Constitution. Finally, this paper will discuss

some consequences of the constitutional arrangements of religious life in the

country.

Diversity within Unity

Indonesia is perhaps one of the most pluralistic societies in many

aspects of life. There is a great deal of differences when it comes to

ethnicity, language, socio-culture, and religion. The Indonesian archipelago -

the largest one in the world, which consists of more than 17,800 island, isles,

and islets - and various ethnic groups make Indonesia an extremely

pluralistic society. Many of these ethnic groups have their distinctive socio-

cultural tradition that enriches Indonesia life.

It is important to mention that many of ethnic groups have a body of

customary laws (adat laws) that become one of the sources of national law.

Therefore, the customary laws to a certain degree have their place in the

Indonesian legal system. But of course not all the customary laws are

compatible with the basic principles and spirit of the national laws. That is

why, as a rule, there should be some changes and adjustment of customary

laws in order for them to be adopted in certain national laws and regulation.

The existence of adat laws is a part and parcel of Indonesian diversity.

Recognizing ethnic diversity of the nation, since the time of independence,

the Indonesian state officially adopts the principle of ‘bhinneka tunggal ika’,

meaning ‘diversity within unity’—a multi-cultural principle. Soekarno, the

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first President of Indonesia was one of the most important proponents of this

multi-cultural principle. Even though he always appealed for the unity of the

young nation-state of Indonesia, at the same time he emphasized the

importance of bhinneka tunggal ika that recognizes differences among the

Indonesian people.

However, various efforts were made by President Soeharto’s regime

in the late 1980s to 1990s to impose a kind of mono-cultural policy to no

avail. He tried to make the Javanese culture the basic paradigm in the

political and cultural development on the country. With the fall of President

Soeharto in May 1998, the principle of bhinneka tunggal ika has been

revived as one of very important principles in the life of the Indonesian

people.

Religious Diversity

In the context of religious diversity, it is important to give some ideas

on the composition of the Indonesian population in terms of religious

following. According to some latest estimates, 88.2 percent of the 235

million Indonesians are Muslim; 5.87 Protestant; 3.05 percent Catholics;

1.81 percent Hindu; 0.84 percent Buddhist; and the remaining 0.20 percent

are of other religions and animists. It must also be kept in mind that none of

these religions is monolithic; in the case of Islam, Protestanism and

Hinduism, for instance, there is a variety of schools of thought or

denominations that lead to some different understanding and practices of

Islam among the believers; even worse, the differences sometimes lead to

conflict and even violence among the faithful.

In the last two decades, religious diversity has been gaining

momentum with the improvement in transportation, migration and

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information. New forms of religion and spiritual tendencies are introduced

from within and without, challenging mainstream and established religions.

Therefore, some of these new tendencies are regarded by the mainstream as

being splinter religious groups that would lead the faithful astray. In this

context, it is not unusual that mainstream leadership of particular religions

put a lot of pressure on the government to ban ‘religious splinter groups’ it

considers as having gone astray.

Despite those kinds of cases, recognition of religious diversity is order

of the day; peaceful co-existence, mutual respect and tolerance have been

practiced by the Indonesian people for centuries. This long history of

Indonesian religious diversity is mainly due to the fact that Indonesia has

long been a country where practically all great world religions meet, find

followings and develop in peaceful co-existence. Even though in certain

course of history—not only in the past, but even also today—there were

rivalries and conflict among the faithful in the efforts to gain more following

of each religion. Therefore, this religious diversity needs to be

constitutionally, politically and socially arranged, in order to maintain and

strengthen healthy and harmonious intra- and inter-religious relations.

The earliest world major religion that came to the Indonesian

archipelago was Hinduism. According to some archeological evidence,

Hinduism was introduced around second and third centuries CE. In the

period between eighth and fifteenth centuries, Hindu kingdoms appeared in

Java, namely the old Mataram, Singasari and followed by the Majapahit -

one of the greatest kingdoms in the history of the archipelago. Around the

same period, particularly in the seventh to fourteenth centuries, Buddhism

also found fertile grounds in the archipelago, and led to the rise of the

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Srivijaya kingdom in South Sumatra, another great kingdom in the

archipelago. The influence of the two religions in the archipelago can be

observed to this day in the forms of the great Buddhist Borobudur temple

and Hindu Prambanan temples in Central Java. Existing in the sea of

Muslims who form the single largest majority of the population, these

historical monuments symbolize religious tolerance in today’s Indonesia.

Hinduism and Buddhism were soon followed by the coming of two

other major world religions—Islam and Christianity. The early history of the

spread of Islam and Christianity in the archipelago had also been largely

peaceful, though bitter contests and struggles took place in certain areas such

as the Straits of Melaka in the West and the Maluku islands in the East of the

archipelago. Conversion to and consolidation of Islam and Christianity

which took place in much of the period of the twelfth to seventeenth

centuries produced clear boundaries among the adherents of these religions

(Reid 1993; Azra 2000b).

It is important to point out that although most of the population of

archipelago converted to Islam, the region remains one of the least Islamized

areas throughout the Muslim world. This has a lot to do with the nature of

the spread of Islam in the archipelago which was mainly peaceful; there was

a lot of accommodation and acculturation between Islam on the one hand

and local beliefs and practices on the other. Wandering preachers of Islam

introduced Islam to local populations in a very compromising and

accommodative way; what was important for them was that local people

pronounced the two pronouncements of Islamic faith, e.g. belief in God

(Allah) and in Muhammad as the prophet of God. This nature of the

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propagation of Islam in the end contributes to some distinctive features of

Indonesian Islam that have some mixture with local beliefs and practices.

Geographically the archipelago is also one of the farthest Muslim

areas from the Arabian Peninsula, or more precisely Mecca and Medina

where Islam was originally revealed and developed. Therefore, Islam in the

archipelago was sometime regarded by some outsiders as “marginal” or

“peripheral” Islam, as “impure” or “syncretic” Islam. As a result, Islam in

the archipelago was regarded as having little to do with Islamic orthodoxy

attributed to Islam in Arabia, or the region which is known today as the

Middle East.

The most important proponent of this perception is the American

anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Having a great reluctance to recognize the

deep influence of Islam in the Java in particular, he called his work “religion

of Java” (1960) rather than, for instance, “religion of Islam in Java”. In this

seminal work, he proposed that there are three variants of Islam in Java

particularly and, by extension, in the archipelago generally. The three

variants were; priyayi (aristocrat Muslims), santri (strict and practicing

Muslims), and abangan (nominal or ID card Muslims). According to Geertz,

the priyayi variant was heavily influenced by Indic-Sanskrit culture, whereas

the abangan variant was too indigenous, syncretic, and even animistic.

Therefore, in his judgment, it is only the santri variant, with its heavy

orientation to Middle Eastern Islam, is the real Islam; and members of this

variant are numerically few amongst the population. With that, Geertz

implies that the majority of Javanese or Indonesian is not real Muslims, and

Islam is adhered to only by a small fraction of the population.

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Geertz’s arguments have been opposed by many scholars; and one of

Geertz’s fiercest critics is Marshall G.S. Hodgson, a prominent expert of

Islamic civilizations from the University of Chicago. In his celebrated work

The Venture of Islam (Vol. 2, 1974) he admits the importance of Geertz’s

Religion of Java. Then comes Hodgson sharp criticism:

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“…it deals with the twentieth century, and with inner Java in particular, but much in it throws light on what happened earlier and is relevant to other part of the archipelago. Unfortunately, its general high excellence is marred by a major systematic error: influenced by the polemics of a certain school of modern shari`ah-minded Muslim, Geertz identifies “Islam” only with what that school of modernists happens to approve, and ascribes everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu-Buddhist background, gratuitously labeling much of the Muslim religious life in Java “Hindu”. He identifies a long series of phenomena, virtually universal to Islam and sometimes found even in the Qur’an itself as un-Islamic; and hence his interpretation of the Islamic past as well as of some recent anti-Islamic reactions is highly misleading. His error has at least three roots. When he refers to the archipelago having long been cut off from the centers of “orthodoxy” at Mecca and Cairo”, the irrelevant inclusion of Cairo betrays a modern source of Geertz’ bias. We must suspect also the urge of many colonialists to minimize their subjects’ ties with a disturbingly worldwide Islam (a tendency found also among the French colonialists in the Maghrib); and finally his anthropological techniques of investigation, looking to functional analysis of a culture in momentary cross-section without serious regard to the historical dimension. Other writers have recognized better the Islamic character even in inner-Javanese religion: CAO van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: 1959), but Geertz stands out in the field. For one who knows Islam, his comprehensive data—despite his intention—show how very little has survived from the Hindu past even in inner Java and raise the question why the triumph of Islam so complete (Hodgson, Vol. 2, 1974:551).

Recent studies have further refuted much of Geertz’s assertion. As

have been shown by Azra (2004) - for the period of the 17th to 18th centuries

and beyond - and by Laffan (2003), Islam in the archipelago has never been

cut off from the one in the Middle East. In fact there is a great deal of intense

connections, networks, religious and cultural exchanges among Muslims in

the two regions. All these in turn have influenced the course of Islam in the

archipelago, including in Java. These also have been shown by such scholars

as Hefner (1985), Woodward (1985), Ricklefs (1998), Riddell (2001) and

many others. All of them basically argue that Islam in fact forms an obvious

layer of Javanese and, by extension, Indonesian cultures.

It is important, however, to point out that despite continuing networks

and exchanges between Indonesia and Middle East, Indonesian Islam at the

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same time continue also to develop its distinctive social, cultural and

political expression. Prominent contemporary Indonesian Muslim thinkers

such as Munawir Sjadzali, Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid,

Abdurrahman Wahid, Ahmad Syafii Maarif and many others continue also

to contextualize the great tradition of Islam with the Indonesian realities.

As a result, Indonesian Islam, by and large, remains faithful to

‘washatiyyah Islam’, middle path Islam, that takes a middle course, rather

than taking an extreme position either right or left. This is also one the

reasons why Indonesian Muslims in general can accept the constitutional

arrangement of the nation-state Indonesia after a series of debates and

struggles in the formulation and amendment of the constitution.

Constitutional Agencies

The original Indonesian Constitution of 1945, before it was amended

four times in the post-Soeharto period (from May 1998 onward), had a

history from the final year of Japanese occupation in 1945. The Japanese

seemed to realize that Indonesian independence was in the end unavoidable

because of some setback they experienced in many fronts. That is why on

April 29, 1945, the Japanese administration formed the BPUPK (Badan

Penyelidikan untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan, or the Investigating Committee

for the Preparation of [Indonesian] Independence). The BPUPK consisted of

62 members from among leading senior and experienced [secular]

nationalists and Muslims who had been involved in nationalist and Islamic

movements. The BPUPK was led by Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat as its

president and RP Soeroso as its vice-president.

With the formation of BPUPK, apparently the Japanese wished to

have a peaceful transition of Indonesia from being under its administration

to be a fully independent state. Therefore, the BPUPK was assigned, among

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others, to prepare the ideological basis and constitution of the future state of

Indonesia as well as to develop its apparatus and administration. Thus, the

BPUPK was the first agency responsible to draft the Indonesian constitution,

better known later as the 1945 Constitution.

The efforts to draft the 1945 Indonesian constitution by BPUPK were,

however, marred by bitter struggles in the first session of the agency from 1

May to 1 June 1945 between the two major factions in the body. On the one

hand they were ‘secular nationalists’ who wished that future Indonesian state

should be a ‘secular’ one; they were challenged by the Muslim nationalis

who aspired that the future Indonesia should be an ‘Islamic state’. In order to

avoid a deadlock on this very crucial issue, the BPUPK formed a sub-

committee of nine members (Panitia Sembilan) that represented the two

factions; they were Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, A.A. Maramis,

Muhammad Yamin, and Ahmad Soebardjo of ‘secular nationalist’ group,

and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Haji Agus Salim, and Abdul Wahid Hasjim of

Islamic-oriented faction.

A crucial agreement was reached on 1 July 1945, among them that

Indonesia would not be based on Islam and that either Muslim or non-

Muslim could become the president. At the same time, a five-principles later

known as Pancasila was introduced in the Preamble of the Constitution

draft. The original five principles were: first, the belief in God with the

obligation to implement Islamic shari’a for its adherents; second, a just

and civilized humanity; third, the unity of Indonesia; fourth, democracy

guided by wisdom arising from consultation and representation; and fifth,

social justice for the whole Indonesian people (Elson 2009: 112-3, Hosen

2007: 61-2).

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With the agreement on the Constitution, the BPUPK was disbanded

and replaced on 7 August 1945 by the Committee for the Preparation of

Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI)

with Soekarno as its head. The PPKI was also assigned to ‘finalize’ the

agreed draft of the 1945 Constitution; and for that purpose it met for the first

time on 18 August 1945, one day after the declaration of Indonesian

independence on 17 August 1945. The PPKI meeting, attended by its 27

members proved to be very crucial. In the words of Elson, “[the PPKI]

moved quickly to finalize and formally adopt the draft constitution produced

by the BPUPK. In the process, such limited gains as had been made by the

Muslim group in the BPUPK were entirely erased” (Elson 2009: 119).

What Elson refers to as ‘such limited gains’ were related to the phrase

in the preamble of constitution concerning the first basis of the Indonesian

state that said ‘with the obligation to implement Islamic shari’a for its

adherents’ which in the Indonesian language known as ‘famous’ seven

words (dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya),

which were generally also called as ‘the Jakarta Charter’. It is reported that

in the evening of day when Indonesian independence was declared (17

August 1945), Vice-President Mohammad Hatta had received ‘a Japanese

navy officer’ who conveyed the messege that Christians from Eastern

Indonesia had strong objection to that particular phrase. They warned Hatta

that if the phrase was not deleted or changed, it was possible that their

fellows Christians from Eastern Indonesia would prefer to be outside of the

Republic of Indonesia. Alarmed by this, Hatta soon in the following morning

convened Muslim leaders who in their fifteen minute meeting wisely

accepted to drop the phrase from the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution for

the sake of the national unity.

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Not only that, in further meetings of the PPKI, further revision was

made to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. First, the word ‘Allah’ (God)

that was associated mostly with Islam was replaced by a more neutral or

generic Indonesian term ‘Tuhan’ (God); second, the stipulation that the

president be a Muslim was also deleted, so that either Muslim or non-

Muslim could become president of the Republic.

In retrospect, many Muslim leaders particularly during the era of

President Soekarno lamented those revisions of the 1945 Constitution; they

felt that they had sacrificed a great deal, but at the same time had been

heavily defeated. That is why, the longing among some Muslims for the

Jakarta Charter has been on and off in the course of Indonesian history as

can be clearly observed in the post-Soeharto Indonesia when the 1945

Constitution was being amended, certain Muslim figures, Islamic political

parties and groups wished that the Jakarta Charter should be reinserted into

the Preamble of the Constitution.

It is good to mention in passing that since independence, Indonesia

has adopted three constitutions; first, the 1945 Indonesian Constitution that

came into effect on 18 August 1945. Then, with the return of the Dutch

colonial government on 27 December, which resulted in the breaking up of

the Republic of Indonesia and creation of the Republic of United States of

Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat/RIS), the 1949 Constitution was

introduced. The RIS did not last long. On 17 August 1950, Indonesia

returned to its original form as a unitary state; and a Provisional Constitution

of 1950 was adopted. The period of the Provisional Constitution was marked

by political struggles between Islamic-oriented group that attempted to make

Islam as the basis of the state and the ‘non-Islamic oriented group’ that

wanted to keep Pancasila as the basis of Indonesian state. This resulted in a

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long political impasse that led President Soekarno to take decision into his

own hands and return to the original 1945 Constitution.

Since the return by President Soekarno in mid 1959 to the 1945

Constitution, the agency responsible for the constitution was the Majelis

Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People Consultative Assembly). In the

early years of General Soeharto period, the MPR was made into MPR-

Sementara (Temporary People Consultative Assembly). When President

Soeharto was firmed in office, the MPRS was disbanded and replaced by the

(permanent) MPR that consisted of parliament (DPR—Dewan Perwakilan

Rakyat) members and appointed representatives from different segments of

society.

It is important to mention that throughout the 32-year-long reign of

President Soeharto, no amendment of the 1945 Constitution was made. The

MPR played a role mostly in the election of the President and issuance of

Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan

Negara/GBHN), which was basically outlining state policy in the national

development. And every five years, the MPR reelected President Soeharto;

that is why the MPR was regarded as being only a rubberstamp in the

maintenance of President Soeharto in power rather than anything else.

It was only after the resignation of President Soeharto from power in

May 1998, that the MPR returned to its role as the constitutional agency.

The MPR, consisted of 695 members, for the final time, in 1999, elected

Abdurrahman Wahid as new Indonesian President, replacing ‘interim’

President BJ Habibie who replaced President Soeharto. But, it was also the

MPR who impeached President Wahid in 2001 for misadministration and

replaced him with his Vice-President, Megawati Soekarnoputri.

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In addition to this, the MPR played its role as the Constitutional

Agency by introducing a series of amendment of the 1945 Constitution. In

fact, the 1945 Constitution was amended four times; first amendment was

passed by the MPR on 19 October 1999, following the first democratic

parliamentary general election; second amendment was accepted by the

MPR on 18 August 2000; third amendment was passed in November 2001;

and the fourth amendment was approved in August 2002. These series of

amendments were conducted, because of the strong pressure from many

sectors of Indonesian society who felt that the 1945 Constitution was too

vague in many ways that in the end had made possible the authoritarian rules

during the Soekarno and Soeharto periods.

For the purpose of amendments, the MPR formed an Ad-hoc

Committee which is responsible for evaluating and drafting the amendments.

I was involved as one of ‘Team of Experts’ selected by the MPR Ad-hoc

Committee. The Ad-hoc Committee held a good number of hearings,

discussion and workshops with various segments of Indonesian society in

different cities across the country; and as one might expect, the Indonesian

people in general supported the amendments of the Constitution.

It is not necessary to delineate all of the amendments here; but one of

the most important—if not the most radical—amendments (Lindsey 2008:

33-4) is that the President (and Vice-President) is no longer elected by the

MPR, but directly by the people as conducted for the first time in the 2004

election and lastly in the 2009 election. This means that the role of the MPR

has been significantly reduced to a more symbolic presence rather than being

the highest political body in Indonesian state-system.

Another important agreement of all political factions in the MPR

during the amendments is that there will be no amendment of the Preamble

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of the Constitution. This simply means that there will be no reinsertion of

the ‘famous seven words’, or Jakarta Charter. The MPR also rejected the

proposal from certain members of MPR of the amendment of Article 29 of

the 1945 Constitution on religious freedom in order to make the practice of

shari`a a constitutional obligation for the Muslim citizens (Lindsey 2008:

40-1; Hosen 2007: 93-6).

Despite that, there are still a few Muslim figures and Islamic

movements such as Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that continue to

campaign and conduct various efforts for the transformation of Indonesia

into a Caliphate or into an Islamic state, and/or for the adoption of the

shari`ah by the state. Before long, it should be made clear that the majority

of prominent Muslim figures, leaders, thinkers and Islamic organizations

accepted those existing political arrangement and realities, particularly the

Pancasila and the current form of the Indonesian state as being final.

It is also clear that political, social, cultural and religious dynamics in

the last two decades at least have brought Indonesian Islam into a new stage.

So, as far as Islamic law is concerned, shari’ah both at the levels of thought

and institution has reached one of the most important stages since the early

1990s, when President Soeharto gave his blessing to the foundation in the

country of the very first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat. From then onwards,

various national legislation that were in line with the shari’ah injunctions

have been adopted, paving the way for further entrenchment of shari’ah-

based institutions in the country as one might observe in today’s Indonesia.

This is one of the factors responsible for driving certain small Islamic

political parties and groups of Muslims in the post-Soeharto Indonesia to

accelerate their efforts for official implementation of Islamic law in all its

aspects, particularly the jinayah (criminal law) that contains the hudud law,

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the most controversial and hotly contested element of shari`ah. In fact, the

local parliament of Aceh Province in name of Aceh Special Autonomy in

September 2009 introduced a Qanun Jinayat Bill that adopted the hudud

law; but the governor of Aceh so far has declined to sign the Bill that will

bring it into effect. Discussion on this is still continuing in Indonesia to date.

With that, the adoption of shari`ah-by laws has also a lot to do with

political contestation both at local and national levels. Continued

fragmentation of Indonesian politics since 1998 combined with the

introduction of democracy, have been used and abused by certain political

parties to support shari’ah-by laws for their own political benefits.

This was also seen during the amendment of the 1945 Indonesian

Constitution between 1999-2004; certain political parties, such as the Moon

and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang/PBB) and the United Development

Parti (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) together with other supporters of

shari’ah put a great deal of pressure on Indonesia’s People Consultative

Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR) to reinsert the Jakarta

Charter into the Preamble of Constitution that will allow the official

implementation of Islamic law in the country. The moves were rejected by

the Assembly. Despite the rejection, the proponents of shari`ah continue

their campaign for adoption of Islamic law both at national and local levels

through the introduction of ‘shari`ah-by laws at the province and district

level. The efforts to introduce shari`ah-by laws reached their peaks between

2000-2004; and since 2005 there is marked decline of the adoption of

shari`ah-by laws by local government.

This tendency could be worrisome for certain circles, particularly

among Western observers. But, the efforts for formalization of shari’ah has

been opposed by largest mainstream moderate Muslim organizations such as

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the Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and many other similar organizations

across the country.

The Transmission of Faith

The Indonesian Constitution clearly does not make a particular

religion—in this case Islam—as the basis of the state; nor does it make

Islam as the official religion of the state. This is the reason, why many

people, particularly the Westerners, consider Indonesia as a ‘secular’ state,

even though there is no stipulation in the 1945 Constitution stating that

Indonesia is ‘secular’ state. That is why the Indonesian people often say that

Indonesia is neither a secular state, nor is it a theocratic (Islamic) state.

For Indonesians in general, Indonesia is not a secular state. In fact the

term ‘secular’ or ‘secularism’ is an anathema. For them, it is unthinkable

that the state is a secular one that—in their mind—would give no room to

religion. Furthermore, secularism is very pejorative, since it would make

religion play a very limited role in the life of the people as well as in the

politics. Especially for many Muslims, who still hold the view that politics

in one form or another can not be entirely separated from religion,

secularism should be rejected. That is why the Constitutional recognition

and accommodation of religion is acceptable enough—or even Islamic

enough—not only from purely Islamic perspective, but also from

considering the fact that there is a significant number of non-Muslim

citizens of the nation-state Indonesia.

As stated earlier, both the original and amended versions of the 1945

Constitution recognize the importance of religion in the Indonesian nation-

state. The third line to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution—that has been

amended four times since the resignation of President Soeharto in May

1998—states among other that the declaration of Indonesian independence

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was due to the blessing of God Almighty. The fourth line states that the

Indonesian state is based on the five principles: First, belief in One Supreme

God; second, just and civilized humanity; third, the unity of Indonesia;

fourth, democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom through deliberation

and representation; and fifth, social justice for the entire people of Indonesia.

These are the five principles that are called Pancasila, the constitutional

basis of the Indonesian state.

It is clear that Pancasila expresses the importance of religion in the

first of its five principles, that the state is based on ‘belief in the One,

Supreme God’. The official explanation of this first principle states that the

principle of belief in One Supreme God means that Indonesians are free to

adhere to and practice any of the six officially recognized religions. As

Hosen argues that believing on One Supreme God becomes the ‘state

religion’; and by not referring to any particular belief, the state guarantees

religious freedom (Hosen 2007: 194).

But Pancasila is more than simply the Indonesian state basis. It is also

the ideological framework and common platform for all different groups of

the Indonesian peoples. Pancasila is a ‘deconfessional’ ideology that can not

be associated with any religion, particularly with Islam, the single largest

religion adhered to by the majority of the Indonesian people.

The fact that Pancasila is a ‘deconfessional ideology’ is in fact a

blessing in disguise for Indonesia. Even though Pancasila can not be

associated directly with any religion, it is clear that it is a religious-friendly

ideology; in other words, Pancasila is not a hostile ideology to religion.

Therefore, Pancasila can be accepted in principle by any religion,

particularly Islam as the religion adhered to by the single largest majority of

Indonesian population. As a result, there should be no strong reasons to

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replace Pancasila with any other ideology, particularly those based on

religion.

The freedom of religion is guaranteed not only by Pancasila, but also

by the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. Article 29 of the Constitution –

which has never been the subject of an amendment - explicitly guarantees

religious freedom as follows: (1). The state is based on belief in One,

Supreme God; 2. The state guarantees freedom of every resident to adhere to

his/her respective religion and perform religious duties in conformity with

his/her religion/faith. Again, this article does not give Islam a special

status—with all rights and privileges; all persons are free to believe in and

practice their own religion or faith.

Article 29 does not stipulate whether the state should or should not

interfere in religious affairs; or conversely, whether or not religion could or

could interfere in the affairs of the state. But in general, it is agreed that the

role of the state is to promote respect among adherents of different religions

and to achieve intra and inter-religious harmony. The state emphasizes the

need for communal and national solidarity in all aspect of Indonesian life,

particularly religious life. Corresponding to the fundamental right of

religious freedom, every citizen is obliged to respect the right of other

citizens. In this sense, all religions have the right to promote their teachings

and to have peaceful co-existence.

Again, the 1945 Indonesian Constitution makes the belief in One

Supreme God as one of the five pillars of the Indonesian state. The use of

generic term ‘Tuhan’ (God) in the Constitution rather than a particular term

such as ‘Allah’ that can be easily associated with Islam clearly shows the

state recognition of religious diversity. This was stated in the Presidential

Decree No 1, 1965 (which was later enacted as Law No 5, 1969), that there

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were five religions recognized by the state; they were Islam, Catholicism,

Protestantism, Hinduism, and. Buddhism. Later, in 2005 the government

recognized Confucianism as the sixth religion. Apparently there are

followers of other religions in Indonesia that are not ‘recognized’ by state

such as Sikhism, Baha’ism, and even Judaism. People of these still-

unrecognized religions as one might expect often face problems and

discrimination when they want to register their marriages, divorces and

births. This is apparently a contradiction of the fair and equal treatment of

all religion. That is why now some NGOs on religious rights have brought

the case to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), appealing for

the abolishment of that Presidential Decree No. 1, 1965 concerned. The

Constitutional Court decision on this matter is pending

One of consequences of the state recognition of the six religion is the

formation of Ministry of Religious Affairs in the Cabinet in 1946. The

Ministry is responsible for administration of religious communities: in

matters of Muslim community it supervises religious education, Muslim

marriages, haj administration and Islamic court (now is under the Supreme

Court), and haj. The Ministry also plays the role in the strengthening of

religious tolerance and harmony among the believers. Therefore, the

Ministry consists of Directorate Generals and Directorates that deal with

socio-religious affairs of ‘all religious communities’ from Muslims,

Catholics, Protestants, Hindus and Buddhists—there is yet no Directorate for

the followers of Confucianism. Furthermore, it is expected that the Ministry

will not interfere in theological and doctrinal matters of each religion; these

are the in the hands of councils, functionaries or leaders of respective

religion.

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In relations to government, each religious communities is represented

by a kind of religious council; Muslims by the Council of Indonesian Ulama

(Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI), Protestants by the Association of Churces

of Indonesian (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia/PGI), Catholics by Conference

of Church Authority of Indonesia (Konperensi Waligereja Indonesia/KWI),

Hindus by Parisadha Hindu Dharma, Buddhists by the Indonesian Buddhist

Council (Walubi), and Confucians by High Council of Indonesian

Confucianism Religion (Majelis Tinggi Agama Konghucu

Indonesia/MATAKIN). These religious councils have also been involved in

inter-faith dialogs and programs.

The government, as a rule, takes side with these religious councils

when it comes to decide whether or not certain ‘splinter’ religious group is

valid or ‘deviant’. Therefore, when the MUI issued a fatwa declaring the

Ahmadiyah as ‘deviant’ group, the government aparently supported that

decision. In another case, when the Walubi was constested by the Great

Sangha Conference (KASI), the government rallied behind the former.

Similar attitude is also shown by the government by not accepting certain

Protestant’s denominations such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, in line with the

decision of PGI. In these cases, it is clear that government has interfered in

deciding the ‘true’ school of thought or denomination; the attitude of which

is not in line with the principle of freedom of religion and belief.

Furthermore, despite their representation in relations to government,

most of these religious councils could not claim to be the sole authoritative

bodies within their own communities. The MUI has sometime been

contested by NU and Muhammadiyah, or other Muslim organizations. The

fatwas of MUI are not necessarily always accepted by the fatwa bodies

existing in each Muslim organizations. That is why, some times the

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government is in a very difficult position; and it is not always easy for

related government agencies to intervene.

Pancasila: The ‘Final Basis’ of Diversity

Even though, Indonesia is also known as the largest Muslim nation in

the world, it is not an Islamic state. Politically and ideologically, Indonesia is

a state based on Pancasila that was (and still is) a compromise between

secular nationalists who advocated a secular state and Muslim leaders who

demanded an ‘Islamic state’. After a series of debates and struggles, Muslim

leaders finally accepted Pancasila and regarded it as having no

incompatibility with Islamic teaching (Madjid 1994:57-8).

Therefore, Muslims’ acceptance of Pancasila is no doubt one of the

most important Indonesian Islamic roots of the acceptance and recognition

of the country diversity and pluralism. For the bulk majority of Indonesian

Muslims, Pancasila is, in line with a verse of the Quran, a “kalimah sawa”, a

common platform, among different religious followers. Addressing the

Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’an has this to say: “Say: O the people of the

Book [ahl al-kitab, that is the Jews and Christians]; come to common terms

between us and you; that we worship none but God, that we associate

partners with him, that we erect not, from ourselves, lords and patrons, other

than God…”(Q 3:64).

As Madjid rightly argues, the Pancasila thus becomes a firm basis for

development of religious tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia. Adam Malik,

who was once Vice President during the Soeharto period, maintained that

Pancasila, in Islamic perspective, is in a similar spirit to the modus vivendi

that was created by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina after having migrated

(hijrah) from Mecca. The Prophet laid down the modus vivendi in a famous

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document called the “Constitution of Medina” (mithaq al-madinah). The

document includes a provision which states that all Medinan factions,

including Jews, were one nation (ummah) together with Muslims, and that

they have the same rights and duties as Muslims. Adam Malik interprets the

“Constitution of Medina” as a formula for a state based on the idea of social

and religious pluralism (Madjid 1994:64).

Similarly, for Bellah, the American sociologist of religion, the

Medinan state was a root of Islamic modernity and pluralism. He argues that

Islam in its seventh century origins was for its time and place “remarkably

modern…in the high degree of commitment, involvement, and participation

expected from the rank-and-file members of the community” (Bellah

1970:150-1). Despite that, the Prophet Muhammad’s experiment eventually

failed because of the lack of necessary socio-cultural pre-requisites among

the Arab Muslims. In other words, the modus vivendi failed because it was

“too modern” for the Medinan society.

Looking to the Indonesian experience with Pancasila as a common

platform, it is a part of what Bellah believes is an effort of modern

Indonesian Muslims to depict the early community as the very type of

equalitarian participant nationalism, which is by no means entirely an

unhistorical ideological participation.

The relation between the Pancasila state and Islam has gone through a

number of different stages in the course of Indonesian history. First, during

most of the Soekarno period there were tension between him and most

modernist Muslim leaders of Masyumi party in particular that once struggled

for the establishment through constitutional means of an Islamic state; but

they failed to gain majority in the Parliament.

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Tension between the two opposing sides remained, however; and

many of these Muslim leaders were jailed towards the end of Soekarno rule.

On the other hand, President Soekarno recruited a traditional Muslim group,

that is, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) into his axis, the so-called ‘Nasakom’

(nationalist, religious, communist). The NU kiyais and politician in fact

issued a fatwa (independent religious ruling) recognizing Soekarno as

Muslim leader who must be obeyed by all Muslims.

Second, roughly in the first half of his long rule, President Soeharto

implemented some kind of hostile attitude and policies towards Islam and

Muslim groups. Early in his rule, he declined the attempts by Muslims to

revive and rehabilitate the old Masyumi party; he depoliticized all Muslim

parties and forced them to fuse in 1971 in the PPP (Partai Persatuan

Pembangunan or United Development Party); engineered through a number

of his generals—particularly General Ali Murtopo—of the so-called

“Komando Jihad” (Jihad Commands) by recruiting ex-DI/TII to conduct

subversive activities in order to discredit Islam and Muslims in general; and

lastly forced all Muslim groups and others to accept Pancasila as the sole

basis of their organizations.

Thus, as a basis of Indonesia pluralism, Pancasila had been

unfortunately used by the Soeharto regime as a tool for repression. The

forced implementation in 1985 of Pancasila by President Soeharto as the

sole ideological basis of all organizations in the country had been

unfortunate and resented by many Indonesian. Through a special training

(Penataran P4), the Pancasila was indoctrinated to Indonesians, which in the

end gave the Pancasila a bad name. It is clear that for most Indonesian

nothing is wrong with the Pancasila as such, but when it was abused and

manipulated for the maintenance of President Soeharto’s political status quo,

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then people rapidly lost their belief in the Pancasila as an integrating factor

within plural Indonesia.

Even though there were attempts by a few splinter Muslim leaders in

the 1950s to replace Pancasila with Islam as the basis of the Indonesian

state, in the end virtually all Muslim leaders recognize that Pancasila as the

common platform and ideological basis of the Republic of Indonesia.

Virtually all large moderate Muslim organizations across the country are of

the opinion that Pancasila as outlined in the Preamble of 1945 Constitution

(including the amended version) is the final basis of the Indonesian state,

and that the current form of Indonesian state is final.

It is regrettable that Pancasila has been conspicuously absent in the

public discourse since the fall of President Soeharto. Indonesian top leaders

from BJ Habibie, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono have all failed to revive Pancasila. I would argue that

in the apparent decline of several integrating forces of the nation-state

Indonesia, Pancasila is the remaining one. Therefore, there should be

rejuvenation of Pancasila, since it remains the most feasible and viable basis

of and common platform for religious pluralism in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The 1945 Indonesian Constitution clearly gives ample spaces for

diversity, particularly for religion; and practically all adherents of religions

existing in the country feel that the Constitution has sufficiently recognized

the diversity of the faiths. In the post-Soeharto period, as an intended

consequence of democratic opening, there are of course a limited number of

individuals or Muslim groups who openly struggle to create an Islamic state

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or a caliphate in the country, like the Hizb al-Tahrir (‘party of liberation’).

But, they fail to find support from the bulk majority of Muslim population.

There are complains and repeated appeals from certain circles of

politicians, retired high-ranking military officers, and intellectual that the

1945 Indonesian Constitution should again be amended for the fifth time.

But this is related mostly to the recreation of a more balanced power and

authority between the executive and legislative branches of government as

well as to the position of the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan

Perwakilan Daerah/DPD) vis-à-vis People’s Representative Assembly

(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), the parliament.

It is important to note, that appeal for the fifth amendment of the 1945

Constitution is not based on the arguments that the current Constitutional

arrangement of religious life should be revised. Therefore, it seems that

current and existing Constitutional arrangement has been generally accepted;

and therefore, there is no urgent need to change it.

In the meantime, we have yet to see whether the fifth amendment of

the Constitution would ever take place at all in the near future.

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Azra, Azyumardi & Wayne Hudson (eds), 2008, Islam beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam

and Western Political Theory, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Azra, Azyumardi, 2006, Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global

Context, Jakarta & Singapore: ICIP, TAF, Equinox-Solstice. Elson, RE, 2009, ‘Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945’, Indonesia,

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Hosen, Nadirsyah, 2007, Shari’a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia, Singapore, ISEAS.

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Indonesian Constitution from Shari’ah Perspective’, The Muslim World, Vol. 97, No. 2, April 2007.

Hosen, Nadirsyah, 2005, ‘Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate’,

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36, 3, 419-40. Kusuma, AB, 2004, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945: Memuat Salinan Dokumen

Otentik Badan Oentoek Menjelidiki Oesaha2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan (the Birth of the 1945 Constitution: To Include Authentic Documents of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence), Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia.

Lindsey, Tim, 2008, ‘Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: Muddling towards

Democracy’, in Tim Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia Law and Society, Second Edition, Sydney: Federation Press.

Mas’udi, Masdar Farid et al, 2009, Syarah Undang-undang Dasar Negara Republik

Indonesia Tahun 1945 dalam Perspektif Islam (Explanation of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 in Islamic Perspective), Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi.

Nasution, Buyung Adnan, 1992, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in

Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.

Prawirosoedirdjo, Soemali et al, 1984, Sejarah Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945

dan Pancasila (History of the Birth of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila), Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press.

Salim, Arskal & Azyumardi Azra (eds.), 2003, Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia,

Singapore: ISEAS. *Azyumardi Azra is Professor of history and Director of Graduate School, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia (January 2007-on); and Deputy for Social Welfare at the Office of Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia (April 2007-October 2009).

He was rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University for two terms (1998-2002 and 2002-2006). He earned his MA, MPhil and PhD degrees in history from Columbia University (1992) with the dissertation “The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian `Ulama’ in the 17th and 18th Centuries”. In May 2005 he was awarded Doctoral Degree Honoris Causa in Humane Letters from Carroll College, Montana, USA.

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He is also a Honorary Professorial Fellow, University of Melbourne, Australia (2004-9); a member of Board of Trustees, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan (2004-9); and a member of Academic Development Committee, Aga Khan International University-Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations (AKU-ISMC), London (2006-8).

He has been involved as a member of selection committees for research awards, such as SEASREP (Southeast Asia Studies Research Exchange Program (The Nippon Foundation & The Asia Center, Tokyo, 1998-9). He is also a member of Advisory/Management Board of Asian Research Foundation (ARF), Bangkok (2005-on); Asian Scholarship Foundation (ASF), Bangkok (2007-9); Asian Public Intellectual Fellowship Program, The Nippon Foundation, Tokyo (2007-on). He is also a member of Indonesian National Research Council (DRN, 2004-now); and a life-time member of Indonesian Academy of Sciences (AIPI). In addition, he is a member of advisory board of a number of international institutions such as the Multi-Faith Centre (MFC), Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia (2005-09); the US Institute of Global Ethics and Religion (2004-on); Center for the Study of Contemporary Islam (CSCI), University of Melbourne, Melbourne (2005-09); the UN Democracy Fund/UNDEF, New York (2006-08); LibforAll (2006-on). He is also member of the Tripartite Forum [governments, UN offices and Civil Society organizations] for Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, Development and Human Dignity, launched at the UN in New York on March 24, 2006; member of the Board of International IDEA (Institute for Democracy an Electoral Assistance, Stockholm 2007-on); member of Board of Governors, Bali Democracy Forum (BDF)/Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), Jakarta/Bali, 2008-on); and member of Council on Faith, World Economic Forum, Davos (2008-on). He is also co-chair of United Kingdom-Indonesia Muslim Advisory Council, formed at the end of 2006 by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He is editor-in-chief, Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies (1994-on); advisory board of Journal of Qur’anic Studies (SOAS, London, 2005-on), Journal of Usuluddin (Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2005 on); Australian Journal of Asian Law (2008-on); Journal of Islamic Advanced Studies (Kuala Lumpur, 2008-on); and Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS, London, 2009-on). He has been international visiting fellow at Oxford University, University of Philippines, New York University, Columbia University, University of Melbourne and many others. He regularly presented papers on various topics at national and international conferences. He has published 21 books; numerous chapters in internationally edited books; his latest books are The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia, Crows Nest, Australia: Asian Studies Association of Australia and Allen & Unwin; Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004; Indonesia, Islam and Democracy, Jakarta & Singapore: ICIP & Equinox, 2006; Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Development, Bandung: Mizan International, 2007; and contributing editor (with Wayne Hudson), Islam beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory, London: Ashgate, 2008.

In conjunction with the commemoration of Indonesian independence (August 17, 1945), on August 15, 2005, he was awarded by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono the ‘Bintang Maha Putra Utama’ [lit, the Star of the Greatest Son of the Soil], the highest star for Indonesia civilian, for his outstanding contribution to development of moderate Islam in the country. Early that year, in conjunction with its 50th year anniversary, The Asia Foundation (TAF) also awarded him for his outstanding contribution to the modernization of Islamic education in Indonesia.