Government of the Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja De Ahorras De Manila FACTS: In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank. HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people. Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy. HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed. Merlin Magallona vs Eduardo Ermita (Executive Secretary) FACTS: In 1961, Congress passed Republic Art No. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. In 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 to comply with the terms of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).

RA 9522 shortened one baseline optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522 as it reduces Philippine maritime territory and of the Philippine states sovereign power, which is in violation of Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also assail that RA 9522 opens the country’s waters to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. Respondents assert that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interest or relinquish the Philippine claim over Sabah. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 9522 is constitutional? RULING: Yes. The court dismissed the case and upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522. The law is consistent with national interest of the country. It merely determined and set the official boundaries of the country’s maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to the standards set by UNCLOS III. The court upheld that the construction of the regime of island suggested by the law is not incongruent with the country’s territorial sovereignty over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal. The court further reiterated that the claims over the said islands, remained even with the adoption of the amendments in RA 9522. The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines sovereignty as affirmed in Art 49 of UNCLOS III. As an archipelagic state, the Philippines has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. The petition dismissed. Shigenori Kuroda vs Rafael Jalandoni FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international. ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts? HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

Calalang vs Williams FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10, 1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulations. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the SC the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Calalang avers that the regulations complained of:

Infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all people; and that

It constitutes unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional principle regarding the promotion of social justice? HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex. (Justice Laurel) Social Justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” Arturo Tolentino vs The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively. Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. HELD: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate. SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days. Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands FACTS: The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance. HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order

or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.” Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?” The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC. HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public

welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality. The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive). Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter and Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. Dante Casibang vs Narciso Aquino (Judge of CFI Pangasinan) and Remigio Yu

FACTS: In 1971, Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who filed a protest against the election of the former with the CFI of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. In 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was then ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the

Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. Then on 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and had rested his case, Yu moved to dismiss the election protest on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government. ISSUE: Whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit HELD: No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office. The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision. Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A ‘term’ of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite. The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.” While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions. General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision. General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term “political question” connotes a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive

branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure”. The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. A purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Wigberto Tanada, et al. vs Edgardo Angara, et al. FACTS: Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.” ISSUE: Whether or not the 1987 Constitution prohibits our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? RULING: NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized. The Court DISMISSED the petition. There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. [W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. [T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members..

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member. E. Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands FACTS: The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance. HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither

fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.” Dominador Aytona vs Andres Castillo FACTS: Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration. ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post. HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness. Romulo Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers FACTS: In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo

followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege. HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. 1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. AKBAYAN Citizens Action Party vs Thomas Aquino, DTI Undersecretary FACTS: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).” JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO. The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns. ISSUES: 1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress 2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. RULINGS: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al”. The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substantives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.” It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that we fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.” Emilio Gonzales III vs Office of The President of the Philippines, acting through and represented by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of a police officer, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive

sessions. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition. G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia’s urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines. Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution’s apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman. HELD: YES. The Ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment. The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not

be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices. Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office of the President is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of back wages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED. Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal and Desierto FACTS: Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president. HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and

solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . . and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General. ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional. RULING: The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus: First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion” Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;” Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree. First Provision: Calling Out Power. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora) President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Third Provision: The Power to Take Over Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional. Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated

because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. United States vs Ang Tang Ho FACTS: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. Zacarias Villavicencio, et al., vs Justo Lukban FACTS: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Justo Lukban has the power and right to deport women with ill repute. HELD: Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly

authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. For this, Lukban must be severely punished Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.” For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. DECS vs Roberto Rey San Diego FACTS: Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the “three-flunk-rule”. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional.

RULING: Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that “every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) vs National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) FACTS: Marilyn Abucay has been an employee of PLDT for ten years when it was discovered that she accepted “bribes” from certain customers in order to facilitate the phone connections of said customers. PLDT terminated her employment. A labor case was filed by Abucay. The NLRC found the dismissal to be valid but nevertheless, the NLRC ordered PLDT to pay Abucay separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service. PLDT assailed the said decision. PLDT averred that separation pay is only available in cases where the employee has been illegally dismissed and reinstatement is no longer possible. PLDT further argued that to award Abucay separation pay is tantamount to rewarding her misdeeds. The Solicitor General, arguing for the NLRC, cited numerous previous cases where separation pay has been awarded by the Supreme Court even if the employee’s dismissal were due to just and authorized causes. ISSUE: Whether or not Abucay is entitled to separation pay. HELD: No. In this case, the Supreme Court finally set the rules as to when separation pay is proper in cases where the employee is dismissed for valid reasons. As a rule, and under the Labor Code, a person dismissed for just and authorized causes is not entitled to separation pay. However, based on equity, an exception can be made if the employee is dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. In the case at bar, the reason for Abucay’s dismissal is due to her acceptance of a “bribe” which is dishonesty and is immoral. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered

at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. The court also made a pronouncement:

Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.