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8/13/2019 Consti Week5
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 (289
SCRA 337)
Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to
challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that
said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied
the radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power
given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media
communication or information during election period.
Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting,
whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as
there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good
so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by
amendment of the franchises of radio and television
broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought,
such provisions had not been thought of as taking property
without just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution
authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common
good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not
only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly
the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in
an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the
requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even
in the United States, there are responsible scholars who
believe that government controls on broadcast media can
constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and
attention to public affairs to further the system of freeexpression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be
required to give free air time to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals
and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of
using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise
of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC
January 28, 2000
FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the
issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit
surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project,
with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections
and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections
for national officials particularly for President and Vice
President, results of which shall be broadcasted
immediately. The electoral body believed that such project
might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the
Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted andreported by media without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its
powers, can absolutely ban exit polls
ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide
reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms
of speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional
and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and
credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve
and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly
confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were
designed "to condition the minds of people and cause
confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the
election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle
to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are
lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally
protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune
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to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its
police power," such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof
creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has
a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has
the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness
of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll
highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit
poll may not be in harmony with the official count made bythe Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll
has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility
and integrity of the electoral process."
SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit
polls ban is nullified and set aside.
1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of
electoral processes
Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a
survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at
random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view
of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result
is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec
count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as
to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity
of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those
of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. Ifat all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative
effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting
centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly,
the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its
application is without qualification as to whether the polling
is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election
Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting
centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or
the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers.
Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the
presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends
to create disorder or confuse the voters. M oreover, the
prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll
data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the
voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain
unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained,
candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in
general would be deprived of studies on the impact of
current events and of election-day and other factors on
voters' choices.
3) Violation of Ban Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly
transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-
tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to
the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is
not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid
vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are
prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots
to other persons, from making copies thereof, or fromputting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified.
Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast
by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate
voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is
the association of voters with their respective votes, for the
purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result
cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters'
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they
have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually
exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector hasvoted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly
tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec,
so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental
rights of our people.##
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by
qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose
of determining the probable result of an election by
confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially casttheir ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the
public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance
overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history,
exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11,
1998 elections.
SWS vs Comelec
Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct
an election survey throughout the period of the elections and
release to the media the results of such survey as well aspublish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction
on the publication of election survey results constitutes a
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prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without
any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of
pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category ofexpression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression
of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Government Service Insurance System and Winston F.
Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al. G.R. No. 180291 , July 27,
2010.
Freedom of speech. Government workers, whatever their
rank, have as much right as any person in the land to voice
out their protests against what they believe to be a violation
of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive
them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to
hold that by joining the government service, the members
thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This
freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be
taken away. Thus, Section 5 of Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 02-1316, which regulates the political rights of
those in the government service, provides that the concerted
activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in
order to realize their demands of force concession. Such
limitation or qualification in the above rule is intended to
temper and focus the application of the prohibition, as not all
collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, government employees
would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. Respondents act of wearing similarly colored
shirts, attending a public hearing for just over an hour at the
office of the GSIS Investigation Unit, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, and some even
badmouthing the GSIS guards and GSIS President and General
Manager Winston F. Garcia, are not constitutive of an (i)
intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii)
for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession. These actuations did not amount to a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action.
SORIANO VS MTRCB
The following is an update on the case of Bro. Eli Soriano
versus Ma. Consoliza Laguardia and the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). It begins with thepreachers account with a snippet from TOP magazine. It then
leads to Erika T. Dys news on Supreme Courts en banc
decision, and Newsbreak Purple S. Romeros voting report of
the Supreme Court on the case. The focus is on the dissenting
opinions of two justices: Justice Roberto A. Abad and Justice
Antonio T. Carpio.The dissenting opinions carry facts of the
case which can update the reader.
Dissent means that judges that do not agree with the
majority may write their own dissenting opinions to state
their views.
Justice Antonio Carpio
Background:
MTRCB suspended Bro. Sorianos television broadcasts after
the same religious group, the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), had filed
practically the same complaints about the use of harsh words
by Bro. Soriano or alleged bad words and defamation
against the INC. Soriano contested the suspensions at the
high court, complaining that the MTRCB violated his
constitutional right to free religion, speech, and expression.
The statements were merely in response to the detestable
conduct of the ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo hosting atelevision program entitled, Ang Tamang Daan, he said.
In taking Ang Dating Daan off the air, the MTRCB cited
Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1986, granting the Board the
power to screen, review, and examine all movie and TV
programs and to delete materials that it deems morally
offensive.
But Soriano countered that Section 3c of PD 1986 is
unconstitutional in so far as it sanctions the censorship of
religious TV programs as a form of subsequent punishment.
[SOURCE: THE OLD PATH MAGAZINE. Vol. 1 No. 3 | 2005.http://www.angdatingdaan.org/publications/pub_top_2.htm
%5D
After four years, this report came out -
The Supreme Court en banc, in an 11-4 vote, upheld the
three-month suspension imposed by the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board on the TV program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, after its host, petitioner
Eliseo S. Soriano, was found to have uttered offensive and
obscene remarks during its August 10, 2004 broadcast.
The majority, in a consolidated decision, speaking through
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., held that the suspension is
not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In
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affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of
suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the
MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running
afoul of the free speech clause. *Source: Erika T. Dy. SC
Upholds MTRCB Suspension of Ang Dating Daan. Supreme
Court of the Philippines. April 30, 2009.]
A researcher from Newsbreak had provided a capsule report
of the voting of the High Court on this issue as followsHow
the Supreme Court decided on
Soriano v. Laguardia; Soriano v. MTRCB
(on the suspension of Dating Daan preacher for uttering
profanities on air against the Iglesia ni Cristo)
Why is it important: The case raised questions on what
constitutes prior restraint.
The SC upheld the 3-month suspension of Dating Daan host
Eliseo Soriano, who uttered profanities against the religious
sect Iglesia ni Cristo on his show.
The Movie and Television Review Classification Board first
slapped Soriano with a 20-day preventive suspension upon
preliminary probe. It then issued a 3-month suspension
against Soriano after he was found guilty of expressing
obscenities on air.
The majority ruled that it is within the powers of the MTRCB
to issue a preventive suspension.
However, those who dissented, which included Chief Justice
Reynato Puno, said that the sanction will extend to Sorianos
future speech, and thus would constitute prior restraint.
How they voted: De Castro concurred with the decision.
Carpio and Carpio-Morales dissented. Brion and Corona voted
to dismiss the petition. [Research by Purple S. Romero.
Newsbreak.com]
Here come now the excerpts from Law Monitor of the
Supreme Court showing the dissenting opinions of Justice
Roberto A. Abad and Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Supreme Court Decisions and Resolutions March 2010
G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636. March 15, 2010
Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et
al./Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board, et al.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006 DIGEST
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right
as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No.
880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly
a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No.
880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time
and place of a public assembly form part of the message
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words lawful cause,
opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition
of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being
tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were
ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the
course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a
speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of
their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising
the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the
Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by
the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution
provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection.
For this rights represent the very basis of a functional
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democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power,
which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote thehealth, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public
places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come fromthe wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit
of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the
expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary
steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation
of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city
and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right
to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied
with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-
emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ
from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID
and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and
to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects,
and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its
National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners - versus -
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE LITO ATIENZA
Respondent.
G.R. No. 175241
Promulgated February 24, 2010
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines[1] (IBP) and
lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the
June 28, 2006 Decision[2] and the October 26, 2006
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals that found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose Lito
Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to
rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National
President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of
the City Mayor of Manila a letter application[4] for a permit
to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from
2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers
and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit[5] dated June 16, 2006
allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated
therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola
Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 94949.[6] The petition having been unresolved within
24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on
June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or
refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided
under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.[7]
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006
and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for
being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition
be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP
No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola
Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan
whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD)
earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto.
Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed
after the peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a
criminal action,[8] docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against
Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at
a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz
filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
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In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance, that the petition
became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second
assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on
certiorari, to which respondent filed his Comment of
November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply of
October 2, 2009.
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in
holding that the mod ification of the venue in IBPs rally
permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application
runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their
constitutional right to freedom of expression and public
assembly.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of
mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court
on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the passing of the date
of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide thebench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule
on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[9]
In the present case, the question of the legality of a
modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms
of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet
it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the
application where the shortest allowable period is five days
prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence
compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Respecting petitioners argument that the issues
presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a prejudicial questionto the criminal case against Cadiz, the Court finds it improper
to resolve the same in the present case.
Under the Rules,[10] the existence of a prejudicial
question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in a
criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at
the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,[11]
the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial
question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a
petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal
action,[12] the determination of the pendency of a prejudicialquestion should be made at the first instance in the criminal
action, and not before this Court in an appeal from the civil
action.
In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the
appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not
categorically require respondent to specify in writing the
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which
warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely
mandates that the action taken shall be in writing and shall
be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellatecourt went on to hold that respondent is authorized to
regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of
public assembly which are not absolute, and that the
challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas
designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are
allowed without permit.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in hisbehalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for
a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemedto have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on
the application [sic] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.
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(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court,
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal
bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decidedwithin twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed. (underscoring supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP) v. Ermita,[13] the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the
utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican
institutions and complements the right of free speech. To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the
majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins,
it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to
freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single
guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation
on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest.[14] (emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the
Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified the 1983
ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.[15] In ju xtaposing Sections 4 to 6
of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the
Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear andpresent danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on
the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority.[16] (italics and underscoring
supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform
the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of hisperceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an
unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a
clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would haveit, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent
Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or
not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may
probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumptionespecially so where the assembly is scheduled
for a specific public placeis that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the AmericanSupreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place.*17+ (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any
basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and
caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for
an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is
thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have
found such grave abuse of discretion and , under specific
statutory provision, not to have modified the permit in
terms satisfactory to the applicant.*18+
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are REVERSED. The
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Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in modifying the rally permit issued on June 16,
2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola Bridge to
Plaza Miranda.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF
THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public
Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to
the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State
shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice
to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of
the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of thisAct:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a
lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public
on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state
of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning
the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public
meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall
be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing
and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard,
avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership
where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the
place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the
parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or
sound system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not
required - A written permit shall be required for any person
or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit shall be required if the public
assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational institution
which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held
during any election campaign period as provided for by law
are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications
for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such
public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the
probable number of persons participating, the transport and
the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor
of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for
a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed
to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on
the application within twenty-four hours.
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(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court,
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal
bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decisiongranting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided
within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the
proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable
length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue,
road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the
route thereof which is convenient to the participants or
reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there
will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of
commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the
duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a
public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps tothe end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted
peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These
shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the
permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to
prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful
activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and
law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be
held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not
go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest
any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of
other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement
authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere
with the holding of a public assembly. However, to
adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement
contingent under the command of a responsible police officer
may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred
(100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain
peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall
be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their
assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to
perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility
to provide proper protection to those exercising their right
peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall
observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal
with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform withtheir nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform
and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as
herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not
carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or
riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots
or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar
anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or
deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit -
No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may
disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer
of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of
the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to
prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other
harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the
police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants
that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be
dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the
preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue
a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and
after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also
be made during the public assembly unless he violates duringthe assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this
Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended:
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(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the
peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group
for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit
- When the public assembly is held without a permit where a
permit is required, the said public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall
constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act
by any leader or organizer without having first secured that
written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any
place other than those set out in said permit: Provided,
however, That no person can be punished or held criminally
liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful
assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a
permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor
or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or
acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying
the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law
enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one
hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public
assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such
as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or
thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law
enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holdingof a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns
and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and
convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the
immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4,
subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g)
shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality
in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of
this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom
park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion
where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any timewithout the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within
the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of
this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters
of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or partsthereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon
its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651
June 22, 2006
BILL OF RIGHTS
Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad EscritorA.M. No. P-02-1651June
22, 2006
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by Estrada
against Escritor before Branch 253 of the RTC of Las Pinas City
for living with a man not her husband and having borne a
child within this live-in arrangement. Escritor is the court
interpreter of RTC Branch 253. Estrada believes that Escritor
is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
She was charged with committing disgraceful and immoral
conduct under Book V, Title I, Section 46 (b) (5) of theRevised Administrative Code.
Escritor was already a widow when she entered the
judiciary in 1999. She started living with Luciano Qu ilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago
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when her husband was still alive but living with another
woman. They have a son. After ten years of living together,
she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness in conformity with their religious beliefs and has
the approval of her congregation, the Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society.
Once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the
validity of the declarations ceases and the couple should
legalize their union. Insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.Escritor appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness to avoid punishment for immorality.
Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity
of this practice and that this is to make the union of their
members under such circumstances honorable before God
and men.
The court could not rule on the issue of whether or not
Escritor was to be held administratively liable so the case was
remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and
ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene
in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritors religious belief and practiceshould warrant her claim of religious freedom under Article
III, Section 5 of the Constitution.
HELD:
The administrative complaint was dismissed. The OSG
categorically concedes that the sincerity and centrality of
Escritors claimed religious belief and practice are beyond
serious doubt. Her request to be exempt from attending the
flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovahs Witnesses
contrary belief and practice was duly noted. The OSG failed to
demonstrate the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests which could limit or override Escritors
fundamental right to religious freedom.
In this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the
law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state.
Soriano vs. La Guardia
Soriano vs. La Guardia
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as hostof the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made
obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the
MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to
in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised
Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within
the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore,
and considering the adverse effect of petitioners utterances
on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners
clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan
for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly
asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior
restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the
reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the
public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the
power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has itsprimary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ,
CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165636
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL
R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV,
and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of
the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB,
JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M.
HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE
S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A.
GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the
MTRCB, Respondents.
In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set
aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with
certain utterances he made in his television show, Ang Dating
Daan.
Facts of the Case
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, ashost of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
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Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di
ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa
sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.[1] x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members ofthe Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),[2] against petitioner in connection
with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.[3] Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a
notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the
alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004
episode of Ang Dating Daan.[4]
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared,
the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20
days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations(IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure.[5] The same order also set the case for
preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the
preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson
Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the
adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the
case.[6] Two days after, however, petitioner sought to
withdraw[7] his motion for reconsideration, followed by the
filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition,[8] docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the
preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB
issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is
hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three
(3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV
Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for
lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R.
No. 165636.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated
G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following
issues:
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY
RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST
THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL
AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT
PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT
BENCH;
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER
THE LAW;
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION;
AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION.[10]
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following
grounds:
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT:
ISECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER,
UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION AS IT
PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
CURTAILING THE SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, RULES OF
PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT
THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND
ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT
BENCH;
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER,
UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEEOF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER
THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE,
AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E.,
DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19
OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT
DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
ITS PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OFPROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT
THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND
ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE
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CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT
BENCH[11]
G.R. No. 164785
We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785,
regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension,
although its implementability had already been overtaken
and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed
September 27, 2004 decision.
It is petitioners threshold posture that the preventive
suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR
provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does
not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive
suspension.
Petitioners contention is untenable.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which
may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-
legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute.[12] They have in
fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.[13] And indetermining whether an agency has certain powers, the
inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as
existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.[14]
A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986
reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit
impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive
suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is
necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and
supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall
have the following functions, powers and duties:
x x x x
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions
from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding
paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of
wrong or crime such as but not limited to:x x x x
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name
and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;
x x x x
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel,
permits for the x x x production, copying, distribution, sale,
lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the
end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance
with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x produced, copied,
reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or
broadcast by television;
x x x xk) To exercise such powers and functions as may be
necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and
objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within
the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly
set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as
quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to supervise,
regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the end that
no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined
by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance withparagraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast
by television.
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part
of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory
mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority
subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other
construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or
discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty
by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.[15] And the power to discipline and impose
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigateadministrative complaints and, during such investigation, to
preventively suspend the person subject of the
complaint.[16]
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB
springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB
did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose
preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD
1986. It is true that the matter of imposing preventive
suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PRE VENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.Any time during
the pendency of the case, and in order to prevent or stopfurther violations or for the interest and welfare of the public,
the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension
Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension of the
permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x television
network, cable TV station x x x provided that the
temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of
not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive
suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to
deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as
preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly
empowered by statute to regulate and supervise televisionprograms to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among
others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose
sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further
violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion,
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the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986
nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB,
by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law,
imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of
regulating or supervising television programs, pending a
determination of whether or not there has actually been a
violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004
IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed,
albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present
case, sufficient to authorize the MTRCBs assailed action.
Petitioners restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the
MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law,
would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling and
rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends
to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its
operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, To exercise such
powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to
the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x
x. Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is
one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished from
express powers, implied powers are those that can beinferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by
necessary or fair implication of the enabling act.[17] As we
held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant
of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance
of the other is also conferred by necessary implication.[18]
Clearly, the power to impose preventive suspension pending
investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of
MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioners assertion that the
aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is
applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials.The scope of the MTRCBs authority extends beyond motion
pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest
as much. And while the law makes specific reference to the
closure of a television network, the suspension of a television
program is a far less punitive measure that can be
undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations
of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner
envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioners argument on the nullity of
the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of
hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order
after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared
before that Board for a hearing on private respondents
complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order
was issued after the adjournment of the hearing,[19] proving
that he had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec.
3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension
shall issue *a+ny time during the pendency of the case. In
this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised
petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986[20] and of
administrative complaints that had been filed against him for
such violation.[21]
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be
meted out even without a hearing.[22]
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right tothe equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the
preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the
criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection
clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.*23+
It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well
as hostile discrimination.[24] Surely, petitioner cannot, under
the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC
ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers noproof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use
language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the
immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that
petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to
answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the
equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the
fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang
Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of
Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of
this case, simply too different to even consider whether or
not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom,
submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding
that words like putang babae were said in exercise of his
religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners
utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The
section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever beallowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he
came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of
a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at
another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in
context show that he was moved by anger and the need to
seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his
statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a
TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that
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petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation
and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious
group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to
the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse.
Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have
the Court nullify the 20-day preventive suspension order,
being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the
freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior
restraint. The main issue tendered respecting the adverted
violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails with
those challenging the three-month suspension imposed
under the assailed September 27, 2004 MTRCB decision
subject of review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping
issues and arguments shall be jointly addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending
him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the
main ground that the decision violates, apart from his
religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expressionguaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which
reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in
particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this
petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first,we restate certain general concepts and principles underlying
the freedom of speech and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio,
television, and motion pictures come within the broad
protection of the free speech and expression clause.[25]
Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the
lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to present
its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with
broadcast media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a
lesser degree of protection.[26] Just as settled is the rule that
restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial
injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of
license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and
damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt
proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression.
Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination.[27] The freedom of expression,
as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is,
however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to
serve important public interests, some forms of speech not
being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom
of expression are reached when the expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern.[28] In the oft-quoted
expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee
obviously was not intended to give immunity for every
possible use of language.*29+ From Lucas v. Royo comes thisline: *T+he freedom to express ones sentiments and belief
does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor
and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed
within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights
of others.*30+
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New
Hampshire,*31+ there are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems. In net effect, some forms of speech
are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that
restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed withoutrunning afoul of the freedom of speech clause.[32] A speech
would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances
involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.*33+ Being of
little or no value, there is, in dealing with or regulating them,
no imperative call for the application of the clear and present
danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test, they being
essentially modes of weighing competing values,[34] or, with
like effect, determining which of the clashing interests should
be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a
protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this
jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low -value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false
or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words,
i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as
obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it
is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court
of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a
definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, butnonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest
word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person,
applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b