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The Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia v.The Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, et alG.R. NO. L-27588December 31, 1927

F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, is the owner and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, IlocosNorte. On the south siide is a part of the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lotused as vegetable garden. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and thechurch. On the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was once a tower. TheProv. Board imposed a tax on the whole land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.

RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the land tax mandated in theConstitution in favor of the religious entities refers to the home of the priest whopresides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his

duties. It therefore must include not only the land actually occupied by the church butalso the adjacent ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man.Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of

commerce require the use of large tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongsto a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is limited to the necessities of the priest.Therefore, which comes under the tax exemption.

As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such,neither is it used for commercial purposes and, accdg to the evidence, is now being usedas a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities. The sameconstitutes an incidental use in religious functions. It also comes within the exemption.

Compania General de Tobacos de Filipinas vs. ManilaGR L-16619, 29

June 1963

Facts:

Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) paid the City of

Manila the fixed license fees prescribed by Ordinance 3358 for the years

1954 to 1957. In 1954, City Ordinance 3634 and 3816 were passed; where

the term “general merchandise” found therein included all articles in Sections

123 to 148 of theTax Code (thus, also liquor under Sections 133 to 135). The

Tabacalera paid its wholesaler’s and retailer’s taxes. In 1954, the City

Treasurer addressed a letter to an accounting firm, expressing the view that

liquor dealers paying the annual wholesale and retail fixed tax underOrdinance 3358 are not subject to the wholesale and retail dealers’ taxes

prescribed by City Ordinances 3634, 3301, and 3816. The Tabacalera, upon

learning of said stopped including quarterly sworn declarations required by

the latter ordinances, and in1957, demanded refund of the alleged

overpayment. The claim was disallowed.

Issue:



Whether there is a distinction between Ordinance 3358 and Ordinances 3634,

3301 and 3816, to prevent refund to the company.

Held:

Generally, the term “tax” applies to all kinds of exactions which become

public funds. Legally, however, a license fee is a legal concept quite distinct

from tax: the former is imposed in the exercise of police power for purposes

of regulation, while the latter is imposed under the taxing power for the

purpose of raising revenues. Ordinance 3358 prescribes municipal license

fees for the privilege to engage in the business of selling liquor or alcohol

beverages; considering that the sale of intoxicating liquor is (potentially)

harmful to public health and morals, and must be subject to supervision or

regulation by the State and by cities and municipalities authorized to act in

the premises. On the other hand, Ordinances 3634 , 3301 and 3816imposed

taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale or retail, and are

revenue measures enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. Both a licensefee and a tax may be imposed on the same business or occupation, or for

selling the same article, without it being in violation of the rule against double

taxation. The contrary view of the Treasurer in its letter is of no consequence

as the government is not bound by the errors or mistakes committed by its

officers, specially on matters of law.

The company, thus, is not entitled to refund.

G.R. No. L-16853 June 29, 1963

PASTOR B. CONSTANTINO and PASTOR CONSTANTINO, JR., petitioners, vs.HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, andHERMINIA ESPIRITU, respondents.

Pastor B. Constantino, petitioner herein, filed a complaint against respondent HerminiaEspiritu, alleging that he had, by a fictitious deed of sale conveyed to her the house andlot described in the complaint on the agreement that she would hold it in trust for theirillegitimate son, Pastor Constantino, Jr. — still unborn at the time of the conveyance —

but that thereafter defendant mortgaged the property to guarantee a personal loancontracted by her; and praying that the defendant be enjoined from further alienating orotherwise disposing of the property and ordered to execute an absolute deed of

conveyance thereof in favor of Pastor Constantino, Jr. The defendant moved to dismissthe complaint on the grounds (1) that it stated no cause of action because PastorConstantino, Jr., the beneficiary of the alleged trust, was not included as party- plaintiff,and (2) that the plaintiff's cause of action was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint by order dated January 8, 1960, notice of

which the plaintiff received on January 11. On January 12, 1960 the plaintiff filed amotion to amend the complaint, attaching the amended complaint itself wherein PastorConstantino, Jr. was included as party-plaintiff. The defendant opposed the motion andafter the plaintiff's reply to the opposition and the defendant's rejoinder to said reply



were filed, respondent Judge, on February 1, 1960, issued an order denying the plaintiff'smotion to admit the amended complaint. On February 27, 1960 he filed with the court anotice of appeal from the order of February 1, and appeal bond and a record on appeal.

At the hearing for the approval of the record on appeal on March 5, 1960, the defendant was given five days therefrom to file her objection and the plaintiff, five days from receiptof a copy thereof to file his answer. On March 8, 1960 the defendant filed her objection to

the approval of the record on appeal; claiming that when the plaintiff filed the notice of appeal, and bond and record on appeal the order of January 8, dismissing the complaint,

was already final. The plaintiff answered the objection on March 11, but two days beforethat, or on March 9, 1960, respondent Judge disapproved the record on appeal on theground that the appeal had been filed out of time. On March 18, the plaintiff moved toreconsider; the motion was denied on March 25; and on April 8, 1960 the instantpetition for mandamus was docketed.

Issue: whether or not the order denying the amendment of the complaint is appealableand whether or not the appeal was perfected on time, on both of which issues we find infavor of petitioner.

Held: Under the Rules a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served,1 but the court may, upon motion at any stageof an action, and upon such terms as may be just, order or give leave to a party to amendhis pleading, to the end that the real matter in dispute and all matters in the action indispute between the parties may, as far as possible, be completely determined in a singleproceeding. Even after an order dismissing his complaint is issued, an amendment may still be allowed. The motion to amend should be filed before the order of dismissal

becomes final and unappealable, because thereafter there would be nothing to amend. If the amendment is denied, the order of denial is appealable and the time within which toappeal is counted from the order of denial — not from the order dismissing the originalcomplaint.

Respondent Judge denied the motion for leave to file an amended complaint onFebruary 1, 1960. Notice thereof was received by petitioner on February 9. The notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were filed only eighteen days thereafter.Consequently, it was the duty of respondent Judge to approve them so that this Courtmay review the legal question of whether or not the amended complaint should have

been admitted.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge is ordered toapprove and certify to this Court the appeal taken by petitioner.

YMCA VS CIR

The Young Men's Christian Association of Manila was incorporated under the law of thePhilippine Islands June, 1907. In relation to its existence, a site for the new building wasselected on Calle Concepcion, Ermita, and the building contract was let on the 8th of January following. The cornersto ne was laid with appropriate ceremonies on July 10,1908, and the building was formally dedicated on October 20, 1909.

The city of Manila, contends that the property is taxable, assessed it and levied a taxthereon. It was paid under protest and this action begun to recover it on the ground that



the property was exempt from taxation under the charter of the city of Manila. Thedecision was for the city and the association appealed.

Issue : Whether or not the building and grounds of the Young Men's Christian Association of Manila are subject to taxation?

Held: The atmosphere of the Young Men's Christian Association is distinctly religiousand there is constant effort on the part of the officials to create a religious spirit; and tothat end there is continuous pressure to induce members to attend not only the religiousservices of the association but also those of one or another of the churches of Manila.

While the association is nonsectarian, it is preeminently religious; and the fundamental basis and groundwork is the Christian religion. All of the officials of the association aredevoted Christians, members of a church, and have dedicated their lives to the spread of the Christian principles and building of Christian character.

The institution also has charitable features. It makes no profit on any of its activities. Theprofessors and instructors in all departments serve without pay and freely give of theirtime and ability to further the purposes of the institution.

It is claimed, however, that the institution is run as a business in that it keeps a lodgingand boarding house. These facts, however, are far from constituting a business inordinary acceptation of the word. In the first place, no profit is realized by theassociation in any sense. In the second place, it is undoubted, as it is undisputed, that thepurpose of the association is not, primarily, to obtain the money which comes from thelodgers and boarders. The real purpose is to keep the membership continually within thesphere of influence of the institution; and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, theopportunities which vice president to young men in foreign countries who lack home orother similar influences. We regard this feature of the institution not as a business ormeans of making money, but, rather, as a very efficient means of maintaining theinfluence of the institution over its membership.

As we have seen in the description already given of the association building and grounds,no part is occupied for any but institutional purposes. From end to end the building andgrounds are devoted exclusively to the purposes stated in the constitution of theassociation.

There is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institution must devoteitself exclusively to one or the other of the purpose mentioned in the statute before it can

be exempt from taxation; but the statute does not say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein mentioned. It may be a combination of two or three ormore of those purposes and still be entitled to exempt. The Young Men's Christian

Association of Manila cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively for religious

purposes, or an institution used exclusively for charitable purposes, or an institutiondevoted exclusively to educational purposes; but we believe it can be truthfully said thatit is an institution used exclusively for all three purposes, and that, as such, it is entitledto be exempted from taxation.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions toenter a judgment against the city of Manila and in favor of the Young Men's Christian

Association of Manila in the sum of P6,221.35.



YUNG UAN CHU VS REPUBLIC

Herein appellee Yung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung alias Yu Hui Tin was born on August 3,1933 in Iloilo City to spouses Yu Bun Juan and Po Kuan, both Chinese citizens. Shestudied, upon attaining school age, at the Chinese Commercial High School Iloilo City

where she finished her primary and secondary education.

Records show that on October 1, 1954, she married one Miguel Cupang Jr. admittedly anative-born citizen of the Philippine which marriage took place in Iloilo City and at thetime of the filing of the petition, the couple had six (6) children

All aforenamed children were registered as Natural born Filipino citizens. After theirmarriage, the couple transferred their residence to Lagao, General Santos City wherethey engaged in the rice and corn business under the name "General Santos Rice mill."

Petitioner writes and speaks Ilongo and English; believes in the principles underlying theConstitution of the Philippines, and has conducted herself in a proper andirreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines notonly with the duly constituted authorities but also with the community in which shelives. After trial, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1971 finding petitioner YungUan Chu baptized as Lina Yung, known in school in her registered name as Lina UanChu and now as Mrs. Lina Y. Cupang, as possessed of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a Filipino citizen and therefore authorized to take her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the same in the proper civilregistrar. (Appellees Brief, pp. 28-34)

On January 27,1972, the City Fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, filed his Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed his brief on August 7, 1972 but appellee failed to file her brief within the period which expired on September 30, 1972 and the case was consideredsubmitted for decision without appellee's brief in the resolution of November 10, 1972.

Issue: whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that it has jurisdiction todeclare petitioner a Filipino citizen based on its conclusion that if administrative bodiesare possessed with such power?

Held : A careful examination of the records shows that the sole and only purpose of thepetitioner is to have the petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by the law, or the Rules for the judicialdeclaration of the citizenship of an individual.

Hence, a "judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in apetition for naturalization because under our laws there can be no action or proceedingfor the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Such a declaration orpronouncement is beyond the court's jurisdiction." An alien woman married to a Filipinocitizen does not necessarily acquire Philippine citizenship. She must prove in anappropriate proceeding that she does not have any disqualification for Philippinecitizenship.



though as already stated, administrative proceedings should have been undertaken by the appellee, still, in the instant case, We find no necessity therefor because in this

judicial proceeding, it is clear she is already a Filipino citizen.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby ordered to CANCEL applicants alien certificate

of registration.

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990JOSE B. AZNAR, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIOMARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.Ponente:

Facts:On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed hiscertif icate of candidacy with theCOMELEC for the position of Provincial Governorof Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.2)On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jos e B. Aznar in his capacity as itsincumbent Provincial Chairman filed with theCOMELEC a petition for thedisqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not aFilipinocitizen, bein g a citizen of the United States of America.3)On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificateissued by the then Immigratio n and Deportation Commissione r MiriamDefensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is anAmerican and is aholder of Alien Certificate of Registr ation (ACR) No. B-21448 and ImmigrantCertificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").4)During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained thathe is a Fil ipin o cit izen, alleging: that heis the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that heis a holder

of a valid and subsisting Phil ippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth andhas not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been aregistered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.5)Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismiss ed thepetition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, thepetition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipin o citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?

HELD: SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision.The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had losthis Filipino citizenship by any o f the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to su pport theConstitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear thatprivate respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citiz enship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippinecitizenship. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having



taken the oath of al legiance of t he United States . He is a holder of a valid andsubsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral processin this country sin ce 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as acandi date. Thus, private resp ondent remains a Fil ip ino and the loss of hisPhilippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considerin g the fact that admittedl y Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a

Certificate stating he is an American does not m ean that he is not still aFilipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American doesnot mean that he is not still a Filipino, posses sed as he is, of bothnationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, t here is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to losePhilippine citizenship must be "express", it stands t o reason that there can

be no suc h lo ss of Ph il ip pi ne 'c it izens hip wh en there is no renu nci at io neither "'express" or "implied"

YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [January 24, 1989] Petition for Habeas Corpus

Petitioner: Willie YuRespondents: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Bienvenido Alano, Jr., Major Pabalan, Deleo

Hernandez, Bloddy Herrera, Benny Reyes and Jun Espiritu SantoFacts: 1971 – Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for

same period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer Feb. 10, 1978 – He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen April 1980 – signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of

Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese July 21, 1981 – He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo.

Passport will expire July 20, 1986.Procedural Facts: (ang dami! File sila ng file!) July 4, 1988 – He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained because the

Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CIDclaims that his acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his Philippinecitizenship.

July 20, 1988 – oral arguments Nov. 10, 1988 – SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issued on

jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest &detention. Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied.

Dec. 5, 1988 – Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order. Dec. 7, 1988 – SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease & desist from deporting Yu

pending conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID. Dec. 13, 1988 – Respondent commissioner (I’m assuming this is Miriam coz she’s the

first respondent.) filed motion to lift TRO saying the commission already issued asummary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88.

Dec. 13, 1988 – Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention.Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO.

Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He complied.His reply revealed aforementioned substantive facts.



ISSUE: WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippinecitizenship.

HELD: Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted.

RATIO:1. Renunciation – made known distinctly & explicitly and

not left to interference or implication (BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). Hisresumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese citizenship and passport andrepresentation as a Portuguese even after he has acquired Filipino citizenship areproof enough of his renunciation.

2. He does not dispute the facts. He was given theopportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. There isno denial of due process.

3. Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. Butdue to petitioner’s insistence, SC had to do it.

4. Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be

displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS VS JOSELITO DELA ROSA

On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5children.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila andsought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special

inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside alldecisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry wasallowed among which was that of William Gatchalian.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance withPhilippine law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of thePhilippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of thatof Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian

following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:



Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte ChineseSchool still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, thelate speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,

she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of IlocosNorte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,

when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voterin San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governorof Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the FirstDistrict of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbentRepresentative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position,filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Electionsalleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The

petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, whichshe sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/CorrectedCertificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintainedTacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligiblein running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in

favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in theFirst District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the districtfor the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, andacts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imeldamarried late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gaineda new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right tochoose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to thecountry clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicileof choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,



Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences inTacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residencequalifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of

Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order theProvincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representativeof the First District of Leyte.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration

GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa toenter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter thePhilippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the

date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within theperiod as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after theexpiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a

Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the

Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, itshould follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial oradministrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority



decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, henceit has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,

was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

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