EN BANC 

[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1472 (Formerly A.M. No. 02-10-271-MTC), October 17, 2007] 

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ZENAIDA L. GALVEZ AND CLERK OF COURT EUGENIO STO. TOMAS,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, CABUYAO, LAGUNA. RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N 

GARCIA, J.:

An administrative complaint was filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

against Judge Zenaida L. Galvez and Clerk of Court Eugenio Sto. Tomas, both of the

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna on account of the adverse separate

reports of the OCA's Judicial and Audit teams dated July 5, 2002[1] and August 30,

2002,[2] respectively, about said court.

Acting on those reports, the OCA, in its Memorandum Report[3] dated October 11,

2002 to then Chief Justice Hilario C. Davide, Jr., recommended, among others, that:

(1) Judge Galvez be directed to explain within ten days from notice why no

administrative sanction should be imposed upon her for: (a) failure to decide some

31 criminal cases and 66 civil cases despite the lapse of the reglementary period

therefor;[4] (b) failure to resolve motions/incidents in some criminal and civil cases

within the prescribed period;[5] (c) failure to take further appropriate action for an

unreasonable length of time on criminal cases under preliminary investigation which

are cognizable by the Regional Trial Court as well as by the MTC, some of which

have been pending for preliminary investigation for several years already;[6] (d)

failure to set, for quite a long time, the cases for arraignment after the accused

therein had posted their bailbonds;[7] and (e) failure to take initial action such as

issuance of subpoenas and summonses;[8] and (2) Acting Presiding Judge Alden V.

Cervantes (now herein made respondent) be directed to decide/resolve those cases,

motions and incidents left undecided/unresolved by Judge Galvez and to make a

physical inventory of all cases pending  in the said court with the assistance of the

OIC;

Pursuant to the OCA's aforesaid Memorandum Report, the Court issued a Resolution

on January 22, 2003, directing Acting Presiding Judge Alden V. Cervantes  to

conduct, within 10 days from notice, a physical inventory of all cases filed and

pending before the subject court, and to submit a report thereon within thirty (30)

days from notice, thus:

(5) DIRECT Hon. Alden V. Cervantes, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC, Cabuyao,

Laguna, to:

(a) INFORM the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) whether the 31 criminal

and 66 civil cases left undecided by Judge Zenaida Galvez aforementioned in item

2(a) and the pending unresolved 13 motions/incidents aforestated in item 2(b) have

already been decided and resolved respectively, if not, to DECIDE said cases and

RESOLVE said motions/incidents within ninety (90) days from notice and thereafter

to furnish this office certified copies of the decisions/resolutions/orders within ten

(10) days from promulgation/rendition/issuance thereof;

(b) INFORM the Court through the Office of the Court Administrator whether the

court has already taken action on the cases  mentioned in item  2(c), 2(d) and 2(e)

and if not, to take APPROPRIATE ACTION on said cases giving PREFERENTIAL

ATTENTION on these unacted criminal cases which up to date of audit is pending

preliminary investigation as well as those which have not been set for arraignment

and unacted motions in civil cases;

(c) ARCHIVE those criminal cases where the accused has remained at large for

more than 6 months from issuance of warrants of arrest and civil cases where the

defendants failed to answer for more than 6 months from issuance thereof pursuant

to Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, as amended dated June 21, 1993;

(d) CONDUCT a physical inventory of all cases pending in said court with the

assistance of the Officer-in-Charge, within ten (10) days from notice hereof and

submit a report thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.[9]

However, after more than a year had lapsed, Acting Presiding Judge Cervantes

failed to comply with the foregoing directives.  Hence, the OCA issued a

memorandum to him reiterating the Court's directives and required his immediate

compliance. Acting Presiding Judge Cervantes, together with Mrs. Elvira B.

Manlegro, Acting Clerk of Court, and Mrs. Amelia D. Teñido, Clerk II and former

Acting Clerk of Court, was likewise directed to submit to the Statistic Reports

Division, Court Management Office-OCA, within one (1) month from notice thereof,

the lacking Docket Inventory Reports and Monthly Reports of Cases which should

include the data of those cases that had been pending and/or filed before October

1, 2001. In addition, Mrs. Teñido was also directed to assist Judge Cervantes and

Mrs. Manlegro in the conduct of physical inventory of cases and in the preparation

of the report.

Again, despite repeated directives, both verbal and written, Acting Presiding Judge

Cervantes deferred the submission of the physical inventory of cases and the

complete and accurate Monthly Reports of Cases and Docket Inventory Reports by

semester, as directed in our Resolution.

In somewhat apathetic attitude, Judge Cervantes and the two other court personnel

repeatedly attempted to submit, through their utility worker, incomplete and

inaccurate Monthly Reports of Cases, the latest of which is a combined Docket

Inventory Report for the period from January 1 to April 2004 instead of Docket

Inventory Reports by semester. Not being in conformity with the prescribed forms,

the reports were returned with reminders for Mrs. Manlegro and Mrs. Teñido to

prepare their reports properly, accurately and in the prescribed forms before re-

submitting the same to the Statistic Reports Division.  Regrettably, the reminders

fell on deaf ears.[10]

On February 8, 2005, the OCA submitted to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a

Memorandum regarding the non-submission of the monthly reports of cases and

inventory reports of MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna. Acting on the said Memorandum, the

Court, in a resolution dated May 3, 2005, resolved:(a) to IMMEDIATELY WITHHOLD the salaries and allowances of Hon. Alden V. Cervantes,

Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna and Acting Clerk of Court Elvira B. Manlegro and former Officer-in-Charge Amelia D. Teñido, also of the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna; and

(b) to DIRECT Judge Alden V. Cervantes, Mrs. Elvira B. Manlegro and Mrs. Amelia D. Teñido:

     

 (1) to SUBMIT the required complete and accurate Monthly Reports of Cases

corresponding to the months from October 2001 up to August 2004 and Docket Inventory Reports by semester for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003; and

 

 

(2) to EXPLAIN in writing, within thirty (30) days from notice, why they should not be administratively charged for their failure to religiously comply with Administrative Circular No. 61-2001 dated December 10, 2001, Administrative Circular No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004 and Administrative Circular No. 10-94 dated June 29, 1994 as amended by Administrative Circular No. 2-2001 dated January 2, 2001, and to COMPLY with the directives in the Resolution dated January 22, 2003 of the SC First Division in this case.

Acting Presiding Judge Cervantes moved for a reconsideration of said Resolution

which immediately withheld his salaries and allowances and those of Acting Clerk of

Court Manlegro and former OIC Clerk of Court Teñido.  The Court then referred

said letter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In due time, the OCA came out with its findings, recommending that Acting

Presiding Judge Cervantes be charged with gross neglect of judicial duty,

inefficiency in the performance of official functions and indifference to his

responsibility concerning speedy disposition of cases. The pertinent portions of the

OCA report are hereunder quoted, thus:

In a letter dated 20 September 2006, Judge Alden V. Cervantes, former presiding

judge, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Alaminos, Laguna and former acting presiding

judge, MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna, requests that he be relieved of the task of submitting

the revised docket inventory of cases for MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna for the years 2001,

2002, 2003 and 2004.

He avers that he could no longer comply with the directive considering that he had

already retired from the service and that a permanent presiding judge had already

been appointed at MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna in the person of Judge Conrado L.

Zumaraga.  Judge Zumaraga was appointed on 7 July 2005 but assumed judicial

function only on 20 September 2005.

Judge Cervantes contends that prior to his retirement, he has already submitted the

docket inventory of cases for the years 2001 to 2004. The Court Management

Office, OCA, however found discrepancies in the docket inventories submitted and

required the court personnel concerned to undertake revisions thereon.  He notes

that the preparation and completion of the docket inventories were overtaken by

his retirement on 23 November 2005. In fact, he claims in his letter dated 2 June

2005 that the docket inventories and monthly reports covering the period

November 2000 to May 2005 are almost finished.

Judge Cervantes admits his failure to submit the correct docket inventories and asks

forgiveness from the court.  He suggests that instead of requiring him to comply

with the directive, he instead be required to pay a fine for his failure. He requests

that his retirement benefits be released to him and the corresponding fine covering

the penalty be deducted from his retirement benefits because he does not have

ready money in his possession to pay the fine.

It is noted that Judge Cervantes applied for optional retirement without first

complying with the Court resolution dated 3 May 2005.  His application for

retirement which was made effective 23 November 2005 was filed on 9 September

2005.  It was approved by the Court on 1 March 2006.  Thus, he had all the time to

comply with the 3 May 2005 resolution.  If the physical inventories and monthly

reports covering the period from November 2002 to May 2005 are "almost finished"

as claimed by Judge Cervantes in his 2 June 2005 letter we see no reason why these

reports could not be submitted prior to his application for retirement.  It is evident

that he did not exert any effort to comply with the resolution.

Moreover, before he could be given a clearance by this Office, the clerk of court of

MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna was directed to submit a list of all the cases left

undecided/unresolved by Judge Cervantes. In compliance with the directive, Clerk of

Court Arlyn A. Hermano submitted a report on 8 December 2006.

The report revealed that Judge Cervantes left unresolved one hundred sixty-five

(165) cases for preliminary investigation. These were all submitted before him for

resolution but were resolved by Judge Conrado Zumaraga, the incumbent presiding

judge.  Likewise, Judge Cervantes left undecided fifty-four (54) cases submitted for

decision. These include cases he inherited from Judge Zenaida L. Galvez, his

predecessor. Four of these cases had already been decided by Judge Zumaraga.

It can be observed from the list submitted by the clerk of court of MTC, Cabuyao,

Laguna that with respect to the cases for preliminary investigation, there were even

cases submitted for resolution as early as March 2002.  Some cases were filed as

early as 16 May 2000.

It is noted that in the resolution dated 30 August 2005 in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC Re:

Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by

removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level

courts, the Court ruled that all first level courts shall continue with the preliminary

investigation of cases pending with them and terminate them not later than 31

December 2005.  The resolution which took effect on 3 October 2005 likewise ruled

that the first level courts, upon the date of effectivity of the amendments, shall no

longer accept new cases for preliminary investigation.

Judge Cervantes not only failed to resolve the cases for preliminary investigation

pending before him as mandated by the resolution, he was already in delay with

respect to the majority of the cases already submitted for resolution.  In fact, his

application for optional retirement indicates that he evaded acting on these cases.

Records reveal that it was Judge Zumaraga who resolved all the cases for

preliminary investigation left unresolved by Judge Cervantes.  It was also only

during the time of Judge Zumaraga that the correct docket inventories and monthly

reports of cases were submitted.  Records further reveal that MTC, Cabuyao,

Laguna is now submitting regularly their updated semestral docket inventories and

monthly reports of cases.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

Judge Cervantes was evidently remiss in the performance of his duty to

decide/resolve cases promptly and expeditiously.  He was designated as acting

presiding judge of MTC, Cabuyao on 31 January 2002.  In his stead, Judge Zenaida L.

Galvez was designated as acting presiding judge of MTC, Alaminos, Laguna.  As full

time acting presiding judge of MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna, Judge Cervantes therefore

had all the time to act on cases pending therein.

We also note that Judge Cervantes had been continually collecting his salaries upon

certification that he had no pending cases for decision/resolution, when in fact, a lot

of cases are still awaiting his decisions/resolutions.  His act seriously undermines

and reflects on the honesty and integrity expected upon officers of the court.  xxx

The OCA accordingly recommended that Acting Presiding Judge Alden V. Cervantes

be ordered to pay a fine of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos to be

deducted from his retirement benefits.  It also recommended that the resolution

dated May 3, 2005 directing Judge Cervantes to submit the required complete and

accurate monthly reports of cases corresponding to the months from October 1,

2001 to August 2004 and docket inventory reports by semester for the years 2001,

2002 and 2003 be set aside, considering that Judge Conrado L. Zumaraga had

already submitted the same.  Further, the OCA recommended that Judge Zumaraga

be commended for his earnest effort to decide/resolve cases left undecided/

unresolved by his predecessors and for updating the semestral docket inventories

and monthly reports of cases in his court.

The Court accepts and adopts the foregoing evaluation, report and recommendation

of the OCA, except as to the amount of the fine.

This Court has consistently impressed upon members of the judiciary the need to

decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that

justice delayed is justice denied.  Delay in the disposition of cases not only deprives

litigants of their right to the speedy disposition of their cases, but it also tarnishes

the image of the judiciary.  Failure to decide cases on time constitutes inefficiency

that merits administrative sanction.[11]

No less than the Constitution requires lower courts to decide or resolve cases or

matters submitted for decision or resolution within three months from the date they

are submitted for decision or resolution.[12]  Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct

enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay, and directs every

judge to dispose of the court's business promptly within the period prescribed by

law and the rules.[13]   A judge is mandated by the Constitution to render judgment

and resolve pending incidents not more than 90 days from the time the case is

submitted for resolution.

The  report  dated December 8, 2006  by the incumbent Clerk of Court Atty. Arlyn A.

Hermano revealed that Judge Cervantes left unresolved one  hundred  sixty-five

(165)  cases  for preliminary investigation and failed to decide 54 cases on time,

which utterly points to Judge Cervantes' obvious inefficiency.  The Court, cognizant

of the caseload of judges and mindful of the difficulties encountered by them in the

disposition of cases within the period fixed by law, remains sympathetic to their

request for extension of time.  Here, Judge Cervantes made no such request.  We

cannot, therefore, countenance his conduct which blatantly manifests his

incompetence and ineptitude in discharging his functions, especially now when

there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not eradicate, the problem of congestion

long plaguing our courts.  Judge Cervantes' failure to decide cases on time,

therefore, merits administrative sanction.

Aside from Judge Cervantes' gross neglect of duty and inefficiency in the

performance of his official duty, the Court likewise finds reason to wield disciplinary

sanction on his indifference to the directive of the Court as well as of the OCA.   In

his letter dated June 2, 2005 addressed to the OCA, Judge Cervantes claimed that

he was "almost finished" with the physical inventories and the monthly reports.  As

it is, however, no report was ever submitted by him prior to his retirement on

November 23, 2005.  Here, it is evident that he did not exert any effort to comply

with the Court's directives.

In Guerrero v. Deray,[14] we held:

It is hardly necessary to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders

and decisions of higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from

which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court

is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,

inadequately or selectively. If at all, this omission not only betrays a recalcitrant

flaw in respondent's character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's

lawful orders and directives which is only too deserving of reproof.

Thus, in one case (Davila v. Generoso, 336 SCRA 576, 580), the failure of

respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions of the Court was

deemed "grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the

honor and integrity attached to his office." InAlonto-Frayna v. Astih (300 SCRA 199,

202-203), we further held:

A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the

resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It

is gross misconduct and even outright disrespect for this Court for respondent to

exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations

contained in the complaint against him.

In other words, indifference or defiance to the Court's orders or resolutions may be

punished with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances

(Pineda E.L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1999 ed., p. 423).

All  told,  the Court  finds  Judge Cervantes guilty of gross neglect of  judicial 

duty  and  inefficiency in the performance of official function, for his failure

to  resolve/decide the  preliminary  investigation/cases within the  period  fixed by 

law.   He is likewise guilty of gross misconduct for his  callous  disregard  of this

Court's previous Resolutions dated January 22, 2003 and May 3, 2005.   However,

the OCA's recommended penalty of fine in the amount of two hundred thousand

pesos (P200,000.00) is too harsh. Hence, we reduce it to only one hundred

thousand pesos (P100,000.00).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

                                 1.) Acting Presiding Judge Alden V. Cervantes of the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna is found

guilty of gross neglect of  judicial duty, inefficiency in the performance of official functions and gross misconduct, and is hereby ordered  to pay a FINE of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits. 

2.) The  Resolution dated May 3, 2005 directing Judge Alden V. Cervantes  to  submit the required complete and accurate monthly reports of cases corresponding to the months from October 1, 2001 to August 2004, and docket inventory reports by semester for years 2001, 2002 and 2003, is SET ASIDE it appearing that Judge Conrado L. Zumaraga had already submitted the same.

 SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 122142. May 17, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.: HTML

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the

amount of P50,000.00 each and to pay the sum of P4,000.00 representing the amount of money stolen.

The information alleged ¾

That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and carry away the amount of P4,000.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine Currency; that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District investigated the robbery with homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following effect:

Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was selling chickens to customers. Cabosas’s business was located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. CODES

In the morning of August 11, 1989, accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344 C.M. Recto Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant came back and turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines testified that after receiving report of the killing, he and

Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas from which they learned that the latter has received a call from Emma Cabrera informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids killed. They were told that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to attend the burial of his grandfather. Pat. Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor Valdez, Pfc. Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. Renato Gutierrez went to Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find accused-appellant. They were told by the sister of accused-appellant, Merly Asuncion, that accused-appellant had gone to La Union. According to Pat. Ines, accused-appellant confided to his sister that he had allegedly done something wrong in Manila.

Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements, both executed on August 11, 1989, one of which, he said, had been executed by Helen N. Moral, a househelp of Emma Cabrera, and the other by Angie C. De los Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I, Moral said that upon arriving in the house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her employer’s nephew, Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor. She told Pat. Ines that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their place.

On the other hand, in her sworn statement given on August 14, 1989 and marked as Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated that on August 11, 1989, she had seen accused-appellant and Ronnie Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.[2]

Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990, he and his group received information from Pat. Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that accused-appellant was in Cataban, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and the next day, March 4, 1990, they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to Manila. Pat. Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita De los Reyes as one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands.[3]

Pat. Ines testified that on that same day, March 4, 1990, accused-appellant gave a confession (Exh. O) in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the circumstances of accused-appellant’s arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet.[4] yacats

Accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as Exhibit O.[5] In it, accused-appellant said he started working for Angie Cabosas in the latter’s business on Blumentritt Street, Manila three or four months before the incident. Cabosas and accused-appellant’s sister Merly Asuncion, had been neighbors in Rosales, Pangasinan. Accused-appellant’s work was to deliver dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular customer to whom he made deliveries in the morning. On August 10, 1989, his fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she died. Thereafter, the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.

The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accused-executing an extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him that any statement made by him could be used against him in court, but accused-appellant said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.[6]

The other prosecution witness was Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, medico-legal officer who conducted autopsies on August 11, 1989 on the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. After proper identification (Exh. D) by the victim’s employer, Antonio Cabrera, Dr. Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab wounds from which she died. olanski

Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital organs, specifically the right and left lungs and the heart, causing her death. Six of these wounds were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical attention. He concluded that the assailant and the victim

could be facing each other when wounds nos. 1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were inflicted and that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side of the victim when he inflicted wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5) and at the victim’s back when assailant inflicted wound no. 16 (Exh. B-6). He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds by using a single bladed weapon.[7]

Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. F) that Remedios Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died.

Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones that caused her death. The fatal wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the heart that she would not survive despite immediate medical attention. He observed that in wounds nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Exhs. G-1, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant and the victim could be facing each other, while in wounds nos. 4, 9 and 11 (Exhs. G-4, G-6, and G-7, respectively), the assailant could have been at the back of the victim. He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single bladed weapon.[8]

Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He stated that the weapon used on both victims could have been the same and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds.[9]

With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral (Exh. I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. L), the prosecution rested its case.

The defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla. Accused-appellant testified that he had worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street for four (4) months before the incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of his sister, Merly Asuncion, in Pangasinan. Angie’s business was selling dressed chickens. Accused-appellant said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 11, 1989, he delivered dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera’s residence on C.M. Recto Avenue. He came back from his errand at around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of P2,000.00 which had been paid to him. He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having

known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to read.[10]

On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and punishable under Article 294(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law. He is further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims, Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity for their death and the additional sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of money taken, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED. haideem

Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.

Art. III, §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:

(1)......Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2)......No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3)......Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same §12.

Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.

To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed again as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement. (Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate that page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third page at the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the third page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O)

We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant five times. kirsten

Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and information sheet.

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant’s consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.[11] When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.[12] barth

But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, §12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.

Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[13]

In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when

accused-appellant executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified:[14]

Q......What happened during the investigation of the accused?

A......He consented to give a written statement to me, sir.

Q......Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to give statement, Patrolman, was he assisted by counsel?

A......Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer.

Q......And who was that lawyer that was provided by you?

A......Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir.

Q......And who personally took down the statement of the accused?

A......I was the one who personally took the statement of accused Obrero. Jksm

Q......Do you know what was the gist of that statement that was given to you, what was it all about?

A......It’s all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero, the gruesome slaying of two househelps.

. . . .

Q......Before having taken down the admission of Jimmy Obrero, what investigative steps did you undertake relative to his constitutional right, patrolman?

A......I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent, to have an attorney; that everything that he will say will be used for or against him. He, however, consented to proceed with the written statement.

Q......Now, Patrolman, did you indicate his constitutional rights that you stated in this written statement of Jimmy Obrero?

A......Yes, sir, I put it on the statement which he voluntarily gave.

Q......And will you please tell us which part of the statement of Jimmy Obrero is it indicated, the consent which he gave after having pointed out to him his constitutional right?

A......This portion sir, this "sagot-opo" and then it was further affirmed by his signature over his typewritten name, sir.

For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified:[15]

Q:......Were you able to confront the suspect at that time, herein accused? Chief

A:......Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of investigation -- custodial investigation I can render my services to him and afterwards avail the services of another lawyer and I told him his rights under the law, sir.

Q:......What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero, the accused, in this case at that time you confronted Jimmy Obrero?

A:......He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he wanted to secure my services, sir.

. . . .

Q......After having manifested that he will retain your services as counsel for the investigation, Atty. De los Reyes, what happened next?

A......I told him the rights under the Constitution, the right to remain silent, the right to secure lawyer, the right not to give statement, the right not to be placed in any identification procedure in a police line up, and I told him that all the evidences he might give will be utilized against him in the court with respect to the case -- and despite of that, he said he wanted to give his statement to the police in my presence.

Q......Was he able to give statement to the police?

A......Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the client and observing fairly [when he] gave statement voluntarily.

Q......Was that statement taken down into writing?

A......In a question and answer form, sir.

Indeed, the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads:

MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG SALIGANG BATAS:

Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang Pagnanakaw na may kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan ayon sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas:

1. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag sagutin ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo;

2. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na maaaring makatulong sa iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka makakakuha ng iyong abogado ay bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa iyo; Esm

3. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong salaysay ay maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang tao sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.

Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan, nais mo pa bang magbigay ng iyong malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?

SAGOT : (ni Jimmy Obrero y Corla)Opo.

TANONG: Kung ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko?

(Sgd.) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA

There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to

appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions[16] of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v. Januario:[17]

Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.[18] Esmsc

Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. On this point, he testified as follows:

Q......Now, whenever there is a crime committed wherein the member of police to which you belong or working but could not solve the crime and then you were designated as counsel to extend legal assistance to a suspect who is under a custodial investigation and in that conference with the suspect you may have inquired confidential information, what would you do, will you keep it to yourself or you must have to divulge that to your co-policeman because you know that?

A......If I am the lawyer, then all the testimonies and declaration is my preferential right, I can divulge it even to my fellow officer.

Q......Now, by the way, do you have authority to practice the law profession, did you get approval or permit from the civil --

A......Previously, when I was at the JAGO, we are authorized verbally [as long as] it will not hamper our time, we will not work our time during the police duty, ma’am.

Q......According to you, you were extending legal assistance to your client who was charged of illegal recruitment, do you not consider that conflict of duty because no less than your organization was the one investigating that? Esmmis

A......I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the case because if it is true that he committed the crime then I will back out, if I found suspicion and there is no proof at all, I go to the litigation.

ATTY. ALISUAG:

That is all, Your Honor.[19]

The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:

As shown in Exhibit "O", accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession after he was informed of rights under custodial investigation, by affixing his signature thereto (Exhibit "O-3"). And absent any showing that the assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of another police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court holds that the proceedings were regularly conducted. In fact, he testified that he first asked the accused if he is accepting his legal services (TSN, March 5, 1991, p. 4); that he informed the accused of his Miranda rights and despite the warning, he decided to give his confession just the same; that he was at all time present when the accused was being interrogated with the accused giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid, p. 4); that he read to the accused the questions and answers before he signed his extrajudicial confession (Ibid, p. 8). Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De los Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member of the police force, when he lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody interrogation.[20]

This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula,[21] the independent counsel required by Art. III, §12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is

admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.[22] Esmso

For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot stand. The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant’s guilt consisting of the sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral, the househelp who said accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence, and Anita de los Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was passing in front of the Gatlin Building where the killing took place when she saw accused-appellant running down the stairs with blood in his hands. These statements are likewise inadmissible for being hearsay. Consequently, there is no identification of accused-appellant.

And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person.

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153675             April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs.HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued

against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have

been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal

proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human

liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be

subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

SPO2 GERONIMO MANALO,               G.R. No. 178920SPO2 LEO MORCILLA, PO3 RICO                        M. LANDICHO, PO2 ROMEO               MEDALLA, JR., SPO2 WILLIAM                    Present:RELOS, JR., P/INSP. ROBERTON. MARINDA,                                                YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Petitioners,                                              Chairperson,                                                               AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

                                                                        CHICO-NAZARIO,               -   versus   -                                       NACHURA, and

     REYES, JJ. HON. PNP CHIEF OSCARCALDERON, HON. P/DIR.GEARY BARIAS, Directorate forInvestigation and DetectiveManagement, Camp Crame, HON.REGIONAL DIRECTOR, POLICECHIEF SUPT. NICASIO J.RADOVAN, HON. POLICE SR.SUPT. AARON DEOCARES FIDEL,HON. POLICE SR. SUPT. LUISITO       Promulgated:DE LEON,

Respondents.                       October 15, 2007 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x  

D E C I S I O N  REYES, J.:

 

 

ANG isang petisyon para sa habeas corpus ay bibigyan

daan lamang kung ito ay nagpapakita na ang nagpepetisyonay ipinipiit o pini

pigilan ang kalayaan nang labag sa batas.  Ang mahigpit na pangangalaga at 

ang pag-monitor ng galawo kinaroroonan ng mga pulis na sumasailalim sa im

bestigasyon ng kanilang pamunuan ay hindi isang uri ngipinagbabawal na pa

gpiit o pagpigil sa kanilang kalayaan.

 

          A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that

petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive

custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under

investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of

liberty.

 

          Filed on August 7, 2007, this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus assails the restrictive custody and monitored movements of

petitioners SPO2 Geronimo Manalo, PO3 Leo Morcilla, PO3 Rico M. Landicho,

PO2 Romeo Medalla, Jr., SPO2 William Relos, Jr., PInsp. Roberto D. Marinda, by

the Philippine National Police (PNP), Region 4-A, after they were implicated in

the burning of an elementary school in Taysan, Batangas at the height of the May

2007 national and local elections.

 

          Petitioners were formerly police operatives assigned at the Regional Special

Operations Group, PNP Region 4-A, Camp Vicente

Lim, Calamba City, Laguna.  When their petition was filed, they were detailed at

the Regional Headquarters Support Group at the same Camp under a restrictive

custody status.

 

          Respondents Oscar Calderon, Geary Barias, Nicasio Radovan,

Aaron Deocares Fidel, and Luisito De Leon were, at the time of filing of the

petition, the Chief of the PNP, the Directorate for Investigation and Detective

Management, the Regional Director and Police Sr. Superintendents, respectively.

 

 

 

The Facts

 

          The facts, as reflected in the petition and its annexes, are as follows:

 

          On May 15, 2007, at around 3:00 a.m., five unidentified malefactors bearing

high-powered firearms suddenly appeared at

theBarangay Pinagbayanan Elementary School in

the Municipality of Taysan, Province of Batangas.  Earlier, the entire school

grounds were converted into a polling area for the 2007 national and local

elections.  The five armed men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A, and poured

gasoline over a ballot box.  Then they fired several rounds of ammunitions at the

premises, setting it ablaze.[1]

 

          The conflagration caused the death of a school

teacher, Ritchel (Nellie) Banaag, who was then acting as an election supervisor.  A

poll watcher in the person of Leticia (Letty) Ramos also perished while nine others

were reportedly injured as a result of the fire.[2]

 

          In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some of

petitioners as the perpetrators of the school burning.[3]  The investigation also

yielded that all six petitioners, who are all members of the PNP Regional Special

Operations Group (PNP-RSOG), failed to timely respond to the incident at

the Pinagbayanan Elementary School.[4]

 

          Acting on the report, the PNP hierarchy issued three successive memoranda

dated May 18, May 22 and June 28, 2007, to wit:

 A.     MEMORANDUM 

                        FOR         :  TDPRM                       

                        FROM      :  TDIDM                           SUBJECT:  Order for Restrictive Custody of                                            PCINSP ELPIDIO RAMIREZ, et al.                         DATE       :  May 18, 2007                        -------------------------------------------------------------

             1.  Reference:  Memo from TDIDM with subject: Special Report re Alleged Arson in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangaswhich was approved by the C, PNP.                       2.  This pertains to the investigation being conducted regarding the reported involvement of personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire incident in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas on May 15, 2007 resulting in the death of two (2) teachers and wounding of several others.             3.  In this connection, request issue orders putting in restrictive custody the following PNP personnel: 

                              PCINSP ELPIDIO A RAMIREZ                              PINSP RUEL C DELA CRUZ                              PINSP ROBERTO N MARINDA                              SPO2 William Relos, Jr. 

                                                          (SGD.)                                                GEARY L. BARIAS                                                Police Director[5]

              B.     MEMORANDUM

                         To        :   GD, RHSG                         From    :   Regional Director 

                        Subject:   Monitoring of PCOs                                                                                                    and PNCOs                         Date     :   May 22, 2007                        --------------------------------------------------------

                                     1.  References: 

a. Verbal instruction of RD, PRO, CALABARZON, dated May 22, 2007; andb.   S.O. No. 274 dated May 17, 2007, PRO, CALABARZON.

             2.  Above references pertains to the relief of PINSP ROBERTO D. MARINDA, SPO2 William D. Relos, SPO2 Leo V. Morcilla, SPO2 Geronimo R. Manalo, PO3 Rico M. Landicho and PO2 Romeo E. Medalla, Jr, from their respective unit assignment and subsequent reassignment to that office.

             3.  In connection thereof, subject PCO and PNCOs should be properly accounted from time to time taking into consideration the following:

 a. All their movements within camp should be monitored;

 b. When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and                      c.  A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).

                       4.  Further inform the Regional Director and the Command Group thru Chief, Regional Directorial Staff of any unusual incident or movement involving subject PCOs and PNCOs.

 

            5.  This Order takes effect immediately.             BY AUTHORITY OF PCSUPT RADOVAN, JR.:                                                                    (SGD.)                                                AARON DEOCARES FIDEL, CSEE

                                        Police Senior Superintendent (DSC)                                                            Chief, Regional Directorial Staff[6]

                        

C.     MEMORANDUM FOR         :  GD, RHSG 4A FROM      :  Chief, RPHRDD SUBJECT:  Order for Restrictive Custody of                    PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA and                    SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr. DATE      :  June 28, 2007------------------------------------------------------                                   1.  References

 a.  Memorandum from TDPRM dated May 23, 2007;b.  Memorandum from Chief, RLS 4A June 19, 2007 noted by RD, PRO 4A 

            2.  This is in connection with the reported involvement of PRO 4A-RSOG personnel to the fire incident on May 15, 2007 at PinagbayananElementary School, Taysan, Batangas             3.  Please be informed that pursuant to reference 1.a., orders are being issued by this Office placing following named PNP personnel underRestrictive Custody (in view of the investigation being conducted against them) effective this date, namely:

      PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA     SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.

             4. In this regard, inform concerned personnel and adjust your records accordingly.             5.  For information and be guided accordingly.                                         

                                 (SGD.)                  IRENEO DIZON BORDAS                  Police Senior Superintendent DSG                  Chief, RPHRDD[7]

 

          Petitioners contend that the May 22, 2007 Memorandum “defines and

circumscribes the scope of petitioners’ restrictive custody” status; [8] that “although

technically speaking, petitioners as PNP officer are not detained or imprisoned,

their physical movements are, however, limited only within Camp Vicente

Lim, Calamba City, Laguna; they cannot go home to their respective families and

if they would leave Camp Vicente Lim they need to be escorted;” [9] “that

petitioners’ restrictive custody status is illegal” and “not sanctioned by any existing

provision of our constitution and laws;”[10] that “it is degrading,” “summarily and

arbitrarily imposed on the basis of mere suspicion and it actually

makes PNP members enjoy lesser rights than what are actually enjoyed by

ordinary citizens.”[11]

 

          Petitioners further posit that what is only sanctioned is preventive suspension

under which they can enjoy liberty and go home to their families pending

administrative investigation.  Hence, they urge, this practice by

the PNP organization should be put to a stop.

 

          In support of their petition, petitioners principally rely on the case

of Moncupa v. Enrile, et al.,[12] where it was essentially held that the writ of habeas

corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person

is deprived of his liberty.

 

          The ruling holds true even if petitioners are released but continue to be

denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial

of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be

unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom, originally valid has, in the light

of subsequent developments, become arbitrary.

 

          They also cite Villavicencio v. Lukban,[13] where certain women were

illegally transported against their will from Manila toDavao.  There they were

forced to change their domicile and some of them returned to Manila.  Yet, this

Court condemned the involuntary restraints on petitioners, fined the City Mayor of

Manila and hoped the decision would serve to bulwark the fortifications of an

orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal

encroachment.

 

          Petitioners thus pray that a writ of habeas corpus be issued, commanding the

respondents to produce the bodies of petitioners before the Court, to explain the

lawful cause of their detention and deprivation of physical liberties and, thereafter,

for this Court to adjudge their restrictive custody status as illegal and to set them

free.

 

          Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court required

respondents to comment.

 

          In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested

that by Memorandum Order of August 30, 2007,[14] respondent Radovan, Director

of PNP Regional Office 4-A, has recalled, effective immediately, the assailed

restrictive custody order embodied in the two Memoranda dated May 22 and June

28, 2007.  In view of the recall, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed on

ground of mootness.

 

Issues

 

          Two critical issues are thus posed for our determination.  One, by petitioners,

on whether or not they are unlawfully detained or restrained of their liberty under

their restrictive custody status.  Two, by respondents, on whether the Court should

dismiss the petition on the sole ground of mootness, the assailed orders having

been recalled, or proceed  to decide the petition on the merits.

 

          We shall resolve them in the reverse order, dealing with the procedural

ahead of the substantive question.

 

Our Ruling

 I.  This Court, By Way Of Exceptions,     Decides Moot Issues

 

          Notwithstanding the mootness of the issues on restrictive custody and

monitoring of movements of petitioners, We opt to resolve them given       (a) the

paramount public interest involved, (b) their susceptibility of recurring yet evading

review and (c) the imperative need to educate the police community on the matter.

 

          Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa ma

higpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody)

at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of

movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sanangingiba

baw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito,

(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at

(c)dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.

 

          The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for habeas

corpus does not automatically abate a decision on the case. Similarly, a recall of

the custody order challenged by petitioners will not necessarily call for a dismissal

on the ground of mootnessalone.  Although the general rule is mootness of the

issue warrants a dismissal, there are well-defined exceptions.

 

          In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[15] twenty-six (26)

petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew during the pendency of

the petition.  The fact that the petition was rendered moot and academic did not

prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one

of the most voluminous decisions ever.

 

          Even petitioners cite Tibo v. The Provincial Commander[16] and Toyoto, et al.

v. Ramos, et al.,[17] where respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition

for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioners had been temporarily released and

their case had, therefore, become moot and academic.  This Court, as in Moncupa,

chose to decide the said cases.  The Court sustained petitioners’ plea that their case

be considered moot and academic only “if their release would be permanent.”

 

          In Acop, et al. v. Guingona, Jr.,[18] petitioning PNP officers questioned, via

petition for injunction, the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes

and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Witness Protection Program.  Petitioners contended

that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers like the

said SPO2 are disqualified from being admitted into the program, though they may

be testifying against other law enforcement officers.

 

          In its comment, the OSG claimed that the petition lacked merit and that the

same was rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes

and SPO2 dela Cruz under the program was already terminated on December 3,

1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director

of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February 10, 1999.  In their comment,

private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agreed with the OSG.

 

          Denying the OSG motion, this Court held:

             Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program.  However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R. A. No. 6981.  As we have ruled in Alunan III vs.Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan III, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied)

 

         This Court then sustained the RTC observation that law enforcement officers

may be admitted into the Witness Protection Program in cases where they are

witnesses in legislative investigations.

 

          In the recent landmark cases of David, et al. v. Arroyo, et al.,[19] involving

seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the President lifted the declaration of

a state of national emergency during the pendency of the suits.  In effect,

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order     No. 5 were

withdrawn.  The OSG thus moved and prayed for the dismissal of the petitions,

arguing there is no more justiciable controversy as the issue has been mooted.

 

  

          This Court denied the motion and proceeded to declare the constitutional

infirmity of the Presidential issuances.  On the issue of mootness, the Court

summed up the four exceptions to the rule, thus:

 The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that

can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.  Courts will decidecases, otherwise   moot and   academic, if :  first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and theparamount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

  All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this

Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.  Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution.  There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.  Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.  It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on

the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.  Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.   (Emphasis supplied).

 

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are

justified under the foregoing exceptions.  Every bad, unusual incident where police

officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or

not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public

confidence in the police institution.  As petitioners themselves assert, the

restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence,

the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of

repetition or susceptible of recurrence.  It better be resolved now for the education

and guidance of all concerned.

 II.  There   Is No Illegal Restraint In The

Restrictive Custody and Monitored Movements Of Police Officers Under Investigation

 

          The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to

antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve

persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and efficient defense of personal

freedom.[20]

 

          Ang mataas na pinapahalagahang writ of habeas

corpus, na ang pinagmulan ay nuon pa mang matandang panahon,

ay ginawa at umiiral bilang kagyat at mabisang lunas upang paalpasin ang ta

o sa labag sa batas na pagkakapigil atbilang pinakamaigi at mahusay na sang

galang ng sariling kalayaan.

                 The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into

the legality of one's detention.  More specifically, its vital purpose is to obtain

immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be

imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver them from unlawful custody.[21]

 

          Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his

liberty will a petition for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained

released from confinement.[22]  If respondents are not detaining nor restraining the

applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed, the

petition should perforce be dismissed.[23]

 

 

          Ang kahilingan para sa habeas

corpus ay maari lamang pagbigyan at ang taong pinipigilan ay pawawalan sap

agkapiit kung masisiyahan ang Hukuman na labag sa batas ang pagkakait sa 

kanya ng kalayaan.  Kung hindi ipinipiit opinipigilan ang mga taong naghain 

ng kahilingan para sa habeas

corpus o ang mga kinakatawan nila, ang petisyon aydapat pawalang saysay.

 

          Measured by the foregoing yardstick, the petition, on its face, fails to

convince us that petitioners are actually and unlawfully detained and restrained of

their liberty.  Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al.[24] teaches us that for the writ

of habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal

and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.  More importantly, the prime

specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is an actual and

effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.[25]

 

          To the mind of the Court, petitioners are not illegally and involuntarily

deprived of their freedom of

action.  Walang illegal napagpipigil o pagkakait ng kalayaan sa nagpepetisyon.

 

          Firstly, the assailed memoranda dated May 22, 2007,[26] June 28,

2007[27] and May 18, 2007,[28] decreeing the monitoring of their movements cannot,

by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as a form of curtailment of their

freedom guaranteed under our Constitution.  Ang ipag-

utos na subaybayan ang kanilang mga kilos

ay hindi maituturing na pagbabawas ngkanilang kalayaan na ginagarantiyah

an sa ilalim ng ating Konstitusyon.

 

Perusing the assailed memoranda, it is evident that petitioners are not

actually detained or restrained of their liberties.  What was ordered by the PNP is

that their movements, inside and outside camp be monitored in the following

manner, to wit:

 a.         All their movements within camp should be monitored; b.         When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they

should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and                             c.         A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said

PCO and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).[29]

 

          It is crystal-clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of Camp Vicente

Lim as they please.  The only limitation imposed upon them is that their

movements within the premises of the camp shall be monitored; that they have to

be escorted whenever the circumstances warrant that they leave the camp; and that

their estimated time of departure and arrival shall be entered in a logbook. Even

petitioners themselves admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.[30]

 

          Secondly, the “restrictive custody” complained of by petitioners is, at best,

nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit ofhabeas corpus.  It is neither actual

nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for.  It is a

permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police

officers concerned are always accounted for.  Ang restrictive

custody o mahigpit na pangangalaga, na inirereklamo ng mga nagpetisyon,

ay bahagyang paghihigpit lamang na labas sasaklaw ng habeas

corpus.  Ito’y hindi aktuwal o mabisang pagpigil para mangailangan ng remed

yong hinihiling.  Ito’yisang pinapayagang hakbang ng pag-iingat upang maka

tiyak ang pamunuan ng PNP na ang mga naturang pulis aymaaring iprisinta 

anumang sandali.

 

If said custodial procedure were not taken, respondent police superiors

themselves would have been exposed to charges of conspiracy, negligence or

laxity in the enforcement of internal discipline.  If petitioners get lost or are able to

go abroad or figure in another untoward incident, respondents would have to

explain why they did not observe the needed precaution, else they would also be

administratively liable.

 

          Thirdly, petitioners’ reliance on Moncupa[31] is misplaced.  In said case,

petitioner was ordered released by respondent but his release was saddled with

restrictions.  There, petitioner was required to secure prior approval for: (a) any

travel outside Metro Manila; and (b) a change in residence.  His freedom of speech

was likewise muffled by a prohibition on granting interviews to local or foreign

media.  He was likewise ordered to report regularly to respondent.[32]

 

          In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature of those imposed

in Moncupa exist.  To reiterate, petitioners are merely held to account for their

movements inside and outside the camp’s premises.  They are not required to

secure prior approval before they can move out of the camp, only that each of

them be accompanied by an escort and their time of departure and arrival

noted. Angmga nagpepetisyon ay pinipigil lamang upang masubaybayan ang k

anilang ikinikilos sa loob at labas ng kampo.  Hindinila kailangan ang permis

o bago makalabas ng kampo, kailangan lang na may kasamang bantay at ang 

kanilang pag-alisat pagbalik ay nakatala.

 

          Fourthly, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended

by R.A. No. 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides

that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary

machinery of the PNP.  Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary

actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated

supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline, to

wit:

 (b)        Internal Discipline. – On dealing with minor offenses involving internal discipline found to have been committed by any regular member of their respective commands, the duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP shall, after due notice and summary hearing, exercise disciplinary powers as follows: (1)        Chiefs of police or equivalent supervisors may summarily impose the administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restriction to specified limits; withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension; or any of the combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed fifteen (15) days; (2)        Provincial directors or equivalent supervisors may summarily impose administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody; withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension, or any combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed thirty (30) days; (3)        Police regional directors or equivalent supervisors shall have the power to impose upon any member the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service. He may also impose the administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody; withholding of privileges; suspension or forfeiture of salary; demotion; or any

combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed sixty (60) days; (4)        The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days: Provided, further, That the chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.[33]  (Emphasis supplied)

 

          It can be gleaned from the memoranda issued by the PNP hierarchy that

an investigation is being conducted on the reported involvement of police

personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire that gutted

the Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangasduring the wee hours

of May 15, 2007.  The initial investigation report appended to the petition discloses

that all petitioners are members of the Region 4 Special Operations Group who

failed to timely respond to the incident.  Some are even tagged by key

eyewitnesses as the primary suspects in the burning of the school.  As a result of

the blaze, two persons, including a school teacher performing election duties, were

killed.  The incident sparked a national uproar, and rightly so, considering that it

was a direct attack on the country’s already much-maligned electoral

process.  Evidently, the PNP is well within its authority to relieve petitioners from

their former positions and place them under tight watch, at least until the

termination of the said investigation.

 

          Clearly, placing police officers facing a grave administrative case under

restrictive custody is a disciplinary measure authorized under

the PNP law.  Malinaw na ang paglalagay sa mahigpit na pangangalaga sa mg

a pulis na nahaharap sa isang grabengkasong administratibo ay

isang pandisiplinang hakbang na pinahihintulutan ng batas ng PNP.  Thus,

petitioners’ claim that their restrictive custody is an illegal practice “not sanctioned

by any existing provision of our constitution and laws” is not true.  Itmust

necessarily fail.

 

          Lastly, petitioners contend that by placing them under restrictive custody,

they are made to suffer lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens.  On this

score, the Court’s pronouncement in Canson, et al. v. Hidalgo, et al.[34] is

categorical.  It was held there that although the PNP is civilian in character, its

members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine

National Police, under the National Police Commission.  Courts cannot, by

injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police

officials.  The police organization must observe self-discipline and obey a

chain of command under civilian officials.[35]

 

          Elsewise stated, police officers are not similarly situated with ordinary civil

service employees. The PNP has its ownadministrative disciplinary mechanism

different from those of other government

employees.  Sa ibang salita, ang kapulisan ayhindi katulad ng karaniwang kaw

ani ng pamahalaan.  Ang PNP ay

may sariling mekanismo ng pagdisiplina na kaiba saipinatutupad sa ibang em

pleyado ng gobyerno.

 

          In Fianza v. The People’s Law Enforcement Board, et al., [36] we ruled:

 

            x x x although respondent policemen continue to be citizens, as public respondents contend, they are not the “private citizens” referred to in the laws cited above. Clearly, the term “private citizens” does not ordinarily include men in uniform, such as the respondent PNP men. This is particularly evident in the PNP law which uses the term “members of the PNP” as well as “private citizens” to refer to different groups of persons and not interchangeably.  The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this situation. When the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its interpretation. The term “private citizen” in the PNP Law and PLEB Rules is used in its common signification and was not meant to refer to the members of the PNP, such as respondent policemen.

 

          In sum, petitioners are unable to discharge their burden of showing that they

are entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for. The petition fails to show on its

face that they are unlawfully deprived of their liberties guaranteed and enshrined in

the Constitution. No unlawful restraint is foisted on them by the PNP authorities

under the questioned memoranda.

 

          The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person

from unlawful restraint.  The writ cannot and will not issue absent a showing that

petitioners are deprived of their liberty.  Neither can it relieve petitioners, who are

police officers, from the valid exercise of prescribed discipline over them by

the PNP leadership.

 

          Ang pangunahing layunin ng writ o utos ng habeas

corpus ay ang pagsaklolo sa

isang tao mula sa pagkapiit opagkapigil nang lisya sa batas. Ang writ

ay hindi makakamit kung walang pagkakait ng kalayaan.

Hindi rin itomapanghahawakan ng mga nagpepetisyong kapulisan upang ma

kaiwas sa takdang paraan ng pagdisiplina sa kanila ngmga pinuno ng PNP.

 

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE

COURSE and DISMISSED.

 SO ORDERED.