[Consti 2] 42- Velasco vs Villegas.doc

7/29/2019 [Consti 2] 42- Velasco vs Villegas.doc

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Velasco vs Villegas

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other

owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitionerschallenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964of the City of Manila, which prohibited the business ofmassaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that itamounts to a deprivation of property of their means oflivelihood without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, andtherefore an improper exercise of police power

Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As

pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is apolice power measure. The objectives behind its enactmentare: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee forengaging in the business of massage clinic under OrdinanceNo. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirelydifferent measure than the ordinance regulating thebusiness of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestallpossible immorality which might grow out of theconstruction of separate rooms for massage of customers."

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinancesbased on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v.

Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through JusticeMalcolm made clear the significance and scope of such aclause, which "delegates in statutory form the police powerto a municipality. As above stated, this clause has beengiven wide application by municipal authorities and has inits relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really isthe progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN,EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDESLOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZBARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf andin representation of the other owners of barbershops

in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants,vs.

HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila,HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and

Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation toRepublic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE

CITY OF MANILA and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief ofPolice of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees.

Leonardo L. Arguelles for respondent-appellant.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissinga suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionalitybased on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, thecontention being that it amounts to a deprivation ofproperty of petitioners-appellants of their means oflivelihood without due process of law. The assailedordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for anyoperator of any barber shop to conduct the business ofmassaging customers or other persons in any adjacent roomor rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within

the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room wheremassaging is conducted is the same person." 1 As noted inthe appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted thatcriminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been

previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore,held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, itsavailability being dependent on there being as yet no caseinvolving such issue having been filed. 2

Even if such were not the case, the attack against thevalidity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief ofrespondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. Theobjectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able toimpose payment of the license fee for engaging in thebusiness of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure

than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershopsand, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which mightgrow out of the construction of separate rooms for massageof customers." 3This Court has been most liberal insustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria,4 a 1918 decision, this Courtthrough Justice Malcolm made clear the significance andscope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory formthe police power to a municipality. As above stated, thisclause has been given wide application by municipalauthorities and has in its relation to the particularcircumstances of the case been liberally construed by the

courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view ofPhilippine jurisprudence." 5 As it was then, so it hascontinued to be. 6There is no showing, therefore, of theunconstitutionality of such ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court isaffirmed. No costs.


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Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, DeCastro, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relovaand Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

Aquino J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Ordinance No. 4964, Section 1.

2 Record on Apppeal, 26.

3 Brief for the Respondents-Appellees, 7.

4 39 Phil. 102.

5 Ibid, 109.

6 Cf. Agustin v. Edu, L-49112, February 2,1979, 88 SCRA 195. The opinion of the lawcited Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726(1940); Ermita-Malate Hotel and MotelOperators Asso. v. City Mayor of Manila, L-

24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v.Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA424; Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, October 24, 1970,35 SCRA 481.

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[Consti 2] 42- Velasco vs Villegas.doc